NationStates Jolt Archive

[OOC: The primary purpose of this thread is to deal with the changes in AMW brought about by the return of France, and more importantly the ‘reset’ of Spain. In previous RP threads, the Saharawi and Frente Polisario were driven out of Algeria following the French-backed shift to a monarchy there, while a Spanish invasion of Morocco allowed Polisario forces to secure control of the Western Sahara. With the former still true, but the latter set aside, the current stat of the Saharawi is far more bleak…]

Bir Lahlou, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)

Fadli Mohamed Ahmed cursed under his breath as he watched another rusted ambulance shudder to a halt in front of the Saharawi ‘National Hospital’. The building was made of mud bricks and corrugated metal, white paint already suffering after only a few months in the desert sands. Ahmed could still remember the modern structure of the old National Hospital, left behind in Rabouni when the Saharawi had fled from the Algerian camps so many had once called home… When Louis I had taken the Algerian throne and pounded the final nail in the coffin of the republic, the Saharawi it had sheltered and supported during Moroccan occupation of their homeland had fled their camps before the wrath of monarchist Algiers and its Franco-Roycelandian backers could descend upon them.

It had been a hard journey, and one which had cost the Saharawi dearly. Long columns of trucks and camels had weaved southwest from Tindouf in Algeria, many skirting through northern Mauritania to avoid the danger of air and artillery attack by the Moroccan forces who controlled most of the region known as ‘Western Sahara’, claime by both Morocco and the Frente Polisario which fought for Saharawi independence. They had struggled for days, through shortages of fuel and water, amidst the extremes of the desert climate. And, they had come home at last, to the town of Bir Lahlou, amidst the rocky lands on the eastern edge of the territory held by the Polisario. Overnight, a village of a thousand soldiers in mud huts had become a city of tents, housing a quarter-million civilians. And, surrounded by a hostile desert, that city was in desperate need of food and water, while stockpiles of fuel and medical supplies were dwindling fast.

The difficulties they now faced were immense: Algeria, their greatest ally, was closed to them, many of their FLN comrades having followed them in flight from the monarchist threat to avoid arrest or execution. Their greatest sources of humanitarian aid in Hindustan, and military aid in Libya, would have to brave Moroccan air power to deliver goods to the Saharawi now that they sat so close to the front lines. Morocco, backed by the might of Baghdad, would not sit by and allow them to recover, nor were the Polisario themselves about to cease their struggle for independence… anger at the displacement had swelled the ranks of the Frente with new recruits.

A foreign aid worker, one of only a few still remaining with the Saharawi after evacuation, snapped a photo of the stretcher being rushed from the ambulance towards the shelter of the National Hospital. Looking down, Ahmed recognized the all-too-familiar sight: a boy in his late teens, legs bloody and shredded from the detonation of a landmine. He let out a bitter laugh… he hated to admit it, but for a moment he had been dissapointed. To see a young man crippled was a sad thing, but he wore the tattered shirt of a Polisario volunteer, likely who had sought to cross the minefields strewn in front of Morrocan defences. He would be seen as a casualty of war by many, perhaps a terrorist by others, easily dismissed. If he had been ten years younger, his photograph might have had more impact on the hearts of the world, brought more food for civilians and more arms to aid Polisario in their efforts to oust the Moroccans occupying their lands. For, without outside help, there would be little the Saharawi could do but die.

[OOC: A map (in .pdf) (http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/wsahara.pdf) of Western Sahara… Rabouni and the rest of the Saharawi’s Algerian camps were located in the desert east of Tindouf, the ‘berm’ is a raised-earth fortification defended by a mix of Moroccan infantry, air power, and some radar-guided artillery, as well as minefields dispersed across the 10km of desert east of the berm itself. And, by reccomenation of the Hindustanis, some north-african-nomad-revolutionary music (http://www.npr.org/programs/asc/archives/asc73/index.html#tinariwen) from Tinariwen].

Most likely the photograph of a wounded hero would appear in Lusakan state media, part of a steadily rising though still very much secondary interest in the Saharawi's cause brought on by a revival of the Republic's underlying cause.

Before long following the unhappy migration and the Algerian conquest behind it, the restored Igomo Social Progress Party mustered the manpower and resources to fly a crate carrying a virtually untrained ambassador to the Saharawi nation that City was reasonably adamant about recognising. Crossing the Commonwealth, the Gulf of Guinea, and the West African Union, the Igovian-built twin-engine Preston ought to be content with any of the region's paved or unpaved airstrips, provided that nobody shot it down first.

The ambassador was ill-trained largely because he, like the pilot (only two men were aboard), was a man prepared to fight and more importantly to die rather than see the aircraft's capture or impounding lead to any unwanted attention fall on the cargo. This included a green copper vulture meant as some uniquely Lusakan take on African unity, token supplies of dried fish from Lusaka's vast lakes and of fresh water, and several crates full of RPGs and of Strela SAMs that the UARL planned to finally replace in its own service.

Perhaps these things weren't of much use at the moment, but the intention was, hopefully, quite clear. The United African Republic didn't forget (and was actually keen to focus on the European and Roycelandian invasions that had caused a worsening of the situation here- clearly, Igomo's pan-Africanism had chosen to exclude the Moroccans, apparently because the Saharawi's enemies were more conducive to the continuation of the Lusakan strain of propaganda).

(Mostly for tagging purposes)

That particular boy would seen by many, many more people than Ahmed would believe. Near the hospital were Jean-Pierre Bemba, a pirate journalist from the African Commonwealth and filmmaker whose underground documentary film festivals had taken africans by storm since 2002; who photographed the boy, and upon his return to the Commonwealth he pitched his idea for a Saharawi media campaign, to build support for the LFU/Secular Party new line of Pan-Africanist foreign policy. The government, not usually keen on Bembas tax-dodging media antics, readily agreed and sent him downstairs to the African News Network, AC's state media.

A stylized drawing of the young man injured in both legs and carring a tattered volunteer shirt; was depicted in newscasts and on posters, with the words "Who will help the Saharawi?" in French underneath. The arms lifting him are potrayed as belonging to black men rather than the foreign aid workers of the motif, arms dressed in the brilliant light blue of the early Congolese flags, and the emerald green of the Lusakan Republic; respectively. Bemba later protested this decision by the ANN, and was censored by the government for his trouble.

Commonwealthers are encouraged to donate to humanitarian help in the small nation, and the government set forth diplomatic feelers to the Saharawi in the hopes of sending envoys to evaluate what the SADR needs the most. Among the propositions are military-escorted caravans or airlifts with food and medicine; the erection of refugee camps with medical supplies in the northernmost Commonwealth, and the more hushhush option of stationing AC Army special forces advisory personnel in the nation to help maximize the resistance with the means available. Direct donations of military hardware is ruled out for the time being, out of the risk of provoking war in an already unstable area.

Mumbai, through some means or another, keeps itself surprisingly up-to-date with events in the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, or at least that tiny sliver of it which still exists. Many foreign service personnel, on the run from the French in Algeria, take it upon themselves to report regularly on the state of the Polisarios and the Saharawis, and radio in dispatches from just across the border in Mauritania.

Hindustanis who frequent the Algerian and Western Saharan deep desert areas will no doubt tell the Polisarios that their FLN comrades continue to fight against the French, although in truth their continued existance is constantly threatened by punitive French measures. After all, they say, they used mustard gas on the Igovians during the Coral Sea affair, so what's to stop them from using it on Algerians, for whom they have hardly more respect.

Parliamentary diplomatic teams continue to work almost non-stop in Rabat and Baghdad, attempting to broker some manner of deal where the Saharawis would gain some manner of autonomy, or at the very least have access to medecines and food aid. Washington and London also recieve a cascade of communiques, requesting in the most humble terms diplomatic assistance. It is a well-founded Hindustani belief that the UK and Quinntonia can force a diplomatic settlement on anyone, and with them aboard the Saharawi cause it would be unstoppable. Of course, such efforts, while far from abandoned, have met with less than outstanding success.

Almost infinitely more promising, however, is Mauritania. Recently absorbed into the West African Union, which has proven itself rather friendly to Lusaka and The African Commonwealth, Mauritania might provide the Saharawis with a friendly border the likes of which they have never before seen. There exists a very strong possibility that the West African Union, through the combined efforts of Hindustan, Lusaka, and The African Commonwealth, could be convinced to open its border to humanitarian traffic and refugees at the very least. Parliament has already set aside some 20 Su-30MKI fighter jets as bargaining chips.

However, until Mauritania is on board very nearly nothing can be done to help the Saharawis. While United Elias' strong involvement in Morocco prevents the French and Spanish from winning it over, Baghdad is no friendlier to Saharawi independence than Paris or Madrid.

The Roycelandian Government has repeatedly offered to allow Saharawi refugees to resettle in Roycelandian Algeria, but so far to no avail...

The Saharawi leadership is well aware of Roycelandian 'offers', but cannot accept them... They have not spent decades in exile while warring against one imperial monarch simply to turn and bow to another. Algeria is a Republic, its legitimate government the FLN, not some piece of desert meat to be carved up between imperialists as was done by Morocco and Mauritania to the Western Sahara after the flight of Spain. The lands around Rabouni are lands of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, ceded by beloved Algerian comrades. They, and the rest of southern Algeria, are not the Roycelandians to give: they are a military occupier who will be ousted, just as Morocco will be ousted from Western Sahara... a fact that those few Polisario/FLN in the region have no doubt made clear with their Kalashnikovs to anyone in a pith helmet.

Roycelandians might find themselves called upon by Hindustani diplomats in Goa, carrying charts of Algeria and numerous...shall we say...other items. Coming equipped with the usual long-winded and comprehensive battery of facts and figures, (in)conveniently printed out word for word on old-style computer paper from the Hindustani government's archaic computers, they inevitably begin drawing on the maps in grease pencil.

The diplomats draw a sort of squiggly line from the Western Saharan border around Tindouf in a kind of mushroom shape, and then turn to ask the Roycelandians; "Well, its no less of a desert than the rest of Southern Algeria. Do you think you might be able to spare it?" It is hoped that the Roycelandians will see fit to allow at least civillians to settle on what is essentially a new Polisario grant in the Algerian desert, allowing them to reside out of the way of land mines and Moroccan airstrikes. "Nobody has to know that you've done it. When you go to sleep tonight, we assure you that you'll feel better for showing such kindness to a people like the Saharawi."

Mumbai would fully sympathize with a less determined national group who took up the original Roycelandian offer, and most Hindustanis would themselves probably opt for water and medecines over cluster bombs and landmines, but the Sahrawis have proven themselves a committed lot. It is Hindustan's hope that a compromise could be reached where Saharawi noncombatants are taken away from the fighting and settled on nominally Saharawi land while still allowing Roycelandia to say that it didn't do anything for the Polisario rebels.

Algiers

His Majesty King in Algeria Louis I, preparing to join his brother-in-law Louis-Auguste on a vacation to Roycelandia, issued several decrees and one secret communiqué from his Rococo themed state room in the rambling Algiers Palace. The Kingdom of Algeria had just been secured following the troubles end in France, and the SADR with its spasmodic gyrations threatened to affect that.

The decrees were simple enough. The SADR was considered a revolutionary body, capable of nothing but mischief. In that light, several hundred known SADR supporters already in Algerian prisons would be dispatched to Devils Island Penal Colony, far away from any harm they could cause in their homelands.

Recent raids by Royal Army Air Cavalry into Atlas Mountain camps suspected of rebel activity indeed revealed that SADR sympathizers were working in the underground against the Bourbon regime. As rebel activity in the Kingdom of Algeria halted after those several raids, His Majesty was inclined to let matters rest. However, the Sulawesi were sent a direct message by Algiers and through them Versailles: spread your malcontention across the border but once, and the fleur-de-lys will come down with a vengeance.

Just to be pro-active, however, a full team, eighty agents, of Ordu du Saint-Louis Special Service Agents were slipped into the SADR. They were tasked with gathering intelligence and setting up spy-rings. With the Marechaussee assuming the responsibility of Secret State Police in France itself, the noble populated ODSL was free to pursue exotic foreign adventures.

And the Governor of Southern Algeria, a good friend of Louis I, was given a call. It was the urgent wish of both Louis’ that no refugees, who were potentially virulent rebels, be given residence in Southern Algeria. That is, unless they wished to renounce their beliefs and swear allegiance to Royce I. And if the Roycelandians let their philanthropy get the best of them, Louis I at least requested Algerian Royal Army and ODSL agents be given leave to search and question the said refugees.

[OOC- Let's assume that this post is official word letting the border from Mauritania be opened. I don't want to hold this thread up, so I'll put the official word in place of this OOC thing tomorrow. Until then, aid workers, supplies, and some refugees are permitted on to cross over the border. Soldiers from the WAU armed with the "latest" in Lusakan arms and indiginous weaponry (AKs and the like) are moving in to police the area (in the WAU) and protect the refugees coming into Mauritania. And protect Mauritania from the refugees, but shhh..... And it'll all be IC in a bit...]

Roycelandians might find themselves called upon by Hindustani diplomats in Goa, carrying charts of Algeria and numerous...shall we say...other items. Coming equipped with the usual long-winded and comprehensive battery of facts and figures, (in)conveniently printed out word for word on old-style computer paper from the Hindustani government's archaic computers, they inevitably begin drawing on the maps in grease pencil.

The diplomats draw a sort of squiggly line from the Western Saharan border around Tindouf in a kind of mushroom shape, and then turn to ask the Roycelandians; "Well, its no less of a desert than the rest of Southern Algeria. Do you think you might be able to spare it?" It is hoped that the Roycelandians will see fit to allow at least civillians to settle on what is essentially a new Polisario grant in the Algerian desert, allowing them to reside out of the way of land mines and Moroccan airstrikes. "Nobody has to know that you've done it. When you go to sleep tonight, we assure you that you'll feel better for showing such kindness to a people like the Saharawi."

Mumbai would fully sympathize with a less determined national group who took up the original Roycelandian offer, and most Hindustanis would themselves probably opt for water and medecines over cluster bombs and landmines, but the Sahrawis have proven themselves a committed lot. It is Hindustan's hope that a compromise could be reached where Saharawi noncombatants are taken away from the fighting and settled on nominally Saharawi land while still allowing Roycelandia to say that it didn't do anything for the Polisario rebels.

Goa, India

In one of the Conference rooms, the cigar smoke hangs thickly in the air and the bourbon is freely available. Lots of Important People (men and women) converse with the Hindustanis, before summoning Men In Suits With Briefcases, with more murmuring. Phone calls are made. A junior officer ducks off to the supply closet with one of the secretaries when no-one is looking.

Finally, about 3am, The Big Red Phone rings. The Garrison Commander for Goa picks it up and has a few words with the person on the other end.

"Ladies and Gentlemen" he begins, "That was His Majesty. He says that the Hindustani plan is agreeable, but officially we aren't handing over any territory, since that's against the constitution. However, we can simply withdraw our troops from the area and allow the Saharawi refugees to settle there, provided they behave themselves."

The Garrison Commander of Goa addresses the Hindustani Diplomats. "Does that work for you?"

The Hindustani diplomatic mission is immediately agreed to the Roycelandian offer, it being more than they expected to secure. The only piece of the puzzle remaining was the Saharawi people, and an urgent dispatch is radioed from Roycelandian Goa to the two-person Hindustani embassy in Bir Lahlou.

No doubt at that time the attention of everyone present becomes focused on the functionary at the telephone, anxiously awaiting the Saharawi response.

Bir Lahlou

One of the two Parliamentary ambassadors to the SADR bursts out of the tent currently serving as the Hindustani embassy with a message in hand. He makes for the main Saharawi encampment as fast as he can.

"Its here!" he says, bursting into the Saharawi government building.

[Tag. Will reply when the WAU IC post is in place ;) ]

OOC: What exactly is the situation as far as the government of Morocco? Can I step in to RP them considering its close links with UE?

OCC: Its fine by me.

Posting on behalf of the Kingdom of Morocco

In Rabat, the upper echelons of government were becoming increasingly nervous. Fear of Spanish aggression had prompted significant increases in defence spending, and laws had been passed conscripting larger number of soldiers into the Royal Armed Forces. Returning from Baghdad, Prime Minister Ahmed Benaissa had much to the relief of many, negotiated yet another assistance treaty with President Elias. This would extend the already considerable and long running military assistance offered by United Elias including training and equipment.

Publicly, government spokesman maintained that the Moroccan Kingdom would continue to abide by the Western Sahara ceasefire as long as the Polisario continued to respect the Sovereignty of the Moroccan State on all territory West of the berm. However, whilst the Prime Minister looked northward, the newly ascended King Yazid II insisted on focusing on the recalcitrant Polisario. In recent weeks the garrison of the Defensive Berm had been increased notably and new technology, such as tactical UAVs received from UE, and a greater number of helicopters had made surveillance that much easier. A newly reformed Armoured Brigade equipped with 96 newly delivered ex-UE T-80 tanks had also been assigned to the Southern Defence Zone, to be used as a heavy response force. Whilst the Prime Minister constantly re-iterated to his counterparts in Baghdad that the Moroccan Kingdom was in desperate need of increasingly sophisticated assets and more of them to deter Holy League invasion, much of the aid was in fact being used to increase the pressure in the South to counter the influx of refugee militiamen from southern Algeria. If Baghdad was to look into the situation carefully, this would quickly become evident, but at a time when moderate reactionary Arab regimes needed to be propped up against fundamentalist Islamists, European Imperialists and the Progressive, few questions were asked. Furthermore, in private many of the ruling elite in UE share the Moroccan view that the Saharawi are generally disgusting, inferior little people and that anything short of genocide is more or less fair game.

.

In Mumbai, news of a Moroccan build-up along the Berm comes at the absolute worst possible time, with the Roycelandian refugee proposal not yet approved by all parties and the Mauritanian border not quite open. There are no doubts that the Polisario Front will fight for as long as it has members, but they never had to deal with quite such a serious problem, with Algeria taken out of the mix. The Foreign Ministry's attempts to resupply the Polisario Front via the Cabo Blanco had all met with disaster at the hands of Moroccan F-5s, the sunken ships taking with them large amounts of 7.62x39mm ammunition, RPG-7s, SA-16s and even several Rafael Spike ATGWs.

Parliament cannot help but see the irony in the Moroccan situation, with far-right (some might say Fascist) Spain offering the most immediate resolution to the plight of the Saharawis. Diplomatic overtures to Baghdad and even more directly to Rabat haven't seen much in the way of promise, understandable given both the Elians' and Moroccans' level of respect for the Saharawi people. In fact, the Moroccans have proven entirely opposed to the idea of any sort of negotiations with the Saharawi and Mumbai not long ago decided to stop dealing with a state it deems guilty of crimes only relatively short of genocide.

Arms continue to trickle into the barren wasteland that now is the SADR, but much more important is food. With no agriculture to speak of, and formerly no resident population, Parliament cannot reconcile itself with the idea of simply leaving these guys to drift.

(I'll tag this now, but don't yet even know what my nation's position will be!)

If the Hindustanis were hoping for a positive reaction, they are to be disappointed. As they convey their news to a cluster of SADR leaders in dusty, outdated suits, the room erupts with shouts of outrage. How dare the Roycelandians make such an offer with something that is not theirs to give? How could the Polisario accept such a thing, such a betrayal of the Algerian republic and its continued legitimacy? “ Ahmed Gasmi, a former FLN member of the Tindouf Assembly who fled alongside the Saharawi, swears that Algeria will oust its occupiers no matter the cost, following the lessons of their Polisario brothers of the Maghreb. Mohamed Abdelaziz, SADR President, begins to pontificate, in a confrontational style the Hindustanis have by now become used to: “Go back and tell them that we have not spent our lives struggling against one Empire to bow to another. We shall fight, and we shall overcome, we may use a stone, a knife, a stick or a gun. The most important thing is a popular will, and we have that. We will not succumb.”

Having some experience with matters in the SADR, the Hindustanis are perhaps able to take this with a grain of salt… the public face of Polisario is usually its most extreme. After the leadership and its FLN comrades have departed, more reasonable men and women appear to pose queries about the proposal.

Still, there seems little hope… even if the arrangement could be finalized, Polisario would insist on painting it as a victory over colonialism, as well as restoring the Algerian republic under those FLN members who had fled with them. And, even if by some fluke such actions would not reverse the deal, the Saharawi would simply be moving from the fire back into the frying pan: Algeria’s republican air force had been the shield which made Tindouf liveable, and with that gone there can be no true safety, just the question of wether the Mirage jets strafing Saharawi towns will bear Moroccan markings or those of France.

The Hindustanis receive a request for air support or SAMs along with the usual begging for food and medical aid... Saharawi who had earned a living smuggling across the porous borders between Algeria, Mauritania, and Western Sahara offer their services in assisting shipments of any type in reaching those who need them, albeit minus the cost of a few bribes.

---

Across the length of the Berm, occasional casualties continue to be suffered by Polisario and Saharawi civilian alike… unexploded ordnance and the ever-present minefields that blanket much of the Eastern sectors are a constant danger to newly arrived refugees. There is no build-up by Polisario to counter Moroccan increases, as there is little at their disposal which has not already been deployed, though efforts intensify diplomatically in search of international aid of both humanitarian and military nature, and Saharawi west of the Berm are encouraged to present foreign journalists with images of populace in protest against occupation to accompany pictures of the malnourished children from the camps.

---

The ODSL, or anyone else seeking to infiltrate the Western Sahara, will find the task at once simple and exceedingly difficult. The core of SADR administration and the Polisario military has been forged through bonds of close contact over years in exile, while local administrations are often linked to their constituents by direct family bonds. In such an environment, infiltration of a specific group becomes close to impossible, especially as many will become suspicious of strangers in case they are Moroccan or Elian spies.

The same cannot be said for a more general presence in the Western Sahara. Difficulties with documents and a nomadic lifestyle mean that few will question a camel-rider passing by through the desert, while infiltrators seeking more sedentary positions have several options: foreign-looking persons might pass themselves off as aid workers, most of whom come from Hindustan or Spain… with food and water in such demand, the only credentials an aid organisation will likely need to present is a plane-load of supplies. Those who look to be Algerian might pursue a different route, entering the SADR as republican refugees. These would have an easier time penetrating the shaky ranks of the FLN-in-exile than the more experienced Polisario.

OOC: Where have you been? It's been over two months since your last post, and six weeks since anyone else posted. I'd consider this RP long dead.

OOC: Where have you been? It's been over two months since your last post, and six weeks since anyone else posted. I'd consider this RP long dead.

Woah now, don't be so hasty Royce!

I'll have a response up in a bit.

OOC:

If you'll be posting more often, Saharawi, I'm in too. Also, not to be bitchy(this does not only pertain to Saharawi, but also other new AMW players), we should really have a probation period where players can show that they are willing to post at least once a week or some such(and inform us when they can't), so we can maintain some cohesion in RPs.

Indeed, a Polisario rebuttal was more or less expected, given the fact that none of Mumbai's proposals had been recieved in any better a light. With Lusakan diplomatic overtures towards Mauritania underway, though, it is not considered impossible that the Saharawis might find shelter across their southern border.

Mumbai's diplomats in the SADR express their deep disappointment in the Polisario and FLN refusal, and maintain that the Polisario Front's first priority should be to provide the people under its charge with the essentials. Liberation is rather pointless, they say, when there's nobody left to liberate, and the Roycelandian offer is better than anything the Moroccans or French would even consider. That said, they touch on the possibility of Mauritania letting aid shipments north or even refugees south, but it would be suicidal to try and pit the Mauritanians against the Moroccans in a proxy war like the Algerians did. Another thing the Indians promise to try is to attract Quinntonian and British support for Saharawi independence. So far, lower-level communiques have failed to elicit any real response, but more significant prodding might secure at least a favorable statement.

And both the Holy League and the Elians are inclined to respect Quinntonian judgement.

The Indians still promise to do the best they can to provision the Polisarios, and ten 75/105mm antitank guns are set aside for smuggling into Western Sahara alongside the usual collection of assault rifles, Milans, and SA-7s.

The government of Quinntonia, which is going through a leadership crisis right now, has yet to form any firm opinions on this particular situation, as the upper echelons have not yet even heard of the situation, and the lower channels have been very blacked out by the leadership race. Current Prime Minister Vanessa Moerike, former Deputy Prime Minister under the legendary Jesse Obed, begins to look quite heavily into the matter, as it seems to be quite a mess in Africa, with many different groups clamouring for Quinntonian attention.

Various African government sponsored Missionary groups begin to make statements explaining that the Quinntonian people very much wish to help their African brothers and sisters, however, they are labouring under a haevy burden when trying to ascertain the best course of action. Quinntonia as a government, has absolutely no experience in Africa, and therefore we are very retiscent to blunder in throwing our wieght around, "proving" the stereotype of the western Christian powers.

Therefore, Quinntonia would very much like our friends in the region to first forgive our ignorence, second be patient with the pace of our decision making, and third, talk to us. Tell us what you, the people of the region wish from us, let the governments of the region explain their position, then, and only then, will we be able to make an informed decision that reflects our ideals and values.

OOC-BTW, speaking of the election, I cannot find through any search function, the Jesse Obed death thread, which I would very much like to complete so that I can move forward with my nation, and not have to start from scratch again. Does anyone know how to find threads that are from before X-mas?


WWJD
Amen.

[OOC: A bump during a relatively inactive period, in case Spain tries for Morocco again and this empty desert land becomes more relevant to the world.... and some notes, as per USQ request, to try and explain the Western Sahara portion of the confusion that is Africa:

Overview
The Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (the POLISARIO Front) formed in the early 1970s to conduct armed resistance against Spanish colonial rule in what is now Western Sahara. In the centuries preceding this, ethnic Saharawi tribesmen had engaged in territorial battles with Moroccan, French, and Spanish forces in the area, and more recently attempts had been made to resist colonial rule both peacefully and forcefully, but these do nothing to dissuade Spanish or Moroccan claims on the area.
POLISARIO attacks, combined with peaceful demonstrations, led to Spain announcing plans for territorial self-governance. Morocco protests, claiming the territory, followed by Algeria protesting the Moroccan claim. As internal and international pressures mount in favour of self-determination, and the Spanish allow POLISARIO representatives into the capital to discuss transition, King Hassan of Morocco orders the "Green March", where 350,000 volunteers cross into the territory. Moroccan troops also push across the border, and fighting breaks out with POLISARIO forces.
In late 1975, the Madrid Agreement is signed between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania: Western Sahara is partitioned between the Moroccans and Mauritanians, and Spain retains rights to the valuable fishing grounds and phosphate mines in the territory. Spain begins to withdraw, along with its nationals, and fighting continues between POLISARIO forces and the new occupiers. In 1976, Morocco begins to use aerial bombing against Saharawi camps and villages, forcing many to flee. Algeria offers the Saharawi a safe haven in the area around Tindouf. Spanish withdrawal is completed, and POLISARIO declares the formation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), followed by official announcements by Morocco and Mauritania detailing the partition of the territory. POLISARIO's Marxist leanings see it backed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (and clients such as Libya), though in the case of the former support is political rather than material.
With refugees secured beneath the Algerian air defence umbrella, POLISARIO forces increase offensive operations across Western Sahara, and out into southern Morocco and Mauritania. Several POLISARIO victories occur, including the shelling of the Mauritanian capital by raiders. Mauritania signs agreements with France and Morocco to bolster its failing military forces. Saharawi attacks extend to Spanish and French fishing boats in the waters of Western Sahara. A coup in Mauritania ousts the government, replacing it with a council of military officers that recognises POLISARIO and begins negotiations.
In 1979, Polisario and Mauritania sign the Algiers Agreement, by which Mauritania renounces its claim to Western Sahara and promises to withdraw completely. As Mauritanian forces withdraw, Moroccan forces advance to sieze the now-empty territory. The death of the Algerian president (Houari Boumedienne) sees the POLISARIO launch an offensive in his honour, overruning several Moroccan bases before being driven back. Morocco begins construction of what will become the 'berm', a fortified wall dividing the territory between the 2/3rds under its control and the 1/3rd dominated by POLISARIO. Spanish and several African governments acknowledge the SADR and call on Morocco to allow self-determination. The Tidouf settlements develop from tent-cities to permanent communities, with some modern amenities, but continue to rely on international aid organisations to deliver needed medical (and sometimes food) supplies.
In the early 1990s, an unofficial cease-fire develops out of military stalemate, as intermittent negotiations between POLISARIO and Morocco begin. Little progress is made, as Morocco refuses to consider independence while POLISARIO requires it. Morocco begins encouraging ethnic Moroccans to settle in Western Sahara, and engages in a diplomatic campaign to reduce support for the SADR (using economic threats similar to 'recognition disputes' between PRC and ROC). With the USSR now gone, POLISARIO purges the last Marxist elements from its public statements in an attempt to gain support in the West (though, administrative policies remain rooted in Saharawi tradition, which are arguably leftist in a modern context). Both sides begin negotiating with foreign intrests about mineral and fuel exploration in Western Sahara.
And thus ends the RL history. (An aside... Morocco was backed (with military hardware sales) early on in the conflict by the USA and France, in AMW it seems doubtful that the USQ would have done the same... regardless, at some point the Elians stepped in to support Morocco, so even without USQ backing they'd still have gotten their hands on the bloody radar-guided artillery and crates of landmines used to secure their berm. International aid organisations consist mostly of those from Spain and (mainly faith-based) the USA.If either power had restricted such groups, the role of Hindustani aid organisations can probably fill the gap. Religious tolerance and freedom are encoraged in the SADR camps, but conversion to Christianity has been negligible due to the nomadic (individualized) branch of Islam dominant amongst the Saharawi. This also means that, despite their fight against a Moroccan monarch who represses Islamic extremism, POLISARIO has no support from Muslim fudamentalist groups such as God's Spear or Jemaah Islamiah).
AMW
With the fall of republican Algeria to France, POLISARIO and the exiled Saharawi in Tindouf fled back into Western Sahara with all that could be carried, along with those Algerians who feared imprisonment under Louis I. This has created a two-fold crisis. The first is an aid issue: the refugees have tried to re-establish a society similar to that in Tindouf, but they face infrastructure difficulties and supply shortages. Medical supplies are particularly short, and malnutrition is widespread. The second is a security issue: thousands of young men are now in a war zone, with a lot of anger and little experience. Small-arms clashes along the berm and camel incursions on the porous border with Algeria are commonplace, and losses to landmines are not uncommon (this applies also to the civil populace, forced to expand communities into areas sometimes scattered with Moroccan air-dropped mines).

And that's that for the Western Sahara. Now for some minor IC blathering...]

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Washington DC, USQ

SADR representatives call upon the USQ to support the right of Western Sahara to self-determination, and to condemn Moroccan occupation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, as well as political repression and revived colonialism in Algeria. Along with such predictable statements come requests for aid in food and medical supplies, much needed by displaced refugees now living in POLISARIO-controlled territory.

Posting on behalf of the Kingdom of Morocco

Prime Minister Ahmed Benaissa after a long struggle against the conservative inclinations of the Moroccan civil service had finally passed directives, under the legislative umbrella of Kingdom Defence Reform and Review (KDRR) to begin a complete restructuring of the Royal Armed Forces largely under the advice of a team of Elias military attaches. The current composition is heavy on personnel but lacks strategic focus. The new doctrine will reform the military to better protect the homeland against foreign invasion as well as protecting Moroccan territory from the Polisario and be able to react quicker to emerging threats and international crises. An important element behind the reorganisation is to allow Morocco to play a larger role in foreign peace missions and other expeditionary operations.

Despite the fact that the total number of personnel will decline, the overall defence budget will rise from an equivalent of 1.7 billion US dollars to $2.64 billion per year, which is approximately 5% of GDP. This will finance improvements in equipment, training as well as better personnel housing and benefits. Furthermore, a one-time supplement of $600 million will be provided in this year fiscal year to accomplish the Army’s re-organisation. (OOC: astute foreign analysts may realise that the total costs of these reforms would be substantially higher considering the amount of foreign procurement, and this is because Baghdad is subsidising much of it, but not publicly. Furthermore, Morocco’s government is receiving several billion dollars worth of cash handouts from UE a year, again, confidentially.)

Morocco’s armed forces currently total 198,500 with more than half of these conscripts serving 18 month obligations. There are also 150,000 personnel ready reserves, made up of previous serving personnel who nominally have obligations until age 50. Under the new directives, the official term of obligation for new conscripts will reduce to 12 months, but many of these and many currently serving conscripts will have their terms of duty reduced or waived entirely. The plan is within two years to have a completely professional military.


Royal Moroccan Army:

The army is currently organised into two zones, Northern and Southern. In practice, Northern zone is responsible for the defence of Morocco itself, while Southern is responsible for operations in the Western Sahara. Units are deployed into Southern zone on a rotational basis and depending on operations requirements. Together the two zonal commands consist of: 3 mechanised infantry brigades, 2 parachute brigades,1 light security brigade and 8 mechanised infantry regiments, each consisting of two or three infantry battalions. Additionally there are a large number of independent units: 4 commando battalions, 10 armoured battalions, 37 infantry battalions, 1 air defence battalion, 3 camel corps battalions, 1 mountain battalion, 7 engineer battalions, 2 airborne battalions and 12 artillery battalions.

Under a new plan the brigades and battalions will be rationalized into seven combat divisions based loosely on the UE Army’s organizational model. Two of these divisions will be purely mechanised, with the other five mixed between mechanised and motorised infantry. Whilst most of the independent battalions will simply be merged into the new organizational structure with their existing equipment, some infantry units will be re-roled to create additional support units. Normally, three divisions will be deployed to the Southern Zone on a rotating basis. Also at any one time a Mechanised Brigade belonging to a division cycling through the Northern sector will be assigned as part of a Rapid Reaction Force also on a rotating basis. Several Army level support units will remain independent to be deployed as required, and several will permanently be assigned to the rapid reaction force.

In terms of manpower, the active component will shrink from 175,000 to 125,000 more or less immediately, with large numbers of conscripts being allowed to opt out of their service obligations ahead of schedule. The army will then transition to an all volunteer force within two years. The new Reserve force is designed around the idea that in a wartime condition each brigade would gain additional combat battalions, so a mechanised brigade would gain a mechanised rifle battalion and a tank battalion whereas a motorised brigade would gain two further rifle battalions. Additionally there are several Reserve support units. The personnel of the ‘drill reserves’ will shrink to 20,000 troops as a way of dramatically reducing expenditure. The Individual Ready Reserve, is a pool made up of approximately 150,000 dismissed conscripts and officers that could be re-inducted during wartime as attrition reserves, with some refresher training.

In terms of equipment the RAM is set to rationalise and modernise its inventory. The Light Security Brigade will be re-equipped with Faaris LAVs (bought from UE), and the number of different artillery types will be somewhat reduced. Plans to acquire further T-80 main battle tanks have been shelved in favour of the cheaper option of updating the RAM’s fleet of M-60 tanks over the next few years. The most significant equipment acquisitions have been in the field of air defence with the introduction of eight S-300, two BUK-M1 and one TOR-M1 batteries, all sourced from Elias military surpluses. More of these systems will be procured in due course to replace the remainder of the Chaparral batteries. The Army will also spend substantial amounts on improving communications equipment and introducing further Spike ATGMs and Igla SAMs to improve the infantry’s capability against armoured and air threats. A lot of funding has also been set aside for training, exercises will be crucial to adapting the RAM’s officer corps and soldiers to the concept of fighting by divisions and an increasing emphasis will be placed on improving tactical coherence and manoeuvring larger formations in a range of different scenarios.


Royal Moroccan Air Force

The Air Force currently has 13,500 personnel, and this number will remain fairly constant in the near future. Under the KDRR plans the RMAF will gain an additional fighter squadron to be equipped with the 5th generation EA-160 Multirole fighter. The mainstay of the combat force will however remain the venerable F-5 airframe for the foreseeable future given the type is extremely cost-effective to operate. All the F-5E/F models will also have their capability increased by being upgraded with a new Elias supplied multi-mode radar that will allow for the integration of the EAW-78 Cobra BVRAAM and the EAW-54 ASM. Across the fleet the AIM-9 Sidewinder will be phased out in favour of the much more capable EAW-67 Viper. The RMAF will purchase a substantial number of EAW-10 ALCMs, which can be fired from the EA-100, EA-120 and the EA-160 aircraft, providing a standoff strike capability that was previously lacking as well as additional rounds of the Yakhont anti-ship missile.

The RMAF will also gain for the first time an airborne AEW&C capability. Negotiations are in progress with Elias Aerospace with two options currently being considered. Firstly, to integrate solid-state AEW radars integrated with the EA-06 turboprop platform. The aircraft themselves are relatively old regional airliner’s but still have long remaining structural lives and will be cheap and easy to operate. Furthermore several EA-06s are already in service in the VIP role. Alternatively, the more costly but more capable option would be for a more sophisticated AEW system using the newly developed EA-010C platform.

To augment the Air Force’s ability to strike beyond Morocco’s borders, four of the C-130H transport aircraft will be converted as tankers for a total of six KC-130H aircraft that can be used for both tanking and tactical transport missions.

The helicopter fleet will also undergo some modernisation. The entire fleet of 33 Mi-17 helicopters will receive new avionics and service life extension, upgraded as Mi-17UEs, a process which is already underway. The 27 UH-1H utility helicopters that are approaching the end of their service lives will be gradually replaced by a total of 32 new EA-22Cs.


Royal Moroccan Navy

The Navy currently has approximately 10,000 Personnel and this is unlikely to change in the near future. The Navy’s planned procurements will largely remain unaffected by the new reforms though several new vessels will join the fleet soon, owing to commitments made several years ago. The Navy will soon have a total of nine Piranha class PCFGs, following the arrival of the last two of the class in the coming months. Its existing corvette force (comprising 2 Elias built Barracuda class vessels) will be complimented by a 3,600 ton Swordfish class vessel currently fitting out at Elias Marine’s Alexandria yard and will soon replace the Descubierta class Corvette Colonel Errhamani. A second of the class is in the early stages of construction, and an option exists for a third of the type. However, studies underway suggest that instead the Navy may purchase a second-hand Kilo class SSK from the Elias Navy. One new commitment is that in order accommodate the new vessels and to improve fleet, the Navy will upgrade its dock facilities at Tangiers, Casablanca and Agadir (nothing to do with the fact that the Elias Navy wants friendly bases on the Atlantic of course.) To embark on its new Corvettes, the Navy has purchased three EA-22H Helicopters, which will be the first aviation assets owned and operated by the Moroccan Navy.

(A much more detailed order of battle will appear on the AMW forum in due course.)

As was undoubtedly expected by the Elians, arms deals with the Moroccans produce much international sputtering from the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, which vows to never back down no matter what forces are arrayed against it. Hopes arise, with elections proceeding in both Quinntonia and Walmington, that moderate friends of Baghdad might join with the Hindustanis and the independent republics of sub-Saharan Africa in supporting the SADR’s quest for independence. That the Whigs fail to deliver hoped-for succor upon taking office in London is a disappointment to be sure, but the Saharawi are hardly accustomed to success after decades of exile and occupation under Spain and then Morocco. Let matters stay as they were, Polisario would persevere along with them.

However, something WAS different now. Algeria and Nigeria, potent powers of Africa, were now colonies once again. The shell-blasted deserts of the Western Sahara were now home not only to the hardened soldiers of the Polisario Front but the women and children for whom they fought. And now Spain, which had been their first oppressor and whose post-imperial guilt had sent them aid while they sheltered in the Algerian republic, had joined the Holy League. Might they, like France and Russia, not look to reclaim what they had once held?

The elected councils and committees of the SADR were filled with debate not seen since the purge of Marxist ideas in the 1980s, but little agreement could be found. If the Spanish struck the Moroccans, would the enemy of an enemy be a friend? Or would one ruling despot be replaced by another, more distant and more ready to rid themselves of the Saharawi problem through genocidal slaughter? Some even worried that the rantings of the French in Rome might be directed towards themselves... were they counted amongst the ‘progressive bloc’ against which global war was to be waged? Certainly they had never claimed such status openly, but they had built a society in their barren land which would find praise with the Igovians or NeoAnarchans, and they now sheltered political refugees who still dreamed of restoring the republic in Algeria. Might the French or Roycelandians sweep down from Algeria and crush them between a rock of League troops and the Moroccan berm, their own enemies becoming friends? Resistance would not be crushed easily, but it would be a blow to move from fighting to liberate the remainder of the SADR, to trying to liberate even a patch of it. The presence of the Algerians in the debate did more to change its course. The ex-republican officials had perhaps not agreed with United Elias or Morocco on every issue, but they had much in common with Baghdad. Their fight was not for the liberation of Western Sahara but Algeria, and if that were ever to be conceivable then the Elians would have to be on side.

Outwardly, there was no change in the SADR... no speech or declaration marked a shift in policy. The elder veterans of Polisario continued to envision an independent Saharawi state, and the fight for freedom still fired the blood of many young recruits, but here and there someone might make a phone call, might write a letter. Through their limited contacts... ex-Polisario defectors living in Morocco, republican Algerians with friends in Baghdad, diplomatic envoys in London... inquiries began about the resumption of multilateral negotiations on the future of Western Sahara.

Like the Saharawi themselves, the Soviets had actually hoped that the Whigs might make Walmington the first European nation to recognise the SADR, if only because the Soviets had more interest in spending resources much further east than the domain of the Polisario. But, if nobody else was to take a protecting interest in the Saharawi, a strong movement had it that the Commonwealth ought to do more.

One of the problems/benefits of a popular hold on political power was that foreign people and ideas often carried more weight in policy-making than did natural resources or strategic interests.

Soviet documentary film makers and writers continue to show substantial interest in the Saharawi, though it might be said that the abandonment of Marxism is presented more in the light of the transition from First to Second Commonwealth rather than as any move away from revolutionary ideology.

While Soviet aid programmes creak along, delivering token quantities of the essentials for life, it is not hard for a wise subject of Commonwealth journalism to realise that the disproportionate interest in Saharawi politics may be linked to the sort of aid programme that was engaged for the SADR. More than a few documentaries film Moroccan soldiers on the berm and make note of a disparity between the Polisario's provision in will and ammunition.

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