The Real ALM
01-08-2005, 15:36
To: General Staff
From: President Featherston
In the wake of our humiliating loss in Angola, I must ask that our capacity for war, especially our Special Forces, be reevaluated. I ask that a study be made, considering what the hell went wrong and what can be done to fix things. This is unacceptable.
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Several Weeks later.....
To: President Featherston
From: General Staff
We have evaluated the problem, and have laid the blame on several causes:
1. We did not have effective coordination with local forces and supply lines. Coordination would have resulted in better results, and we would have not experienced the embarassing capture of Col. Stuart.
2. Equipment. Our planes and AA were not enough to hit the enemy planes as they were in 60,000+ ft in the air. Our stuff had only, say, 50,000+ range. We have to do something about this, be it enhanced AA or new Interceptors.
3. Rash Action. The Enlightened Guardians made boneheaded mistakes, relating to problem #1. They did not inform the rest of command of their decisions, we had to bail them out when they got stuck. Not fun.
4. We allowed the enemy to cut us off. We had lost initiative, and should have intercepted his landings when they occured. Instead, he was allowed to ocupy Naimbe Province, and deny us a landing spot. Initiative should be a primary objective from now on!
5. Not enough training. We did not balance our responsibilities in training local forces with our active fighting mission; many of our teams seemed to be more interested in fighting the enemy than training our charges.
6. Hubris. A general sense of hubris pervaded the decisions made.
Recommendations:
Our forces must learn how to exercise effective coordination with all Allies in the future. We must have initiative, and defend our flanks on all sides; this means bringing in naval detachments to guard shore points, and securing everything. We must act with more caution, and focus on bringing any guerilla force we have under our care to a reasonable standard, capable of fighting independently from us and winning.
In addition, we need better equipment. We must develop new anti-air weapons and aircraft, to ensure that we are not left naked again. And we cannot emphasize this enough: we need coordination!
This is our report.
From: President Featherston
In the wake of our humiliating loss in Angola, I must ask that our capacity for war, especially our Special Forces, be reevaluated. I ask that a study be made, considering what the hell went wrong and what can be done to fix things. This is unacceptable.
-------------------------
Several Weeks later.....
To: President Featherston
From: General Staff
We have evaluated the problem, and have laid the blame on several causes:
1. We did not have effective coordination with local forces and supply lines. Coordination would have resulted in better results, and we would have not experienced the embarassing capture of Col. Stuart.
2. Equipment. Our planes and AA were not enough to hit the enemy planes as they were in 60,000+ ft in the air. Our stuff had only, say, 50,000+ range. We have to do something about this, be it enhanced AA or new Interceptors.
3. Rash Action. The Enlightened Guardians made boneheaded mistakes, relating to problem #1. They did not inform the rest of command of their decisions, we had to bail them out when they got stuck. Not fun.
4. We allowed the enemy to cut us off. We had lost initiative, and should have intercepted his landings when they occured. Instead, he was allowed to ocupy Naimbe Province, and deny us a landing spot. Initiative should be a primary objective from now on!
5. Not enough training. We did not balance our responsibilities in training local forces with our active fighting mission; many of our teams seemed to be more interested in fighting the enemy than training our charges.
6. Hubris. A general sense of hubris pervaded the decisions made.
Recommendations:
Our forces must learn how to exercise effective coordination with all Allies in the future. We must have initiative, and defend our flanks on all sides; this means bringing in naval detachments to guard shore points, and securing everything. We must act with more caution, and focus on bringing any guerilla force we have under our care to a reasonable standard, capable of fighting independently from us and winning.
In addition, we need better equipment. We must develop new anti-air weapons and aircraft, to ensure that we are not left naked again. And we cannot emphasize this enough: we need coordination!
This is our report.