NationStates Jolt Archive

Kashi, Tibet

The usually quiet town was bustling with construction activity - the city's dirt strip airport was being expanded to deal with heavy aircraft. Similar building activity took place in Yining in Xinjiang as well.

Secretly, the towns of Urumqi and Yining were home to increasing numbers of military personel and equipment.

Depkazia

With man of mystery Wing Lee tied up in the Phillipines and no intelligience in Central Asia barring a loose network of informants, the Chinese intelligience has begun an aggressive effort to establish a network in Depkazia.

Leading the charge will be Bao Cha Zou, or "Bauer" in English. Ethnically Kazakh but born in Beijing and fluent in several central Asian languages including Russian. The first task was to find who his potential allies would be while avoiding loyal authorities - Winning over the top ranks of the military would be key.

Arriving in Samarqand, Bauer immediate began his work.

Away in Rome, Edmund Wolfgang Tchokareff son of the last head of the USSR when it survived only in the union of the Depkazi and Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republics, was resolved to become Khaghan Depkazi and Turkmenbashi- king of kings and leader of the Turkic peoples.

Seeking to turn Depkazia, northern Afghanistan, eastern Azerbaijan, and western China into a grand new Orthodox Khaganate, Tchokareff was discussing monetary union with the Holy League, reposting desert soldiers to the chilly climbs of the Chinese frontier, deploying chemical weapons against Taliban militia, accusing Baku of supporting semi-mythical Azeri nationalists against Depkazia as well as Iran and anciently-Christian Armenia, building warships on the Caspian, and sending for more light troops to be raised to support the reconquest of Africa.

But it was just two things that carried most significance back home. First, Tchokareff appeared to be giving-up Depkazi claims to Kazakhstan to pursue less profitable and more difficult aims in China, and apparently just for the sake of his ego's flattery as amongst the pillars of the decadent Holy League; and, second, it was the realisation of how truly great the contrast between Depkazia administered by Edmund directly, and Depkazia administered by proxy through his generals and one other key party. Most had forgotten what it was like to live and work under the relatively forgiving order of even the end-stage USSR, and were amazed by how much got done when Tchokareff was out of town.

Friends from the Soviet era were few and far between in positions of authority, most having been executed or consigned to endure the ignomy of life as an infantry soldier or camel warden. But many were found languishing in prison, and some few were released on the gamble that Tchokareff had long since forgotten them, or at least that he had forgotten his own order to gaol them. A fairly strong conspiracy was in action, pursuant with the objective of a Soviet recovery, as was their whole motivation for mustering more than fifteen years ago in Depkazia after the failure of the hard-line coup in Moscow.

Their problem now was that ordinary workers had started to forget their former indoctrination, while the rank and file soldiery had too much to lose in above-average pay in Tchokareff's Depkazia.

The remaining issue likely to appear of significance to newly interested Chinese agencies was that of the other party significant to Depkazi life since Tchokareff's trip to Rome. Previous to Edmund's accession to the League, his son had been of little interest to the premier. Now, though, it seemed the kingly thing to have an heir, and even to show-off the siring of such.

Nineteen years old, Chokareff Junior (he hadn't been obliged to alter the spelling of his name, since he hadn't been considered remotely the same thing as Edmund) was previously obscure, even abused, and had wandered the substantial expanses of Depkazi Mid Asia, muttering about restoration of the old empire, cursing his father for giving him one part Russian blood with what was otherwise good -one part Depkazi, and two parts Kazakh (his mother's)-, apparently resenting the Soviet legacy and regarding Mid Asia as having been used by his grandfather and abused by his father.

Tchokareff, sense full-up on liquid mercury, had absolutely no time to worry about his son's opinions, nor what he'd been up to for the last several years, and wanted only to prove the strong breeding of his heir and to show him off in the corridors of power.

In public view, most newspapers would have taken note of Beijing's announcement that recognition of the Russian invasion of Kazakhstan was withdrawn.

Radio broadcasts from the Chinese state-owned broadcasters had run opinion programmes giving a sympathetic view of the Depkazian struggle to hold their own against Russia - no doubt these programmes would have been of some interest to those in Samarkland who were appalled by Tchokareff's ceding of Kazakhstan.

So when an note signed by Bauer arrived at Tchokareff Junior's desk promising foreign assistance to reclaim Kazahkstan, it was expected he would be interested.

Chokareff most certainly was interested by China's news, and, with his father still in Europe, keen to act upon it. Wasting no time, he suggested that Chinese Turkic soldiers especially should be sent to help him secure power in Depkazia, and said that he was moving favourable officers to control border units in the east. He was soon executing some of those most likely to cause trouble, saying that it was on the orders of his father, which was not hard to believe. Some were shot or assassinated in their beds, but since this was supposed to be an order from Tchokareff, more than a few were flung from catapults, dropped by helicopter into the Caspian, dragged behind horses and camels, buried alive, crushed under tanks, and all of the other usual things.

Chokareff would add that Afghan warlords loyal to his father could easily be convinced to side with the likely victor, that was if they couldn't just be paid-off, perhaps with Chinese aid or loans to the plotters.

As Bauer met with Chokareff, Chokareff Jr would have been pleasantly surprised at Bauer's fluency in Kazahk and Russian. Bauer bought a gift from Emperor Zhang - a golden bangle of priceless value, and went on to explain how China viewed his father, Russia, and Depkazia overall.

"The Chinese government under Emperor Zhang is interested in seeing Kazahkstan under Depkazian control, returned to her rightful ownership and led by a smart leadership," Bauer explained. "There are many Chinese Turks who trust in this new administration, and would be willing to participate in this task."

"The number of Chinese Turks in the PLA currently numbers around three thousand, and with recent recruitment efforts, can be pushed to around four thousand." Bauer explains in fluent Kazahk (OOC: Correct me if I'm mistaken)

"Rest assured, China will contribute a good amount to your nation's war chest to bribe whoever you deem troubleseem."

"There is the small matter of the Queen of Nigeria wandering around Depkazia with a large force of men, can you clarify the current situation?"

(OOC: Actually I'm not 100% sure, but I think that the Queen has been reported attending events elsewhere, and with other things happening in the world since the Estenlands has been away I'm assuming that they've gone, though it's likely that some Russian personnel might still be in the country in light of Tchokareff's moves towards the HL and his invitation to observe the Afghani campaign.)

Young Chokareff struggled to keep his eyes from buldging out, his tongue from licking his lips, and his already leathery hands from rubbing together in gleeful anticipation of Chinese diplomatic, military, and economic aid to his patricidal ambition, which previously he'd thought only a spiteful dream which, if ever realised, would follow shortly with his own slaying. Now that he actually had the means to bribe and intimidate, and to acquire personal protection, even if his father remained in Europe and safe from his murderous vengeance the youngster could still get back at the abusive, self-involved trainwreck of a father, whose only desirable lessons were demonstrated when his own father mysteriously was caused to vanish and Edmund took power from him in Depkazia during Kazakhstan's secession from the dying USSR.

Collecting himself quickly for such a young person, Chokareff -who'd been called Yuri by his father, but never used the name himself, and carried with him a list of possible alternatives, though he'd never made a decision on the matter- tried to give all the information he could. He admitted that shortfalls in this intelligence was largely due to the hopeless disorganisation and corruption in post-Soviet Depkazia due to his father's frequent and quite random reshuffling of government officials, duties, and objectives.

"...However, as I have said, this in fact makes our task that much easier. I am able to remove uncooperative elements without question, and often in doing so to intimidate others. More than that, a favourable posting -perhaps near one's family... or in some cases far from it!- is the best bribe in Depkazia to an official who's pay is relatively good and opportunities for theft and extortion greater. Specifically I would hope to enable the movement of Turkmen PLA forces into the eastern mountains of Depkazia to help the few troops I can currently trust in securing hydroelectric facilities and defensive positions in the region.

"With my father out of the country; my forces entrenched in high ground and the most difficult part of Depkazia's terrain already negotiated by Chinese forces; and power to the cities of Bishkek, Osh, Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube and others, along with water supplies to cities and agriculture in a position to be choked, enough of the Generals will be prepared to risk defiance to the current order.

"There is a chance that the Russians may attempt to interject, but seeing Chinese forces involved and in the most defensible ground might, I hope, be sufficient to stop them. And if it is not, then may we have war, for it will not endear the Holy League to my people if they should see their nation invaded (this is why I ask that Turkmen and other compatible peoples be the bulk of any Chinese intervention, and why I consider my own presence to be of importance)!"

In essence, young Chokareff was prepared to move as soon as he knew that PLA forces were close enough to arrive in time to prevent him being abandoned by his frightened co-conspirators.

The army had been mobilised for much of the past year in China, having faced down first Roycelandia, and now Russia.

"We can have 15,000 men on those mountains in three days, of which around a quarter will be Turkic. We have almost 100,000 others in China fully mobilised for this operation. As for the risk of Russian intervention, it is inevitable that Russian spy satellites will know something is up when they see our troops in the mountains.

We are prepared to 'paint' our units in Depkazi colours and engage the Russians fully if war breaks out."

Tchokareff waited, making the smallest moves possible so as not to alarm his father's loyalists, trying to kill the hours before Chinese troops would be available to his cause.

The Holy League had done too fine a job of convincing his father to join them, and he was much enjoying Europe's rich life, and was also keen to be on the continent to indicate his disapproval of Yugoslavia's war effort following the 'theft' of twelve of his MiG-29s.

Two days later, during the lunch hour of many workers, shooting was heard on the streets of Fargona, southwest of Andijon. Members of the public were out in support of a coup attempt by Tchokareff the younger, indicating that other actions were already well under way. Several key oil production facilities (the industry here is 98 years old) were surrounded by armed guards, but it was unclear to which faction these were loyal- perhaps neither, yet.

Across Depkazia a number of major airports, roads, and rail links, particularly to Kazakhstan, were barricaded or sabotaged. Satellites would detect fires in several cities and large parts of the countryside.

Most soldiers were uninvolved, notably those in Afghanistan (or at least their units did not react- the mood of individual soldiers would be hard to detect). In the eastern mountains, however, Tchokareff's chosen officers moved to sieze major hydroelectrical dams and other key facilities nestled between the peaks, not to mention tactically important heights themselves.

The cries went out- act now, and save Depkazia, act now for Allah, act now for Kazakhstan, act now and we may even prevent the return of the lunatic.

OOC: Guys, can you delay this until the 15th? I have Finals 'till then. Also, Russian troop presence in Kazakhstan is pretty heavy, and Russian troops have been mobilizing for a while now in response to the Chinese.

___________________________________________________________
-Kazakhstan-

It was funny, really. The Depkazis had chosen perhaps the worst Russian territorial posession to attack, short of Russia itself. The Baltics would have likely erupted in cheers if he had invaded (although things were much more settled in favor of the Russians than they used to be), Nigeria would have collapsed into anarchy...But Kazakhstan? Kazakhstan had been annexed without much incident decades ago, and a combination of democracy, heavy investment, economic liberalization, and a massive wave of Russian immigration (with a less reported but still quite significant unofficial deportation of "unruly" ethnic Kazakhstanis) had made the place not much different from any other Russian province, albeit hotter and with more guys with funny accents. (Who, according to some Russian females, made things even hotter...)

The military presence on the border wasn't as strong as it could've been; indeed, there was actually no Russian presence, as all professional Russian soldiers had long been diverted to defense of the Chinese frontier. Kazakhstani conscripts lined the stretches of border, armed with aging AK-101s and Russian Federation era tanks. They were, however, better armed than the Soviet era weapon bearing Depkazis, and the leadership wasn't nearly as choatic as Tchokareff Senior's had been. Crack Russian officers had long been working to improve the training and ability of the Kazakhstani military forces, and they did vaguely resemble something of an army at this point. Air support, Russia's key strength, was currently plentiful as Kazakhstan had been an anticipated launchpad for air strikes against China, but the Austrian-Yugoslavian war would soon stretch this aerial strike capacity. Elite MiG-35s hummed with anticipation for the growing battle, but the question of course remained of how effectively it could coordinate with the still shaky Kazakhstani Army.

And of course there was the issue of dissent; while much of Kazakhstan was now loyal to Russia, (partly for previously aforementioned reasons and partly due to the Tchokareff family's "reputation" for "leadership") there remained significant elements willing to take up the fight. Ironically, the one element that seemed most likely to aid the Depkazis, that of the Islamic insurgency, would be severely lacking. Russian success and a lack of enthusiasm for the cause amongst the general populace had long since driven many out, and the Depkazi invasion of Afghanistan had lured most of those who had remained.

Old guard, fanatical Bolsheviks too, would be strangely gone from this struggle. The overwhelming majority had been converted to Igovian Communist theory during the brief period of Russian-Beddgellen Space cooperation, and had, at one time or another, hitched a ride with the Igovians as they took the Space Program with them.

(OOC: That's as far as I go, for now. I'll list off the potential bases of support the Depkazi/Chinese Axis From Hell :D may find later. I need some help, fellows. I must construct one of those infamous military "lists" for both Kazakhstani and Russian military forces...and I have no idea how. And have Chinese forces moved into Depkazia, yet?)

OOC: I will do the same here. For now, I'm busy as well, so I think I might hold off for a week as well.

OOC: Depkazia hasn't attacked Kazakhstan.

And Kazakhstan hasn't been Russian for 'decades'. It hasn't even been decades since the USSR collapsed! And AK-101s aren't aging by any reasonable measure. These things of course are only true if we haven't moved AMW on to 2030 or something.

A note related to part of that: are the Kazakhstanis really using the AK-101? Chambered for 5.56x45mm NATO instead of a previously available Russian cartridge?

All that has happened is that, with Tchokareff Snr in Europe, Tchokareff Jnr -unbeknownst to anyone but China- has launched a coup. Other nations will be able to see that violence has erupted, but that Tchokareff even has a son is only just becoming common knowledge as he talks about his royal heir on joining the Holy League. The violence at this point is just a few hours old, and comes about two days after the Chinese told Tchokareff Jnr that they could deploy forces in three days.

Of course, Tchokareff Jnr, who will likely emerge with a new name, leading to more foreign confusion over who he really is, intends eventually to cause conflict with Russia, dragging China in, and taking back Kazakhstan, which until 1991 was united with Depkazia, and at some point between 1991 and 2006 was annexed by Russia, but more importantly was at various times in ancient history partly and/or wholly joined to Depkazia or parts of it under various Khanates and Khaganates. As to the Russian population, the coup-leader comes from a long line of genocidal maniacs...

OOC: Sorry, I misunderstood. I assumed the final cries implied an assault on Kazakhstan, or at least a call for Kazakhstanis to rebel.

And it has in AMW terms, at least. Putin annexed it in the beginning of his Presidency, which was roughly 2 years after he became President. He was President for ten years, and the Tsar has been in charge for at least five-seven now. That's nearly two decades. (I guess I'm stretching it a bit, but at least a decade)

And how many Russian troops remain in the Depkazi capital? They never really left...I'm assuming the majority of the parade left a long time ago, but a small presence certainly remained.

The fact that he comes from a long line of genocidal maniacs is going to make most Russian Depkazis uneager to return to Depkazia, no? Of course there's ethnic loyalty, but the fact remains that Russian governance has provided democracy, prosperity, and stability.

The AK-101s they use are aged, in that they get old hand me down models from Russian forces. The AK-101 itself isn't aged, just the specific ones used by the Kazakhs.

OOC: No, sorry, it's an appeal to Depkazis, mostly high-ranking types with ambition, to recognise that Tchokareff Snr's cavorting with the HL means giving up long-standing claims to Kazakhstan. Some generals will turn on him just because they can't accept that Kazakhstan will never be Depkazi again, and they see Chinese aid as the only way left to get it back.

Anyway, USSR ending: in AMW we have it that the main USSR crumbled slightly before reality, but not far, presumably the late 80s instead of early 90s. Depkazia and Kazakhstan continued until the actual break-up date, which enables other nations to have had their relations with the USSR without screwing up their histories. Kazakhstan was made independent in late 1991, less than fifteen years ago. Somewhere after that it was re-annexed by Russia, much to Depkazia's annoyance. At most it's just shy of one and a half decades since the reconquest, and presumably, since it was a clearly unaffiliated Kazakhstan that was annexed, with Indian Soviet presence established in the independent state, it is substantially less than fifteen years. Certainly the term, "decades" is totally inapropriate, whatever the specific truth.

Anyway, it probably doesn't matter, as we've not actually attacked Kazakhstan as yet.

As to Russian troops: they were escort for the Nigerian(?) Queen, and she has since been mentioned as going elsewhere, so presumably she exited with her escort.

If for some reason the Queen left without her escort, then a few hundred to a couple of thousand Russian crack troops are totally farked deep in Depkazia. Presumably they went with her, though, as I say... much as POWs may appeal to the coup-leaders, I don't see why they wouldn't have left with the Queen.

OOC: So, has Russia made a massive switch to NATO-standard ammunition, same as France uses (if so, what was done with millions of rounds of 5.45x39mm ammo?), or is the Kazakh use of the Ak-101 an aberration meaning that only Kazakhstan is struggling for munitions?

Everybody do the Quinntonian BUMP!

WWJD
Amen.

OOC: I always assumed that AMW time was far ahead of real time. With the sheer amount of things that occur, we'd either have to push back events continually or cram major wars in the span of days.

I'll assume that the only troops present are the ten or twenty guarding the embassy. And yes, they are fucked. (Unless Junior decides to respect diplomatic immunity laws...which I doubt.)

The AK-101 is actually in use by the RL Russian federation, and AMW Putin (far different from RL, by the way) implemented them as soon as he came into office.

(By the way, I might have to explain...I used to be the Russian player, controlling it under the conservative democrat Vladimir Putin, but through RP it came into the hands of Tsar Wingert, ruler of Ukraine. He's been busy so I've been substituting in as his PM. You probably know this all, but I'm just clarifying.)

All along the Russian border with China, air patrols were stepped since the PLA did not rule out a pre-emptive strike by Russia as a possible scenario in reaction to events in Depkazia. A strike through Mongolia would also be defended against with the army now fully prepared against any 'quick moves' by the Russians, and secretly, the Great Wall OTH radars were switched on to peer deep into Russian territory and monitor Russian movements. Talks with Russia were in continuation but China did not see any real progress - It became clear that if France or Spain were attacked as would be the case in New Caledonia, Russia would be obligated to help their Holy League allies.

Anyone with reconassiance capabilities over Asia would notice rapid movements of Chinese troops onto the mountains of Depkazia, with dozens of convoys of PLA transports arriving. Over the next few hours, critical locations will be fortified, radar and air defence facilities set up, and troop supply facilities would be built.

China's allies were briefed on the situation regarding the Russian buildup in Central Asia.

(OOC: Is the Mig-35 the RL one or a modified one?)

OOC: The AK-101 isn't used by the Russian Federation. It is chambered for the 5.56x45mm NATO calibre. The AK-74 is still most widely used, chambered for 5.45x39mm Russian ammunition, and the An-94 is, so far as I know, in limited special forces and the MVD in the same calibre. The Ak-103, in 7.62x39mm, same as the AK-47 and AKM, is also in use, and is apparently the the rifle recently reported as having been sold to Venezuela.

In AMW I suppose that the military/government would have had quite the dillema, with lots of potential choices each with pros and cons. The AK-74 isn't a bad weapon (while we're chattering on the subject, the Depkazi military uses the 5.45x39mm AK-74, but many reserve units would still rely on the AKM and by now quite old stocks of 7.62x39mm ammunition), but the modern down-sized and recovered military might still have been keen to replace it. But the An-94 sounds like more trouble than it's worth for rank and file infantry, over-complicated and several hundred percent more expensive than the AK-74. The AK-103 seems to be a a more practical weapon, but it would mean reversing through the 7.62-to-5.45 change, and having a truckload of 5.45mm rounds and weapons lying about unused. I'm not sure who -except Depkazia- would want to buy them. Of course you could go to the AK-101, using the same round as France and presumably Spain (and Walmington, Quinntonia, et cetera), but questions might be asked about the value of changing from 5.45 to 5.56mm ammunition, and the perception of Russia as bowing to French ambition and pressure may not be helped.
AK-107? That's 5.45x39mm Russian, has a high rate of fire, I don't think it's so complicated as the An-94, and I think that Venezuela uses that, too, so it has been picked in reality.

IC:

By mid afternoon, the Fargona disturbances had spread to Andijon and beyond. Tchokareff's favoured internal security detachments, at least those that had not escorted him to Europe, had fired on rioting civilians, and, over night, began to fight with soldiers. The security forces were better looked-after, and in some ways better trained, but they were soon outnumbered as The Immortal Regiments of The Depkazi People's Will began to call themselves the Turkic People's Army and spread revolt through their ranks.

Internal security used 9x18mm Makarov pistols and Roycelandian-supplied rechambered Thompson submachine-guns as they tried to raid dissenting military outposts before they moved to join the coup. Soon they were manning 7.62x54mm Vickers machineguns to defend their own regional headquarters throughout the nation as the rebels swamped them with more modern military-grade firepower.

Afghani warlords bribed earlier by Tchokareff, and others bribed recently by his son, were clashing lightly with one another and with Depkazi forces in northern Afghanistan.

International news programmes - Depkazia refuses entry to own premier

The headlines said what was most important. Tchokareff had wanted to come home, but his aides abroad indicated that the Aeronautical Battle Force, now calling itself the Turkic People's Army Air Force, was opening Depkazi airspace to Chinese military aircraft, and it was not safe to attempt the flight.

Much as he may have been confident and infuriatingly self-aggrandising, Edmund was not a man prepared to die for any cause.

The lack of confidence in Tchokareff was apparent, but foreign media sources were hard pressed to differentiate an enthusiastic core of revolt from the shoulder-shrugging decision of several hundred thousand military personnel to go along with it rather than fight their own countrymen for no clear reason.

The Chinese would have faced fairly united resistance as they arrived, but Chokareff (Jr)'s ability to put understanding sympathisers near the border enabled them to cross more or less unmolested. The internal security forces still resisting on the next morning quickly gave up, most trying to flee or to suggest that they'd turned against their comrades -every trooper you asked was responsible for talking the rest of his unit into surrender-, when they heard of the PLA's deployment into Depkazia. If the eastern mountains were breached, there was no point fighting other Depkazis- they'd all have to get on-side with the Chinese, or else all join together against them. Either way, the fighting died down quickly.

Two different figures were floating around in the press -147 and 189- for the number of people killed out-right in some eighteen hours of skirmishing. This did not appear to take into account violence south of the border.

In Rome, Tchokareff was silent but unmolested by his aides. They had the distinct impression that a storm was quietly brewing inside the humiliated leader.

Several hours before the coup was made public, close to forty transport aircraft in Xinjiang were being prepared for a large scale troop insertion right into the heart of Depkazia. They would begin arriving in Depkazia as the news broke, setting up airbases and fortifications. A couple of them landed outside Samarkland and began setting up defensive structures and radar sites.

Twenty odd J-14s crossed the border,flanked with support aircraft and an AWACS. Meanwhile fully mechanised PLA troops cross the border at a great rate, anticipating some sort of reaction from Russia, while the Great Wall OTH radar system would give adequate warning if they tried anything.

(OOC: Will need a map soon and a list of Russian military capabilities from Winger, not sure what goes where)

(OOC: Goddamit, you're such a goddamned slime ball, AMW China. And you know what I'm talking about. Anyhow, Depkazia, I was relying on Strathdonia's knowledge, since he's far more informed than I am on these issues, but I looked it up and you were right. I'll leave it to Wingert to decide.)

Peshawar

Shareef, always with an ear to the ground, sees Tchokareff the Elder's inability to re-enter his own country as an extremely good omen. While the ISI's long fingers have not yet pried into Depkazia, a nation with better counterintelligence assets than princely Kashmir, the Foreign Ministry has been able to detect upheval in the northern neighbor. The ever-scheming and plotting President, after publically condemning Depkazian 'anarchists,' prepares a diplomatic mission to Tchokareff the Younger, with orders to promise him support; air strikes, assault rifles, and advisors, and as much of those as he needs. With many times more powerful China backing him up, Edmund's son probably won't so much need the North Pakistanis, but it is hoped that Depkazia's new ruler can be won-over.

Of course, if Shareef can't get what he wants through diplomacy, he has never been skittish about using other means. In the Wahkan Corridor, long columns of infantrymen, often accompanied by an armored vehicle or two when the terrain permits, snake across the landscape, up small tracks and along the few paved highways crossing the corridor. The Federal Army men march double-time, and their commanders have orders to reach the Depakzi border 'as quickly as possible.' Helicopter-borne detachments of SSG commandos and light infantry secure vital positions ahead of the infantry columns, saving them from time-consuming mountain assaults, the likes of which they'd most likely bungle anyway. Shareef hopes to innundate the Wahkan Corridor with his troops and convince whoever ends up in power in Samarkand that the Wakhan belongs to North Pakistan. Shareef is, of course, banking on the Depkazi Army being somewhat less than interested in Edmund Tchokareff's Afghani adventure and therefore not inclined to oppose his own interests.

All in all, Shareef rates his progress as good. With Depakzia destabilized, Shareef might be able to realize his goal of hegemony over the corridor.

Depkazia

Refusing to use the name given by his estranged and exiled father, sick of being called the younger, Depkazia's new master was introduced to his people -almost forty-five million, plus sympathetic Afghanis- as President Chingiz Khagan.

Technically, that was an assumed-name sandwiched between two arguably contradictory titles with the second passed-off as a family name, but anyone who took issue would find that the new premier, whatever his name... or title, had no more time for dissent than had his despised father.

Chingiz had the infamous hippo butchered and incorporated into an inauguration banquet in Samarqand, to which Chinese and North Pakistani dignitaries were invited (other foods beside hippo were on the menu), and he announced the publishing of his desert diaries, written in his wander-years before daddy decided to take an ill-timed interest.

Promising to supply western China with hydroelectricity, gas, and some oil, and to back Beijing in disputes with Russia and other neighbours, as well as recognising the PRC's dominion over Tibet, Hoping to pay for it with petrochemicals, power, and politics, Chingiz declared that Chinese construction firms would be invited to build new highways in Depkazia, some east-west through the extremely difficult terrain between the new TPRD and the PRC, and most north-south running from Depkazi population centres towards... the Kazakh border.

The new premier also released information on Afghanistan, the disputed lands. The Turkic People's Republic, he said, laid official claims over Faryab, Jowjzan, Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan, Kondoz, Takhar, and Badakshan. Konar and Laghman were not mentioned but did feature in some Turkic People's Army advanced plans, as generals settled into posts with hopes of staying there for more than a week.

Afghanistan

Save for a Pashtun pocket northeast of Feyzabad, Badakhshan was almost entirely peopled by ethnic Depkazis, and the province was now under official claim by the Turkic People's Republic. While graciously accepting North Pakistani envoys and treating them in princely fashion, the new Depkazi premier was ordering reinforcements up into the Wakhan corridor.

Pakistani forces on the advance would find Depkazis mostly hanging around in villages and near bridges and narrow passes, but doing little other than sucking on pipes and playing games in the dust. There was no cohesive Depkazi line in the sparsely peopled and mountainous region, only tactical positions and population centres were occupied by small mountain infantry units with little view to strategic planning. And there was no urgency or motivation about the men, though they were at least fairly well equipped. Small-calibre assault rifles, grenade-launchers, guided missiles, numerous light and armoured vehicles, mortars, and other bits and pieces at least made the scattered units able to defend themselves in isolation, if they ever really felt like it.

Meanwhile, other operations continued as if little had changed (cough). Airstrikes on Pashtun areas persisted, and the enclave in Badakhshan, just west of the corridor itself, was hit by Su-25 carrying napalm, cluster bombs, FFARs, cannon, and more unusual weapons. After one attack, livestock in the increasingly isolated Pashtun-dominated area began to die, hit by bacteria of the genus Brucella, making life even harder, and several people in the same proximity succumbed to severe flu-like symptoms.

Chingiz had the infamous hippo butchered and incorporated into an inauguration banquet in Samarqand....

:eek:

Not the hippo! You bastard!

Afghanistan, the Depkazi sphere

Depkazia's officially-proclaimed area of interest in Afghanistan was, under Chingiz Khagan, officially reorganised into two protectorates, reversing what Samarqand called theft by the 1873 Anglo-Russian border agreement, apparently ignoring everything that had come since. Interestingly, Chingiz chose to designate the protectorates East and West Bactria.

In the west, from Mazar-e-Sharif, the infamous General Rashid Dostum would rule more than two and a half million Afghanis in Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, and Samangan, while in the east, from Feyzabad, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani would administer more than three million across Kunduz, Takhar, Badakshan, and Baghlan. Dostum would do specifically more or less as he wished, with Samarqand's help, so long as he also enacted Chingiz's broader ethnic and political policies, and the region's oil and gas reserves would once more flow north, almost as if the USSR never left. Rabbani... would do specifically, well, it wasn't hard to imagine the rest, and Badakshan's famous mineral wealth would be exploited for the good of the Turkic People's Republic. There were also ambitious plans for agricultural reform based on the great potential of so much of the protectorates' land (outside of the eastern mountains, at least), some of Central Asia's most viable, but whether relationships between Depkazia-proper and Depkazi-lead Afghanistan were even capable of facilitating this sort of wide-reaching programme remained open to debate.

That southern Samangan was no more under Dostum's effective control than western Baghlan was under Rabbani's was a practical matter, not one for paper, which was how Chingiz regarded Afghanistan through the maps and reports delivered to Samarqand. Fighting continued, but, now, the Depkazi warlords were using the People's Army as unwitting bait and cover, as well as fire-support in their fights with less fortunate rivals.

Afghanistan beyond Chingiz

To some degree, Samarqand was prepared to allow the Combine its fun in the southwest.

Places within Combine reach to the far south, such as Nimruz, were of no interest to distant Depkazia, and didn't appear to have much going for them anyway, beyond emptiness and danger, Nimruz being the most sparsely populated of Afghanistan's provinces. "Somewhere for these damned Pashtun to go."

Farah had some value as a location on a trade route, but since it was one between the Combine and the sub-continent it was of limited direct interest to Depkazia, and wasn't a bordering province anyway. There didn't seem to be much else there... historically poor and offering little gain from the Combine's perspective, it at least had some ethnic Depkazis wandering about the surrounds of the capital with rifles and grenades. "Let the Armandians flap about there", said the Khagan, "and get lost in vast and useless place."

Herat was harder to ignore. Sharing a border with the Turkic People's Republic, it also contained something more or less worthy of the description of a city. The border here would be lightly fortified, and Towraghondi would be captured: Pashtuns and any Armandians would be driven out of the border town and the Depkazi population integrated as much as possible. The actual city of Herát, which the Depkazis expected to be amongst the most important within the Combine's reach, Chingiz ordered hit by a major air strike if it were sufficiently exposed or, if such an operation were found to present risk of intercept by Armandian forces, by Scud-B missiles. The new President authorised release of evolved Novichok nerve agents from the Chemical Research Institute near Nukus, and weaponised pneumonic plague from Vozrozhdeniye for possible deployment.

This was part of Chingiz's plan for disassociation from Herat, in which he was only interested from a defensive point of view. So far as he was concerned, accepting that parts of Afghanistan would be left in a foreign power's sphere of influence did not have to mean that it should be left alone, or allowed to remain in a fit state for development.

Pashtuns had to be pushed away from the Depkazi border, and both they and Armandian-related peoples had to be shaken-out from amongst Depkazi populations.

Things changed if the Combine swept through the rest of Herat and threatened beyond. Ghowr was considered a mess of a place in which Depkazia did not wish to become involved, and so would largely be ignored, but, while Badghis was too poor and had too many Pashtun to be easily incorporated, it was the point at which Armandian influence would become totally unacceptable to the Khagan. Badghis falls just outside of Dostum's protectorate, but contains a now-dangerous mix of Depkazi and Pashtun peoples.

The plan, such as it was, called for Badghis to become a potential barrier to further Armandian expansion, an example of how dangerous and of how erratic, conflicted, and distinctly 'un-combine' Afghanistan could be. The TPRD would periodically inflame the province, arming Depkazi militias and encouraging Dostum to go campaigning without Samarqand's forces having to become directly involved in any serious way.

Wakhan Corridor

Whatever agreements stood between Shareef and Tchokareff now held little water with Chingiz Khagan. Most of the people of the corridor were of Depkazi extraction, and, more importantly, Badakhshan had been officially handed into the control of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was now being prodded forcefully by a Samarqand that wanted him to deal with the Pakistani problem.

Depkazi Turkic People's Army maintained its posts in some of the corridor's villages and at several chokepoints and other sites of interest, with small units obliged to dig-in as best they could at these tactical but not very strategic locations as reached during the joint Tchokareff-Shareef invasion. Meanwhile helicopters were slowly redeployed to fly in supplies and establish military stockpiles that would be under TPA protection and accessible to Rabbani's forces. Major new TPA ground forces were not moved up to the border from Depkazia.

Hopefully, coming days would see Shareef's forces under attack by reasonably well organised and surprisingly well armed Afghan militia. They would, of course, have Soviet-origin weapons (Depkazia was drowning in them, and could turn out more as if they were ten a penny), and many would also use Roycelandian guns, of which Depkazia had a few thousand. Never hurts in a game of deception to confuse the issue further with a totally unrelated piece of information.

In Samarqand, as it was becoming increasingly obvious that Tchokareff's fall was quicker and easier than might be expected for that of a more than decade-old dictatorship, Chingiz prepared his half-made government to accept North Pakistani envoys as if he wasn't also coaxing his Afghani allies to make war on Shareef. In fact he was hoping to find Shareef as stupid as his father (who perhaps fell too easily for it to be a useful experience for the would-be war hero, now in danger of believing his own hype) and to get the Pakistanis to make those airstrikes they'd talked about... if only so he could cripple their air force.

He would allow Rabbani to take a beating, making sure that the former president had learned humility, by providing intelligence that would enable Shareef to hit back after militia attacks began to hurt his forces in Badakhshan. This would be explained as coming from ethnic Depkazi villagers and infiltrators, which was close enough to the truth, anyway. He would learn as much as he could about Pakistani aircraft and tactics, and perhaps even get liason officers into air force facilities to co-ordinate the strikes. Then he would prove himself Rabbani's gracious saviour by stepping-in, striking a decisive blow against North Pakistan's air force with the benefit of all this carefully gathered operational intelligence, securing Wakhan for Rabbani and Rabbani for the Turkic People's Republic.

The decision to avoid sending diplomats to Kashmir was made out of fear that co-operation with that state would be exposed by Shareef's own intelligence forces and would ruin the project, but, as a spin-off benefit presented itself, Chingiz would actively present this lack of Kashmiri relations as if it were indicative of a genuine desire for friendship with North Pakistan.

Once the plan was carried-out and Pakistan's air force wounded, then relations could be approached with its eastern neighbour, and the Kashmiris would be encouraged to take advantage of Shareef's losses. If they went for it, North Pakistan's ability to hit back against Depkazia and her interests in Afghanistan would be limited by an emboldening of their old enemy.

-Combine Zone, Afghanistan-

Afghanistan was certainly not the most beautiful place on earth, with its craggy peaks and barren landscapes, and it was certainly a wonder as to why so many had fought so brutally over it for so long. But logic and reason often had no place in that fine game called politics, and so the Combine released its young to spill their blood in that ravaged land...

Nimruz and Farah had long been held under the sway of the Combine, for their emptiness made it an easy offering for Armand's military machine. The Depkazi and North Pakistani assault on Afghanistan had given the Combine the opportunity to expand its control of Nimruz and Farah until the whole province was firmly under Armandian control, and and native Depkazis resistant to the introduction of Communist rule were either recruited or shot. The province's emptiness actually excited the Armandians, for such a vast, empty space would be a perfect base for establishing Armandian Cooperatives, along with solar and wind power facilities. Newly renewed trade with the INU also made the Farah trade route all the more exciting.

The city of Herat had served as the de facto base of operations for the Combine, largely due to the fact that it was the only thing vaguely resembling a city. The city itself was fairly exposed, only protected by a few aging Soviet anti-air emplacements, MANPADs, and of course, the ubiquitous Stinger missile launchers. However, nearby there lay the Combine's largest military base in Afghanistan, numbering over 20,000 soldiers, 50 MiG-23s, multiple tanks and heavy vehicles, and of course, extensive artillery. The base's position near Depkazia had guaranteed that it was armed with the most modern anti-missile and anti-air systems money could buy, and thus the local Combine commanders didn't worry all too much about a potential Depkazi air strike. The Combine was after all a "major world power with a first rate economy, a massive population, an advanced military, and of course, a superior ideology."

(Although to be fair, the Combine was an inherently arrogant and wildly overconfident institution...)

Herat is also home to a certain Mr. Najibullah, the final leader of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and his steely band of Communist warriors. They represented a tiny force, only numbering in the low thousands at best, (some estimates placed them in the hundreds) but they were also one of the few professional Afghani military forces around.

-Towraghondi, Herat-

The Depkazi seizure of Towraghondi was deemed unacceptable, and Combine aircraft begin flying reconaissance missions near the area. Local Pashtun tribes, clearly not favored by Depkazia, are openly lobbied by Combine, and the city itself begins to experience a rash of homicide bombings targeting military barracks and police headquarters.


(OOC: More tomorrow...I'm dyin' here...Blarg)

Wakhan Corridor

Things are definately not going Shareef's way in the corridor, much to his and his generals' surprise. Where there were only a few militiamen, generally poorly-armed and easy to scatter, the Federal Army starts to encounter the Depkazi-backed forces, and things don't go at all well for the long, largely unsupported infantry columns. Afghan ambush parties do a little too well, in fact, for Chingiz's purposes, sending the Frederal Army into panic and killing hundreds of the unprepared infantrymen. Many of the Federal Army's old T-34/85s, deployed away from the more demanding Kashmiri frontier, are also lost to RPG fire on the narrow, difficult roads where the tanks can't properly manouver. Before long, the bulk of Shareef's invasion force is pulled back into North Pakistan under air cover. Sarhadd, the unlucky target of NPAF helicopter gunships in the first hours of the invasion, is visited again, but this time by napalm-carrying Su-22s keen to punish Afghan defiance, although there probably isn't much left to punish.

While the airborne side of Shareef's short-lived Afghan campaign could probably be considered a success, the NPAF's helicopter forces do take losses, especially once resistance in the corridor comes together. An Mi-8 laden with SSG commandos is brought down in the most costly incident while attempting to support ambushed Federal Army infantry.

The Federal Army, along with local police units, try to regroup once they are back across the border, often dispatching recruitment officers into towns with orders to call-up as many conscripts as possible. Within a few days, there are enough 'volunteers' at arms in Gilgit-Baltistan to replace all the lost Federal Army men and then some, even if they don't all have rifles, but Shareef's attention is decidedly focused elsewhere.

Peshawar

The continued presence of Depkazi troops in what Shareef thought would be his corridor is annoying enough for him to consider recalling his diplomats, but not for long. As he turns his attention away from the difficult corridor and to central Afghanistan, he begins to worry about Combine influence within striking distance of his planned new expansion into Nangarhar. Constance had expressed displeasure with Peshawar in the past, and the Wakhan operation had only served to decrease their tolerance for Mustafa Shareef's goals and methods. Shareef also becomes a good deal more aware of his rather unfavorable position, cut-off from his Elian benefactors and bordered by at least two overtly hostile nations. With precious little domestic industry and next to no trading opportunities, North Pakistan can not hope to holdn onto its present position for long. And while he is careful not to show it, Shareef is also very fearful of the new Depkazi leader, who does not seem like the same kind of man as his father.

North Pakistan, as far as Shareef sees it, in order to get a piece of Afghanistan, could either join the strange, often unsettling, but apparently very rich and well-armed Armandians against the Turkic People's Republic, or join Chingiz, a leader much more like Shareef himself and one apparently much less anchored by a sense of morality, and oppose Combine ambitions. Shareef favors the latter option. So perhaps to Chingiz's surprise, when the North Pakistani delegation arrives in Samarkand, it promises both to fully withdraw from the Wakhan Corridor and Badakhshan, and to recognize Depkazi rule in every province currently occupied by Chingiz's forces. Instead of complaining about North Pakistan's not getting a piece of the pie, Shareef's diplomats talk about forming a united front against the Armandians. Crafting a more friendly relationship with the Depkazis is made all the more important by word of Union troublemaking on the Baluch frontier.

Chagai Hills, Balochistan

Chingiz Khagan should thank his lucky stars that Mumbai doesn't quite know the extent of his atrocities against the Pashtun, and hasn't picked-up on his use of Depkazia's biological weapons programs. If Parliament knew, the Army of the Indus would likely stream into Afghanistan, intent on engaging the TPA. But right now, all the Depkazi leader, or Mullah Omar, for that matter, has to fear are Baloch border irregulars, a hardy lot by themselves but hardly an army capable of mounting serious offensive operations. It is these men, most of them armed with SMLEs and Owens, who look down into the empty Rigestan Desert from positions along the border. Besides the occasional raid or patrol along the porous and barely-defined frontier, action is, so far, quite light, and shows no signs of changing. No doubt Mullah Omar in Kabul has more important things to deal with than the welfare of the almost unpopulated southern deserts.

Behind the border, though, a more frightening force is being assembled around the 15th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by three battalions of Balochi irregulars. Marshalling near Chagai itself, this force is meant to allow Parliament a say in Afghan affairs if it decides that it wants one, and could possibly be used to support Combine forces in Herat if the roads are clear.

Nuclear events in Turkic People's Republic of Depkazia!

Samarkand

2,700 years of history in this city on the ancient Silk Road. Самарқанд. Samarqand. Crossroads of cultures. Long the greatest city in central Asia, capital of Tamerlane's world-empire, briefly capital of the Depkazi Soviet Socialist Republic before replacement by Tashkent, it was restored by Tchokareff as capital of a resurgent Depkazia.

Registan, completed over almost quarter of a millenium, starting six hundred years ago, was now the active hub of government, other sites -such as the tomb of Biblical prophet Daniel- being promoted to the job of impressing-foreigners.

Depkazi leaders had an aversion to conducting diplomacy abroad, Chingiz especially, given what'd happened when his father broke a fifteen year rule-at-home tradition and travelled to Rome. They liked to make people come to them, and to impress them with their nation's actually quite surprising size, natural beauty, and imposing architecture.

In Registan, Chingiz was at work. The courtyard outside was quivering with the sound of execution, suspected anti-government figures once again put to the sword as if Timur the Lame never left this spot whose name means sandy place, after the grains that would be scattered to soak up the blood, then as now. This young dictator, boyfaced, was aging by the calendar of the worried man.

The Armandian Combine could ruin everything. Chingiz's plans depended largely upon Beijing favouring him as his nation lay beside Russia. He'd never get-back Kazakhstan without the Chinese. Even more directly, the Combine threatened his domination of the southern Caspian. Chingiz much prefered it when the Armandians were quiet and introspective. How would he maintain the modern core of his military if the Chinese would be discouraged from supporting him? After how he'd come to power, he couldn't join the Holy League, North Pakistan was something to be kicked around if not outright ignored, and that only left the Combine itself amongst the neighbours of this landlocked nation.

Chingiz was Chingiz, and he drew-up his plans accordingly.

Massive parades were arranged, a clear taste of Depkazia's Soviet-flavoured experience of the twentieth century. For reasons soon to be explained by Afghan policy, China must see that Depkazia was a strong independent power. Soldiers from the almost four-hundred-thousand strong Turkic People's Army marched with small-calibre late-Soviet assault rifles and squad automatic weapons, grenade launchers, RPGs, and SA-14 surface-to-air missiles, behind two quartets of 152mm self-propelled artillery, specifically 2S3M Akatsiya turreted weapons and nuclear-capable 2S5 Giatsint-S. 220mm Uragan multiple-rocket-launcher vehicles, trucks and UAZs carrying AT-5 Spandrel anti-tank guided-missiles and towing 82mm and 120mm mortars followed. BTR-80 wheeled APCs and BMP-1 and 2 and BMD-1 and 2 armoured vehicles were on show, the 8x8 machines in especially large number. T-72 battle tanks were escorted by ZSU-23-4 Shilka anti-aircraft gun vehicles and SA-8b Geko/Osa surface-to-air missiles.

Cameras followed giant Mi-6 Hook and Mi-17 Hip helicopters and Mi-24 Hind gunships, An-12 Cub and An-26 Curl transports, and YaK-52 and L-39 Albatross trainers as they passed over head. Then, much more impressive: Su-24 Fencer air-interdiction bombers and Su-25 Frogfoot fire-support aircraft flew with MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker interceptors over-flew Scud-B missiles on mobile 8x8 wheeled launchers, weapons with 300km range and CEP under a kilometre, bearing the potential to carry nuclear and chemical payloads. Perhaps tellingly, the Scuds were escorted by slightly crude FROG derivatives, apparently developed and built independently by Depkazia based on its left-over Soviet capacities. The Scuds looked quite in keeping with the Soviet norm for their type, while the FROGs did not exactly match.

The MiG-29s circled above a large building now widely known to have been involved in production of parts of Soviet-era solid-fuel rocket motors, indicating their intent and ability to defend this capacity.

Afghanistan

Perhaps the Combine was only in the country out of habit, spite, accident, with no appreciation for its beauty or value, but Depkazia bordered an Afghanistan that looked, from the northern side of the frontier, like the richest agricultural land in Central Asia, a land with oil and gas fields, populated by several million ethnic-Depkazi Muslims.

No pipeline through Afghanistan Chingiz had written, indicating his opposition to the idea of Combine exports to China. They can buy Depkazi gas, and, if they want oil, they can support our claims in the Caspian.

His forces were tasked with destabilising all of Afghanistan that was not previously claimed by the TPRD and administered by the warlord Dostum and former national-leader Rabbani. Depkazia began to push the religious angle above all others, Chingiz appearing on posters picturing him in Registan Square, dressed in traditional garb rather than the Soviet-style uniform more usually seen on Depkazi politicians. The Combine was increasingly associated with... well, what it wanted, one supposed: The old communist regime. The Pashtun were accused of complicity in an effort to alienate them in Depkazi areas of interest. Of course, since most Pashtun were deeply anti-communist and, by extension, anti-Combine, there was also the possibility that some would be inspired to prove this in action, restore some honour, and generally to be turned-on to the communist threat.

Wakhan

For now, it actually seemed as if North Pakistan would be more trouble than the Combine, though it was far weaker and already in retreat. This was exactly the problem: Chingiz was now worried that Rabbani would become too confident and quite uncontrollable. To hit his pride before the North Pakistanis were totally discouraged, Samarkand hastened to provide information on, 'Mujahideen strategic disposition in Badakhsan, often correctly identifying strongholds but over-stating their importance'.

Depkazia increased its air-assault on Towraghondi so as to explain the unavailability of its own attack air craft. There was also a delay in providing fresh SA-14 batteries and missiles to Rabbani, who was promised that they would arrive soon, and told to keep it quiet, 'for the sake of surprise, should the retreating Pakistanis counter-attack at a later date'.

Herat

Combine aircraft were traced by Depkazi surface to air missiles inside the Turkic People's Republic as the assualt was launched. Soviet-built river-ports and rail-lines to Towraghondi were assaulted by Turkic People's Army forces, whose contacts had previously compelled friendly fighters to be ready near-by, making the insertion relatively easy. Airborne forces followed initial cross-border thrusts, which were easily accomplished given the extreme proximity of the town to the Depkazi border. Really, though, the tiny airborne element was hardly more than a show, all the work being done by tribal militia and army infantry and cavalry.

The large Depkazi force moved into the small town, not without casualties, believing that it was striking a blow for the faith -units from mostly practicing Islamist areas of Depkazia had been selected for the spearhead- and officers ordered the rounding-up of Pashtun, some of whom would be driven south, at bayonet-point, and told to walk towards the Combine-controlled regions, while others were put on horse-drawn barges and moved north. Ethnic Depkazis soon found themselves granted shares of Pashtun property and business-interests, and encouraged to take land for cotton and grain farming, assured of Depkazi state help in transporting the product via the river to the republic for re-export, perhaps to China's growing market.

Shareef was contacted about the value of opiates, and his position on the trade. If he could be engaged in helping to export the sinister goo of the poppy, it would be all that much easier to keep the people happy with Samarkand's influence.

Kyzyl Kum desert, northern Depkazia

The wind blew north over what was called Qizilqum by the unfortunate locals. A bactrian camel reared its head and looked towards Kazakhstan, chewing on a precious something made of nothing. It saw a flash, more than just a reflection from the shifting dunes. Then, it died. The fairly crude fission bomb that had just detonated was made with uranium produced at the Leninabad Mining and Chemical Combine, which, long ago, had given the USSR its first such weapon, and so had now done the same for the TPRD, no doubt helped by the world's largest uranium production centre, Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Combine .

The blast was small by today's standards, hardly a thermonuclear event, but an ugly landmark none the less.

Samarkand did not admit that a second, far smaller, explosion in the eastern mountains was in any way related, claiming that it was merely related to mining operations. In fact it was a failed nuclear test, a back-up in case the Kyzyl Kum device did not perform sufficiently well.

NBC-protected vehicles would shortly advance to recover the mutilated remains of bodies and Afghan clothing and convey them to atomic research facilities.

In the Caspian, more warheads crashed down, deployed by FROG and Scud rockets from tens, even hundreds of kilometres away, and soon, in other parts of the desert, chemical and biological weapons received far less high-profile testing, with help from Chingiz's new subjects...

Chingis recieves an invitation to attend or send a representative to a conferencein Beijing aimed at easing tensions in the Caspian and Afghanistan, obviously unaware of his aversion to travel.

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=492170

Privately however, many of China's top brass are beginning to run out of patience with Chingis's antics. Many think he has outlived his usefulness, and there are even calls within the secret service for his assasination if he doesn't yield at the conference. Military intervention was an option, but with Chinese forces stationed near Siberia, moving against French Caledonia, and preparing a strike on Spain's Atlantic fleet, it would mean enacting conscription and/or a major funding boost for the army to attract new recruits, not a very palatable option and certain to smash opinion poll ratings.

Outwardly, China's PR spins phrases like "China is a friend of Depkazia", "unconditional aid against foreign aggression", "supporting the rightful rulers of Kazahkstan" and completely glosses over the alarming nuclear detonation at Kyzyl Kum, but inwardly even Bauer, China's man in Depkazia, was beginning to regret the course of action that had been taken by China's neo-conservatives. Like the Vietnam war, Depkazia was inches away from biting the hand that feeds it.

OOC: An OOC issue - are my troops still in your mountains?

(OOC: On my way out, but yes, if you don't want them withdrawn, a few thousand PLA troops are still in eastern Depkazia. They are there along with thousands of Depkazi mountain troops, and quite allowed to consume Samarkand's Turkic-nationalist and Islamist propaganda. There's a good reason for us pushing-for (and getting) Turkic-only troops deployed ;) )

[OOC: That's what you get from trusting a man who would murder a hippo, China.]

IC:

The piping hot vapors flowed across her nude body, caressing her golden toned thighs, stroking her lean, tightly muscled body, and wrapping around her beautiful, but most certainly not delicate, face. The steam pried open every one of her pores, rushing through her mind and body with an intense, soothing heat. Her taut chest muscles suddenly relaxed, and the iron fisted Energy Minister allowed herself the rare luxury of an exhausted sigh.

The fact that she was enjoying such an extravagant thing as a sauna was already a little suspect in such a place as the Combine, but even more damning was the fact that she was in there alone. Nothing was done alone in the Combine, nothing. Yet here she was, soaking up the warm moisture and plotting strategy, with no companion, no link to the greater beast that was the Combine itself.

Watch yourselves, women...It's this sort of individualistic foolishness that will get us Collected...

Her body tensed again for a moment, her neatly carved abdominal muscles freezing in fear, and then she shelved the fear away, to be dealt with at another time, and focused her mind on the immediate task at hand: Depkazia. Her mind's eye shifted the clouds of vapor before her, shaping them into battle plans, maps, graphs, charts, and more information from the vast repositiory of data she had stored within.
____________________________________________________
-Depkazia-

Depkazi military parades only earned the Minister's laughing contempt; the late Soviet technology was, at least in her estimation, nothing compared to the Combine's own repertoire of cutting edge modern forces. Chingiz's air force was another matter, however. The MiG-29s and Su-27s he flew seemed to be on par with the Combine's own air assets, if not more advanced. Armand was of course accelerating its air program in order to develop a world class air force, but this was a matter of years, while the Depkazis could be a threat in months.

The nuclear program was also worrying, especially since the fact that the Depkazis had wasted a significant chunk of their reported arsenal on a mere demonstration meant that their approach to the use of nuclear devices was far more...casual than one would expect. The Combine had no nuclear assets of its own, but Chingiz's little demonstration convinced it that this was a deficiency that needed to be corrected. Armandian diplomats in Dra-Pol were told to alter their proposal of purchasing nuclear weapons for dismantlement purposes into one of purchasing them for defensive ones. Additionally, rumors swirled of the Combine deploying its highly advanced biological weapons programs into Afghanistan, rumors which were only further inflamed by the appearance of several new, oddly shaped buildings in the Armandian military base in Herat.

-Afghanistan-

Towraghondi's fall was deemed flatly unacceptable by the Energy Minister, and the Final Symposium concurred. However, the Armandians didn't want to be the ones to spark a full out war with Depkazia, for fear of losing burgeoning Chinese sympathy, and thus Chingiz found himself at war with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Communist government of Afghanistan. The Minister realized that association with the former government wasn't necessarily good for PR, but that government's request for Combine aid was still the only legal justification for a Combine presence in Afghanistan. Some Pashtun tribesmen seemed to be able to overlook this due to their oppressive treatment by the Depkazis and the nice bribes the Combine loved to dish out, and some formed rogue groups which desperately tried to push back both the Combine and Depkazia. It was the former group from which the Combine drew upon to form a ramshackle force with which it hoped to reclaim Towraghondi. The People's Liberation Army of Afghanistan, numbering ten thousand or so men, and armed with Armandian built Harvester Rifles, RPGs, and Stinger-equivalents, marched towards the occupied city, while artillery pieces "on loan" from Armand rolled into position for assault. Along the way, the PLAA attempted to recruit local tribesmen, especially those expelled by the Depkazis from their hometown, for the assault.

This wasn't the only place in Afghanistan where the Armandians hoped to make trouble for Chingiz. Impoverished families in Mazar-e-Sharif and Feyzabad were ripe targets for oil stained cash, and the incentive of providing food and shelter for an entire family's lifespan proved too tempting for several young males in the city. Dostum's and Rabbani's police and security forces would have to deal with a increasing wave of suicide bombings, car bombs, and improvised explosive devices.

Blood will flow in the streets, death shall dance across the boulevards, and hell itself will be brought upon those who dare challenge the Black Flag...

-The Caspian-

One more day.

One more day was all that seperated the Combine and Depkazia from total war.

If Armandian vessels continued to push forward at the same rate they did everyday, tomorrow they would cross the boundary of Depkazi claims and violate (according to Depkazia) Depkazi sovereignty. Unless the Depkazis made some direct overtures for peace at the conference, Combine vessels would cross the point of return the very next day...

-Beijing, China-

The Combine sends a delegate to the Chinese conference, but waits for the Depkazis to make their statement before revealing a position.
______________________________________________________

The Energy Minister lay in beautiful repose, resembling for a moment an ancient Chinese Goddess, and drifted off into a slumber filled with great battles and cunning plans...

Assaulting Towraghondi, the Turkic People's Army had lost twenty-seven men killed and more than forty wounded, even though most of the strategic locations were seeded ahead of time with sympathetic operatives. This was no doubt a symptom of inexperience, and the nepotism and chaos infecting the command structure as a result of Tchokareff's fifteen-year administration.

The Depkazi soldiers themselves -individually- were proven strong, and probably in sharp contrast to Combine-lead operations. Even in the People's Army, Depkazis sought hero-status. Chewing on various narcotic fibres, they went into battle convinced that they were closer to paradise for their intoxication, and that self-sacrifice would only bring them closer. Glory on earth wouldn't hurt, either.

During the Winter War between the USSR and Lapua-influenced Finland, defenders, weilding 9mm Lahti submachine-guns, often would report that Russian infantry marched towards them in closed ranks, singing the Internationale, and could be knocked down usually with a single round. "Russian bunny-boys", such as were now in the service of the Tsar. But when reinforcements came to the Soviet cause, they were eastern, muddy-faced, barrel-chested, Depkazis, and they would come on when hit four, five, even seven or eight times, always seeking the objective and dropping only when the last instant of life was passed.

They were like that, now, though bullets were more deadly. Still, shot once, even through the middle, a Depkazi infantryman would often press-on, apparently unaware of his injury until shot a second or third time. Of the wounded, most would likely have been dead were they made of softer stuff.

Still, these stories would likely impress only a few with special interest. Foreign media would be more likely to note that heavy casualties had been suffered in what ought to have been a simple operation. The Depkazis and Afghanis, of course, were encouraged to see the fallen as martyrs, even as people to be envied rather than pitied or mourned!

(OOC: Woops, sorry, got a bit carried away in trying to emphasise the gulf between the... well, the lions and the donkeys, as it were, in Depkazia today. The average Depkazi will fight you until you understand what a man really is, while Tchokareff has left them faithful to a complete mess that Chingiz is trying to tidy.)

In Afghanistan, Combine meddling wasn't all that serious a worry. It was they who needed stability, not Depkazia. You can't build and maintain a pipeline in a climate of chaos, but you can all the more easily get away with ethnic cleansing. Certainly Chingiz wanted stability, so that he could exploit moderate gas and oil reserves and the major agricultural potential of northern Afghanistan, but instability was no major issue. He was always going to win.

Islamist and Depkazi-nationalist propaganda continued to increase, and the increasing association of the Combine with the old communist authority only helped. A few bombs and shootings here and there, well, that was life in Afghanistan. Typically, left to their own devices, the Depkazi-Afghani warlords wasted little time in hunting-down and executing everyone even remotely associated with, "communist agitation".

Even left to their own devices, the Afghanis at large would route the Armandians. With Depkazi help it seemed no more easy to explain Combine intervention than it had been to predict Soviet invasion.

Still, the Pashtun issue was worth noting.

Chingiz felt that he had two major pillars holding-up his dreams of empire. Islam, and Depkazi nationalism.

The Pashtun did not sit well on the second. Some amongst them were still fighting the communists before the Depkazis, but, over all, they had only what Chingiz considered half-loyalty. Best to ge them out of the north, where they were already a minority.

Meanwhile

Chingiz Khaghan, King of Kings, Turkmenbashi, ethnic, national, and religious hero, the communists had little with which to compete against his appeal. His only limitations were of his own making: by targetting the Pashtun, he confined himself to the north. Move further south, and the majority would oppose him. He'd never make it, not in this country, not in Afghanistan.

Looking about, though, any ruler at Samarqand saw problems.

But then... why fight them?

As at Beijing, in Central Asia Chingiz would push for peace. "The Higher one is in Tulgary, and so is Tchokareff." He would say. "For each of us, the real enemy is in Russia and Europe."

Disputes in the Caspian, though Chingiz would, for now, continue to fight them with the Combine, were, he'd say, really all Russia's fault. If they didn't dominate Kazakhstan, so clearly Depkazi territory, there'd be no need for these 'right nations' to fight over the scraps.

If the Depkazis thought a typical Armandian soldier was anything like the Russian "bunnies" that the Finns used to eliminate, they would be in for quite an unpleasant surprise. The Depkazis had apparently forgotten several things about the very nature of the Combine. First, the nation was operated like a well oiled machine; meals, activities, and exercise were all coordinated on a nationwide scale, and designed for peak efficiency. While the average Armandian was certainly no match for someone of Tsar Wingert's stature, for example, he or she was in quite good shape and even fairly proficient in a uniquely Armandian form of martial arts. Secondly, and more importantly, Chingiz had failed to note that all cogs in the Combine's machines had a purpose. Meaning, all were born into certain industries and crafts, and were trained from birth to fulfill whatever role was desired of them. The military was no exception to this rule, and so the Combine's soldiers were an elite force, born and bred to defend their society. The fanatical loyalty and intense, life long training guaranteed that the a Black Flag Army man would be more than a match for a rough and ready Depkazi warrior.

-Afghanistan-

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v232/Futureworldruler/afganistan.jpg
Proposed Route For Combine-Chinese Pipeline

As for Afghanistan, the Armandians had become fixated on the goal of a Chinese pipeline. The Chinese hunger for fuel would inflame the already vigorous Armandian economy, and bind Beijing and Constance closer together in alliance. Thus, a division of Armandian troops, rumbling along on various four wheel drive vehicles and flanked by MiG-29s, move into Ghor, seeking out every major city and tribe in order to bring them under Combine control. Tribal warriors might have been fierce and experienced, but this proved to be of little use when faced against elite commando units, modern technology, and precision smart bombs. Additionally, several local tribesmen are recruited to aid the Combine's cause, chief among them the Pashtuns. While the Pashtuns had formed the core of the opposition to Communism, they had also been the main element within the old Communist regime. Indeed, Najibullah himself was an ethnic Pashtun, and there were many whose hatred of Depkazia was enough to make them rally to the banner of the Revolution once again...

Khagan's refusal to surrender Towraghondi back to the Democratic Republic meant only one thing: war. Combine artillery pieces moved into position and began barraging the ancient city, while mobile anti-air units and overhead flights of slighltly aged MiG-29s and Su-27s prepared for any aerial retaliation. Ground forces moved into position, as exiled Pashtun leaders revealed the lay out of the city to the Afghani generals and their Combine "advisors." A thick barrage of artillery fire rained down upon strategic locations within the city, quickly caking it with flame and smoke. The massive shells tore through army barracs and anti-air installations, burning men as well as buildings, and thoroughly thrashing the city's military infrastructure.

The Depkazis were not the only ones who could play the propaganda game; after all, both sides of this duel had studied under the tutelage of the ultimate propaganda master, the Soviet Union. While ethnic Depkazis were likely out of the Combine's realistic reach, other ethnicities would likely be susceptible to the barrage of revolutionary rhetoric contained in pamphlets, banners, and speeches. Harkening back to the days of the Russian Revolution, when Russian anarchists and true Communists took to the streets to rain fiery rhetoric upon both the capitalists and the repressive Bolsheviks, "Afghani Lenins" (a poor title not really reflecting the Combine's nature, but a catchy one that stuck on anyhow) climbed upon whatever platform they could find and preached the doctrines of the Black Flag Revolution. Filled with a genuine zeal, these fire brands would make emotional appeals to the people of Afghanistan, tempting them with promises of peace, freedom, and prosperity. The stark contrast between Depkazia and Armand proved to be a healthy source of fodder for such propaganda; Depkazia was backwards, anarchical, and poor, while the Combine was modern, orderly, and rich. The choice was in the hands of the Afghani people...

-The Caspian-

The last thing on the Combine's collective mind was to challenge the Russians. Although such a war could likely be won, it would cost a tremendous amount of blood and treasure, likely result in a nuclear exchange between Moscow and Beijing, irk the Chinese for forcing them into entering a war at a time not of their choosing, alienate the Combine's capitalist clients, drag into the Euro-African conflagration, and generally make a mess of things. The Depkazis were a far softer target, especially since Beijing looked more and more uneager to support Samarkand. However, any form of war was undesirable to the Combine, for it would involve dedicating military forces to keep a people under the sword for the decades that assimilation into Armandian society would require. Thus Armandian vessels continued to skirt Depkazi waters, but did not cross that deadly boundary.

The ball is in your court, Khagan, thought the Energy Minister, observing satellite footage of the events unfolding in Afghanistan and the Caspian.

[OOC: By your previous post, I assumed you hadn't done anything to intercept the assault force, so I simply went ahead with the attack. Correct me if I'm wrong]

I take exception to that. The modern Russian military that was left us by the capitalist and democratic Putin is very much the model of the modern technological fighting force in look, training, equipment and so on. They will not march mindlessly into a killing field.

Of course, our Navy is almost entirely, except for some Roycelandian Dreadnaughts, Soviet era, though all newer than pretty much anything Depkazia can boast.

Humph.

OK, I am all right now.

Tsar Wingert the Great.

I take exception to that. The modern Russian military that was left us by the capitalist and democratic Putin is very much the model of the modern technological fighting force in look, training, equipment and so on. They will not march mindlessly into a killing field.

Of course, our Navy is almost entirely, except for some Roycelandian Dreadnaughts, Soviet era, though all newer than pretty much anything Depkazia can boast.

Humph.

OK, I am all right now.

Tsar Wingert the Great.

Heh. Yes, I was too sleep deprived last night to mention that. The Russian military is one of the best in the world, and a far cry from the Soviet Union's lackluster conscripts. Toss in the Estenlands' legions of puppy kicking, baby meat eating sonsuvbitches from hell and you have quite a challenge to go up against.

(OCC: With Russia's borders threatened by both China and Spyr, one wonders just exactly how much of a threat Moscow can afford to pose to, well, anyone with a halfway decent regular military...)

IC:

Wakhan Corridor

Shareef, still somewhat suspicious of Khaghan's motives, and convinced of easier pickings across the Khyber Pass and its paved highway, still can't resist an opportunity to hit-back against the Turkic Afghans who thwarted his designs there. Although his brief occupation was already quite brutal, Su-25s and Su-22s again appear overhead to drop cluster bombs and napalm on villages and other civilian targets. With aircraft supplies unsure, to say the least, pilots are ordered to use extreme caution, and more often than not drop their unguided stores from high altitude in an often unsuccessful effort to avoid MANPADs and light AAA fire. Two Su-25s and a single Su-22 are downed over the corridor and several more damaged, not unacceptable losses when one considers that Shareef's Su-22s only have a few more years of useful service left in them, and that there are nearly fifty Su-25s in service, but a loss rate that Shareef can ill afford.

The SSG mounts several raids into the corridor by helicopter, mounted with varying degrees of success against targets indicated by Depkazi intelligence. SSG commandos, feared domestically for their violence, gun down almost any moving thing with RPDs and RPKs while rappelling from hovering Mi-8s, often under fire themselves, and do manage to kill a great many people, some of them armed, without taking unmanageable casualties themselves. None of Shareef's Mi-8s or Mi-24s are lost in the operation, which only lasts a few hours until they are withdrawn south to Chitral. A regiment of regular army troops also passes through the Baroghil Pass, occupying the northern end and engaging in several small-scale firefights with Rabbani's militiamen in the process.

Peshawar

President Shareef, sensing the association between Depkazia and Afghanistan's Turkic population, decides to try and win Pashtun support, with which he's had an up-and-down relationship for the better part of three decades. Mohammed Zahir Shah recieves a telephone call at his home in Italy from the President's office, but more importantly, Shareef makes a desparate effort to reach Mohammed Omar. While the Elians had made an attempt on the Mullah's life before, and Peshawar would usually not be apt to go against Baghdad, Mullah Omar is still, in name at least, commander of one of the largest Afghan militias, and Shareef is extremely keen to count the Taliban's 20,000 and up men-at-arms amongst his allies. ISI agents are inflitrated across the border in an attempt to contact Taliban-aligned warlords and explain to them Peshawar's reversal of policy, all of this while the bulk of North Pakistan's armed forces build-up on the east end of the Khyber Pass.

It is hoped that the Pashtun-dominated Taliban will provide the support needed by Shareef to secure and legitimize his planned rule in the border districts, and more immediately pave the way for a high-profile drive on Kabul. The value of a good relationship with Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan with regards to domestic affairs is not lost on Shareef either, who decides to take an uncharacteristically soft line with the usually uncooperative Pashtun in Waziristan and the Tribal Areas in the hope that his dealings with Omar and others will build confidence in Peshawar's central authority. Of course, Mullah Omar has to be located first, and the ISI agents have to survive amongst members of a movement so recently condemned by Shareef.

That North Pakistan is trying to recast the Taliban in order to oppose the Northern Alliance under Depkazi-aligned Rabbani might not be immediately apparent to the authorities in Constance and Samarkand, since Shareef is going about it with more than the usual level of secrecy. But what is apparent is that the president is decidedly unsatisfied with his position in the region, and is out to win for himself some legitimacy. He would also like to force the Combiners to the negotiating table, by putting the Federal Army along the proposed pipeline route, although whether the notoriously ineffective Federal Army can take and hold any defended piece of land is questionable.

For the first time in quite a while, Beijing recieves a communique from Peshawar, written by Shareef himself. Now nuclear-armed, it does not seem likely that Chingiz Khaghan will tolerate North Pakistani ambitions for much longer, and rhetoric coming out of the Combine suggests that they have equally little sympathy for Shareef's authoritarianism and brutality. The threat, if Peshawar exhausts Samarkand's good graces, is increasingly seen as national extinction. Facing isolation from the rest of the world, Shareef is willing to make accomodations if it means a cozy relationship with China. What Beijing could see in North Pakistan and its opium-based economy is, though, anybody's guess, and like most of Shareef's schemes this one looks set to produce less than ideal results.

Islamabad

Seismic stations across the Indian National Union detect the shock waves produced by the Depkazi nuclear test, and few technicians take long to identify it as such. Nowhere in the Union does this pose such a threat as in Islamabad, the city closest to Depkazia and, if they were fired from within the Corridor, within the range of Scud-C and -D ballistic missiles, the likes of which Mumbai thinks Chingiz is sitting on. Rawalpindi and Islamabad were siezed from North Pakistan in 1983, while Shareef still struggled to consolidate his rule, and Islamabad at least was bitterly contested for the next two years before the INA and UIC could assert total control. Islamabad's defenses are soon on alert, wary of a North Pakistani attempt to retake the city with Depkazi assistance, and air raid wardens can be seen patrolling the streets at all hours while the border defenses are reinforced with another light infantry brigade brought by train up from Hyderabad.

With the Federal Army on the other side of the country, Islamabad is in next to no danger, but the city's signals intercept station does catch wind of some equally disturbing developments. It becomes clear, after comparing the radio intercepts with accounts collected in northern Balochistan, that Depkazia is deploying ballistic missiles against the Pashtun, possibly with biological and chemical warheads. This information is subsequently wired to Hyderabad and the headquarters of the Army of the Indus.

Chagai

The 15th Balochi Independent Brigade, now present at Chagai in strength, recieves a set of brand-new maps and code tables from Hyderabad via helicopter, as well as orders to ship east towards Nushki, there to join with the 18th Light Infantry Division and the 3rd Border Militia Regiment. Balochi irregulars look on as the Brigade loads its equipment onto the train, pulled by a pair of modern, but quite heavily worked, diesel locomotives painted in faded Union Rail Service colours.

It isn't very much equipment, or very modern, by most standards. Ferret and Fox armored scout cars are driven onto flatcars along with Saxon-alike IC.1s and a few Second World War-vintage ACV-IPs. There are also some 105mm Mk.6 light guns and R.130 towed MRLs to be seen, many of them still attached to Morris Quad artillery tractors. What the brigade lacks in equipment, it probably makes up for in training and experience, but even when those 5,000 are added to the 18th Division's 10,000 and the 3rd BMR's 5,000, it is hardly a force capable of standing on equal terms with the TPA. But fortunately for the Union regulars, they will be riding a veritable tidal wave of Balochi irregulars and their numerous Afghan allies. Enough, at least, to affect a successful crossing of the border and a quick advance into southern Kandahar.

Spin Buldak, Kandahar

There is relatively little evidence to suggest the start of Union operations in Afghanistan. A pair of IAuxADF Jet Provosts, carrying Vinten camera pods, are hardly noticed as they cross the border at a none too impressive 400 knots. The two converted trainers, closer to Strikemaster specification than the average Jet Provost but still posing relatively little threat to militias used to attacks from Su-22s and Su-25s, are greeted by sporadic ground fire over Spin Buldak as they start their photo runs. The pilots don't see anything terribly unusual, and threat warning recievers are comfortably silent, so the two Jet Provosts turn east and head back to their airfield outside Quetta.

However, not at all far away, a much more threatening concentration of men inches its way through the hilly landscape. Surprisingly enough, it is not a mechanized, regular force that is sent up the road towards Kandahar but rather two Border Militia Regiments and four thousand more irregular troops. With SMLEs and AKMs in hand, the fourteen thousand Union troops, under the command of General Abdur Jehan Khattak, walk into Afghanistan for the most part without facing opposition, with 105mm light guns and 130mm MRLs in position to cover the advance from shelters on the Balochi side of the border. A flight of Springers of No.404 squadron loiters overhead, FFARs and cluster bombs hanging from the wing pylons, ready to swoop down on targets radioed-in by General Khattak's forces.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v232/Futureworldruler/Black_flag.jpg
Secret Communique to the Indian National Union
"Your friendship and aid is greatly appreciated. Our men, gold, and guns are at your disposal. Soon we shall bring liberation to Afghanistan!"

(OOC: Could I get a map of North Pakistan and Kashmir, or an explanation of who owns what?

With Chinese interests now at stake, attention turns to central Asia where North Pakistan poses a possible threat to the pipeline. The communique from Shareef arrives at General Chiang's desk, where it is reviewed.

(I haven't been following North Pakistan/Kashmir closely. Can someone give me a rundown or history?)

Austria is mildly interested in the "far-east" and is somewhat dismayed by the recent agression of all participants, no formal position Austria takes yet politicians with a deeper knowings of Maxen's policy predict a slight benevolent attitude to Russia and it's Tsar, while a more upity attitude to "backwards" Depkziah.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v148/Chivtv/NS1/ind-map-3.jpg

India and Pakistan in reality, quite different in AMW. You can see where India and Pakistan would fit together, I'm sure.

Then, of course, there's Asia at large, so you can more easily see where Depkazia and the rest fit in.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v148/Chivtv/NS1/map.jpg

As you can see, the lion's share of the Combine's population is landlocked and, perhaps until recent association with China, has probably struggled to develop with the west... and even to connect over land with itself, they still need at least the INU or... Depkazia on-side.

As to North Pakistan and Kashmir, you'll have to ask LRR really, but they've a long-standing rivalry. In this thread (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=471053) LRR has posts on North Pakistan, the Kashmiri military, and the history of India, for anyone with time to burn.

(OCC:

North Pakistan, ruled by President Mustafa Shareef, has been fighting Kashmir, ruled by Maharaja Parak Singh, on and off for the past fifty years or so. The conflict stems from the fact that the Kashmiris currently claim all of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, which are in North Pakistani hands. Parak Singh has a better-trained and more competent military on his side, while Shareef has loads more equipment and (until recently) more reliable foreign backers. Essentially, if you want to hurt one, help the other.)

The Depkazi President, titled Khagan because he held [or claimed] dominion over both Depkazia-proper and Bactria, was engaged in something of a rethink over North Pakistan, mainly because of events relating to Afghanistan.

Since he siezed power, Chingiz had been working to elevate the status of Islam in Depkazia, and many of his diplomats and spies had become makeshift preachers in the nations to which they were assigned. Leaders of religious communities in Bactria were shipped into the Turkic People's Republic. Mosques that were disued reopened with government funds, and some of those taken-over for other state functions would be returned to at least part-time religious use, or extended.

Chingiz himself increased his religious education by restoring to it's original purpose one of the once-famous madrasah that make-up Registan (http://www.samarkand.info/Registan_Tillya.jpg), and hurridly acquiring the blessing and support of many leaders in the religious community, all of whom of course owed their restoration entirely to his government.

The problem was Shareef. That man had too much personal ambition, and too many ties in the secular world.


Depkazi forces in the perilous Wakhan are soon joined by reinforcements that have lingered long in the east of the TPRD and are actually glad of having had the chance to get used to the altitude. They move in behind existing Depkazi positions, lightly manned as these are, and many of Rabbani's men are quietly absorbed into their ranks, possibly giving a greater impression of casualties than is true in the warlord's forces.

Chingiz is happy to let the Pakistanis look to the Khyber Pass, and, "...offers to complete the passification of Badakhshan with Depkazi and pro-Depkazi Afghan troops, so as to allow the concentration of Pakistani forces through the Khyber Pass." More importantly, the Depkazi premier is interested in working-out some sort of propaganda programme and resettlement policy to allow the movement of ethnic Depkazi people to Bactria and of, "individuals in Bactria belonged to peoples found more properly in North Pakistan" to Peshwar's area of interest.

The Khagan presents the line that Turkic and Pashtun peoples would be better served by alliance between their distinct nation states than by racial conflict within both.

Chingiz's diplomats claim to be conducting Jihad by the tongue when they convey the wisdom and suggestions of their Khagan, and suggest that potential agreements about how to divide Bactria and Afghanistan and settle the disputes of its people represents Jihad by the pen. Then... they say that Samarqand and Peshwar should prepare for Jihad by the sword, against the communists in Afghanistan and the Kashmiris, furthering this by Jihad by knowledge, such as in sharing science and military technology, which must certainly be a fairly one-way proposal, considering Depkazia's substantial Soviet-origin capabilities in military NBC science and rocketry.

"We must move quickly, while our enemies -who are all different in their politics and economies, but united in Shirk- struggle to co-ordinate their own selfish operations. We must act before Bihar's debris fall on Kashmir and Pakistan, and before Armand can ruin Afghanistan and Bactria alike.

"Secure the future of Bactria and eastern Afghanistan, and we may direct the united front of a holy storm against Kashmir. I stand certain that Afghan terrorists can be defeated as a threat through Jihad of the tongue and the hand, where the infidel incursion of British imperialism and Soviet-Armandian communism. And so shall the sword crush Kashmir, with Turkic warriors free to move through Bactria and Afghanistan to assist in the final victory for which Pakistan has waited so many years."


In Bactria, Depkazi government assaults on the Pashtun slow, though militia activities persist, but Chingiz can not delay for long lest the hostile warlords regroup and destablise the fragile governments of Dostum and Rabbani and menace the frail nature of their submission to Samarqand's supreme authority.

Towraghondi

The initial Combine artillery barrage had been answered before long with 152mm counter-battery fire, and 220mm rocketry, all coming from self-propelled systems rolled across the border... or still inside Depkazia. Chingiz's artillery was fairly formidable, and incorporated counter-battery radar aboard BTR and other vehicle bases, along with the reasonbly far-reaching Uragan rockets nad Giatsint-S and Akatisiya self-propelled plus D-20 and M-1987 towed howitzers.

But, until the diplomatic team in Beijing reports back on genocidal threats by the Combine, Depkazia does not actually want war with the Combine, and tries to continue its, 'dignified' withdrawal from Towraghondi. This becomes something of a matter of honour, as continuing to pull-out now could look like fleeing the Armandians, and so begins a scorched-earth policy intended to convey the idea that the town was in Depkazia's total control, and withdrawal came only after that influence was fully exercised. Anything that isn't distinctly Islamic in origin or purpose is likely to be either blown-up, it's collapse blamed officially on Combine shelling, or booby-trapped.

Most ethnic Depkazis choose to leave, either for the TPRD or for Dostum's West Bactria, but some fighters -of various races- remain, seeking martydom. They are provided with mines and other explosives, RPGs, assault rifles, light machineguns, and a few Strela-3 MANPADS, and encouraged by the parting words of 'religious officers' newly attached to forward deployments.

Some streets, fields, paths, ruins, and buildings are sewn with explosive devices, but, amongst them, sinister chemical mines are dispersed. Some of these contain binary nerve agents able to penetrate run-of-the-mill NBC protection, others more simple older mustard gas weapons.

Depkazia intends to warn the Armandians about mines and the like if discussions and Combine actions and attitudes improve, and to offer to over-see their safe removal, but if the town is to be taken by force instead of civilised agreement, it will likely win itself a bloody nickname.

(May deal with Caspian stuff in the other thread, next time. So much going on, or not going on, or... quite confusing!)

The Combine, a nation in the thrall of something that wasn't quite a religion but not quite atheism either, was deeply disturbed by the rise in Islamic sentiment in Depkazia. The Taliban's (OOC: My, haven't we forgotten about them?) vicious implementation of Sha'riah law had lowered Afghanistan's penchant for devout Islam, but the Depkazis seemed intent on reviving it. Combine officials are especially worried about the fact that United Elias, once the world's leading opponent of fanatical Islam, was seemingly intent on isolation, leaving the Combine to deal with a foe potentially as fanatical, stubborn, and irrationally determined as...well, as the Combine. For their part, the Armandians continued to emphasize the DRA's "Islamic socialism" policies, which strived to integrate socialist economic principles, democracy, and moderate Islam.

The Pakistani threat becomes more and more of an irritant for the Combine, and Armand quietly inquires with the INU and China about possibilities for regime change in that eternal troublemaker. The Combine argues that this is the ideal time to strike at Shareef, when United Elias seems to be too preoccupied with its own internal affairs to support him. Friendly moves are also made towards Depkazia, urging that nation to abandon the weakling Shareef to the wolves.

-Towraghondi, Afghanistan-

When word reaches DRA forces that the Depkazis are to withdraw from Towraghondi, the artillery becomes silent. Depkazi fire had inflicted some damage upon a few of the artillery pieces deployed closer to the city, but the lack of modern detection technology on the Depkazi part, along with the distance between the forces and the brief time span between the unleashing of artillery and the Depkazi acquiescence, ensure that the damage done to Armandian forces is minimal. Troops on the ground wait for further word from the conference.

OOC: Well, the Taliban is still a major force in Afghanistan, especially outside of the Turkic north. So far as I'm aware, they haven't actually been seriously tackled, let alone defeated. Isn't Shareef interested in courting their favour?

I have imagined that the Combine is at something of a disadvantage in Afghanistan.

The Depkazis have always had ethnic and cultural ties to the large Turkic minorities, backing Dostum and former-president Rabbani in what we call West and East Bactria respectively. They and Samarqand have fought the Pashtun and others in a largely ethnically-defined war, with the real motivation at the top always being personal and political power, of course. Since Tchokareff's sudden fall, the Depkazis have been able to reintroduce the religious aspect of their association with Bactria and Afghanistan (which Samarqand considers distinct, everyone else's perception of a larger Afghanistan being based on old Anglo-Russian imperialism).

The only reason that the Bactrians, backed by the Depkazi state, maintain their racist line, is that they don't want to lose influence to the Taliban, which happens to be Pashtun (AKA Afghani) dominated. It's good to know that AMW's Afghanistan is every bit as complicated as the real thing! It would be easy for the Depkazis to focus entirely on the religious aspect and join with religious Pashtun and the rest in fighting the DRA and Combine influence, but then Bactrians might be influenced almost as much by the Taliban as by Depkazia.

So now Muslim Depkazis are fighting Muslim Afghanis for the cause of a greater Turkic khaganate, and both are fighting communists for the cause of Islam.

As I say, so far as I can see, the Combine has the weakest hold over any part of the population in Afghanistan, and, while nobody has it anything like easy, the Armandians have a real up-hill struggle to get anything accomplished. That's Afghanistan for outsiders, though!

In pretty much every other regard, of course, Depkazia remains inferior to its larger, richer neighbours, with their tens of billions of barrels of oil and hundreds of millions of people.

Peace in Afghanistan thread when I've had something to eat, for the first time today.

OOC: Yesh...I've tried to stay away from the issue of the Taliban as much as possible, since we don't really have anyone to RP them. Judging by RL Afghanistan, however, their brutal regime made them seriously unpopular amongst the Afghani people, so I'm not sure how much of that 20,000 force exists only on paper.

Here's an idea: let's give the Taliban to Shareef. I have the DRA as my puppet---I mean, err, loyal ally---and Depkazia has ethnic Depkazis in Afghanistan. Shareef certainly has the weakest position of all in this conflict, so for the purposes of making this more interesting, let's say his courting of the Taliban works, mmm?

I'm certainly aware of the Combine's weak PR position in Afghanistan. (Although we are working on it by using good old fashioned Leftist propaganda, along with a good deal of simple comparison between living conditions in Afghanistan and Depkazia) That's what makes this RP so interesting: we all have our different advantages and disadvantages. Depkazia has much more popular support amongst northern Afghanis, but is poor and militarily backwards. The Combine has an extremely well trained and well financed military but doesn't really have much support. Shareef has...

Heh. Let's move on. :)

I don't think the task of achieving support is all that impossible for an outsider, however. The regimes of Chingiz and Omar are notoriously brutal; that's exactly what allowed the US to gain support in RL.

(OOC: Heh, support in Afghanistan? That's a relative term. We're hearing a lot about the latest British deaths in the country, this month, since they redeployed to, well, areas near the Combine (and... INU? or NP? INU, I think) border, actually, most notably the Taliban-stronghold and largest opium-poppy producer that is Helmand. Even the Gurkhas have come close to copping it. It's not like dealing with terrorism in Ireland or 'insurgency' in Iraq. In Afghanistan you either leave people alone and have no influence over them, or you try to get in and end up dead. I'm pretty sure that the only reason we don't hear more about Afghanistan is that most of it has generally been left alone: after all, the Taliban is still there, and still strong, years after the invasion. "I don't know" said a soldier asked why she was in Afghanistan, "Something about drugs I think... but it seems more like we're here to be shot at by the Taleban." Don't be taken in by relatively low fatalities (though they're actually in the hundreds for the US alone, anyway), they're not trying to fundamentally re-shape Afghan society, or even go to large parts of the country. And that concludes Yugoslavia's intrusion!)

After reviewing Sharef's telegram, it was decided that Beijing would send an envoy to North Pakistan, and Beijing utters friendly noises in reply, something to the effect of "We'll send someone to talk with you"

This was no ordinary envoy - Beijing already viewed North Pakistan as useless at best and a force capable of stopping the pipeline at worse. The diplomatic envoy ,headed by Bauer of the Ministry of Defence, had other intentions besides diplomacy.

Towraghondi, Afghanistan, just beyond the Depkazi border

The Depkazi pull-out was not unexpected, and many were not unhappy to see it completed, for it had been painful. TPA commanders went with the understanding that Samarqand did not want the Armandians to gain a prize, however small, but a mess, however large, and destroyed most of the limited utilities, many of which were Depkazi-built anyway. The unstable relationship between Constance and Samarqand made it difficult to plan far ahead, so it was unfortunate that such destruction was hard to take back once enacted.

Turkic Mugāhidīn armed by the departing People's Army were few in number because Towraghondi was not such a big place as one may be lead to believe after the level of dispute that was associated with it, and because some citizens chose to leave for Depkazia or Bactria... including some who might continue the armed struggle from elsewhere. But, few though they were, some did stay, and saw a ring of communist forces establishing themselves. The man who would lead them was a Muhammad Novruzov, who revelled in the title Commander, which he earned largely because he was amongst a minority of still-able veterans of the glorious war against the USSR. Notably, as he prepared to once again battle the communists, he carried a Tommy-Gun with Roycelandian markings.

The declaration indicating the start of communist military operations in three days time, and the evacuation at gunpoint of the entire civilian population sent a few more potentials into Novruzov's ideological camp, and the band of strugglers began to include one or two people of non-Depkazi origin.

At a communist checkpoint in the east of the perimiter

"...no, nothing, just this." Said a young man holding up a bundle of rags and pushing it towards the security personnel searching the trickle of civilians leaving at this particular checkpoint. He was dressed quite modestly in loose fitting apparel. "It's just my lunch. Peace be with you, soon." he added, as a soldier unwrapped the bundle, which didn't feel much like lunch, and found himself holding a live grenade, fused for seven seconds and activated six earlier as the person ahead of the young man was cleared to move on and leave the doomed town. The first martyr in the renewed armed struggle with the communists flung open his robes to cast two further grenades, one to either side of the checkpoint at which security forces worked, this time fused for only three seconds, and was consumed with the soldier facing him in the first of three blasts.

Further back in the queue, as people scattered in all directions and some threw themselves to the ground, two of the grenadier's comrades, one moving in the chaos and another having approached dead and wounded bodies and taken a prone position close to them, swept out Thompson submachine-guns and began to unload their useful hundred-round drum magazines into the communist position.

Amongst the fleeing civilians, several more Mugāhidīn attempted to cross the cordon, pretending to be every bit as much panicked. If any made it, some would continue to move, into the surrounding area or even towards West Bactria, and others would take any available cover and begin to fire on the communists from the other side, or on reinforcements moving up from elsewhere.

On the far side of the cordon at about the same time a mortar crew launched several bombs towards a checkpoint there before displacing and retreating back into the already half-ruined and half-evacuated town, a lone sniper waiting in rubble to cover them against pursuit.

Was Commander Muhammad Novruzov still in the town, or trying to break through in the east?

The surprise attack had taken the Communist forces by...well, by surprise. Tommy gun bursts and grenade blasts had taken the lives of five Afghani soldiers, and over three times as many civilians. Hassan Amir, one of the Communist generals, surveyed the horrific scene with his sky blue eyes. Still young and naive to some degree, he was disgusted by the sight of limbs, faces, and children's toys strewn about the blood soaked puddles that covered the ground. He felt bile rising up from his stomach, but had no chance to vomit---there was little time. It had become quite clear that the Mujahadeen were trying to use the panicked crowd as a way to cover their escape, and thus a quick, but brutal plan was hashed out. Communist forces on the ground would push back the mob with gunfire, attacking both the Tommy gun wielding maniacs and the civilians who were trying to escape. The cordon around the city was multilayered, and any who got past the first checkpoint were butchered by those further behind. A pitched battle soon emerged, as the various layers of security pounded the Mujahadeen, and armored four wheel drive vehicles roared after the mortar team. This was all a delaying tactic, however. The real battle began once the teams of Louie Attack Helicopters arrived onto the scene. The bloodbath was horrific, as they poured ammunition into the entire escaping mob, civilian or not, and pushed back the tide.

The checkpoints would be re-opened in a few hours, the massacre would be blamed on Depkazi suicide bombers, and the evacuation period would last one more day.

Eastern cordon, Towraghondi

The Mugāhidīn here were few. One had killed himself up front, two more were quickly exposed. Though they killed five infidels, they all were felled within minutes, their young bodies falling with Roycelandian weapons still in hand.

But Towraghondi really was just across the border. By some quite amazing coincidence, Depkazi state media personnel were right on the other side of this stretch of border! Astonishing!

By the end of the day, images of Armandian-backed communist forces gunning down Afghani civilians were all over the news.

The Depkazis hadn't been gone for two days, and the heathen communists were already shooting wildly into crowds of refugees. Tapes were sent to Istanbul and Beijing while images played in Depkazia and Bactria.

In the western extent of the barrier

The struggler had no word to express his feeling at seeing a communist flying limp through the air and descending upon his position, and so he stayed silent as he watched the wounded man fall to his death. A 4x4 vehicle, chasing a mortar team into the town, had rolled over an anti-tank mine in the only road not blocked by debris, utterly destroying it and sending one crewmember a full twenty feet into the air before he landed on the ruinous remains of a house in which sheltered a Mugāhidīn sniper, breaking his back on impact and dying within two seconds.

The road blocked by a burning hulk, the mortar team easily escaped into the town. The last of the armoured 4x4s chasing them now found itself struck repeatedly by RPGs.

Now, the surviving members of the communist mission to hunt-down the attackers were trapped between two burning hulks as snipers opened fire and mortar teams were directed by semaphore, raining death on the easily ambushed communists, whose innocence was taken at Towraghondi.

Over the town, the arrival of helicopters, apparently taking the bait of the major eastern attack, was met by MANPAD fire. SA-14 Gremlin missiles lept from the debris to attack targets in the sky, crews scrambling down the side of rubble heaps the instant after they fired, disappearing below the level of remaining buildings -mosques- and great mounds of ruin, out of a helicopter's line of sight.

So far, this operation could not have gone better for the Islamic strugglers if they dreamed it in heaven.

http://img160.imageshack.us/img160/2828/iriflag5ow.jpg
Islamic Republic of Indonesia

Images from Towraghondi arrive on Indonesian television shortly after their release, sending angry crowds into the streets where they burn the black flag and curse the evils of the Combine athiests. The timing could not have been better for the Depkazis, coming as it does as Mohammed Kalla and the IRI leadership attempt to formulate a new policy towards Afghanistan.

The Indonesians had long supported the Taliban, for years the only Islamic state on the world stage and home to training camps where southeast Asian Muslims had trained and prepared for their efforts against the Federal Republic of Bonstock. The Taliban had been assaulted on all fronts, it seemed, by Depkazis, the Combine, and the Elians (through their Pakistani puppet Shareef)... and Kalla was increasingly concerned that his own nation might share a similar fate.

There was little to be done directly... Afghanistan was distant, and the Indonesians hadn't the capacity to move troops or significant supplies into the theatre. But it was becoming more and more apparent that they had to do SOMETHING.

The Combine was the major threat, associated as it was with the same 'Progressive' movement as the Strainists who now blinded the Faithful in Sujava. United Elias and its allies were distasteful in that by all reason they ought number amongst the Faithful themselves, their secularism coming as a rejection of Islam itself. Depkazia... the best of the lot, despite their socialist history and tendency for racial division. They, at least, seemed increasingly influenced by the true Faith, and because of that perhaps there was hope they might be worked with.

Across Indonesia, ulema and imams began to speak of the need for 'soldiers of the Faith' to defend their Muslim brothers wherever they were threatened.

[OOC: A query... who is in control of Kabul and Kandahar, and what is the status of the airports there?]

If the Depkazis thought they were the only ones capable of media manipulation, they were in for a rude surprise. Hassan Amir had the Combine's news agencies, as well as a few foreign ones (who would perhaps carry more credibility than Depkazia's state media, who only a few months ago was known to report that Russia was engaged in a mad scheme to steal Depkazi...water) film the bloody aftermath. Strewn about the scene were enough weapons to arm a small army, which the Combine intended to make out the mob to be. Hassan tenderly raised a dead child, only to reveal the grenade in the cold, lifeless grip of the boy. The message was clear: these were no civilians. They were cold blooded killers, jihadists every one.

[OOC: I don't appreciate the portrayal of my troops as total incompetents who fall into every obvious trap, by the way, but I'll play along for now.]

The ambushed attack party would have been doomed, if not for the arrival of Louie assault helicopters to assist it. The Armandians weren't idiots; they weren't going to leave their comrades to be butchered in the streets. Of course they kept watch for any anti-air forces along the way, and made sure to level plenty of ammunition and rockets down upon any threats.

Two gunships met their fiery doom over Towraghondi that day, causing the first actual Armandian casualty (although this would not be reported) in the war. However, a Depkazi would have to have superhuman speed to unveil, launch, and run away from an anti-air attack of any sort without getting at least a return barrage from the deadly Louies.

Half a day remained...

(OOC: I was just responding to what happened. 4x4 vehicles tried to chase the mortar team, which meant 4x4 vehicles charging into the town streets, the condition of which was broadly pre-established, and, there's no two ways about it, the lead vehicle rolled over a mine while fighters had nothing immediately to stop them opening fire on the rear. So that was what happened.
The helicopters were reported arriving some time after the 4x4s, thus playing no part in the moment of ambush, and, even when they did arrive, heading to the opposite side of the town to slaughter civilians, passing all the territory in which SAM teams lie in order to do so, and so they -still having no impact on the ambush- were attacked en route and/or from back in the town while assaulting the crowd.
I'm sorry if I've now laboured any points, but I wanted to be clear that, on double-checking, I do not think that anything was presented even slightly inaccurately, based on available information, and I wouldn't want a difference of opinion festering behind the scenes.
For what it matters, Depkazia is under a different administration since the lunatic days of Edmundian rule, and a recent post even referenced the foundation of a (desperately limited) independent media. I shan't linger on whether or not anyone in the world shall swallow the Armandian hogwash, since that's for individual chumps and opportunists to decide IC ;)
Back for IC later, though, for what it matters, in spite of their early showing, there's probably not much left in the strugglers' bag of tricks for little Towraghondi, I'm afraid! I'm sure the Armandians will be distraught.)

(OOC: I was just responding to what happened. 4x4 vehicles tried to chase the mortar team, which meant 4x4 vehicles charging into the town streets, the condition of which was broadly pre-established, and, there's no two ways about it, the lead vehicle rolled over a mine while fighters had nothing immediately to stop them opening fire on the rear. So that was what happened.
The helicopters were reported arriving some time after the 4x4s, thus playing no part in the moment of ambush, and, even when they did arrive, heading to the opposite side of the town to slaughter civilians, passing all the territory in which SAM teams lie in order to do so, and so they -still having no impact on the ambush- were attacked en route and/or from back in the town while assaulting the crowd.
I'm sorry if I've now laboured any points, but I wanted to be clear that, on double-checking, I do not think that anything was presented even slightly inaccurately, based on available information, and I wouldn't want a difference of opinion festering behind the scenes.
For what it matters, Depkazia is under a different administration since the lunatic days of Edmundian rule, and a recent post even referenced the foundation of a (desperately limited) independent media. I shan't linger on whether or not anyone in the world shall swallow the Armandian hogwash, since that's for individual chumps and opportunists to decide IC ;)
Back for IC later, though, for what it matters, in spite of their early showing, there's probably not much left in the strugglers' bag of tricks for little Towraghondi, I'm afraid! I'm sure the Armandians will be distraught.)

[OOC: I should've been more clear, sorry. My assault copters are divided into two groups: one massacring civilians, and one immediately trailing the 4X4 team. I didn't directly mention it so I'll take this hit.

"even when they did arrive, heading to the opposite side of the town to slaughter civilians, passing all the territory in which SAM teams lie in order to do so, and so they -still having no impact on the ambush- were attacked en route and/or from back in the town while assaulting the crowd. "

This, however, I have issue with. My forces formed a cordon around the city; why would they need to pass through territory with SAM teams lying in wait? The checkpoints are too far out of the city for anyone to realistically conceal an SAM and fire it with any accuracy from within. To attack the helicopters firing on the civilians, you would have to come into range for either the copters or the ground forces to get you.

As for the Depkazi media, I know, but it's still a media controlled by a dictator, and I doubt if anyone takes the pretensions about being at all independent very seriously. It's going to be hard for Edmund to shake his father's reputation, and I'm not going to make it any easier for him. ;)

I've got one more trick up my sleave, actually, although I admit that my original plans now look like a crude and childish lashing out rather than the cold efficient assault they were originally intended to be. Ah well, I'll get you next time.]

(OOC: Hm, I assumed that the cordon couldn't be all that wide, since the Depkazi border at Serhetabat (Gusgy/Gushgy/Kushka, formerly the southernmost point in the USSR) is all but on the outskirts to the northeast of Towraghondi. If you were going to skirt widely around the town to reach a checkpoint more than a few yards to the east you'd be flying over TPA positions. They could still fly wide around the south and escape fire en route, I suppose, for a slight time penalty, but would still have the threat to face when you actually approach the eastern checkpoints. And, of course, helicopters following the 4x4s would still be in as much danger as ever. The Depkazi border makes this a very confined theatre in which it must be quite a challenge to make full use of combined arms flexibility.
There's a good reason why America's Apaches waited out the whole war on Yugoslavia and never made an impression. However, to be fair, I should add that our MANPADS are not the world's best. They're no useless Strela-1/2, but neither are they latest generation systems. At close range they're especially dangerous given the limited reaction time available, but once out of the confines of Towraghondi I'd imagine that modern gunships might have the countermeasures and agility to have at least a good chance of evading, though it'll always be an nailbiting ride for Combine helicopter crews over hostile regions.
Anyway, yes, I'm sure the Combine's big enough to absorb a few hits to begin with. This generation of Combine soldiers is probably only cutting its teeth in Afghanistan, isn't it? And presumably you're on your first generation of post-Soviet commanders as well (much as Depkazia, should we end up more directly invovled).
IC post probably soon, I just keep finding other things to read or reply to whenever I come to address this thread.)

North Pakistan

To Mustafa Shareef, Chingiz Khagan remains a highly worrying individual. The Chinese and Combiners, at least, are open about their intentions towards his nation, whereas Shareef can't so much make out whether Chingiz sees North Pakistan as an ally or as a target. None the less, Chingiz is the only show in town, and suggestions of a Jihad against Kashmir are particularly attractive. The Depkazi diplomats are subsequently called to Shareef's headquarters to recieve his communique. According to it, Shareef is prepared to join in the fight to drive the Combiners out of Afghanistan, and is also eager to negotiate a division of the nation into "proper" Turkic and Pashtun islamic states. Shareef, who has enough trouble with the Pashtun population in his own country, is not at all eager to accept more, but would gladly aid in the movement of the Pashtun out of areas under Turkic control. In the interests of harmony under the banner of Islam, of course.

It might not be immediately apparent to the Depkazis, though, and the North Pakistanis are doing their best to spread information to the contrary, but Shareef still has not succeeded in securing the Taliban's good graces. Despite efforts to threaten, bribe, and impress with munificence, Taliban warlords still remember Peshawar's airstrikes on Kabul and support of the hated Elians. Mullah Omar, on the run from Baghdad's very long striking arm, cannot even be located, much less made to forget the aid that Shareef rendered to his would-be captors. Progress, though, is being made, as a slowly increasing number of Taliban see Shareef's sponsorship as the best way to secure for themselves some power after Afghanistan's inevitable division.

Mustafa Shareef, in order to impress Chingiz, makes his first visit to a mosque in Peshawar since his youth. The Kufi-wearing Shareef, his NPAF uniform conspicuously absent, is followed by more television cameras than there are stations in North Pakistan as he prays with other government ministers and discusses his rediscovery of Islamic values. With luck, it will give his new plans a slight tint of legitimacy.

Khyber Pass

In truth, the North Pakistani president is hardly occupied with spiritual matters. On the eastern end of the Khyber Pass, some 25,000 Federal Army troops prepare to move on Kabul, with or without the Taliban's sanction. At the head of the North Pakistani column, just outside the pass, tired old engines come to life, belching clouds black exhaust typical of their poor condition. Despite the fact that little in the way of modern equipment has been recieved since the 1980s, barring of course Elian D-30 howitzers, the Federal Army can still call upon a vanguard of T-55AM2PBs, upgraded with applique armor and improved fire control. Behind these are unmodernized, but still useful, T-62Ms in slightly greater numbers. Infantrymen ride in one of three APC types, from the cramped BMP-1 to the more roomy, Chinese-built YW 531, to the Hotspur Hussar, a Land Rover conversion imported at great cost.

First through the pass is a scouting contingent of SSG men, supported by a pair of Polish-built Rys (Lynx) 8x8 APCs, based on the erstwhile OT-64. They seek out hostile positions along the paved roadway and engage them with the vehicle-mounted KPV or their own small arms, usually the AK-74, and make way for the sizable armored force by cutting-down near every living thing. Up to an hour later, thanks to an error in timekeeping, the first Federal Army tanks start to roll towards Afghanistan, the North Pakistani star and crescent hanging from radio aerials as further proof of Peshawar's credentials. Sporadic fire is taken from the surrounding hills, but the lead tankers in their RPG-proofed, IR-sighted, mine plow-equipped T-55s feel quite secure as they navigate the road's twists and turns under the watchful eyes of NPAF Mi-25 crews. The following infantrymen, many of them on foot, will be the ones to worry.

Jalabad

Nangarhar's provincial capital, home to a sizable airfield if not all too many aircraft, is at the top of Peshawar's list of military priorities in east-central Afghanistan. North Pakistani Su-25s arrive over the city just minutes after the tanks start to move, and therefore just after daybreak. With Alamo-armed MiG-29As serving as top-cover in case any Combine aircraft show up to harrass the raid, the veteran Frogfoots swoop down and strafe Jalalabad Airport, exploding some of the still-operational aircraft there and wrecking the control tower before moving off. All eight of the NPAF's An-28s lumber up from Peshawar to make an airborne assault on the very useful runway, and using their STOL characteristics to avoid damaged sections the rarely-used Antonovs deposit 96 SSG commandos.

(OOC: On Kabul and Kandahar, I forget exactly what's happened over the months. Certainly I can say that they're not under Depkazi sway! Presumably they're controlled by Afghan warlords and/or the Taleban?)

If this part of the world is hard to understand from the outside, let it not be said that the labyrinth is easier to navigate from within. At times, it seems, even yarn can turn on one who has strung it.

Chingiz is able, to a degree, to differentiate Pakistan and Shareef. But he appears to be struggling to draw a tidy line between Taleban and the rest of non-Turkic Afghanistan.

While the Khagan is not his father, secrecy and suspicion necessarily remain strong in Samarqand, and it is even said that Chingiz may be experimenting with some of the same sort of treatments as are believed to have sent his father mad. European doctors have, by now, diagnosed Edmund Tchokareff with mercuralism. It is hard to know precisely what the young Khagan is thinking.

Still, for now, Chingiz continues to preach the virtues of two ideals: Turkic nationalism and Islamic unity.

Bactria

The flag of the Turkic People's Republic flew from more rooftops and vehicles here than in Depkazia, and the face of Chingiz was appearing on banners and posters in as many places again. The militias controlled by Dostum and Rabbani, long benefitting from Depkazi munitions and even intelligence and training, were now receiving Turkic People's Army designations, titles, and some heavy equipment. Dostum could not infrequently be seen riding about on a T-62, and TPA helicopters and transport planes appeared at small facilities here and there. Major government projects were connecting the Beyliks of East and West Bactria with Depkazia's power-distribution grid and rebuilding road and rail links. Land reform, started on Samarqand's orders and managed by Dostum and Rabbani, was beginning to take advantage of the best agricultural land in all of what used to be Afghanistan, and Turkic communities were benefiting.

Samarqand had keenly accepted Pakistani support in removing Pashtun minorities from Bactria, even if the Beyliks' governments were less enthusiastic and a few, 'hostile incidents... disturbed the peaceful nature of the programme' in government-speak.

Afghanistan

In contrast to works further north, Depkazi aid to Afghan warlords actually continued. Chingiz had negotiated so far to avoid direct conflict with the Combine, but he still wanted resistance to the communists on his frontier. Samarqand provided propaganda videos and posters to those who'd take them, and otherwise distributed by script and word-of-mouth accounts of martydom in the northwest as Turks and Afghanis fought valiantly to defend the faith against the communists. Increasingly, such aid was arranged through Bactria rather than Depkazia directly.

North Pakistan's operations in Afghanistan in some ways made things more difficult, as Chingiz would rather like to supply anti-Combine resistance through the Pakistanis (to avoid taking the rap for it himself, of course!), but this would mean asking Shareef to put weapons in the hands of some of the same people he was shooting at. Perhaps things needed to progress more quickly in an effort to blur the line between Pakistani and Afghani Muslims. That Shareef was going to have to leave if the Pashtun were to be placated, most likely...

Depkazia

For now, Depkazia's huge military, only really one generation behind the honestly modern (though certainly not getting any more modern, it had to be said), was doing precious little. Bactrian units were strong, having several thousand battle-hardened fighters with increasingly good training and proven organisation, and it was Afghanis that were fighting the Combine.

In the southeast, ranks of conscripts and more enthused volunteers were lining up. Chingiz proposed to march a Jihadi army to the Pakistani capital to join the Federal Army and advance upon Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir, the Khagan suggests, might be induced to revolt on the approach of jihadi warriors, and Singh can be driven from power there, if perhaps not in the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh.

The Khagan states that he recognises the difficulty of Pakistan's other operations in Afghanistan, but suggests that his Mugāhidīn further west can delay Combine progress for now, especially since the Armandians have involved themselves in Bihar, and that the current freedom of his own armies means that, from the standpoint of Shareef's best likely ally against Kashmir, there is a window of opportunity. He also makes vague reference to growing support abroad, mentioning the Ottoman Empire and others.

Chingiz's forces would begin to move into North Pakistan almost immediately, indicating it as an operation aiming at the Khyber Pass and on to Afghanistan's major cities, and only then would agitation amongst Kashmiri Muslims, recruitment of Jihadi volunteers in Depkazia to follow and support the initial advance, and the eastward drive of Pakistani forces begin.

Depkazia's president said that he would match the regular manpower of the Maharaja's Royal Army and provide fighter aircraft to assist in subduing the inferior RKAF (by this he means to commit mainly his MiG-21s, which are desperately close to the end of their airframes' safe use, but are about a hundred strong at this time) and any, 'other' weapons that may be required to induce the collapse of Hindu and other forces uninspired by Islamic sentiment.

Jalabad

By nightfall, the SSG detachment had, for the most part, secured Jalalabad's military airfield, although in its cratered state it is really only good for STOL aircraft and helicopters. They had dug-in around the runway dispersal area, still largely undamaged and suitable for helicopter evacuation. With RPDs, RPG-16s, and AK-74s, the DPM-clad North Pakistanis are ready to defend their position, but probably not for long if the Taliban in Jalalabad decide to mount a serious attack. Much to their displeasure, and in spite of the NPAF's relatively large fleet of serviceable Mi-8/17s, they had not since recieved any reinforcements, although for a detachment of less than a hundred men in the midst of an opponent many times larger, things could be going much worse. One of Shareef's personal aides, more tactful and affable than most of them, is largely to blame for this less-violent state of affairs. He had been landed with the commandos, and had since opened negotiations with the Taliban commander in the city. The raid is explained as a mistake; Peshawar had assumed that it was Armandian paratroopers holding the airfield, and had meant in any case to arm the Taliban against the communists. Skeptical as they were, the Taliban had held-off on attacking, and Shareef's man had returned to the airport to beg for concessions from Peshawar.

Peshawar does in truth want to arm and fund the Taliban, and is not trying to fight them. But, like usual, Peshawar is not trying hard enough. Depkazi prodding, though, does yield a promise to stop at Jalalabad and negotiate from there on in. Fighting Combine influence should, Shareef agrees, be their top priority, and the acquisition of territory only secondary.

North Pakistan

For almost fifty years, the Federal Army and the Royal Army had been arrayed against each other along the line of control, a seemingly inflexible frontier that had barely moved since Shareef's father had sent truckloads of armed Pashtun into Hari Singh's principality 59 years earlier. Neither side had been able to break the other's defensive line, blasted into solid rock or diligently carved into high-altitude ice. Pakistani numbers couldn't accomplish it, and neither could the Kashmiris' superior training. And for all the innumerable conflicts fought over the intervening span of time, for all the lives lost, all that had ever been captured were a few fortified hills and observation posts. Shareef, as eager as ever for the rest of Kashmir, very much hopes that he can change this situation with the infusion of Depkazi manpower.

Chingiz had, it appeared, promised to match the Royal Army's 79,000 regular troops with men of his own. Added to the Federal Army's 60,000 men on the border, plus another 10,000 in Azad Kashmir as a reserve, it might just be enough to force a breakthrough. He therefore decides to commit them in Azad Kashmir for a heavy attack through the worst of the Kashmiri defenses and into the Vale of Kashmir itself. Srinagar might, if everything goes according to plan, fall relatively quickly. Parak Singh would be forced from Kashmir in its entirety, and while the western portion of the front crumbles, the troops in Gilgit-Baltistan will mop-up resistance in the more remote parts of Singh's principality. Not, of course, that it would be difficult, the Depkazi and Pakistani muslims being liberators to such a large portion of Kashmiris after all...

Indeed, Chingiz was sending thousands of men. He was the Khagan, he had to conquer, to prove his descent from the greats of antiquity... after all, he'd taken the name of probably one of history's three most famous generals, Asia's own Caesar or Alexander.

At this moment, his people were in thrall, sure that here was something approaching a god on earth. But, to such a man, stagnation was almost as bad as defeat, and the armies went out.

Chemical and biological weapons, Shareef was told, would be deployed to shock and disorder the entrenched Kashmiri front, but not later with foreign eyes watching. After those frontal defences were broken, the jihadi armies would be in, and the Muslim majority in the northwest of the Kashmiri state would rise, inspired by the Afghani martyrs and the new North African struggle. Then, the Maharaja would be exposed as a failure and weakling, and it was even possible that the rest of Kashmir would reject him: people had been converted in the past, perhaps this population was wanting for the word of the Prophet?

In truth, as Depkazi forces followed a green light across the Pakistani frontier in and around the east of Rabbani's domain, Samarqand had very different plans. As holy warriors marched on his capital, Shareef would do well, at this point, to search back just-over eight centuries in history, and west so far as Istanbul...

Two Beyliks are too few!

[OOC: Guys, if it's not too much of a bother, can you refrain on meddling with my part of Afghanistan until monday? I'm sorry, it's just that I have college applications now and am under a huge work burden.]

OOC: Oh, yeah, I'm looking further east, for now! In the meanwhile, I just assume that basic Mujahadeen resistance continues, but no major Depkazi-backed operations like the Towraghondi one until everyone's on hand!

Peshawar

Shareef, the truth be told, is no student of history, and, surprisingly enough, has no concept of Chingiz's insidious plans. For the time being, he celebrates his impending victory over North Pakistan's long-time rival. Afghan ambitions take a back seat to the conquest of Kashmir, begun some 59 years earlier by General Mohammed Akbar Khan but left to fail by an uncommitted Liaquat Ali Khan. Subsequent emasculations of the Federal Army, undertaken first by Zulfiquar Shareef and then by Mustafa on an altogether larger scale, have made any repeat of General Khan's successes impossible. Until now, of course, and Mustafa Shareef delights in imagining Parak Singh's temperment upon learning of Chingiz's pledge.

Of course, when all is said and done, and Shareef's master plan comes crashing down as it most likely will, the President doesn't have much of anywhere to go.

Skardu

It is no coincidence that General Mohammed Akbar Khan's grandson, Husayn Ali Khan, can be found in Skardu. While it wasn't the general himself who was responsible for the victory there, Skardu was the site of North Pakistan's greatest victory in the First Kashmir War. AZK troops had beseiged the town, heavily defeating a Kashmiri relief column before finally overrunning the Royal Army in Skardu itself. Next to its historical significance, Skardu is also nestled amongst the high peaks of the Karakoram Range and rather on the inaccessible side. The roads are easy to watch and control, and the altitude helps to prohibit large-scale helicopter operations. True, the town is the headquarters of the Federal Army's 4th Division, but with the bulk of its strength in remote outposts along the border, itself many kilometers of poor roads distant, Husayn Ali Khan and his small band of followers has relatively little to worry about. The only Federal Army men in the town are administrators and quartermasters anyway.

Like a surprising number of North Pakistanis, Husayn Ali Khan has a personal vendetta against the Shareefs, both father and son. Zulfiquar had been Liaquat Ali Khan's right-hand man, and Mustafa had purged Husayn's father, Khurram, from the Army. With charisma, and experience fighting in the mountains against both the Kashmiris and Pashtun tribesmen in the Tribal Areas, he is a better commander than almost any Federal Army officer. But being able to take and hold Skardu is one thing, and being able to mount a serious attempt on Peshawar something completely different. If, however, Chingiz is looking for a Pashtun Beylik, a look at Husayn Ali Khan might just be worth his while.

Wakhan Corridor, Badakshan, Beylik of East Bactria

Villagers, who'd recently heard that they were now Bactrians, subjects of a Bey called Burhanuddin Rabbani -most had heard of him, at least- under the Depkazi Khanate, stopped their work to observe the passing of the Turkic People's Army.

Except, it wasn't the Turkic People's Army. Not officially. Granted, some ninety-plus percent of its constituents were under TPA contract or conscription, and all of their equipment was supplied by the Depkazi state, but this was a god's army, not a people's. It was the first jihad of Chingiz, banners of green and bearing swords flying in greater number than those of Depkazian red and blue.

This vast procession of Holy warriors struggled through the under-developed and difficult terrain of the Beylik's eastern arm, making the short but testing journey to Pakistan. Were they not sure of their martial security they would have been most vulnerable with vehicles moving in single file and break-downs causing tail-backs stretching into the Depkazi mountains. Gradually, man by man, truck by truck, tank by tank, the Turks arrived in Lasht, and their vanguard set-out along the banks of the Kunar, aiming ultimately for Peshwar.

Several Bactrians joined the jihad as it rumbled by, coming from miles around in plenty of time to catch hold of the army's long tail. Now Pakistanis too would be encouraged to join, the trucks bearing ten-a-penny AKM rifles in sufficient quantity to take on several new formations even from an unarmed community. The force was already in the strength of several divisions, and, looking back at the Depkazi border, one could see a black seam of men and vehicles running to a vanishing point within the shining climbs of the Pamir.

Light vehicles included many mounting AT-5 Spandrel missiles and a numberless quantity of Zil-131 and 157 bearing supplies and munitions. Almost all of the men were forced to walk or to cling upon the exterior of the vehicles that had no room for them inside. Even some of the BTR-70 and 80 APCs and BMP-1 and 2 ICVs were, for now, laden with goods instead of soldiers. Urgan and Grad rocket launchers were there, and self-propelled guns and mortars including Anona, Gvodzika, Akatsiya, and Giatsint-S types. T-72 tanks had been committed, but were protected by Shilka guns Sa-8b Gecko SAMs.

Registan Square

Chingiz Depkazi called himself Khagan -Khan of Khans- though, as yet, he was the only significant Khan in town. That did at least mean that there was nobody to contend the title, but it also seemed rather to devalue it. He was President of the Turkic People's Republic -Depkazia- and planned to legitimise this post with a referendum... later. He was Malik ul-Mugāhidīn -king of the strugglers-, and holder of more minor regional titles than you could shake a stick at.

Now, though, came more.

The President had met with Ottoman diplomats, and even with conspirators against the Sultan. These meetings convinced him that the House of Osman no longer had the desire nor the courage to discharge all of the duties for which it had traditionally claimed responsibility.

Chingiz Depkazi appeared in Registan Square, surrounded by its impressive architecture and warmed by its history, and spoke to state and independent journalists and cameras. Believing that the current Ottoman Sultan, a paranoid introspective, was about to be removed from power, the Khagan made a declaration. He claimed for himself the title of Amir al-Muminin and that of Khalīfah, Commander of the Faithful and Successor of the Prophet of the Lord of the Universe.

The Khagan was establishing himself as leader of the Islamic world, hoping to do so before a new Ottoman Sultan could arise to claim the titles for himself. This century would know only the Depkazi Caliphate!

But Chingiz was not finished, and now announced his jihad to the world, urging the faithful in Depkazia, Bactria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to join the jihadi army of mujahideen and win their place in paradise along with those in Kashmir, whom he told to await the approach of the jihadi army while preparing to rise-up on the command of the Caliph. Jammu and Kashmir would be liberated from the influence of the infidel Maharaja.

Of course, more worryingly for the average Depkazi, it might be possible to conclude that Chingiz's new responsibilities include an obligation to confront the DRA and to liberate the Holy cities of the Middle East. But, perhaps, if the Ottoman want back their title, they shall by obliged to earn it by pursuit of those issues.

Samarqand, later

Caliph he may -perhaps yet disputedly- be, Khan of Khans he is, but Chingiz is still President of a nation state.

His government has announced a plan to improve transport links in the east, specifically by building a new road inclusive of extensive tunnel and bridge connections to link Depkazia, East Bactria, and North Pakistan across the Wakhan Corridor. All three states will be involved, but, in places, there is a need for major engineering works, and Chingiz has invited Chinese firms to take part.

This is true elsewhere in Bactria and Depkazia. The governments and partially-independent Depkazi firms are working on development, but Chinese firms continue to be invited to bid for parts in the Khaganate's reconstruction as a modern land.

Chingiz's continued delaying of projects that would link Armandian oil directly with Chinese markets is now joined by a willingness to allow Chinese capitalists a bigger part in the Depkazi economy than they can ever get in communist Armand or the lands it absorbs. Development of Bactria's modest petrochemical reserves is also to be undertaken, and continued work on Depkazi Caspian claims may attract the interest of Chinese firms running out of Spratley reserves to exploit: Chingiz wants greater efficiency in exploiting his limited oil wealth than he can get from the dated USSR-origin technology available to Depkazia.

PLA prepares peacekeeping force
(Xinhua)

A month after the inconclusive conference aimed at diffusing tensions in the region, 40,000 chinese troops have been earmarked to secure the southern portion of the western Afghanistani provinces. The peacekeeping force will recieve the full support of the air force and Chinese intelligience assets, and will be authorised to detain any persons suspected of interrupting the peace.

Mumbai

The raising of a jihadi army in Central Asia would -only because of the European war- potentially have been a minor issue for His Majesty's government. That it was marching on the sub-continent, however, made it rather more important.

Given the choice between Chingiz and Shareef on one side, and the Maharaja on the other, London was inclined to favour the latter. However, there was a problem in that, well, shouldn't the contested area really be part of the INU, anyway?

It didn't seem likely that Mumbai was in a position to capitalise on the situation by annexing the rest of Kashmir to the Union, given other events on the subcontinent. Britain's embassy in the Union creaked and shifted uneasily on its unstable foundations and, with most of the government absorbed by European concerns, waited for the Indians to make their own noises.

British observers, meanwhile, clucked their tongues and shook their heads as more nations stuck their necks out in Afghanistan. Been there, done that, got the bloodstained shirt. Afghanistan on its own can explain why one should never get involved in a land war in Asia.

Gilgit-Baltistan

Jihadi troops crossing the border with North Pakistan's northernmost province are met by sometimes hostile, largely disinterested glances on the part of state border guards, who watch the column from on horseback. They are, before anything, suspiscious of the Turkic Depkazis, whose countrymen they had recently dealt with quite brutally during the brief Federal occupation of the Wakhan Corridor. The fact that they are armed only serves to keep the, brutal, violent, and generally unpleasant border guards at arms' length, lest one of the Depkazis or Bactrians identify the murderer of some relative in the company and decide to settle a score.

On arrival at Lasht, Chingiz's men are given a much warmer welcome. Star-and-crescent flags, sent ahead aboard An-14s, hang from windows and sign-posts on the road into town, and in the town center, the Depkazis and Bactrians find a banquet laid-out for them. Sure, it would only be enough to feed the first thousand or so to arrive, but a kind gesture nonetheless, from a town with not altogether more people in it. A group of volunteers, no more than a dozen, is also on hand to join the Jihad against Kashmir. Those travelling on foot are also welcomed to stay the night in Lasht, with billets offered in the town's small in and private homes. Few Lashtis, after all, are about to turn away the jihadi army, even if its numbers and equipment stand to swamp them. Provisions and accomodations are also prepared further south, in Wasam and Mastuj, while Peshawar readies itself for a colossal parade.

The border itself sees Federal Army troops recieving better food and more regular supplies of ammunition. Not, of course, quite up to Kashmiri standards, but certainly more than most Federal Army men would expect. More ominously, the infantrymen deployed in Azad Kashmir are issued with gas masks. They are old, dusty, DDR-surplus and haven't seen the light of day in years, but something, figures the General in command of those 60,000 men, is better than nothing. And if Chingiz keeps his word, there won't be too many Kashmiris left to worry about, and therefore no need to quickly occupy a gassed or diseased piece of land. Some of the Federal Army's heavily-modified T-55s are redeployed from the defenses facing Islamabad to the Kashmir front, replacing many of the T-34-derivative tanks and tank destroyers in service there. With NBC protection and advanced fire control, they, along with BMP-1s, stand to allow the Federal Army at least some freedom of movement in a Kashmir Valley ravaged by Depkazi missile strikes.

Sappers also begin to survey routes through the Kashmiri outposts and barbed wire, although with minimal accuracy and without the aid of many surveyors' tools. Bangalore torpedoes and shaped charges, vital for clearing paths through barbed wire and destroying Kashmiri bunkers respectively, are stockpiled near the front, along with 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds. Tunnels are also started from the North Pakistani positions, laboriously dug through ice and solid rock, with the goal of undermining Kashmiri emplacements. How important such measures will be, with the promised use of Depkazi chemical weaponry, is anyone's guess, and they are usually not successful anyway.

Kashmir, West of Srinagar

Activity on the North Pakistani side of the perpetually-contested border does not go unnoticed by the generally more competent and aware Royal Army of Kashmir. Secure in their positions, Royal Army troops facing Azad Kashmir are reinforced by troops only recently redeployed from the Punjab while more Giat 155mm self-propelled guns are brought to positions in the mountains. Aware of the Depkazi chemical arsenal, the Kashmiri troops are also issued gas masks, albeit no better than the ones given to the Federal Army. Without full NBC gear, the gas masks might not be of any use depending on the agents deployed by Depkazi missiles.

The Royal Army's small, but highly capable, tank force is also on hand to reinforce the Kashmiri defenses. With only 62 vehicles, it probably doesn't worry the Depkazis very much, but the fact remains that, until recently, Kashmir had the best tank force on the Indian Subcontinent, outside of the ISC. Its 34 Chieftain Mk.5s and 28 Leopard 1A4s are easily worth all of the Federal Army's T-34/85s and tank destroyer derivatives, and could probably handle quite a few T-62s before being obliged to withdraw. The only tank type in the Federal Army that can expect to challenge either of those types on relatively equal terms is the T-55AM, and poor command usually keeps them from exploring their combat potential. Depkazi T-72s would likely deal with the vehicles better, but, when the Kashmiris have the advantage of position, the Chieftains and Leopards will likely make their presence known.

Parak Singh also sends frantic telegrams to both China and North Sienna, begging for assistance against dangerous Chingiz and his new puppet in Shareef.

From Sujava, Muslim leaders begin to condemn the recent extremism in Central Asia, and the conflicts it has spawned. Standard theological arguments are made... jihad is an internal struggle not an external one, true martyrs die for the faith while soldiers in present conflicts die for the secular ambitions of their leaders, et cetera. Chingiz' choice of titles is also condemned, though this is perhaps due more to local politics than concerns over Turkic politics... "Without the full backing of the Faithful, no man can declare himself Caliph, be he Depkazi or Indonesian..."

From Istanbul and Ankara came the clamor of protest. Angrily worded messages roaring at the Depkazis for their "insubordination to the sucessor of the Prophet" and "willful ignorance of tradition and all that is right" thundered the airwaves of Islamic - and non-Islamic - countries throughout the world. A letter, carefully copied and sent to each of the interested parties, had been written by the mother of the Sultan, of the Hashemite line, and thus a descendant of the Prophet himself, denouncing the Depkazi claim to the title of "Caliph". Each letter or message had been made to appeal to a different demographic and if the Ottomans had succeeded, then they would all succeed. The Khagan had made his move, but the Ottomans were moving to make their own.

[OOC: China, southwestern Afghanistan is DRA territory. I never gave you permission to move in, and to get in you'd have to cut through the Depkazi-Pakistani owned Wakhan corridor. I don't know if either of them agreed to such a deal, although I'd love for you to come through and open a path for me...]

-Towraghondi-

Amir Hassan sniffed the air around him; it held the cold, rank stench of an old death, one that had occured ages ago, but had yet to be noticed. The wind whipped the world around him with a fury, as if it knew what lay ahead. Ancient buildings crumbled alongside new ones, both scarred alike by the wartorn ways of Afghanistan. The crack of bullets, the screams of the innocent and the not so innocent, and the endless ring of explosions pervaded the city; they were the dying gasps of a city that had died long ago and an era that had long since passed. Towraghondi was grim reminder of the blood splattered days of an Afghanistan ruled by fanaticism and superstition, barbarity and savagery. These days had long since passed, but men like the Khagan refused to move past them, trying to incite the world back into an age of barbarity and shadow. Somehow it had staggered into this new age of reason and socialist brotherhood, even though the ideas and spirit that had once given it life had long since crumbled, but now the Grim Reaper had come to collect what was his.

With a smile, Hassan watched the green digits pass past the the 72 hour mark, and barked out the order.

It was time for Death to take his fold back into the shadow, and for Prometheus to shine light upon the world.

-Operation: Prometheus-

The blast of a thousand cannons, the screech of dozens of planes, and the roar of a million bombs heralded the beginning of the end for Towraghondi. The Armandians weren't stupid; Towraghondi wasn't worth a long running, bloody, and costly in terms of money, men, and public image, urban battle. Instead, it was cleared out of the innocent, and then set ablaze; the corpse of the old would turn to ash before the flesh of the new could be born. Of course the wholesale annihilation of the wretched town was not done pell mell; the Combine was notoriously cost efficient. City maps, engineering reports, and reconaissance readings had identified the most efficient ways to level the city, pointing out the perfect places to strike in order to maximize destruction. Admittedly the lack of smart bombs, which were far too expensive for simple demolition work, would make things less than ideal, but there would still be plenty of money saved as Towraghondi burned.

Flames devoured time worn Korans, bombs broke the ceilings of ancient mosques, and explosions tore apart age old Minarets. Both the ornate Islamic buildings of the city's past and the concrete slabs of its present gave way to the horrible destruction unleashed. Rubble was flung through the air, which had become thickly permeated with a twisted mix of flesh, flame, and foundation. Within minutes, the beast had returned to its maker, and the long awaited death of the ancient world had begun.

General Hassan gazed upon the undying flame, laughing as a cigarette rested on his lips.

"And then God said, 'Let there be light.' And behold, there is light."

-Afghanistan-

Towraghondi was not the only place where Armand’s light would shine. The Combine’s divisions had doubled in size throughout the country, numbering over forty thousand well trained and armed men, alongside thousands more Communist and simply bribed Afghanis. Their advance had been admittedly slow, as they had been thorough in establishing control in all areas. Never before had Afghanistan seen such law and order; towns actually had functioning police forces, coherent justice systems, and the beginnings of a socialist economy. Afgani towns were slowly being transformed into Combine Cooperatives, and the constrution of several new Cooperatives had also been undertaken. Locals would be enticed with offers of prosperity and stability, and then slowly seduced by the Combine’s pervasive ideology. The fertile soil of Afghanistan would become a socialist bread basket, and the rough, craggy mountains a revolutionary treasure trove of resources. Most importantly, those Afghanis who proved most loyal would be allowed to work on the oil pipelines, with the future promise of life in the Combine itself. The pipeline’s construction had already begun, and it laced through the plains of Farah.

Of course, this progress would come at the cost of bloody battle. Ghor had already been taken by the sword, and the armies of the Black Flag marched upon Day-Kundi, Bamiyan, and Uruzgan in the center of Afghanistan. In the south, they had established full control of Nimruz, and were halfway through Halmand, with an eye on Kandahar and its valuable airports. The Taliban had, as of yet, not made any major moves against the Combine, and thus all the Armandians met in the South were scattered pockets of tribal resistance and the occasional Depkazi or North Pakistani insurgent. In the center, the Depkazis were more aggressive, but no major military action had been launched against the Combine’s ever more widespread columns. The Combine may have been the most alien of all participants in this war, but it had the most powerful military, the deepest pockets, and the offer of the brightest future for Afghanistan.

Mumbai

London's diplomats in the Union capital are informed, perhaps to their surprise, that Kashmir and North Pakistan are perhaps the only parts of India as a whole not mandated to the INU at some point in time, and for that reason Parliament cannot justify an invasion with a legal pretext as was the case with Rajasthan. Not that such an obstacle would stop Parliament, of course, but in the Armandian Combine the INU seems to have found a problem that it can't ignore or throw treaties at. Deeply suspiscious of the Combiners, Unioners are not keen to move troops away from border areas, where the INA likely faces a discrepancy in numbers to start with, and possibly in equipment. A popular uprising, the Walmingtonians are told, is the best option for both Kashmir and North Pakistan, and if things continue as they have been going, it would not be unreasonable to expect the regimes in both states to topple rather dramatically rather soon. Farooq Abdullah, the son of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, continues to organize strikes that periodically cripple the Kashmiri economy, and foreign service officials can fill dozens of pages with names of people more charismatic and popular than Shareef. Let the rulers do what they want, says the Unioners, they'll be dead or in prison within a decade. Mumbai will see to that.

Parliamentarians are more concerned with other things, though, and quickly steer the discussion towards affairs in Europe and Africa.

News of Towraghondi's destruction meets widespread condemnation from Unioners, not just muslims, already concerned over reports of a massacre perpetuated there by the Combiners. Besides decrying such wanton destruction, many wonder what the Combine is doing with the city's 20,000-some former residents, now without homes or jobs. Perhaps, one Parliament says, the Armandians will put them to work rebuilding the city, like the French did with Porto Novo's former residents. A sorry lot, she goes on to say, for a war-ravaged Afghan town and its inhabitants, and not something that would appear to improve Constance's standing amongst the Tajik-majority population of northern Herat.

Displeasure is not reserved for the Combiners, however. Muslims in the Indian National Union, accounting for almost half the population, join both the Ottomans and the Sujavans in contesting Chingiz Khagan's assumption of the Caliphate. That the generally liberal Ismaili Muslims living in the INU disapprove of Chingiz's jihad is expressed in normal political discourse.

Khada Hills, Kandahar

The Combiners aren't alone in their quest for Kandahar's airfields. General Abdur Khattak commands around 45,000 infantrymen in the Khada Hills just southeast of Kandahar City, a force largely comprised of Afghan troops, but augmented by some 5,000 INA regulars and 18,000 Baloch irregulars, and while it is headed for Kandahar, Khattak is in no hurry. While the Combiners wade through the deep muck of local warlords and Taliban fighters between Herat and Helmand, Khattak takes his time. The General and his commanders are keen to secure lines of communication and build a local support base, and there is no reason to rush to Kandahar while the Combiners are still weeks away. His force is, after all, better-suited to the type of warfare common in Afghanistan, and where warlords can't be bribed or ambushed, their Kalashnikov-armed fighters are often shot from long range by the Baloch irregulars, who haven't abandoned long-range marksmanship for "spray and pray" just yet. Logistics is no particular source of worry. From a high point, after all, the border is visible, and Khattak has taken to flashing his reports back with an Aldis Lamp to avoid interception on the part of the Armandians of the Depkazis. Supply convoys protected by mineproofed IC.1s and SB7 observer aircraft make the short trip to Khattak's position in safety, equipped none the less to deal with any threat that unfriendly forces might present. If support from the roads becomes problematic, then the IAuxAF and IAF can always fly cargoes in aboard Twin Pioneers and Mi-8s. Worryingly, Hyderabad has not been forthcoming with force estimates for the Combine units in Afghanistan. Whether Khattak's 45,000-strong force, composed mainly of Baloch irregulars from both sides of the border and other sympathetic Afghanis, will make enough of an impression on the Combiners so as to convince them to stop in Helmand is anyone's guess. Perhaps the Taliban and other local forces will do it themselves. In the ranks of Khattak's First Army are veterans of the Indo-Bedgellen Wars, the Soviet (Russian) invasion, the Korean Unification War, and the Malacca War, and it is a minority of officers who haven't fought in more than one of those conflicts. So they don't lack experience, if things do get heated and rapid action is made necessary, but they do not mean to fight the Combiners, only capture Kandahar before Constance gets there. Mabye the Afghan populace will recieve Khattak's force more warmly. They aren't, after all, about to demolish anything, or to convert anybody.

It is certainly not a secret that London is no admirer of the Combine, MI6 agents having surely caused one or two minor diplomatic tiffs in the past while working to undermine the communist administration: in North Sienna, London supports INU rule, even if the INU has given up on the idea, and in the west London supports the idea of... somebody other than communists having control of giant petrochemical resources. The only consolation is that at least the Combine isn't thought likely to throw its lot in with the Holy League.

Lately, the United States, with Japan's support, has threatened to open-up a new front in an already difficult intercontinental war, Roycelandia has continued to be frighteningly unreliable, and now reports suggest that Germany has lost its mind and begun to supply cutting-edge weaponry to Morocco and possibly to the Holy League, ruining Britain's only clear advantage against the French and Spanish. Having shut-down effective opposition, Mainwaring is feeling increasingly pressured to rebalance relations with the world.

As Anglo-Australasian fleets fight under unified command, the Whigs debate putting greater faith in India. Some -including elements in the right of the party, and those who abandoned the British Industrial Democrats- talk of the Empire, imagining reunion with Australasia and a future in which the INU might be the sub-continent. London is no more keen on the Soviets than on the Combine, but recognises Mumbai's relative influence in and safety from the former. Because the Soviets can be dealt with to a degree through the INU, the Commonwealthers are almost favourable to the Armandians.

Moving along this road, the Whigs have -nervously- agreed to pursue industrial defence co-operation with the INU, resisted in the past for fear of Soviet acquisition of British technology. But, if Germany is going to supply League-friendly nations, and the United States is going to pursue its own policies in conflict with Britain's interests, what other choice has London? Perhaps turning its component nations into US states, or recognising the pope and joining the League?

British teams travel to India with the intention of building facilities co-operatively, perhaps between HAL and BAe, to produce ordnance for the RAF and FAA, including the British Meteor missile. London doesn't want the Soviets to obtain such technology, but if it happens, perhaps it will only be used against the League -great- and the Combine -which we won't be sorry to see defeated, especially if it leaves Mumbai with some sway over Armandian petrochemicals, perhaps under Soviet control-.

The INU is quietly encouraged to construct an aid programme for Kashmiri defences, London apparently feeling that it might be a good way to encourage reform and introduce propaganda, since the Maharaja may be in no position to decline it, faced with Depkazi and Pakistani assault.

London's opinion of Constance is of course reassuring, and constitutes a welcome break in the recent pro-Combine trend. The Unioners make it very clear that they aren't looking for a fight with the Combiners, over whom the INU doesn't really have that much of an advantage. North Sienna alone had recently proven itself to be far from the impotent enclave that Mumbai had always assumed it to be, launching an invasion of Bihar with mechanized units and modern tanks. Not, say the Unioners, something that the INA has terribly many of. So it is not always Mumbai's place to make threatening gestures towards the middle of the Subcontinent.

Kashmir, though, does seem to them like an excellent place to check both the Combine's growing influence and Depkazi expansion. That is, of course, if the Maharaja decides that he is in fact threatened by the North Pakistanis. It is common knowledge that the Federal Army has been routed even when furnished with a ten-to-one numerical advantage, and likewise Kashmiri generals have little faith in Depkazi soldiery. If Parak Singh has that idea, the Army of the Indus will have to make its presence felt in the Punjab. Walmingtonian diplomacy might help convince the Maharaja to trust the Unioners, by rekindling the family affinity for Great Walmington and invoking Hari Singh's friendly relationship with Lord Mountbatten. And if Parak recognizes Parliament's very devious intent, well, there is no worry. He can't fight two invading armies at once, after all.

Although talk of Commonwealth with Great Walmington prompts some unkind words, military cooperation is greeted with widespread approval. The establishment of Meteor production facilities is made a top priority, and the Walmingtonian representatives are taken on a tour of the arsenal at Surat soon after their arrival. Parliament would like to open production lines at Hyderabad and Ajanta, in addition to Surat, and projects the first shipment of missiles within six months, should all things run according to schedule. Although the IAF already operates the comparable (?) D'Angelot Maudit, it plans to take possession of a fair few examples of the Meteor in order to round-out its inventory. True, Sovietists probably won't have to try very hard to get a look at the Meteor in detail, but the hope is that it won't be anything they don't already have.

Combine and Hindustani troops pushing towards Kandahar will eventually begin to find the occasional Southeast Asian body amongst the native Afghanis. This is not in itself unusual... Mohammed Kalla and Indonesia are known to have gathered forces for 'international jihad'. What IS unusual is that the bodies bear not the expected Islamic affectations, but bibles and crucifixes... the Indonesians are Christians.

Indonesia is home to a small Christian minority, which was once privileged over the more numerous Muslims by the Federal Republic of Bonstock. When the FRB fell, a wave of ethnic and religious violence exploded in the country, beyond the ability of Hudecian peacekeepers there to control, eventually leading to the ascension of Mohammed Kalla and a council of extremist imams. Many had thought that the Christians would be purged or exiled, but they were wrong: Kalla was never one to waste a chance to play one side against the other. He personally intervened to ensure the safety of Indonesia's Christians, taking in return able-bodied volunteers to serve in a paramilitary force: the Martyrs of the Second Prophet. As it became apparent that those who DIDN'T volunteer lost Kalla's protection, the regiment expanded and gained a reputation for both loyalty and ferocity... loyalty Kalla found valuable because it was directed at him alone, not the religious trappings which bolstered his regime.

However, since the crisis in the Philippines, Kalla had grown increasingly concerned over his Christian pets... they were useful internally, but should an enemy force manage to sieze control of the Christian villages, their reliability would vanish and they might even rise in rebellion. Events in Afghanistan had given him an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: to get the Martyrs safely out of Indonesia, and to assist his Taliban allies in resisting the ongoing invasion of their lands. Almost two thousand Martyrs had already been shipped in, with three thousand more awaiting delivery via Pakistan. Even so far from home, fighting for a cause that was not their own, they were amongst the most ferocious and determined of Afghanistan's soldiers, bolstered by the knowledge that if they lost or surrendered, Kalla would put their families back home to the sword.

While Chingkis continued to pull the wool over Kashmir's foreign affairs ministry, he had failed to take into account one very important thing - The recent signing of a peace accord between Russia and China. This meant that Chingis's antics were no longer tolerable, he was no longer needed. They were now a downright annoyance. A more workable leader would be required, and China was willing to risk access to Depkazian natural resources and even a possible war with the Islamic countries to do so. Secretly, China's man in Depkazia, Bauer, with the help of the Secret Service, begins the 24 hour tracking of Chingis himself.

Chinese diplomats discreetly make contact with Singh of Kashmir, offering a package involving secret military assistance in exchange for reform and support of future Chinese actions in the region. The Combine and the INU are also informed of China's intentions.

China would continue to allow the free media such as Xinhua to paint the military buildup as a peacekeeping operation.

Samarqand

The Khalīfah -he made sure that he was introduced as such at every opportunity- regarded the report on Chinese state media with substantial caution. Are they going by sea, or will they want to come through the Khaliphate? If the latter, we'll have to take issue. It'll have to be with the size of the force. It's more like an occupation force than one of a 3rd-party peacekeeping contribution.

Chingiz was worried that the Chinese, if they travelled through his territory, might be up to something dastardly. In fact, that they might be thinking the same thing as he was when he ordered his jihadi army to march towards Peshwar.

Samarqand continues its efforts to attract the interest of Chinese firms in infrastructure projects, though there is no sign that the government intends to surrender control of utilities (to private business) once they are constructed in co-operation between the Depkazi and Bactrian states and foreign private sectors.

Afghanistan

Ignoring criticism from those he considers either weak (in Indonesia) or unambitious (in the Ottoman Empire), Chingiz wields his self-proclaimed offices like weapons, especially in Afghanistan. Muslims, even the non-Depkazi, are warned of the Combine's intention to under-mine their faith through the instrument of the supposedly-tollerant but obviously malignant DRA, and urged by their Caliph to resist.

The Taliban authorities as yet have seen little attempt at engagement from the Khagan, but, now, Chingiz's diplomats are beginning to put forward the idea of a treaty. Under this, Taliban authority would be recognised in Afghanistan-according-to-Samarqand's-definition -namely that which is not called Bactria- and Taliban fighters given access to Depkazi arms and other resources, and the Khagan and his Beys would be uncontested in their administration of Bactria, and Chingiz given recognition in his claimed titles, Afghanistan becoming a self-governing part of of the Depkazi Caliphate.*

At Towraghondi, Depkazi cameras recorded the continued slaughter and destruction. Of course a part of the town's population had not got up and left when some foreigners turned up and said, "get out, NOW!" and mangled pieces of Afghani civilians hung from the ruined skeleton of a town. Several fighters and sympathisers had escaped across the Depkazi border or towards Bactria during the attacks on the cordon, and more retreated during the barrage, some remaining civilians attempting to flee with them, but, after the initial success in both east and west, most of the small band of resisters died with their relatives and neighbours in the collapsing town.

Still, as the Combine was filmed destroying a down hours after gunning-down civilians, other pictures began to circulate, showing the burned hulks of Armandian vehicles in the west of the town, and the bodies of several people in the uniform of communist soldiery from there and the east. State media reported, in an officially neutral manner, the deaths of probably as many as two-dozen armed Mujahideen in Towraghondi, along with several hundred civilians, and heavy Armandian casulaties including at least five dead infantry, the whole of an armoured detachment, and the shoot-down of two armed helicopters.

In the Khagan's military command, it appeared that the Combiners had been goaded into excessive expenditure and propaganda-unfriendly actions after being delivered disproportionately high casualties on day one of an engagement that seemed very new to them. The small border town of Towraghondi, defended by a handful of irregular infantry, had been attacked as if it were a military stronghold, and the Armandians cost possibly dozens of lives, tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars, and a hit to the image in taking -and ruining- a town that Chingiz had already given-up as external to his plans for Afghanistan, and had been rewarded also with a new refugee problem consisting of those they'd given good cause to despise them and their cause.

*I don't know how much this might appeal to the Taliban leadership, but suppose that its value may increase as Indian and Armandian forces close in, and, more to the point, I'm not sure who decides how the Taliban receive the Khagan. He's not actually asking for any control in Afghanistan, just seeking to secure Bactria against internal meddling and set-up somebody less dangerous to his ambition than the Indians or Armandians may be if in control of Afghanistan.


Peshāwar

The Jihadi vanguard were approaching North Pakistan's capital almost five centuries after Zāhir ud-Dīn Mohammad Gurkānī... Bābur. Coming from Depkazia, the Mughul founder, claiming descent from the man whose name Chingiz had adopted as his own, built in a Peshāwar then called Begram, and his descendants rebuilt and renamed the city. So far as the Depkazis were concerned, rebuilding their Khaganate, Peshāwar was a child of their nation, and they evoked the names of Babur and Akbar amongst others as they marched into the outskirts of the crowded city, waving banners hoped to hold some appeal for the Muslim population.

Things continued in this manner for some time as Depkazis and Bactrians rolled in. Amongst the Bactrians a handful of Pashtun found themselves suddenly pulled away from Turkic comrades, who often had given them a hard time (now passed-off as merely rough cases of dedovschina), and put in more public positions and used in contact with locals and authorities. In truth only a few dozen Pashtun were to be found amongst the army before it entered Pakistan, but it was hoped that seeing them at every meeting would create a different and more inclusive impression.

In the early hours of the approach to the Pakistani capital, Samarqand had made a show of its propaganda in Jammu and Kashmir, takling in general terms about the community of Islam and the negative legacy of the Great Game and of the British Raj and what not. But, now, Depkazi officers were ordering their oblivious men to various points around the city, and sites of strategic and tactical importance within. Having tens of thousands of men moving up, the Depkazis were able also to put rabbles of shoddy-looking (but highly experienced) Bactrians and generally more miserable home-grown troops throughout the city, flooding the place with a sudden several-percent boost to the city's already dense population.

Now, officers and religious leaders began to talk about the Caliph, and the Caliphate... and a large contingent from the jihadi army went to meet the President.

OOC: I hope it was okay to march on to the capital without Shareef doing anything unexpected. I wanted to catch up a bit after falling behind for a few days.

(OCC: Quite alright, Depkazia. Also, Uzbek Flankers (http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_555.shtml), in case you've ever been in need of a paint scheme. There'll be an IC post here in a few hours, Insh Allah.)

OOC: Ah, thank you, my friend. I think that I shall assume one squadron in each of the two schemes, though of course the roundels are different, probably red, blue, and green, and a star and crescent may now be replacing Soviet-style icons. I just wish that we had friendly access to the high seas so that we might upgrade our Flankers with foreign help. Oh well, painting them ever more distinctively shall have to substitute for actual improvements.

Peshawar

Men from Bactria and Depkazia proper will perhaps be impressed by the North Pakistani capital's scale, if not its age. With slightly over two million inhabitants, Peshawar is one of Central Asia's larger cities, surpassing Samarkand, Kabul, Dushanbe, Ashgabat and Bishkek, and only just smaller than Tashkent. It is not, though, as old as Kabul or Samarkand, having been made an urban center by the Kushans at around the start of the first millennium ACE. With great size comes a great many activities, and any Depkazis or Bactrians on leave from their units might could easily spend hours in its bazaars and amongst its people. Those with the time to dig a little deeper would stumble across back-alley opium dens, run by drug barons based out of Afghanistan, and gun shops, whose occupants build domestic copies of the Sten, SMLE, and Ak-47. Rare Jezails can even be had, for a price. Peshawar's people are a diverse lot, made up of both native North Pakistanis and Afghan refugees. Pashtuns make-up a clear majority in the population, but significant numbers of Hazaras and Turkic peoples can be found as well. Depkazi troops are regularly invited into the homes of the latter, to share conversation and a meal. Indeed, Peshawar would make a fine capital for a North Pakistani Beylik, although historic Muzaffarabad wouldn't be a bad choice either.

Residents of Peshawar wait for a minibus in the old city. (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Three_Pakistanis.jpg)

Depkazi forces are greeted by Mustafa Aziz Shareef from the balcony of Islamia College, overlooking an invitingly green and well-kept lawn. He is dressed, as usual, in a uniform lacking clear rank insignia and adorned with medals and campaign ribbons, most of them self-awarded. All in all, between his height and his heavily-waxed moustache, the President cuts an imposing figure as he begins to address the armed men arrayed in front of him. It surely is not lost on many of the Bactrians that, just recently, Shareef had made speeches condemning the Turkic race as "backwards, un-islamic, and unsuited to government" in an attempt to further justify his brutal presence in the Wakhan Corridor. Perhaps finally realizing the threat posed to his person by the assembled crowd, he admits that his opinions "had no basis," and attempts to apologize, but this will of course be of no use in the end.

As the President makes his speech, ISI agents begin to realize just what is going on. In their capacity as the only capable and creative government employees besides the President, it has historically been up to them to foil coup attempts and break subversion. With a gigantic network of paid and threatened informants, there is little going on in the capital that Inter-Service Intelligence doesn't know about. So it is not long before ISI agents, already suspiscious over the influx of unreliable foreigners, start to suspect the worst; that Chingiz's army is in town to overthrow the Shareef regime. UAZ vans, the ISI's trademark, speed towards the Governor General's House, only to be obstructed blocks short of their destination by throngs of TPA soldiers and Bactrian fighters. Believing the cause to be lost, prematurely although quite understandably, agents pull-out AK-74s and open fire on the Depkazis, while drivers shift the vans into reverse and attempt to escape the doubtless battle-ready regular soldiers. So in a surprising turn of events that will doubtless make Chingiz Khagan quite happy, it is not the jihadi army that opens hostilities in Peshawar.

Samarqand

With Bactria's fealty, Khalīfah Chingiz Khagan Depkazi, Amir al-Muminin, Malik ul-Mugāhidīn, Lord of... -well, you didn't need a list of all his cities, forts, and strategic possessions, but he would, typically, force it upon you- commanded territories more than twice the size of the Ottoman Empire.

He had more proven natural gas than all Western Europe, and exploration was far from complete in his domain. He had the world's largest open-pit gold mine amongst his proud jewels.

He had more than fifty million subjects and four hundred thousand regular military servicemen- almost a million with reserves and Bactrian militias-, and they watched over inshore seas, unforgiving deserts, impassable mountains, and countless sprawling towns and cities.

He had substantial hydropower projects, and controlled a not insigificant part of Western China's power and water. He had nuclear power. He had the world's largest uranium production centre. That was nothing unusual to him, for he also had the former Soviet Union's largest biological weapons facilities. He had some of the USSR's Scud and other ballistic missile production facilities.

Chingiz had the support of his people, and the confidence and -as he and his people believed- the blood of kings, conquerors of China, champions.

He also had mental health issues, an opium habit picked up while wandering through internal-exile, and a belief that quicksilver would make him live longer.

Trying to attract Chinese firms to government contracts for infrastructure development didn't seem to be leading anywhere, and the Khagan was warey more than frustrated. There must be a reason, and if private firms had wind of it, his spies wouldn't be much troubled in learning more.

With all the things he had, Chingiz was worried about what he may lose. The Turkic People's Army was placed on an increased state of readiness, the jihad being primary cause, while the peace between Russia and China was also a publically declared motive, though it was said that Samarqand was reacting to the possibility of Tsarist aggression, not Chinese. Small mechanised units were pushed north, with the expectation that, in many areas, they would beat a fighting retreat through the desert in the event of Russian aggression. Fifteen thousand regulars were also deployed to the low mountains separating Depkazia from Armand and dug-in along side existing border forces, and these were evidently less mobile, with limited offensive value. The largest troop movement was to the formidable eastern mountains, where pains were taken to doubly secure strategic locations, and the general mass of personnel was explained as related to the jihadi expedition.

Any Turkic Chinese forces not yet pulled-out continued to face the propaganda barrage as the call to prayer rang through the mountains, day after day, and preachers gave plenty of time for Turkic nationalism to be addressed. It was by no means the case that every religious figurehead in the Turkic People's Republic was 100% behind Chingiz's ambitions, but many of those who were inclined to toe the line soon found themselves in more prestigious settings, or else deployed temporarily to the proximity of Chinese forces. Small travelling cinemas came to the mountains to show films of traditional plays, dances, and musics, and surrounded each such movie with documentaries on the healthy armament of the Turkic People's Army, the wonders of Depkazi architecture, and the showpieces that seemed to indicate a surprisingly strong economy based on power generation and distribution, mining, and intensive agriculture.

For now, the TPRD's large reserve forces were on an increased state of readiness, but were not actively deployed.

Over forty-thousand personnel were now deep inside Pakistan.

Peshāwar

Outside the college, several Depkazis and Bactrians smile up at Shareef, some clap, and a few shout encouragement and agreement to him, though almost all are totally insincere. A few officers are smiling only because they know what is going on, and will be glad to shut him up, most of the men just think it'll be good to get the formalities over with and march on to liberate Jammu and Kashmir.

When ISI agents open fire, they do so to the surprise of the men on the receiving end, and a couple of TPAD recruits are badly hit. Near by, others appear to think the sound of firing just celebratory, a sign of just how welcome they are or of how keen locals are to join the jihadi army. In the first few moments, only one or two men react in any serious way, and they are without fail Bactrians, mostly men who've fought under Dostum. One appears in a seriously un-Islamic state of dress to give fire from a window one floor up from the street, rattling-off several fairly well aimed rounds from his AKM.

It was a while before Depkazi commanders got wind of the situation and organised a proper sealing-off of the crowded city and hunt for offending ISI agents, but this was enough to cause them to make a more straightforward than planned move against Shareef. It seemed that his support base was a bit shakey -and shaken- and so a small detachment was sent to confront him with a proposal.

"...and take retirement in exile at an ample household prepared in the northwest deserts of the Turkic People's Republic- or, we can hang you over that balcony and see who fights to cut you down."

General Begh hadn't spent much time introducing himself, moving on quickly to running through a proposal that suggested Shareef's participation in the absorbtion of North Pakistan into the Depkazi Caliphate in exchange for his own personal safety. Outside, Depkazi tanks and guns were catching-up, having taken a long time to pass through the Wakhan Corridor, and began to position themselves to shell Pakistani military positions in the region surrounding the capital. Depkazi aircraft were starting to appear over East Bactria, massing for potential first-strike missions should the Pakistanis attempt to scramble their own aircraft. Large numbers of Su-17 and fewer Su-24 were involved.

High ranking Depkazi diplomats began to arrive in each of North Pakistan's major subdivisions, seeking to meet favourable leaders in various communities. Chingiz was apparently still deep in thought regarding the status of a Depkazi Pakistan, and the manner in which it ought to be administered. The other areas were fine, similar in size to the Bactrian Beyliks, but the North West Frontier Province wasn't all that far from half the size of the TPRD, and the Khagan was considering making a Pakistani Khanate under the greater Khaganate, and containing its own Beyliks in the former FATA and Northern Areas, and, at least for now, Azad Kashmir... which might in time be united with Jammu and Kashmir, depending upon the outcome of issues yet unresolved.

Chingiz was warey of making a new Pakistani leader with as much power as Shareef had.

OCC: Sorry for the delay, and I should have a post up tomorrow.

Here's something for the meantime, that I think might just arouse Depkazi interest:

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=499917&highlight=Spyr

And by the way, if events in India transpire in a certain way, a certain someone might just end up getting his self a coastline... ;)

While Depkazian attention was being diverted by the buildup of "peacekeepers" on the border, the real work was being done on the ground where the Chinese were buying informants at a pace. High on the shopping list - An islamic cleric who opposed Chingis and was not afraid to declare jihad in order to do so. Even better if he was of Turkic or Arab origin.

(OOC: Any radical clerics with whom the Chinese could get in touch with secretly?)

OOC: Well, after the USSR and then Tchokareff's Atheist Labour Republic, Depkazia is only just rediscovering its faith. It is actually Chingiz who is responsible for releasing religious prisoners, reopening mosques, allowing the call to prayer, and so on. Most clerical opposition to Chingiz comes from outside Depkazia, as the majority of those who've achieved influence in the Turkic People's Republic owe it directly to the new ruler. There are some who dare to question some of the titles and responsibilities that he's claimed, but none of them are big-time, so to speak, and they are mostly to be found in remote backwater regions less keenly watched by the security services... and the general public.
As a rule, the Depkazis who like Chingiz least are elderly socialists, atheists in fact, and they are being replaced by fewer and fewer people in the younger generations. Those who oppose him mostly quote old party dogma about religion as the opiate of the masses, and swear that his insistance on inviting Chinese and other firms in will be the ruin of Depkazi society.

Peshawar

Shareef, shocked but no fool, readily agrees to General Begh's terms. There isn't, after all, a whole lot he can do, surrounded by hostile Depkazis and Bactrians and with only his own notoriously unreliable Federal Army to back him up. Still dressed in his medal-studded uniform, Mustafa Shareef repudiates North Pakistan's independence and gives up his titles as its fourth and final president. The ex-president certainly deserves worse, and isn't altogether upset with exile, but moments after signing the necessary documents begins to contemplate his escape and eventual return to power. It had certainly been a good run for Shareef the younger, ruling for nearly three decades, and he can at least take comfort in the fact that his extreme centralization of government had left the nation almost wholly devoid of capable administrators. As such, the regular military stays where it is, its commanders obeying Shareef's order to accept the change in command, and Federal Army men as unwilling as ever to risk their lives for the unloved, and now ex, president.

Peshawar's citizens, meanwhile, come out into the streets upon news of Shareef's removal from power. Fireworks go off and traffic stops as North Pakistanis celebrate the fall of their hated dictator and actively encourage the Depkazis to hunt down and kill ISI men. Bodies also begin to turn up on the streets, suspected ISI informants beaten to death and then hung from balconies and lamp-posts. With no armed agents to protect them, the collaborators are easy pickings. Of course, the guilty aren't the only ones who suffer. Crafty informants, and there are plenty of those, don't have much trouble dodging the public outpouring of rage and pin their actions on others, often their family members. It is, though, more a festive atmosphere than a violent ones, with Depkazi soldiers invited to join in the dancing and feasting. With such feelings repressed by ISI bombings and assassinations ever since Mustafa Shareef's succession to the Presidency, there is plenty of entheusiasm to go around.

The ISI men who started the mess are able to escape largely unharmed, although one of the agents is shot-up badly by the Bactrian in the window and doesn't have much of a chance. Speeding away from the Turkic soldiers, the vans run straight into another crowd, this one of Peshawar's citizens. As soon as the vehicles are recognized, they are set-upon from all sides by Pakistanis with rocks and clubs. Frantic gunfire kills some of the attackers but it only serves to further enrage the crowd, and all the ISI agents are beaten, stoned, or shot to death on the spot and hung from an overpass. Other ISI units stage more effective getaways, and those in more far-flung locales have time to organize altogether more effective responses to the sudden change in government. Some are ready to cooperate with the new authority, while others take to the hills and mountains and prepare for a long guerilla struggle. The sound of automatic gunfire is of course a common one in a city such as Peshawar on any day, but more than the usual amount is lethal as Shareef's internal security troops resort to desperate measures when surrounded or discovered.

Enterprising Pakistanis also begin to raid arsenals in the city, the likes of which are now undefended or protected by soldiers who don't have to answer to the ISI anymore. All sorts of machine guns and assault rifles, mostly standard-issue AKMs and DP-28s, are carried out of government ownership by escstatic arms dealers, along with crates of 7.62x39mm ammunition, most of it destined for Afghanistan and Waziristan. Some of those who know what to look for get ahold of the ISI's P90 SMGs, rare and highly sought-after pieces of equipment all the way from Tulgary. There are of course plenty of AK-74s to go around as well, enough to make Peshawar's home-made Stens and AK-47 copies unprofitable overnight. Certainly none of the capital's many gangs and cartels is about to challenge the Depkazi occupiers, but drug-related violence is set to become a worse problem than it had been before. And it had been a very major problem.

Skardu

Away in the former Kashmir, Beylik hopeful Husayn Ali Khan isn't about to disappoint his grandfather's legacy. The news of Shareef's downfall comes late to Skardu, as it is only reported by the BBC several hours after the event. Almost as soon as they hear it, Khan and his men spring into action, and proceed to tear through the Federal Army in the town. Shareef's former troops are totally unprepared, and fall in droves to the rebels with their SMGs and grenades. In one of the more dramatic episodes of the whole affair, the Federal Army survivors fortify themselves in Skardu Fort, commanding an impressive view of the town, and begin to pour machine gun fire into the houses below. Unphased by this development, Khan decides to scale the position. While machine gunners in the town sweep the parapets, grappling hooks are shot up the rock face from the cover of a few houses at the bottom of the cliff, and a hand-picked force of 25 men, led by Husayn Ali Khan himself, begin the ascent. As a diversionary contingent pushes its way up the stone stairway, distracting the Federal Army troopers, Khan's commando scrambles up the cliff and reaches the base of the wall in record time. A shaped charge makes a hole through the centuries-old masonry, and the fort is infiltrated. The rebel leader himself cuts a fearsome figure, gunning-down the fort's defenders with his AKS-74U. Within an hour the fort is taken, the wooden entrance having been obliterated with a recoilless rifle and its defenders attacked from two directions.

In initial security operations, the Khaganate's forces had significant numbers and enough enthusiasm to avoid major distraction... the Bactrians were alone in having any significant combat experience, and even they didn't know keeping-the-peace from stoning-the-odd-one-out.

Shareef, for now, would be kept in Pakistan, under Depkazi control. Initially, part of the Islamia College was to be heavily secured by an East Bactrian company and half a Depkazi battalion, and temporary offices established for liason between authorities yet to be fully established and those yet to be fully removed. It was felt that Shareef should not be removed from the country immediately, lest his command prove of help in subduing any remaining loyalist sentiment.

The Federal Army begins to find itself lumbered with liason officers from the vast TPA. An organistion that, in all branches, has almost four hundred thousand regular personnel and over nine hundred thousand inclusive of irregulars, discounting the much smaller Bactrian militias, the Turkic People's Army may lack combat experience but certainly does not want for officers. Some amongst these are glad to get an assignment 'on the jihadi front' as it were, hoping to elevate their status- it's not too hard to become an officer, but it is a serious task to advance once there, the men at the top tend to stay there since Edmund was over-thrown, and a mass of junior officers compete for a handful of higher postions.

In the streets, the Depkazis allow most of the celebrating to go on, and are often easily convinced to join. Few are so hard line that they see anything wrong with such displays.

The hunt for ISI agents is keenly undertaken, usually best engaged by Bactrian forces. In truth, Depkazi officers are often keen to take the agents alive, partly to gather intelligence and generally to use any who may be willing to help in establishing new government of North Pakistan. Nothing high-profile is likely,of course, but those who possess detailed intelligence on citizens and perhaps politicians may be of more use in custody than in pieces. There is some effort to convince people to help in the arrest of ISI agents, and little to discourage attacks upon their informants, but it is true that turning oneself in may be better than waiting for the mob.

The problem of looting armouries is not ignored, but could perhaps have been addressed more quickly and forcefully. The Depkazis make efforts to secure what sites they are aware of, both in the capital and in other regions at which their forces are starting to arrive, but often as not their limited intel means that they probably expect to turn up after such looting has already started. The government is presently thinking about future deals to trade arms and intelligence for favours in the new states that will arise in Chingiz's Pakistan.

Back in the Turkic People's Republic, national media was beginning to report the glorious joining of the people and lands of North Pakistan to the new Khalifate, while, in contrast, Depkazi diplomats abroad announced to their host governments the capture of the dictator Shareef.

OOC: More needed, I know.

Northern Pakistan

During a clear spell in the weather, and preceeded by a cautious over-flight by two Su-27 Flankers in Depkazi colours, a modified An-26 approached little Gilgit Airport. Then an An-12 came into view, and landed under watch of two Su-24 Fencers bearing substantial air to ground firepower.

Before long, Depkazi airborne troops, one hundred strong, were moving across the facility, some seeking to secure operational elements and the perimeter while others formed ranks.

Their aircraft struggled back into the air, leaving the small runway to a partner that off-loaded a BMD-2 fighting vehicle before it too left and the An-26 finally came-down.

With the fighting vehicle trundling along and the assembled men presenting arms -mostly AK-74S rifles- Khalīfah Chingiz Khagan Depkazi, Amir al-Muminin, Malik ul-Mugāhidīn, Lord of the City of Samarqand and Many Others stepped from the Curl and waved to his troops. A rushing sound overhead implied that the Flankers had not departed with the large transports.

The new Premier had decided to go on a journey that later would be presented as a spiritual tour through Kashmir. After meeting a local official or two and confirming that a new detachment of Depkazi soldiers would be be arriving in Gilgit and other towns and cities to set-up relations and integration with the old Federal forces, Chingiz and his large bodyguard contingent would be heading east to Skardu, to meet Husayan Ali Khan and discuss the union of the former Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir into the Beylik of Kashmir. There after, issues of political and defensive integration with the Khalīfate can be pursued along with economic development of the region and proper pursuit of rightful claims to the Maharaja's occupied Kashmir.

More vehicles were soon flown-in to support Chingiz's little jaunt, along with supplies... and Bactrian camels, of course. For now, though, the Depkazis didn't intend to make public the location of their premier, nor his intended course.

(Hey TCB, any response from Kashmire to China's diplomatic overtures?)

Srinagar

As the situation grows ever more dire on the border, Maharaja Parak Singh takes whatever help he can get. True, he has no love for democracy, and would kill Farooq and Omar Abdullah, and indeed all the reform leaders, himself if it would not lead to a popular revolt, but at this stage the Maharaja's options are relatively few. Even more disturbing are rumors that the National Congress has been engaged in negotiation with the Indian National Union regarding a cooperative effort to overthrow the Maharaja ahead of Chingiz. So when visited by the Chinese diplomat, Singh's foreign minister readily agrees to Beijing's terms. Being a proxy state is, after all, immeasurably better than being conquered by Depkazia. The Kashmiri foreign minister also discusses the possibility of Singh and his cabinet fleeing to China in the event of an especially successful Depkazi invasion, although if it comes down to it they'll likely opt to run for the nearby Combine.

Peshawar

Crowds of Pakistanis continue to kill known and suspected ISI personnel for days after Shareef's removal, but at a steadily decreasing rate. Those careless in maintaining their cover had, for the most part, already been killed. A few ISI operatives turn themselves over to the Depkazis, understandably expecting better treatment in their hands, and these often include district commanders and high-level administrators, who are able to furnish the occupying forces with the intelligence that they desire. Some readily cooperate with Depkazi forces, hoping to find employment with the new Pakistani Beylik, revealing the positions and aliases of the ISI agents and informants in their charge. Their crookedness shouldn't surprise General Begh's men, since the younger Shareef's dictatorship taught those in the bureaucracy to do anything in order to preserve their posts and their lives.

The arrival of regular forces at the armories largely brings a stop to the looting, although not in time to prevent the loss of much of the Federal Army's stored weaponry in the capital. Depkazis often find Federal Army men actively engaged in hawking their armaments, from aged AKMs to Spigot anti-tank missiles, and these troops usually scatter when challenged. ISI armories, which stood entirely unguarded, are almost completely emptied, although they never held very much heavy equipment and furnish the arms dealers with guns that are more exotic than terribly useful, the P90 being a prime example. It will surely irk warlords when they find themselves unable to obtain 5.7x28mm ammunition between Tulgary and Singapore. But more useful weapons like the AK-74 and DP-28 soon start to hit the market, arming tribesmen in Waziristan and Afghan warlords across the Khyber.

Gilgit-Baltistan

Sleepy Gilgit is taken by surprise at the Kalifah's visit, and the local commander, a squadron leader in charge of eight Mi-17s, quickly organizes an honor guard. A pair of F27s are pulled off the runway to make room for Chingiz's An-12, still well within the airport's capacity to handle but a larger aircraft than usual notwithstanding. News of the Depkazi head of state's arrival in town attracts a large crowd before long, which is only too eager to praise and support him. Shareef was certainly never recieved in a similar fashion...at least not in recent memory.

At Skardu, Husayn Ali Khan eagerly awaits the arrival of the new head of state, fully expecting to recieve an appointment as Beylik of North Pakistan. He hopes to impress Chingiz partly with Skardu's natural beauty, and to these ends has a barge ready on Satpara Lake, nestled within the folds of the Karakoram Range and high above sea level.

Peshāwar

In the early days of the joining of Pakistan to the Depkazi Khalifate, the effectively disbanded jihadi army saw its minority Bactrian elements set to major security opperations both in the former federal capital and, soon, fanning out from it to pursue the worst troublemakers, while the less battle-experienced Depkazis worked to speed their logistical operations by securing and preparing facilities, and forward elements -rather slowly but with a fair degree of fanfare- moved-up to support old federal army troops on the Kashmiri border.

The Depkazis headed towards the Vale, by and large, hailed from the Pamir and Tian Shan ranges in the east of their motherland, and so were familiar with high altitudes (though perhaps to most 3,000 metres was a more agreeable total than 5,000) and trained in mountain warfare, if only perhaps a tiny minority had actually experienced it for real.

Pakistanis were informed through what media sources existed and more commonly by word of mouth and the equally unreliable dropping of papers from planes struggling over the mountains to reach isolated valleys (without anyone stopping to consider that, in many of these valleys, not terribly many people would be able to read what rained on them) of ambitious plans for the development of their land within the great and proud Khalifate. These included hydroelectrial power generation projects similar to the mighty facilities increasingly to be found in eastern Depkazia (even one or two over which experts may be given to suffer heart trouble after considering fault lines, dams, large bodies of water, and the tendancy for human settlement to occur in fertile valleys), gas exploration, road building and the trading it should restart, and the establishment of increased media and entertainment industries. Samarqand wanted to make more promises about consumer goods, but future relations with China were uncertain, and the Khaganate did not know for sure what it would be able to provide. All of these things, though, were advertised as providing employment potential.

ISI agents do indeed find opportunities for advancement. Quite honestly, the commanders and administrators can most probably run rings around most of the existing Depkazi intelligence set-up, which hasn't changed since Soviet times except in becoming even more introspective and paranoid (working under Tchokareff made it even more important to please the big man than had been the case under Stalin,as Edmund was totally insane, and sucking-up beat real talent almost every time- under Chingiz, the old suck-ups are floundering, just waiting to be over-taken by new blood, which may well include Pakistani agents with real experience).

Fortunately, Shareef is in the care of some of the better Depkazis -that is to say, the Bactrians- or he may have found himself in a position to attempt a counter-coup!

For now a good deal of disorder will probably endurre out side of the former capital (which itself is swarming with tens of thousands of inexperienced trigger-happy Turkic troops prepared to use RPGs and infantry mortars against anyone spotted causing trouble with a looted gun). Chingiz is prepared to allow warlords to make themselves and their abilities known. Anyone good might be offered a commission, anyone really good might be gassed in his compound by the air force. After all, former warlord Rashid Dostum is now Bey of West Bactria, while Depkazia has executed more 'terrorist' leaders in the last month than the west will capture in a decade, killing some by catapulting them through helicopter rotors, strapping them to test rockets, or parachuting them into the desert with the mark, "no help" tattooed upon their brows.

Gilgit-Baltistan

Token rewards are handed-out after the Khalifa's arrival, from cotton-goods to cash to cans of petrochemicals, and of course the odd blessing of a sort. Chingiz takes several days in transit from Gilgit to Skardu, and eventually arrives with medals for Husayn Ali Khan and his men. He promises many of them a place in paradise after their brave actions during the jihadi march.

Meeting the local commander, Chingiz is... well, he is no Geletian, no Wingert, but more a man like the Hotans, Ghandis (at a stretch), and Aidarovs of this world- so small, so soft-looking, but somehow surrounded by an unidentifiable force. At least, that is the way that most Depkazi accounts describe him when published for foreign consumption (in Depkazia he is often reported as a more traditional titan of a man). He is quite short, but only as normal for children of Depkazia's eastern mountains- maybe five and a half feet, a little more or a little less. He is only in his early twenties. But he is master of some seventy-seven million subjects, at least in theory, across an area twice the size of the contemporary Ottoman Empire.

"Congratulations" Chingiz said to Husayn "your efforts have been invaluable in the liberation of eastern Gilgit-Baltistan! Your medals will prove it for all the world to see. But much of the work is the people's, and more remains yet to be done. I am here to offer to you the title of Bey and the associated territories of the former Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, a great responsibility in administering a population equal to that of the two Bactrian Beyliks combined."

Chingiz attempted to creat context by indicating, on some level, Husyan's superiority next to infamous warlord Dostum and former Afghan president Rabbani, aware that whoever was offered title in Pakistan may expect all of the defunct country, and be disappointed to receive less.

"The Beylik to be formed here shall be called Kashmir, and its master shall bear great responsibilities." Warned the Khalifa. "First, Kashmir must strive always to serve the greatness of the Khaganate. Second, its master must stand for the defence of the one true faith. Third comes a responsibility to deliver prosperity to the people within the Beylik. Fourth, and most specific to this Beylik, the struggle to liberate all Kashmir must be pursued unreservedly. When such time comes as Kashmir is independent in its entirety, the Beylik shall cover not only its presently proposed territory but also the Vale of Kashmir, making certain of our security in Mid Asia and the permanence of the faith here."

Peshawar

Bactrian troops will find that ISI and SSG combat units, the only Federal troops inclined to resist the takeover, have not gone very far, being for the most part on foot. Many of these men are veterans of secret operations in present-day Bactria itself, and surely the Bactrian troops sent to hunt them know this, so few hold out much hope for survival in surrender. Therefore, when fighting occurs between these fleeing detachments and their pursuers, it is fierce and desperate, although the Bactrians usually come out the victor. Fortunately, valuable units are not caught-up in this business for long, as only a relatively small minority of Shareef's already-small elite units opt for resistance over surrender to the likely accomodating Depkazis.

The Federal Army, doubtless to nobody's surprise, is completely submissive to the new leadership in the capital. Depkazi liason officers are uniformly more popular than Shareef's commanders, appointed specifically for their disagreeable characteristics, and in some areas Depkazis will encounter Federal Army units that had only recently shot their officers, such was the hatred between the army itself and its leaders. Of course, it is not only poor leadership which is to blame for North Pakistan's acute lack of success on the battlefield. Most Federal Army men are not altogether better-trained than the Taliban fighters that they had recently fought near Kabul, upon enlistment being taught how to fire and reload their firearm -either an AK-47 or an SKS- and not much else. They are also very poorly paid, although there are few in the country who could call themselves otherwise.

Talk of public works projects attracts much interest from North Pakistanis, the majority of whom still live without electricity and running water. Surely a few river valleys could be sacrificed for hydroelectric dams, and the welfare of a hundred thousand city dwellers must trump the livelihoods of a few illiterate mountain tribesmen. It doesn't, though, take an expert to realize the difficulties involved in building dams in the mountainous northwestern corner of the subcontinent, as frequent earthquakes, the likes of which have more than once laid waste to Muzaffrabad and Peshawar, can readily attest. Chingiz might be able to conquer Shareef, but he can't very well fight a jihad against plate tectonics. Not even his father could hope to win that contest. Still, the prospect of any wage-drawing work is enough to attract droves of eager applicants to local administrative centers, looking to get a foot in the door ahead of the competiton.

Indeed it is a very serious thing to see that the Depkazis were embarking upon damming projects in North Pakistan, but they were not so great as imagined by Chingiz before his advisors plucked up the courage to familiarise him with reality, something they took time to do largely because of years spent labouring under his father's surreality. The potential still existed for accidents, but progress must be satisfied.

Nuclear power was set to become North Pakistan's number one, but these programmes were moving more slowly under the Caliphate, which got much further with hydropower since the end of the USSR partly since that could be done with less opposition from neighbours.

Workers paid by the state, military personnel amongst them, would be the first to benefit from the arrival of the Caliphate. Wages would be increased as soon as it was physically possible to collate the relevant data and deliver the proper payments according to Depkazi standards. For now, this part of the population, soldiers and public servants, would likely become the new upper/middile classes in the more accessible and developed parts of North Pakistan, especially in Peshawar. It wasn't as if they were being made into millionaires by the coming changes that had been announced, but the equivalent of a few dollars here and there ought to be at least significant.

Chingiz ordered the expansion of the national bank into Pakistan's cities, and the establishment of Islamic banking facilities, and pushed the work on roadlinks between Pakistan and Depkazia more forcefully than any other development project, as it was otherwise difficult to provide much for newly wealthy people to buy, and giving them more money in such a situation couldn't be regarded as economically sound.

Notably, road works in East Bactria now approach the Beylik's southern border, with Afghanistan, and crews were arriving in western Peshawar to begin improvement of the way to the Khyber Pass, where large numbers of the Caliphate's troops were being sent. A few Pakistani units were ordered to go with them as honoured vanguard elements in the process of the old federal army's joining with the Holy warriors of the Caliphate. Anyone who'd ever been to -or fought near- Jalalabad would be looked-for especially.

While Depkazi reconnaissance jets flew ever increassing numbers of missions over Afghanistan between the Kuh-i-Baba and Hindu Kush ranges, their part in looking-out for Pakistani resisters gradually declined, and willing ex special-forces were hurried out of the country to retraining and likely posting at Depkazi military and special-forces schools or in the field on Armandian, Chinese, and Kazakh frontiers, as far as possible from Bactria and Pakistan. Those sufficiently important to the Caliphate (either by being high-skilled by repute, or being skilled enough to make Depkazi intelligence believe as much!) would be able to ask the state to evacuate their families, the rest expected to leave them or send for them to make their own way out of Pakistan.

For now, the Peshawar-Dushanbe Highway was an undeclared priority, crawling through via Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Kunduz, with off-shoots to Feyzabad, Mazar-e-Shareef, and Samangan along the way to joining with the growing Depkazi highway system. Soon, Chingiz would be calling himself restorer of the silk road, on top of everything else. Depkazi embassies in surrounding nations are receiving plates to display on their gates the motto, Chingiz Khagan is Good for the Economy!

If there is one thing that the Lord of the City of Samarqand does not know, it is how to quit when he is ahead.

It is late afternoon, and Caliphate troops are on the march into Afghanistan, from two directions. Depkazis and Bactrians from the East Bactrian Beylik, more Depkazis and hastily reorganised Pakistanis from the Khyber Pass. This was done even while huge parts of the Khaganate's manpower were tied to the Kashmiri border (or front, as it may be called, given that the new authorities weren't shy about incouraging potshots and skirmishing), and to the borders with China and Armand, while much more was spread through the north, ready to counter-attack against any Russian aggression.

The disorder in Afghanistan meant that Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi already had lost patience with the idea of subjugating a Taliban government to the Caliphate's ultimate authority, and Samarqand was urgently concerned by the progress of foreign forces, especially the Armandian communists and their distasteful Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Strategically important areas had to be secured before communists or Indians became a direct factor, and the invasion was on.

Hardly aware of their new units, the languages spoken by their comrades and commanders, their doctrine, or even their mission, Pakistani troops marched through the famous pass were expected to be encouraged by promises that they would be paid, next month, and better than before. By the fact that their Turkic comrades, at least, were quite well equipped, and that they should be, 'brought up to standard during the course of the campaign'. By promises of total air superiority over-head, and by the occassional sight of a self-propelled gun or some such weapon. And by service not to an unpopular president but an all mighty god and his primary vessel on earth, Khalīfah Chingiz Khagan Depkazi, Amir al-Muminin, Malik ul-Mugāhidīn...

The armies would march on ideas and promises, and on dusty roads and the forgotten graves of those who'd gone this way before. Into Afghanistan!

Samarqand

On capital radio and television the news aired first. Chingiz, speaking from the north of his newest province where still he was engaged in hands-on reorganisation efforts, informed his people and the whole world of his holy imperative to rescue Afghanistan from local despotism and foreign communism, openly declaring the fact of simultaneous advances on Jalalabad and Kabul.

Film, dubbed with the excited chatterings of an inexperienced post-Tchokareff newsreader whose words were frequently drowned-out by the booming tirade of the Khagan's announcements, showed Su-17 Fitter and more impressive Su-24 Fencer aircraft screaming from airstrips, apparently in Bactria and Pakistan. Shown only in the Caliphate (that is to say, not on tapes handed to foreign sources, though hardly top-secret), missile launches also blazed across screens as Scud-B strikes were carried-out against Taliban forces (in theory). Troops poured out of Baghlan towards a smoking Kabul only a few dozen miles distant.

Kulob, Depkazia

Not far south of the scene of a major trial targetting reputed Tchokareff-loyalists responsible for atrocities against Pashtun populations in Bactria, not far north of the Bactrian border, Kulob suddenly exploded with the sounds of Mid Asian unrest.

It would not be clear for some time that anything other than an act of civil unrest and police brutality had passed in the town of eighty-thousand, and Samarqand desperately struggled to cover-up the extent of even this. People had been injured, a few bad eggs had caused a disturbance in which bystanders were unfortunately consumed, shots had been fired into the air, that sort of thing.

The day following the movement of troops against the ill-respected Afghan borders, dissenters in Kulob had, through numerous quite different contacts, conspired to put radically opposed sets of demonstrators on the streets at the same time. The Young Communists numbered hardly more than a dozen, and even they included mutually resentful Tchokareff/Soviet loyalists and Combine/DRA sympathisers amongst their thin ranks. The larger body of protestors included members of probably about the only Shi'a family in town, and other Afghanis (including one or two Bactrians who resented that term) and Muslims alarmed at the nature and direction of the newly self-proclaimed Caliphate- though many of them had concerns that were not desperately serious or deeply in conflict with the authorities, they were never the less concerns that had received no official attention what so ever, and so voices were raised in pursuit of some dialogue and a possible resolution.

Disturbances arose when the little crowds met, and then an agitator fired a deliberate shot from a crumbling old Enfield rifle, just as the security forces arrived to investigate the unrest. Many people had been shot, and even run-down by BTR armoured personnel carriers, and dozens arrested and subject to the less than well-regulated environment of the Depkazi prison system.

Skardu

Chingiz Khagan is right to think that his offer is not entirely pleasing to Husayn Ali Khan, who fully expected to become Beylik of all North Pakistan. He does not, after all, see himself as some kind of provincial warlord like Dostum or Rabbani, and for a man educated at the Frunze Academy this is not unreasonable. Of course, while Khan was engaged in relatively low-stakes struggles with Kashmir, his soon-to-be peers from Afghanistan were fighting and winning against a superpower. But Khan does not show his disappointment, and makes the most of a relatively peaceful afternoon on Satpara Lake. It is not often, Khan tells Chingiz, that he is able to sit back and absorb the natural beauty of the place, and, unlike Shareef, whose strange mannerisms and general coldness did little to endear him to foreigners and his own subjects alike, Husayn Ali Khan is generally good company. Chingiz will surely hear more than one of the new Bey's war stories before the barge outing is done with.

In Skardu itself, the atmosphere is quite festive as the town's inhabitants make the most of Chingiz' visit. It isn't often that they have cause to celebrate, and nobody can be sure when the next opportunity will arise. After all, there had been no particularly happy occasion since the accession of Mustafa Shareef to the presidency in 1976. Quite satisfied with their victory, and exhausted after the vertical attack on Skardu fort, Husayn Ali Khan's own troops enjoy some of the opium confiscated from surrendering Federal Army administrators, and don't bother to attend the various ceremonies attached to the arrival of their new head of state. Khan is prepared, though, and explains to Chingiz that his troops are, "resting, after their particularly arduous assault on Skardu Fort." Medals will, therefore, go to what few of Khan's troops present themselves in an orderly state, and several of these are men whose job it was to cut telephone cables in the first few minutes of battle, and who did little else. Chingiz is not the only one doing the giving, though, and Husayn Ali Khan presents the Khagan with a decorated Shamshir.

The new Bey readily accepts his responsibilities as outlined by Chingiz, as might be expected of a man whose whole life has been spent in service. It is no secret that Husayn Ali Khan is not the most observant of Muslims, and it could be said that this is due to his long and early exposure to secular Europe. Khan's brief career as an officer in the Soviet Army had even seen him engaged in the fighting in Afghanistan, against some of the men that he now shares Bey status with. Perhaps Chingiz will see fit to overlook this, when a more tolerant figure might expect to attract Kashmir's Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs to the Depkazi cause. It is, though, the military aspect of the Kashmir operation that Khan will likely be most useful in. An experienced mountain fighter and a charismatic leader, he could reasonably be expected to break-through Kashmiri defenses with troops recruited from the recently-shattered Northern Light Infantry, added to his personal battalions. Used to dealing with the Federal Army's standard tactics (or lack thereof), Kashmiri infantrymen will likely be in for a surprise when the operation gets underway, and they find a competently-led force attempting to inflitrate their lines without the customary bombardment or marshalling of tanks.

Events in Afghanistan recieve little attention from Beijing. Simply, Chingis had picked the best time to launch his raid, with both Chang and Hu Jin Tao more focused on election campaigning than anything else, and the "security mom" voters more concerned with western imperialism and the unrest up north than Chingis's antics.

Acting foreign affairs minister Wen Jin Bao also decides to do nothing for the time being and allow Chingis to further annoy the Combine and the Indians before there was much need for Chinese action. Needless to say, if the "assertive" Chinese Nationalist won in a fortnight, President Chang would have something to do with the matter.

(OCC: It appears as though tomorrow was something of an optimistic assessment... :/

I promise I'll get my response rate up from now on.)

(OCC: I amended the Skardu post, at long last, so that should give us more to work off of. Right now I am rather short on time, but an amended Kashmir post will also soon appear.

By the way...would you have any aversions to Spyr playing the part of Kashmir? I am most inclined to ask him.

Balochistan will also get its independence, although I'm not quite sure whether that will come with the Punjab just yet...certainly, for all the Bugtis' panache, they aren't about to challenge the Combine with a militia, especially not one that still leans heavily on bolt-action service rifles...well, I suppose when Balochis can deliver accurate fire from 800 meters, while Armandians can't hit anything reliably past 300, it can't go all Constance's way. ;) )

Quetta

The Baloch capital is, by South Asian standards, not a very imposing city, with some 760,000 residents. It is still important in regional terms, though, as the largest urban area in the province of Balochistan. Quetta commands major road and rail junctions, and effectively controls traffic through the Khojak Pass to Kandahar. Indeed, it was from Quetta that General Abdur Khattak's army left to capture Kandahar's valuable airfield before the Combiners. As far as Prime Minister (well, not quite yet) Zulfiquar Makran is concerned, it is really the only place for his soon-to-be national government...at least, until work on the port of Gwadar is completed.

Most of the city's residents, as well as close to 50,000 Balochis from other towns, turn up to watch the ceremonies associated with the independence of Balochistan from the Indian National Union, which had occupied the area ever since Abdul Karim Khan had signed the accession document in 1950. Zulfiqar Makran's train arrives at Quetta Railway Station with the Prime Minister's several hundred-strong entourage aboard, adding that many more people to a crowd already tens of thousands strong. If it was not for two lines of railway workers, physically holding-back the crowds to form a more or less clear cordon to the outside, Makran would probably have spent quite some time working his way off the platform. Even more people wait outside the train station, waving home-made banners and Baloch flags, and they form a long procession towards Mali Bagh sports ground. Zulfiqar Makran, walking slowly and dressed in plain clothes, stands in sharp contrast to the noisy, colorful parade walking behind him. It is a sight that could, and not just by chance, evoke thoughts of Mohandas Gandhi, although close comparisons between India's independence hero and Balochistan's new Prime Minister might be a bit less than strictly accurate. He is, after all, no proponent of Satyagraha, and no spiritualist, but rather a Nawab's son who would just as often be spotted on horseback with rifle in hand, leading a raid into Kandahar province. But as he marches to meet Parliament's State Commissioner, that side of Makran's personality is temporarily forgotten.

It is a sight that would perhaps horrify some statesmen; uncounted, unregulated thousands, forming a veritable human sea around a raised wooden platform, quite unprotected. Makran, never one to fear his people, walks through the midst of the crowd, which parts as he goes. On the platform, next to a well-used podium, is State Commissioner Islam Manzil, a man elected by the citizens of Quetta to process official documents for Parliament, and thus the man charged with serving the independence papers. The Prime Minister and the Commissioner shake hands, and, with an ornate fountain pen, Makran signs Balochistan's secession. It does not take much more than two minutes, and the celebrations begin as Makran takes to the podium for his first speech as Baloch head of state.

Why did the province choose independence in the first place? Balochistan had not seen any great misfortune during incorporation under Mumbai, and had operated, much as is the case with the Punjab, as a de facto independent state, with the exception of foreign policy, which remained under Mumbai's direction. It could be said that Balochis have simply voted to remove the official distinction. Of course, independence opens for the Baloch people no few economic doors, and, for a province that has always lagged somewhat behind in terms of development, this is significant. Natural Gas reserves, Balochistan's key resource, might now be tapped independently and made more profitable, in per capita terms. Certainly it could be sold to the Indian National Union at profit, and perhaps Lyong as well, depending on the state of Indonesian fields. A more contentious program, openly discussed by Makran but not entirely liked by Mumbai, involves the construction of a fairly mammoth pipeline, headed all the way from Depkazia to the coastal city of Gwadar, plus road and rail infrastructure that will allow the Central Asian Khaganate sea access. It might not be a short route, but it is certainly shorter than the passage west to east through China, and easier than trying to negotiate the use of the Volga-Don Canal, contained entirely within Tsarist Russia. If Depkazis are interested by this, they might also be interested in financing the construction of Gwadar Port, an alternative to more likely than not unreceptive Karachi. Even in the first hours of Baloch independence, China is also sent a communique detailing the various infrastructure projects planned by the Makran government, and opportunities for investment.

...well, I suppose when Balochis can deliver accurate fire from 800 meters, while Armandians can't hit anything reliably past 300, it can't go all Constance's way. ;) )

I resent that utterly untrue and false notion.

(OCC: Sorry AC...I had always assumed that your forces used a rifle much closer to the AK-47, and other similar Western-influenced assault rifles, many of which have an effective range close to 300 meters. It just so happens that the Baloch forces are still, for the most part, armed with the 7.62x51mm 2A1 Rifle, an Indian conversion of the tried and true Lee-Enfield, with which accurate fire can be delivered at 800 meters, if I'm not mistaken. Most Balochis, being without assault rifles, are good marksmen, and weapons with such a long range are useful in open terrain such as is found in much of the province, and indeed much of the region. An IC post will soon follow.)

Allah, Mohammed, Chingiz. This worked for most Depkazis because it made their time and place seem worth living in, even grand. Worth dying in. Not like the dark, un-heroic times of their parents and grandparents, nor the unwritten time of their children. It was simple, too, and with as much -maybe more- confidence as with which the Europeans surrendered to the whims of their kings, so the Depkazis put their faith in their Caliph.

And their Caliph was interested in India. Rich, great, world-class... more vulnerable than ever it had been. For now, his Chinese operations continued to some degree, but they received no more overt Caliphal sanction. Chingiz stopped talking about East Turkestan. His troops were in Afghanistan, and his eyes were on the Baloch. Preachers continued to visit China's western autonomous region, but Samarkand called it cultural exchange, and invited a Chinese theatre troop to perform at Registan Square.

Meanwhile, Bactrian and Pakistani troops were forced into eastern Afghanistan by the thousand. Chingiz's highway was to be built and secured regardless of the cost.

The Caliphate's forces were pushed forward relentlessly. An Afghan nationalist, or a communist, would fire at them, often killing one with an experienced eye for the target. Sometimes the Pashtun militias would hit both ends of an advance column and deliver considerable slaughter and delay. Chingiz honestly did not care.

122mm SPGs would invariably open-up in defence of these attacked columns... not pin-point accurate, they would walk their fire on to enemy positions and walk it back with them as they withdrew. Every time that the Afghanis attacked they found shells landing behind them as Depkazi, Bactrian, and Pakistani infantry marched on them, answering their battle cries with exultations of the Caliph and his glory. Presently not aware of any great air defence strength having been supplied to the Taliban, which had more enemies than friends, the Caliphate often reacted with close air support as well, and used aircraft to spot for guns, rockets, and mortars.

The Caliphate was suffering fairly heavy losses, but, for now, nobody in the general public really knew the extent of it. Ground was being gained and, with Pakistan, Chingiz was prepared for attrition to decide much of the game.

Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi received Mumbai's diplomatic approach with a weathered stoney exterior and a smug inner smile. And he made them wait. First, the Caliphate sent diplomats to Balochistan.

That may appear as a bitter slight to the INU, but many newly independent Baloch may be less than flattered by the Khagan's attitude towards their sparsely peopled domain.

Samarkand had not yet officially recognised independent Balochistan, and was deliberately holding-out on doing so.

Mullah Ogun Sukur was the ambassador-in-waiting. He was more wirey than most of his typically sturdy cohorts, and like most religious men who'd survived the Tchokareff years he obviously had something going on upstairs.

He sought audience with Zulfiqar Makran.

"There are several issues" he would say, "of urgent importance and crucial significance to Balochistan and the Holy Caliphate.

"The Caliph congratulates the virtuous Baloch people over their historic step outside of the Indian National Union, and hopes that this move may be indicative of an embrace of the holy imperative to associate the long lost Baloch people with the great brotherhood of the Caliphate."

Chingiz was well aware of the tradition of independence and resistance in Balochistan, and did not expect its leaders to submit local control just because he implied that they really ought to. But nor was the Khagan happy with the idea of a few simple bi-national agreements between Balochistan and Depkazia, and he was not confident of the security of anything he may invest in a totally independent little nation in this situation.

Ogun Sukur was, privately, to suggest accession to the Caliphate on terms. Balochistan would become a Khanate, something greater than a Beylik, attached to the Khaganate and protected by the Caliph on the international stage. Under the Baloch Khan would exist Beys, chosen at his discretion in order to keep the peace. Beys appointed by the Khan would be recognised by Samarkand and given perks within the Caliphate. The Khan himself would receive Depkazi military equipment and training for his own men, and airstrips would be leased or built (by Depkazia) to accommodate Depkazi aircraft for the defence of Balochistan and the Caliphate.

Most importantly, two things. The Khan and his Beys would provide support and security in the building of Chingiz's grand highway... from Dushanbe to Gwadar via eastern Afghanistan, with a branch through the Khyber Pass to Peshawar. Secondly, they would be similarly supportive and protective in the exploitation of Balochistan's mineral and gas resources.

As the province develops further, gas would be provided to Balochistanis at a subsidised rate from facilities owned by the Caliph, while the Khan would take partial credit for this arrangement with his people. Exports to the INU, which surely could not do without them (and bearing in mind the control that a Caliphal Balochistan would give the Khaganate over routes from Armand, and into China), would be carefully managed to balance high profits with the Caliph's political clout.

Of course, Balochistan would co-operate with the recovery of Depkazia's MiGs (as Beijing had been dragging its feet due presumably to somewhat tense relations with Samarkand), and Gwadar would indeed become a grand port city connecting the Caliphate to the world without such need for Russian waterways. It might even convince Moscow to be more fully co-operative and requiring of Depkazi commerce.

Gwadar, in fact, might become one of the most important cities in the world, for Samarkand, with a Balochistani Khan loyal to the holy empire lead by Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi, could make it vital to the economic well-being of the Armandian Combine, the Russian Empire, China, and the Indian National Union, four of the largest and most diverse nations on earth, as well as to Depkazi itself.

If an agreement were reached, Chingiz felt that Depkazia would be finally recognised as equal to its great neighbours, and, next to the Osmanli alternative, the Depkazi Caliphate would be all but indisputable as the rightful leader of the community of Islam, only increasing his power and influence all the further. And he was still in his twenties (though looking older, given the life he'd lead).

It was all important enough to leave nobody in much doubt about whether or not Chingiz would let the issue drop if it didn't go exactly his way. Operations in Afghanistan were only increased in scale and force as Ogun Sukur arrived in Balochistan, probably now involving as many people as lived in pre-development Gwadar!

Soon, Chingiz's token-woman diplomat would return from her travels and be assigned to Mumbai.

OOC: I sure hope that the PM's a Baloch, because Chingiz is not doing much to endear himself to the Pashtun outside of (North) Pakistan, right now! Spyr as Kashmir is fine by me if he wants to do it. I'm happy enough to let it proceed slowly if need be, as the Caliphate is creating enough work for itself in Afghanistan and Balochistan... and Pakistan, come to think of it. But, then again and for all I know, Kashmir may want to strike first, anyway.

Quetta

Prime Minister Zulfiqar Makran is not shocked when Mullah Sukur raises the issue of unification with Depkazia, and had expected as much out of a government such as Chingiz's. The Khagan does, after all, have reason to be optimistic, given his very smooth acquisition of North Pakistan. That does not stop Makran from being displeased, though. Certainly there is little that Balochistan can do to oppose the interests of far larger Depkazia, without running headlong into the arms of very much distrusted Constance. And that might be worse than acquiescence to Samarkand's desires. He had hoped that Samarkand, with commitments in Afghanistan and North Pakistan already, plus an impending offensive against Kashmir, would be more willing to accept Baloch independence. But Makran is unwilling to sign away the nation's days-old freedom because of Depkazia's needs. The Prime Minister is, after all, a secular man and no friend of autocrats, and has not been blind to both Tchokareffs' transgressions with regards to the Pashtun community. Ogun Sukur is, of course, thanked by the Prime Minister for his, "fraternal concern for the welfare of the Baloch state," and told that the issue of unification with Depkazia must necessarily be delayed, at least until the national Parliament can convene. Makran does not, after all, have the authority to put his name on anything without the explicit consent of the Baloch people.

That is not, of course, to say that the Baloch people, or at least those holding sway over the bulk of the population, don't have different ideas. To many of the old Khans, who are still immensely popular amongst their constituencies, the idea of once again being bestowed with titles and government salaries is a very attractive one indeed. The power of the Khans had never been entirely broken by the Mumbai government, and Parliament's willingness to let the Khans be was largely the cause of such a low incidence of political violence in the country. Now that Depkazi interest in Balochistan has been confirmed, many of these men see their chance to jump several ranks in the employ of a Baloch Satrap.

When the Baloch national parliament does convene, in some two weeks' time, it will serve as a referendum on Depkazi involvement in the country. Certainly most of the old princes and their descendants, and the family groups that they have nominal control over, will support closer ties with the Caliphate, if not outright unification. But the significant Pashtun minority is set to be very much against accession to Depkazia, or indeed any especially close diplomatic relationships, as is the largely secularized, urban population of Quetta. Only time will tell whether these feelings are more widespread, but, at least now, they are limited. And if Zulfiqar Makran fails to convince the bulk of Balochistan's population that union with Depkazia is a bad thing, he very likely will face a vote of no confidence and replacement. Mumbai is not thrilled about the prospect of Depkazia acquiring Balochistan either, and Unioners as a whole would have preferred Balochistan to remain in the INU. Provided any change of government is conducted along legitimate lines, Mumbai won't have an excuse to take drastic action. Balochistan is a sovereign nation, albeit a young one, and the Baloch people can make their own decisions. Another Rajasthan is, given the state of the INA, out of the question if things go a way that Mumbai becomes particularly upset about. Parliamentarians are desperate for a way to make the INU look particularly threatening in advance of Gulsana Turbeskova's next visit, so that Samarkand might stop and think before taking advantage of what is, in truth, a golden opportunity for expansion at Mumbai's expense.

Samarkand

Rarely did so much change sweep so broad a stage in so brief a time as had cleared Central Asia of its Commuist Party hangover since the bright-eyed and bushy-tailed rise of young Chingiz.

It was an advantage, perhaps, to be an observant Muslim when others had eyes red as the vodka labels scattered about their unmade beds.

Depkazia had opened-up its heavy lids and roused its ancient frame, shaking off the sandman's dust. It had out the boot ito a sleepy community of Islam, moving it from its wayward path and bad habits. Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi was back home and making noise. This Empire of his was to reorganise, so he yelled.

Chngiz's diplomats around the empire and beyond its fringe put-out new offers to vassals and potentials. More change.

In Depkazia-proper a man was being called Uzbyet Khan, and he was master -under Chingiz- of the northwest... the Blue Khanate.

To his south was rising the Green Khanate, to his east the Red Khanate, and to its south the Yellow Khanate.

In Bactria, the Beyliks were abolished. Brab Khan was now lord of the Bactrian Khanate. Burhanuddin Rabbani appeared to accept his new title and lands with grace.

But what of Dostum? Observe, the White Khanate, land of Radu Khan! The issue of the Pakistani Border Agencies was resolved: they would follow Dostum or face his Mujahideen. Dostum received less than Rabbani for one reason... Chingiz wanted him to conquer, to lead his men from the front one last time. The White Khanate included also Konar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabol, Parvan, Kapsia, Laghman, and Kabul. Dostum had the Caliphate's backing and his own varied means to take these lands as his own. They would be his legacy, his Khanate, his pension. Radu Khan would recruit in the neglected -if difficult- Border Agencies and take-over operations in eastern Afghanistan. Rashid Dostum with a numeric advantage and combined arms support versus whomever dares resist him in his quest for a Khanate to call his own... the future of the White Khanate.

Next, Husayan Ali Khan was to receive good news, and wages equal to his name. Kashmir was to be made a Khanate, he need not serve as Bey. More personal perks, more local-powers, but also more responsibility in undermining the Maharaja by his own initiative. For now he had Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, but his Caliphaly-sanctioned Khanate incorporated the Maharaja's lands as well.

The Khanate of Pakhtunkhwa, a home for the Pashtun finally recognised by Samarkand. The former Capital Province. Here Chingiz needed a Khan who would show religious rather than ethnic or otherwise motivated loyalty to the Caliphate, and the post was vacant. Chingiz lined-up unpopular members of the old government to be tried and punished by whomever acquired the post, a gesture to win the new Khan some support as a strong leader different from the old authority.

Balochistan. A Khanate here would cover Kandahar, too, if the place accepted association with the Caliph. Otherwise he'd place Kandahar under the White Khanate, obliging Dostum to address it once he was through with Kabul, and would issue fatawa on the leaders of opposition to his plans.

Ogun Sukur suggested now that association with the Caliphate could be presented instead as association with the Khaganate, or vice versa, if either seemed in any way more palatable before parliament.

Fighting in Afghanistan immediately intensified as Dostum drove his forces south from Mazar-e-Sharif, his vacated capital, to skirt the western fringes of his claim, while aircraft dropped bombs and calls to surrender/revolt in Kabul and the surrounding lands. Pakistani forces too continued to be pushed out of the Khyber Pass as Samarkand backed Dostum's drive on a second front.

Gulsana Turbeskova was now sent back to Mumbai with hopes of establishing an embassy as wildly ambitious and thus far successful Chingiz made very real efforts to become more powerful and influential than his Indian neighbours.

Gilgit-Baltistan

Husayn Ali Khan receives the pleasing news from Samarkand while he enjoys an outing on his barge in Satpara Lake, where he had first met Chingiz Khagan not at all long ago. It would, after all, be criminal not to enjoy one of the last fine days before the onset of winter, official business notwithstanding. The dispatch from the new center of national authority does, however, hasten the new Khan's return to Skardu proper. The capital might have been, officially, moved to Gilgit, but Skardu is still Husayn Ali Khan's town and he will doubtless continue to govern mainly from there. With his new responsibilities as a bona fide Khan, especially those concerning the seizure of Kashmir from the Maharaja, it might also do to be nearer the border, so Chingiz won't have any excuse to sack him for slacking.

Indeed, Gilgit-Baltistan has never been a terribly peaceful place, and the calm following the most recent Chorbat War was not widely expected to last. It simply falls to Husayn Ali Khan, his name now significant beyond the exploits of his grandfather, to execute the latest in the series of fierce little wars that have dogged the roof of the world since Great Walmington ceased to exert power over the region. Although his means are still limited, and Chingiz's seeming preoccupation with events elsewhere looks to cap support from Samarkand, the men of what was North Pakistan are altogether better-equipped to undertake the Kashmir operation than they have ever been. Shareef's shiftless appointees will not have the opportunity to steer the army into a wall as they so often did in the past, having been replaced by skilled and charismatic lieutenants from Husayn Ali Khan's regional army.

All manner of military stores are gathered in Skardu, breeching charges and mortar bombs especially. The Khan will, in all probability, try to make use of the relatively ancient tactics of infiltration, employed to such great effect during the First World War. Small teams of shock troops, armed with light machine guns and manifold bombs, will be sent to penetrate Kashmiri lines, bypassing strong positions and generally sowing confusion amongst troops used to far less complicated tactics.

While diplomacy with Kashmir has slowed slightly due to the recent change in national leadership, new Vice President Chang has continued his aggressive stance towards Depkazia, throwing the weight of his newfound power against those in parliament who continued to tow the lenient line suggested by Emperor Zhang.

An internal memo states that a small force from the ROCA has been deployed in Xinjiang. More precise details are unclear, but VP Chang obviously intends to make a strong show of force in Kashmir as he tries to erase the only major mistake he made in his career.

(Tag, the Czech Republic is concerned that peace in the far east may not promote unity between slavic brothers)

EDIT: Sorry wrong thread

Depkazi private media claims Samarkand to finally and formally recognise DRA... along with the White Khanate, the Bactrian Khanate, and the Baloch Khanate.

In this, eastern Afghanistan and most of the north shall join the Khaganate and/or the Caliphate (de jure, though de facto Taliban and other militia control remains unbroken in much of the old Afghanistan), while much of the west will be considered an independent Armandian-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Konar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabol, Parvan, Kapsia, Laghman, and Kabul all were either under attack or in line to be assaulted by Dostum's forces and Pakistani elements supported by the Depkazi air force, Kandahar was hoped-for in the pending and possible absorbtion of Balochistan, and Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kondoz, and Baghlan already fell under the mandate of the Bactrian Khanate. What remained of Afghanistan was all that Samarkand was prepared to dismiss as within the Combine's sphere of influence.

Herat, Badghis, Ghowr, Farah, Nimruz, Helmand, Oruzgan, Sar-e Pol, Bamian, Ghazni, and Vardak were on new Caliphal maps to be shaded in a colour indicated by the key as associated with the DRA. Most of the nation's Turkic populace, some of its gas reserves, and many of its major cities and passes under Samarkand's sway, much of its territorial extent left to the communists. At least three provinces in which the Depkazis and Bactrians had previously deployed some forces were to be left alone in hopes of making Chingiz's position seem a reasonable one.

The Caliph, meanwhile, has announced that his next step (possibly implying that the Afghan partition must happen according to his design before this issue is approached) would be to negotiate transit fees for Armandian petrochemicals passing through the Khaganate to China and to break-ground in the Caliphate for a pipeline hopefully to be funded jointly by Caliphal, Combine, Chinese, and potentially DRA sources. Actually consisting of several pipes, Samarkand's vision indicates the incorporation of a line supplying gas from the Khaganate to China along side Armandian gas and oil.

Notably, since the Depkazi gas will not be subject to transit fees in Caliphal territory, it stands to be cheaper than Armandian gas once Bactrian and potentially Balochistani sources are incorporated with Depkazia's own fields. Calihpal oil, it seems, will not be exported in significant quantity but reserved for domestic use, as reserves do not compare favourably with Armand's and Samarkand has no desire to become a net importer of crude in the near future.

Of course, the more difficulty Chingiz receives in arranging Afghanistan's future, the more inclined he may be to make difficult demands on transit fees and even planning permission.

Balochistan's parliament has been made aware of the Caliph's plans and discussions with the implication that there's a lot of money to be made once Chingiz has the strategic clout to make Constance and Beijing amenable.

...of course, once he gets his way, Chingiz intends to flatten the Maharaja and then to square up finally with the formidable Tsar.

(And none of this takes into account the continued fact of stiff Afghan resistance to Caliphal and Communist forces!)

Kashmir

Parak Singh was not sleeping well. Not that the Maharaja would spend to much time abed... it was important to be on top of things. But matters were shifting quickly around the small state of Kashmir, and none of it was for the better.

Parak knew there were two types of leader in the world... most were like the two generations of Shareef in North Pakistan, like the nervous men in London who looked on as India gained its independence... like his own father, certainly. They could be nice men, they could be cruel men, but they were not DANGEROUS men. They could rule passably, they could fight passably, but they would accomplish nothing of note in the end.

The other type were men who, equally nice or equally vile, posessed that elusive quality of skill or ambition which meant they could not be dismissed. For a long time, the Maharaja had considered himself a dangerous man surrounded by non-entities, a leopard amongst goats, perhaps attacked but never truly at risk. But now the goats were dropping one by one, and who knew what had arrived to replace them.

North Pakistan and its new Caliph were, of course, an obvious concern... there was a man who seemed intent on expansion, and quite successful at it too. But Kashmir's royal troops had held off the armies which now served this new Central Asian despot for years, and could do so again.

They could not be so sure when it came to the INU. Rajasthan had been a surprise, Bihar equally so, forcing a reconsideration of future plans. A determined assault by Chingiz could be repelled, but Kashmir would be weakened and ripe for Union encroachment. The reverse was equally true, and if the Bedgellens threw themselves behind Mumbai then the Royal Army could not hope to repel even the first assault. There was, unfortunately, no military solution. A political one would thus be needed.

China seemed an optimal ally for the Maharaja... large enough to excercise influence over the greater Indian powers and sharing a border with the Depkazi Caliphate, they would certainly be able to deter either from aggression. But a recent shift in government might have changed matters, and so while diplomats and officials were sent to inquire about Beijing's support for Kashmir, others were enroute across the world to London. Walmington, as his grandfather had known, treated its favourites well, and perhaps would prove vulnerable if fond memories of the Raj were invoked. In either case, talk would range from general friendship and assistance towards specifics such as the need to deter Chingiz' expansion. Also sought would be modern interceptors, capable of engaging aircraft such as the Su-27 or Mig-29... equally important are loans, subsidies, or delayed payment plans to allow the small state to acquire such planes quickly and at affordable prices.

Internal matters also called for the attention of Parak Singh. Internal dissent was relatively quiet, the result of a few liberalizations here and a few crackdowns there, to keep reformers from taking too many steps towards becoming revolutionaries. Muslim complaints, in particular, had been quieted with grants of autonomy and equal opportunity, and the Maharaja worried he might regret that decision most of all. He could hope that the Muslims under his rule were satisfied by his concessions, without interest in the growing Caliphate nearby, but until hope became certainty he would have to review Muslim presence in military and state posts to ensure their reliability. The Civil Guard would have to be asked to keep an eye open for fundamentalist activities... hopefully recent efforts would keep the notoriously corrupt Guard from dismissing threats encountered in exchange for bribes.

[OOC: Just returning a favour and playing an NPC, as LRR has been kind enough to take up Indonesia as it faces Strainist invasion... not much new, besides political begging. Though, not sure, was Husayn Ali Khan starting to launch raids, or just preparing for them?]

A leaked report suggesting that China import Kazahkstani oil has been released to the media. Amongst the factors in support of Kazahkstan is political stability, an already developed oil infrastructure, and an already existing pipeline which meant no new ones needed to be built.

China's leadership has been quiet on this but appears to have done an about-face on Russia. The leaked report means that China may no longer recognise Depkazi claims to the country and continues to put pressure on Depkazia.

It is even suggested that the report may have been deliberately leaked in order to force Depkazia to offer much better terms in foreign petrol investments than it has already done.

----------------------------------------

Singh's diplomats are informed of a few things - firstly, the change in leadership will benefit their cause. Secondly, the demands for demcratic reforms were dropped from the agenda and China could meet the Kashmiri demand for modern aircraft but it was hinted strongly that "continued obedience" from Singh would be neccesary for anything to happen. China was burnt once with Chingis, VP Chang would not make the same mistake twice.

OOC: Quick post---Armand will flatly reject Depkazia's offer. Sorry for the lack of IC, but I'm still on hiatus for now.

"Bah! Kazakhstan's petrochemicals are in great demand in the hugely out-matched ranks of the Franco-Spanish armies!"

"Its production capacities are limited by the youth of occupation!"

"Kazakh prices won't be much lower."

The Caliph and his Khans and Viziers conducted a much more lively discussion than had been the case for like men in the Edmundian years... at least, nobody was drawn and quartered for venturing the wrong opinion, hiccuping, or wearing perfume -or not- on the wrong day of the ever-changing week. It was still evident that most people thought it best to appeal to Chingiz's vanity and ambition, and to venture a positive opinion rather than discuss bad news.

"I can address the matter of Kazakh stability."

A smile ripped slowly across the face of the Khagan.

"And so you shall, for your Caliph requires it of you. Allah's blessings are with your arm in this act, Vizier Abeid."

"And once the infidel occupier of Kazakhstan lies bleeding... I shall have my time to face the heretic in Latakia?"

The most wanted Al Khali received a convincing nod from Chingiz Depkazi. Next, Syria... but first God's Spear must be thrust into Kazakhstan's petrochemical heart.

OOC: I hope that I take no undue liberties in the course of this campaign, but do feel free to discuss with me any such issues if they should arise...

Almaty, Kazakhstan

A mild draft interrupts the quiet order in an otherwise bare floor wearing a spotty coating of maps and hand-written documents.

Footfalls in the hallway tell of the draft's cause as the stairwell door has been opened and allowed to snap shut once more.

Hakan recoils, tenses. He is the lone resident of the fourth floor in this decomposing corpse of a Soviet-era apartment block, and every draft carries for him the scent of a potential raiding party, for the Tsarist security forces stalk the streets of the former capital of this declining nation.

"As-Salāmu `Alaykum... it's Ali."

Relief. Hakan unlocks the door to his little flat and returns the greetings of his friend. They embrace, quickly, and Hakan shuts the door with an involuntary glance to confirm that the hallway is clear.

"Our brothers have met the caravan." Says Ali. "Our comrades in the Caliphate have come through impressively."

"It is well that this sick empire's borders are so vast and so harsh -and natural that they be pressed by so many enemies- or we may not expect our successes to be so much more frequent than our martydoms in these operations."

While speaking Hakan seems to notice for the first time a deformity under Ali's greatcoat. Seeing the wandering of his friend's eye, Ali exposes a bundle of cloth and, unwrapping it, reveals a weapon.

"I thought that you would like to see one... before we go.

"They call it the Khagan-05 in honour of our great Caliph."

Hakan is now able to scrutinise the AK-like carbine as it is handed to him. It has a short barrel, though a heavy one, and is accordingly furnished with a large baffle to fight muzzle-climb (but not, says Ali, flash or audible report) during automatic fire. The receiver, too, is heavy, fashioned after the weapons delivered by United Elias to North Pakistan before that nation's absorption into the Caliphate. The Khagan-05's butt collapses in a manner seen in other AK-S models, and there is a forehand pistol grip.

Ali explains that the gun accepts standard AKM magazines, and that, "We have drums for fifty-rounds, because the Khaganate's security forces came to so much enjoy the Roycelandian Tommygun.

"They're brand new, even the Caliphate's forces haven't received any, so, if we get away, the swine won't even be able to identify with what sort of weapon he has been bled.

Later that day...

That evening, Ali, Hakan, and three more of their friends would attack the Almaty home of a wealthy Russian Christian known to hold a high post in the nation's petrochemical industry and to have been involved in talks with the Chinese.

Blasting -with grenades- their way inside, the five would spray the occupants with two-hundred and fifty 7.62mm bullets in two bloody minutes before attempting to escape towards the nearby mountains, planning to dump the white minibus in which they fled.

A notice purporting to be written in the hand of Amal Abeid, one-time head of the Al Khali Islamic Progress Party and suspected sponsor of the terror campaign that blighted the Democratic Republic's last days before Lusakan invasion, would appear the next day. Taped to large roadsign in the heart of Almaty, it swore death to the infidel occupation forces, warned foreigners against becoming involved in what it called the theft of Kazakh resources, and indicated the rightness of Kazakhstan's acession to the Caliphate. In the message, the leaders of the reportedly defunct God's Spear organisation signed their names to a statement of responsibility for the previous day's attack and to an intention to conduct further operations.

OOC-Um, I think I need a recap of what is going on here. Are you invading Kazakhstan? I am in the middle of finals and was just told that this thread was going on. Well, I knew about it, but didn’t know that it was about me. Perhaps I should be responding a little? I’ll have more time later, but for now can I get a recap and then I will try and read what I’ve missed.

Tsar Wingert the Great.

OOC: Ah, finals, okay. No, the Caliphate is not invading Kazakhstan, but Islamists are attempting to initiate a campaign of assassination and sabotage there.

Sorry, all sorts of things are going on in this thread. Russia is only being dragged in now that China's talking about establishing a greater reliance upon Kazakh gas and oil.

We don't have to do much with it for now if you're busy. The Caliph's just trying to damage Kazakhstan's petrochemical links with Beijing and is using Islamists and anti-Russian nationalists to do it rather than directly confronting the Russian Empire. We want Kazakh oil and gas to be unreliable, dangerous, and expensive, because the idea of being unneeded by China is pretty damn frightening to Chingiz.

Amal Abeid, the former Al Khali opposition leader from Tanzania, has joined the yet unnamed movement born partly out of the old God's Spear network, and is effectively its day to day commander, having apparently been radicalised during the collapse of the DR Al Khals.

Abeid has met secretly with the Caliph, and though Samarkand's sponsorship of the campaign is as yet secret it probably won't take a genius to spot that it is directed largely against the petrochemical industry and links with China, or that a lot of the attacks are likely to happen close to the Depkazi border where attackers presumably can flee into the desert or mountains and head for the Caliphate, or that the attackers tend to be pretty darn well equipped and informed about their targets.

OOC-Oh, Ok, I will respond a little to this later, when things settle down a bit after this weekend. In the meantime, I will just post the Kazakh numbers from my invision fact book.


Kazakhstan:
Population: 15,233,244
Ruler: King Igoriij Romanoff (Effectively under house arrest in palace in Alma Ata)
Head of State: Tsar Wingert
Fealty: to The Divine Russian Empire

This nation was annexed by Putin when implementing his democratic and economic reforms on former Soviet states and has remained under Russian control since. It was also very keen to ratify Tsarist control of its government, and the military there is quite sizable, as Moscow saw military involvement as a make-work program for the Kazakhstani people.

Total Active Military: just over 1%; 160,000 troops
Kazakhstan Land Forces: 100,000 troops
1 Division Heavy Mechanised- 10,000 troops
2 Divisions Light Mechanised- 20,000 troops
3 Divisions Heavy Infantry- 30,000 troops
4 Divisions Light Infantry- 40,000 troops

It should be noted here that he military uses a lot of transport helicopters and other non-conventional methods of warfare, including, camel regiments, plainclothes nomadic patrols, etc.

Kazakhstan Air Force and Air Defence Brigade: 30,000 troops (This is a fairly high number as it takes into account the extremely high amount of troops that are deployed to both man and protect air defence systems and installations, like AA guns and SAM Batteries, which are literally dotting the landscape wherever you go in the nation. Those troops will also be represented as a defending force if the nation is ever attacked, as they are quite capable land combat troops, and might be considered Light Infantry)

This includes:
120 MiG-23 (These were essentially dumped here and given to this military with the understanding that the main near threat was Depkazia, and these planes would be able to easily keep pace with anything that they would have in service, there are airfields and warehouses full of these all over the former Soviet Union, and they could easily be pressed into service here, hoping that numbers could keep up with superior technology.)
65 MiG-29

Kazakhstan Navy: 30,000 troops (based in Shevchenko and back up base in Makhachkala, perhaps the largest land-locked Navy in the world)
Has many Alligator Class and Ivan Rogov ships for troops movement in the Caspian.
1 Nuestrashimy Class Frigate
1 Tartorstal/Gepard Frigate
10 Grisha I Corvette
1 Udaloy I Class Destroyer










Just to gove you an idea of what you are facing. Now, remember the subtext here, these are not crack troops, there is a lot of them, and they are everywhere, but they pretty much get what's left after everything has been distributed to the rest of the Empire. However, that doesn't mean that the Tsarists don't enjoy some support there, remember that the Tsarists were elected here as a democratic political party, and the people chose through referendum to remain a part of the Empire after Wingert ascended when Putin disappeared. Also, the King here is basically a madman who has no real power, the administration is locally controlled by teh Prime Minister and teh Duma, and they take their direction largely from Moscow and Wingert himself. This area is considered one of the "safe" holdings of teh Tsarists. That means, it is pretty stable and little chance of popular revolt. Just wanted to give you some context.

Tsar Wingert the Great.

Depkazi Caliphate

In truth, the Caliphate is something of a warzone. A collection of low-intensity wars, perhaps, but a collection under the legal stuardship of the most high Caliph, king of the strugglers in more senses than one, and in no senses at all.

Eastern Afghanistan is a mire of military patrols along half-built highways and snatch-squad and air raids targetting stubborn tribal leaders.

Radu Khan's hardened forces are lurching towards Kabul with the former Mr.Dostum leading as ever from the front.

Pakistanis are assigned to countless outposts and patrols and expected to resist corruption by enjoyment of their thus-far average 18% pay increases since accession to the Caliphate, with bonuses promised pending the completion of Chingiz's great infrastructure drives and the attempt to incorporate Balochistan.

Religious, nationalist, and racist radicals are being armed -often with ex-Soviet and other blackmarket arms difficult to pin-down- and smuggled across the vast borders of sparsely-peopled Kazakhstan.

Agents attempt to infiltrate Kashmir, Balochistan, and the INU.

Chingiz tries once more to gain results with international diplomacy, of a sort.

The Caliph has come out against the coup in Syria. He decries heresy and cultism in the Al Khalis and Alawis, calling them bent on corruption and vice. Samarkand identifies the Ba'athist movement as the next manifestation of the absurd in its logical path to extremism, and warns of a new Nazi state under decadent Qottar.

Samarkand has also communicated privately to Port Royal, Washington, Cairo, and Raleigh that it may in fact support the canal take-over, and even back Roycelandia and the Treaty Organisations in any armed confrontation with India... hopeful that, in return, these governments may induce London and Beijing to rather forget about Kashmir, which would, after all, make the Indians somewhat vulnerable were it in the hands of a wise and powerful ruler able to work with the west. Mutterings of, 'basing rights' have been heard.

Constance is again asked to consider the status of Afghanistan. The Caliphate stands by its partition proposal, but offers a further reduced duty on oil transported through the Caliphate, leaving only a token fee upon it while profitable fees for Armandian gas to China really must naturally remain. Armandian gas would, however, contractually constitute at least 25% of gas exported to China via the pipeline by volume, regardless of its cost. Naturally, China is yet to be told of this proposal!

Samarkand perceives a likely shift in Soviet policy that will absolutely not benefit the Caliphate if met favourably in Constance, making the Combine suddenly almost more valuable than China.

Mumbai

Roycelandia's de facto seizure of the Suez Canal marks a turn for the worst with regards to Parliament's affairs worldwide. All of a sudden, it seems as though the nations of India will have to fight a two-front war against the leading imperialist powers, and, in Mumbai's case, quite possibly against its one-time Walmingtonian allies and confidants. Certainly in light of the present state of affairs, a diplomatic engagement with Depkazia has considerable appeal, more so than ever before. True, Parliamentarians are deeply suspicious of Chingiz Khagan's seemingly limitless ambition and landlust, but the Depkazi premier's relatively peaceful acquisition of North Pakistan pales in comparison to the wholesale inundation of West Africa on the part of Frenchmen and Roycelandians. And, if push comes to shove, there is considerable doubt as to the Indian National Union's chances of winning a war against half a million Depkazi soldiers while, at the same time, supporting deployments on the African Continent and possibly fending-off a Roycelandian excursion out of Goa. News of Depkazi communications with the new aggressors, when it reaches the Union capital, will only be the latest in a series of unfavorable findings on the world stage.

But Mumbai is not about to take the state of affairs sitting down. II Corps, headquartered at Hyderabad and charged with the defense of Sindh and the Punjab, is ordered to prepare an operational plan for an invasion of Kashmir, on the shortest viable timetable. Parliament might yet show Chingiz that he does not hold a monopoly on audacity and military daring, and might very well give the Depkazi premier cause to debate the merits of seeking to take advantage of the INU's over-stretched state. Some 70,000 fighting men of the INA are concentrated in Gujranwala and Rawalpindi, although the bulk of them are reservists, facing the border with Kashmir, and Parliament is keen to see them used. A great many ultimatums are wired to Parak Singh's capital at Amritsar, ordering him to relinquish his rule and disarm, etc. Parliament makes no secret of its intentions towards Kashmir, half to frighten its Maharaja into peaceful cooperation and half to try and draw Depkazi energy away from programs pertaining to Balochistan. It is also no secret that the INA has no troops to spare for that nation's defense, despite Parliamentary efforts to keep it so, and therefore many consider the nation's best chance of long-term survival to be the distraction of Chingiz Khagan and the redirection of his efforts elsewhere.

The infiltration of Depkazi agents -spies and provocateurs- does not go entirely unnoticed in the Punjab at least. Next to Rajasthan, of course, the Punjab has a reputation for violence, and over the course of its history within the Indian National Union several small conflicts have come and gone. A fairly competent troop of border police patrols the frontiers with Kashmir and what was formerly North Pakistan, although that was more to prevent enemy commando incursions than anything else. Small parties or individuals might cross the network of poorly-maintained fences without much trouble at all. Depkazis might find, to their dismay, a remarkably contented populace, used to focusing its aggressions and hostility outwards rather than inwards. But that is not to say the situation might not be reversed. Certainly ethnic tensions exist in the Punjab, farther from central Parliamentary authority and closer to tumultuous North Pakistan and sly Armandia. It will, though, be up to the Depkazis who set up shop in the province to exploit these.

Balochistan

Not surprisingly, the Baloch borders are more or less unguarded, they being crossed on a daily basis by Pashtun or Balochi tribesmen who don't have much respect for national frontiers when their own kinsmen inhabit both sides of them. Depkazi agents have no trouble crossing, although, where found and identified by Pashtun, they might be in for a very unhappy fate. Quetta is not oblivious to Samarkand's less diplomatic attempts at subverting the new government. Indeed, nomadic tribesmen are encouraged to go north and make contact with family and friends there. But the Balochi Parliament, locked in a debate between those for accession to Depkazia and those very much against it, continues to deliver no concrete statements or policy goals. Zulfiqar Makran, therefore, finds himself wielding a good deal of executive power, and has the rare ability to conduct military operations on his own volition. Abdur Khattak's advance towards Kandahar is ordered accelerated, as is the deployment of irregular troops north, ostensibly as part of a major operation to curb opium trafficking. Ogun Sukkur is once again invited to the capital, this time to discuss issues in Afghanistan. Any mention of accession on Sukkur's part and Makran quickly changes the subject. It might be Parliament's call, but Makran has his own opinions. Communiques are sent, perhaps worryingly, to Constance, in order to gauge Armandian interest in Balochi infrastructure projects, and in order to give Samarkand something to worry about. It is thought that the prospect of a war with the powerful Combine, despite the fact that the bulk of its population is isolated from the seat of government, is not an inviting one as far as the Kalifah is concerned.

While China prepared to recognise Kazahkstan, troops from Siberia and along the Russian borders were no longer required there and as a result, free for more adventures. The military buildup in Xinjiang continues quietly, while a heavy police presence in border towns has stopped last months riots and an eerie calm reigns. The rumours of basing rights were making China jittery and any western powers basing forces there would be there for only one reason - to act as a counterweight to the ascendant republic.

However, things aren't entirely bad for James Chang and his department of Foreign Affairs. Zhang's heavy defeat in the last election was celebrated by many in Xinjiang, glad to see the end of his christian-based education policies. This was the chance to open inclusive dialogue with the neglected Muslim minorities there, and maybe to even dent the popular appeal of the faithful Chingis.

The solution was two-fold. Gain widespread support amongst Muslims for Beijing's government and to that end, Beijing announced the formation of a "Minister of Islamic affairs" portfolio and would begin government engagement with the Islamic Society of China. The second part of the solution was more deceptive - Chang needed a person who could convince the Islamic community that he would make a better Caliphate than Chingis while remaining absolutely loyal to the Chinese state, and who could appeal to unruly Turkic minorities.

Jack Bao was the man. He was of Han-Turkic descent, and was immediately selected to undergo training in Arabic, muslim customs, and press manipulation. Secretly of course. Having lived in Depkazia for a few months now to facilitate dialogue, he was promptly recalled to Beijing and given a full mission briefing.

Quetta

Debate in the National Parliament continues to be as fierce and as heated as ever, although neither side is able to gain a clear-cut advantage on the issue of accession to Depkazia. The Baloch National Rally, ostensibly Zulfiqar Makran's party, is split almost evenly between those in favor and those against accession, the former mostly being the once-disenfranchised nawabs who now find themselves wielding quite a bit of clout. Pashtun opposition is not universal, owing to the progress made in North Pakistan and Chingiz' departure from Shareef's interventionism in Waziristan. Many clerics are inclined to support increased Depkazi influence. Chingiz Khagan might not be recognized as a true Caliph by every Muslim, but he is without doubt a strong leader, and one who will protect traditional interests from the secularizing influence of the Igovians. With Bedgellens more or less free to roam throughout the INU, it was not long before the traditionally independent-minded Gelatians began to cause trouble in the more observant parts of the subcontinent. Chingiz will put a stop to that, for sure.

A letter is sent to Samarkand by the pro-accession faction of the Balochistan National Rally. It invites Chingiz Khagan himself, or any Depkazi diplomat, to come and address the Baloch Parliament, with the goal of showing it the benefits inherent in union with the Caliphate.

So close and yet so far?

Young Chokareff, grandson of the last -much reduced- Soviet premier, now Khalīfah Chingiz Khagan Depkazi, Amir al-Muminin, Malik ul-Mugāhidīn, master of Central Asia and still in his twenties, perceived some problems suddenly critical.

China appeared to be moving against him, the Soviets were rumoured to be considering rapprochement with the Combiners, and where they went the Union would likely follow. Balochistan was taking too long. And he couldn't just invade it with much chance of success while he was still fighting in Afghanistan and now required to guard more borders than Depkazi school children could remember.

And the Syrians weren't biting. They actually favoured Christian meat!

It was time to try Mumbai again... perhaps too late, even. Gulsana Turesbekova was sent back to the INU as Ogun Sukkur returned to Quetta. Turesbekova was to remain fairly tight-lipped to begin with... Samarkand was desperately hopeful that its earlier snub of the INU's diplomacy still carried a weight of confidence with it, and Gulsana was to allow the Unioners to speak first, like they needed her more than she they.

Which really wasn't true.

At the same time, of course, Chingiz being Chingiz was after another highly unlikely gain, offering Singh a rather costly deal by which the west of his nation, the Vale and the Muslim-dominated areas, would be gifted to the Caliph, and the Maharaja in turn receive his protection against India. Which, apart from anything else, was rather in conflict with Samarkand's hopes for improved relations with Mumbai. Best to keep that quiet, for now, and put on another USSR-influenced military parade, perhaps in Peshawar, this time.

Brief theme music plays, in the traditional Kazak style. Then, the TV camera focuses on a tall thing man with wild hair and a moustache ina grey suite smiling very enthusiastically at the audience. “Jagshemash! My name Borat Sagdiyev. I am Premier of Duma in Kazakhstan. I wish to take time now to comment on horrible sayings of terrible terror group “Spear of God.” Our great and glorious king, Igoriij Romanoff, has decreed that this organisation be crushed by any means necessary. I say that I like new Depkazi regime, they hate Soviets, very nice. High Five! Also, if Kargat or KGB find information that this group be fund by neighbour nation Depkazia, we will not rule out possibility of military invention. Chenquieh!

After that broadcast is sent out on a broad enough band that it reaches their closest neighbour, the orders of the Premier begin to take effect. The new Lithuanian troops, 4 Divisions of mostly Russian Ethnicity Troops, will be placed under the command of Kazak High Command and replacements mobilised should they need them for Lithuania. A full mobilisation of the Kazak military is ordered, with every unit and man to be in service as soon as is possible. This is especially true among the expansive border, and patrols are stepped up all along it. Of course, with mobilisation, come major KGB arrests. Almost two thousand people with suspected terrorist leanings are arrested and taken for questioning, most will be returned home after a few days, hungry, badly beaten, but alive. The rest will just disappear. God’s Spear soon realises that the old Kazak that they knew no longer existed, and they find that many of the strategic locations that they have in mind as targets come under heavy guard, especially in regards to oil production. The people themselves, the populous is considered “very loyal” to the Tsarists, as they chose through referendum to invite the Tsarist government to take over, are encouraged to report any suspicious behaviour, and given opportunity to get rewarded financially when that information leads to results.

During this time, the military, commanded by the KGB, storms a many suspected terrorist strongholds, (a couple of them even are) and the inhabitants are questioned under sodium pentothal and torture until they give in or die. And the KGB knows how to make someone live for a long, long time. Of course, if they have trouble, they just call in the Kargat, the Tsarist Secret Police, who can teach the KGB a thing or two about mean. The few lucky breaks they do get indicate the name of the leaders, and that there are some kind of ties to the government to the south, though what kind is unsure. They also indicate a few of the next targets, but after the first two or three targets turn into ambushes, the Spear soon figures it out, but by then, the KGB has more people to “persuade” to help.

Of course, Premier Borat contacts the Depkazi government and asks if he may make a state visit to Samarqand and discuss the future of Kazak/Depkazi relations.

Tsar Wingert the Great.

[LMAO! Premier Borat!!!!]

China stays quite on the issue of Kazahk-Depkazia relations. Beijing was keen to get the first shipments of oil, but the death of the contact had set the programme back weeks at least.

In the end, Beijing quietly roots for Chingis to be humilated and be forced to renounce his claims on Kazahkstan. It would save the ROCA the hassle of toppling another dictator and a few billion in cash.

Mumbai

Gulsana Turbeskova is finally allowed to go before Parliament a second time, after having been made to wait for several days as Parliamentarians determined just what it was that they wanted to say to her. What does Mumbai have to say to Chingiz Khagan? Don't annex Balochistan? Don't agitate in the Punjab? Certainly it is a fool who thinks that he can control Depkazia, with its lion of a ruler and his boundless ambition. A strong Depkazia works both ways; Tsarist Russia might very well overrun the whole of Eastern Europe if its Kazakh border is not threatened by a strong Depkazi state, and the strong Depkazi state threatens Union-occupied Punjab and newly-independent Balochistan. Perhaps if Mumbai showed interest in a proper friendly diplomatic relationship, the Khagan might moderate himself and his nation, removing the threat to the INU's borders. Maybe the Khagan will interpret an attempt on Parliament's part at diplomatic engagement as a sign of weakness and pursue Balochistan more strongly. Either way, there is a consensus that Depkazia must be dealt with somehow, and Unioners might as well try diplomacy while the avenue is still open.

Parliamentarians, who try very hard to hide their confusion and their indecisiveness, announce to Turbeskova that the Indian National Union is prepared to establish a limited trade with Depkazia, provided that Chingiz Khagan agrees to set free political prisoners held by his regime, and conditional on his regime's "continued even-handed treatment of ethnic and linguistic minorities." Included in this "limited trade" would be the sale of Hindustan Ambassador automobiles and other civilian transport equipment, as well as train engines, in exchange for token amounts of Depkazi raw materials. Depkazi nationals might eventually be permitted to study in the Indian National Union, says the Parliamentarian committee, provided Chingiz is open to the Union's proposals so far.

While Turesbekova is indeed willing and empowered to push forward Union-Caliphate relations, Samarkand expresses a willingness to enter negotiation on the composition of Afghanistan, Chingiz saying only that the Turkic-dominated north (Bactria) and a safe eastern passage to Balochistan and along the former Pakistani border are key to the Caliphate's co-operation.

Samarkand is also keen to continue working towards the pipeline project involving the Caliphate, Combine, DRA, China, and possibly Balochistan in some minor way, but is clearly determined to dig in its heels until a favourable set of conditions are agreed.

Meanwhile, the great Caliphate continues propaganda directed at Kazakhstan. Nobody believes the Tsar's insistance of Kazakh stability. True perhaps many
Russians and a few Kazakhs were satisfied with Putin-era Russia entering the country, but the Tsar has since robbed them of the democracy that he brought, and now the undeniable rise of Turkic nationalism and Islamic sentiment just across the vast border with Depkazia can only add to the discontent of the still large aboriginal populace.

Depkazi speedboats are now also thought to be smuggling agents and arms into Dagestan and on to Chechnya where more Clerics speak in opposition to the Tsarist Orthodoxy.

Back in India, Gulsana tells the INU that life is improving in Mid Asia since Tchokareff was exiled, crediting Islamic values and strict law and order measures. The diplomat holds herself up as an example of the Caliphate's respect for women, and says that the death penalty is now passed only after a standard legal trial and/or Islamic trial, and not carried-out by the police, who often arrested and shot political opponents of Tchokareff or rivals in Depkazia's old corrupt economy. Nor is it carried-out through the strong application of a hippo.

Despite the rise of the Caliphate, alcohol has not been banned, though its advertising has and its use is not advocated by the authorities. Turesbekova says that a Pashtun homeland is being created in the Khanate of Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the N.Pakistani Capital Province), and that the campaign in Afghanistan is against the oppressive faith-corrupting Taleban. Islam is not even enforced in the Caliphate, which may also be described as the Khaganate by those not wishing to convert, though Islamic courts do have powers over those who profess the faith and then defame it by their crimes (and, she doesn't say, it is easier to get ahead if you convert to Islam).

Mumbai hears that Samarkand wishes to pursue the integration of eastern Afghanistan into a Khanate, thus introducing stability and security, and Chingiz reportedly admits to desiring the accession of Balochistan as a great Khanate, perhaps joined with Kandahar, but says that it is up to the people and parliament of Balochistan to pursue the issue.

Gulsana also calls the Kashmiri Maharaja one of the last corrupt despots of the region since Depkazia and North Pakistan were liberated by Chingiz, Rajasthan by the Union, and Soviet intervention struck at Bihar's tyrant. She calls the Depkazi Khanate of Kashmir incomplete without her vale.

There are jovial assurances of a total lack of Caliphal ambition in the Indian Union's territory. Gulsana still calls the western extremes of China East Turkestan, but does not list China as an enemy of the Caliphate.

She then decries in one breath the Russian occupation of Kazakhstan and the Tsar's aggression in Eastern Europe.

The news that Kazakhstan was going to be treated as an independent nation would
be treated with some scepticism, both because the Kazaks considered themselves
independent, just Tsarist. Much like if there is a Conservative government in
UK, USA and Canada, they are not the same country, just share a lot of the same
politics. This is not entirely true as we all know, but everyone seems to be
surprised to find out just how much autonomy the Tsarist nations really have.
The second reason that they would be sceptical would be because they were not
sure that they cold trust Chingiz, who by all accounts was completely and
unflappably nuts. Of course, the very large Kazak Armed Forces were already on
alert, and the nation was on total war footing, along with some 50,000
Lithuanian troops that had been sent to the nation. As they were on total war
footing they were currently receiving lots of mothballed Soviet era warplanes
and equipment that the Kazaks had the almost unique ability to restore to
working order, so they were happy to hear the offer.

Premier Borat Sagdiyev eventually makes a speech on national Kazak television. The screen comes up, and traditional Kazak music plays in the background, when the music fades the perpetually smiling face of Premier Borat as he is affectionately called comes up, “Jagshemash! I am proposed a ‘Great Treaty Make Benefit Glorious Nations of Kazakhstan and Depkazia.’ Points would be:
1. Non-Aggression Pact for peace between our nations.
2. Opening of trade.
3. Mutual cooperation for encouraging trade with Central Asia, especially with China.
4. Military Support for Glorious Depkazi Regime in Afghanistan.
5. Mutual cooperation and support in maintaining older Soviet-era technology. We have much resource place here. Very nice!

These mentioned parts of the ‘Great Treaty Make Benefit Glorious Nations of Kazakhstan and Depkazia’ would mark a new era in Central Asian politicians and would see our nations move to next century very much happy. Would like to send Tsarist diplomats to Chingiz. Please respond. Chenquieh!”

Music comes up again as the screen goes black.

Tsar Wingert the Great.

Samarkand

The Caliph looks favourable upon te Kazakh approach, saying that he would like immediately to begin export of cotton to Kazakhstan, negotiate the sharing of water resources (the Caliphate has much locked in its mountains, but worries about the decline of the Aral Sea which is causing the uncovering of salt deposits which are now blown across the land, damaging the soil), and to reconnect a Soviet-era pipeline severed by his father's Atheist Labour Republic. This pipeline would carry the Caliphate's natural gas to Kazakhstan for re-export to Russia and the European market.

At this moment the Caliph is not keen to export his gas to China, still wishing to force Beijing to work more according to his terms in respect of his petrochemical resources and those of the Combine, which can not reach China directly without Samarkand's co-operation. Chingiz does wish to reopen trade with China, he is just not keen to be steamrolled into something suitable for China, Russia, or the Combine before the Holy Caliphate.

Recognised as the true Caliph -and for all his other titles such as King of the Islamic Strugglers and Khan of Khans-, Chingiz Khagan Depkazi wishes to confer upon Sagdiyev the honourary title of Botu Khan (and quietly hopes that some day it shall be an active position in a Kazakh Khanate attached to the Caliphate).

Samarkand, meanwhile, has begun to draw-down forces on the Kazakh border and issue new deployments to the Combine frontier and the Afghan theatre of war, where Chingiz has the Taliban and other militias already outnumbered by many many thousands.

Depkazi diplomatic movements towards Kazakhstan worry the Combine; just as it had begun to slowly shift against the League, its neighbor had done the opposite. As Armandian forces continue to slowly plough through central Afghanistan, diplomats make overtures to the Khagan for potential...negotiation.

((Tag. I'll post here trying to drum up anti holy league sentiment))

Mumbai

As soon as it becomes clear that Chingiz Khagan has opened negotiations with Tsarist Russia, Gulsana Turbeskova is evicted from the Indian National Union. Some Parliamentarians even briefly consider arresting her and other Depkazi diplomats in the INU. The thought of a Holy League presence on the Indian Subcontinent makes Unioners shudder and, for the most part, they are moved to violence and anger. Fear of Russian invasion through Central Asia is by no means new in India, after all. II Corps in Hyderabad moves more Union infantrymen to the Punjab while Golkonda squadrons are deployed to forward airfields facing the former North Pakistan. Should the Khagan associate himself with the Western tyrants, he stands to lose what he has gained in the northwestern corner of India, or at least this is the message that Parliament attempts to convey to the Depkazi head of state. With Chingiz now actively seeking a relationship with Russia, or so it appears to Unioners, there is no longer a strategic motive for establishing good relations with Depkazia, and all the more reason to treat Constance with more respect and friendliness.

Parliament continues its agitation of the Maharaja in Kashmir, hoping to beat Husayn Akbar Khan to the prize as II Corps divisions are moved to the border and as Farooq Abdullah calls ever more strongly for the institution of democracy in the nation. With Depkazi troops on one border, and Parliamentary forces on the other, Mumbai expects the Maharaja to be perhaps more open to negotiation. Perhaps Combiners could pressure Kashmir from their direction in exchange for increased transshipment rights through the Indian National Union. Certainly Parak Singh can stretch his already-overdrawn army only so far. For better or for worse, independent Balochistan is left alone, Zulfiqar Makran unwilling to call upon Mumbai for assistance but still deliberately stalling with regards to Depkazia.

Kashmir greets INU pressure with (perhaps surprising) willingness to negotiate... but only under two terms. The first is the signing of an agreement to guarantee joint defence in the event that Kashmir is confronted by 'hostilities from a third party', and the second that Union troops being moved into 'confrontational border positions' be redeployed elsewhere. Parak Singh, with two swords dangling increasingly precariously above his head, hopes to avoid both, if only temporarily.

The Maharaja also adds to his request from China... in addition to planes, he needs Chinese pilots. While worded as requests for 'advisors to assist in establishing a domestic training program', the implication will be obvious: if hostilities break out with the Khaganate before Kashmiri pilots are comfortable with their new machines, Singh does not want to lose his airframes due to inexperienced crews. He is realistic, though, in suspicion that any Chinese pilots he obtains will not be in the air should agression be launched from Mumbai instead.

(OCC: Just to clarify, by my last account Kashmir includes the provinces of the Punjab (RL India), Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu & Kashmir, giving the Maharaja a population significantly larger than that of the former North Pakistan. So I think he could reasonably raise a larger army, at least amongst his Sikh subjects).

IC:

The removal of some INA units from the border is a condition that Unioners are not entirely unwilling to meet, given concern over Depkazi movements directly to the north. A joint defense agreement, however, is not something that immediately appeals to a great many people. Punjab in the INU being mainly populated by Muslims, there is not a great deal of sympathy for the autocratic Maharaja Parak Singh, who has for the most part denied Kashmir's Islamic majority a place in government and ignored Congress Party calls for the institution of democracy. Punjabis vote to make any defense agreement conditional on the Maharaja's abdication at the end of any hostilities or within two years, whichever comes first. Of course, he will be given a pension and free passage to any country of his choosing, but before any INA soldier or Punjabi militiaman lifts a finger, Parak Singh must agree. And if he does not, Unioners would be quite happy to wait for the anticipated Depkazi invasion and flood into Jammu while the Royal Army fights elsewhere. In the meantime II Corps continues to stockpile ordnance and supplies for a mobile campaign while the garrisons in Islamabad and Jhelum sure-up their fortifications.

Diplomatic missions are sent to China as well, and they ask Beijing to make defense assistance conditional on democratic reforms. The Maharaja must be pressured, they say, to improve his methods, because his continued refusal to reform is bringing instability to the already dangerous and violent northwest corner of India. All Parak Singh does is give Chingiz Khagan an excuse to cause trouble, it is said, Unioners being at least vaguely aware of Chinese displeasure over the conduct of the ruler that they helped to install.

While Gulsana Turesbekova visits Paris with the intention of receiving Christian recognition of the propriety of the Caliphate's ambition, Chingiz Khagan has his forces fighting harder than ever in Afghanistan's east.

Periodic ups and downs in the Caliph's support for Radu Khan's campaign towards Kandahar via Kabul are not unfamiliar problems for the Depkazi's under that Bactrian's command since most joined the army established by the far more erratic Edmund W. Tchokareff. That the Khagan appears now quite committed to the mission is clear as air support returns and two hundred thousand men make it difficult for warlord militias to move, or for their leaders to convince anybody as to the value of fighting the Caliph.

Balochistan must be reached!

Then Chingiz issues a summons to somebody by the name of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, requesting his presence -or representation- at Registan. Is Lashkar-e-Toiba up to the task of supporting a holy insurrection in Balochistan? Chingiz knows full well that General Aiyana is sending a strike force to the new country, and has requested that it be assembled from Abassamara's large Muslim population. Along with internal plotters, support from fighters of the Army of the Pure would surely bring about the collapse of the Baloch parliament, which, the Caliph reasons, can not yet be strong enough to face so many concurrent pressures. If Hafiz Muhammad Saeed can provide help to Chingiz's creation of a Baloch Khanate it is reasonable to assume that his radical Islamic organisation will be the one to receive Caliphal sanction for its activities in the rest of the sub-continent.

With the Combine contemplating major military entanglements abroad, it can no longer afford the Depkazi distraction in Afghanistan. Combine diplomats send urgent communiques to the Caliph, requesting he reverse his pro-Holy League course and avoid the mistakes of his father; Kazakhstan could very well be Depkazi once more if the Armandians' sweet song of temptation is to be believed...

At the head of the new Baloch National Army, Abdur Khan Khattak continues to march his 25,000 men towards Kandahar, a city finally within range of his 25-pounder howitzers and 130mm MRLs. With a force many times the size of his bearing down on Kandahar from the north, though, his mission is not one that looks likely to succeed. The question is not one of getting to Kandahar, or indeed of defeating local warlords. Khattak is very much capable of all those things. But when the Depkazis and their Afghan allies arrive, the Balochis have no desire to try and hang onto the town. Baloch Dingos and Saracens continue to creep west, Bren guns and VGOs occasionally brought to bear on the forces of enemy warlords while foot infantrymen protect the flanks of the motorized (it could not, after all, exactly be called armored) advance column. Strikemasters and Canberras appear overhead to strafe and bomb hostile troop concentrations, further adding to the operation's decidedly 1960s feel, and perhaps surprising foreign analysts who thought the decades-old airframes un-serviceable.

Baloch intelligence men bring worrying news to Prime Minister Makran, a man now facing threats from within and without. Reports indicate the formation of an anti-government front in the south of the country and LeT infiltration from Waiziristan, and government analysts are more or less certain of Chingiz Khagan's intent to make the country part of Depkazia with or without the blessing of Makran's government. And the lack of serious progress on the various infrastructure projects planned at the announcement of secession from the INU hasn't much helped things either. As the Prime Minister makes preparations for his exit, he sends a communique to Damascus, asking both for permission to take his likely exile there and for aid, namely a brigade of soldiers to guard the capital and Gwadar port. Increasingly paranoid, Zulfiqar Makran is by now not even sure about his being able to escape Balochistan when the time comes.

Hafiz Mohammed Saeed is, of course, honored and delighted over his invitation to the Depkazi capital. The leader of, after the Taliban, South Asia's largest Islamic militant group is visibly humbled by the place, and even more so by Chingiz Khagan, perhaps the earth's only stable, well-established Muslim ruler. Talk of establishing Balochistan as a Depkazi Khanate is extremely attractive to him and he wastes no time in promising Lashkar-e-Toiba's full attention to that goal.

Arab Republic of Syria

Going to some pains to redirect the communique to Ramitha, as they typically had to do since most of the world declined to shift embassies from Damascus on Omar Qottar's self-indulgent Al Khali nationalist whim, the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party receives Makran's plea with sincere interest and some sense of impotent frustration.

With the Suez closed Syria feels terribly isolated from the eastern world, and Qottar is uncertain as to whether or not he can deliver forces to Balochistan, though he should very much like to. The Caliph has lately belittled the President well enough to make an enemy of him.

Baghdad and Constance would have to agree to allow Al Khali forces to be airlifted through their territory, and if this were found possible Qottar promised to send two companies of Party Guards immediately and to ready more forces there after.

Certainly residence in Syria would be quite attainable for Makran for so long as Qottar's Ba'athists are in power.

Summoning a Combine diplomat to Registan even before he has spoken with the leader of Lashkar-e-Toiba, Chingiz Khagan Depkazi is surprisingly frank.

"I see that you accept, on some level, the inevitabilty of my victory in Afghanistan. My forces there are great in size and greater in spirit.

"But, you see, my situation is not an easy one. If I turn the Caliphate away from contact with the Holy League I may lose voice in relation to the interests of Turkmen in Kazakhstan and of the faithful there, in Russia, and in Algeria, Nigeria, Abassamara, and elsewhere in the domain of the Christian monarchs. You can understand that, and see it from my perspective as leader of the community of Islam, I expect?

"I am not a tyrant like the Tsar or a madman like my father, I am simply the Caliph and the Khan of Khans, and I have great responsibilities to attend. I must restore the Caliphate, which the lazy Osmanli Sultans have allowed to decay. How can I allow Islam to continue struggling under Christian autocracy and secular domination everywhere that it has been great and everywhere that it is still in the hearts and prayers of men?

"And the same may be said of my Turkic brothers, weakened by disrespect in Europe and the uselessness of Turkey. I must erradicate racism as well as religious persecution.

"But, we neither of us can destroy the other, and we neither of us could really further our aims by doing so in any event. I can tell you that I must have access to Balochistan, and, indeed, I must have Balochistan itself. Not only must I bring order and enable progress for the God-fearing Muslims there but I must open the oceans to the Caliphate.

"...Once I have done this, the importance of Russia's rivers and canals diminishes, and my obligations to the authorities there are quite reduced and I may be done with that other Orthodox dog Aiyana.

"Once I am connected by Afghanistan to a Balochistan under my Caliphate my Mujahideen may run into the ocean and make a tide of Abassamari, Nigerian, Egyptian, Algerian believers in which to drown the imperialists.

"I am not an erratic ruler or an unreliable man, Armands, I am a classical ruler winning the game of government.

"I think that we have still much to discuss. And much cause to discuss it quietly."

A groan at that moment signalled the end of another heretic lead to a bloody end in Registan Square.

Kabul Encircled, Kandahar Under Fire

Afghanistan. Unsurprising given their strength it appears that a victory of sorts is within the grasp of the forces of the self-styled Caliph. Afghan militias, who fought so famously against the Soviet Army, now lack many of their former advantages and their enemy is motavated, experienced, and on a winning-streak.

Samarkand's Islamist doctrines have won-over many Mujahideen, and nationalist sentiment is hurt by ethnic divides and the creation in the west of the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Most of those resisting Radu Khan's army of two hundred thousand holy warriors are in the employ of selfish warlords and have little chance of repulsing multi-divisional combined-arms offensives by professional forces.

Conventional resistance is failing without support -last time the INU helped, this time Mumbai has other things on its mind and has lost Balochistan- and North Pakistani divisions are moving to completely surround the capital. Aircraft flying from Bactria now strike frequently at the city of Kandahar, and Balochistani forces are dangerously close to the front of Caliphal aggression.

It now appears that only insurgency and terrorism -with little evident foreign support- can be used to resist the Khaganate's forces as they bring most of Afghanistan under the sway of Chingiz Khagan Depkazi.

And forward detachments approach Balochistani forces with a message of brotherhood even as Abassamari Marines and Indian terrorists move on the parliamentary power...

Versailles

After a several hour speech to his Conseil d’Etat, consisting of the Ministers Prime, State, War, Interior, and Exchequer His Most Christian Majesty Louis-Auguste finished a now cool cup of tea, and popped his several times a day medication of the tranquilizer Diazepam.

“And so, messieurs, that is how we decided we would gloriously win this war which God and Christ commanded us to undertake to bring the West to a point of spiritual and cultural awakening, catharsis if you please. It is a matter of logic, and a much simpler matter of our brilliance.”

There was polite applause. The King basked in it for a few minutes, and then lit a cigarette.

Before he could begin another speech, a consequence of the tranquilizers to numb the stress of the war was that he had become a bit spacey, Monsieur le Comte de Maurepas, Prime Minister to the King, broke some fresh news. In minutes valets had placed a large and suitably ornate map on the table.

The King, dressed in a matching black set of smoking jacket and silk trousers, drank more tea and took another drag of the cigarette.

“But Afghanistan is poised over the very heads to the communists! I don’t care how radical those rag headed camel jockeys are, or how many times they prey in whatever direction from their caves. We must ally ourselves with Radical Islam to defeat the communist demons! Yes, this is the answer!” He stood up rather unsteadily.

“I want lunch. And some cold beer I think.” And with that he left the room, saluted by the doughty Garde Suisse.

Used now to these ‘attacks of the vapors’ M. le Comte de Maurepas personally ordered a suite of rooms to be made available in the Grand Trianon. The Depkazis, not the well known kind like the former ruler Edmund, very well received in the Holy League, but the Islamist new regime of the Caliph. But they had the goods, and their position if Afghanistan now made Depkazia the state of the hour for France.

The Depkazis were coming to Versailles, and they left their Paris hotel rooms in a motorcade.

Kandahar

Balochistan's fortunes in Afghanistan could not be much more different from Depkazia's. Though Quetta didn't pay much for it, the operation to capture Kandahar can only be described as botched, General Khattak having smashed his way through local forces and militia and having entered the city in triumph, and now having to abandon it less than a week later.

General Abdur Khan Khattak did not take months to reach Kandahar from Quetta for no reason, however. Part of it doubtless had to do with Quetta's reluctance to fully commit to the operation, but the greater part had to do with Khattak's own less than honest intentions. It is with some displeasure and annoyance that the Baloch commander abandons both Kandahar, therefore, especially considering that he meant to outright conquer the whole province, plus Helmand, and carve out of them his own khanate.

The state of affairs is not improved by Prime Minister Makran's reluctance to give orders to his troops in the field, another manifestation of the indecisiveness that has, some say, made him almost ineffectual during his short stint as head of state. In truth he is already overwhelmed by the worrying intelligence that domestic security services have started to bring in, especially regarding what certainly appears to be a massive LeT infiltration from Waziristan. Depkazi regulars he can escape, Abassamaran commandos he can escape (although that particular side of the plot remains completely unknown to Baloch military men), but Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists, who might be sitting off the runway with a SAM as his airplane takes off? By far the more frightening.

Does the General plan to take it sitting down, though? Certainly not. After one last trip to the Baba Wali shrine, and with bags full of Kandahar-grown fruits, Khattak is ferried across the Arghandab River to join his troops at Takhteh Pol, on the river's southern bank. Already reconnaissance elements are on their way west, sweeping the route ahead of the slower, primarily foot-borne main body of the army. Save for two light battalions, moving quick towards Spin Baldak, and another battery of artillery rockets emplaced on Zmari Sar, the (albeit division-sized) Army of Kandahar moves deeper into Afghanistan, perhaps contrary to Chingiz's expectations.

It might look like Khattak is abandoning his own border, opening Balochistan's flank wide and providing Depkazi armies with an easy route into the country. But in truth, although nobody except Khattak himself knows it, the Army of Kandahar is going to go after an altogether bigger prize. Khattak, very much a pashtun warlord at heart, is not one to bow down, especially not to a Tchokareff. He has the ego and the confidence to match Babur even if he doesn't have the blood or the forces, and he has set his sights on nothing less than Afghanistan.

Though it might be more self-sufficient than most modern military units, Khattak's force needs its heavy supplies for as long as it elects to keep its vehicles. A column of about two dozen trucks, escorted by an armored car squadron and a pair of armed Twin Pioneers, sets out from Chagai, meaning to intercept the main force in Helmand.

Chaman

At the head of the Khojak Pass, the Baloch town of Chaman controls the best road (and indeed the only road) headed into Balochistan from Kandahar. One thousand men from the Kalat Mobile Force, Balochistan's Gendarmerie, are sent up the road from Quetta to reinforce the town's defenses, while the MRL battery entrenched atop Zmari Sar, overlooking the approaches to Chaman, improves its position. It is no force capable of resisting the influx of an entire Depkazi army group, but perhaps enough to cause Chingiz's troops enough of a delay as to allow the rest of the Baloch Army (that portion of it that hasn't embarked on a questionable expedition towards the domination of Afghanistan, at least) to fall in along the road to Quetta.

(OCC: Just FYI, I'll have another IC post up soon. I've been neglecting this side of things lately, but in the next few days I plan to update the situation pretty heavily from the Union perspective.

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_339.shtml

An article on post-Soviet Afghanistan.)

Mumbai

The affairs of the Hindustani Parliament are, with regards to Depkazia, as contradictory and as confused as ever, a situation which isn't helped by the general incompetence of the National Intelligence Service. Once again Mumbai finds that, when it comes to Chingiz Khagan, it is of two minds. Many would see the Depkazi ruler and the Depkazi state as an immediate military threat to India, one best countered with INA divisions and aggressive posturing. Others would prefer to engage Depkazia diplomatically, perhaps with the end result of working-out some kind of understanding with Samarkand.

Both points of view have held the majority opinion at one time or another. Foreign policy does tend to be a very flexible thing when the policy-makers are being voted in and out of office monthly, and when the only semi-permanent posts don't actually have the power to make decisions. Samarkand's demonstrated desire for a closer relationship with Tsarist Russia led to Gulsana Turbeskova's expulsion from Mumbai, and it also led to the acceleration of plans for an invasion of Kashmir. But as Unioners consider the situation more deeply, many come to see the present, hostile, policy as a mistake, one apt to drive Chingiz closer to the hated League.

Of course, Parliament's rather rude conduct towards the last Depkazi diplomat puts Mumbai in something of an awkward position as it leans heavily towards re-opening diplomatic relations with Chingiz's kingdom.

Balochistan is the most immediate of Parliament's concerns. Although never a very solid part of the Indian National Union to begin with, Unioners are largely unwilling to let the place fall under Samarkand's direct rule without at least some say as to the conditions.

Orders are delivered to commanders in Sindh and the Punjab. Forty thousand INA troops prepare to take-up positions along the Baloch border, while a marine regiment is ferried to Karachi. This, force, it is hoped, will give the Depkazis reason to pause at the other side of Balochistan, providing Mumbai with the leverage that it thinks it needs in order to open negotiations. Hopefully the Depkazis will not discover that the bulk of these troops are second-tier reservists and motorized militiamen, spearhead by what amounts to a brigade's worth of regular-force armor and mechanized infantry. And, moreover, it is hoped that Samarkand doesn't realize that Parliament has very little intention of actually using what is ostensibly its Baloch expeditionary force.

At the same time a communique is sent to Samarkand, asking, once again, for an audience with Chingiz Khagan on the behalf of a Union diplomatic mission.

Europe

Gulsana Turesbekova, distant cousin of the most influential man in the second-largest religion in history, rides from Paris with few escaped words. Thus far, Depkazi intelligence believes, Tchokareff is still alive and kicking inside the Holy League, and until he is up to his neck in sand and looking at incoming rocks, the Holy Caliphate will not be happy with Europe.

Still, co-operation with Kazakhstan is helping Chingiz to acquire spare parts for his more complicated USSR-era weaponry, which is all that he needs to enable his on-going domination of Mid Asia and his southward expansion, not to mention his defiance in the face of both Armandian and Chinese pressure.

Asia

Back home these issues remain directive in Samarkand's policy. The Caliphate is expanding physically and politically while its very existance is contrary to the evident interests of Beijing, Constance, Mumbai, Moscow, Raipur, Baghdad, and a list of powerhouse capitals that just doesn't seem to end. Even neutral Belgrade has a grudge. Chingiz can't even buy drills from Da'Khiem. He has tried.

Chingiz, at home, is, somehow, still a reasonably popular ruler. He has, of course, only to best the likes of Edmund Tchokareff, Mustafa Shareef, and Joseph Stalin in order to be the finest that anyone in his domain remembers. Providing subsidised gas and electricity to his people, along with public transport, (intermediate) women's rights, free (if largely propagandic) primary education, and a string of diplomatic and military victories only adds to a victory won by simply ceasing to execute people at random or for over-achieving.

With this -and the rapid growth of Islamic radicalism under his watch- in mind it is full of confidence that the Caliph sends countless young men to face death in Afghanistan.

To Chingiz's community of Islam this is the second world war (the first was a horrid affair for the Turkmen, misconducted by the pathetic Osmanli pretender) and hundreds of thousands are at arms. In short, Samarkand, though noticing India's deployments, is unmoved by them. This, the Caliph notes, is the second time that Depkazia has been asked back to Union India.

No senior diplomat will travel, this time. A mere messenger-boy of an ambassador will inform Mumbai of Samarkand's intention to incorporate both Balochistan and the Vale of Kashmir into the Caliphate, and of its intention to get the better deal -over Armand- in Afghanistan, even as LeT and the Abassamari commandos attack the Baloch Parliament's forces.

Otherwise Samarkand is fairly amenable to relations with India!

Afghanistan

Chingiz's forces here, under Radu Khan (the former General Rashid Dostum), decline both NATO/Union burdon-of-proof and feudal indescriminate-killing for something in between. With two hundred thousand troops in country, the Caliph has great force in a simple form. He also has the Caliphate and all that it means, which, while disputed by many -the problem- is also accepted by some. Afghanis who want to get ahead now do so by identifying resisters and opponents... who then face personally everything that France would throw at a random African village.

Doubtless many innocents are dying in territory 'secured' by Dostum, but the suffering pales next to West Africa's and order -of a slightly corrupt sort- is coming about at a significant pace.

In Registan, Chingiz is aware that eastern Afghanistan is not on its way to being one of his most profitable provinces in and of itself. Not in terms of manpower for military or labour, not in industry or agriculture, not in political support. But it is on its way to hosting vital highways between the lands of the Turkmen and the loyal-ish of the Pashtun and between the gasfields and the Indian Ocean. Most of Afghanistan can continue to be useless, backwards, no-go-zone Afghanistan, making its own familiar way sideways, but Chingiz's highways will no doubt be protected by thousands of shoot-first-ask-questions-if-and-when-Allah-requires-it Caliphal soldiers and travelled by same and billions of dollars in vital commerce.

...Right?

Mumbai

Indeed, it is a small minority of Parliamentarians who find themselves surprised at Chingiz's cold reception. What else could they expect, after snubbing the Caliph at least once already? Parliament may very well have lost its chance at engaging Depkazia on somewhat favorable terms, or so a fair few Unioners have started to think, and now the only course left may be aggressive confrontation.

As the famously indecisive Union Parliament argues over the nature of its reception of the Depkazi ambassador, Chingiz's diplomat himself is taken on a tour of the capital, the likes of which probably would have been more suitable for Gulsana Turbeskova. The fact that he is an official of no particular stature is ignored as Unioners try to demonstrate token goodwill towards Samarkand, though the time for that is likely long gone.

Ultimately Samarkand's representative is brought before Parliament and presented with what is, more or less, the INU's new policy on the matter of Depkazi territorial ambition. Balochistan's affairs, says Parliament, do not concern the Indian National Union, and whatever the Baloch people choose, Hindustan will stand by it. If a foreign invader unilaterally annexes the nation, then of course the Indian National Army will have no choice but to intervene. But so long as a change of government is met with popular approval, the Indian National Union will have to settle with the state of affairs. Specific mention of Depkazia is avoided, but that is the end of Parliament's attempt to hide its acceptance of the Caliph's coming to acquire a coastline.

Kashmir, however, is treated altogether differently by Unioners. Maybe the INA's force along the Baloch border is nothing special, but, against Kashmir, II Corps has some of its best formations set aside, those that aren't in Hyderabad to prevent Depkazi invasion via Balochistan. Certainly, or at least by Parliament's reckoning, a force sufficient to carry out Hindustan's will in the region. The fact of Kashmir's Muslim majority is acknowledged, but at the same time it is held that popular opinion favors independence under a democratic system. Of course, it is no secret that Mumbai wants to absorb Maharaja Parak Singh's Kashmir itself, as Depkazi agents that might be in Kashmir could readily attest. Communication between the Maharaja and Parliament consists, as of late, of little more than the exchange of ultimatums, and military deployments speak for themselves. And though North Pakistan is never mentioned specifically, it is implied that Samarkand should be content expanding its rule there.

But Samarkand's ambassador isn't too heavily discouraged. The whole business would be made far easier, where Mumbai is concerned, if Chingiz Khagan shattered the Maharaja's credibility by dealing him a major military defeat.

Parliamentarians express their "strong disapproval" of Depkazi activities in Afghanistan, but nothing more comes of that issue. If Chingiz were to rule the place it would hardly be worse-off than it is already, surmise Parliamentarians, and certainly there is a significant portion of the Afghan population who likely identify more closely with Samarkand than with Kabul. Still, some Indians are aware of their history, and look to Turkestan and Afghanistan with suspicion. They can only hope that there isn't another Mahmud camped out in the mountains.

This is what the ambassador is told. Whether Samarkand finds any of it surprising is doubtful, but Parliament tries its best to look like it doesn't care. Mumbai still tries to make a minor gesture of friendship in the gift of 35 Ambassadors, this time referring to the automobile, to Depkazia.

Chingiz Khagan Depkazi is back once more on a high. To the few physicians allowed near him it is increasingly evident that the young man is not every bit the raving loon that his father was, but that he most certainly is afflicted with some sort of mental illness. Manic depression seems a likely candidate, symptoms and attached tourments worsened by the near total neglect for his son shown by Edmund Tchokareff and by a life that has seen Chingiz on the streets one minute, in a palace the next, powerless today and destroying the life-works of his estranged father tomorrow. Through his adolescence this individual could not choose the composition of his irregular meals, and in his twenties he has styled himself leader of the world's second largest faith and forced the entire world to call him by the name of Genghis Khan. While not deliberately cruel in his actions, some think that Chingiz exhibits some sociopathic traits and at times fails to identify with the human side of those opposing his self-raised mandate.

Gurbanguly Dubnov, Chingiz's new ambassador to Mumbai, is no less erratic, coming and going between the INU and the Caliphate sometimes two or three times weekly. He has evidently yet to prove himself worthy of real decision-making and must report either to the Caliph or his favourite Vizier. Still, the Ambassadors are accepted and put into diplomatic service in the major cities, Chingiz having scrapped plans to make them taxis and acquire moder high-class, modern vehicles for the government. A gesture to humility and pious austerity (not reflected in his increasingly refined palaces, mosques, and madrasahs).

In time Dubnov conveys limits to the Khagan's ambition in Kashmir, saying that only western, Muslim-dominated climbs are of particular interest to the Caliphate. Of course that also means taking some areas of strategic military significance, but since the word of the successor to the prophet holds that this fact is coincidental there really is nothing for Mumbai to fear. Indeed, even the Maharaja may escape total defeat if only he would partition his domain.

In Samarkand the INU is allowed the opportunity to re-establish an embassy, though Dubnov claims that the Caliphate is much too busy with regeneration work, the salvation of a long-oppressed cultural and religious life, and the martial restoration of the Khaganate's proper (pre-'game') frontiers and so the erection of permanent buildings on a site provided will have to be a Hindustani responsibility. A set of regulations and guidelines limit the potential facility's height, militarism, and 'unnatural style' (in other words, limits the outward expression of Hindu and other non-Turko-Islamic culture). The site, however, is impressive, being surrounded by mosques both ancient and new, domes to the left and minarets to the right. Indian staff will be forced to walk in the shadow of Chingiz's Muslim-Depkazi restoration.

In truth, Samarkand is keen to secure Balochistan and bring just enough order to eastern Afghanistan that work may begin on building a pipeline to India through which gas may be exported. Chingiz is nearing the end of his territorial ambition in the south and would prefer to start work with the Indians so that he can wash off his painted smile, worn for Russia and France, and take back the Kazakh petroleum reserves that will secure for him every other victory he imagines.

For now, outwardly, he combines baby-step recovery of his relations to Mumbai with continued deployment of forces to face the Combine, the DRA, and Kashmir, and his advances through Afghanistan and towards Balochistan. He must very much appear in Europe to be descending upon the fringes of India and squeezing the frontiers of communism, though in truth he has no interest in (most of) Armand, even in western Afghanistan, and only a part of Kashmir. Great resources are directed at trade with Kazakhstan as Samarkand attempts to catch-up on post-Soviet developments in Russian military technology.

(OCC: I must again apologize for the time it has taken me to respond here. On top of my usual laziness and lassitude, my main computer got a virus and I've had only sporadic internet access over the last few days.)

IC:

Mumbai

Though there is little in the way of unused space in Mumbai, perhaps the world's most heavily populated city, home to just over 13,000,000, Dubnov is given an old, largely unused administrative building, not too far from Gilbert Hill, in which to establish his own embassy. Certainly it is no advanced, terribly modern compound, stuck right in the middle of a bustling residential district, but it does come with a pair of specially-furnished Ambassador automobiles.

Parliamentarians, for the most part, are pleased with the results of their new policy towards Depkazia, and, despite their earlier error, it appears that a cordial and beneficial diplomatic relationship might yet come about. Regarding Kashmir, Parliamentarians continue, in principle, to oppose Samarkand's getting any of the place. Less publicly, Mumbai says at the same time that it won't do anything to oppose a prospective Depkazi invasion as long as Chingiz Khagan limits his campaign to the Vale of Kashmir and the northern reaches of Ladakh, including Kargil and Dras. It is widely accepted that, although the self-proclaimed Caliph is far from an ideal ruler, he is probably better than Parak Singh, and generating unnecessary friction over an area that Mumbai probably could not assert influence over in the first place is counter-productive.

Abdul Rahman, a Gujarati Muslim and one-time Parliamentarian, is elected to serve as the INU's ambassador to Samarkand. One of the few Unioners who could be called career diplomats, Rahman is, Parliamentarians are inclined to think, particularly well-suited to handling such a demanding post. Along with the new embassy staff, he leaves Mumbai for Samarkand aboard a chartered K101. Likely the embassy will become a fairly simple structure, functional and cheap to build, and as soon as the ambassador arrives his first task will be to find suitable construction materials and equipment.

Quetta

As Unioners attempt a limited rapprochement with Samarkand, the situation in Balochistan continues to unfold, and there is strong suggestion that the young nation of Balochistan will not likely survive to see adolescence.

When Ogun Sukkur visited Quetta to promote the idea of Balochistan's accession to Depkazia, he did not need to argue his point with the Baloch Sardars. For the better part of fifty years the Sardars, traditional clan rulers, were obliged to play a fairly minimal role in the government of Union-administered Balochistan. The prospect of finally regaining proper influence and responsibility, the likes of which the Sardars enjoyed under British colonial rule, is an inticing one. Prime Minister Makran's insistence on adherence to the parliamentary system and Baloch independence did not sit at all well with Samarkand's newfound supporters, who also feared that Makran's infrastructure-building projects would not benefit them. Pushtuns too, initially skeptical of Chingiz and Depkazia as a whole, a result of his father's genocidal activities against Pushtuns in Afghanistan, have, in large part, come to see an opportunity for the creation of Pashtunistan, long ago interrupted by Abdur Rahman's ceding of Afghan territory to British India. Makran, not a terribly skilled diplomat to begin with and now hardly a popular man, finds himself trying to run a nation that, for the most part, no longer wants to be independent.

In the capital itself, the Baloch Parliament no longer functions, though Zulfiqar Makran still claims, with now dubious legitimacy, the title of Prime Minister. Holed-up in the Quetta Garrison with 1,500 men, most of them members of the Presidential Guard or the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, Makran finds himself no longer in control of most of Balochistan, and just barely able to exert authority over Quetta itself. Parliament no longer functions, all political parties except the Balochistan National Rally having walked out in protest of Makran's imposition of a state of emergency. Even the BNR, Makran's own party, bleeds MPs profusely, and counts just over 40 dependable seats to the 210 held at independence. The Prime Minister's authority is, by now, more academic than anything else. Gendarmes, many of them with loyalties to various Sardars, take an increasingly casual approach towards suppressing anti-independence sentiment.

Mumbai

Ambassador Dubnov, little by little growing in confidence with the Caliph's faith in him, finds himself spending more time in the Union and less in the Caliphate.

Gurbanguly settles in to his new residence quite merrily, but his business remains rather grim. Samarkand wants to hurry along with the Caliph's plans, Chingiz proving himself no more patient than the great conquerors with whom he should like to hear his name associated, from Napoleon to the one whose name he stole. On the doorstep of the state that Chin built, Chingiz wants a second China.

Speeches delivered by Dubnov, Chingiz, and Depkazi-sponsored scholars and clerics from Kazakhstan to the Caucasus and Quetta to Xinjiang appeal to disperate peoples, Turkic, Pashtun, and others, for unity under Allah. Disunity over the last century-plus is, according to Samarkand's current doctrine, responsible for the relative poverty of the masses trapped between China, India, Russia, and Armand, and disuniting forces must be cut from the pious hearts of these long-oppressed and neglected peoples so that a new golden era of Islamic empire may be built-up.

In India, too, certain aspects of this policy are freely advertised. By unity Chingiz means to give stability to all the lands between the four great powers on their frontiers, reducing the chances of conflict between capitalist, socialist, and feudalist rivals while attaining the commonality of purpose necessary to raise millions from poverty and lives run by the struggle to survive or by drugs and thugs.

The new ambassador, then, is compelled to push the Caliphate's ambition in Kashmir. The Caliph is, reportedly, prepared to meet for most serious and grave discussion on the matter. It is his hope that a treaty may be drawn-up by Samarkand and Mumbai to settle the future of Kashmir, which at this time is clearly lacking the proper structure and which has failed to fully break-free of colonial legacies.

Chingiz even hopes to convince the Union to join a two-way offensive against the Maharaja's regime, to take place with prior agreements existing to ease transition and avert further conflict. Aware of Hindustan's other military responsibilities, the Khagan might even be prepared to put forces temporarily at the INA's disposal, both for fighting and later peacekeeping within territory not assigned to the Caliphate. Dubnov even offers the possibility of Depkazi intelligence passing-on any Russian secrets it may 'acquire' in 'dealings' with Kazakhstan.

Balochistan

Radu Khan's forces continue to press through Afghanistan at a brutal pace, hurling scripture and shell-fire in all directions, laying siege to major Afghan cities and paying-off warlords with ranks, titles, honours, lands, soldiers, and future gas-cash.

In Balochistan, respected characters in many communities receive numerous similar incentives to speak for accession to the Caliphate, or the Khaganate if it be considered more appealing in a given context, perhaps for historic or cultural reasons.

Mumbai

Dubnov finds himself called more and more frequently to speak in front of Parliament, as his position in the Hindustani capital seems to become more permanent. Perhaps the ambassador will find addressing six thousand-some Parliamentarians at a time, a good many of them inevitably engaged in heckling and shouting him down, to be somewhat daunting. Then again, the Parliamentarians themselves are characteristically blunt and generally do not try to hide their opinions or intentions, accountable as they are to their constituents and subject to immediate replacement should they not live up to expectations. Maybe, some Unioners imagine, Dubnov might just come to like the Hindustani political system.

Talk of Islamic unity does cause some concern in Hindustan. Almost half of all Unioners are either Muslim or trace Muslim heritage, and a strong extremist faction exists in both the Punjab and Sindh in the form of LeT. Some believe that, given the right circumstances, Chingiz Khagan could manage to tear the western states away from the Union. It is no coincidence that II Corps in Hyderabad has not yet been asked to spare any of its divisions for the fighting in Africa. Hopefully, Parliament's strict secularism and tolerance will keep Muslim Hindustanis satisfied with their status in the Union, with its decentralized style of government and high degree of local autonomy.

Certainly, though, Unioners aren't themselves advertising any competing ideology to the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, who would, all things considered, probably be better served by Samarkand now than they ever have in the past. That much is widely accepted.

On Kashmir, Parliamentarians are eager to see some kind of arrangement drawn up between the Union and the Caliphate. Doubtless the Maharaja watches dealings between Samarkand and Mumbai with great apprehension, especially after Parliament's ultimatum to Parak Singh, which itself demanded full accession in return for the INA not invading Kashmir. Unioners propose, then, that Depkazia and the INU issue a joint declaration and ultimatum to Parak Singh's government, asking for his abdication and a "proper settlement" to the issue of Kashmir's status.

Chingiz Khagan is invited to send a delegation of diplomats, or to travel himself, to Mumbai in order to draw-up a treaty concerning what looks likely to be a two-way invasion of the Principality of Kashmir. Indeed, a treaty looks like the best way to go about things, Unioners agree. The prospect of Depkazi forces being placed under INA command delights officers in the MoD. Indian officers, the likes of which might well serve as liaisons with Depkazi units, have a reputation for bravery and ability, and this might impress favorably upon the Caliph's troops. And if Parliament handles the issue properly, could not the business in Kashmir be the beginning of a strong friendship between India and Turkestan?

Meanwhile, Depkazia's earlier Ambassador order, denied when Parliament was in a huff over Depkazi operations in Afghanistan, is finally approved. Provided that Samarkand still wants them, Hindustan Motors is eager to begin production on what certainly looks like the largest single order to date.

Outside Kandahar

Flight Lieutenant Ataullah Yousef pilots his Strikemaster above the rocky, rugged landscape of Kandahar province, making a modest 490 miles per hour, fast but not fast enough to make low-level flying such a terribly dangerous proposition. Wing pylons hold a pair of BL.755 cluster bombs and rocket pods, a fairly modest arsenal when coupled with the pair of Browning machine guns mounted in the intake walls, but still enough to cause a fair bit of trouble.

Then again, Yousef doesn't feel entirely safe in the little, single-engined strike plane. He is flying over a country that claimed Frogfoots and Hinds by the dozens, far more heavily armed and armored than the Strikemaster, and he would prefer a proper RWR and countermeasures suite. But the Baloch Air Force cannot afford everything it wants.

Counting on the element of surprise to survive what may well turn out to be an extremely foolhardy decision on somebody's part, Flight Lieutenant Yousef pushes the throttle all the way forward as he makes his turn to run along the road that connects Kandahar with Quetta. Before long he sights some of Radu Khan's forces, and makes his attack. Maybe the Depkazis, so late at night, won't hear the Strikemaster until it is too late, or maybe they're waiting for it with SAMs. Either way, the stillness of the late hours is broken by the whoosh of FFARs and the rattle of machine gun fire as the aircraft strafes what Yousef certainly hopes is an acceptable target.

Near Kandahar

Radu Khan's forces are in high spirits. Many units fighting in Afghanistan are deeply pious Muslims, often convinced of Taleban heresy in acting on misreadings of scripture, sometimes less sure but none the less loyal to the word of the Caliph. Others, in fact probably a majority, especially amongst the Turkmen such as those making up the bulk of the men in Yousef's primitive sights, are taking fuller advantage of the dual nature of the new Turkestan... part Holy Caliphate, part secular Khaganate. That is to say, they are loaded-up on Depkazi vodka, newly arrived by Mi-6 Hook in recognition of the troops' successes thus far. Tomorrow was to be their last day of waiting outside Kandahar before a major offensive against the city, and so their last opportunity to be hung-over without expecting to get up and fight.

Far more dangerous than this, from their point of view, is the near total lack of aerial threat faced so far in the Afghan campaign. Warlords, it seems, tend to have pretty limited capacities in that respect. Gremlin MANPADS were stowed aboard vehicles, and ZU-23 guns, having been used in ground-fire role for the last few hundred kilometres, were not actively associated with radar at the time of the strike.

As a result, the Balochistani would have at least a fair chance of getting away with poorly directed tracer fire jumping at random this way and that. He isn't likely to face more than a few 7.62 to 14.5mm vehicle-mounted machineguns operated by bleary-eyed soldiers squinting against the darkness, at least not unless he chooses to come back for a second pass.

Spotlights are soon illuminating the damage as a scant few short-range air-search radar sets are warmed up and ammunition crates flung left and right in search of boxed-up Strelas. Several men are dead, more stunned and injured, and a D-30 howitzer's heaped munitions taken-out along with the piece itself. The Depkazis, it appears, hadn't even been expecting much serious counter-battery fire.

Communications are pretty sluggish after the fact, but information slowly spreads through the Caliph's forces, and though a few ex-warlord commanders shrug off a reported aerial threat and continue to rampage as if nothing has changed, most Depkazi and Pakistani-commanded regular units grumble as they try to remember air defence procedures and discern whether or not their Shilkas' guns have rusted on their vertical axis. Radu Khan is not slow to blame Balochistan and swear revenge, while the Caliph is more inclined to try whipping the incident up into a case of Parliamentary affront to divine authority.

Union India

A request for clearance and escort coming from the northwesterly skies of Hindustan probably isn't the most regular item requiring attention there, but today is a little different. A big Il-76 Candid wishes to exchange its formidable four-Flanker escort for something that won't cause concern in the subcontinent and requests permission to make for Mumbai so that Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi may meet the Union's top brass.

The refitted Candid is apparently one of the many items that Chingiz's grandfather, last Premier of the (by then much reduced and Russialess) USSR, evacuated to Mid Asia when Wingert's impending victory became undeniable in Ukraine and the likes of Yeltsin were making life hard for a proper Old Guard party official.

Dubnov, for his part, has already forewarned of the Caliph's visit -but only by a matter of hours- and confirmed the Ambassador deal.

The INU

As Chingiz Khagan's personal Il-76 enters Union airspace, it is greeted by a flight of F.4 interceptors, the newest variant equipped with all manner of electronic warfare gear and advanced radars, with a multitude of missiles hanging from the wing pylons. No.97 Squadron, the outfit providing the aircraft, is as experienced and as professional as any other IAF unit, so the Caliph has little to worry about as he makes for Mumbai.

Sardar International Airport, the main civilian airfield serving the capital, is hastily readied for the arrival of the Depkazi head of state. Militia marksmen are posted on the control tower and the terminal roof in the event that some member of Mumbai's incredibly diverse population makes an attempt on Chingiz's life or something of the sort. Humbers and Dingos are out in force as well, giving the whole affair a bit of historical flavor, and although in the west they are collector's items the INA still makes heavy use of its old armored cars. They help to cordon-off the runway in advance of Chingiz Khagan's landing. The Guards Tank Brigade is on hand to provide an honor guard, and the tankers cut a fine figure, their khaki dress uniforms more often than not adorned with a fair few campaign ribbons and medals.

The most senior Parliamentary officials are all present at the airport, and they wait in a motorcade of (what else) Ambassador sedans, protected by motorcycle outriders and Militia scout cars. Immediately recognizable in the group of army officers and parliament ministers is the Prime Minister himself, an awkwardly tall, mustachioed man by the name of Prakash Vaidya. Along with his sizable entourage, Vaidya walks over to greet Chingiz Khagan after his plane is guided to a suitable spot on the apron.

Quetta

Zulfiqar Makran rushes to to take cover in a slit trench as a handful of mortar bombs explode within the military compound that has come to cover both Quetta International Airport and the mud-brick fort that houses Quetta's garrison. Dressed only in his pajamas and wearing a somewhat unflattering hairnet, it is not the most dignified condition for a head of state to find themselves in, but Makran would rather not have himself blown up just yet. Fortunately, the Baloch militiamen firing the 60mm weapons are more concerned with their own survival than killing any government troops, so they aren't too accurate. A few troopers from the Prime Minister's bodyguard are injured by shrapnel and a good deal more have their sleep rudely interrupted, but nothing worse than that.

Still, it is a sad reflection of the overall state of Zulfiqar Makran's government that he can just barely exert his authority over the capital district, to say nothing of the rest of the country. That does not, of course, mean that he is ready to stop trying, as the unfortunate soldiers who remain loyal to the Parliamentary government will readily attest. Makran is, though, satisfied with the result of his airstrike against Radu Khan's column, and wastes no time in ordering a second, far larger attack. From Quetta itself, No.6 Squadron puts five Canberras into the air, escorted by a full twelve HAL-built FT.10 armed trainers from No.7 Squadron. A small dirt airstrip at Chagai sees several Jet Provost trainers off as well. Armed with an assortment of rocket pods, cluster bombs, light machine guns, and 20mm cannon, the Baloch aircraft are ordered to inflict maximum damage upon Depkazi forces, though the prospect of this happening does not look, from the pilots' point of view, very likely.

Flight Lieutenant Yousef finds himself back in the cockpit of his Strikemaster, headed out to attack the Depkazis once again and regretting his first sortie. What damage he did to Radu Khan's force couldn't, after all, have made much of an impact, and now the Depkazis may well be expecting this kind of thing. And for the Strikemasters and Jet Provosts that sortied out from Balochistan, even a single Depkazi PKM could prove fatal. At least they still look apt to arrive over their targets in the dark, so the Depkazis will not be able to spot them quite so easily.

Crossing over into Afghanistan, the BAF bombers drop to low altitude, and make for Kandahar.

Near Mina Bazar, Northern Balochistan

Anti-sabotage patrols are not usually so eventful, thinks trooper Akbar Sidi Rahimuddin as he lies flat in the bottom of a dry drainage ditch next to the railway line from Quetta to Zhob, his SLR in hand. Several meters away is a Saracen armored personnel carrier belonging to the Kalat Mobile Force, though it isn't quite recognizable after being struck by a recoilless rifle round and ripped open. At least the gendarmes inside didn't have to suffer much, but for the troopers like Rahimuddin poking around outside, looking for explosives on the tracks, their troubles are just starting.

The LeT guerrillas currently engaged in a firefight with Rahimuddin's section never really intended to attack any government troops when they set out on their nighttime sortie. Initially they meant to blow up a locomotive with their SPG-9, but the Saracen came quite close to attacking them first, and the guerrillas really had no choice. Armed with a motley assortment of rifles and a pair of Swedish-made BARs, mostly liberated from Baloch Army stocks, they pour fire in the general direction of the Kalat Mobile Force section, which, for its part, is making itself scarce. Armed only with their personal weapons, Hindustan-built copies of the FN-FAL, the four survivors aren't keen to stick around.

In spite of the bullets whizzing over his head, trooper Rahimuddin rises to return fire against the LeT men several tens of meters away, and he mostly empties the magazine before he catches the attention of one of the BAR gunners. Further down the ditch, three more Kalat Mobile Force troopers also are doing their best to keep alive, though they are not as well-armed as Rahimuddin, with only Browning pistols and a single Sten gun. Separated and surrounded, their situation is quite grim, especially as, on the LeT side, the commander decides to advance on the blown-up Saracen. Trooper Rahimuddin watches as several dark shapes get up off the ground and advance towards his position, weaving in and out behind the low, scraggly shrubs that subsist in the harsh, arid climate in the north of his country. Rahimuddin reloads in record time, tossing the spent clip far away from him to make some noise. One of the LeT men stands up and lets off with a burst from his M1 Carbine, but Rahimuddin shoots him down. The same fate befalls two of his companions, and trooper Rahimuddin draws a bead on a fourth, but his shot goes wild. A searing pain in his shoulder forces the trooper to hit the deck and drop his rifle, and it isn't long before a lot more LeT men converge on the ditch. Rahimuddin removes a bloody hand from his shoulder just as several figures appear over him in the ditch, wielding rifles and submachine guns. One of them whacks him in the chest with the butt of a Lee-Enfield, and trooper Rahimuddin feels himself being dragged up and out of the trench before passing out from the pain of his bullet wound.

The other Kalat Mobile Force troopers are less lucky. Hunkered-down in their own section of ditch, they fight to the last, and are ultimately dispatched with another SPG-9 round.

Along the Quetta-Zhob railway, such raids have become frighteningly common. Lashkar-e-Toiba guerrillas, operating out of southern Waziristan, make sorties south to attack trains and to sabotage the railway in ever increasing force and with more and more firepower. The paved highway leading to Zhob comes under regular attack as well, and another of the Kalat Mobile Force's many duties has become the removal of landmines. Armored columns roam the countryside in search of LeT forces, eager to bring the enemy to battle so that superior government firepower might be concentrated. Of course, even the KMF, a paramilitary force to begin with, has seen one of its battalions recalled to the Quetta area to block the Bolan Pass, and no further support is about to come its way. Indeed, outside of its own camps, the KMF exerts little authority, and all the while local Sardars raid armories and attack patrols, seizing weapons and equipment.

It its getting late now, and I'll finish up tomorrow.)

Hints of possible German military aid filter through to Radu Khan's government and inquires are made to their needs.

Samarkand

Suggestion of German aid, even if it is addressed to one of the Khagan's underlings, Radu Khan, comes as a welcome surprise. Chingiz is not slow to order relations pursued, suggesting to Berlin that the Caliphate's raw materials might be exported to Germany in significant quantities if Balochistan comes under his sway and gives him direct access to the high seas.

The Khaganate's military is large and relatively highly motivated and experienced, and it has much of the equipment that it needs. Some weaknesses remain, however. Brief relations with Yugoslavia promised to see Depkazia's Soviet-era air defence systems and battle tanks upgraded before Samarkand and Belgrade fell out. Chingiz's generals -such as Radu Khan- fear that SA-6 SAMs and T-72 battletanks represent weak points in their defences should there ever be conflict with a major power such as the communist bloc, Russia, or even China.

The defence forces are interested in acquiring German technical help in upgrading these weapons.

1) Increasing the sensitivity of air-search radar and providing missiles with counter-countermeasure systems seems all the more important now that Balochistan's air force is being deployed aggressively, especially as the scene of battle is far from safe Depkazi airfields, making it difficult for the Caliph's interceptors to react.

2) T-72 tanks could benefit from fire control, powerplant, and self-protection enhancements. Commanders are interested in German active-protection systems and thermal imagers.

Hindustan

PM Vaidya is notably taller than the Caliph whose childhood neglect had the effect of stunting his growth along with his social skills, which leave him prone to random bouts of... oddness, if not quite the sheer madness of his estranged father.

Chingiz is more direct and respectful around the Prime Minister than he has previously been in dealing with foreign officials, a fact related to the importance with which he views his relationship with India, which he hopes may yet save him from Combine aggression and ease his acquisition of Kashmiri and Baloch territories.

The Caliph doesn't stand on ceremony, largely because he gets more than his fill of that back in Samarkand. He is pleased enough with the turn out of Indian forces, anyway.

At times Chingiz is slightly distracted, talking in vague terms about something that has evidently been bothering him at home. He is, it seems, attempting to force reform in the Islamic courts even as he extends their authority and coverage in the Caliphate, and he skirts around what is apparently a particular rape case in which he is planning to personally intercede owing to his annoyance at a judge who he calls all manner of names.

It won't be long, though, before he is back on track and talking about Balochistani provocations and alleging undue repression of freedom-fighters in the infant nation. His main purpose is still to discuss the future of Kashmir, but the Caliph may need a nudge, either from his hosts or from is tag-along Vizier, before he gets to it.

Afghanistan

This time Radu Khan's short-range radar picks up incoming jets several thousand metres away. Unfortunately the unit that makes the identification is not the one towards which the attackers are headed, and a few bursts of 23mm cannon fire are speculative at best, being aimed at targets beyond the weapon's practical range.

An attempt is made to warn the threatened unit, a Bactrian outfit, but it takes a good two minutes to figure-out exactly what unit that is and some confused radio chatter goes in several directions before the sound of explosions confirms things.

The Bactrians themselves are quick to disperse and go to ground, and their heavy equipment isn't the best or the most important, which is well considering how quick the Mujahideen are to abandon it when aircraft approach. Unfortunately this rather limits the severity of their defensive fire, which is mostly given by AKM and RPK rifles. A couple of UAZ jeeps are wrecked along with some trailers and a few supply crates, but only a handful of Bactrians are seriously hurt in the first strikes.

A better target presents itself, however, as a Depkazi soldier in a near-by unit launches an SA-14/Strela-3 missile against a heat signature, quite possibly revealing his position and that of a whole company hiding on the opposite face of a low rise. They have several BTRs and tracked engineering vehicles, and are more than three and a half kilometres from a ZSU-23-4 that is attempting without much success to get a bead on the low-flying BAF Canberras.

Development of an airstrip from which to operate defensive fighters is a clear priority, and the engineers are supposed to be starting preliminary work in the morning before better-equipped troops arrive.

Lashkar-e-Toiba, meanwhile, receives widespread adulation from Depkazi speakers and the Caliphate pledges to increase its support once the BAF threat is reduced.

It rather appears that the Caliphate and Balochistan are sliding into a war that will finally have to be openly recognised as such.

Mumbai

Prime Minister Vaidya is quite attentive, and listens closely to what Chingiz Khagan has to say, even venturing so far as to offer his own personal insight on the situation now and again. It would not do, of course, for the Hindustani head of state to offend Chingiz Khagan before they've even reached the negotiating table.

On the subject of Balochistan, Vaidya expresses his own displeasure with Zulfiqar Makran, whose increasingly authoritarian rule seems to have alienated the general population and left him with little in the way of a support base. The Indian National Union, he says, is not going to waste any time or effort in propping-up that particular weak and unpopular leader, and Parliament could really care less what happens to him, as long as Baloch natural gas remains available to the INU, and as long as the administration that does come about in Balochistan is favorable to the Baloch people. Depkazia has, of course, the right to retaliate against what amounts, doubtless, to an act of war on Balochistan's part.

No mention of Kashmir is made just yet, or at least Vaidya doesn't go out of his way to discuss that particular issue over the course of the trip to Parliament House. He is, like most recent Prime Ministers, not a particularly savvy politician or skilled diplomat, and would rather not risk making any potentially binding statements without first consulting his cabinet ministers.

Before long, the motorcade is at Parliament House, where it is met by a sizable collection of Unioners, both Parliamentarians and regular citizens. It is not, after all, every day that a foreign head of state pays a visit to Mumbai, and a fair few militiamen are needed to keep the onlookers at a respectful distance. Then again, the Hindustanis are not very keen on authoritarianism in any form, and any man who styles himself as Ghengis Khan is bound to raise some eyebrows. The motorcade drives directly into the building, minimizing exposure to any would-be assassins that might be lurking amongst the common citizenry.

And, at long last, the two heads of state arrive at the negotiating table itself, and Vaidya commences the business of diplomacy.

The Indian National Union, he says, would very much like to use the occasion to draw up a treaty regarding Kashmir, principally between the INU and Depkazia, but to which China and the Armandian Combine might later become signatories. Vaidya confirms Parliament's interest in a joint undertaking with regards to Kashmir, and he stresses that, whatever settlement emerges in the end, it must guarantee a stable and lasting peace, and it must provide for friendly relations between Samarkand and Mumbai.

Chingiz is first asked his opinion of Parak Singh, and what kind of settlement Samarkand might be willing to negotiate with him. Parliament, says Vaidya, is fairly well convinced that a suitable show of military force on the part of the regional powers, coupled with a substantial bribe, will be enough to secure the Maharaja's abdication. He is, Vaidya points out, bordered by at least two states that are openly hostile to him, although this is likely not news to the Caliph. Parliament's willingness to involve both China and the Armandian Combine in the enterprise may be, though, and Vaidya is very much eager to hear what Chingiz thinks of this. Further diplomatic efforts should, therefore, be directed at Constance and at Beijing, says the Prime Minister, and he thinks they would be done well as joint missions.

Mumbai

Chingiz's still unknown (abroad) Vizier, a preposterously lanky fellow with a mustache that he must have cut from a slightly racist publication on ancient China and a turban that would have served as well to mummify a sumo wrestler as to adorn his pointy little head, wore the most terribly nervous, pained look upon his pointy skin-and-bone face throughout the tour. He had worried himself sick and bothered the Caliph almost to the point of drastic action before finally giving up in his attempts to dissuade the personal visit to what he called a lawless, anarchistic land unsafe and unfit for the presence of such a man as his master.

Chingiz remained, apparently, quite far from concerned. The young leader, still not out of his twenties, had that feeling of invincibility that beholds a man still unfamiliar with grey hair and wrinkles.

The Khagan, it does not take long to confirm, is most desirous of a trading relationship with Union India, particularly one centred around the export of Mid Asian natural gas. Presently Chingiz was exporting to Kazakhstan, which was re-exporting to Russia and continental Europe. This certainly was not the Caliph's favourite economic production, as he still loathed Russia with every maltreated fiber of his being. He wanted to export to China, but disputes over transit fees and infrastructure development arising between Beijing, Constance, and Samarkand had put the whole region's petrochemical business on hold.

Mumbai was the only other viable customer on the Caliph's frontier. If Balochistan's reserves were added to Chingiz's wealth of Afghan and Turkmen holdings, satisfying Hindustani needs would present little difficulty, especially as Dostum and other generals crushed daily more and more dissent in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To the Union's related concerns over the Khagan's iron fist a number of defences might be offered, though, so far, none had gone far to convincing the world's most liberal societies. Samarkand maintains that brutality in Afghanistan is lead by three non-Caliphal protagonists: The Taleban, seeking to usurp Caliphal authority and corrupt traditional learning, whose power the Bactrian-Depkazi alliance had shattered. The drug-profiteering warlords with no loyalty but to themselves, the better of whom -Such as Dostum and Rabbani- Chingiz was approaching with the rule of law and inspiration of Allah. And the ill-titled Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with its Armandian backers, who had committed a massacre at Towraghondi and who surely were doing much the same within their own murky borders.

Chingiz holds that he is bringing order first so that infrastructure and education can later alleviate motivations for violence.

Of course it is not hard to learn that capital punishment continues in the Caliphate, but it is at least administered after a trial, and does not surpass the rates not so long ago seen under neighbouring governments such as that of Liu.

Moving on to Kashmir the Caliph seems to shake off some of his distractions.

"I am not an unreasonable man, and should hope to be considered a wise ruler among nations." He says. "The Maharajah, I think, is less well bred, and really out of his depth amongst such neighbours as Kashmir's. But this does not mean that he must be punished so much as reapplied, and certainly it does not follow that his people ought to suffer.

"The Vale of Kashmir is home to good Muslim citizens. By all rights these people and their lands ought to have come together with their brethren in the Pashtun and Turkmen lands at the time of independence, but, in a last-minute application of bitter divide-and-rule politics, the old colonialists were keen to see their former subjects kept weak. Hindustan has wisely made corrections in Rajasthan, even the Soviets have re-united many of the Bengali people, and it is now the proper time for Singh to differentiate himself from autocrats such as Shareef and Patel by recognising the proper state of a free and independent Asia."

Provided, the Vizier later explains, that the majority of willing Muslims and the historic western reaches of Kashmir find their way into the Caliphal fold, Samarkand holds no further ambition in the region, bears no pre-existing ill-will towards Singh, and considers itself, 'hands-off' in respect to the future course of Kashmir's less-Islamic eastern lands, be it influenced by Hindustani, Chinese, or Armandian interaction (though, once again, Depkazi distrust of Constance is not well hidden by the wiseman's tone and disposition).

In Afghanistan the Khaganate has committed mostly Pakistani and Bactrian infantry and semi-mechanised forces, leaving the bulk of its Soviet-reminiscent armoured divisions and air power free for any deliberate posturing over Kashmir. How much use are tanks in the Vale of Kashmir, of course, is up for debate, but scores of Fencer, Fitter, Flanker, and Fulcrum jets must be of some significant value in any theatre.

Mumbai

The assembled Parliamentarians and Vaidya nod in agreement when mention is made of establishing proper economic ties between Depkazia and the Indian National Union. It would seem, says one Parliamentarian, that the Ambassador automobile is proving the validity of its name once again, as it looks set to be the INU's first major export to the Khaganate. Hindustanis propose, on the side, that worker self-managed domestic production facilities be established in Depkazia itself for the venerable Ambassador. Doubtless, they say, the Depkazi economy will benefit from the introduction of a new industry and the creation of new jobs. Perhaps, if Depkazi workers are willing to adopt the principles of self-management, they will also take greater pride in their work and enjoy a greater share of the fruits of their labor.

Vaidya, despite the explanation provided by Chingiz and his advisers, must still oppose the Khagan's method of governance on ideological grounds, but he does not let it show. Without question Chingiz Khagan amounts to the best head of state that any nation in Central Asia has seen in ages, far better than his father, for instance, or Mustafa Shareef. He is, think a great many Hindustanis, Depkazia's best hope for progress and prosperity. Some believe that, given the right blend of regional stability and economic improvement, that he might be convinced to trust his people enough so as to allow them participation in national politics and greater personal autonomy. Certainly the Combine does not look all that much more favorable to Unioners, who too made note of Armandian actions at Towraghondi, which culminated in what could only be described as a humanitarian catastrophe. Capital punishment continues to be met with disapproval by Unioners, in some cases very strong disapproval, but most are not willing to make any major fuss over the issue. Chingiz is advised to abandon such practices, and after that not much is said. Unioners should hope, though, that rates of capital punishment are a good deal lower than those in Liu's China. General Liu was, after all, responsible for untold millions of deaths, the details of which are still not well-known in India.

Kashmir, though, is the focus of the discussion, and onto that subject Vaidya quickly moves.

"Indeed, the very purpose of our venture in Kashmir is the liberation of the people there. If outright war might be avoided, we should do our best to avoid it, and it seems likely that the Maharaja would take us up on so generous an offer. We must be sure, though, that none of his generals or subordinates is given the chance to take power immediately after his departure. I am confident that Depkazi forces are prepared to undertake an invasion of Kashmir at short notice, and I am able to report with confidence that II Corps is also ready to deploy immediately.

"The Vale of Kashmir, home as it is to an overwhelmingly Muslim population, should, naturally, be allowed accession to Depkazia. Provided the safety and free conduct of ethnic and religious minorities is provided for, this Parliament cannot rightly protest that. Dogra Maharajas such as Parak Singh are an anomaly in the Vale of Kashmir, the result, as you mentioned, of policies dating back to the colonial era. The Principality of Kashmir has, in essence, remained a colonial state, retaining the same institutions and the same government, minus only the British.

"Likewise Hindustan will gladly accept Ladakh, Jammu, and Himachal into the Indian National Union, provided of course you have no reservations. Parliament is content to leave these three areas independent, should the populace so desire, and doubtless any Union government in the region will enjoy considerable local autonomy. The Punjab, though, is a matter of some uncertainty. We will have to perform a more careful assessment of that particular piece of territory, and perhaps it would be best to leave it out of the military side of our operation.

"Muslims living in areas that will presumably be brought under the charge of the Indian National Union will not be interfered-with whatsoever, as per long-standing Parliamentary policy, but, should they choose to migrate to Muslim-majority areas likely to become Depkazi, transportation will be provided free of cost by Parliament."

There Vaidya pauses, allowing his own advisers to present documents and reports, all the while stroking his mustache and fidgeting, the Prime Minister not being a man capable of sitting terribly still.

Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

Balochistan's airforce swoops down on Depkazi columns with all the ferocity of a flight of hawks, albeit very old and frail ones. Little Jet Provosts might strafe the occasional unfortunate jeep or pile of crates with their two .303 machine guns, ineffective against anything besides the softest targets, before their pilots throw the aircraft into frame-testing evasive maneuvers, very much aware that their aircraft can be brought down by equally light machine gun fire. 25lb rockets and light bombs are sometimes carried as well, meant to make as much noise and trouble on the ground as possible, and not really expected to do very much in the way of real damage. Jet Provost pilots are quite eager to be rid of performance-reducing external stores anyway, and shouldn't be expected to out of their way in order to find suitable targets. Two of the Jet Provosts are given the job of FAC, though, and armed with flares and smoke rockets. They do their best to mark worthwhile targets before one of them is shot down and the other heavily damaged. More warlike Strikemasters are perhaps a greater threat, with their superior weapons carriage capacity and more powerful Viper turbofan, and these come in just after the Jet Provosts. With the enemy hopefully scrambling for cover by now, Strikemasters devote their energies to attacking abandoned vehicles with altogether more accurate rocket and machine gun fire.

One of the Strikemasters is brought down by an enemy missile while in the process of strafing a supply truck. For such a small aircraft, traveling very close to the ground, there isn't very much chance of survival, and the pilot is killed outright. The BAF's first-ever casualty of war is not without his vengeance, though, as the aircraft piloted by Flight Lieutenant Yousef follows the rocket's smoke trail to its source, and there deposits a pair of BL.755 cluster bombs.

At about the same time, the Canberras arrive on-scene, by far the largest and most lethal warplane in the Baloch arsenal despite their age. About half of the aircraft committed to the mission fly in at extremely low altitude, armed with belly-mounted cannon packs and 51mm rocket pods. Canberra pilots, armed with a fairly heavy gun in addition to more modern and accurate rockets, mainly go after armored vehicles, which the more lightly-armed Jet Provosts and Strikemasters don't stand much chance of destroying. Cannons roaring and rockets whooshing, the Canberra crews are very much in their element, and relatively modern self-protection suites allow them to go about their business with some degree of safety from enemy missiles. The other half of the Canberra formation, notably lacking the large cannon pods, flies at altitude, escorted by a few FT.10s armed with short-range AAMs and 30mm cannons. Bomb bay doors swing open to reveal nine 227kg high-explosive bombs, and bombardiers look through their optical bombsights for suitable targets. Above the range of most MANPADS, and entirely immune to 23mm fire, the Canberras can afford to take their time in looking for things to bomb. As such probably deliver some of the most devastating damage of the entire raid, though at the same time such damage is necessarily limited, and, for an airforce equipped with almost no antitank weaponry, the destruction of a few static armored vehicles by high explosive ordnance would be quite an achievement.

The raid is over by sunrise, and most of the Baloch formation is not much worse for wear. The BAF, however, can ill afford losses, since there is next to no source of new aircraft, and the money doesn't exist to purchase them either. Two Jet Provosts are downed, their light construction and small size no match for any kind of heavy machine gun fire, along with two additional Strikemasters, one hit by a missile and the other crashed in the Khada Hills on the way back to Quetta. Most of the Canberras come back with a fair few holes in them, but not un-flightworthy, and a third Jet Provost is written-off after the damage that it took is deemed too heavy to repair.

(A moment aside before getting back to the on-going themes, or nobody really knows what's going on in Chingiz's Caliphate. Doesn't really matter if this is immediately before, after, or in a break during Chingiz's negotiations with Mumbai.)

The Depkazi Khaganate

At the end of the Caliphate's first year, Chingiz Khagan Depkazi takes stock.

His state is a burgeoning nuclear power thanks to at least three Soviet-era reactors maintained on its soil. It is a global focus for Islamic sentiment and freedom of expression in light of the ineptitude and introspection of the Osmanli, the secularism of the former United Elias, the new Crusades in North Africa, and the Strainist invasion of Indonesia. It is, surrounded by Armand, India, China, and Russia, the little engine that could. It is sitting on gold, gas, oil, and hydropower.

But it is hardly benefiting from its resources. The Soviets will not willingly accept Islamic partners. Armand opposes Chingiz in Afghanistan and he calls them imperialists in the Caucasus. The Khagan's strong rule is an affront to Chinese ambition and influence. Russia... Chingiz hates Russians.

Taking Balochistan, then, could not possibly be more important to Depkazia, to Islam, and to Chingiz himself. Balochistan is an oasis in the desert, a camel in... the desert, a way out of... well, the desert.

And, in all of its neighbours, the Caliphate can see potential in but one. Hindustan, of all things!

Caliphate, 'advises women to cover hair'

Tashkent, Depkazia... Caliph Chingiz Khagan Depkazi has spoken openly on Islamic dress, declaring that, according to the Qur'an and the best learning of proper scholars, (Muslim) women should cover most of their hair and avoid figure-hugging attire, but need not hide their faces.

The ruling follows a significant criminal case that long troubled the Caliph. In this case, five men were accused of beating to death a young female member of their extended family who refused to wear a burqa disguising her entire face and form. Samarkand interceded to order the five buried to the neck and stoned until dead, the Caliph saying that those who pervert the message of the prophet will receive neither sanction nor mercy when found to be forcing their perversions upon others, Muslim or not.

Chingiz also declared that a handful of preachers blaming women for their rapes would be, 'evaluated for further signs of sexual malfunction and social deviance or failings of self-control' and intervened personally in a Dushanbe court to force the conviction of three alleged rapists who sought to blame the, 'immodest dress' of their two victims.

The Caliph is reputed to have asked the court, 'Did anyone else see these women so attired?' 'Yes, yes!' answered an enthusiastic defence, 'And did anyone else attempt to rape them?' 'No...' the less exuberant reply. 'Death by stoning... for the judge. Life in hard labour for all accused, pending review in the Caliph's time.'

Chingiz is, evidently, no kitten, but his people increasingly tend to see him as tough, but fair.

As Radu Khan's campaign continues, still too slowly for the Caliph's liking, progress is finally made in one key respect.

Outside Kandahar, cries of Incoming! are barely off the lips of soldiers watching for the next BAF attacks when missile trails spread across the sky... coming from the north. A flight of four Su-27 Flankers in Depkazi colours roar into action, making the first aerial attempts against BAF presence over southern Afghanistan by Caliphal fighters.

The Sukhois, with longer legs than the MiGs previously stationed in Bactria, are tasked with the destruction by attrition of the BAF's combat capability. Their Vympel R-27 missiles, including R-27ER models brought to the Depkazi SSR by Chingiz's grandfather during the USSR's final days, are loosed at range by pilots hopeful of Baloch unpreparedness, even as Vympel R-73 missiles are armed and dogfighting speed made...

Near Kandahar

Radar-less BAF FT.10s are unaware of the presence of Depkazi Flankers until their RWRs begin to buzz and blink worryingly, and, shortly after, when missile warning alarms sound. The combined formation of attack-trainers and Canberras flying at altitude immediately breaks and performs evasive maneuvers, all the while releasing chaff. Though by no means fast, the FT.10s, and the Canberras as well, are quite maneuverable, and Baloch pilots do a good job of yanking their aircraft around in spite of their questionable mechanical state. Still, none of the Baloch aircraft are equipped with anything serious in the way of jamming equipment, and the Alamos have a serious speed advantage against the Baloch bombers. All the FT.10s manage to maneuver themselves out of the way, but three Canberras are struck outright and fall to the ground in flaming heaps.

A fourth suffers a near-miss, which sends bits of shrapnel into the port Avon, setting it aflame. Though equipped with an ejection seat, the Baloch aviator stays with his airplane until the bombardier/navigator, who still has to jump out of a hatch, is able to save himself.

The remainder of the Baloch aircraft beat a very hasty retreat as the FT.10s, fitted with Python 3 AAMs, hang back to cover the egress of the low-flying Canberras, Strikemasters, and Jet Provosts. If Depkazi Sukhois are so inclined, they could easily brush past the very firmly subsonic escorts to get at the perhaps more important Canberras, rapidly fleeing as they are and sticking very low. But if the Flankers do opt to engage the more modern FT.10s, they will find a group of fairly well-trained and experienced pilots who have, if not the most modern ordnance, at least a capable dogfighting missile in the form of the Python 3.

Though sent in with hopes of frightening the life out of the BAF, the Khagan's best fighters, his Su-27s, are soon exposed as items handled like Mussolini's warships. They are considered too valuable to be risked, and withdraw from the engagement almost as soon as it looks as if anyone is prepared to return fire. Only two-dozen strong, the Flankers are needed to discourage brash actions by the Caliphate's larger neighbours and protect Samarkand's interests over the Caspian.

(Curses, I am called away mid post!)

(OCC: No problem. I appear to have jumped the gun there with regards to the safe return of my raiding force. Hmph.

Reserved for a better post sooner or later.)

(Quite all right. I think that I was perhaps getting ahead of things and supposing that the BAF was continuing attacks, causing damage until the Depkazis relocated their long-range interceptors.)

Beijing had, not so long ago, thought to pursue the over-throw of young Chingiz, and yet since then the only Mid Asian rulers to fall have done so at the hand of the Khan of Khans, from the Taleban to Shareef. Now that Chingiz is pursuing the dual collapse of governments in Balochistan and Kashmir it seems that the momentum is very much with the self-styled Turkmenbashi, Makran and Singh have to be very much aware that when the Caliph threatens something, he acts on it. Not like some wishy-washy Chinaman!

Now, with LeT forces active between the Baloch force in Afghanistan and the Balochistani capital, and Radu Khan's force moving -however grindingly slowly- down from the north, Chingiz is even bold enough to insult Makran and his comrades by declaring that he is already the true authority in Balochistan. A rather over the top claim, but the Caliph wishes Balochistanis to act like they believe it and accept that Caliphal authority is now superior to Parliamentarian.

Envoys to Kashmir, meanwhile, are every bit as impatient as is typical of Chingiz's administration. At the moment, without more than the briefest initial consultation with Mumbai, Samarkand is quite bluntly telling the Maharaja to vacate the Vale of Kashmir, and while saying that the Indian National Union is intent on taking Jammu, Ladakh, and Himachal, the diplomats seem to imply that Singh could continue to rule in the Punjab if he does not force the Caliphate to declare war.

Whether Chingiz has any future plans for Punjab, of course, is less than crystal clear, but it is notable that he has already begun talking again about the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, saying that the divisive Combine presence ought to end in order for security to return across Afghanistan and pipelines to be laid between Armand and China.

There is more than the usual haste about all of the Khaganate's expansive campaigns. State media is discussing little else but the approach of Chingiz Khagan Depkazi's 29th birthday. Certainly the Caliph wants a nice present, and certainly he wants to have wrapped-up his immediate plans and achievements before he is thirty. Perhaps Kazakhstan awaits in middle-age.

For Zulfiqar Makran, the situation in Balochistan could not really become much worse. Prime Minister in no capacity except title, he is largely concerned with making the final arrangements for getting the hell out of the country, but Makran still has enough spare time to make threats of his own. Depkazia, he says, will "pay in rivers of blood for each square meter of this nation," a ridiculous claim that Makran can afford to make, given his imminent departure.

LeT militants from Waziristan and native Baloch irregulars have succeeded in gaining control over most of Balochistan, constantly engaging and often getting the better of Quetta's 6,000-strong Gendarmerie. Chingiz's forces may well arrive in the capital only to find that it has already been taken by domestic forces, if things continue the way that they've been going.

A rift does, however, begin to show between the LeT and local Sardars. Local LeT commanders generally advocate a slower pace of operations against the Quetta government, since Radu Khan's forces ought to show up in the near future. If victory is certain, they argue, why over-exert themselves? Leaders of the largest Baloch tribes, meanwhile, are eager to make as much military progress as possible, in hopes of preserving the maximum amount of local autonomy once Depkazi authority is established. Unlike LeT, which does indeed want Balochistan to become part of the Caliphate, as per its ideology, Baloch tribal leaders want, as has always been the case, the freedom to run their own affairs.

Mumbai, meanwhile, continues to watch the whole affair very closely. Few in Parliament are confident that the decision to approach Depkazia was the correct one, and a large portion of Unioners maintain, and have maintained, that pursuing friendly relations with Samarkand would be a major disaster. Indeed, diplomats in Beijing are up at all hours, carefully monitoring the decisions and statements made by the Chinese government, and ready to call Mumbai at a moment's notice with strong urgings to break-off relations with Depkazia. China, at least united China, is not a nation whose favor the INU can really afford to lose, and if the choice presents itself, few Unioners have any doubt as to which way they'd lean.

By "rationalizing" the political and geographical situation in Central Asia, Parliament hopes that Chingiz Khagan may be presented with a fine and suitable state, one with sea access and one that satisfies the greater part of its citizens. Whether Chingiz sees things in a similar manner, well, nobody can really know. In case Samarkand does interpret Mumbai's willingness to allow Depkazi conquests as a sign of weakness, the INA's 2nd Army remains in the Punjab and Sindh in full strength, reinforced by the 11th Mechanized Infantry Division, formerly attached to the 1st Army in Rajasthan.

And all the while, 25,000 Baloch soldiers continue, strangely enough, their advance into Afghanistan. Having bypassed Radu Khan's force entirely, it is not very clear what exactly it is that General Abdur Khan Khattak means to do with his Corps, though it would be reasonable to suspect that he is aiming for a strike at Depkazi lines of communication in a long, distant left hook through the north of Helmand and into Ghowr. Whether he will ever get there, in light of his fuel situation, is anyone's guess, and, for the time being, BAF Twin Pioneers and DC-3s conduct resupply missions.

Kabul

The great city, hunger increasing in its weeks long encirclement, can only watch as its belt made of Caliphal banners is closed one notch tighter every day with the approach of Dostum's Bactrian warriors.

Chingiz has promised his best general a Khanate of, 'the next major Turkic territory added to the Caliphate' which, to the excitable and overly heroic warlord, sounds like Xinjiang or Kazakhstan, and the title of Field Marshal until then, if he takes Kabul. To do so he has the support of Bomber Command, modest though it may seem by international standards.

With infantry exchanging fire in the outskirts and a battery of 122mm self-propelled guns keeping the defenders on their toes, one of the Khaganate's aged Il-28 bombers tests the city's limited and even older air defences. Its safe return, after a propaganda drop urging the city's surrender and embrace of the Caliphate over the wrong and cruel Taliban, signals the start of frequent raids by the twelve-strong Beagle force. Helped by MiG-25s flying photo reconnaissance missions the Beagles do further advance Radu Khan's cause, but not without killing their share of civilians in spite of orders to avoid this.

Slow and painful though it may be, the Caliphate's victory in Afghanistan, owing to the Taliban's abject lack of foreign support, seems increasingly near and unavoidable.

Kandahar Province

Radu Khan himself may be found here, having deputised Colonels to complete the inevitible conquest of Kabul, which he deems relatively safe to the north.

By now the Khan has no less than 40,000 men -of 950,000 regular and recently activated reserve personnel in the Caliphate's ground forces- which he deems, 'spare', that is, beyond what is necessary to sustain the siege building against Kandahar itself. Finally supplied with worthwhile quantaties of gasoline and foodstuffs, this lumbering force, placed under a General Akram, apparently promoted from the ranks of Shareef's dismantled army, sets off to find and confront General Abdur Khan Khattak's 25,000 men.

That the enemy has apparently crossed the Arghanadab and is making further north and west is a cause of some consternation as Akram wheels about his great hulk at the pace of, well, the camels, horses, and mules contained along with its men, tanks, and trucks, and attempts to give chase, Akram all the while urging Dostum to hasten the capture of Kabul, which itself is rather getting in the way of alternate lines of supply.

Akram hopes, in the vaguest of terms, to squash the Balochistanis up against the DRA's Combine-secured frontiers... wherever they are, exactly!

Northern Helmand Province, Afghanistan

General Khattak, satisfied that he has put enough distance between himself and the enemy since the abandonment of the Kandahar operation, finally halts his columns in the small town of Musa Qal'eh. It is a welcome change of pace, and the greater part of the 25,000-strong force takes advantage of a rare opportunity to catch-up on missed sleep.

There is no rest for the engineers and storemen, however, and they prepare to receive badly-needed provisions from Balochistan itself. Khattak's force is now quite far from Balochistan itself, and so far there have been few volunteers for the task of moving supplies up the length of Helmand by truck, so the job of supporting the Baloch army in Afghanistan falls to a mixed transport squadron based at Dalbandin. Eleven DC-3s and C-46s operate off the town's dirt airstrip, which is by now heavily fortified and protected by a substantial garrison.

At about midday the first transport, a civilian-registered Curtis Commando, touches down on a fairly straight section of road, cordoned-off by the engineers for use as an airstrip. It is a difficult piece of ground to land on, and the first Commando's pilot does an excellent job of bringing his heavily-laden, and quite aged, transport down on the relatively narrow, and by no means perfectly straight, dirt track. Storemen are on board before the engines are shut down and they unload the cargo of fuel drums in record time. Khattak's troops, many of whom are on horseback or camel-back, are capable foragers, living off the land as a matter of course, and carry plenty of 7.62x39mm and .303 ammunition, but one thing that cannot be had locally in any great quantity is fuel. Kandahar Force's small Centurion squadron was scuttled some days earlier, sacrificed in order to keep more economical Daimler Armored Cars and artillery-hauling trucks in working order.

Takeoff is much easier for the first Commando, now empty save for a handful of casualties and a pair of medical attendants. Four others, two DC-3s and two more Commandos, repeat the process without any serious problems, delivering more fuel as well as shoulder-fired SAMs and .303 ammunition. It is only later that the Baloch troops hear that one of the resupply aircraft, loaded with a shipment of fuel, went down east of Qowryah with its three-person crew. Opposition from the Taliban might not be heavy, and Depkazi combat aircraft might not yet be interested in the Baloch air bridge, but low-level flying in heavily-loaded transports, many of which are over 50 years old, is a dangerous endeavor in and of itself.

And despite the fact that he has very nearly reached the limit of his supply lines, Abdur Khan Khattak has no intentions of permanently halting his maneuver. Indeed, after his troops are sufficiently rested and provisioned, he plans to push north into Ghowr, and from there swing east to, eventually, cut the road between Kabul and Kandahar. The fact that he will likely be unable to support his motorized units for much longer does not seem to trouble Khattak in the slightest. Mechanized infantry has never quite supplanted dragoons in Balochistan, and Khattak is one of perhaps very few modern cavalry commanders. Ever the optimist and full of confidence, he says that Afghans will probably find his forces less worrying and easier to receive, they being closer to the 'classical' model than Radu Khan's more heavily-mechanized formations.

Khattak, of course, looks forward to engaging the enemy in a cavalry battle, the likes of which hasn't been seen for at least half a century.

"The world is at war" the Khagan warns his people "and we can not pretend to be immune merely because we are surrounded by deserts, seas, and mountains. Russian troops that marched first into Kazakhstan and then into Lavrageria and Nigeria before taking Moldovan independence and re-imposing themselves on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have more recently bombed Yugoslavia and violated Hungarian territory."

Not all of his audience knew where Nigeria was, but the Depkazis at least recognised former Soviet states and understood that their leader was noting the fact that, Armandian-dominated Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia aside, theirs was the last part of the former USSR not back under the Kremlin's control.

Chingiz told of the great number of nations at war in Africa, of fighting in South East Asia, and of the Strainist invasion of Muslim Indonesia.

"Henceforth" he declared, "the Holy Caliphate is at was in defence of Islam, at war for freedom in religion denied to millions, at war with Satanic forces!"

He was extending the draft and mobilising the Khaganate's reserve forces in full. Almost one and a half million young men would be called to arms.

"While the great powers bring war to whichever nations they see fit to ruin, and while they worry in Paris, Raipur, Moscow, Washington, and London about the threat of Communism, Catholicism, Atheism, Capitalism, or Feudalism, we prepare for the long awaited victory of Islam!"

Chingiz as Caliph then declared the establishment of an elite force to be known as the Islamic Brigades, and called for volunteers from home and abroad. He promised to liberate Afghanistan, Balochistan, and Kashmir first, then Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Dagestan...

Afghanistan

Having ordered the raising of more troops, enough to put the Caliphate at maximum wartime mobilisation, the Caliph is confident in beginning to send more forces south. Samarkand has again demanded the surrender of Balochistani forces in Afghanistan, though whether they've heard this is another matter, and Chingiz's diplomats advise the Maharaja to promptly evacuate from the Vale of Kashmir any forces loyal to his person lest they be consumed by the legions of Islam.

Mazār-i Sharīf

Radu Khan's former capital is now host, briefly, to some forty BMD-1 and several BMD-2 ICVs and two batteries of 2S9 120mm self-propelled gun-mortars, and hundreds of airborne troops, as well as a large part of the Caliphate's aerial transport fleet. That fleet, it must be noted, is incapable of moving all of the armour at once, and will leave the vanguard isolated for perhaps hours before reinforcing it on the ground.

The force is to be flown into Helmand, north of Khattak's force. The unit is arrogantly tasked by Chingiz with raising local support and attacking Khattack from one side as Akram moves his lumbering 40,000-man force to overwhelm the Balochistani.

As Chingiz moves more and more manpower into Afghanistan he is increasingly bold in attacking targets within the Democratic Republic, seeing Combine influence on the wane, and now intends to take the whole country into the Caliphate, painting himself as a liberator from renewed Communist oppression.

Even as the Caliph tells Singh to watch yet another crushing Depkazi victory unfolding he appears to be forgetting the importance of Hindustani support in Kashmir, and his propaganda becomes daily more theistic and reactionary in its appeals to the Afghan people. Chingiz is already picturing the shimmering waters of the Arabian Sea off Balochistan dotted with his merchant ships and amphibious forces.

Mumbai

Chingiz Khagan's latest comments do little to comfort Parliament, by now very much doubting the benefits of its relationship with Depkazia. Parliamentarians are hardly of a single mind when it comes to how Samarkand ought to be engaged, and delegations from the Punjab and Sindh in particular are quite vocal in their opposition to current policy. Samarkand's territorial ambitions, say those Parliamentarians, may well include Muslim-majority areas within the Indian National Union, and the Khagan, far from being content with his latest acquisitions, seems more likely to try for the whole region. How else, they argue, should Parliament interpret the Caliphate's mobilization orders, certainly surplus to requirements when it comes to Balochistan and Kashmir.

Diplomats in Beijing as well are by no means pleased with the present state of affairs, and their reports are filled with warnings about the potential gravity of Hindustani support for Depkazia's expansion, something that disquiets China significantly. They strongly advise Parliament to re-evaluate its approach before it does some real damage to what they, and indeed most Hindustanis, consider a far more important relationship, and before the authorities in Beijing are moved to consider closer ties with Tsarist Russia.

At the same time, though, the Hindustanis that support friendly relations argue that, in spite of his government's many disagreeable aspects, it is better than having a League-affiliated Depkazia, the likes of which France and Russia could use to directly threaten the frontiers of India. That prospect, of course, does not much worry the greater part of Unioners, but all the same there is a strong sense that the West African campaign would have to be scuttled in the event of serious tensions with Samarkand.

Hindustanis, as ever, cannot exactly agree on how to act. It of course remains to be seen as to whether Chingiz Khagan will continue to trust the INU, liable as it is to sudden and rapid changes in leadership and policy. And while one part of the Planning Office draws-up instructions for a joint invasion of Kashmir, another examines the viability of re-asserting Union control in Balochistan and devises ways to make Gwadar Port unusable. Unioners may for the most part make bumbling and ham-handed diplomats, but, for better or worse, they are generally quite thorough and considerate military planners.

Helmand Province

Khattak's force is once again on the move, its handful of remaining vehicles refueled and re-armed for the vague and questionable push north. For once, though, the troops are eager to get going, thanks to news of enemy paratroopers landing to the north. A handful of forward scouts, equipped with heliographs and frequency-hopping radios, are on hand to observe the Depkazi parachutists, and it is with much alarm that they report the parachute landing of enemy tanks. Masters of stealth and bestowed with keen eyesight, the Baloch scouts are however lacking in terms of identification training, and they fail to elaborate on "tanks," leading Khattak to believe that the only things he has to worry about are BMD-1s and BMD-2s. The fact that the enemy has self-propelled mortars on the ground is quite unknown to him, and an important piece of information.

General Khattak quickly sends a regiment of dragoons, some 1,500 men armed primarily with Lee-Enfields and Bren guns, and with a few dozen RPG-7s and SA-7s in evidence as well, north along the main road. Unencumbered by heavy equipment, the regiment is up and off in record time, moving to link-up with the forward scout detachments. Khattak is not entirely sure what to make of the Depkazi parachutists, since, according to his scouts, they are relatively few in number, airborne armor notwithstanding. He hopes that his dragoons will be able to solve the problem before the paratroopers receive reinforcements or link-up with conventional forces. And if they aren't able to overcome the Depkazis, there is still the main body of the force, most of its (rather modest) artillery and heavy anti-tank component intact, ready to blast its way through. Akram's 40,000-strong force may well catch up with Khattak, but Khattak for one is determined to make him work for it.

For Hindustanis concerned about the purpose of the Caliph's vast military draft this day brings some clarification. The infamous site of the Combine's most visible atrocity, Towraghondi, is over-run by Depkazi and Bactrian forces, signaling the start of the invasion of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Widely reviled as foreign, dictatorial, weak, anti-Islamic, and communistic, the DRA's government does not appear to be in a strong position to resist since the collapse of Armandian support, and the Caliph hopes to win some support as a liberator offering stability.

With the Republic based mainly in northwest Afghanistan and Depkazi infrastructure stronger in the west than the mountainous east, and large forces stationed there to meet Combine threats, Samarkand is able to direct overwhelming force across the frontier.

Chingiz orders propaganda drops near Khattak's forces informing the General and his men that fresh divisions have entered Afghanistan with heavy armoured support and may soon join the chase for the Balochistanis if they persist in their heretical defiance to the Caliphate.

Samarkand's diplomats in Mumbai inform the Hindustanis that Chingiz plans to liberate Afghanistan, secure the Caliphate's frontiers by acquiring the Vale of Kashmir and integrating its Muslim population, and establish open ocean access by returning stability to anarchic Balochistan, reaffirm its territorial claims in the Caspian Sea by tackling Armandian incursions... and then turn the Khaganate's full force against the advancing Russian Empire before dealing with the Caliph's claims in the Armando-Russian occupied Caucasus.

Helmand

The last elements of the Depkazi airborne force are still being dropped as Khattak's brigade makes contact with a unit of BMD-mobile infantry that is consolidating after dropping across an area slightly larger than planned.

The Depkazi Paras characterise their part in the battle by constant movement, and AKS-74-armed infantry fall back almost immediately under cover of 30mm and 73mm cannon fire from their vehicles. Though unsure exactly what they face at this moment, the Paras are well aware that the enemy's full force far out numbers them and they appear keen to avoid being flanked or over-run, and their fire seemed aimed at keeping a distance between they and the enemy rather than causing casualties. That the enemy are armed with Lee-Enfield rifles is for once a problem, and the Depkazis are forced to use their rifles at maximum rather than really effective range in order to avoid being picked off.

Still, the force's self-propelled 120mm mortars are deployed several thousand yards to the rear, and only take part after the infantry have fallen back some distance. Half a dozen artillery pieces open-up several minutes into the engagement, helped in range-finding by visual and experimental electronic markers dropped by withdrawing infantry and approached by the enemy.

Should the barrage convince the enemy to retreat or scatter, the BMDs are ordered to give chase and infantry to close in to a range at which their automatic weapons will give them an advantage, and mortars to begin laying their fire beyond the enemy to hinder his escape. Should the enemy hold their ground or continue to advance, things become a little more complicated for one hundred and twenty semi-elite Depkazi soldiers.

Helmand

Baloch riflemen do their best to pick-off exposed Depkazi infantry from long range, making full use of what few advantages the Lee-Enfield offers in modern warfare, but it soon becomes clear that, no matter how small the enemy force is, it won't be possible to defeat it until its tanks are dealt with. Slowly, and making sure to stay under cover as much as possible, the Balochistanis work to reduce the distance between themselves and the paratroopers so as to put RPG-7 teams within range of the tantalizingly thin armor of Depkazi BMDs. Heavier forces are apt to show up sooner or later, and with them 73mm and 120mm recoilless rifles, but the Baloch dragoons would prefer to resolve the situation as quickly as possible.

It isn't long before the Balochistanis initiate a flanking maneuver, and, as one part of the force stays put, more or less, several companies attempt to position themselves on the sides and to the rear of the paratroopers, negotiating difficult terrain on horseback in an effort to stay out of sight until they are in position. Squadron commanders coordinate their maneuvers with hand-held radios, feeding one another information on enemy positions and tank activity as best as possible. Within a short while they hope to have the Depkazis surrounded, with routes of escape for their tanks cut-off, and at that point the Baloch commanders will make their heavy attack.

Further to the south, the main column gets moving again, headed north along the main highway through Helmand. It is hardly an ideal situation, moving such a large force by way of a single road, through a province that contains no few hostile Taliban militants, but as long as Khattak wants to keep his artillery it is really the only option. It is slow going, necessary so that the reconnaissance screen, mostly on horseback, and which protects the column from Taliban raiders, can keep pace. News of Armand's collapse is very interesting to Abdur Khan Khattak, who, in truth, is in Afghanistan largely for personal gain anyway. Though his chance of becoming the Emir of Kandahar seems to have slipped past him, Khattak now sees opportunity in the DRA and Armand as a whole, endowed as it is with significant oil wealth. He begins to consider a swing west rather than east once he reaches the nearest crossroads in Ghowr, perhaps viable if he moves quickly. Balochistan's intelligence network in Afghanistan, though never large to begin with and for the most part destroyed by the Taliban, does still have a handful of assets in the DRA, and these are to some extent capable of reporting to General Khattak on the strength and deposition of both Armandian and Communist Afghan forces in the area. Ever the optimist (some might say characteristically impractical), Khattak imagines that he might be able to entice some of the Armandian-sponsored Afghans to join his cause if he does decide to take the Western route, and in so doing acquire some heavy equipment to replace what his troops already scuttled. Those living in the DRA might, Khattak reasons, want to take something from Armand to make up for the destruction of Towraghondi, but, then again, they might just as well support the Depkazis for the same reason, a flaw in Khattak's plan that the General himself does not bother considering.

Besides, reflects Khattak, his troops need a steady supply of oil if they are meant to take-on Depkazi formations in the field, and inconsistent supply flights from Balochistan itself are hardly sufficient to meet requirements.

Chaman, Balochistan

Though the house may be collapsing behind them, a mixed force of gendarmes, rangers, and border police continues to stand guard at the door, garrisoning the town of Chaman at the head of Khojak Pass. About 1,500 troops, with supporting light artillery and nine Centurions, shouldn't unduly worry Radu Khan when it comes time to actually invade Balochistan itself, but the commander of the Chaman garrison, himself a Pashtun, is very keen to exploit Depkazia's rather touchy history with regards to the Pashtun people. Patrols cross the border with Afghanistan on a regular basis, oftentimes meeting with local tribal leaders in an effort to promote resistance against the likely Depkazi invasion of the area. Balochistan's Baloch population cannot, after all, be counted-on to support the Quetta government, now that most of the Sardars have made quite public their support for the establishment of a Baloch Khanate, and if forces loyal to Makran expect support to come from anywhere, they expect it from the large number of Pashtun refugees currently residing in Balochistan, though even then the Prime Minister has done little to endear himself to that people.

The Punjab

Ever since Parliament's commitment to the removal of Maharaja Parak Singh in Kashmir, and the occupation of at least some of his territories, INA forces on the border with Singh's portion of the Punjab have been more than usually active. Unioners have never been content to leave the Maharaja be, and the prospect of finally re-uniting Union Punjab and Kashmiri Punjab, two areas that were only ever tied on paper, is one that generates considerable excitement, especially amongst the small Sikh minority that lives in Union territory.

Overflights by Union aircraft increase as well, mostly photo-reconnaissance aircraft collecting information on Kashmiri defensive positions and deployments in the area. It is hoped that Parak Singh might be convinced to abdicate peacefully, but in the event that he opts to fight it out, the 2nd Army means to be ready for it, and, even if things do on the surface go smoothly, Union commanders are not about to dismiss the possibility of armed resistance on the part one group or another.

Hindustanis are hopeful that those living in the Kashmiri Punjab will welcome Union government, but a good reception is far from certain, and if a bad reception is certain, the UDF will in all likelihood scrap the whole operation. Indeed, many efforts are made to gauge the average Punjabi's perception of the INU, and the opinion of the Sikh majority especially. Though denied democracy and self-government, the Sikhs were not exactly maltreated by the Dogra Maharajas, not nearly as badly as Kashmiri Muslims, so many Unioners can see how Punjabi Sikhs might be less than totally inclined to join the INU. Members of the Punjabi Union Parliament, therefore, draw-up a long and detailed proposal for what to do with the Sikh portion of the Punjab if or when it is taken-over by the INA, aimed at making any sort of political unification as comfortable and as inoffensive as possible. A high degree of local autonomy is promised, with a Parliament separate from that of the rest of the Punjab, exemption from the usual military responsibilities, and a considerable amount of financial assistance.

Then again, it must be said that Unioners don't entirely know what they're wading into. The Punjab is not in nearly as dire straits as was Rajasthan, after all, and it has been a long time since the Mumbai government has had anything to do with goings-on in Amritsar. Avoiding a disaster, Parliamentarians reflect, may well entail stopping the whole operation and subjecting it to a serious and deep re-thinking.

(OCC: I must apologize for the massive amount of time that it has taken me to produce this post, and to Spyr too for Red East, which is due to not much more than pure laziness on my part.)

Helmand

The relatively small scale engagement here is fast turning into one of the more intense battles active in the wildly unstable world today as the Baloch riflemen decline the Depkazi Anona mortars' invitation to withdraw.

The paras have little recourse but to continue their own retreat, knowing that their small numbers lack the weight with which to overwhelm the enemy. It is fortunate that they do continue to fall back on their mobile artillery, or else they may already have been encircled.

Many are somewhat frustrated by orders as they see the main body of enemy infantry halting and wonder if it wouldn't be best to charge them with light armoured support, but going against the Caliph's explicit orders without damn good cause is, as yet, not something that Depkazi officers are prone to risk. Thus far his orders have always resulted in triumph, and many remember how easy it was to win a deadly stoning in Registan for raising the ire of Chingiz's father. In truth, of course, Chingiz is yet to prove himself so wildly unforgiving, but, so far as high-profile officers are concerned, few want to be the first to throw themselves on his equally unproven mercies by doing something so rash as to show initiative on the battlefield.

The paras withdraw north-ish, radioing to warn their artillery of the battle's progress, thus far narrowly avoiding a complete flanking disaster only by virtue of their less than aggressive posture. Mortar fire soon dies down as the half dozen Anona begin to relocate to a more defensible position on a low rise, and the paras attempt to withdraw towards it, hoping that direct fire from the heavy guns might disrupt the enemy advance.

This operation, it appears, is not going to convince the enemy to give up the fight, and now it is just a matter of surviving the first major Depkazi-Baloch confrontation and perhaps setting the scene for a more decisive show-down when Khattak and Akram clash in strength... except of course that Khattak may not actually be interested in seeing that happen, anymore.

Afghanistan at large

Herat is now threatened by major Depkazi armoured forces with heavy aerial support flying out of southwestern Depkazia as the Caliph proclaims himself a liberator from Communist oppression and brooks little opposition, crushing it under T-64 treads (as part of the former USSR, the last loyalist part at that, Depkazia does have access to that non-export armour), cluster-bombs, and the hooves of Bactrian guerrilla raiders.

Still, with some Armandian armaments, the badly outnumbered DRA loyalists, perhaps suffering poor moral, do present a different kind of threat to more enthusiastic but less well armed Taleban and warlord opposition further east. Depkazia must learn yet another kind of warfare if it is to triumph over the Democratic Republic.

In Kabul, meanwhile, another victory appears close as infantry move through the suburbs, and it seems that the majority of Depkazia's military strength is focused on Afghanistan, subjugation of which, once again, proves a complicated and draining prospect, this time threatening to derail Chingiz's plans as every day sees him worry that much more about his chances of maintaining Mumbai's support over Kashmir.

Helmand

Baloch infantrymen are quick to follow the Depkazi retreat, moving swiftly and relatively stealthily over the landscape, and making expert use of whatever natural cover presents itself. By now conscious of their considerable numerical advantage, the Baloch are less than usually cautious in their maneuvers, often bunching-up or exposing themselves and suffering accordingly, but speed is of the essence if the paras are to be pinned-down and superior Baloch numbers brought to bear.

The flankers, for their part, do their best to catch the enemy paratroopers in a crossfire as they pass by. Most of the riflemen make for their horses and try once again to encircle the Depkazis, but a handful, mostly excellent marksmen, lag behind and use their Lee-Enfields to snipe at enemy infantry. Though not likely to cause much damage, it is hoped that such sniper fire will cause whatever non-mechanized Depkazi infantry there are to slow-up and look for cover, perhaps allowing the main body of Baloch infantrymen to close some of the distance between themselves and the paras.

With the sun beginning to set, the Baloch regiment becomes especially eager to conclude the engagement quickly, and the enemy's withdrawal towards a nearby promontory is seen as a highly favorable occurrence. Scouts study the feature with their field glasses while flanking detachments rush to get ahead of it and the greater part of the infantry companies make good progress towards it.

Artillery support makes its belated appearance as well, in the form of a long mule train loaded with 82mm recoilless rifles, a varied collection of mortars, and 3.7 inch mountain howitzers. Though by no means equal to the enemy's Anonas, the mixed Baloch battery will at least allow the Dragoons to engage targets outside rifle range, a capability that, if brought into play earlier, might have already concluded the engagement.

Helmand

Depkazia's 'semi-elite' airborne forces are now put to the test in less than ideal circumstances. Withdrawing on foot and making full use of their firepower is seeing the paras cut-off from their rear guard and artillery, but their armoured support doesn't especially want to sit around waiting for them to board while RPG teams are in the area.

Chingiz's forces are clearly on their way to a first defeat, if only a small one strategically.

In fact it is likely because Chingiz has become, after building a reputation on infallibility, scared of defeat that he authorised only a small airdrop, much weaker than his officers had wanted. Now its defeat is all the more likely owing to the Caliph's cautious down-sizing, and, as he demands updates on the operation, he only blames his generals all the more for making him press ahead with an operation he doubted from the start.

Bold in strategic planning, overly cautious in practice?

As the firefight rages and the paras' casualties slowly mount, slowing their movement all the more and making it with ever moment a more ridiculous course of action, frantic radio calls beg for air support resound from both the ICVs and the artillery, where crews are now hearing the sounds of the firefight and spotting Baloch scouts, whom they invariably attempt to shell with probably little direct result.

If the situation is saved, it will be only at the last moment and only due to the Caliphate's overwhelming hardware as two late mark MiG-27 take off from Maimana airport and head south across Ghowr with significant warloads for a strike at the extent of their operational range. Unsure of enemy defences, they will release their flares automatically during their attack runs as they attempt to disrupt the Balochistanis... assuming that it isn't already too late as heavy weapons arrive to threaten the AVs that until now have been desperately fending off the attackers with 30mm and 73mm gunfire.

Helmand

The arrival of Depkazi Floggers sends Baloch troops running for cover, while would-be SAM crews rush to unpack their launchers after serving as riflemen during the day. Khattak's field commanders could not be called completely dismissive of the enemy's ability to mount air raids in support of their forces, but none materialized earlier, and this certainly gave the Baloch dragoons a false sense of security, prompting them to trade missile operators for riflemen.

Less inclined than most armies to bunch-up, and experts at using natural terrain for cover and to mask their maneuvers, the Baloch do not suffer too greatly, though the whole of the recently-arrived mountain gun battery is put out of action and its ammunition supply destroyed, leaving only four recoilless rifles and perhaps twice as many infantry mortars to bombard the beleaguered Paras. Depkazi pilots get almost nothing in return, given that most of the riflemen and machine gunners are taking cover, and would not be likely to waste finite ammunition on targets that they are unlikely to hit and unlikely to seriously damage even if they do hit them.

Not eager to wait around until more enemy aircraft show up, the dragoon commander finally decides to end it. Mortar and recoilless rifle crews are ordered to bombard the Depkazi-held hill, though this bombardment is doubtless rather underwhelming and will probably not impress much of anybody. Most of all it is meant to keep enemy heads down while riflemen make their attack. They advance relatively stealthily, but within a short while it will become impossible to conceal the movement of so many people over such a relatively small piece of ground, and the Baloch will just have to hope that their significant numerical advantage proves able to swamp the better-equipped paras.

Further to the south, Khattak's main force moves north along the main highway, moving to link-up with the dragoons who by that time will hopefully have destroyed the enemy airborne force. General Khattak decides ultimately to abandon any notions of attacking Armandian territory, after receiving reports that contradicted his earlier assessment of the Combine's ability to defend its home territory.

Depkazis might have reason to complain about faulty planning and awkward strategy, but the Baloch army is being led by a man who makes things up as he goes along, doubtless an able field commander but one with little experience campaigning and one that would very much like to become a Khan as well, in more than name. Khattak may give the Depkazis a severe headache, but the result of the encounter between his 25,000 semi-regular personnel and enemy forces is not difficult to predict. The Baloch troops are certainly good soldiers, expert marksmen with superb fieldcraft, but they lack much in the way of supplies and a modern army cannot expect to sustain itself for long by foraging and raiding its enemies for ammunition and equipment. Zulfiqar Makran, who sent Khattak into Afghanistan in large part to get rid of a man with his eye on the Presidency, is beginning to regret that decision as he faces the complete collapse of government authority throughout much of Balochistan with only a marine commando regiment and loyal gendarmes. The big plans that drove Balochistan to announce its independence and that brought Makran into office in the first place now seem highly unlikely to be realized, at least not under Quetta's authority.

Helmand

Depkazi Paras don't stop to cheer as their jets come in, rather keen as they are to rush for the perceived relative safety of their artillery poised on the near-by rise, taking full advantage of the strike and the fact that it forces a brief respite .

In the end this escape is fleeting, as the hill is hardly a fortress and certainly doesn't come with an airstrip or other means of true escape.

The Paras have thus far suffered fairly light casualties and done a good job of leaving none behind in their fighting retreat, but as the enemy infantry begin to converge and the truth of their numbers becomes creepingly apparent, as does the insufficiency of Depkazi firepower now concentrated on the hill.

Perhaps surprisingly the personnel landed in association with the half-dozen Anona have managed to scratch out a few slit trenches and throw up some sandbags, but to go so far as to refer to the all too shallow, spread-out, and lightly populated dimples as earthwork defences would be somewhat generous. Clearly, to occupy the system for long would be merely to await death. Losses were already mounting as shells landed and, now static, the infantry became ever more easily picked-off by powerful Baloch rifles.

Even as this was going on, further waves of the airborne force were finally arriving, clearly too late. With around fifty BMD-1 and 2 and a dozen Anona assigned to the mission, the Caliphate's airforce had been unable to deploy the whole force at once. Now the limitations of the large Caliphal military were becoming obvious as vehicles and men were dropped in the wrong place. Some came down almost in the middle of the enemy riflemen as flightcrews followed original mission plans with no regard for how the battlefront had shifted.

Frantic radio calls brought some assets down on the hill, but this situation was hardly more favourable as personnel struggled to make vehicles battle ready with .303" rounds zipping amongst them and pinging off armour or thumping into flesh.

Here and there vehicle crews and vehicleless infantry tried to fight off Balochistanis swarming past them, but often in pockets of seven men or less and armed with AK-74S and AKS-74 rifles and carbines their attempts to break out of minature pockets and even to figure out where the hell they're supposed to be going prove universally futile. At first, few have chance to surrender. They begin by fighting enthusiastically, and then, moments later, there's nobody left, so ridiculous is the situation.

Soon the first vehicle is over-run. A BMD-1 that landed hard with one side coming down on top of a large boulder is surrounded by a half dozen Depkazi whose efforts to use the 30mm cannon aboard their vehicle are thwarted by the slant at which the BMD is well and truly stuck. When they arrive, Baloch riflemen find three dead soldiers, one more trying to set light to his own stuck vehicle, and another recruit cradling his mortally wounded Sgt. and muttering Koranic verses in shaking tones.

On the hill, as the last self-propelled mortars arrive, more than a hundred infantry are trying to get aboard vehicles resolved to make a break for it and empty their fuel tanks in getting as far north as possible. After falling back in good order and stretchering wounded to the high ground, the still-able Paras are now abandoning both amidst cries to disorderly retreat and growls of over-revved engines.

The Balochistanis have won the field, and now all that remains is a final count on killed and captured Depkazis and lost machines.

South

Stopped in his tracks by reports that seem to be painting a picture of his first military defeat on any scale, young Chingiz Khagan suffers a momentary crisis of confidence. General Akram receives frustrating new orders to halt his 40,000 strong force, still behind Khattak and until now in pursuit, and concentrate on blocking its supplies while preparing airstrips and reminding locals that Afghanistan is Caliphal land, now. Akram is told to expect strong gunship and heli-mobile support in the near future, and for now sets to hiring Afghan militias to hassle Khattak's scouts, supplies, and other suitable targets.

Now unsure of his supposedly mighty military's true capabilities, Chingiz appears to plan the wearing-down of the enemy in the vastness of Afghanistan, and decrees that aiding the Baloch force, even by surrendering food or other support to it, will be an offence against the Calihpate and affront to heaven itself. Smarkand is switching to a little-considered strategy of siege as the air force is authorised to begin regular strikes against Khattak, which it -gradually- initiates with Su-17, MiG-23, and Su-25 attackers and a dozen Il-28 bombers. Even here Chingiz's confidence is lacking as he mandates limitations on the use of Su-25 and blocks deployment of Su-24 for fear of losing his better aircraft. Almost as bad, many of the involved planes will be flying at fairly extreme range and will be likely to attack the first target they locate before turning hurridly for home. The cost of deploying large ground forces is already telling on the Caliphate's ability to construct or operate significant airbases in newly captured territory.

At home, a few Generals steel themselves to take a potentially fatal plunge and confront their Caliph over his hesitations, many feeling that an advance from Kandahar could over-run Balochistan at the same time as Akram's force ought to be knocking the wind out of Khattak's allegedly inferior sails.

Akram sends envoy to Khattak

Approaching on horseback under a flag of truce, a Caliphal officer recruited from Afghanistan, near the North Pakistani border, identifys himself as an envoy from, "General Akram's Army of Pakhtunkhwa, which stands twice your size and poised to strike with the support of Allah, Khagan, and the Caliphal air force!"

The envoy attempts to present the idea that fighting thus far has been little more than a test of Khattak's metal and the discipline of his men, and that a one-time offer is now extended by which the General may save himself and his soldiers from certain destruction.

Of course Akram's army isn't quite so large as claimed, but it isn't all that far off, and the start of relatively small-scale air strikes lends legitimacy to his claims of air support.

It is unclear as to whether or not Chingiz himself has actually authorised Akram's approach, but the General, who as a North Pakistani experienced a much more peaceful Caliphal integration for his own nation, appears to be thinking ahead. He believes that prolonged bloodshed can only hurt the Caliphate and the Muslim peoples that may be united under its banner. Even if the Caliph turns out to be less forgiving of Khattak, Akram stands to gain great influence by achieving a sudden victory with minimal violence and may be able to consult Samarkand on the Balochistani's behalf.

The messenger claims that Khattak's men can expect pardons and free lives within the Caliphate, and that the General can still go on to high office if he embraces Akram as a friend and together they all but seal the annexation in one fell swoop of both Afghanistan and Balochistan, but that a refusal at this stage will be followed quickly by an overwhelming offensive by ground and air forces and the martial rather than diplomatic pacification of Balochistan.

Helmand

General Khattak's dragoons are quite pleased at their victory, though it came at not-insignificant cost and failed to do any damage to the main body of Depkazi pursuers. Fleeing BMDs and Anonas are fired-upon by recoilless rifles, aimed with some degree of skill and accuracy, but it is not possible for the dragoons, lacking any significant motorized transport, to pursue the Depkazi armor that is able to escape encirclement. It isn't long before the main force arrives at the site of the battle, and the sight of destroyed Depkazi equipment and enemy prisoners provides an important morale boost at a time when an increasing number of Baluchistani troops are calling into question their purpose in Afghanistan, and the validity of General Khattak's strategy.

Abandoned equipment is rounded-up as quickly as possible, and a great many troops take the opportunity to replace their Stens and Sterlings with folding-stock AK-74s, larger than their 9mm SMGs but far more useful in modern warfare and in Afghanistan especially, and significantly more reliable than the Sten. At least one BMD captured during the second Depkazi parachute drop is pressed into service by Khattak's force, manned by Centurion crewmen left vehicle-less by the scuttling of their tanks just after the abandonment of Kandahar, whose capture by Balochistan's armed forces was quickly rendered meaningless by the approach of Depkazi troops.

General Akram's envoy is received shortly afterward, blindfolded and escorted to Khattak's command vehicle on foot. Certainly aware of the forces arrayed against him, Khattak nonetheless refuses Akram's offer, demanding promises of amnesty for himself and his troops from Chingiz Khagan before the Baloch force considers surrender. Several armored cars and the captured BMD are driven back and fourth outside Khattak's command vehicle, in an effort to give the Depkazi envoy the impression that the Balochistanis are more heavily mechanized than is actually the case. The envoy is subsequently sent back to his own lines with a message from Khattak, demanding the immediate surrender of Kandahar and the complete withdrawal of Depkazi forces from both Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Or else, the hand-written dispatch threatens, Depkazi forces in Afghanistan face utter ruin.

Buoyed by his success against the Depkazi paras, Khattak, it appears, has finally gathered the confidence to seek a head-on engagement against the forces sent to pursue him. Once again, he plans to make full advantage of the terrain-traversing capabilities of his large horse-mounted contingent, and he hopes to at least bloody the numerically superior Depkazis to the point where they either withdraw or offer him more favorable terms for capitulation. All movement towards the north is stopped and the 25,000 or so Balochistanis swing around to confront their pursuers.

First contact with Akram's force is almost certainly made by the roving bands of mounted troops that screen the Baloch army. Equipped, like most of Khattak's army, predominantly with Lee-Enfields, the scouts often snipe at Depkazi patrols from long range, certainly not enough to cause serious difficulties but perhaps a nuisance for the advancing Depkazis to deal with. It isn't long, though, before the scouts are ordered to expand their activities, and larger mounted contingents, sometimes numbering in excess of a hundred men, set off across the terrain with the intent of raiding supply lines, often carrying with them 73mm recoilless rifles and light mortars. A large party, some 250 men, is even sent off to raid Kandahar itself, with the goal of seriously damaging its airfield and whatever enemy aircraft might be there.

Kashmir

[OOC: A bit crammed, this... it really ought have appeared over several posts, but I've been dropping the ball here while poor LRR has been roleplaying a dozen different countries in a half-dozen conflicts. The following was mashed together from a pile of half-completed notes, so likely you can tell where I was waxing poetic for a paragraph and where I just made quick sentences out of point-form notes...]

Maharaja Parak Singh is certainly aware that his position has now become untenable... the Indian National Union and the Depkazi Caliphate present twin challenges which surpass the predictable danger that was North Pakistan, while further afield Chinese instability and Soviet radicalism deny him support and bolster the ranks of his enemies. Parak loves his position, his power, dearly... but he has no intention to sacrifice his life or even lifestyle trying to keep them. Best to cut his losses and leave the fighting to others while he moves on to more successful endeavours.
The Maharaja's representatives can be found in Samarkand and Mumbai, exploring the possibility for 'special dispensations' to cover the expense of a peaceful transition out from Parak's rule. On their own, the suggested sums might seem rather steep, but the cost of a military victory in Kashmir has the potential to be steep, even if the eventual outcome is certain. Just look to the French in Africa or the Strainists in Indonesia, it will be said, to see examples of a possible future everyone hopes to avoid.
Kashmiri bankers and bureaucrats at the higher levels are also hard at work... the Maharaja, in his generosity, has permitted the sale of his private assets in the country to the state apparatus: palaces of historical significance, luxury vehicles for state motor pools, hunting estates for public parks, are all signed over 'at cost', Kashmiri tax money providing Parak with a much more liquid form of assets that soon vanishes out of the country destined for banks in Switzerland and Hudecia. It is wholly corrupt, an abuse of power which he would not have attempted even when his power was far more secure, but Parak Singh knows he cant take land with him when he goes, and will be long gone when the time comes to pay the consequences.
Money is not the only thing beginning to flow out of Kashmir... increasingly those at the highest level of the Maharaja's administration begin to put forward applications for immigration to the British Isles. These men, Parak included, start out applying as skilled workers... doctors, lawyers, businessmen, all with significant personal wealth and connections to the British elite dating back to the days of the Raj. And, should such factors fail to sway things in their favour, these men will not be above claiming status as refugees. Staying in Kashmir, after all, is looking increasingly dangerous for anyone too close to the Dogras... a death sentence, certainly!

The Maharaja's actions do not go unnoticed amongst those he plans to leave behind... the suspense in the air is palpable even to foreign visitors, everyone aware that things are about to fall apart, but no one quite aware of just what will happen when it finally happens.
Crowds in city squares grow larger each day, brandishing Jammu & Kashmir National Congress placards and shouting slogans... occasionally some yells might mention the world of Muslim brotherhood represented by the Caliphate, but for the eyes-and-ears who might report such things these will seem few and far between, drowned out by a sentiment long-eager to burst forth: "Democracy in Fifty Years!"
Kashmir was not Afghanistan, was not Pakistan... here, the identity of Muslims had been interwoven over a half-century with the other ideals espoused by the Congress' founder Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah... ideals of democracy and self-determination, born in opposition to the exclusive pan-Islamic vision of men like Muhammed Ali Jinnah, and what the result of such vision had beome under despots like Zulfiquar Mirza Shareef and his progeny.
Chingiz Khagan may see challenges in facing Combine troops or Pashtun poverty, but the greatest threat to his Caliphal dreams may well lie in the Vale of Kashmir.

But, if Kashmir represents a danger to the Khagan, it is one which he could ultimately overcome, if at the cost of concessions or crackdowns against the Muslims he claims to protect. Though it may not yet have occured to eager HDF officers or idealistic Parliamentarians, Kashmir is a threat not to the people of the Indian National Union, but to its very nature. The Muslims of the J&K National Congress would incorporate easily into the INU's democratic structures and freely-granted autonomy. The Hindus who have stood opposed to them for the past fifty years are a different story entirely... a radicalized minority constantly terrified that, if not smashed down and chained, the majority will rise up and destroy them. It is a vision exploited by Parak Singh's predecessors and other politicians for personal gain, which has grown as the current Maharaja granted concessions to his Muslim subjects which reduced Hindu power and influence, and which is now faced with the rise of a Caliphate that represents its worst nightmares given form. Even amongst moderate Hindus in Kashmir, the language of absolutes has become increasingly dominant... Muslims seek to dominate the world, Islam is a violent religion, Hindus and Muslims can never live side-by-side. Such extremist language had to be defeated before, at the founding of the INU, and even then the dream of a united India had been wittled away in order ensure such philosophies were absent from the Union, condemned to hide amongst shadows at the periphery. Absorption of Kashmir's Hindus would re-inject such sentiments into the INU, espoused by a population that could claim a degree of economic prosperity and political cohesion... in Mumbai's shifting political landscape, such a rock might be too small to dominate, but it would certainly make its presence felt.
Even now, angry Hindu mobs were gathering where National Congress rallies occured, shouting insults and throwing rotten fruit along with the occasional stone. Police units continued to keep the groups apart, though injuries were suffered and few actual arrests were made... uncertain of the future, police and Army officers had no desire to take sides, but neither did they wish to perform their current duties with too much dedication. A blind eye was turned to vandalism and racist graffiti, mostly targeted against Muslim-owned businesses, increasing calls on both sides to form groups which might defend their interests.
Hindustani aircraft seeking to observe the Kasmiri military might, if they were lucky, note that matters had the potential to get far worse than broken windows and rotten tomatos. Most Kashmiri military units remained nervously at their posts, some motivated to fight against Chingiz by years of conflict with North Pakistan but few seeming to have spirit for a battle against the HDF when matters at home seemed so uncertain. But Hindu officers had more to lose than their Muslim counterparts, and were thus more vulnerable to subversion.
In scenes reminiscent of the Khaganate's takeover in North Pakistan, the Army supply depot at Naushahra is emptied overnight, its Hindu commander claiming ignorance as to the location of its small arms, mortars, and landmines. A court-martial is scheduled by his superiors, but local Hindu leaders accuse Muslim brass of discrimination, and the trial is put on hold pending a decision from the Maharaja which may never come. Security around other depots is tightened in response, but half-measures are unlikely to deter problems if the political situation continues to deteriorate.

The Punjab

Union officials are more than a little disturbed about recent goings-on in Kashmir, and news of Parak Singh's withdrawal of Kashmiri revenue from the country is met with stern language, Unioners for instance threatening to arrest and imprison the Maharaja should he set foot inside Union territory. Though not one of the premier intelligence agencies in the world, the INU's Special Research Directorate has at least a competent signals intelligence section, and transmissions into and out of the Principality are closely monitored. Indeed, IAF overflights of Srinagar become a daily occurrence, and often include attack aircraft loaded with laser-guided bombs, in an attempt to remind Singh that the INU at least is "entirely capable" of removing him by force. Kashmiri diplomats are nonetheless told that, in all likelihood, a small stipend, equivalent to several million Quinntonian dollars at least, will find its way to Parak Singh. Perhaps it isn't much when measured against the wealth of a whole nation, but enough to put the outgoing ruler up comfortably in most Western capitals.

A great many Union diplomats are also dispatched to conduct business across the border, engaged in preparing Kashmir for the Maharaja's departure and what will hopefully be a peaceful transition to democratic majority-rule. The Unioners conduct interviews with community leaders, lower-level functionaries, and military commanders to the greatest extent possible, explaining the process of government in the absence of Dogra administration. Those with local responsibility, it is said, must be on the lookout for signs of racial and religious violence, and they must do their utmost to de-fuse tense situations before they develop a more ugly character. Hindustan's presence in Kashmir is not, the diplomats will explain, intended to be an occupation, and if popular rule did not appeal to a large segment of the population the Unioners would not be there to begin with. Rather, the INU is keen to see Kashmir, much of it anyway, peacefully integrated with India proper, and the INA's planned presence will help to ensure that the democracy "long denied by absolutists" is not spoiled by authoritarian and sectarian elements.

Civil unrest in Kashmir, a more immediate problem than Parak Singh's evacuation of state funds, the looting of government armories especially, gives cause to accelerate its preparations for a military intervention in Kashmir. Five out of the fourteen divisions available to the INA's 2nd Army, as well as the 25th Parachute Brigade and the 3rd Guards Tank Regiment, are committed to the operation already, and these units, accounting for at least 80,000 personnel, occupy positions close to the border with Kashmir. Ideally, though, UDF troops won't have to engage Kashmiri government forces in combat, and most commanders have come to see law enforcement and the prevention of communal violence as their most likely roles once established in the Principality. Indeed, besides the removal and replacement of the Royal Army's general staff, current plans do not call for the disbandment of the Kashmiri military for some time at least, and when that does come to pass Parliament expects to provide pension benefits for Kashmiri veterans with clean records.

Most do not expect things to go quite as smoothly as Parliament would prefer, but, as in Rajasthan, Hindustan's traditional approach to territorial acquisition applies. The dismantlement of old power structures will be coupled with a liberal dispensation of funds and the introduction of a wide range of democratic freedoms, and the end product will hopefully leave Kashmiris with a strong sense of self-determination even under Mumbai's authority.

Samarkand, meanwhile, is approached about the prospect of abandoning its own ambitions on the Vale of Kashmir, Union diplomats raising concerns about the historically strong democratic bent of that region's Muslims. Some expect Chingiz Khagan to find such talk insulting, as it flies in the face of earlier agreements, but at the same time several incentives are offered in exchange. Mumbai, for instance, offers to assist Depkazia in developing Gwadar port, which is also meant to be taken as an endorsement of the Caliphate's absorption of Balochistan, and Union yards are further offered-up for the construction, at greatly reduced cost, of merchant vessels once Depkazia acquires a coastline. It is further proposed that restrictions on cross-border trade be lifted and that new rail lines be opened linking the Caliphate and the Union.

As is too often the case, the INU speaks in a number of often-contradictory voices, and one could hardly blame Chingiz Khagan for growing tired of the indecisiveness, and some might say incompetence, of Union policy-makers. But the vast majority of Parliamentarians feel no small amount of sympathy for the Kashmiri National Congress and likewise feel no small amount of shame for, potentially, dashing its democratic aspirations against an authoritarian Depkazia. Indeed, with representatives coming and going on a weekly basis, it is difficult to maintain a steady point of view on difficult issues, a potentially dangerous bi-product of Hindustan's brand of democracy.

Hindustani diplomacy does indeed land awkwardly on the Caliph. Certainly Chingiz is not the sort to give-up stated territorial ambition without suffering the sort of defeat that makes sense to him, but his chief Vizier is keen to point-out the meaning behind Indian developmental assistance in Gwadar.

Chingiz, though, seems unimpressed. He believes that operations being enacted even now will give him Balochistan, and he does not believe that Mumbai will try to stop it. "If they are willing to give me Balochistan as incentive, they are not willing to spill blood over it when I reject the attendant obligations."

Right or wrong, the Caliph's position necessarily becomes that of Samarkand.

Afghanistan

General Akram had received his envoy's report with a heavy heart, believing that his opponent's defeat was already written and that it would lead to a bitter occupation of Balochistan rather than a genuine integration. Further he felt that this could finally ruin the Caliphate's relationship with India, necessitating more extreme policies and the eventual collapse of the sacred dream.

Even as the Pakistani General considered the awfulness of having to destroy Khattak, the raid on Kandahar was scuppering plans to begin major CAS sorties, significant material damage being rendered at the airport in a city that was still not really under Depkazi control in the fullest sense. Certainly the security situation was unlikely to impress locals told to expect a golden age of stability and prosperity within the Holy Caliphate and the protection of the undefeatable armies of the Khaganate.

It was at this point that the Caliph's new orders came through. If things hadn't already gone too far, Khattak was to be pardoned and offered a role at Registan in helping to work-out how to divide, unify, administer, and protect the varied territories and peoples of the Caliphate. Eventually he might be amongst the Khans or the Generals such as Akram, Radu (Dostum), and Brab (Rabbânî), while his men could march back into Balochistan with the Army of Pakhtunkhwa, perhaps to arrest Makran.

The Khagan was worried that the Vale of Kashmir could slip from his grasp at any moment, his forces were partly distracted in the DRA where Combine support had not melted so quickly as expected, and he was making inroads with the Xiannese at a critical juncture in Chinese history. There was simply no time to be messing about with a lot of Balochistani irregulars just because Khattak had dared to resist Caliphal ambitions. Best if possible to get him on side now and deal with his independent streak at a later date.

Khattak and his men would have to swear allegiance to the Caliph, and that would be that. By now Chingiz was deeply involved in the image he had cultivated... or perhaps simply stumbled into, of a very young ruler expanding Depkazi influence and the glory of Islam at a simply unprecedented pace and with surprisingly little bloodshed. Lightning progress mattered above all. Mid Asia was to be administered from Samarkand, Crossroad of Cultures, before Chingiz was an old man, and damn the long-term consequences: if his descendants failed it would only emphasise his own greatness, after all!

Peshawar

Caliphal cricketers warmed-up at the Arbab Niaz Stadium where crowds had already turned out to catch a glimpse of Younus Khan, Umar Gul, and Yasir Hameed ahead of the class with Hindustan, for which a full twenty-thousand spectators were expected, including a few hundred on tickets offered to the Indians along with special tourist visas.

Other North Pakistanis Mohammad Kabir Khan and even the controversial Syed Sajid Shah were added to the team at short notice in hopes of at least giving the mighty Hindustanis a run for their money. That Sachin Tendulkar, the little master could be joined by the likes of all-rounder Irfan Pathan, Zaheer Khan, Danish Kaneria, and others doesn't bode especially well, but Caliphal citizens don't seem to care.

Samarkand pushes the relative opening-up of North Pakistan as an example of the Caliph's benevolence and the progressive nature of Caliphal rule.

Opposition to the DRA is also promoted in much of the world, but owing to Hindustani relations with Armand it is not pressed so hard with Mumbai, though the odd reference to the past will continue to be made. Samarkand is just doing the work that Mumbai did in the past when supporting Mujahideen against the Russian Soviets and the puppet Democratic Republic.

Religious freedom is the other cornerstone that Chingiz uses to justify his actions and promote his ambition internationally, while the advisory body established at Registan is supposed to something of a halfway house, better than military or theocratic dictatorship from the standpoint of those who want full democracy.

Singh, meanwhile, may find the Caliphate more forgiving than a lately critical Indian National Union. As with Khattak, Chingiz merely wants the Maharaja to get out of his way, and really doesn't care where he goes or what he takes with him so long as he goes quickly and relatively quietly. Samarkand is not shy about expressing this to the Kashmiri establishment, though the Caliph's Vizier remains ever nervous about the possible PR implications, and Chingiz himself clearly does not.

Kashmir

Parak Singh did not care one bit for the future of Kashmir without him... certainly, he'd be happier to see it become a source of endless trouble for both the people free of his control and those who had forced his departure, but he was not a petty man. More to the point, instability in Kashmir might threaten his ability to squeeze Samarkand and Mumbai for further funds in exchange for the handover.
Singh's agents would be sure to play down any impressions of impending difficulty amongst advisors to either Caliph or Parliament, assuring all who will listen that the National Congress and Hindu militias are both merely reacting to the confusion of the situation, and will come around to more suitable behaviours once order is restored.
Well aware that the Maharaja would be unlikely able to re-assert control at this juncture, they nevertheless must maintain the illusion of control to gouge bribes from Kashmir's would-be new rulers. Thus, bureaucrats continue to work, military patrols continue to thread between mountain outposts, and the business of government generally proceeds half-heartedly.
Hindustani representatives making their way into the Vale and surrounding territories will quickly come to understand the difficulties ahead... most Muslim community leaders are welcoming, but their enthusiasm is not for partition of Kashmir but for the realization of long-held dreams. Belief that the National Congress will sweep to power in elections, and statements that Kashmir will welcome the friendship of the Caliphate and Hindustan may set the pangs of conscience throbbing in Mumbai... blind idealism seems the order of the day, ignoring stormclouds now gathering on the horizon.
Of course, not all Muslims are members of the National Congress or its hopeful peers... a few have been hardened by years of political oppression, favouring a more militant course that has seen thempushed from the bosom of the Congress. In these men, Mumbai's representatives may see the likely future leaders of Caliphal Kashmir, excited by the power Chingiz brings to Islam and ready to return the favours dealt by Hindus over a half-century of Dogra rule. They are certainly not the majority, but with the vast numbers of boots at the Caliph's disposal from his expansion elsewhere, they may be enough to secure the country against aspirations of democracy and self-determination.
Leadership in the Hindu population can be seen as similar, but reversed... the majority of those in positions of influence are worryingly fearful and dangerously angry, or perhaps merely feigning such sentiments for political gain. They are more motivated to push their wishes with force than the Congress, and it seems that if Kashmir were left to its own devices they would likely remain dominant in its politics, strong-arming their way to a new Maharaja, though perhaps not such a strong-willed individual as Parak Singh. One or two will even call on his Hindustani visitors to join a cheer for a bright future and a strong Hindustan to stand united against the Muslim horde.. A minority of Hindu community leaders are likely to be much more satisfactory in Hindustani eyes... a few are even themselves members of the National Congress, agreeing with its ideals and choosing not to obey boundaries of religion. These are, however, encountering some difficulty in conveying their beliefs to the wider populace, as violence and paranoia seem a better sell than reason and tolerance.

If Hindustan hopes to remove the head of the Royal Kashmiri Army, it may encounter some difficulty here as well. Kashmir, for all its authoritarian structures, is home to a military with a well-trained and capable set of officers, who have earned the respect of their men and built a strong esprit de corps over their years beating back the more numerous but more corrupt forces of North Pakistan. The number of officers in the highest ranks is essentially nil, Parak Singh preferring to play the final authority over councils of junior officers who could be promoted freely based on skill without gaining sufficient commands to mount a coup. In part, this structure has been a great source of difficulty as he prepares to depart... without a single hand to determine strategy, agreement is hard to come by. Still, it is not all bad: the Army's members may have political and religious leanings, but those visiting them will be under the impression that the vast majority have not reached a mental state where they could turn their weapons on their fellow soldiers, or their countrymen. The Army's peripheries house a few radicals, but the danger of these will not be on the march but in opening the armoury doors so mothers might do the dirty work they cannot bring themselves to approach.

http://img250.imageshack.us/img250/5987/kashmirsignaturexn3.jpg

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Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Chingiz might be encountering stiffer resistance than expected from the Combine and its tribal lackeys, but the Persian collectivists had problems of their own... while comrades in East Asia seemed to slip further towards conflict with the NATO powers, supposed Soviet ‘friends’ mustered at the border of the Armandian enclave in India. The Combine approached such conflicts with its usual stoic determination, but it was not a stupid organism: compared to these greater pandemics, Afghanistan was a mere sideshow, and one that would cost more than it was worth.
The Combine’s spread was a slow process. Proper integration, thorough as it was, created a populace from which Combine ideals would never be truly cleansed, but the first generation to suffer it could not help but struggle as individual urges were stamped out. The heart of the DRA had undergone this transformation, fed by those across the country who were most willing to embrace it and freed of its most ferocious opponents as they fled to more amiable climes. But Afghanistan was vast, and its people strong-willed… while few doubted that the Black Flag would march inexorably to Kabul, and then on to fly over the tumbled minarets of Samarkand, now was not the time. When threatened, the Combine needed to react like a phalanx, each part drilled to know its place and to defend the part beside it, and even conquered Afghanistan would be the weak man whose stumbling brought danger upon the whole.

Thus, Combine diplomats attempt to open negotiations with the Caliph… in the Khagan’s hands, the DRA would be unable to integrate into the Caliphate, a thorn in his side much as the rest of Afghanistan would irk the Combine should it come under their power. War would be brutal and unending, for even losing neither side would die a slow death, but peace would bring stability and benefit to both. The Combine will have its Democratic Republic, the Khagan his Khanates, and both can turn their attentions to more important matters.

Mumbai is encouraged to support the Combine in its efforts towards a negotiated settlement, in the interest of regional stability and security, the Armandians perhaps hoping to exploit the INU’s closer connections to Samarkand as it makes its case.

The Strainists too are pushed to play nice, though they will certainly not be pleased by the pressure… they war against one Caliph already, and the Islamic scholars who claim significant influence over the Party’s hundred-million Muslim members have shown little regard for the latest upstart to claim the title. Still, Chingiz Depkazi holds sway over quite a number of Muslims himself, and while unlikely to acknowledge him as Caliph, there is an understanding that the two greatest forces within the Ummah ought reach some form of accommodation.

http://img214.imageshack.us/img214/6903/combinesignatureur5.jpg (http://z7.invisionfree.com/A_Modern_World/index.php?showtopic=65&view=findpost&p=15977959)

The Indian National Union

Samarkand's unfavorable response towards the INU's proposal regarding Kashmir comes as no great surprise, though that consideration does not lessen the disappointment felt by many Unioners upon hearing the news. Certainly Parliament's complete failure to take Kashmir's strong Muslim-based democratic movement into account when negotiating with the Depkazis weighs heavily on the conscience of more than a few Unioners, many of whom see in the National Congress (OCC: Conference?) a model Indian political organization and a group worth supporting. Indeed, no few voices cry foul at the idea of providing for a partition of Kashmir when the Kashmiris themselves were not asked their opinion on the matter. It stinks, they say, of imperialism, and Parliamentarians ought to be ashamed of it, Parkash Vaidya especially.

Almost automatically, Parliament sends Samarkand a revised proposal with terms supposed to be more favorable. A generous aid package is offered for public works projects throughout the Caliphate, besides Gwadar Port, and economic assistance is proposed in the form of the establishment of an Ambassador production line in Depkazia. Parliament also suggests, very belatedly, that the INU and Depkazia hold a plebiscite in the Principality of Kashmir on the subject of accession, so that the actual leanings of the Kashmiri people, and the various ethnic and linguistic groups that compose the population, can be known in at least broad terms. It would not do, the communication points out, to impose any kind of government on Kashmir that most Kashmiris themselves don't want. Indeed, many Unioners are upset that Parliament did not hit on such a simple solution earlier, before it made its ill-advised accommodation with Depkazia.

Just the same, should the Khagan need some persuading, the 7th Division, a mechanized infantry unit deployed in Sindh, ostensibly to protect against seaborne invasion, is told to ready itself for a cross-border incursion into Balochistan.

Hindustani diplomats in Kashmir report back to Mumbai with urgent requests for Parliament to hurry up, at the same time criticizing in very plain language the ham-handed way by which the government has handled the situation thus far. Some diplomats, fed-up with the glacial pace of Parliamentary efforts, even go so far as to take matters into their own hands, and foreign voices can be heard at National Congress rallies and those of other 'friendly' political forces and trade unions. If Srinagar has anything to say about it, the Unioners often point to the sky, and say that, if anything happens to them, the IAF will turn up. Alarmed by the apparent militarism of Hindu elites, diplomats are keen to unite the workers and the lower classes against the Maharaja's appointees and the governing sector of society, invoking language and ideology borrowed from the INU's own origins.

The professionalism evident in Kashmir's Royal Army does impress Union visitors, but then again they are not overly surprised given the Principality's surprising measure of success against Mustafa Shareef's forces, which, as far as Hindustani analysts have gathered, were usually better-supplied and for a long time backed by the USSR. It is advised that the Royal Army, in light of its rather higher-than-expected level of competence and ability, be left more or less as it is, albeit without the "Royal" title, and talk of INA involvement centers more and more around police-type operations, as opposed to open warfare. Union diplomats for their part try their best to ensure that the Kashmiri military will maintain its high standards and its "apolitical nature," promising that Mumbai will pay salaries and provide support as long as the Army continues to carry-out its civic duties.

It is very much hoped that the INU will be able to view the Kashmir operation through the lens of "protecting Kashmiri democracy," something Mumbai is, more or less sincerely, interested in, and something that may well take precedence over the relationship with Depkazia. Parliament at last sets a date for the Maharaja's departure, giving Parak Singh approximately one month to organize his affairs before he is obliged to hit the road. Union diplomats are, for their part, sufficiently confident in the Royal Army's ability to maintain order and the National Congress's potential to form a government relatively quickly, in some areas at least. Of course, veteran Foreign Service members are very much aware of the fact that, if delicateness and discretion are not closely adhered-to, guerrilla struggle and proxy war could be the result.

Afghanistan

Abdur Khan Khattak is much more receptive to General Akram's terms the second time around, especially in the wake of the unexpectedly successful raid on Kandahar. Indeed, Khattak is visibly conscious of the fact that he can claim victory in both the engagements that his force fought over the course of the Helmand campaign, and morale is correspondingly high in the Baloch formation. For the most of Akram's troops, their loyalty rests more with their commander than with their nominal government, and they are happy to join with the Depkazi soldiers, who they will doubtless come to regard as not at all different from themselves.

Collectively the Baloch force swears its allegiance to the Caliph, and the Quetta government's standards are exchanged for more traditional green and black banners in a well-attended and jubilant ceremony. Several hundred personnel are, however, absent from the events, and Khattak is privately quite concerned about the disappearance of several battalions of horsemen. Some Baloch troops, it appears, are not about to abandon the fight, and have taken to the rugged countryside with the intent of engaging Depkazia by less conventional means. The countryside, of course, is by no means unoccupied, and few can guess as to how well the deserting Baloch troops will fare against local warlords and what few Taliban troops remain.

Khattak does not fail to point this potential difficulty out to Akram, but for the Baloch commander this is not a major concern as he arranges transportation to Samarkand, eager to meet with Chingiz Khagan himself. Command of the Baloch field army is left in the hands of a trusted subordinate, one Brigadier Umar Hasni, and preparations are made to march on Balochistan.

Back in Quetta, news of Khattak's change of allegiance throws Zulfiqar Makran into a rage. Furious, he orders the BAF, or what's left of it after its rough treatment at the hands of Depkazi Flankers, to mount an attack against the Baloch army in Afghanistan. Told that their targets are in fact Depkazi armored units moving to attack Khattak's force, eight Canberras set-off on a nighttime low-level attack sortie, armed with cluster bombs and cannon.

The epic fortunes of young Chingiz -his exiled father, as it happens, has recently admitted that the Caliphal ruler was given the name Chingiz Chokareff at birth- continue their relentless cycle of improvement and decline as Samarkand pushes his ambitious agenda.

Afghanistan & Armand

The Combine's refusal to lie down and die like a good little Marxian economy raises the spectre of not unlikely military defeat should the Caliphate attempt to take the DRA by force. Though Chingiz firmly believes that 'his' Muǧāhidīn would forever prevent the 'Combinisation' of Afghanistan and eventually link up with Azeri nationalists to shatter the foundations of the Armandian empire, even this optimistic assumption is insufficient in respect of the sheer pace of the Caliph's plans and aims.

On the other hand, Khattak's switch to the Caliphate and the capture of Kabul and Kandahar all but settle the fate of greater Afghanistan, and Chingiz's self-confidence is reaffirmed. He continues to claim that, divinely protected, his forces are unbeatable, and his belief in his own irresistable magnetism is stronger than ever.

The Caliph agrees to open discussions with Constance, and claims to be happy to have Mumbai take part as a third party element. Samarkand maintains that Azerbaijan and Afghanistan are rightly Caliphal lands, and that the Combine represents a continuation of the Russian Soviet empire in Mid Asia, but agrees in principle to work with the foreign element while maintaining official disapproval of the occupations.

Samarkand will not grant full recognition to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, but will conceed for the immediate future to accept its administration of the following provinces:

-Herat
-Farah
-Badghis
-Nimruz
-Ghowr

In total, the Caliphate estimates, this covers an area of 201,324 square kilometres and has a population a probably over 2,600,000. This will leave the Caliphate to gobble up -inclusive of Bactria- some 446,176 km2 and more than twenty-nine million Afghanis, though quite how many will end up paying taxes or showing-up for military service must be in significant doubt.

Quietly the Caliph considers that Badghis especially is home to a huge number of ethnic Depkazis, but by not contesting it he hopes to retain a claim that is all the stronger and maintain strong links in the DRA. Most other states are either already under Samarkand's direct or indirect control or else are clearly exposed, as Khattak and his Caliphal pursuers marched back and forth across provinces such as Helmand and Oruzgan during their hostilities.

Depkazi forces that crossed into Herat and Badghis will withdraw if a settlement is reached, but already it is clear that Turkic militias and Muǧāhidīn guerrillas in those provinces have received small arms, RPGs, infantry mortars, and MANPADS along with camels and horses and not a few Depkazi and Bactrian advisors since the Depkazi military arrived at the fringes of Towraghondi and elsewhere.

Still, Chingiz indicates that a peace deal, while not exactly what he wants, may allow the restart of consultations on a possible Armand-China pipeline running through the Caliphate, provided that Constance and/or Beijing (if that should remain China's capital in future) pay reasonable transit fees related to service, loss of land to other uses, and security requirements.

In the south, Brigadier Umar Hasni is asked to divide his force. One part is required to proceed with Akram to Balochistan as planned while the second element is to move with another part of the Army of Pakhtunkhwa to secure the major road through Helmand and reinforce Samarkand's claim to the province in negotiations with Constance. This expedition will be lead by none other than Radu Khan, a man personnal infuriated by the prospect of Badghis, a territory that he once called his own, being secured to the DRA for some time to come and not unlikely to end up exchanging fire with Armandian-backed forces on the border.

It is expected that the Brigadier will prefer to lead his men into Balochistan, but orders directed at his person are not terribly clear on the matter, and he can probably decide to move west as Dostum's subordinate if he so desires, leaving Balochistan up to Akram.

Afghanistan & Balochistan

Khattak will be almost royally received in Samarkand, though he has to put up with the usual tour of the ancient city, which drags on because the Caliph is engaged in entertaining the new Xiannese Emperor at Registan. Khattak must wait his turn. He too sees considerable displays of Caliphal military might, with Flanker aircraft predominant in the sky and plenty of SRBMs and SAMs nestled amongst the minarets.

Eventually Chingiz will greet him as a respected soldier and potentially valuable servant, and he can expect to hear that Samarkand intends eventually to organise a significant number of Khanates in Afghanistan, North Pakistan, Balochistan, and Kashmir, and that he is a contender for the title to one of these, presumably in Balochistan and/or southern Afghanistan, though little can be confirmed as borders are yet to be drafted.

The Caliph will, though, ask after Khattak's own preferences and ambitions with reference to the alternative possibility that he may reject political office and pursue a soley military career, in which case he may become commander of the army of a Khanate and effective number-two to its Khan, and might expect to campaign in future in Armand, the DRA, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Chechnya, western China, Kashmir, or even overseas.

OOC: Afraid that I haven't time to deal with everything this time around, but I don't mind if you choose to play-out the BAF air strike yourself, afflicting the Brigadier and/or near-by AoP forces if you like. Obviously we've some AAA and SAMs, and Flankers are in theatre, but Depkazi radar coverage here absolutely blows, of course.

Helmand

Flying in at very low level, and using the terrain to mask themselves from early warning radars, the Baloch Canberras are able to avoid detection until very close to Khattak's force, though flying so close to the ground without the benefit of modern terrain-following radar costs one bomber before the target is reached. Lacking any altitude margin to correct a problem with one of the Avon engines, the aircraft plows into the side of a hill and explodes.

Baloch soldiers on the ground are somewhat confused as the Canberras roll in to make their attack, and they recognize in aircraft with such blatantly hostile intent the distinctive profile of what was only very recently one of the few friendly silhouettes apt to be spotted in the skies over Afghanistan. Not unprepared for air attack, but at the same time not expecting it after making peace with the Depkazis, Khattak's troops are able to offer some resistance as the Canberras sweep overhead, dropping parachute-retarded bombs along the length of the Baloch column. Casualties in terms of personnel are relatively light, but much equipment, not evacuated from the main road in time, is lost to the air-dropped ordnance. Ammunition supplies are decimated in the attack, rendering several of the more unusual types of weaponry employed by the Baloch force completely useless and further aggravating an already precarious supply situation, though the Depkazis are expected to rectify this in short order through their far more capable logistics network.

Despite their maintaining the element of surprise, two BAF Canberras are downed by Baloch and Depkazi shoulder-fired SAMs, and two others suffer considerable damage, likely to make it back to base but not likely to fly again after that. Those still flying at the end of the raid duck down to low altitude and try to put as much distance as possible between themselves and the nearest Depkazi airbases. The BAF's Canberra fleet already had a bad run-in with the Caliph's Flankers, and aircraft out on the latest raid into Afghanistan are hardly more prepared for that eventuality.

Brigadier Hasni, meanwhile, after receiving treatment for a slight injury sustained during the BAF attack, carries-out Akram's orders and divides the 25,000-strong contingent roughly in half, assigning two out of the four available maneuver brigades, plus supporting elements, to Radu Khan's operation while the two others remain with Akram's command, dedicated to the push into Balochistan itself. Both forces, increasingly referred-to by Baloch staff as divisions, include sizable contingents of horsemen, the same dragoons that defeated the albeit much less numerous Depkazi paratroopers and successfully raided Kandahar. They are an anachronism to be sure, but in Afghanistan, where the terrain often prevents the deployment of vehicles, the Baloch at least have found their mounted contingents extremely useful for their ability to travel off the major roads. Armor is in very short supply, and a few companies of WWII-vintage armored cars are all that the Balochistanis can muster on that front. Baloch artillery comes from around the same time period, but there is no shortage of it, from 6-pounder antitank guns to 4.5-inch howitzers. Hasni remains, as expected, part of the Balochistan operation, and with his two brigades comes the greater part of surviving artillery and armored cars. Coming from a very much urbanized Baloch family, and placing little value on his tribal affiliations, Umar Hasni does not share the tribal leaders' strong dislike of Zulfiqar Makran, but at the same time he is no great fan of the Prime Minister and is sensitive to any opportunity for gaining in terms of rank and prestige.

Samarkand

Visibly impressed by his surroundings, the Balochistani general has high hopes for his meeting with the Caliph. He presents himself at Registan in full dress uniform, a British-style affair with a chestful of campaign ribbons and medals, no few of them issued by the INA.

Certainly Khattak is attracted to the idea of becoming a Depkazi Khan, a position that would seem to give him what he was out to get in the first place, but Chingiz's offer of a command in the Depkazi armed forces is also highly appealing. The strokes his mustache and thinks things over for a few moments, weighing the relative benefits of each position, before deciding to accept a new military post. Khattak tells Chingiz Khagan that he is, at heart, an adventurer and a campaigner, in the same vein as his celebrated Pashtun ancestors, and, if it suits the Caliph, he'd prefer not to be stuck in some administrative post while others push the frontiers of the Caliphate.

Samarkand

At the new think tank in the Registan, the Caliph talks vaguely of a future with twelve Khanates under the Depkazi Khaganate, but admits to lingering uncertainties about borders yet to be drawn.

Abdur Khan Khattak, the Caliph declares, will take charge of a yet-to-be-raised Balochistani Jundullah, or Army of God, comprised primarily of Baloch and related Brahui recruits who may be drawn largely from the former Hindustani Balochistan, southern Helmand, and Kandahar.

In the short term the purpose of the force, also to be refered to as the Army of Balochistan, will be to lead security operations in the integration into the Caliphate of Hindustani Balochistan and parts of southern Afghanistan, and possibly there after to assist in the safe acquisition of Kashmiri territory, while it's long-term objective will be to complete the liberation of Balochistan.

In this sense the Caliph uses the name of Balochistan to incorporate parts of Afghanistan that he will agree to leave for now under the Democratic Republic (pending a deal on the matter), namely Nimruz and part of Farah, and a formidable 180,000 square kilometres of Armand-proper that he considers under (an extremely long) occupation by the heathen Armandians.

OOC: Again I'm too short on time. More on troubles in Afghanistan, and plenty of new foreign relations drives long over due. Unfortunately Chingiz is working his way up to really, really p'ing off Mumbai (and others), at the moment!

It was well that the bulk of 25,000 Balochistani fighters had sworn allegiance to the Caliph, essentially deciding the conflict's outcome, because, as observers may note, the Army of Pakhtunkhwa was not behaving in a manner likely to awe many more into submission in the aftermath of the BAF's latest attack.

Caliphal strategy seems to hold that victory is assured and that the downing of a few bombers by attached air defences is sufficient response. The bombers are not pursued.

General Akram and Brigadier Hasni -likely to be promoted before long, as Akram himself was after helping to smooth the integration of North Pakistani forces into the Caliphal fold- push on to the border at a not wholly inspirational pace, the vaunted Depkazi military struggles to maintain a really good level of supply so far from home. Akram eventually drops much of his original strength and takes only 2,500 men with the Balochistanis, turning supplies and vehicles over to this smaller contingent and their allies. 15,000 Balochistani and mostly North Pakistani fighters will attempt to cross the border in a high state of mechanisation.

The General's action runs contrary to the advice of Radu Khan, Akram suspecting that Dostum resents his more glory-ridden assignment and wishes to slow him down. A few thousand Caliphal men are left near the scene of the recent strikes with little to do but salvage equipment and hope against further airstrikes or ground-based raids.

Meanwhile, Samarkand has sent envoys to Dodoma to negotiate for the purchase of AFRISAM technologies with which to upgrade Sa-6 Gainful SAM systems in an attempt to make the Caliphate Russia-proof.

OOC: Just a bump to see if we hit any problems in marching into Balochistan. And how's Kashmir holding up?

Balochistan

As General Akram's forces arrive along the poorly-guarded frontier, it appears almost certain that Balochistan will be absorbed into the Caliphate, its brief period of national independence well and truly at an end. Zulfiqar Makran takes the opportunity, along with most upper-level officials in his government, to flee the country, and it isn't long before the prime minister and his cabinet arrive at the airfield in Jacobabad aboard a Yak-40 transport, claiming refugee status and requesting political asylum. This is promptly granted, although the Yak-40 jet will almost certainly be returned to Balochistan and whoever comes to power there. Makran's personal automobiles, a Citroen Traction Avant and a Citroen DS, also turn up at the Union frontier, and though these are nominally property of the Baloch state there is absolutely no question of returning them.

Accession to the Caliphate is by no means an unpopular course of action, and that much will become readily apparent to Depkazi troops as they enter the nation. Never very enthusiastic members of the Indian National Union, and dissatisfied by the Makran administration's complete failure to deliver on its promises, Balochistanis are hopeful when it comes to the young Chingiz Khagan and his nation, both of which appear to be on the up and up.

Resistance is correspondingly light, though at the town of Chaman, just before the Khojak Pass that controls access to Quetta, Akram's forces will encounter a regimental-strength detachment of Baloch troops, a mixture of gendarmes, border police and coastal rangers, who are dug-in and intent on making a fight out of it. Equipped with a battery of 17-pounder antitank guns and a great many 20mm AA pieces, they mean to block the road to the capital. The process of crossing the border will of course be a great deal easier elsewhere, and in a short time the Depkazis may be able to bypass Chaman's defenders with relative ease.

Samarkand makes no official protest to Mumbai over the decision to grant assylum to Zulfiqar Makran and his allies despite the Caliph privately complaining to his Vizier that he infers a perception of the Caliphate as somehow unsafe or unjust. Despite some advisors suggesting that pushing this case may force the INU to more openly and officially accept Caliphal legitimacy, others pursuade Chingiz that Balochistan is best absorbed with the absolute minimum of fuss and without taking-on unnecessary diplomatic risks.

The opposition at Chaman is a cause for some consternation, and Akram again delays his advance as he calls for the defenders to embrace the Holy Caliphate and avoid dying for a nation whose leader has already abandoned it. The General immediately calls for propaganda posters to be made-up and dropped over the town to clarify Makran's flight, and to imply -with however little evidence- that his government may have made-off with no small part of the nation's wealth to live a comfortable life in one of Mumbai's more up-market suburbs.

Fighting is not completely over in parts of Afghanistan, and Akram does not want to be responsible for turning Balochistan into a rebellious occupied province with a population soured against the Caliphate by a bloody siege at Chaman.

Still, it is not long before Samarkand is telling Akram to hurry-up, lest the Prime Minister's departure create a power-gap into which undesirable elements slip, and the General does grudgingly detach parts of his force, sending Hasni with 5,000 mixed Balochistani and North Pakistani troops on a lengthy -and chiefly horse-mobile- flanking mission, while he keeps most of the heavy equipment and 10,000 men facing Chaman's defenders and protected by what anti-aircraft equipment he has on hand.

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

Negotiations with Chingiz Khagan over the division of Afghanistan will likely not be resolved quickly... Constance does not wish for a costly sideshow battle with a power that would better serve as an ally-of-convenience against the Russians, but it is far from considering itself bested. Many of the forces fighting in the country, after all, continue to be the men of the DRA People’s Liberation Army of Afghanistan, as well as its affiliated militias, a force which has surprised many with its tenacity since it was abandoned by Moscow following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Unified Combine’s own mechanized divisions, and attached air elements, are predominantly deployed in the northern provinces of the DRA, where recent offensives were concentrated. Intelligence estimates from satellite photographs (human intelligence being notoriously difficult to gather from within Armand) indicate that an equal force has been readied for deployment in the southern provinces. Oddly, this might turn the Khagan into a supportive voice as Constance lobbied Mumbai to allow its military units into North Sienna… better there than here.

DRA and Combine officials, accepting the provinces first suggested by the Depkazis (Herat, Farah, Badghis, Nimruz, & Ghowr), also argue for further concessions in Oruzgan and Helmand, west of the Helmand river. Communist control here is certainly not firm, but neither is the PLAA completely absent, and the language used strongly implies confidence that these regions will be brought into the fold soon enough, with or without an agreement with the Caliphate.

Meanwhile, within Afghanistan, DRA propagandists find themselves suddenly able to draw upon an element which has up until now worked against them. Chingiz’s successes in Pakistan and Balochistan, and his expansive Khaganate, mark him as going further than even the Soviet Union did in its presence here… whatever one might say about its relations with outside powers, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan remains a national entity, not a series of carved-up khanates under the thumb of a foreign ruler. That such a ruler is an ethnic Depkazi is icing on the cake when dealing with nervous Pashtun… many may not like the communists, but it will do to leave Samarkand with just as much trouble as faces Constance in securing Afghan territory.

Faith is a sphere where the Afghan communists still struggle, and where the Caliphate has an advantage. Efforts continue to tout the DRA’s ‘Islamic socialism’ and to garner support from moderate clerics, bolstered by visiting Islamic scholars from the Combine-allied Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and Strainist Sujava. DRA internal security, and their Combine backers, are somewhat nervous about the latter, aware that the Sujavan clerics emerged from the founding of their leftist state with far more influence than some of their secular Party comrades would have liked. Little can be done given present circumstances, and the Sujavan example may well be a selling point despite DRA discomfort.

Having not proven particularly extreme in his approach to Islam, an appeal to moderates worried over extremism is not guaranteed to change many minds. Clandestine efforts do begin, however, to try and spread the word that Chingiz Khagan Depkazi is perhaps not extreme ENOUGH. Those who would consider such an argument are already staunch enemies of the Communists, and will never change that position, but why not let the Caliphal claimant face a volley of rocket-propelled grenades from mujahideen each time he fails to hold a woman responsible for her rape when she fails to wear the burqa.

And of course, the standard argument continues, of prosperity versus poverty… imagery of vast fields of wheat and melons in Nimruz, wind turbines and solar panels illuminating Farah’s villages against the night sky, the streets of Heral busy with beetle-like Combine electric cars as uniformed soldiers of the PLAA assist in the construction of a local mosque. Unity and peace instead of war and chaos... a message with an appeal that can only grow as factional fighting persists in the rest of Afghanistan.

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Kashmir

Distant from the Democratic Republic, the Combine's touch can still be felt... it was the Armandians, after all, who had assisted the Dogra Maharajas when they first faced the armies of North Pakistan, and Sienna might well do so again if they saw an advantage in it. Doubtless, HDF pilots making overflights of Kashmir were keeping an eye on that border for signs of such smuggling.

Hindustanis in Kashmir will have, despite the dangers of ethnic conflict erupting in the Vale, found some reason for hope, in the form of Kashmir's significant Sikh population. The majority of Kashmiri Muslims seemed united by a vision of independent democracy, the Hindus dominated increasingly by extremism and paranoia, but while a small number of Sikhs shouted demands for an independent Kalistan, the majority looked upon membership in the Indian National Union as something which would secure them economically while preserving their autonomy and religious freedom. Balochistan's departure from the INU fold was further proof that Mumbai would respect Sikh wishes, and would allow their departure if the relationship proved untenable.
And, the Sikhs had fared well in the merit-driven ranks of the Royal Kashmiri Army... it was their determination not to side with either Hindu or Muslim factions, more than anything, which had so far kept the country from degenerating into warlordism and ethnic fighting.

Maharaja Parak Singh, meanwhile, signs over the last of his residences to the Kashmiri state, in exchange for liquid capital from government coffers. It will likely be some time before outside accountants get ahold of Kashmir's books to find that the country is now flat broke, with nothing to left pay the salaries of soldiers and government employees, not to mention maintenance on existing infrastructure. Parak will abdicate his title and hand over the keys in one month's time, hopping on a jet to London and away from his fiscally-gutted former princedom.

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Afghanistan

Certainly Islamic extremism worries the Caliph more than Communism, especially in Afghanistan, which includes probably the most traditional, under-developed, and inaccessible territories in Chingiz's imperial vision. As such, the vast bulk of the Caliphate's education budget, a few vital technical colleges aside (some of which are starting to receive private industry funding in any case) is directed at the promotion of Chingiz's particular Islam, which is Sunni, of course, and Hanafite particularly.

Most important is the strength given to this Madh'hab by the fact that, when Chingiz came to power, most Depkazis were broadly ignorant of the details and practices of any religious dogma, and the Caliph has been able in Depkazia-proper to establish Hanafi wisdom in its most liberal form, hopeful that it will only help him in both economic endeavour and in attracting new believers. Apart from such cosmetic touches as reestablishing the acceptability of limited consumption of some alcoholic beverages, Chingiz's modern Hanafi Fiqh promotes the acceptability of reading and reciting from the Qur’ān in languages other than Arabic.

While this means on the one hand that Samarkand is up to such things as the printing of large numbers of holy texts in the Armandian tongue, it also leaves that much more room for hard-line criticism.

Chingiz embraces the growing enthusiasm of Turkic 'new' Hanafites as something of a counter-weight in pushing his vision across Afghanistan.

Still, Oruzgan and Helmand west of the river seem reasonable enough concessions. In them the Caliphate will surrender little population and no small expanse of sparsely-peopled and potentially troublesome territory.

At this time Afghanistan matters to the Caliph mostly for two reasons. First is direct access to Balochistan and by extension the high seas, and second simply the large number of Muslim people to be found in that nation when compared to Balochistan (at most ten million people), Xinjiang (maybe twenty million people, many non-Muslim), and even Kazakhstan (fifteen million with no few infidels amongst them) and other territories that Chingiz wishes to rule. He would rather give up -however temporarily he views the concession- a hundred thousand square kilometres than that number of souls, since land develops no loyalty to any master or ideology, while human hearts may be, well, turned black.

Samarkand implies that it is willing to halt Radu Khan's force on the east bank of the Helmand river and perhaps begin new discussions on such issues as the Armand-China pipeline (even if the Chinese end is now rather confused), the Russian problem, Islam's role in the Sphere, and North Sienna's situation, all matters in which Chingiz apparently believes he has something to offer-to or hold-over Constance, and of course the disputed demarcation of borders in the Caspian basin, where Combine military might perhaps has something on Chingiz.

Construction boom touches all corners

The Caliphate that Chingiz Khagan is building... is building. Since the turn of the century, more Mosques have been built in Samarkand than in any other world city in a similar timespan. German renewable energy has made a small impression with wind turbines and solar farms here and there in the desert, vast hydro-electical dams continue to be built in the mountains, and US and British petrochemical giants are beginning to arrive as new roads cut into Afghanistan and airstrips appear all over the vast empire. New mines are sunk regularly, and every major city will soon have a new library and college sponsored by the Caliph.

Chingiz has now ordered the construction of a grand mosque in each principle city. In Dushanbe, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazār-e Sharīf, Peshāwar, Aşgabat, Türkmenbaşy, Toshkent, and Bishkek huge mosques will be raised, with the biggest at Samarkand facing the Registan and planned to dwarf the Blue Mosque. The young Depkazi Caliph plans to convince all Islam to look at Mid Asia for Paradise on earth, and intends to eclipse the domes and minarets of Istanbul with earth-and-blue Timurid glory.

A new construction project in the southwest is neither economic nor religious in purpose.

The Köpet Dag range between Depkazia and Armand are host to the biggest construction scheme in their history. Tens of thousands of people are being trucked in, tent cities erected, prefabricated warehouses erected, and the most conflicted of all Asian political dynasties begins work on its great wall.

Soldiers, convicts, and unemployed people, many with their families, are relocated to the bare region and set to work for the Caliphate.

Close to the border but with a course dictated by terrain, a defensive chain is building link by link. Following Liege, Maginot, GHQ Line, the Atlantic Wall, the 38th parallel's HARTS, the Westgaard Line, Yugoslavia's underground airbases and bunkers, the French forts, and Roycelandia's anti-Lusakan pillboxes is 'Timurline', the Iron Line.

A large part of the line is epic simplicity, modification of existing ridges and dips to make natural barriers more visually imposing. Likely such works are more aesthetic than practical, but more militarily sound emplacements are being established in the rear through a depth of several kilometres, including trenches, minefields, fences, bunkers, tunnels, gun emplacements, and pill boxes.

On its face the line will be highly visible if tactically weak, and in the low mountains and desert behind designed for defence in depth.

'The Timur Line' does not look like a friendly gesture to the Combine and its Sphere allies, but every completed section sees a mobile unit of Caliphal troops displaced from the southern border and reassigned to the Kazakh frontier, and friendly or not, such an undertaking is hardly suggestive of expansive imperial intent here.

The Indian National Union

News from the Kashmiri Punjab serves to encourage a Parliament that is still very much doubtful as to whether its present policy towards Kashmir as a whole is correct. Foreign Ministry officials in Mumbai are quick to present authorities in Kashmiri Punjab with an instrument of accession for their review, the expectation being that the predominantly Sikh leadership will have an answer for Mumbai within a few days. Though there is some uncertainty over what exactly Hindustan's prospective seventh state will be called, given that the western portion of Raj-era Punjab is already known by that name, it will no doubt be accorded generous terms of accession and a significant amount of financial aid. Parliament as a whole certainly has no desire to interfere with the Sikh religion, or any religion for that matter, and Unioners point to the number of Sikh officers in the Hindustani armed forces as evidence of that.

A great many Unioners are, however, concerned over the impact that the Punjab's accession might have on the rest of Kashmir, which, it seems to Parliament, is likely to remain independent under democratic and popular government after Parak Singh's departure. Though most civil servants and administrators are Hindus, a large part of the Royal Army's officer corps is made-up of Sikhs from the Punjab, who will presumably leave Kashmiri service to join the INA once the accession of their homeland is confirmed. Unioners are not eager to lose the moderating influence exerted by Sikh commanders over the Principality's armed forces, especially as Kashmir's Hindu minority turns increasingly towards militancy. INA officers will likely be sent in to fill any positions made vacant for the time being, in an effort to prevent the looting of armories at the very least, though if elements within Kashmir are intent on taking up arms against whatever government comes to power in Srinagar they will have had plenty of time to gather them by the time Hindustanis or whoever else arrive in force.

Kashmir's financial situation is widely speculated-on by Union accountants, and although they lack concrete information on the subject, having been so far shut-out by Princely officials, optimistic appraisals are few and far between, and intelligence reports submitted by the Special Research Bureau paint a similarly bleak picture. Parliament is by now more or less resigned to the idea that its Kashmir business will cost a massive and uncomfortable amount of money. At the same time some Unioners, looking for something good in this probably painful situation, say that Depkazia may be more willing to abandon its notions of territorial acquisition in the Vale once Caliphal officials become aware of the costs involved.

With regards to Afghanistan, Parliament has, as is typical, not very much to say. Certainly efforts towards negotiating a more stable peace between Armand and Depkazia are met with general approval and encouragement, as is any prospective Sino-Depkazi diplomacy. Hindustan is officially silent on the construction of the Timurline, but, privately, no few Parliamentarians wish that Samarkand was building something similar on the border of Gilgit-Baltistan.

The circumstances surrounding Zulfiqar Makran's arrival in the INU are, in response to supposed Depkazi misgivings, clarified by Parliament in an official communique. Makran, despite his massive unpopularity, did not commit any criminal offenses during his period in office, or so the communique claims, and thus he is, legally speaking, perfectly capable of regaining his Union citizenship. Special emphasis is placed on the notion that Zulfiqar Makran and his cabinet ministers will not be accorded any special treatment by the Mumbai government, which is generally not in the habit of putting-up exiled heads of state in comfortable conditions.

Balochistan

When the weight of numbers arrayed against them becomes apparent, and once the political reality of Balochistan's situation sinks in, most of Chaman's defenders decide that resistance is quite pointless, and offer their surrender to general Akram's forces. The border police and gendarmes who compose most of Chaman's garrison are not really trained or equipped to operate as a proper military formation anyway, and they'd prefer to avoid entering into a pitched battle with Depkazi and Baloch regular troops. Not all the units present at Chaman share that view, though, and two companies of Baloch Rangers resolve to try and escape to the coast. As was the case with the North Pakistani SSG and Mustafa Shareef, the Balochistan Rangers are closely associated with Makran's government and much of the 1,500-strong formation fears being singled-out for special punishment by both the Depkazis and local Sardars.

Brigadier Hasni will face little opposition in his drive towards Quetta, and when he gets there he will find the parliamentary capital itself in the hands of Baloch Sardars and their personal forces, whose generally ragged appearance hides a disciplined, able, and experienced bunch of guerrillas. They are, ostensibly, led by the charismatic and agreeable Mir Mohammad Khan Mazari, but the fragility of the anti-Makran alliance forged by the most prominent Sardars will probably not escape Hasni and his officers.

Balochistan

Those surrendering to the flag of the Depkazi Caliphate find their metaphorical swords accepted by fellow Baloch and by Pashtun officers, many of whom have not long since been through the same experience. In a manner of speaking it is becoming a rite of passage for both parties to give and accept surrender to the new Islamic empire.

Any who have been in two minds about whether to run may be relieved. Caliphal troops are generally in good spirits. Victories are coming relatively cheaply and quickly, as promised, and all have been told that the coast of Balochistan represents the starting line on the road to prosperity for which they have long waited. Others are simply glad to have been posted to a mobile army rather than some remote part of Afghanistan where warlordism is yet to be completely erradicated or controlled. This sort of tour is supposed to result in more frequent leave, so long as objectives continue to be met, anyway.

Those trying to flee have a good chance. Akram and Hansi have orders to secure key infrastructure and to open relations with tribal and religious leaders as a matter of the highest priority. Samarkand's biggest worry is that delays in establishing Caliphal control may lead to disorder from which local leaders could score points, so individuals looking to escape will find the chase rather half-hearted so long as they don't stick around to cause trouble.

Meanwhile, transport aircraft are already arriving to secure the BAF's facilities with airborne troops from Depkazia-proper, and Caliphal officers are prepared to forget the BAF's last deadly missions if crews co-operate with the redeployment of BAF strike and bomber strength to Peshawar, post haste...

Balochistan

Depkazi forces will find the conquest of Balochistan a very simple and straightforward affair, given the widespread appeal that membership in the Caliphate holds for most citizens of Balochistan, the large population of Pashtun refugees included. Probably the biggest problem apt to face General Akram's forces in the short term is that of internal violence, given the loose nature of the present confederacy of Sardars and the departure of that union's reason for existing in the first place. There's certainly no shortage of firearms, after all, and some of the more militant khans may take advantage of the space between the departure of Makran's administration and the imposition of the Khagan's authority to gain a more favorable share of the region's natural resources.

Though they are by now accustomed to subordination under some state government, Baloch Sardars are by tradition an independent bunch, inhabiting a part of the world that certainly breeds gruff self-reliance. Expectations are that the Caliph will grant them significant local autonomy and control over whatever natural resources are in their particular areas, along with a healthy level of development assistance and more modern military equipment for their personal forces. Life under Depkazi authority may become quite uncomfortable for most Sardars if those conditions are not met, though no doubt Chingiz Khagan will be more able than Zulfiqar Makran to maintain order in the region in the event of more serious tensions.

Absconding Baloch special forces troops do everything they can to avoid making trouble for themselves in their rush to leave the country, and the fact that the Depkazis are not actively pursuing them means that most are indeed able to reach either the Hindustani or Armandian frontiers in one piece. Those arriving on the Union border are apt to be disarmed and detained by border police, though the Baloch rangers, if they chose to press the issue, could probably shoot their way past Hindustani border guards armed mainly with Lee-Enfields and a collection of old British revolvers. Parliament is not likely to allow the Baloch special forces troops permanent residence in the INU, but in all probability they will be permitted to make their way to other countries from Hindustani territory.

Balochistan Air Force personnel, despite their rather active role in Quetta's brief war with Depkazia, mostly remain at their posts to accept integration with the Caliphate, and much of the BAF's combat strength is deployed to Peshawar per Depkazi request. Instances of equipment being sabotaged are few and far between, though many of the BAF's aircraft will be found in a poor state of repair. By far the most numerous type in Baloch service is the Jet Provost and its Strikemaster variant, and there are also a fair few HAL-built Alouette IIIs on hand. The six remaining Canberras will probably be of greatest interest to the Depkazis, and despite their significant age the aircraft can still give a good account of themselves on ground-attack missions.

Kashmir

Some Sikhs will suggest Khalistan as a fitting name for their province when it joins the Indian National Union, a chance to satisfy the wishes of more independent-minded members of their community, though those of other faiths who reside in the area may not look upon such a name with the same eagerness as those of the Khalsa. In private, many Sikhs within Kashmir's military also start to explore the possibilities that await within Union defense forces once the transition is complete, though few are ready to step aside just yet... even as it begins to break apart, most members of the Royal Army continue to feel at least some sense of duty towards the current state.

Additionally, perhaps seen by HDF commanders as a benefit and perhaps as a danger, the Kashmiri Royal Army shares a vision of just who its enemies ought be: even Kashmiri Muslims are not fond of North Pakistan, and those who come into the Union fold will bring that antagonism with them, along with respectable training and experience in fighting the Pakistani forces who now march beneath Caliphal banners. While such might provide a ready defense should relations between Parliament and Chingiz sour in the near future, some may think it better to assign ex-Kashmiri officers to borders with North Sienna or the Commonwealth, where they will be less likely to 'jump the gun' and provoke border clashes of the sort which have long plagued the Kashmir-Pakistan frontier.

Within Kashmir, while Hindu extremists seem to be moving with substantial speed as the state crumbles around them, the Muslim-dominated Kashmiri National Congress crawls forward at a pace whose slowness may alarm those hoping it will rise to stabilize the country: while it could, if votes were cast tomorrow, certainly secure a majority of them, it cannot escape its own democratic traditions. Delegates must me elected from various localities to come together and form a platform and select a slate of candidates, all while negotiating the nature of an unfamiliar electoral process with government bureaucrats who are both predominantly Hindu and quite short on competence (the Royal Electoral Commission of Kashmir having, due to its irrelevance, a favourite place for the Maharaja to deposit those who owed their jobs more to family connections than to merit). Many within the Congress make their impatience with the process known publically, but there is no clear alternative save for the Congress executive to violate its own rules and impose a platform upon its membership, a step which itself might break the party into rival factions. Of course, a debate within the KNC on Kashmir's future holds its own potential for internal splits, particularly given widely varying views on wether the Congress ought seek a close relationship with the Caliph looming on their borders (and undeniably a hero of modern Islam, no matter what one might think of his claim to be Commander of the Faithful), or wether they ought be willing to do battle with him to preserve the independence of Kashmir. There remain some weeks before such a debate will begin, and weeks more before it will likely have concluded, by which time Parak Singh will be sipping tea in London and Depkazi tanks may well be rolling into Srinagar.
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Balochistan
When one thinks of Baloch Sardars, one is not likely to have visions of Armandians in suits and dark glasses, but the Combine has long held an interest in the region and its tribal leaders, seen as a weak link in the Union-Commonwealth encirclement of their enclave in North Sienna. Some tribal militiamen may well wield weapons stamped with serials in the tight cursive of Armandian script, dating from periods of heightened tensions between Constance and Mumbai, while North Sienna's need to acquire goods from central Armand ensured Combine oil money was present in quantity to compensate Baloch smugglers able to dodge border constables.

The Combine could not return to its former (and rather laughable) stance, abandoned as relations warmed with Mumbai in recent years, that the Indian National Union was a colonial remnant keeping member provinces such as Balochistan from rightful independence, nor would it attempt military deployments to oppose Caliphal advances there. But the Armandians believed in getting the most out of every resource, and in Balochistan as in Afghanistan they would take clandestine steps to ensure that Smarkand did not have an easy time as it brought new lands into its fold. Aware of this fact, certain Baloch sardars would perhaps feel more confident in making demands of their new Depkazi overlords.

Any Baloch special forces who manage to reach the Armandian border will find themselves welcomed by men with blue-tinted sunglasses, intelligence agents seeking to expand Combine knowledge of capabilities and deployments on the other side of the border or hoping to add military training to smuggling runs in case the Caliph devotes significant resources to stopping them. They can expect excellent treatment, though in cloistered quarters, at least for the time being... military men will be of value should it prove advantageous to form a 'government-in-exile' for a puppet Democratic Republic of Balochistan, though the Armandians as yet hold back from taking such a step.
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Central Afghanistan
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The Indian National Union

Parliament is quite pleased with the progress of events in Kashmiri Punjab, an area that certainly looks ready to become the seventh state in the Union, barring of course any (hardly uncharacteristic) clumsiness on Mumbai's part. Government accountants and financial experts are somewhat less enthusiastic over the whole affair, but cost does not typically deter Unioners from their periodical attempts at inviting new people and territories into their country.

A small army of Parliamentary functionaries is quickly mobilized to assist Kashmiri Punjab, which Mumbai proposes to rename Punjab-Khalistan, in its prospective transition to democratic government and semi-autonomy within the Union. They are a capable and experienced bunch, most of them having worked in Rajasthan just after that state's reentry into the INU, and specialties range from election organizers to railway engineers. For just about any problem that the Punjab-Khalistanis might run into, there's bound to be a few Hindustanis present to give some advice and guidance, but no doubt Parliament's input will not be so direct as was the case in Rajasthan. The instrument of succession itself is flown into Amritsar aboard a HAL-built Andover wearing Air India livery, along with a large delegation headed by none other than Prime Minister Vaidya, whose job it will be to sign the necessary documentation on behalf of the Mumbai parliament and, if necessary, to negotiate any last-minute concerns that might be raised by Punjabis.

INA troops do not yet receive instructions to cross into Kashmiri Punjab, and if things go as well as they have so far it is not likely that the INA will need to deploy in force. Parliament certainly wants Kashmiri Punjab's accession to look as little like an invasion as possible, for both domestic and international concerns. This does not stop Mumbai from sending a fair amount of military advisers and liaisons to the region, whose job it will be to integrate, as much as is practical, local armed forces with the Union Defense Force. The division of units and equipment between Kashmir proper and Punjab-Khalistan is also something that Union liaisons will probably become involved in.