NationStates Jolt Archive

Casualties and How to Take Them

Index.

I. Intro/Purpose
II. Types of Casualties
III. The Field of Battle

Infantry Engagement
Artillery
Artillery in Terrain
Aircraft
Armored Forces

IV. The Expanding Torrent, Better Known as the Blitzkrieg
V. Urban Warfare
VI. Non-Combat Losses
VII. Common Errors in Judging Losses


I. Intro/Purpose

I have decided to write this after spending quite a bit of time reading and participating in NS Warfare, and noticing a fundamental flaw in how it is conducted. Many, if not most people, do not know how to take casualties. This is not to say that those people guilty of this are god modding, but simply that it is often difficult to discern how many losses a certain side should take during an engagement. It is not an easy thing to determine, how many dead wounded and captured one side should suffer in any particular battle. It comes as a result of a number of factors, including not only the weapons being used - for WWI demonstrated that massive casualties can be inflicted with relatively primitive weaponry - but tactics, morale, experience of the troops, and the status of the troops in general - these all play a large part in trying to come to grips with just how many men will die. This is certainly no small part of warfare, for the ability to judge the loss of life caused by any particular attack is crucial to determining the outcome of the battle. If one of the two combatants launches the best devised plan NS has ever seen, and the other simply doesn't understand the scale of what has just happened - that plan that might have gone down in the history books, has just gone down the drain, and all because of a misunderstanding of the nature of casualties. There are a number of treatises and written opinion pieces on war itself, but from those I have read, none actually get into the fine details of the casualty taking process.

Furthermore, it is always the first step in the wrong direction when one player in an RP has to step up and say, 'Uh... you're not taking enough casualties.' I've done that and had it done to me, and know that it always leads to some sort of uneasiness that will plague the RP, if not ruin it altogether. This is not always the case, there are exceptions to every rule, but for many, especially new players, this is so. I believe this will serve as a tool to help players avoid that awkward stage of judging how many of their own men have fallen, and continue on with the actual RP - not getting bogged down in simple numbers. While I also realize that not every player focuses on numbers, and enjoy RP'ing battles for the other aspects, there are many that like precise figures - benchmarks of success if you will.

Without further ado, I will detail how the guide is to be laid out. I will begin with the most simple of battlefield scenarios - the open field assault on a defensive position - and add variations to the scenario that will effect battlefield performance and explain their significance. From this rather lengthy example/explanation session, I will get into a number of other factors that influence casualty making decisions, and discuss those. I will try throughout to relate what I am talking about to real world examples, however due to the fact that many of us use WWI Tactics with NS Technology, you will have to give me some leeway on saying that the casualties will be higher than the examples I am using. Furthermore, as the technology used in NS Warfare is far deadlier than anything the modern world has ever deployed, one must understand that there are no exact correlations. For instance, there has never been a 2,000 Tomahawk Missile Spam launched at a single division - a very possible outcome in NS. I hope those reading do respond, either with criticisms or advice on what is missing, what you see as flawed or a general opinion of the piece overall.

II. Types of Casualties

The term casualties entails dead, wounded, captured and missing.

Dead. Those whom die during or shortly after battle. This is actually one of the more rare forms of a casualty. Though the human body is notably fragile, it is much easier to wound a man than kill him.

Wounded. This is where the bulk of your losses should be sustained. These are to be marked as wounded during the battle itself, and depending on you medical corps, these may or may not be converted to dead by the end of the war.

Captured. During the end of a battle, or a war even, the number of captives will dramatically increase. To say your entire army is so driven as to never surrender ever no matter the circumstances is folly. Of course there are elements of a war that may decrease the likelihood of surrender, but even the most hardened, frenzied soldiers will eventually lose the will to fight.

Missing. Though often lumped in with the dead or wounded category, those missing can often come as a result of desertion. Conscript armies are prone to such casualties, especially when morale has been lowered by high losses in previous engagements.

III. The Field of Battle

Scenario A. Infantry Engagement A large green field expanding in all directions for as far as the eye can see. The red team is composed of 100 men armed with M4's and Kevlar vests. The blue team is made of the exact same stuff. These men are a mile apart and told to 'go at it'. Assuming no tactics are used, and these men are from the exact same place with the exact same training - we can expect a draw. Probably around 30 wounded, 15 dead, 5 captured on both sides. Those casualties may not look severe, but that is 50% casualties - far past that the morale of a force collapses - thus leading to the end of the engagement. Now there are a number of factors that must be considered on who would win this in a real world environment.

Elements of Determining Casualties

Rest Status. Are your men well rested or tired?
Hunger. Have they been receiving supplies? Are they well fed?
Terrain. Are you fighting in your enemies back yard? If you're people are from the swamps, don't expect them to fight as well in the mountains. Also included are who holds the better ground in a fight.
Type of troops. Are these your crack veterans or your conscripts? No - your entire army is not elite.
Equipment. Are these men unarmed or do they look like space marines?
Morale. Do these men really believe in the cause, or are they ready to throw in the towel?
Strategy. A General's ability to put his men in the right places


Summary of Example. The team with better 'ratings' in each category will take fewer losses. If it helps you, rate your own forces in each category 0 - 100. If you lack in certain areas, but defeat your opponent in others, expect the casualty difference to offset. However if you are being handily beaten in all of the above six categories, do no expect to walk out of there with any men left.

Things to Consider
-If your troops, and your enemy's troops seem pretty similar in the above areas, they probably are, and the casualties should be relatively similar.
-If your enemy's troops seem like they overwhelm your own in the above areas, they probably do on the field as well. Don't assume your men are better just because they are your men. There is a loser in every war.

Scenario B. Artillery A large green field expanding in all directions for as far as the eye can see. No tree, no hill, no fox hole in sight. On one side there are exactly one hundred men, armed with Kevlar Armor (covering the abdomen, thighs and upper arm), M4 Assault Rifles, side arm pistols, helmets, and some nice shiny black boots. This is the red team. Exactly one mile in the opposite direction are twenty five men, armed only with pistols. They however possess five 60mm Mortars. This is the blue team. The objective of the assaulting force is to destroy the defending force, and vice versa. Now as the engagement begins, the red team is forced to traverse the one mile distance in order to come within range of the enemy on foot. It takes approximately 7 minutes to run a mile. [This may vary depending on the troops you are using. If these are your elite spec. ops ultra delta black unit assassin ninjas, they can probably knock it out in 6. If they're conscripts, probably more like 8 or 9.] Now during these seven minutes, blue team has deployed a couple spotters along this path to keep track of where red team is. [Another important fact, if the opposing force does not specify how they see your position, they cannot. Infared, visual spotters, and aerial observation are all methods of spotting. Assuming they know where you are is not - no/very light casualties should be taken from random fire.] Now during this seven minute run to attack the enemy, the opposing 60mm Guns can fire 20 rounds per minute. One gun, over seven minutes, can fire 140 rounds on your position. Five guns can fire 700 rounds on your position. These rounds are not the simple explosive shells of WWI/II - they pack better explosives, and are loaded with metal balls which cover large areas with their blasts. Red team likely is completely destroyed within three or four minutes of rushing forward. Note however that most casualties inflicted would most likely be wounded - if in doubt, assume a 2:1 or 3:1 wounded to kill ratio - depending on how well armored your men are. A poorly trained, poorly equipped conscript force will probably take 1:1. The better equipped and supplied your men, the fewer dead you will sustain. This does not mean you will not be suffering casualties, it just means they will be wounded.

Summary of Example. Now most of you will agree that what happened above is an acceptable result of a forward assault against artillery. However many of us ignore the aspect of traversing space to engage the enemy. One post usually says, 'I am attacking you' - the next says 'I attacked you'. Furthermore, we need to take into consideration that just because you add zeros to a number, the outcome of the battle is not guaranteed to change. For instance, if the red team had 10,000 men charging 500 mortars - the exact same result should be expected. The same goes for 100,000 charging 5,000 mortars, 1,000,000 charging 50,000, etc.

Things to Consider
-If your attacking force suffers 75% casualties, the remaining 25% will not continue the assault. Morale will fail, and a cessation of the attack will take place.
-Infantry charging on open ground will result in massive losses when facing artillery.
-Increasing the armor/equipment of a soldier will increase the number of wounded and decrease the number of dead - it will not seriously effect the number of casualties altogether. [A 2-3% decrease in casualties may be expected.]
-Always consider the time it takes to traverse space, and what will happen in that amount of time.
-Artillery is not alone in its ability to cut down infantry - machine guns, minefields, and other such weapons will also destroy frontal assaults.

Scenario C. Artillery in Terrain Alright, now that we have seen what will happen on this ideal, highly unlikely field of battle, lets change a few characteristics. Lets add a forest. With hills, trees, ditches, ravines, streams, large rocks and everything else found in a forest. Same situation as before - red team 100 men - blue team 25 with 5 60mm mortars. Now the effect of terrain cannot be ignored. It seriously hampers the ability of artillery to inflict casualties among assaulting infantry. However although it decreases the effectiveness of the artillery, it also increases the amount of time it takes to move across that terrain - thus the seven minutes of before, is more like 8 or 9. The assaulting force of 100 men, facing 700 shells, probably suffers instead of 90% casualties, something like 30%. Why? It is harder to precisely target them, there are many obstacles blocking potential shrapnel, the uneven terrain may absorb completely many shots. The additional minute of fire does not completely make up for this loss of fire capability - and because the blue commander knows this, he is likely to not fire the full 20 rounds per minute - but conserve his ammo and fire, say, 10, waiting for a better opportunity to release his fire power.

Summary of Example. This example is basically just an expansion upon the first, detailing the significance terrain can play in taking casualties. There are many factors that must be brought into consideration before pulling random numbers out of your ass and throwing them down on the table - they are listed above in Scenario A.

Things to Consider
-There are a variety of factors that increase and decrease your likelihood to take casualties, and the types of casualties you will take.
-For every bonus terrain gives you, it likely takes one away.
-It is better to assault with cover than without it in terms of taking losses. Open terrain is bad for infantry assaults.

Scenario D. Aircraft. Aircraft inflict massive casualties upon infantry - potentially more so than artillery. They can carry nastier payloads, and are far more accurate than their land based cousins. Red team has 100 men, blue team two F/A-18s loaded with nine bombs each. A single cluster bomb will likely incapacitate the entire 100 man force if dropped within fifty meters of its intended target. A cluster bomb covers a lot of space with just enough fire power to tear apart soft targets. Many do not take into consideration just how fragile the human body really is when taken in respect to flying red hot steel shards. A much higher dead to wounded ratio can be expected from precise aerial bombardment. By spreading your forces out, casualties can be reduced - however this weakens your ability to fight ground forces. Cluster bombs are not exclusive in their ability to devastate infantry - napalm and other incendiaries and explosives are just as effective. Now to expand upon this, the two F/A-18's have eighteen bombs total - capable of inflicting serious casualties to an exposed, or even unexposed enemy.

Summary of Example. Aircraft act as mobile artillery in regards to ground forces. They are however much more accurate and can carry diverse payloads. If you men are hit by such weapons, make sure they are spread out or in cover - or expect the same results as an artillery bombardment in an open field.

Things to Consider
-If I just did to my opponent what he did to me, what sort of casualties would I expect him to suffer?
-Air power has a extreme psychological effect on infantry, are my troops able to handle it?
-Air strikes on ground forces are very effective, take losses accordingly.
-Long range ground-to-ground missile strikes are very similar to air strikes in terms of taking losses.

Scenario E. Armored Forces An armored unit is much easier to hit than a single soldier. However it is also much more capable of taking hits than a soldier is. When considering frontal assaults over open fields, consider the same things as in the the scenario with infantry moving across an open plain. If 100 tanks were to attempt to cover 1 mile and take 5 155mm Artillery Pieces. What is the difference here? Yes, the tank is faster, and would be able to cover the terrain in around a minute or two - but the key difference is that the tank can shoot the target from where it is. Now change it around a bit, say the Red Team has 100 M1A2 Abrams - located 30 kilometers away from the Blue team, which has 5 M109 Paladins. The M1A2s begin moving forward, over the open terrain at about 30mph. At that speed, it will take them about eight or nine to cover the 30kms. In that time each Paladin fired about two rounds per minute - or about 85 rounds total. Though it is much easier to hit an enemy tank due to their size and up-to-date relaying of coordinates from potential RADAR readings, only direct or near direct hits really hurt a tank. Though light damage can be sustained, it is not nearly as detrimental to a tank force as it would be to infantry. Whereas a soldier with a chunk of steel stuck in his knee is not dead, but certainly out of the fight, a tank with a similar problem will continue forward. At best, ten to fifteen tanks can be assumed destroyed.

Summary of Example. When attempting to cover large distances under fire, armored units will take the least amount of damage. [Imagine trying to do the same thing with 1,000 infantry on foot! 30km's... 10 rds per minute...]

Things to Consider
-What type of artillery is the opponent using? The paladin is pretty old, newer guns can fire much faster, with better accuracy. Take this into consideration when calculating losses.
-Keep in mind, tanks get hurt to. Though that blackened scar might not stop the tank from moving or shooting, the next time an RPG hits there, you might go from fully operational to... dead.
-Same things from above lists apply to tanks. Just because they are machines, doesn't mean they don't need to rest. They also need lots of gasoline and constant supply.

[B]IV. The Expanding Torrent, also known as Deep Operation and Blitzkrieg

HA! Blitzkrieg! Owned. Most people assume a blitzkrieg is simply a very fast attack with lots of pwnzer tanks and air support. This is not so. The Expanding Torrent, or the Blitzkrieg, is the massing of armored forces at a specific point along your enemy's line, and punching through this narrow spot with overwhelming force. Once your armored forces have broken through this narrow point, infantry flow through it, and the armor, along with the infantry, expand into the enemy's rear, cutting off all communications, supplies and lines of retreat. The enemy then believes that their entire army is overrun, and fall into disarray. In this sort o attack, the vast majority of casualties are CAPTURED soldiers. There are very few wounded, even fewer dead. The bulk of losses come as a result of the enemy main force believing the battle is over and surrendering en mass. Now there is a problem with this tactic. When it was developed, communications were very flimsy - by putting troops between the enemy front line and the enemy command, you effectively cut communication, inducing the idea that you had been overrun. However now, communications are much more solid, and can be kept regardless of such a blitzkrieg. Additionally a blitzkrieg was designed to fight against WWI style armies - which is quite convenient because that is how most NSers fight, so it is not entirely obsolete as it in in modern warfare. This is important to note though, for when your troops are, or believe they are overrun, they will most likely surrender.

*Most defensive casualties should be captured if this measure is successful.
*The attacker should take high initial casualties due to the fact that the attacker is forced to concentrate his forces at a certain point along a line of battle - thus allowing the enemy to concentrate fire.

V. Urban Warfare.

Urban warfare is a very tricky issue when it comes to calculating casualties for a number of reasons. Without getting too much into the elements of warfare, which this guide is not dedicated to, there are two basic components of war that must be addressed. The first is nations ability to create force. [i.e., the sheer power of howitzers, bombs, guns, tanks, etc.] The second component is a nation's ability to apply that force. [Are you hitting your enemy with those shells? Are you killing civilians or combatants? Are you hitting your mark at all?] This is a pretty basic understanding of how to wage war - create firepower and use that firepower efficiently. In conventional warfare, in which two armies line up and have at it, this is a relatively simple concept. In urban warfare, in which the majority of life in the city is made up of civilians, the second aspect of war is drawn into a deep quagmire. How to apply force specifically against those you are trying to kill as opposed to those you are not. There are two approaches to this problem, each with its own benefits and draw backs.

Complete Annihilation. Usually the approach of the fascist regime which has no care for public opinion or international backlash. This method can go one of two ways. If the city is of little to no importance, and the enemy resistance is expected to be stiff, blowing apart, so that it is of no strategic importance, is not an impossible option with modern technology - let alone in NS.

A. Promote Economic Activity. If a city's power, fuel and water sources have been destroyed, that city's economic power is for all intents and purposes, gone. The workers of a city, without reliable food and water, will not work - thus nothing will be produced. Without ample energy, factories will again, produce nothing. Data systems will be down. Electronic finances are out the window. A modern city cannot function without power.

Now, is it impossible to destroy a city's power system through strategic bombing/missile strikes/artillery strikes? No. Is it impossible to knock out the water system? Again, no. So we all agree that it is very possible to destroy a city's economic purpose.

B. Administration. By destroying government buildings, wreaking havoc throughout the city though artillery fire and aerial bombardment - the administrative potential of a city will deteriorate into nothing. Now every last government worker might not be dead, but with the chaos that comes from such a bombardment, and the destruction of government facilities, a city's administrative potential can be reduced to negligible portions.

C. Defense. Now if the defense forces of a city cannot prevent an invading force from destroying the city's economic and administrative potential - that defense force cannot do much besides making occupation difficult. Now if an invading force does not want to occupy the city, but rather just 'destroy it', it needs only to contain whatever defense forces remain inside. By bombarding the city, it is possible to eliminate whatever mobile potential the enemy has. [This means knocking out armored vehicles, transport, aircraft and other such modes of transportation] If not by knocking out every vehicle, than by causing such destruction that it is impossible to procure and ample amount of fuel to wage effective warfare.

So if the defense force is incapable of leaving the city without being blown apart - it will have to stay in the city. If the city is cut off, surrounded, and being bombarded on a daily basis - the majority of its denizen will be killed by the elements. If a large percentage of the people are killed, the city cannot produce any economic goods, there is no administration, the army defending the city is unable to attack the forces besieging it - then the city is destroyed.

Note. On why immobile forces in a besieged city can do nothing. Immobile forces, when assaulting mobile forces with artillery and aerial superiority - will be obliterated. Not engage in an interesting battle - they will be erased without inflicting casualties on the enemy.

So now we have a large number of people, living in a city which has been heavily damaged, a city which has no economic potential, no administrative authority and no means to assault the forces isolating it, with a large number of immobile soldiers within its borders.

That is a destroyed city.

Occupation. The second approach is the circumstance in which it is necessary to take the city somewhat in tact. This begins much of the same way as before, with a shelling of the city. The force may issue a warning to the city, ordering an evacuation to limit civilian casualties and avoid the problems mentioned above. The bombardment is somewhat controlled, attempting to target fixed enemy positions through intelligence information, however it is limited in effectiveness, as applying force accurately is extremely difficult in such situations. In order to take the city, a series of ambushes, street fights and sieges will take place, in which the element of surprise and unusual circumstances dictate high casualties regardless of the qualities of the offensive forces. The invading will suffer approximately double the casualties of the enemy. This ratio however is affected by the elements of casualty determination listed in section I, scenario A. If the invading force has a significant advantage in all areas, then the ratio will be significantly altered, if not reversed completely.

VI. Non-Combat Casualties.

The first major war in human history in which casualties due to combat exceeded casualties due to illness and disease was the Russo-Japanese War. Until then, in all previous wars, the losses sustained by the elements and sickness always exceeded those of combat. Though medical technology has increased, and the casualties suffered from the elements has seriously decreased, it is still a major factor that must be brought into play. Invading forces especially must take this into consideration, for if you are invading a land unlike your own, there are probably differences besides the climate. Different terrain means different illnesses, different illnesses means an increased vulnerability to to those illnesses. Now while the majority of deaths suffered from illness has been significantly decreased over the last century, the same is not true of those wounded from illness. Believe it or not, a soldier fighting with a case of the cold is nowhere near as effective as a healthy one. If an entire force is sick, even if not fatally, and is fighting against a healthy opponent, that is a significant factor to be taken into consideration. Usually these casualties due to sickness will be pulled to the back and left to recover - this is an important manpower obstacle to take into consideration. Overall, it is very important to take sickness into consideration - especially if your nation does not have a well funded medical core.

VII. Common Errors in Judging Losses.

Saving Private Ryan. My troops are the Americans. Yours are the Nazis. For every one of my men that die, ten of yours must fall. This is probably the biggest problem there is on NS. We all see our own troops as the best troops in the entire world, and we hate to say it but... everyone else is a tier below. This is not true! We all have, for the most part, very equal troops. If I have 1000 men with kevlar vests and AK's, and you have the same - don't expect me to take twice the losses. Your troops can die. Just because they are 'your troops' does not mean that napalm doesn't burn. It doesn't mean that shrapnel doesn't cut. It doesn't mean that bullets don't kill. Patriotism and honor counts for nothing in a foxhole. When considering casualties, follow the golden rule. Take the same number of casualties you would expect your opponent to take in the same situation. (Minus the differences between your troops of course)

Casualty Equalizing. It is a tough thing to do, but important. Do not, under any circumstances, base the casualties you take on the casualties the opponent is taking. If you think that your enemy is taking too few losses, do not lower your own losses to reflect his error in judgment. Talk to him, discuss your qualm in a civilized OOC forum. If you simply lower you casualties, the enemy will do the same - until no casualties are being inflicted on either side. The first time you believe casualties are too low, bring it up. This works both ways. If you think you opponent is taking too many losses, tell him about it - don't try and take advantage of a miscalculation. If in doubt, ask an older member for help in determining losses.

Conclusion.

I hope this helps many of you as you go forth to wage war. If you have any questions, advice or would like to see something else in there, let me know. I realize there is nothing regarding aerial or naval losses on there - I do not believe I know enough about the subjects to write up anything on taking losses. If anyone is up to the task, I'd appreciate it. Comments and criticisms are welcome. Good luck!

this needs a sticky, very informative.

a very good read very informative and puts across what most rp's face.....

The London Times Calls it

"Smashing" and "Explosive":p

Standing Ovation. One of the Stickies indeed. Excellent!!

and Thank you!

Very informative and helpful. I think this is a problem many people seem to have. Maybe someone could eventually add further examples such as naval combat, air to air combat, bombing other nations etc. That would probably take forever though.

Very nice, I've encountered both of those common errors.

The Super-nationalist action-hero one was my fault... I was a newbie then... but then again, I was sending in wounded to fight to the death because they knew the enemy wouldn't take prisioners and that they really couldn't outrun the enemy. So total anhilation of my better forces. Also to my credit was the fact my men were in heavy bunkers while they attacked with light infantry supported by a few light tanks.

As for casualty equalizing, Pudites are apparently killed by leaflets. I tried clearing that up with him, but he deided to keep those casaulties for the lulz.

Both instances occured in the same RP.

I propose this be either stickied or given a link in a sticky.

As for navy/air battles, he pretty much outlined 2+2=4 and you're asking him what 2+3 equals. Which is actually a valid question if you don't know the value of 3 in relation to 2, 4, and all the other numbers. So I suppose it would require some explanation in how taking air and sea casaulties compare to land battles.

OOC:*Dials 1-800-MODS-4YU* WE NEED A STICKY HERE! THIS IS PERHAPS THE MOST HELPFUL THREAD I'VE SEEN SINCE I'VE BEEN HERE! Wah? Calm down? Oh, okay. So yeah, this NEEDS a sticky, it's one of the best threads I've seen. heck, even I was helped by it.

Glad it helps. I suppose I will try to get a link to this in the compass sticky.

As to naval and aerial losses - especially on the aerial side, it is much more technical and dependent upon the types of aircraft you are using. But due to the relatively limited numbers on both the aerial and naval battlefields, I suppose its a bit more straightforward.

Very nice work. This needs to be stickied. :cool:

Excellence.

What we should do is compile all of these excellent guides, such as the Art of NS War, into one big book. That would be one hell of a sticky.

Now I'm never one for liking casualties - it ain't nice having to say that your airship has finally absorbed too many flak shells for its own good. But a simple thing I try to do is to make any of my losses very well RP'd and pretty glorious: instead of saying it came down as a burning wreck flattening most of a small city, I describe it's final moments, details of the whole thing going out of control, crew reactions, the reactions of my men on the ground below (normally "Oh Shit...") and then finally it's final resting place. And remember, the crew can escape, meaning that there's chance for even more of an RP.

Before I go into too much of a love fest for airships, I'll just add my support that this could do with a sticky link: perhaps a seperate one, seeing as it's such an important factor of RP'ing.

In regardsl to what's defined as 'blitzkrieg', it shouldn't really be called either 'blitzkrieg' nor the 'expanding torrent' [wherever that term came from], as opening holes through an enemy line and filtering troops to enter the rear area has existed as a tactic since classical Greek civilization, and before. IMO, the term 'blitzkrieg' to explain any tactic from an educated perspective is erroneous, period, because blitkzkrieg was invented during the Second World War by a periodical. You might as well call it deep operation, which although was 'invented' by the Soviets [again, not really, since it's just a conpendium of existing strategies and tactics] also applies to 'blitzkrieg'.

But, my main point is that in that type of assault the majority of the casualties will most likely be taken by the attacker, since he is channeling much of his strength to open that small gap in the line. As a consequence, this normally requires using a large mass of forces to break through a most-likely heavily defended sector. Even at the Battle of Sedan, 12-14 May 1940, against one of the weaker portions of the French Maginot Line, German infantry took horrendous casualties attempting to cross the Meuse River - despite the air superiority [not guaranteed]. This should be factored into this guided, I think. While casualties for the campaign, if successful, may be lower than your enemy's, it will not during the opening days of the offensive.


Scenario D. Aircraft. Aircraft inflict massive casualties upon infantry - potentially more so than artillery. They can carry nastier payloads, and are far more accurate than their land based cousins.


This is no longer true, with the advent of guided munitions. Furthermore, a self-propelled howitzer can be programmed to allow up to six rounds hit simultaneously the same area, increasing the opening firepower. Furthermore, in terms of firepower the key is that howitzers can fire continuously, while an aircraft can't. So, why an aircraft may have four to five missiles, a howitzer can fire between twelve and fifteen rounds per minute. Aircraft are better used for precision strikes and not to inflict massed casualties, except for bombers and carpet bombing, which may be obsolete given the invention of the long-range anti-air missile.


Armored Forces. ... At best, ten to fifteen tanks can be assumed destroyed.

It really depends on the density of the armored formation and the type of projectile being fired by the artillery piece. For example, during the Battle of Ishme-Dagan, during the War of Golden Succession [NationStates], my armored units were packed densely and so were open to take casualties from Havenic [Safehaven2] anti-tank cluster munitions, such as SADARMs. There are variables that will decrease a tank's suceptibility to these type of attacks, but now this is beyond the scope of the article.


If the city is of little to no importance, and the enemy resistance is expected to be stiff, blowing the city off the map is not an impossible option with modern technology - let alone in NS.


Unless you use a nuclear bomb, yes it is impossible. There are historical examples which prove it.

What we should do is compile all of these excellent guides, such as the Art of NS War, into one big book. That would be one hell of a sticky.


It already existed, as the Consolidation Thread.

The Expanding Torrent was a strategic doctrine developed by Liddell Hart in the years before WWII (Read "Combined Arms") to defeat a standard army that could be expected to be faced on the modern battle field. [Taking WWI as an example of 'standard'.] This is not a made up term as you seem to imply, it is a major theoretical idea in the realm of armored warfare that really shaped modern armored combat as we know it today.

In reference to Greek tactics, it is rather inappropriate to compare the limited scale encirclement tactics of the Greeks to near-modern warfare. The purpose and execution of both are completely different, Greek troops never fought battles spanning dozens of miles, etc., etc. etc. Combined Arms doctrine of WWII is certainly not a mere copy of Greek tactics of over 2000 years before, but rather a developed response to WWI a few years before.

In regards to armored losses, I was not trying to pitch a certain storefronts artillery design - this is a basic guide to help people determine casualties, not my opinion of the latest NS Tech design.

It is impossible to prove something is impossible simply because it had not been done thus far in history. If you are referring to WWII attempts to destroy cities, then I think you do not give enough credit to the differences in technology that have come about in the last 60 years. If anything Dresden proved that a city could be destroyed, especially with modern weaponry. If you are insinuating that no amount of conventional explosives/incendiaries can destroy a city, I think you are incorrect - it simply has not been done - which does not mean it cannot be done.

... it is a major theoretical idea in the realm of armored warfare that really shaped modern armored combat as we know it today.

So ... it's 'Deep Operation'.

In reference to Greek tactics, it is rather inappropriate to compare the limited scale encirclement tactics of the Greeks to near-modern warfare. The purpose and execution of both are completely different, Greek troops never fought battles spanning dozens of miles, etc., etc. etc.

Surface area doesn't dictate purpose nor execution. The purpose was to breakthrough to the enemy's rear and threaten its logistics and cut off the army, the same as it was during the Second World War. The execution ... well, it depends on what you mean by 'execution'. There are reasons why modern strategists continuously referred back to examples in ancient warfare, especially Cannae [German General Edhard Raus, for example, compared his encirclement of Soviet forces near Stalingrad during Operation Winter Storm as a sort of Cannae].

Combined Arms doctrine of WWII is certainly not a mere copy of Greek tactics of over 2000 years before, but rather a developed response to WWI a few years before.

I never called it a 'mere copy', but it was obviously heavily influenced.

In regards to armored losses, I was not trying to pitch a certain storefronts artillery design - this is a basic guide to help people determine casualties, not my opinion of the latest NS Tech design.

Erm, right, but to determine casualties you sort of have to take into consideration what's attacking you - and by latest storefront, it's latest real-life technology, really.

It is impossible to prove something is impossible simply because it had not been done thus far in history. If you are referring to WWII attempts to destroy cities, then I think you do not give enough credit to the differences in technology that have come about in the last 60 years. If anything Dresden proved that a city could be destroyed, especially with modern weaponry.

Dreden's buildings were destroyed, but its inhabitants were not [100,000 casualties does not encompass the entire city]. As Stalingrad proved, which was also heavily destroyed by aerial bombardment, turning a city's buildings into rubble might actually aid in its defense, so the city is not really captured or neutralized.

So ... it's 'Deep Operation'.
Sure... it was just developed a solid 30 years earlier.

Surface area doesn't dictate purpose nor execution. The purpose was to breakthrough to the enemy's rear and threaten its logistics and cut off the army, the same as it was during the Second World War. The execution ... well, it depends on what you mean by 'execution'. There are reasons why modern strategists continuously referred back to examples in ancient warfare, especially Cannae [German General Edhard Raus, for example, compared his encirclement of Soviet forces near Stalingrad during Operation Winter Storm as a sort of Cannae].
Area dictates both purpose and execution. The purpose of Greek encirclement tactics are both very small on scale, and designed to actually annihilate the enemy force. The Expanding Torrent/Blitzkrieg is designed for no such purpose. The cutting of communications and the imposing the idea of defeat was the purpose - this would be impossible on a small battlefield (Ancient Greece), as the entire field of battle would for the most part, be in sight. On the near-modern battlefield, where a commander could be fifty miles from portions of his army, it was very possible to induce a false sense of defeat. Blitzkrieg is not designed to destroy the enemy main force, but to convince the enemy that they have already been destroyed. Greek encirclement tactics were designed to actually destroy an enemy army. That is the purpose.

In terms of execution... the two types of warfare cannot even be compared. Fast moving armor and close in aircraft support being compared to hoplites... like comparing baseball and football strategy. It just shouldn't be done. In comparing the encirclement at Stalingrad to ancient encirclements - there is a simple explanation. Blitzkrieg is a war-scale strategy. What happened at Stalingrad was a battle-scale strategic situation. Furthermore, by the time Stalingrad had come into play, the Blitzkrieg had completely dissolved and was transformed into a much more 'conventional' war. In all, you are comparing different scales, different time periods, and different strategies and trying to link them together in ways they simply cannot be.

I never called it a 'mere copy', but it was obviously heavily influenced.
While I am not going to deny there was some degree of influence, I have read a number of writings from Hart, Guderian and other such major figures on WWII era armored combat and have never read of any 'heavy influence' from ancient Greece upon any of their doctrines. What I have read was that the armored tactics in WWII were designed to fight WWI style armies - thus the defeat of Poland, France and initial defeat of Russia - they were all fighting WWI. Military doctrines throughout history have been designed to solve problems recently encountered - not on abstract ancient philosophies.

Dreden's buildings were destroyed, but its inhabitants were not [100,000 casualties does not encompass the entire city]. As Stalingrad proved, which was also heavily destroyed by aerial bombardment, turning a city's buildings into rubble might actually aid in its defense, so the city is not really captured or neutralized.
History cannot prove something is impossible - just because something has not been done, does not prove it cannot be done. Saying a city cannot be destroyed through bombing because it has not been thus far is like saying man cannot go to Mars because he has not already.

Advances in explosive power have advanced drastically since WWII, it seems you are not taking this into consideration. MOABs did not exist in WWII. Nor did Daisy Cutters, Cluster Bombs, High Intensity Napalm or any of the massive explosives available to modern arsenals. Nations of 3,4,5,6,7 billion with economies that match that of the entire world did not exist. To put it simply, in the past nations did not have the physical ability to produce enough conventional explosive to level a city. On NS, they do.

On a side note Stalingrad was never meant to be destroyed completely - the Nazis wanted to take the city, not obliterate it, as shown by the quagmire they embraced in attempting to occupy the city.

long time no see,


also very good....

this will come in handy later

The Expanding Torrent was a strategic doctrine developed by Liddell Hart in the years before WWII (Read "Combined Arms") to defeat a standard army that could be expected to be faced on the modern battle field. [Taking WWI as an example of 'standard'.] This is not a made up term as you seem to imply, it is a major theoretical idea in the realm of armored warfare that really shaped modern armored combat as we know it today.

In reference to Greek tactics, it is rather inappropriate to compare the limited scale encirclement tactics of the Greeks to near-modern warfare. The purpose and execution of both are completely different, Greek troops never fought battles spanning dozens of miles, etc., etc. etc. Combined Arms doctrine of WWII is certainly not a mere copy of Greek tactics of over 2000 years before, but rather a developed response to WWI a few years before.

In regards to armored losses, I was not trying to pitch a certain storefronts artillery design - this is a basic guide to help people determine casualties, not my opinion of the latest NS Tech design.

It is impossible to prove something is impossible simply because it had not been done thus far in history. If you are referring to WWII attempts to destroy cities, then I think you do not give enough credit to the differences in technology that have come about in the last 60 years. If anything Dresden proved that a city could be destroyed, especially with modern weaponry. If you are insinuating that no amount of conventional explosives/incendiaries can destroy a city, I think you are incorrect - it simply has not been done - which does not mean it cannot be done.

Expanding Torrent was what Hart called, the British brass ignored it, the Germans ran with it and called it Blitzkrieg, now its called Combined Arms.
So I dont see the purpose of using a term from 1917 when you can more easily direct the uninitiated to Combined Arms Doctrine that applies far more to NS warfare then Harts suppositions. I respect following your roots, but what your doing amounts to name dropping...we get it, you read a book. Of course the same concepts were developed and in use 2000 years previous to Hart...but ok.

TAGGED

Also, destroying a city with none-nuclear weapons, while by no means impossible, is rather difficult and may be expensive... depending on the city.

In regardsl to what's defined as 'blitzkrieg', it shouldn't really be called either 'blitzkrieg' nor the 'expanding torrent' [wherever that term came from], as opening holes through an enemy line and filtering troops to enter the rear area has existed as a tactic since classical Greek civilization, and before. IMO, the term 'blitzkrieg' to explain any tactic from an educated perspective is erroneous, period, because blitkzkrieg was invented during the Second World War by a periodical. You might as well call it deep operation, which although was 'invented' by the Soviets [again, not really, since it's just a conpendium of existing strategies and tactics] also applies to 'blitzkrieg'.

But, my main point is that in that type of assault the majority of the casualties will most likely be taken by the attacker, since he is channeling much of his strength to open that small gap in the line. As a consequence, this normally requires using a large mass of forces to break through a most-likely heavily defended sector. Even at the Battle of Sedan, 12-14 May 1940, against one of the weaker portions of the French Maginot Line, German infantry took horrendous casualties attempting to cross the Meuse River - despite the air superiority [not guaranteed]. This should be factored into this guided, I think. While casualties for the campaign, if successful, may be lower than your enemy's, it will not during the opening days of the offensive.



This is no longer true, with the advent of guided munitions. Furthermore, a self-propelled howitzer can be programmed to allow up to six rounds hit simultaneously the same area, increasing the opening firepower. Furthermore, in terms of firepower the key is that howitzers can fire continuously, while an aircraft can't. So, why an aircraft may have four to five missiles, a howitzer can fire between twelve and fifteen rounds per minute. Aircraft are better used for precision strikes and not to inflict massed casualties, except for bombers and carpet bombing, which may be obsolete given the invention of the long-range anti-air missile.



It really depends on the density of the armored formation and the type of projectile being fired by the artillery piece. For example, during the Battle of Ishme-Dagan, during the War of Golden Succession [NationStates], my armored units were packed densely and so were open to take casualties from Havenic [Safehaven2] anti-tank cluster munitions, such as SADARMs. There are variables that will decrease a tank's suceptibility to these type of attacks, but now this is beyond the scope of the article.



Unless you use a nuclear bomb, yes it is impossible. There are historical examples which prove it.


1)True but . . .. does it really really matter?
2)To true. Initial casualties amongst the attackers will be high unless they somehow manage to find a hole in the enemy lies or achieve complete surprise (both highly unlikely in NS)
3) Not true (or not entirely true) I'd say aircraft and artillery are about on par through airborne standoff weapons such as the JSOW and precision munitions used by both.
4)Very true though if you knew you were facing Heavy artillery why bunch???? see charge of the light brigade for a RL historical example.

5)Not true several towns were destroyed during world war two using basic incendiary and explosive weapons one example would be Dresden. (Which actually suffered more casualties than Nagasaki)

Expanding Torrent was what Hart called, the British brass ignored it, the Germans ran with it and called it Blitzkrieg, now its called Combined Arms.
So I dont see the purpose of using a term from 1917 when you can more easily direct the uninitiated to Combined Arms Doctrine that applies far more to NS warfare then Harts suppositions. I respect following your roots, but what your doing amounts to name dropping...we get it, you read a book. Of course the same concepts were developed and in use 2000 years previous to Hart...but ok.
So you basically just summed up my argument and then said you do not approve because I called the strategy by its original name...

The Expanding Torrent is the original name the strategy was developed by, thats what I was taught to call it, thats what I call it. If you want to call it something else, thats entirely up to you - but don't give me any crap because I am using the original name. As to the accusation of 'name dropping', I was accused of making up the term. I did not make up the term, and cited the original author of it. If that is name dropping, then according to you, every scholarly journal should be disregarded for 'name dropping'.

EDIT. Additionally, in response to ignoring the importance of technology in regards to armored losses, I said...

-What type of artillery is the opponent using? The paladin is pretty old, newer guns can fire much faster, with better accuracy. Take this into consideration when calculating losses.
So to say I am ignoring this factor is simply not true.

One factor which may cause some overestimation with this method is the close grouping of troops in the scenarios you give. A lot of people on NS use great slabs of troops together as if they were in Napoleonic times. A modern army can cover a front with a lot fewer soldiers per kilometer on the front lines than was possible in the past, due to a number of factors - better information-gathering capacities, greater range and accuracy of artillery, etc, and of course just sheer firepower. A modern brigade has a lot more available firepower than a brigade of the same size from, say, WWI, and can apply that firepower much more quickly, fluidly and precisely - so you don't need to bunch up a hundred riflemen to cover one field under most circumstances. A fireteam with a a radio will do.

The same increases in firepower and firepower applicability that have made high troop concentrations unnecessary have also, of course, made them highly dangerous. On a modern battlefield, massing ten armored divisions and trying to punch through a small hole in an enemy front line ALA WWII is asking every artillery crew in a hundred miles to rape your tanks.

Patriotism and honor counts for nothing in a foxhole.

This is specifically untrue. Actually, there are numerous examples of honor and patriotism providing the moral authority to do the right things that keep troops alive. It could be argued that in trench warfare in WWI, the astonishingly bad leadership and innovation overcame the importance of honor and patriotism, but that is not the same thing. In the end, idiotic behavior triumphs over commitment and integrity. It should be kept in mind the amazing amount of idiocy that went into overcoming patriotism and honor in WWI.

Certainly it can be argued that honor and patriotism do nothing to penetrate reinforced concrete. Iwo Jima certainly was not the first proof of that. But honor and patriotism kept the Japanese defenders fighting long after the issue was decided. It is not that Japanese troops were coming out of hiding after the end of the battle of Iwo Jima, it is that they were coming out after the end of the war.

For a list of examples where honor and patriotism mattered in foxholes, the United States Marine Corps provides a litany. Siege of Peking, Guadalcanal, Chosin Reservoir, Khe Sanh, Kafji, and Fallujah II are all examples where honor and patriotism mattered. In situations where Marines should have lost, they held together.

Otherwise your article is very informative for the beginner. Since there is no metric in the game for honor and patriotism, we have no ready way of proving it for battles. I would argue that professional militaries in mostly free states show greater resilience.

While we could have a rather lengthy argument over the effects of patriotism in regards to war [from most first hand accounts I have heard, the fighting is done for the man next to you, rarely for the national glory] - for the purpose of NS, patriotism, glory, honor and all those abstract ideas cannot count for anything.

Why? Even if we assume, as you said, that these are real factors in determining losses, there is no way to prove that one nation has a stronger sense of patriotism than another. If two armies are having at it, and one says, 'My men aren't taking casualties because of a strong sense of patriotism', the other will instinctively do the same. If you have two players who constantly insist that their army has an edge because their nation is more honorable - well, that just doesn't make for very good RP.

On a side note, in regards to your Iwo Jima example - honor did keep the Japanese fighting longer - it did not however reduce their casualties. If anything, by prolonging the fight, it shifted potential captured losses to dead and wounded losses.

On a side note, in regards to your Iwo Jima example - honor did keep the Japanese fighting longer - it did not however reduce their casualties. If anything, by prolonging the fight, it shifted potential captured losses to dead and wounded losses.

With Imperial Japan, potential captured losses is equal to zero.

On a side note, in regards to your Iwo Jima example - honor did keep the Japanese fighting longer - it did not however reduce their casualties. If anything, by prolonging the fight, it shifted potential captured losses to dead and wounded losses.

The highest casualties are experienced in uncontrolled retreat, specifically routing units. "With your shield or on it" means that you are not going to die running from a fight. There was no running from Iwo Jima, and their honor code precluded surrender. The Japanese on Iwo Jima died hard in prepared positions, but statistically insignificant quantities of them died trying to abandon their cause.

By way of contrast, I offer the "Road of Death" where a handful of aircraft killed thousands of Ba'athist troops retreating from Kuwait in a panic.

Another example worth noting is a time where then-LTCOL "Chesty" Puller talked a marine out of battle fatigue by appealing to his honor. That marine went on to be decorated for valor. Granted that Chesty Puller carried more honor in his toenail clippings than the rest of us mortals are usually granted, but nevertheless there are examples of honor and patriotism making significant differences in the character of battle.

And none of this matters in the game unless agreed to by the participants and moderator in a war.

just too say great work!

Epic thread. As a US Army Infantryman, i whole-heartedly agree with everything stated in this thread from my own experiences.

Epic win. Also, sigged.

Very informative and excellently written.

Sure... it was just developed a solid 30 years earlier.

Deep Operation was developed in the mid and late 1920s...


Blitzkrieg is not designed to destroy the enemy main force, but to convince the enemy that they have already been destroyed.

History says otherwise, given that the Germans were forced to reduce entire pockets of men in long battles. In the end, the force had to be defeated. Even in France and Poland, encircled forces were defeated, with the surrender coming after the reduction of those forces.

Greek encirclement tactics were designed to actually destroy an enemy army. That is the purpose.

So are mechanized tactics ... see above.

Fast moving armor and close in aircraft support being compared to hoplites... like comparing baseball and football strategy.


Err, no, more like cavalry.

Blitzkrieg is a war-scale strategy.

Blitzkrieg is more properly a tactic, while Deep Operation encompassed both blitzkrieg and turned it into a strategy.

What happened at Stalingrad was a battle-scale strategic situation.

This only has to do with the fact that one soldier could cover more surface area in WWII than one soldier could in the ancient era. So, by your definition modern tactics should not be compared to blitkrieg, because one tank can cover an area worth around 6 squared kilometers ... something a German Panther tank could not do. For example, by your definition you can't compare the encirclement of Iraqi forces during the Second Persian Gulf War [1991] to the encirclement of Soviet forces around Kiev in 1941.

Furthermore, by the time Stalingrad had come into play, the Blitzkrieg had completely dissolved and was transformed into a much more 'conventional' war.

Except for Operation Uranus and then Operation Winter Storm, and then Operation Little Saturn. The fact that the siege of Stalingrad itself devolved into a siege [which is natural], doesn't mean deep operation wasn't used.

In all, you are comparing different scales, different time periods, and different strategies and trying to link them together in ways they simply cannot be.

No, you are putting words in my mouth. I'm not really comparing, as much as saying that it's obvious that deep operation/blitkzrieg was completely based on ancient techniques. Of course, evolved to fit mechanized warfare ... but this is natural. It's the same way that these same tactics have been changed in modern warfare to account for the digital architecture that Western countries can make use of.


While I am not going to deny there was some degree of influence, I have read a number of writings from Hart, Guderian and other such major figures on WWII era armored combat and have never read of any 'heavy influence' from ancient Greece upon any of their doctrines.

Of course, they're not going to directly compare, that's not within the scope of their books. You have to make those comparisons yourself by having a wider base of literature.

History cannot prove something is impossible - just because something has not been done, does not prove it cannot be done. Saying a city cannot be destroyed through bombing because it has not been thus far is like saying man cannot go to Mars because he has not already.

And you obviously can't prove it's possible, while I've already stated why it's impossible. You can destroy the majority of the buildigns, but you can't destroy the majority of the population - that's the key. The physical city has been reduced, but it's still an obstacle ... as has been proven by examples I have already offered you.

Advances in explosive power have advanced drastically since WWII, it seems you are not taking this into consideration. MOABs did not exist in WWII. Nor did Daisy Cutters, Cluster Bombs, High Intensity Napalm or any of the massive explosives available to modern arsenals. Nations of 3,4,5,6,7 billion with economies that match that of the entire world did not exist. To put it simply, in the past nations did not have the physical ability to produce enough conventional explosive to level a city. On NS, they do.

This technology makes it easier to destroy large areas of surface, but not kill everything within it.

On a side note Stalingrad was never meant to be destroyed completely - the Nazis wanted to take the city, not obliterate it, as shown by the quagmire they embraced in attempting to occupy the city.

They wanted to take the city, and thought that by eliminating it and consequently trying to kill its occupants, it would be easier to take. It was a similar strategy as adopted at Leningrad, which failed as well [the Germans had a lot less firepower at Leningrad, as well].

3) Not true (or not entirely true) I'd say aircraft and artillery are about on par through airborne standoff weapons such as the JSOW and precision munitions used by both.

You missed my point. Aircraft's load-out is much more finite than that of an artillery cannon, and so the artillery cannon can apply much more firepower over a longer period of time.

4)Very true though if you knew you were facing Heavy artillery why bunch???? see charge of the light brigade for a RL historical example.

Well, the light brigade faced crippling casualties at Balaclava, and the Russian cavalry force opposing them was routed solely by the audacity of the light brigade - but, Russian artillery forced attritious casualties on them.

5)Not true several towns were destroyed during world war two using basic incendiary and explosive weapons one example would be Dresden. (Which actually suffered more casualties than Nagasaki)

You missed my arguments; physical destruction of the city is not what matters, it's the destruction of the population and the military garrisson inside.

5)Not true several towns were destroyed during world war two using basic incendiary and explosive weapons one example would be Dresden. (Which actually suffered more casualties than Nagasaki)

You're missing the crucial point, which lies in a subtlety. No city has been totally destroyed by warfare, only rendered uninhabitable by civilians. Monte Cassino, which I bring up for the sake of freshness in the discussion, was bombed extensively by Allied forces trying to oust German defenders from the city. Unfortunately, despite four hours of heavy aerial bombardment, the Germans were still there and still proved to be a considerable thorn in the side of the Allied attackers. They'd simply left their positions when the bombers came, and then re-occupied the ruins (already ruins before). No effective change was made in the equation, since there were still accurate German snipers in their hidey-holes, and German defenders in the city, occupying variously their old basements or new ones.

Monte Casino wasn't even a city, just one (albeit very large and very strong) building. Ruined masonry, concrete etc. is still hard cover, and in a heavily bombed city there will be huge amounts of it.

Monte Casino wasn't even a city, just one (albeit very large and very strong) building. Ruined masonry, concrete etc. is still hard cover, and in a heavily bombed city there will be huge amounts of it.

Sorry, I was referring to both the town of Cassino and the monastery in one go.

Unless of course your city is made of paper...

(>.<) Tokyo c. 1944

Unless of course your city is made of paper...

(>.<) Tokyo c. 1944

[ooc: lulz]

Deep Operation was developed in the mid and late 1920s...
Regardless of the exact date, Hart's Expanding Torrent philosophy was published at the end of WWI. The entire argument over this point was my using the term Expanding Torrent - which you accused me of making up - in reality, it was the origin of Combined Arms, developed before Deep Operation, Blitzkrieg or whatever one chooses to call it.

History says otherwise, given that the Germans were forced to reduce entire pockets of men in long battles. In the end, the force had to be defeated. Even in France and Poland, encircled forces were defeated, with the surrender coming after the reduction of those forces.
History completely supports this position. In Russia, especially during the early part of the war, mass surrender occurred shortly after communications were cut. The Germans had only to break through the line - that is where the fighting took place - not in some massive battle in which both armies had at it. In Poland - there were no extreme losses before the surrender. When communications were cut, there Poles surrendered en mass. As far as France is concerned, the casualties were suffered primarily by the forces engaging each other in Belgium. [The diversionary German Army and the combined French-British Army] The Germans engaged there were not performing any sort of Blitzkrieg tactics, they were engaging in a more conventional battle in which both sides suffered heavily.

Greek encirclement tactics were designed to actually destroy an enemy army. That is the purpose.
Blitzkrieg tactics were developed to psychologically defeat the command of the opposing force - inducing the idea of defeat before there was actually a defeat. This is the purpose of Blitzkrieg... Greek encirclement tactics were developed to negate enemy numbers by allowing as many Greeks to fight as few [Persians] as possible.

Blitzkrieg is more properly a tactic, while Deep Operation encompassed both blitzkrieg and turned it into a strategy.
This argument is over the usage of the term Blitzkrieg... if you consider it the battle scale of breaking through, it is a tactic. If you use it as a war scale version of cutting off the enemy and inducing the idea of defeat, it is a strategy. There is no use arguing this point as there is no specific definition that is going to end this.

This only has to do with the fact that one soldier could cover more surface area in WWII than one soldier could in the ancient era. So, by your definition modern tactics should not be compared to blitkrieg, because one tank can cover an area worth around 6 squared kilometers ... something a German Panther tank could not do. For example, by your definition you can't compare the encirclement of Iraqi forces during the Second Persian Gulf War [1991] to the encirclement of Soviet forces around Kiev in 1941.
There is a difference between comparing and equating. One can compare two similar scenarios, such as comparing blitzkrieg to modern tactics. However what you are doing is equating them. You are telling me that a horse is a tank. An archer is a howitzer. A hoplite is a stormtrooper. There are serious differences that dramatically alter the fundamental basis of warfare. Blitzkrieg was developed as a counter to WWI Stalemate - not a simple reflection on classic history.

Except for Operation Uranus and then Operation Winter Storm, and then Operation Little Saturn. The fact that the siege of Stalingrad itself devolved into a siege [which is natural], doesn't mean deep operation wasn't used.
Encirclement does not directly equate to Expanding Torrent/Blitzkrieg. An encirclement can come as a result of simply deep flanking - such as in Uranus and Winter Storm - which had nothing to do with expanding torrent tactics.

No, you are putting words in my mouth. I'm not really comparing, as much as saying that it's obvious that deep operation/blitkzrieg was completely based on ancient techniques. Of course, evolved to fit mechanized warfare ... but this is natural. It's the same way that these same tactics have been changed in modern warfare to account for the digital architecture that Western countries can make use of.
It is not obvious at all. Blitzkrieg tactics came about as a result to the mass casualties suffered in WWI, and due to the result of the situation the Germans were put in after Versailles. Hart, Guderian and others did not simply sit down one day and read Homer. Blitzkrieg tactics were formed independently of Greek Tactics, regardless of similarities between the two.

Of course, they're not going to directly compare, that's not within the scope of their books. You have to make those comparisons yourself by having a wider base of literature.
Would you care to site a single book? I am not looking for a General writing in his memoirs that two situations seem similar - how about one of the originators of blitzkrieg doctrine saying they developed their tactics based off of Greek tactics. I have read a number of works on the subject - blitzkrieg came from the failures of WWI, which occurred within the last five years - not Ancient Greece, of over 2000 years ago.

And you obviously can't prove it's possible, while I've already stated why it's impossible. You can destroy the majority of the buildigns, but you can't destroy the majority of the population - that's the key. The physical city has been reduced, but it's still an obstacle ... as has been proven by examples I have already offered you.
You stated its impossible because no one has done it yet. That is an unsupported statement with nothing but opinion behind it. Additionally, by destroying all of the buildings in a city, you effectively destroy the city - there is no way for a large number of humans to live in a pile of rubble - even if that pile of rubble is temporarily defensible. So yes, I have proven my point. If you reduce a city to rubble, and wait - the buildings will fall, the people will die of starvation and the elements. Thus, it is possible to destroy a city with non-nuclear weapons.

Little Boy, a 15kiloton nuclear weapon, destroyed Hiroshima. It is entirely possible for many NS Nations to drop 15,000 tons of conventional explosives on a single city. This is not even considering the effects of incendiaries, which of course multiply the effects of the weapons far beyond their own tonnage.

This technology makes it easier to destroy large areas of surface, but not kill everything within it.
As I said above, it is impossible for a large number of survivors to live in a city of rubble without water, food or shelter. Thus, by destroying large areas of surface, everything inside will eventually die.

They wanted to take the city, and thought that by eliminating it and consequently trying to kill its occupants, it would be easier to take. It was a similar strategy as adopted at Leningrad, which failed as well [the Germans had a lot less firepower at Leningrad, as well].
I am not denying that. I simply said the Germans were not trying to erase Stalingrad, they were trying to occupy it.

...in reality, it was the origin of Combined Arms, developed before Deep Operation, Blitzkrieg or whatever one chooses to call it.

Well, not really; combined arms has existed before the First World War. It was perhaps the beginning (there were many simultaneous 'beginnings', at that) of the mechanized combined arms doctrine.

In Russia, especially during the early part of the war, mass surrender occurred shortly after communications were cut.

Right, in ancient warfare a surrounding army could and did surrender. There were examples that the army was completely annihalated, as there were examples during the Second World War.

The Germans had only to break through the line - that is where the fighting took place - not in some massive battle in which both armies had at it.

OK, but the Germans had to launch an offensive along a broadfront, similar to an ancient army. Then a large 'mass of forces' could create a breakthrough, as did cavalry charges during ancient warfare. The principle difference is not method, but the fact that in an ancient warfare it was more tactical, while in modern warfare it's more strategic - due to the surface area covered by an army.

In Poland - there were no extreme losses before the surrender. When communications were cut, there Poles surrendered en mass.

... so you're saying that the majority of Poland's losses were suffered after they surrendered? This doesn't make any sense.

As far as France is concerned, the casualties were suffered primarily by the forces engaging each other in Belgium. [The diversionary German Army and the combined French-British Army] The Germans engaged there were not performing any sort of Blitzkrieg tactics, they were engaging in a more conventional battle in which both sides suffered heavily.

There were more French forces deployed in the north, so this was to be expected. But, looking at breakthrough operations at Sedan, the majority of French forces defending were actually destroyed (as in, they were no longer units legible for combat - surrendered, dead, et cetera). I think your main issue is that you believe that in ancient warfare soldiers always fought to the death, which is not an issue; large portions of enemy armies which were defeated surrendered and were not actually killed.


Blitzkrieg tactics were developed to psychologically defeat the command of the opposing force - inducing the idea of defeat before there was actually a defeat. This is the purpose of Blitzkrieg... Greek encirclement tactics were developed to negate enemy numbers by allowing as many Greeks to fight as few [Persians] as possible.

No, when the breakthrough was established Greek cavalry would charge Persian commanders, to force them to retreat - the effect is the same; only the consequences in the ancient era were tactical, while in the modern era they were strategic. But the idea remains the same; they were just extrapolated to fit a modern battlefield. I'm not demeaning the creators of these strategies, because they were unique for their time - but they in no way invented it.


This argument is over the usage of the term Blitzkrieg... if you consider it the battle scale of breaking through, it is a tactic. If you use it as a war scale version of cutting off the enemy and inducing the idea of defeat, it is a strategy. There is no use arguing this point as there is no specific definition that is going to end this.

That's the issue; blitzkrieg was not invented by the Germans (the word) ... it was invented by a British journalist.


There is a difference between comparing and equating. One can compare two similar scenarios, such as comparing blitzkrieg to modern tactics. However what you are doing is equating them.

No, I am comparing them; I am showing you how they are similar, to prove to you that modern tactics are just an extrapolation of ancient tactics.

You are telling me that a horse is a tank.

No, I am telling you they were used in much the same way in this specific case.

An archer is a howitzer.

Archers were definately artillery.

A hoplite is a stormtrooper.

No, the Greeks did not really have an infantry equivalent - their breakthrough units were cavalry. The Romans, OTOH, since their units were more flexible could conduct similar tactics to isolate specific groups of enemy soldiers by bypassing them, et cetera.

There are serious differences that dramatically alter the fundamental basis of warfare. Blitzkrieg was developed as a counter to WWI Stalemate - not a simple reflection on classic history.

Right, I never said it wasn't - but blitzkrieg is an extrapolation of ancient tactics to fit the modern battlefield. You are just misinterpreting my position.


Encirclement does not directly equate to Expanding Torrent/Blitzkrieg. An encirclement can come as a result of simply deep flanking - such as in Uranus and Winter Storm - which had nothing to do with expanding torrent tactics.

Breakthrough tactics + encirclement = deep operation. Which is why it makes more sense to use the word, since deep operation theory is far more evolved and incorporates tactical theories and sees them from a strategic point of view. This is probably because 'expanding torrent' was never really put into effect, until during the Second World War, and blitkzrieg is just a made up word by some British journalist.


It is not obvious at all. Blitzkrieg tactics came about as a result to the mass casualties suffered in WWI, and due to the result of the situation the Germans were put in after Versailles. Hart, Guderian and others did not simply sit down one day and read Homer. Blitzkrieg tactics were formed independently of Greek Tactics, regardless of similarities between the two.

Err, no they weren't. Basil Liddle Hart, Guderian and Tukhachevsky were all experienced theorists and commanders who had a handle on strategy and tactics which were in constant evolution before them. They were simply smart enough to extrapolate existing tactics to employ them to defeat an enemy that fought like one did during the First World War. They did not create what they did out of thin air.


Would you care to site a single book? I am not looking for a General writing in his memoirs that two situations seem similar - how about one of the originators of blitzkrieg doctrine saying they developed their tactics based off of Greek tactics. I have read a number of works on the subject - blitzkrieg came from the failures of WWI, which occurred within the last five years - not Ancient Greece, of over 2000 years ago.

Well, first of all - again - none of the theorists that made 'blitzkrieg', called it 'blitzkrieg'. It wasn't within the scope of their books to cite sources from past history, although some gave examples of their tactics being put to use (like I said, Edhard Raus). But, if you have studied both you can obviously make comparisons. But, what you're saying is tatamount to claiming that Clauswitz' On War was solely made up by him, which is ludicrous - he was a great strategist that new how to put together different existing tactics to make a grander strategy; the same as post-WWI tacticians and strategists. None of these men did what they did out of thin air.

You have to stop equating 'they did it because of WWI' to 'ancient tactics were designed to defeat WWI style armies', because you're making the wrong connections and look at this from a very narrow perspective.


You stated its impossible because no one has done it yet.

There have been dozens of aerial mass bombings of cities, throughout history - you have even stated one example, Dresden.

That is an unsupported statement with nothing but opinion behind it.

Well, yours are actually more unsopportive, since you just keep saying the same thing over and over again.

Additionally, by destroying all of the buildings in a city, you effectively destroy the city - there is no way for a large number of humans to live in a pile of rubble - even if that pile of rubble is temporarily defensible.

It's not a question of humans living in the city, it's a question of using the city as a fortress. Even if a large mass of the civilian population dies, the military population won't. The garrisson has to be effectively destroyed, as Leningrad and Stalingrad prove - this is especially true for larger cities.

So yes, I have proven my point. If you reduce a city to rubble, and wait - the buildings will fall, the people will die of starvation and the elements. Thus, it is possible to destroy a city with non-nuclear weapons.

You really haven't proven anything.

Little Boy, a 15kiloton nuclear weapon, destroyed Hiroshima. It is entirely possible for many NS Nations to drop 15,000 tons of conventional explosives on a single city. This is not even considering the effects of incendiaries, which of course multiply the effects of the weapons far beyond their own tonnage.

The advantages of incendiaries is to burn the city; if you are dropping enough bombs to level the city, there's no point behind incendiary explosives. There were survivors to Hiroshima, as well. And ... dropping 15,000 tonnes of explosives is sort of ... difficult ... to say the least (given the amount of defenses on NationStates, especially long-range surface to air missiles; the strategic bomber is more or less obsolete against a modern enemy).


As I said above, it is impossible for a large number of survivors to live in a city of rubble without water, food or shelter. Thus, by destroying large areas of surface, everything inside will eventually die.

The keyword is eventually, but while the garrisson remains alive it has to be destroyed.


I am not denying that. I simply said the Germans were not trying to erase Stalingrad, they were trying to occupy it.

Of course, but the point remains that most of Stalingrad was turned into rubble by bombers. The German's goals are irrelevant, in this case.

I will contribute my widget, The Lightning Warfare strategy used by the Germans in WWII was developed to smash a WWI style army layout, or to prevent the WWI scenario from happening in the first place. The idea of the blitz, first and foremost, is speed. All the details fall into place after, and only after speed is first taken into account.

I had a number of responses written to the points we were arguing - however as this argument continues expanding to encompass points in no way related to our initial debate, I'm going to look back at your initial criticisms.

[FONT="Palatino Linotype"]
In regardsl to what's defined as 'blitzkrieg', it shouldn't really be called either 'blitzkrieg' nor the 'expanding torrent' [wherever that term came from], as opening holes through an enemy line and filtering troops to enter the rear area has existed as a tactic since classical Greek civilization, and before. IMO, the term 'blitzkrieg' to explain any tactic from an educated perspective is erroneous, period, because blitkzkrieg was invented during the Second World War by a periodical. You might as well call it deep operation, which although was 'invented' by the Soviets [again, not really, since it's just a conpendium of existing strategies and tactics] also applies to 'blitzkrieg'.
Your point here is that I should not use the term 'blitzkrieg' or 'expanding torrent' - but use deep operation. I have stated, in my original post, that I do not agree with the term blitzkrieg - I do agree with expanding torrent. It was the first term developed on the subject, and it is the one I choose to use. If you want to call it Deep Operation, feel free to do so. If you want to call it blitzkrieg, feel free to do so. I am going to call it expanding torrent.

But, my main point is that in that type of assault the majority of the casualties will most likely be taken by the attacker, since he is channeling much of his strength to open that small gap in the line. As a consequence, this normally requires using a large mass of forces to break through a most-likely heavily defended sector. Even at the Battle of Sedan, 12-14 May 1940, against one of the weaker portions of the French Maginot Line, German infantry took horrendous casualties attempting to cross the Meuse River - despite the air superiority [not guaranteed]. This should be factored into this guided, I think. While casualties for the campaign, if successful, may be lower than your enemy's, it will not during the opening days of the offensive.
Your second point was that majority of casualties will be taken by the attacker. In my initial post, where I claim the majority of casualties will be 'captured' - I was referring to the casualties of the defense. I maintain the position that if the expanding torrent/deep operation/blitzkrieg is done successfully, that the defense will suffer large amounts of captured losses.

I will concede that the attackers will take high initial casualties [dead and wounded] in the beginning phase of the attack - and will add a note of this in the opening post. However, I still maintain that at the end of the encounter, the defense should maintain higher captured casualties.

This is no longer true, with the advent of guided munitions. Furthermore, a self-propelled howitzer can be programmed to allow up to six rounds hit simultaneously the same area, increasing the opening firepower. Furthermore, in terms of firepower the key is that howitzers can fire [i]continuously, while an aircraft can't. So, why an aircraft may have four to five missiles, a howitzer can fire between twelve and fifteen rounds per minute. Aircraft are better used for precision strikes and not to inflict massed casualties, except for bombers and carpet bombing, which may be obsolete given the invention of the long-range anti-air missile.
In my opening post I stated that aircraft could potentially be more devastating than artillery - not that they were always so. I maintain that aircraft dropping high payloads of precision guided cluster bombs can be more devastating than artillery barrages. I never claimed it was always so.

It really depends on the density of the armored formation and the type of projectile being fired by the artillery piece. For example, during the Battle of Ishme-Dagan, during the War of Golden Succession [NationStates], my armored units were packed densely and so were open to take casualties from Havenic [Safehaven2] anti-tank cluster munitions, such as SADARMs. There are variables that will decrease a tank's suceptibility to these type of attacks, but now this is beyond the scope of the article.
I noted in the original post that both the density of the formation and the technology being used are critical in determining casualties. The opening numbers were very basic, general numbers from which to base actual casualties.

Unless you use a nuclear bomb, yes it is impossible. There are historical examples which prove it.
Though extremely expensive, it would not be impossible for even a nation the size of the United States to drop 25,000 tonnes of explosives on a city. As Little Boy proved it only requires 15,000tonnes, I don't see your argument here.

Just wanted to tack on about the "destroying a city" debate. It would seem there are two sides to it that don't exactly gel because you are talking of a "city" in different terms. One of you [Kroando] is talking in very physical terms; i.e. the buildings, the infrastructure, the homes, etc. The other [Mac] is talking about it in a battlefield sense; i.e. just because you destroy the buildings, doesn't mean the attacker instantly wins and can mosey on through.

Well, here is what I think. Is it possible to level a city? Yes. By the simple mass size of militaries and technology in NS, it should be possible, whether it takes repeated bombardment or not, to destroy the physicality of a city. That being said, just because a city is destroyed, doesn't mean the battle is over. If Stalingrad taught us anything, it would be as Mac has said that a destroyed city can become even more dangerous for an attacker trying to go through. Additionally, bombing a city to kingdom come may cause severe casualties, both civilian and military, but not this: "the defending force should accept total losses." I don't think there is a single attack that I or anyone should accept this in. Maybe nine out of ten people die, but never 10 out of ten. I don't care if nuclear f***ing holocaust reigns down.

While the debate may have devolved into examples of leveling cities, I think the initial point was more along the lines of a city as a battlefield (considering it was under the heading "Urban Warfare"). As such, I would side with Mac in that in invading, simply bombing a city out of your mind doesn't end it so that you can move on.

Military doctrines throughout history have been designed to solve problems recently encountered - not on abstract ancient philosophies.

Tell that to Sun-Tzu. He has influnced Western Millitary Doctrine for almost 300 years.

Hiroshima has a population of about 1.15 million and Nagasaki about 450,000 according to Wikipedia. The populations were most likely much smaller in 1945. Back then, a 15 KT bomb could take out much of the population, but cities in 2008 (or 2010, or 2020, or 2050, or whenever a lot of people RP) are vastly larger than Hiroshima or Nagasaki were in 1945.

Now, nuclear devices spend most of their energy at the centre of the explosion. You won't be able to take out a city 10 times the size of Hiroshima with a bomb 10 times the size of Little Boy. There is simply no way in hell you can kill everything and everyone without a) moving troops into the city to hunt down survivors, b) sucking out all the oxygen, e.g. with thermobaric bombardment - nuclear flame might not reach everyone but they'll all die if they can't breathe, or c) using an unfeasibly large (multi-gigaton) bomb to literally crater (or better yet, vapourise) the entire city.

Hiroshima has a population of about 1.15 million and Nagasaki about 450,000 according to Wikipedia. The populations were most likely much smaller in 1945. Back then, a 15 KT bomb could take out much of the population, but cities in 2008 (or 2010, or 2020, or 2050, or whenever a lot of people RP) are vastly larger than Hiroshima or Nagasaki were in 1945.

Now, nuclear devices spend most of their energy at the centre of the explosion. You won't be able to take out a city 10 times the size of Hiroshima with a bomb 10 times the size of Little Boy. There is simply no way in hell you can kill everything and everyone without a) moving troops into the city to hunt down survivors, b) sucking out all the oxygen, e.g. with thermobaric bombardment - nuclear flame might not reach everyone but they'll all die if they can't breathe, or c) using an unfeasibly large (multi-gigaton) bomb to literally crater (or better yet, vapourise) the entire city.
I'll be citing the Los Alamos's study of Nuclear effects, circa 1964:
With nukes, you don't need thermobarics, as the heat would be sufficient to cause a firestorm along the fringes of the city-limits. Towads the center everything would be blasted to bits and make quite fine kindling, EMP and all the other fun stuff would make fighting those fires a royal pain.

And to wipe out a city with 10x the area would need roughly 1250x the explosive power.
(So it would be like Hiroshima+15Kt=Manhattan+20Mt)
(Pi*r^2) vs (4pi/3*r^3) Sorry for the fuzzy math.

Many have also theorized that most casualties in a modern nuclear exchange would be caused due to the widespread destruction of critical life-sustaining infrastructure, and not the bombs themselves. (Many more would be critically/fatally wounded by the bomb/s, but not killed outright)

Kroando, you have to ask yourself, why would a nation bother to obliterate a city, completely, when they could, at a much lower cost (monetarily speaking) destroy the city from the inside out by seige or air raids upon the military installations within. Eventually, the population would starve (Unless of course they followed the ideas of Galbreath, who theorized that through the proper manipulation of productions possibilities a isolated land could survive without any help from without, hey look, I can cite immaterial economists like you can cite immaterial military theorists!) a much cheaper alternative than the rapid use of expensive munitions to wipe them out.

Kroando, you have to ask yourself, why would a nation bother to obliterate a city, completely, when they could, at a much lower cost (monetarily speaking) destroy the city from the inside out by seige or air raids upon the military installations within. Eventually, the population would starve (Unless of course they followed the ideas of Galbreath, who theorized that through the proper manipulation of productions possibilities a isolated land could survive without any help from without, hey look, I can cite immaterial economists like you can cite immaterial military theorists!) a much cheaper alternative than the rapid use of expensive munitions to wipe them out.

Well, North Korean economists do believe that an isolated country like their own can survive without any help from without, but Galbreath doesn't sound like a typical North Korean name.

Usually, destruction of a city is motivated more by a desire to inflict terror, or an ideological aim of genocide rather than a tactical or strategic need.

"Survive" is a loaded word. They would be, in fact, correct seeing as they still exist despite years of isolation. Then again, all you need to simply survive is a means to food and safety. Hell, there are some 1500+ tribes (I believe that is the number) around the world with no outside contact in their modern history... they still survive.

Time for me to offer a bit more into the 'destroying a city debate'. A city's value is first and foremost, as a center to promote economic activity, establish administration, and of course, to defend the denizens there to promote the before mentioned purposes.

A. Promote Economic Activity. If a city's power, fuel and water sources have been destroyed, that city's economic power is for all intents and purposes, gone. The workers of a city, without reliable food and water, will not work - thus nothing will be produced. Without ample energy, factories will again, produce nothing. Data systems will be down. Electronic finances are out the window. A modern city cannot function without power.

Now, is it impossible to destroy a city's power system through strategic bombing/missile strikes/artillery strikes? No. Is it impossible to knock out the water system? Again, no. So we all agree that it is very possible to destroy a city's economic purpose.

B. Administration. By destroying government buildings, wreaking havoc throughout the city though artillery fire and aerial bombardment - the administrative potential of a city will deteriorate into nothing. Now every last government worker might not be dead, but with the chaos that comes from such a bombardment, and the destruction of government facilities, a city's administrative potential can be reduced to negligible portions.

C. Defense. Now if the defense forces of a city cannot prevent an invading force from destroying the city's economic and administrative potential - that defense force cannot do much besides making occupation difficult. Now if an invading force does not want to occupy the city, but rather just 'destroy it', it needs only to contain whatever defense forces remain inside. By bombarding the city, it is possible to eliminate whatever mobile potential the enemy has. [This means knocking out armored vehicles, transport, aircraft and other such modes of transportation] If not by knocking out every vehicle, than by causing such destruction that it is impossible to procure and ample amount of fuel to wage effective warfare.

So if the defense force is incapable of leaving the city without being blown apart - it will have to stay in the city. If the city is cut off, surrounded, and being bombarded on a daily basis - the majority of its denizen will be killed by the elements. If a large percentage of the people are killed, the city cannot produce any economic goods, there is no administration, the army defending the city is unable to attack the forces besieging it - then the city is destroyed.

Note. On why immobile forces in a besieged city can do nothing. Immobile forces, when assaulting mobile forces with artillery and aerial superiority - will be obliterated. Not engage in an interesting battle - they will be erased without inflicting casualties on the enemy.

So now we have a large number of people, living in a city which has been heavily damaged, a city which has no economic potential, no administrative authority and no means to assault the forces isolating it, with a large number of immobile soldiers within its borders.

That is a destroyed city.

You have, however, changed your argument now.

I quote your original point: "In this option, an array of large caliber guns loaded with high explosive weapons and incendiary munitions may literally level the city - killing everyone inside. This is very possible, and the defending force should accept total losses - including all civilians and defenders."

Your new point is saying that it is possible to win a battle in which the battlefield is a city... ... ... Well, Duh. The point we have been making is based on what your guide says. We have been saying that "just using an array of large caliber guns loaded with high explosive weapons and incendiary munitions may literally level the city - killing everyone inside... [the] defending force should accept total losses" is not a valid point. Okay, maybe after a long, long time, sure. If you had instead said that carrying out a long siege on the city will eventually result in total losses, well I agree. Hell, you could do that and without firing a shot and make the defender accept total losses... eventually.

If the city is of little to no importance, and the enemy resistance is expected to be stiff, blowing the city off the map is not an impossible option with modern technology - let alone in NS. In this option, an array of large caliber guns loaded with high explosive weapons and incendiary munitions may literally level the city - killing everyone inside. This is very possible, and the defending force should accept total losses - including all civilians and defenders.

As it has been already pointed out, its rather unrealistic to kill everyone in city in conventional bombardment.
It should be noted that as there are NS nations which have population higher than Earth currently has, then there are also lot bigger cities. So argument "we have more artilery in NS, so we can bomb them to dust" doesn't really work so well, because targets are also bigger.

Something about historical examples, some have pointed out Dresden, well firstly in Dresden losses there so high because city was unprepared and weather was ideal for bombing, and still less than 5% of population died.
Berlin received huge amount of bombs during war, I think tonnage was like 67,000. Although Germans obviously did their best to repair stuff, but still thats worth several little nukes, still only like 30k people were killed, and city gave significant war production up to moment then Red Army reached to its doorstep. And obviously Monte Cassino which was simply one big building, that received probably hundreds of tons of bombs, and still functioned as fortress.

Time for me to offer a bit more into the 'destroying a city debate'. A city's value is first and foremost, as a center to promote economic activity, establish administration, and of course, to defend the denizens there to promote the before mentioned purposes.

If city is indrustially importnant, then it most likely fuctions as logistics center for area around it, as most importnant railways and highways will probably go through, or very near to it. So enemy fortess in such location can seriously disturb your war effort. It would also tie down significant forces which are needed to besiege it. Also lots of artillery shelling besieged city(es) (there may be more than one at same time), means that there is a lot less artillery avaible in other parts of front.

Finally city that survives prolonged siege, especially if besieging force puts lots of effort into bombing city, is pretty damn good for propaganda.

On the matter of Blitzkrieg

I wont pretend to be a military strategist but I think I might have something to add to the Blitzkrieg topic.

It is still a viable strategy used today. In fact, the United States implemented it against the Iraqis in order to defeat them very quickly.

I believe some experts outlined Blitzkrieg in these terms -

I. Deception - Surprise your enemy or make your enemy believe you will attack somewhere else.

II. Mass your forces for a fast initial attack in a soft spot (Think Ardennes forest Battle of the Bulge).

III. Soften your enemy with Air Power to throw them in disarray or leave them vulnerable. (USA Blew up communications lines, AA Batteries and Strong holds before tanks arrived)

IV. Seize major roadways/ passages, and vital areas before they can be secured/ sabotaged (Can't push your men forward if they blow up the bridge.), Even if this means avoiding the enemy (USA Captured 993 out of 1000 oil drills in Iraq. 7 were sabotaged, entire Iraqi garrisons were bypassed in order to attack Baghdad and oil fields faster.). Army can be divided for this attack for a short period of time in order to secure these points. By capturing these major roadways you limit the enemies ability to regroup the scattered forces.

V. Pull up reinforcements at this point. Your Supply lines and flanks are quite possibly overextended and vulnerable to the enemies you avoided and when they try to make a counter attack. Counter-Attacks on the flanks and supply lines are the bane of blitzkrieg. (French almost halted German Blitzkrieg by attacking the right flank. They were of course destroyed.)

VI. Secure captured vital areas and hunt down the enemies remaining forces if you haven't been able to force them to peace talks yet. If your good, you could have captured their capital and leaders by now and force them to sign outrageous concessions to you/ surrender.

VII. Occupy if needs be and pacify the populous. From the words of Machiavelli, do not try to seize the property or impose harsh new laws so quickly or else resistance against you will be intense.

My 'revised' argument does not state, "Your new point is saying that it is possible to win a battle in which the battlefield is a city." at all. It says that a city, for all strategic purposes, can be destroyed. Seeing as this entire guide is based on strategic warfare, it is rather understandable that the 'destruction of a city' would be in a strategic sense. And while my literal 'kill everything' statement is not the norm on the battlefield, it is still possible. It is possible to drop 20, 30 even 40,000 tonnes of explosive on a city if that city must be removed from the map at all costs. Now the above explanation states that a city can be 'destroyed' without obliterating it - a valuable point in the argument.

As far as the argument that 'the cities are bigger' - that really depends on who is fighting.

Bump! Please O' Great and Powerful Mods grant us this wish!
Make this a sticky on the II forums?
( burns Oxen on Golden Brazure, tosses hand fulls of gold coins into the fire. Has hired
all the village Priests to sing the Praises of The Great Old Mods for three days. Feasts
are held and Icon's hang from the wall of Sirocco )

Bump! Please O' Great and Powerful Mods grant us this wish!
Make this a sticky on the II forums?
( burns Oxen on Golden Brazure, tosses hand fulls of gold coins into the fire. Has hired
all the village Priests to sing the Praises of The Great Old Mods for three days. Feasts
are held and Icon's hang from the wall of Sirocco )

It's in the consolidation....

My 'revised' argument does not state, "Your new point is saying that it is possible to win a battle in which the battlefield is a city." at all. It says that a city, for all strategic purposes, can be destroyed. Seeing as this entire guide is based on strategic warfare, it is rather understandable that the 'destruction of a city' would be in a strategic sense. And while my literal 'kill everything' statement is not the norm on the battlefield, it is still possible. It is possible to drop 20, 30 even 40,000 tonnes of explosive on a city if that city must be removed from the map at all costs. Now the above explanation states that a city can be 'destroyed' without obliterating it - a valuable point in the argument.

As far as the argument that 'the cities are bigger' - that really depends on who is fighting.

The Judicious use of small weapons ( like 100lb bombs ) can with some planning destroy major cities. Instead of the Arc Lite campaigns of Vietnam.
Or the Daylight raids of the USA and Briton led against Germany and Japan
in WWII.

You can opt to a much more fearsome form of bombing. By striking very important targets in the city.
Things to strike ( but not necessarily in this order )
Communications systems like Radio, Television and Internet.
Electrical generation systems,
Power distribution blocks,
Fire Stations,
Police Stations,
Hospitals,
Prisons,
Water towers,
Dams,
Bridges,
Airports,
Rail yards,
Sea ports.
then Warehouses which hold food, ( perishables)
and Non perishable foods.
Sporting good stores ( deny the population of guns )
Electronics stores and Home depot type buildings
( No IED's or home bunkers )
Hmm I know I've missed something.
It'll come to me later.

It's in the consolidation....

It's so close we can FEEL IT!

The bright blue Aura of Awesome begins.

" This is when the Magic Happens" says to the Public gathered Round the Pantheon of Moderators.

It's so close we can FEEL IT!

The bright blue Aura of Awesome begins.

" This is when the Magic Happens" says to the Public gathered Round the Pantheon of Moderators.

And it's going to stay in the consolidation and nothing more.

I think something should be said about naval-based landings. In the past few days, I've watched over an invasion of East Congaree, annoyingly since I've nuked the invader into a lake, but soldiers, I would believe, would take a huge number of casualties to secure a beach. The only reason the Allies took Normandy is because the Germans were grossly outnumbered and outgunned. Had the Germans been more prepared and didn't move those divisions into Norway the Allies would have collapsed into a hole.

I think something should be said about naval-based landings. In the past few days, I've watched over an invasion of East Congaree, annoyingly since I've nuked the invader into a lake, but soldiers, I would believe, would take a huge number of casualties to secure a beach. The only reason the Allies took Normandy is because the Germans were grossly outnumbered and outgunned. Had the Germans been more prepared and didn't move those divisions into Norway the Allies would have collapsed into a hole.

I'm working on a thread about Naval landings in a modern era,

And as for the German's at Normandy, there were many things which helped
but even if they didn't loose all the beaches.
The Russians would still have pushed and pushed and eventually rolled over the
Germans. At some point fortress Europe would have fallen, and when those
men on the Coast of France were needed to save Berlin, The Allies would have returned.

Here's the link to Naval / amphibious landing thread I started,

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=563095