NationStates Jolt Archive

Tian Shan

West, Depkazia; south, Pakistan, recently taken into the care of the Khalifate; east, China... or, in the opinion of everyone assembled here today, East Turkestan.

In days bygone, the Depkazi Soviet Socialist Republic and its Edmund Tchokareff-lead successor the Atheist Labour Republic had harboured leaders in the Uyghuristan movement. Today these leaders were gone, executed or imprisoned by Chingiz as Depkazia embraced both Islam and the pan-Turkic ideal.

Today, the Khalifate tried still to appeal to the millions of Uyghur in 'Xinjiang' though took the line that a distinct Uyghur ethnicity was relatively unimportant. Depkazia's de facto official line was behind the wider Turkic identity... even perhaps a Turanian one, as a possible mechanism for relating to Japan should relations with China worsen any further.

Hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs in East Turkestan -Xinjiang- were encouraged to see Depkazia, the Khaganate, and the Khalifate as very much their ally as it continued to call for the liberation (and annexation to itself) of Kazakhstan. Tens of thousands of Depkazis were more obviously courted, but Chingiz -since he claimed the title of defender of the faith and successor to the Prophet- was also keen to reach the Hui, Dongxiang, and some few Muslim Zhuang. The Mongols too are encouraged in their widely-held belief in Turkic origin via the Hun and the idea that they may be elevated in Depkazi society more than Chinese. Of course the few thousand Tatars of the region are also targetted as Turks and Muslims, and the Salar encouraged to remember their own belief in Samarqand as home.

These efforts may have significance also in places such as Qinghai and Gansu -where the Tu are also infrequently contacted by representatives of the Khaganate (rather than as members of the Khalifate)-, but it is Xinjiang that is most easily accessed and most keenly engaged by the Depkazis.

The call to prayer, traditional Turkic musics, and reports of the great victories of the Khaganate and the Khalifate trickle through the mountains on the airwaves of state and private media sources, and diplomats and religious or cultural leaders visit Xinjiang with all allowable frequency, Depkazia increasingly using the Autonomous Region for diplomacy and trade with the Chinese state whenever they are not absolutely forced to travel to Beijing or elsewhere. And the Depkazis are not hesitant about exploiting corruption wherever they suspect it, keen to buy important figures on to their side and, more importantly, hurt the reputation of the Chinese state as did the administration of Jin Shuren before the revolts that lead to the East Turkestan Republic's first appearance.

But that wasn't all. Today, with significant help from the Depkazi border security forces, radicals and agents were sneaking through the mountains to East Turkestan to plot, organise, and carry-out terrorist attacks on the Chinese state, sometimes in the name of their religion and sometimes independence from Han domination for Turkic and other related groups in the region.

Attempts at stock-piling weapons and explosives had recently begun, and would continue in the build-up to the first major attacks: the Depkazis wanted to get as much equipment into East Turkestan as possible before high-profile attacks gave cause for significantly enhanced security. Still, if the rebellious message really got through to locals, there was nothing to say that some wouldn't try striking before hand, but, hopefully, nothing large-scale... at least for a few more days.

During the formative years of Liu's regime, an intrepid warlord known to the Chinese as "Daylam" had attempted to raise Xinjiang up as an independent nation. The scheme failed, and it had set the stage for a brutal battle between the Chinese Communists and the National Stratocracy, with the indigenous population caught in the middle. The minorities suffered particularly hard, in part because of lingering hostility between the Han soldiers and the Turkic population, and also because large numbers of civilians had disappeared, taken by Sinoese soldiers who suspected them of aiding Daylam.

Nowadays things were much better thanks to race relation programs since Zhang's rise, but there were still a few areas of discontent. While the quality of life had improved substantially, the Turkic minority were fearful for their culture, and Depkazian radio served as a much-needed reminder of their tradition. The Han now dominate Xinjiang as they did Tibet, around three-quarters of the population now describing themselves as Chinese. Generally, things weren't too bad overall for most of the younger Turkic Chinese. It was the older men and women whose grandparents were forced into the back of a black van and never seen again who could provide support for Depkazian efforts.

It would be however in the mosques of the region that the call of a muslim state could reach fertile ground. In the beginning of Zhang's tenure, he had altered the school cirriculum to include christian ideals and with Quintonnian help, built several Christian schools in Xinjiang. The enroachment of Christianity on what was formerly Muslim soil had created discontent, enough to cause extremism.

While China kept a close-eye on the border, there was really nothing to suggest that there was anything significant happening. Even with the Great Wall OTH radar sweeping the area now and then, the crossing of agents into Xinjiang goes undetected.

On the politcal front, China's administration was again indecisive. The Emperor had been silent over the recent conquest of North Pakistan, hinting at an unspoken agreement that China would allow it as long as the peacekeepers could hold the portion of Afghanistan neccesary to build the pipeline to the Combine. On the other hand, General Chang was now absolutely fed up with Chingis's antics and wanted to seize Afghanistan with the assistance of the Combine.

(Just stop me if I ever go too far, China.)

A lot of Depkazi resources these days were trapped in development and the reorganisation of North Pakistan, which would likely be the scene of continued conflict on some level for at least the immediate future. It looked like a third Beylik would be created under the Khalifate, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir becoming the Beylik of Kashmir, perhaps administered by Husayan Ali Khan, while the Capital (Northwest) Province is likely to become a Khanate subordinate to the Depkazi Khaganate, and the Border Agencies remain on course to a less certain future requiring major investment in order to turn them around.

War is still being planned against the Kashmiri Maharaja with a view to taking Jammu and Kashmir into the Beylik, meaning that significant Depkazi and Bactrian forces remain in Pakistan as surveys and preliminary works get under-way towards gas exploitation, roadbuilding, and power generation.

The Khalīfah is desperately keen to see unrest in China worsen to the point of crisis, hoping that he may then be in a position to make Xinjiang unsustainable under a weak government and take control of at least its western half (as the east is believed to be increasingly Han-peopled ). Whether this would be accomplished by deployment of troops during an extreme crisis or almost as part of a trade deal remains to be seen. But Chingiz, of course, is totally confident that it will happen, one way or another.

Days later, Kashgar, Xinjiang/East Turkestan

Many students on their way to school still had the resonance of yesterday's speech in their ears after a noted Depkazi scholar, resident at prestigious Registan, secured an invite to lead the prayers and give an address at a fairly large mosque. He'd mostly been speaking on three topics: the usual one about the rise of the community of Islam under the heroic guidance of the new Khalīfah, Chingiz Khagan Depkazi; a barely disguised attack on the Han and Christendom by way of a warning over the future of Turkic and Muslim identity under Chinese domination; and a little about the attack on Indonesia, which he'd insisted that China supported, and in which he called the Spyrians infant-Chinese and the Sujavans their dolls.

They would be greeted today by graffiti on the wall of the school ordering [i]Infidels out of East Turkestan! and three other articles reading May the Caliph Free Turkestan!/Kazakhstan!/Indonesia! and then, around lunchtime, smoke rose from across town: a small Church had been fire-bombed and a slogan urging the people to repeat the revolts of the 1860s in which the Han were slaughtered and Chinese influence driven out for several years.

The tone of these actions was evidently quite harsh, but, as yet, the actions themselves were pretty minor attacks in a city far in the west of the region with (relatively) little Christian or even Han penetration, but, over the next few days, a few further acts of incitement would be carried out in Karamay and, eventually, Urumqi.

Samarqand

Work was slowed by the absence of Chingiz, still on a semi-secret tour of Kashmir's Beylik-to-be, but it did continue with his intermittent input.

Exploration and exploitation of oil and gas were high on the agenda, as Chingiz had instructed his government to investigate all potential bargaining chips with the Chinese. The problem was that the border with China, which was helping agents to sneak into the country, made the laying of pipelines a lot more difficult than the Armandians seemed to think, as they had drawn proposals that cut through hundreds of kilometres of mountains as if they weren't there. The cost of running pipes such great distances straight into China through Depkazia, Bactria, or even Pakistan would off-set a lot of the potential profit.

Possibly diverting through Kazakhstan would avoid some of the most difficult terrain, but that meant bringing the Tsarist Empire into negotiations, and, from Samarqand's point of view, potentially recognising Russian domination of Kazakhstan, which the Khaganate still claimed as its own. Yes, if Kazakhstan were Depkazi, a lot of these problems would go away. Samarqand will certainly always do its best to blame the Tsarist occupation of Kazakhstan when problems arise in respect to supply of Central Asian petrochemicals to China.

Samarqand was looking into the cost of a gas pipeline from its southern Dauletabad gas field to China via the extreme northeast, close to the Kazakh frontier, but even this looked likely to be extremely expensive, and the possibility of combining Armandian gas and oil lines along the same route in order to induce the Combine to cough-up a few billions for a construction project on which Depkazi lines could piggyback. There was already talk of increased transit prices being demanded of the Armandians if their pipes did not run a route proposed by the Depkazis.

In any event, there would be no pipelines at all if Bactria were invaded in an attempt to run pipes through the ridiculously difficult Combine-suggested route, and there was no question of troops from outside the Khalifate being allowed into Bactria, which presently was defended by twenty-thousand battle-hardened paramilitaries under Tumens Dostum and Rabbani with the support of the Aeronautical Battle Force.

For now, though, no rush. Best that China struggle for fuel and energy prices rise while the Khagan has hopes for instability there, and the means to lower said prices. If it should come to war, the loyalty of the Turks and Muslims in western China must be tested seriously, and so propaganda efforts continue as vandalism and fire-bombings continue on a fairly low level.

(It's a shame the Armand is so busy in reality and LRR in other RP. They may both be handy in getting this to go somewhere.)

(Sino was generally a lot more thorough than the PRC was when it came to putting down rebellions. Tibet was a lot worse off, with the % of native Tibetans thought to be less than 10% when Liu instituted his quest to build the largest concentration camp in the world by population. I imagine Xinjiang may have escaped the worse of it since it was under joint PRC-Sino adminstration when the last rebellion broke out, but the proportion of Han is likely to be somewhat higher than RL)

With Beijing occupied by more important tasks, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Xinjiang goes largely unnoticed except by the local police force. A hundred or so more policemen are sent to the border towns with the standard equipment.

Truth be told, the main reason for the pipeline was more politics than economics. The pipeline would only be marginally viable through the Combine proposed route, but it was always possible that China's sea route to the Combine could come under threat from the Soviets or the INU should they be so inclined. Building a secure pipeline was part of China's energy plans which included siezing the Spratlys (done) and reducing domestic energy consumption in order to achieve energy security and ultimately, self-sufficiency.

With the snap election weeks away, political analysts with an interest in the region predict a deployment of "peacekeepers" into Afghanistan if Chang were to influence military policy, or else a softer line of continued negotiation with Samarkland if Zhang retained power.

India

Under Emperor Zhang, China has become more of a friend than a hinderance to the Indian National Union, and, despite the fact that there exists no formal diplomatic relationship between Parliament and Beijing, few Unioners are eager to see the Middle Kingdom destabilized from within or from without. Of course, Liu had been quite thorough in his dismantlement of Indian intelligence networks in the former Sino, what few existed in the first place, leaving the INU at least without information regarding reported political unrest. The situation in Xinjiang is the subject of even fewer reliable or detailed intelligence reports, despite Parliamentary concern over the plight of the native Uyghur population. Attempts made by the foreign ministry to support Uyghur uprisings had ended in disaster, and not since the 1970s had any serious follow-up been tried.

However, with events in Kashmir rapidly unfolding, and with unrest more the rule than the exception on the roof of the world, the situation in China's westernmost provinces could very well gain significance for humble Mumbai. It stands to reason that, as long as Parliament continues to oppose rather than accept Depkazi expansion, it should be checked wherever it rears its head. But the situation in Xinjiang is more complicated, with the Khaganate supporting what Mumbai has long viewed as a legitimate cause. Parliament could, therefore, make its presence felt on the issue from either point of view, and a great many Muslim Unioners are not bashful in their support for an independent East Turkestan.

Of course, for the Maharaja of Kashmir, any opportunity for him to cause the Khagan trouble is an opportunity to be taken full advantage of. Long jockeying for Chinese support, Parak Singh takes the unprecedented step of offering a whole regiment of his best troops, sorely needed at home, for internal security duties in Chinese Turkestan. They are experienced in mountain warfare and counterinsurgency operations, having long been occupied with crushing revolts in the Muslim-majority Vale of Kashmir, and ruthless. If Beijing accepts, the Maharaja can only expect further support from Emperor Zhang in return.

(OCC: It isn't a very informative post, but hopefully it more or less outlines Hindustani and Kashmiri opinions on the matter. More later.)

The Caliph persisted in all his works across his domain, with military parades (at which a solid-fuel strategic-range ballistic missile has been displayed) and public works (in light of on-going difficulties in securing major foreign investment) becoming ever more grand in reaction to increasing pressure placed upon the Caliphate by delays and uncertainty in dealings with its neighbours.

Depkazi media outlets began to deliver thus far thin references to the idea that Russia might seek treaties with the Caliphate in light of a more militarily-influenced China. To many this would be confusing for many reasons, but to one with enough experience and understanding of Depkazia it made more sense: Samarqand could not speak openly of a desire for reconciliation with the infidel occupiers of Kazakhstan, but might suggest such desire on the Russian side, and at the same time indicate to the Chinese that the Caliphate could be forced to realign itself if exposed to excessive pressure from a government overly influenced by Chang.

While the Combine remained introspective it was hard for Chingiz to arrange alternatives. Plans for access deals for Depkazia to the oceans without having to transit Russian waters and for the Combine to China remained on hold.

In this light, there was little to do but continue the support of Turkic nationalists and Muslim seccessionists in Kashmir and Xinjiang, which the Caliphate did with ever increasing propaganda, funding, and Mujahideen training programmes.

The offer from Singh was respectfully declined. It would have been highly impractical for non-Chinese speakers to try and police what was a complex situation. Also the PAP had just managed to get on top of the issue. Singh is offered "the most sincere gratitude" for his offer, but no thanks.

Beijing had plans of further assistance for Kashmir, but in what shape or form would be determined after the election.

---------------------------------------

A few days after the firebombing of the church, a group of men discreetly arrive in Kashgar. Nothing unusual, except for the cache of heavy automatic weapons in the back of the van.

Unknown to most, the right-wing, ultra-nationalist National Stratocracy was still alive, abeit in a shrivelled and depleted form compared to the heady days of the 90s when General Liu ran the nation. Now seemed like a good time to rear their heads again. The riots in Guangzhou were a good start.

It was only a brief letter sent by a mid-level diplomat to Samarkland, but the ramifications were enormous.

The four page letter was sent by Mr Wing Lee, regarded as one of Chang's pitbulls and one of China's most eloquent letter writers, having previously sent a death threat to the Filipino president and having a bounty placed on his head as a result.

Much of it was background and irrelevant trifle noting China's assistance of Depkazia in the past, the shared cultural heritage between the two nations and a short story regarding the bloody fate of those in ancient Chinese history who betrayed China, but obviously demands were made.

"Should Depkazia continue eyeing Xinjiang's riches with greed, then China will no longer consider Samarkland her ally."

Bump!

(OOC: Sorry, repost from Depkazia homepage.)

Caliphate pulls forces from east, retreats from Chinese frontier

...but still refers to East Turkestan.

Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi has issued orders for the decommission of several defence facilities in Depkazia's east, notably withdrawing many Su-27 Flanker interceptors from bases close to China.

Samarkand calls this a good-will gesture in hopes of future commercial relations with Beijing, while a foreign newspaper claims to have interviewed a senior Defence Association Co-ordinat officer who, though unidentified, suggests that the retreat is in fact an attempt to protect the Khaganate's best military assets in the event of a Chinese first-strike against the Caliph, who has, no doubt, made many enemies by his obstruction of a proposed Armand-China pipeline once slated to intersect territory now occupied by Caliphal soldiery.

Meanwhile...

The Caliph is newly arrived in Hindustan for high level talks on the future of Kashmir, Radu Khan's Afghan, Pakistani, and Bactrian forces are coming under attack from Balochistani aircraft as they lay Kandahar under siege, Caliphate-backed rebels are increasing attacks against the Baloch state, and Depkazi engineers are already laying infrastructure links from their heartlands into less than stable Afghanistan.

In the chaotic mess that was China's supposed democracy, the Social Democrats hit a speed bump in quest to secure a deal with the French after King Louis walks out of a conference organised by Hu Jin Tao, leaving him red-faced and facing accusations of betrayal by the Progressives he had aligned Beijing with. Zhang's United China Party has hit financial straits after the double whammy of losing the last election and losing party investments in Austria hat were destroyed by the war.

That left Vice President Chang the political victor in the minefield of foreign relations after he hosted a successful conference with Russia in Beijing and secured relative peace in Asia - and the foreign relations portfolio is a strong indicator of election victory.

----------------------------------------------------

It was decided that the whereabouts of Chingis should be known to Chinese intelligence 24 hours a day. As Chingis was by now probably extremely wary of any ethnic Chinese that were in contact with him or his officers, the secret service decided to send an Indian-Chinese woman this time, Shilpa Hira.

Hopefully there was a Depkazian officer who enjoyed gambling, drinking, and women.

While such an officer may not be hard to find (half the population seems devout in its Islamic faith, the other half is content to embrace Turkic nationalism and keep on the vodka), Chingiz is busy announcing Samarkand's preparedness to re-open talks with Constance and Beijing over the proposed pipeline.

"Northern Afghanistan is now relatively secure" says the Caliph, "and so it is time to talk again about transit fees and tri-national co-operation."