NationStates Jolt Archive


High mobility tactical vehicles, insurgents and small-arms

Castilla y Belmonte
30-01-2008, 18:52
I recently posted this as a topic on the NS Drafroom (http://z4.invisionfree.com/NSDraftroom/index.php?showtopic=2054), and I rather have people respond on that thread - but, I want to open this thread because I'm aware not everyone on NS is on the Draftroom (if you're not, you should join!).

The vehicle will be sold by Sistemas Terrestres Segovia Land Systems (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=547939).

Castilla y Belmonte’s defense company MecániCas, known for the Tiznao-60 modular armored truck, is currently in the development phase for the upcoming Tiznao-10 ‘Vehículo de Alta Movilidad’ (VAM). The VAM is going to be heavily based on Iveco’s Light Multirole Vehicle (LMV), except since I don’t know the specific materials used on the LMV I’m going to have to ‘invent’ an armor based on what I have available in papers on my computer and in the various magazines/journals I have. Ideally, the vehicle is also going to be a tad larger in height, because I’m going to trade the LMV’s flat composite floor for a v-shaped hull floor (not as dramatically shaped as some of the United States’ MRAP trucks, but it’s going to be better designed to deflect the blast of a mine). Regardless, the vehicle’s main customer for now is going to be The Macabees (TM is going to start to buy its land vehicles from Sistemas Terrestres Segovia and MecániCas, so that I don’t have to start making two of each vehicle, for each nation I play). Some of the most important areas in a vehicle like this are the glass windows – ideally, I want to make the windows proof against 14.5mm heavy-machine gun armor-piercing ammunition. The thickness of ballistic glass is limited by the fact that the thicker an armor becomes the heavier the vehicle becomes – and the chassis’ armor will be heavy enough – and the thicker transparent armor becomes the less light is transmitted through the armor. Given the ceramic industry’s current state in the European Union, some newer transparent ceramic armors have not yet been applied to combat vehicles because they cannot be produced in current European factories, and they are too expensive to produce in the United States (and more expensive to import). In other words, they are still being developed and they have not entered a stage in their development where cheap production has become a priority (like titanium).

http://i75.photobucket.com/albums/i291/Macabees/typicalarmor.jpg

With that taken into consideration, small-arms armor penetration is highly dependent on the material of the round or of the core of the round. For example, a tungsten carbide (WC) core will offer more potential penetration than an all-steel projectile (higher hardness and density). I know that on NationStates there has been a more widespread introduction of newer armor-piercing projectiles in the calibers between 4mm and 15mm, and I want to see if I can provide the VAM with protection at least against 7.62mm – that is, if I can’t provide protection against heavy machine-guns, as well. Therefore, I want to take a survey on the type of armor-piercing ammunition in use around NationStates, especially from those who frequent the NS Draftroom. This information will play a role in the materials I decide to use for the armor (if I can choose a cheaper material, then I will choose it – if not, I will have to weigh cost versus ballistic protection and go with a more expensive material), especially the glass. What’s more, I’m willing to bet money that a large number of armies on NationStates use depleted uranium (dU) cored small-arms armor-piercing ammunition! Obviously, that will make my job much more difficult. So, if you are willing, please respond to the following questions (your post doesn’t have to mention the questions and you don’t have to answer them like you were writing your response on a piece of paper with space to answer – answer like you want to, and if you want to add extra information go for it):

1. What type of armor piercing projectiles do your infantry use?
2. What type is the most common? The more specific, the better.
3. What caliber heavy machine gun is issued at platoon level or company levels?

http://i75.photobucket.com/albums/i291/Mac...amplerounds.jpg (http://i75.photobucket.com/albums/i291/Macabees/examplerounds.jpg)

And for the sake of interest, although nothing I have hints on the protection of the LMV’s windows, Spain is acquiring forty LMVs as an emergency measure and these will reportedly be fully armored – protection against 14.5mm armor piercing ammunition on the chassis on the front panel (not engine block), roof panel, upper rear panel (basically, the frame of the back window) and the side panels. The windows are not included in this package, because the article my reference is from suggests that the windows can be armored independently (not sure if Spain will go for the transparent armor package), and the article doesn’t mention what these glass armor panels are proof against. Based on production centers, it’s likely that the ballistic window panels on the LMV have a front-plate of Quartz glass (produced in Italy). To stop a 7.62x51 AP8 NAMMO (WC core) projectile, a glass panel would need at least seven 8mm layers of glass (56mm), plus a 7mm front plate of quartz glass (total of 63mm). This is an educated guess – depth of penetration into quartz glass seems to be lowest of all available transparent front plates (float glass and glass ceramic, made in the Czech Republic). I need to find some sort of formula for the dissipation of light for a given thickness – protection against 14.5mm NAMMO projectiles might be impossible, with existing materials, for the windows.

An alternative is to offer two separate modules for the vehicle’s doors – one with larger windows, and one with a firing port. The former could be used in less intensive peacekeeping operations, so that the soldiers can keep in contact with the local population (largely, the theory behind vehicles like the Golan and all of that), while the second module could be used in vehicles that are escorting convoys and are more likely to be engaged by heavy assets. The firing ports can’t be protected, but a greater surface area of the door would now have complete protection against 14.5mm armor piercing WC-cored projectiles (and I can use more mass efficient materials than glass) – the firing ports can be designed high enough on the door so that it forces a soldier to take a knee while firing, but it means that stray shows into the ports will be unlikely to fatally wound a soldier in the vehicle, or harm something else important. The problem is that I have never been peacekeeping, so I don’t know the design theory behind primarily peace keeping vehicles and high mobility reconnaissance vehicles – there must be a reason most of these vehicles have large window panels. I will have to ask some veterans. But, the idea is still out there – given that the doors can be easily exchanged, it shouldn’t be an expensive module to acquire for a percentage of the total vehicles procured. Given the modular nature of the vehicle, some will be turned into smoke generators, others into command vehicles, other into artillery command vehicles, et cetera – some will be fine with larger windows and will prefer them, while specific urban combat vehicles will be able to be more heavily armored, with reduced ‘weak points’.

Personally, I think mounting an active protection system is out of the question. Even if the vehicle is destroyed, the majority of its occupants will survive (as has been shown in Iraq and Afghanistan), meaning the economic loss is the value of the vehicle (Spain is purchasing 40 LMVs for 14.4 million Euros or 360,000 euros per vehicle). What I need to figure out is the cost of an infantry man (to train). Ultimately, what decides the question is the amount of life loss per vehicle, plus the average life lost in the same vehicles per month, compared to the total amount of vehicles in the fleet. Let’s say that each Ariete active protection system will cost about $250,000-300,000 (I’m not sure between the cost of the cost of the X-band phased array radar of the Ariete on the Lince, and the current Doppler radar on the T-80UM1, or the future X-band sensor radars developed in Italy; Arena is thought to cost up to $400,000, while I’m sure that Rafael has claimed that their Trophy costs about $300,000 per package – production of the Ariete may decrease due to the sheer amount of systems produces for the almost one hundred thousand Lince tanks sold so far, and the amount which will be sold on the Lynx (different type of grenade, but this is irrelevant), and those which may be sold on surrogate vehicles based on the Lynx chassis. Nevertheless, we can agree that installation the system will almost double the price of the VAM! If we put a price of $300,000 per installation for a total of two thousand VAM vehicles acquired by Castilla (far, far more by The Macabees) that means total installation costs will be 600 million dollars! How many soldiers are fatally wounded, or wounded enough to be put out of action indefinitely, in similar vehicles in Iraq? How much does it cost to train the average U.S. infantryman (I’m pretty sure the price our drill sergeants told us is inflated – they claimed over a million just to recruit us from MEPS)? Even then, the installation of an active protection system will not increase protection against small-arms.

The design of a light vehicle is more complicated than one could have originally thought.

Armor design is probably the easiest part, given that the general idea for lightweight defense already exists, and it’s mainly an issue of which material to use for what. The vehicle will be constructed from a single structural rectangle which is what holds the crew, and to this a unit can issue either standard modules (low ballistic protection) or armored modules (ballistic protection versus 14.5mm armor piercing ammunition). The floor panels will only have one module, which will be armored to deflect and absorb the blast of an improvised explosive device or anti-vehicle mine. Principally, this is to sell the vehicle as wars on NationStates don’t seem to be asymmetrical – but, players who take the time to role play guerilla warfare will have this vehicle. The floor panels will be more inclined than those of the LMV (very slight angle, to form a very obtuse V), which will add height and a bit of weight (longer panels), but only the height will be incremented to a point where it will be noticeable (increase in weight should be minimal, as the space is largely hollow). In general, the armor of the chassis and the ballistic paneling for the windows will be the same – a number of layers of composite. The vehicle’s armor will be similar to that of the Tiznao-60, only thinner (no protection versus shaped charges), and the window panels are going to be layers of glass, with a strong backing layer (probably S-2 glass, which is superior to E-glass) and a hard front-plate (which has to be decided). What will ultimately decide the materials to use are the answers I receive in this thread on the type of ammunition used, and on research I will have to conduct simultaneously (although, for the most part I have enough information on my computer). As expected, the ballistic panels will be centered on the rectangular crew module, and the back area of the propulsion module (part of what surrounds the crew is part of the propulsion module). I don’t think the engine will be heavily protected, although I’m not sure. It doesn’t seem to be protected on the Italian LMV. The same seems true for the Israeli Golan, given that the visible modules can only be seen behind the engine, where the crew is. In fact, the same is true for a lot of the MRAP vehicles – a lot of bolts around the crew modules, but no bolts on the engine module. The vehicle is a 4x4, and will run on run-flat (which is copyright, but there is scientific term for them that I know of and everyone uses the name Dyneema and Kevlar to describe what is in reality fiber reinforced polyethylene or aramid – so, I should be fine) tires to increase its chances of survival even if the tires are shot-up.

In regards to weaponry, the vehicle will mount a primitive version of the HammerFist remote weapon station (at $215,000 per HammerFist, with everything included, the system is hardly affordable on a vehicle that should cost less than $500,000), which can mount any type of automatic weapon up to a 15mm heavy machine gun, and a 40mm grenade launcher. This will allow the client to make the ordnance as versatile as he or she wants it to be, and the HammerFist includes four grenade launchers with the possibility to increase the amount of grenades by mounting a grenade module (similar to the grenade modules used on the Israeli remote weapon stations on their heavy armored personnel carriers). Given the vehicle’s role as a cavalry vehicle or as an escort vehicle, heavy armament is not really a priority – so one weapon should do. As usual, Sistemas Terrestres Segovia Land Systems (export conglomerate and not to be confused with Sistemas Terrestres Segovia the company) and MecániCas (manufacturer) will advertise mountable ordnance from Doomingsland Defense Industries (DDI). But, a client can use whatever he or she wants as long as it fits in the system.

It will be powered by a compact diesel engine, which still has to be designed/acquired. Power output is simply too small to justify the use of a gas turbine; the technology of Turboas’ TA series 600 gas turbines used on our heavy armored fighting vehicle can’t be designed for a horsepower production of less than 900hp, or the engine begins to decrease in efficiency. Consequently, as far as I know a gas turbine is out of the question and this shouldn’t be a problem anyways, since the diesel will be multi-fuel. The engine’s output will depend on the weight of the vehicle, but it will probably be about 200hp. For the sake of affordability, the transmission will be mechanical (and for the sake of efficiency), despite the weight – I don’t feel comfortable enough with the technology to begin introducing lightweight electric transmissions for vehicles of this size, or for vehicles in general (that is, vehicles that are going to be exported). The general idea is that the mobility assets will be designed in such a way to maximize survivability of the people inside the vehicle. What I’m afraid of is that the lack of armor around the engine will cause insurgence to begin to aim for the power pack, and therefore conduct a mobility kill. There is a chance that if the vehicle is stopped, then the area that the vehicle was stopped at will likely become the perfect area for a firefight – which may end up with dead soldiers. The problem is that on NationStates all the forces automatically know all the enemy’s weak points, and even untrained insurgents find it fairly easy to target areas of a vehicle that are more likely to result in a kill. I don’t know if mobility kills are a current problem in Iraq, and I don’t know how well a diesel engine can stand-up to small-arms ammunition. In the end, the power pack may have to be defended against 7.62mm ammunition. I will have to find some statistics for the use of these vehicles in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Lebanon, with special interests on statistics on kills involving these vehicles.

It’s interesting to note that in Spain’s case the best vehicle armor proved to be pig blood – well, really, any blood that can be said to be pig blood. In Bosnia and Kosovo (I haven’t heard of this being used by Spanish troops in Iraq (2003-2005) or in Afghanistan (2001-present)) Spanish armored fighting vehicles (such as the BMR) were bathed in blood from one (animal) source or another, but was ‘advertised’ as pig blood. Militia fighters refused to fire against Spanish vehicles which these characteristics for religious purposes. I’m willing to bet that such ‘protection’ has its limits, and I’m not sure how effective it would be in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, despite Spanish soldiers generally being more respected and better liked in Bosnia than their U.S. allies, I’m not sure that such a method would be respected in general. I think that Iraq is a poor example of a successful peacekeeping operation (which is what it is, only much more violent than those normally conducted) because of the general mentality of the U.S. soldier. I remember talking to a captain in Fort Benning’s hospital’s kitchen about the Arabic culture and Iraq, and his explanations and descriptions were poor and very biased. When I was still in college, in San Diego, my professor of ‘history of film as an art’ talked to us fairly frequently about American soldiers and their relations with the Arabic population in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the only American soldiers which really preformed well in these types of war were the Army Special Forces (according to him), because they’re trained to integrate themselves in the society and culture. On the other hand, the average U.S. Soldier (all branches included) are not – during basic training, we were issued a handbook on Arab culture, and I know for a fact that the majority of the recruits never opened it (and we were never ordered to, unlike the IET Soldier’s Handbook). For example, my professor explained that one of the bigger issues is that U.S. soldiers tend to wear sunglasses even when entering a building, or talking to the local population. This is a sign of major disrespect in the Arab culture, and is explained in the handbook (which isn’t read, and this is evident that U.S. soldiers still wear sunglasses in these situations). In regards to what my professor has witnessed, and his position to judge, he’s been to Afghanistan multiple times (according to him, at least twenty) and to Iraq (less than to Afghanistan) – he’s an independent director and an artist, and goes to do some jobs for documentaries and such. Interestingly, he found out that his photographs of the Afghan population had to be taken from his chest, as not cover the face, to avoid disrespecting the subject of the photograph.

This VAM isn’t only designed for asymmetrical warfare, and in conventional wars I don’t think heavy armor will be entirely necessary (low threat of ambush and the vehicle is not likely to be used during a planned firefight). Nevertheless, even in asymmetrical warfare some vehicles generally have large windows to increase the vehicle’s occupant’s contact with the local population. In other words, these vehicles cater to countries that have a mentality of winning the hearts and minds of the population. Back to the subject of two different modules for the doors – the windowless modules can be fitted by nations not interested in a pacific occupation of a country, and instead wish to conduct a violent repression of the local population. Heavily armored vehicles will always be superior for this type of strategy, and I don’t see a reason to have large windows on a vehicle if there are no plans to interact with the local population.

If you’re asking why this is so long and why I keep going in circles, it’s because I don’t have internet access at home – so, I write this at home and them go to an internet café and post it. So, when I’m bored at home I try to write, and normally end up writing abnormally long posts for things that should probably be simpler. For example, this last sentence should have probably been shorter and more direct. And this second sentence should have most likely been omitted from the text, as should have this sentence. Up to here, 3,269 words total.

Given that I’m bored and that I’m hoping that this vehicle will be the ‘ice breaker’ for Sistemas Terrestres Segovia Land Systems (the storefront on International Incidents) I’ll make this into a more complex questionnaire. Ideally, this is to cater to everyone possible so that sales will increase. This is probably the first vehicle on NationStates that is going to be designed based on such a type of questionnaire.

1. What do your armed forces use high mobility vehicles for?
2. What do you believe should be present in a ‘future’, or more ‘advanced’, high mobility vehicle?
3. What is the most common threat faced by your armed forces, and what do future projections dictate that your next conflict will be? Conventional? Asymmetrical?
4. What would be the ideal price range, keeping in consideration the ideal technological level?
Diggledom
30-01-2008, 21:23
Hey,

A thread to get involved in while writing a uni report, good. Anything to distract me:-p



Right, answering the questions.

At the moment my force are undergoing a big reorganisation, shifting from mainly Russian equipment to more western equipment.

So at the moment the most common armor piercing rounds that will be used are 5.56 armor piercing rounds. Other rounds include:

15.2mm Steyr APFSDS - In several infantry organisations snipers are going to be equipped with this beast of a round, specifically for long range anti-light armor work.

7.62mm NATO - Snipers and machine guns, not that they will be much of a threat against you, but still, included for accuracy.

12.7mm fired by both snipers and heavy machine guns, can be armor piercing, mainly used against light vehicles or emplaced positions protected by softer civilian walls.

And both 25x59mm and 40x53mm automatic grenade launchers.

For special forces use:

9.3x64
7N33 (Russian): 16.5 gram bullet travelling at a muzzle velocity of 770 meters per second.

7NR45 (Russkyan): Armour Piercing Fragmenting Jacket (APFJ) bullet type.


The most common armour piercing round will be 5.56mm. Simply because that is the most common weapon calibre at the moment. Platoon level machine guns are 7.62mm in light infantry roles or 12.7mm with 25mm and 40mm in my mechanised/motorized/airbourne units. Company level is basically light infantry with the mech/moto/ab platoon level weapons or in the heavier formations it will probably be the 15.5x115 mm rounds fired by the BRG-15.

Second set of questions:

High mobility vehicles are used for behind friendly lines patrols, hearts and minds operations in neutral territories, light artillery towing, courier work, some CASEVAC roles.

You have pretty much covered what I would have asked for, specifically, large bullet proof windows, mine resistant body, mobility-kill protected and a weapons station. The only thing I might add would be the option to integrate into a battlenet system, I am slowly trying to introduce my troops to some form of the system, yet to be exactly designed.

My, limited, military actions are based mainly around short high-intensity wars followed by peace-keeping operations, the only one presently posted being the Novajev incident.

Cost, I have no idea, I would have to look that up and I have to go back to "The use of Plant Material as forensic evidence in court cases" a fun essay if there ever was one.

Hope this helps mate.
Castilla y Belmonte
31-01-2008, 18:08
Because I can't log onto the NS Draftroom, for some reason ... I'll post this here. I'll repost on the Draftroom when I can.

http://i75.photobucket.com/albums/i291/Macabees/Hardware/VAM.png

I made a line-art picture of the vehicle, and yes it’s too long and the wheels are too small; but, it’s just a picture and my images have never served as completely accurate representations of the vehicle in the write-up (I just don’t draw well enough). And yes, the vehicle’s image is based entirely on IVECO’s Light Multirole Vehicle (LMV) – with different tires and wheels, and a strangely huge second door. Regardless, the line-art distinguishes the armored ‘crew cell’, and the unified ‘lower chassis’ (propulsion unit and rear storage area unified by the transmission block). The issue of armoring the motor is still unsolved – I don’t think it’s armored on the LMV, and I need to see if any of the new armor kits for the Humvee include protection for the engine. As I said before, I don’t know how well a diesel engine can sustain damage if hit by a tungsten-cored armor piercing 15mm projectile – the main question is, can it still run? The main strategy for light reconnaissance and exploration forces like the ones that will be using this vehicle will always be to ‘get the fuck out’, and so apart from surviving the initial attack the vehicle also needs to survive long enough to get out of the kill-zone. Run-flat tires and a central inflation unit will help to increase survivability, but the integrity of the engine is still an issue. I will need to ask active soldiers on their experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan in tactical vehicles with damaged engines.

Another issue is: how much does the roof need to be armored? The LMV can be fitted with an armored panel for the roof, and the HIM-TAC will be offered the same option. I’m guessing the main threat is fragmentation of nearby artillery rounds, and the entire vehicle will be definitely armored against that. On the other hand, what about parachute deployed grenades (explosively formed penetrators, in other words) fired from anti-vehicle rifles, or even smart top-attack ammunitions fired from artillery rounds – the LMV’s roof panels only offer protection against fragmentation grenades. The capable penetration of both of these are likely to be the same, depending on the manufacturer of either weapon – a top-attack parachute deployed grenade can probably penetrate 60-100mm of armor (how much did the grenade that knocked-out the ammunition of an M1A2 Abrams have to travel?), while a well-made artillery top-attack EFP can penetrate roughly 140-170mm of armored steel (RHA). To be completely honest, complete protection against the former might not be completely necessary – just enough protection to dissipate the energy of the threat. Perhaps a roof panel composed of layers of lightweight ceramic tiles, plastics and glass? In a sense, a type of non-explosive reactive armor (NERA), only not thick enough to protect the vehicle against dedicated anti-vehicle shaped charges, but enough to absorb the majority of the energy of a parachute deployed grenade. I just won’t know an accurate number for the weight penalty of perhaps 50-60mm of that type of armor – it will be many times lighter than steel, but it will still increase weight versus a standard non-protected roof panel (which can be constructed out of aluminum, really). There are new technologies which increase the protection of standard aluminum or steel plates many times over, but these have entered widespread production in the real-world (such as carbon nanotubes, for example); or at least, their production has not been announced (one article I have suggests that new steel ballistic panels have been introduced for some MRAP vehicles, and these were developed in Israel). In order to provide a vehicle ‘superior’ to real-life designs (LMV, for example) I will probably have to use these, even if some people don’t trust them because they have not been reported in available literature – otherwise, a ‘superiorly’ protected vehicle will just mean a heavier vehicle, and that’s not necessarily superior.

Apart from protection, I have to start looking into diesel engines (and will have to print Sumer’s guide to diesel engines). Ideally, I want to make something with a high power to volume ratio. Rolf Hilmes suggests that the MTU 880 series produces 219kW per m3 and the MTU website suggests that the MTU 890 series produces the same in half the size (or 438kW per m3). The HIM-TAC will probably have a 150kW diesel engine, so if I use similar technology to the MTU 890 series it means that the engine will be less than .3m3 in size – the problem is, can that technology be applied to engines of this size? For example, the technology used in the LV100 gas turbine (not yet produced for the M1 Abrams – there’s still issues of wanting to spend the money to replace the AGT-1500 and issues with what to replace it with) does not work, apparently (Koschier, Angelo V. and Mauch, Hagen R., ‘Advantages of the LV100 as a Power Producer in a Hybrid Propulsion System for Future Fighting Vehicles’, Journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power, 2000) if the engine produces less than 900hp of power (explaining why all of the Lince’s surrogate vehicles have no less than 900hp engines). Similar issues may exist with large diesel engines, so I will have to look into diesel engines offered by MTU for smaller vehicles and into engines offered by IVECO and other diesel companies. The more compact, the better, because it means I can justify using a central inflation unit to keep the tires at the ideal pressure level (although, this is used on the LMV). If anybody wants to give it a shot at designing a diesel engine for the HIM-TAC, go ahead and post a brief description with all the important details and I’ll turn it into part of the write-up (if it’s better than anything I can come up with – or, perhaps a hybrid between something I come up with and something you come up with; we can work out details).

In terms of firepower, I decided not to make the remote weapon system standard. Instead, the vehicle can mount a machine gun up to 15-16mm in caliber (to allow for 15.5mm machine guns) or an automatic grenade launcher of up to 40-50mm. A remote weapon system, such as HammerFist, can be fitted (HammerFist is especially easy to fit, since all you need to do is bolt it to the roof – there is minimal intrusion inside the vehicle proper) into exploration or reconnaissance variants if required by the client – a remote weapon system will probably cost over $100,000, so it won’t be included in the base vehicle. The Macabees will acquire about 120,000 to distribute amongst the auxiliary forces (light infantry divisions and armored divisions composed of Guffingfordi and Havenic volunteers – the two new occupied territories of the Second Empire), and Castilla y Belmonte will procure about 900; these two orders should be enough to justify a decrease in cost. I think that it would probably be a bit more than the Italian LMV, if a similar amount were sold (a bit over 2,000), and so maybe the vehicle’s price (after taking these two orders into consideration) can be of around $275,000 per vehicle, despite the more expensive armor protection. But, if ten nations acquire as many as The Macabees has, that means that over one million more vehicles will be exported and so that should justify a dramatic decrease in price (perhaps price should be decided based on the amount of vehicles purchased per order, and not after tallying the production of all orders). In any case, the inclusion of an active protection system will also be up to the client and not to MecániCas – at a minimum of $250,000 per APS, that at least doubles the price of the vehicle; MecániCas doesn’t see the venture as economical for the threat. If the soldier inside doesn’t die due to a successful penetration (or if casualties are kept to a minimum) then replacing the vehicle will be cheaper than mounting an active protection system. In The Macabees’ case, that’s 120,000 x (275,000 (price per vehicle) + 300,000 (estimated price per Ariete APS)) = $69,000,000,000. Let’s put the average price to train an infantryman and to pay for his first deployment at $1,000,000. Price without the APS is: 120,000 x 275,000 = $33,000,000,000. Consequently, in order to justify the application of an APS in the fleet The Macabees would have to face the potential loss of 36,000 infantrymen – cost to replace the vehicles lost. I don’t honestly foresee the loss of 36,000 lives in the occupation of Theohuanacu, let alone just lost while being in a HIM-TAC. Let’s assume that an average of 1.5 persons are killed per HIM-TAC which has been hit (understanding that anywhere from 0 to the maximum amount of occupants can be killed – but the figure is made-up, so perhaps there is a better figure based on real-world statistics); this means that basically 6,000 HIM-TACs would have to be lost to fulfill the necessary quota. This, over the lifespan of a HIM-TAC without needing a major refit or major maintenance and over the time in service of the average non-officer (the amount of officers to occupy this vehicle on the frontline will be extremely low, compared to non-officers). How many Humvees has the United States lost in Iraq? Even such a figure wouldn’t be at-all accurate, because we’d have to figure out the amount of life lost in Humvees before the general era in which they received up-armor kits and after (the loss of life afterwards should be a lot lower on average per month). Even then, up-armored Humvees are not brand-new vehicles and do not have the anti-mine protection of newer Humvee-type vehicles (like the LMV). If 40-50% of life loss in Iraq is due to IEDs (I believe this is an accurate statistics), how many are due to Humvee casualties? Average loss of life per Humvee lost? How many lives are lost due to rocket propelled grenades against Humvees? How does this compare to the possibility of a much greater distribution of RPGs amongst NationStates insurgencies?

This brings up important questions for roof protection. What are the chances of a dedicated artillery attack versus a squad of these types of vehicles? Then again, that’s why such a vehicle is best to be modular. A client can buy the armor kits necessary for the foreseen use of the vehicle – if the vehicle is for law enforcement and border patrol then most vehicles will probably only need protection against 7.62mm gun fire (and then, probably not against WC-cored ammunition), if any at all. The price of the vehicle, therefore, could vary between $75,000 and $300,000. A vehicle without special armor is going to cost dramatically less than a vehicle with special armor, and special tires and central inflation units – border patrol units don’t need all of that stuff. For example, in real-life the chances of a band of Mexicans crossing the Rio Grande and ambushing a border patrol vehicle with rocket propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices is less than 1%, approaching 0%. I think to most accurately place a price the write-up will need a separate list of prices, specifying what these costs cover. Furthermore, different armor packets will need separate prices in case a client wants to up-armor their vehicles after a given time (perhaps the vehicle is going from a logistics unit to a front-line unit, for example). These vehicles are more complicated than one would have originally thought!

I think I have the ‘solution’ for the ballistic windows. Cotland confirms that his friend – a Norwegian soldier – says that the LMV in service with Norway can successfully stop an impact from a 14.5mm machine gun round (the type of round, unconfirmed). Given the type of ceramic produced in Italy, the front-plate is probably Quartz Glass – although, there is a possibility that it could be something imported from the United States (if this is true, then the material is most likely sapphire). If a 7mm front-plate of sapphire and six 8mm inner plates of floating glass can stop a 7.62x52 AP8 WC-cored projectile, then aluminum oxynitride (AlON) should perform much better. I need to figure out the penetration of a WC-cored projectile in 14.5mm, and then I can estimate the penetration capabilities of a 15.5mm WC-cored projectile (maybe around 30-40mm?). In any case, we’re looking at no less than four 8mm layers of glass material (perhaps even polycarbonate? – I don’t know how polycarbonate would effect transmission of light if it’s 32mm thick, composed of four 8mm layers) – with a front plate of 8mm worth of AlON. If the polycarbonate can transmit light as well as float glass, the polycarbonate will increase ballistic resistance – the layers would be bonded by thin layers of polyurethane (PU). The backing layer will be composed of E-glass, which apparently has stronger spall strength than S-2 glass (see: Yuan, Fuping, et. al., ‘Spall strength of glass fiber reinforced polymer composites’, International Journal of Solids and Structures, 44, 2007). Total thickness will therefore be between 45-48mm. This might be thinner than it should be, though – in order to stop a 7.62x51mm WC-cored projectile you need approximately 48mm of floating glass, plus 7mm of sapphire, plus an undefined thickness of backing material, which is at least 56mm thickness. True, we’re exchanging sapphire with aluminum oxynitride, which is superior, and floating glass with polycarbonate and specifying a backing layer (E-glass), but to be honest I don’t know how much better this would be over the sapphire and floating glass. I don’t have the knowledge on the transfer of light and ballistic formulas in order to make an accurate analysis. Information on the LMV’s window protection is likely classified, or extremely hard to find. I know, however, that polycarbonate is normally used as a backing material (E-glass should still be superior), although polycarbonate is also what makes up the riot control shields for law enforcement and probably my ballistic shooting glasses (the riot control shields may give some insight on the thickness of polycarbonate where as one can still see accurately from one side to the other). So, in any case, I have a clear idea of the materials I have to use, the question is only about the required thickness to defeat any given threat.

I’ll have to continue my research!
Wandering Argonians
01-02-2008, 01:10
OOC: In 2005 I think it was close to $200,000 USD to put a soldier through basic training, not counting advertisement costs and recruiter time and materials. Infantrymen undergo an additional five weeks of training, bringing the cost to roughly $311,110 by estimation through the Windows calculator. That might have increased by now, since training days are longer and Saturday has become a training day as well, so they'll be using more ammo and such. That does not include equipping the infantryman once he reaches his duty station, which will run you a bit more. I can't exactly estimate how much since I don't know what the government pays to aquire the gear, but I'm sure it's less than what I pay when I buy my own stuff.

Hope that helps.
Doomingsland
01-02-2008, 01:21
My only complaint is that I already have a vehicle called the VAM <.<
Dostanuot Loj
01-02-2008, 02:15
OOC: In 2005 I think it was close to $200,000 USD to put a soldier through basic training, not counting advertisement costs and recruiter time and materials. Infantrymen undergo an additional five weeks of training, bringing the cost to roughly $311,110 by estimation through the Windows calculator. That might have increased by now, since training days are longer and Saturday has become a training day as well, so they'll be using more ammo and such. That does not include equipping the infantryman once he reaches his duty station, which will run you a bit more. I can't exactly estimate how much since I don't know what the government pays to aquire the gear, but I'm sure it's less than what I pay when I buy my own stuff.

Hope that helps.

OOC: No it costs way way less then that.
Consider that the entire DoD budget (Which includes all training, equipment and maintenence for all branches) is currently about $440 billion, and the total military personnel is 2.3 million. That alone means the US DoD has, annually, about $191,000 per person. Training costs will again be a fraction of that.

In fact according to this DoD document (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/defense.pdf) in 2005 the US DoD spent just over $102 billion in personnel. That is, if we divide it by even 2 million personnel, that's roughly $51,000 average, to include pay and training.

The US Army does not, nor ever did, spend even remotely near $200,000 per person just to train them.