NationStates Jolt Archive

NOTE: w00t second one... hope you like it... I had a lot more to write... all escaped me...

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[Historical Abstract]
Most know that the holder of the defense has the advantage, and this idea has persisted throughout history. Indeed, so engraved is this that many still believe it to be true. Consequently, smaller nations believe it to be a lost cause to fight against a larger nation. Well, I present a much different perspective, which preaches that the advantage lies in superb tactics and strategy, but foremost the fact that stratigical numerical advantage is less important than tactical numerical advantage, and in that respect the offensive army, whether smaller of larger, and even a defensive army, will have the advantage.

First, let us study an early example, the Battle of Cannae 216 B.C. This August battle saw Hannibal, the overall Punic commander in Italy, defeat the Roman Army, under the generalship of either Varro or Paullus (it is unknown who truly commanded the Roman Army – Plutarch claims Varro, Adrian Goldsworthy claims otherwise). It should be noted, as Punic general Gisgo pointed out to his superior, that the Romans outnumbered the Carthaginian Army over two to one – eighty thousand men to thirty thousand. Yet, in a double envelopment maneuver the Punics slaughtered at least seventy thousand souls, loosing six-thousand as a sacrifice to their overwhelming victory. The reasons were simple. Although, strategically Hannibal was outnumbered, tactically he outnumbered his opponent, as he had six thousand elite cavalry and the Romans but three thousand. Through the re-construction of the battle it is known that Hannibal’s cavalry hit the Roman cavalry while the Roman infantry smashed through the Carthaginian center. In the midst of the gruesome fighting the Roman cavalry routed and their infantry pushed the Punic center so far back that they trapped themselves inside two Punic infantry wings, even though there were three and a half times the amount of Roman infantry. Then, the victorious Punic cavalry returned and closed the encirclement.

It could be claimed that cavalry was the early mechanization, and both seem extremely closely related when analyzing functionality. Both serve strongest on the wings, and both, at some instances, have a clear advantage of infantry and it was just this relationship which German officer Heinz Guderian explained in his 1937 narrative Acthung Panzer! So, the key component of my writing, at least in the first part, is centralized around the tank and mechanization, and how a small mechanized force with supplemental strategical and tactical skill can defeat an enemy tenfold its size.

During the 1939-1940 winter war the Red Army placed overwhelming strength on the Finnish border, giving them severe numerical advantage. However, the Finns were able to isolate groups of Soviets and achieve tactical superiority, causing grave casualties on the Red ranks. This was mostly due to the fact that the Soviet offensive was disorderly at best, and it took the blood, sweat and tears of Timoshenko to organize the offensive better. Yet, Soviet ground troops still faced massive casualties, and it took a huge effort to hammer the Finns, ultimately relying on overwhelming artillery and bombing. But even in the end the Finns were able to exact an incredibly toll on Moscow.

In the summer of 1944, while the Red Army had utterly crushed German Army Group Center in their genius campaign, codenamed Operation BAGRATION, the Northwestern Front launched an offensive into Vyborg, Finland. The Soviets, although finally capturing Vyborg, ultimately lost at least sixty thousand lives, which some claim even higher, while the Finns lost but thirty thousand casualties, including KIA, WIA, and MIA. One cannot blame these casualties on mere military impotence because as proved by southerly development the Red Army had finally learned to achieve operational success. They had defeated the German CITADEL offensive in 1943, the first time a German offensive in Russia had been defeated in the summer, and then the STAVKA operations against the Orel Salient and the Kharkov Salient were successful. What achieved Finland’s numerical victory was superior Finnish tactics, including overall mechanization and fluidity. The Finns were able to shuffle forces back and forth, applying the necessary pressure where needed.

The Germans were able to exact a terrible tax on the Red Army by using a tactic called Shield and Sword. Shield and Sword was the brain child of Werhmacht General-feldmarchall Walther Model. Model created the perfection of Shield and Sword when he took command of the Leningrad Front (Army Group North). The strategy requires an elastic defense, in which the commander is willing to give ground. However, the key component of Shield and Sword is the counter-attack which is theoretically designed to take back the lost territory, and surround and destroy the enemy which occupied it. The main problem with Shield and Sword is limited space – the Germans had little territory to give up, making their eventual defeat inevitable. Moreover, giving territory might make your opponent stronger, so Shield and Sword requires a very keen mind to juxtapose advantage and disadvantage. The best scenario to use this is when retreating from a certain position creates a salient, or a bulge, in your line, which you can cut off at the “neck”.

Another German tactic is called the hedgehog defense, used greatly by panzer commanders throughout the war. It involves a strategical concept and is mainly the occupying villages in the face of an enemy offensive, allowing your enemy free flow outside. Thus, your opponent is either forced to take the time to crush each position, slowing down the advance and diverting crucial forces to the destruction of these, or leave them, allowing the mechanization inside the villages to strike in the enemy’s rear. Again, limited space is a major factor in this strategy; however, the Germans exacted a terrible toll on the Soviets when the Red Army was able to commit small encirclements of small German panzer forces.

Thusly, a numerically inferior German army was able to exact over ten million casualties on the Red Army, while loosing no more than four to five million (I haven’t found a credible number yet – I still think it’s below two million). However, most of the casualties were taken during the German offensives – Operation BARABAROSSA, TYPHOON, NORTHERN LIGHTS, and BLAU. Although blitzkrieg to perfection never existed it came might close to it under the German, later Israeli, use. This required greater mechanization and the advantage in skill, command, discipline, and experience. True, Hitler’s army had the same number of horses as Napoleon’s, but while the Germans had ten Panzer divisions facing France in May 1940, the French had but three, all undermanned and poorly organized. The Russians, although technologically superior (the T-34 and KV-1 was vastly superior to the German Panzer IV, until the advent of the Panzer IV Ausf. G and Ausf. H.) faced poor organization and poor skill.

However, I’m ranting just a bit here, so I will get back on track. The point is that although Nation B might have a population of 3.7 billion and you might have a mere 1.4 billion that doesn’t mean that your cause is lost. It only means that you are going to have to apply yourself a bit more, perhaps print each post out and think about it for a day, and then reply. However, generally speaking, an adversary which is smaller can defeat an enemy manifold larger than him/her with little in the way of casualties. During the German invasion of Poland (September 1, 1939) the Germans faced 1.5 million Poles; however, the Polish were poorly armed and had poor leadership, ending in the deaths of dozens of thousands of Polish infantry with scant German deaths. The German French campaign was much the same. Of course, there are several exceptions, including the historically infamous Second Battle of El Alamein where Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery was able to literally blast the hell out of Rommel’s German army. These scenarios happen when your adversary has a superior logistical system and superior amounts of machinery – which on NS rarely happens as both sides normally role play as nations without cracks in their military system.

Most of the examples I gave were solely defensive, as Shield and Sword and the hedgehog defense, however, this further goes on to prove that an outnumbered army can work perfectly, and win, on both the defensive and the offensive without too much trouble – again, it all relies on technology, skill, command and discipline. Now you ask, how would you get all of this if you know little about nothing concerning military strategy and the military in general.

As for technology, I suggest you search on the internet and red up on modern technology, such as the FAS guides – I’m sure other players can direct you to better sites. Also, if you can’t think of anything yourself then look at the several storefronts online – such as the one in my signature (!) – and look through the technology posted in their, and when you find something good purchase it – of course, if its within your buying powers.

As for strategy, you can’t really do much. At best practice makes perfect, consequently, the more you practice the better you get. NationStates martial success depends heavily on your ability to role play – you can know all the strategies you want but if you can’t write, and you can’t explain what you’re doing to the fullest, good role players will always find holes in your tactics, and will always exploit them. Moreover, don’t expect to find many circumstances where you can use Shield and Sword or the hedgehog defense – instead, you have to begin to improvise tactics around your defense and the layout of you country, or of the enemy country. You must be able to grasp the situation and analyze the pros and cons of follow up actions and commit yourself to the best option.

Moreover, don’t be like Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus, a Greek king and general, invaded Italy, defeating the Romans twice and then loosing once and invading Sicily and finding himself victorious, yet then leaving when he was defeated once. The Romans, on the other hand, were defeated four times straight in the Punic Wars in Italy itself, and yet never surrendered. So, be determined! Do not surrender, do not give up! You will probably wear down your opponents – nations don’t like to take major casualties!

I hope this helped… I had much more in my head, but when I came to write it all down it escaped! Blast!


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Added by Hamptonshire:
One of the best examples for use in NS Warfare (since it parallels the usual ground warfare seen in I.I) is the Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil War.

Through superior command, morale and aggressiveness the Confederate Army of Northern Virgina was able to bottle up and whip the much more well armed and larger (at times over 5 times the size) Union Army of the Potomac.

Two of the most imporatant factors in the possiblity of a smaller force defeating a larger, seemingly more capable force is 1) mobility and 2) interior lines.


1) If you are mobile enough you can conduct hard hitting, lightening raids and attacks against your enemy. In the case of an invasion, even if you are outnumbered 3 to 1, you can still divide your force and hit your opponent while they ready themeselves to fight.

A brilliant example of this IRL is General Stonewall Jackson's flanking maneuver at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederates were outnumbered more than 2 to 1 but Lee decided to split his forces. The risk was great for he risked having the entire Union Army placed between the two sections of his own smaller Army. However, the advantages would allow him to carry the day. By splitting his forces and sending a highly trained, effective and swift force to meet the enemy before they were ready to fight Lee effectively turned the numerical superiority of the Union into a liablity.

2) Interior Lines- If your lines of supply, logistics, and movement lie solidly within your control, you can face a force several times your size and still win. Interior Lines allow you to quickly move your forces to where they are needed. You can quickly move in small units to fight holding actions while you move larger units from other fronts to fight off the attacks. An Army with strong Interior Lines could, very likely, stand against a force many times their size

When it comes down to it, the side that has more to fight for almost always wins. If you are fighting to defend "home and hearth" you can be damned sure you'll fight harder than if you are fighting for some abstract sense of national glory.

Secret comms


Yes I agree 100%, we are selves are a band of Highly skilled warriors. and one of our first lessons taught is strategy. how to fight consuming numbers and live to tell the story. thats our motto.

All very well, but here you run into the huge porblme of text-based RP: it's really, really hard to show what you're doing.

I agree with Mac. Which is why my Armed Forces has 3 million personnel total...

I can still get ya!

Always fight. If you're on the defensive, and the enemy is enormous compared to you (meaning more than 50X bigger) maybe gurellia warfare is what you want. Fight with temporary numeric and tactical superiority and then vanish when the enemy brings their reinforcements. Send those troops to attack where the re-inforcements came from. Try to stay mobile (like The Macabees said) PLEASE!!! Don't line up in one area... "Making a stand" is more like "moving to one area so they know where to attack better." If you're widely dispersed, where should the enemy attack? No single place will cripple you, forcing them into a multi-front campaign.

All very well, but here you run into the huge porblme of text-based RP: it's really, really hard to show what you're doing.

That's why I stress very good RPing...through all my W@Ws I think I got pretty good at explaining what I want done...but, then again, many don't know how to do this - "practice makes perfect"

Thanks all!

The thing is, a numerically inferior nation(Assuming lower population, not just better equipped equal size) will have trouble in the air. The larger nation can pull up AWACS and long-range attack aircraft, and slowly destroy the weaker enemy airforce. Then they can obliterate Anti-aircraft and ground forces with bombers, probably stealth if its a small nation. Once the small nation has no armour, they can only turn into an insurgency, and depending on how brutal the occupier, insurgency can be ended quickly, or before the insurgency, surrendur can be forced. The only way they can really counter this threat is to put most of their money into airforce/anti-air, and hope for the best, but then enemy ground units can handle them easily, if they are strong enough...

The thing is, a numerically inferior nation(Assuming lower population, not just better equipped equal size) will have trouble in the air. The larger nation can pull up AWACS and long-range attack aircraft, and slowly destroy the weaker enemy airforce. Then they can obliterate Anti-aircraft and ground forces with bombers, probably stealth if its a small nation. Once the small nation has no armour, they can only turn into an insurgency, and depending on how brutal the occupier, insurgency can be ended quickly, or before the insurgency, surrendur can be forced. The only way they can really counter this threat is to put most of their money into airforce/anti-air, and hope for the best, but then enemy ground units can handle them easily, if they are strong enough...

Most advanced NationStates (2005 to 2008) surface to air missile batteries can destroy mass amounts of aircraft...my wars are rarely fought in the air... enemies find it difficult to destroy me by that third dimension.

We only have about 300 field ops units, and on other forums for nationstates we have destroyed entire bases with 1 or 2 ,I am all for tactics

ooc: If you want a very good guide on how to win a war. of any type...Read Sun Tzu's book of war......Very very good......

One of the best examples for use in NS Warfare (since it parallels the usual ground warfare seen in I.I) is the Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil War.

Through superior command, morale and aggressiveness the Confederate Army of Northern Virgina was able to bottle up and whip the much more well armed and larger (at times over 5 times the size) Union Army of the Potomac.

Two of the most imporatant factors in the possiblity of a smaller force defeating a larger, seemingly more capable force is 1) mobility and 2) interior lines.


1) If you are mobile enough you can conduct hard hitting, lightening raids and attacks against your enemy. In the case of an invasion, even if you are outnumbered 3 to 1, you can still divide your force and hit your opponent while they ready themeselves to fight.

A brilliant example of this IRL is General Stonewall Jackson's flanking maneuver at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederates were outnumbered more than 2 to 1 but Lee decided to split his forces. The risk was great for he risked having the entire Union Army placed between the two sections of his own smaller Army. However, the advantages would allow him to carry the day. By splitting his forces and sending a highly trained, effective and swift force to meet the enemy before they were ready to fight Lee effectively turned the numerical superiority of the Union into a liablity.

2) Interior Lines- If your lines of supply, logistics, and movement lie solidly within your control, you can face a force several times your size and still win. Interior Lines allow you to quickly move your forces to where they are needed. You can quickly move in small units to fight holding actions while you move larger units from other fronts to fight off the attacks. An Army with strong Interior Lines could, very likely, stand against a force many times their size

When it comes down to it, the side that has more to fight for almost always wins. If you are fighting to defend "home and hearth" you can be damned sure you'll fight harder than if you are fighting for some abstract sense of national glory.

Most advanced NationStates (2005 to 2008) surface to air missile batteries can destroy mass amounts of aircraft...my wars are rarely fought in the air... enemies find it difficult to destroy me by that third dimension.

That gets into tech war. Air-to-surface cruise missiles, in conjunction with satelites, can destroy Anti-aircraft missile batteries without being in danger. AWACS and Long range missiles(Aim-52, I use Aim-153's though) can destroy the enemy airforce, all of these from long range. Then stealth aircraft can get in(Most smaller nations dont have decent anti-stealth), and destroy most other Anti-aircrafts, then large bombing campaigns can be launched to destroy everything. The invader will lose some forces to AA fire, but not war stopping. Aircraft are usually one step above AA.

ooc: If you want a very good guide on how to win a war. of any type...Read Sun Tzu's book of war......Very very good......

Hate it... I thought it very obvious...same goes with Machiavelli's The Prince..Karl von Clauswitz Von Krieg was awsome though.

Hamptonshire..I'm going to add what you said..either right now or tomorrow.

That gets into tech war. Air-to-surface cruise missiles, in conjunction with satelites, can destroy Anti-aircraft missile batteries without being in danger. AWACS and Long range missiles(Aim-52, I use Aim-153's though) can destroy the enemy airforce, all of these from long range. Then stealth aircraft can get in(Most smaller nations dont have decent anti-stealth), and destroy most other Anti-aircrafts, then large bombing campaigns can be launched to destroy everything. The invader will lose some forces to AA fire, but not war stopping. Aircraft are usually one step above AA.
OOC: hehe... my surface to air missiles can outdistance, or out manuever, any air to air, or air to surface missiles... in fact, multi-layered SAM defenses will make sure, along with most-modern RADAR systems on NS, that your aircraft won't get close...trust me.

Sun tzu setup the basics of modern combat.

Thanks Mac, I may post a little more later. I feel like finally being able to use some of the otherwise useless information I keep stored in my head.

Interesting post. However, hedgehog defence in WWII was first used by France in the Battle of France... it worked too, they simply didn't have the defencive depth.

In the Winter War, Finland took over 60 000 casulties (about 20 000 fatal), while the Russians lost closer to a quarter million dead, and another quarter million wounded. And that's a fairly optimistic figure... Khruschev claimed it was almost a million dead. It wasn't that their tactics were abnormally bad, or that their equipment was inferior. They actually had the best tanks of the time, they were well diciplined, and performed a very competant combined arms armored thrust exactly in the same way as the Germans... and it failed. Which is because blitzkrieg is a flawed concept... and because the Finns are bloody tough people. But the Finns were almost completel unmechanized. Is there such a word as Ski-ized?

Also, I would hesitate to say that the Finns even ever had local numerical superiority. What they did have was fire superiority, because they were using mobile light machineguns and submachineguns, while the russians relied on bolt action rifles. And the russian tanks were useless because offroad they would be ambushed with molotovs, and the roads would be mined.

The shield and sword tactics are remarkably similar to Caene... Get the enemy engaged... let them advance, slam on their rear and wheel the flanks in.

The Poles actually had high moral, cost the germans 8 months of production worth of tanks, shot down a third of the luftwaffe, and held out for 37 days against both germany and russia when the allies promised help within 14 days. Their defeat was inevitable, they were outnumbered, but they gave a VERY good account of themselves, particularly as they were expecting the Czech fortifications to hold back the germans initialy. Pity the allies let those forts get annexed. I would actually hold Poland up as a perfect example of how a country in a terrible stratigic position should fight a war. It was unwinnable for them, given the situation.

Frankly, if you are outnumbered in NS, the trick is to take strategic offence, tactical defence. Defend positions that MUST be taken by the enemies and defend them well. Counter attack when the opertunity presents itself. Hit their supply lines.

Tactically, use fortifications as much as possible, and urban combat. This doesn't mean rely on fortifications... use them as basing points. Rally out from them, swing around them, use them to anchor your lines. Even today, well designed fortifications with good air defence are very tough to crack. ONly one section of blockhouses on the maginot line ever fell.

Mines are your friends, mass produce FASCAM and use it liberally, along with tank traps and obsticles. mine the area around the obsticals with anti personel mines, and zero your artillery in on it. There's no easy way to crack that kind of obstacle

Deny your enemy his satalites, without GPS and satalite communications, most nations are helpless. Remember he is on YOUR land, so you know it and know where to hold and have interior lines of communications/supply

Don't be afraid of giving territory if situation is bad... if you bleed the enemy and retreat intact, that's a victory.

Artillery is the god of battle, worship it.

Ambush, ambush, ambush. Let them get close, then blow them away with ATGMs and drop mines behind them.

Rivers are your friend... blow bridges as you retreat. I can't think of an easy way for someone to force a river crossing even now.

Finally, be creative, especially with terrain. Remember Thermopylae... terrain can turn what should be a lopsided victory into an embarresing debacle.

Hate it... I thought it very obvious...same goes with Machiavelli's The Prince..Karl von Clauswitz Von Krieg was awsome though.

Hamptonshire..I'm going to add what you said..either right now or tomorrow.

Indeed.....But if it was the first strategy book you came across....Then it lies you in good stead if you wish to gain more advanced strategies.

OOC: hehe... my surface to air missiles can outdistance, or out manuever, any air to air, or air to surface missiles... in fact, multi-layered SAM defenses will make sure, along with most-modern RADAR systems on NS, that your aircraft won't get close...trust me.

OOC: Believe what you will. Distance means the missile has to be bigger, which means they can be picked off by Mica's and other weapons that can target other missiles. The planes wouldnt need to get any closer than 250km, and thats if they used Scalp EG's, other missiles have even longer range, so your manuvering missiles wouldn't come into play(Low altitude cruise missiles have little to fear from SAMs).

My point was, however, about smaller nations, not you.

Superior Intelligence defeats Superior Numbers.

If you look at the last three "big wars", in each, the side which had the greater intelligence operations won.

Yes, this includes propaganda.

Superior Intelligence defeats Superior Numbers.

If you look at the last three "big wars", in each, the side which had the greater intelligence operations won.

Yes, this includes propaganda.
Meh. No one ever RPs intel, nor do they ever misinterpret enemy actions if they know OOC what the enemy is doing.

Hm, some decent stuff in this thread, from all sides. It's nice that someone's sticking up for Poland (and even France, a little bit), too.

And there are plenty of nations out there that do play with intentionally flawed militaries. Maybe they're all in AMW, I dunno.

At the moment I tend to agree with Chellis about the general probability of vastly superior air power suppressing air defences in the end. It may never be total, and aircraft losses may remain quite high while enemy production and movement may never be totally crippled, but I'm struggling to think of ways for a nation with a beaten air force to prevent the enemy's airpower from seriously weighting a conflict against them. BG is a great believer in the fielding of a strong, deep, layered air defence grid, but -in our situation- if enough of our principle potential 'big' rivals -Sino, Xiaguo, Quinntonia, United Elias- somehow got over their own differences and global war broke out against BG, it would be considered absolutely vital that the aircraft war not be lost to us as SAMs are always at a disadvantage and in the long run of a major conflict, an enemy will always figure out how -by tactics or technology- to deal with a defence system, like how piston engine fighters in WWII got over the technical superiority of Me.262s and did away with perhaps more than a thousand of them. Those uber SAMs are asking for a solution, and a serious rival with an airforce on the offensive may well find it.

I do hope that somebody can now chip in and blow a lot of that away by indicating how easy it actually is to work under enemy air superiority in anything more than a guerrilla fashion :)

Meh. No one ever RPs intel, nor do they ever misinterpret enemy actions if they know OOC what the enemy is doing.

Hm, yes, it'd be nice if that were a greater factor. I'm trying to think of examples of it happening, and hope that I can find at least one before I get bored of typing and go away.

I think that -with given knowledge in a person's mind- it can be hard to think of ways that the IC situation might be improperly handled, mistakes that may be made. It may require a really massive degree of detail to be put in, more than I think I've seen anyone fully achieve. It also requires a player to trust his opponent -who benefits from the mistake- to behave properly given the advantage and to recognise that they're being given it by good role playing, so it's not just an oportunity to oh my god win right now and get a fearsome reputation.

It would be great though, eh, because it'd also open a greater possibility for deceptions to be used -is his character making an honest mistake in full OOC knowledge, or is he pretending to make a mistake to draw me in?- which at the moment is hard to do and seems to require slightly far out deceptions.

I didn't think of any good examples. I'll go, now.

TAG, RP is very complicated, you can sometimes win on being technelogically supperior even though the enemy is larger, or better RPers, when it comes down to it you rtroops who are experianced should be the ones doing the hard fioghting, let the young ones learn in smaller skirmishes, small wars are best to start with i think, get your RP skills up were forces are equal and only supperior RP will win, that way you improve Drastically(hopefully)

OOC: Lol, taking a leaf of mine and Voll's book or what Mac?

If you remember I did say on the forums that RPing a strategy and tactics is very hard simply because people refuse on the most part to loose in war even if they are blatently doing so.

If me and Voll play Hearts of Iron to settle the matter of who is the best strategically, do you want to come and be a third power in our little death match.

Meh. No one ever RPs intel, nor do they ever misinterpret enemy actions if they know OOC what the enemy is doing.

OOC: As a point I RPed an Intelligence Blunder in my war with TDU.

OOC: Lol, taking a leaf of mine and Voll's book or what Mac?

If you remember I did say on the forums that RPing a strategy and tactics is very hard simply because people refuse on the most part to loose in war even if they are blatently doing so.

If me and Voll play Hearts of Iron to settle the matter of who is the best strategically, do you want to come and be a third power in our little death match.

I find that I think it admiral for people not wanting to die, and I think it's a very valuable RPing factor...makes for much better role plays, unless it's a TOTAL godmod.


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Verdant:

The French didn't simply suffer from little to no space - they had enough to defeat a numerically inferior German army with worse technology. The factor of their defeat was the crushing German air power, when the French air force failed to put up a fight and the RAF was in the midst of re-deployement north of the Thames for fear of German bombing. Poor communications was also a major problem, take in mind that their overall Commander, Gamelin, refused to install a phone line in his headquarters, and instead opted for a drive to commander's quarters, which meant by the time he got there orders would be obsolete. Moreover, the French divisions, especially those in the Ardennes were under equipped, with only a fourth of the anti-tank guns. The two armored divisions deployed at Sedan failed in coordination due to poor command and leadership and inactiveness and when they counter-attacked they did so late and piecemeal - when I have time I will put up my narrative on the battle of Sedan which I wrote for a magazine.

The Poles lost for different reasons - mostly over extension of the lines..however, that's all I can post right now as I have to run to class.

Nice thread. I suggested it for the Guide to NationStates.

I did a pretty decent job in the Second War of the Roach against a "numerically superior" foe, based on tactics. Of course, an experienced navy clamping down a stifling blockade was a huge factor...

Nice thread. I suggested it for the Guide to NationStates.

I did a pretty decent job in the Second War of the Roach against a "numerically superior" foe, based on tactics. Of course, an experienced navy clamping down a stifling blockade was a huge factor...

That I must agree that I left out - I think my mind was only set on the "ground war" stage... blockades are a huge factor, taking as an example the First World War and the effect the blockade had on Germany (almost inciting revolution by 1918!).

That I must agree that I left out - I think my mind was only set on the "ground war" stage... blockades are a huge factor, taking as an example the First World War and the effect the blockade had on Germany (almost inciting revolution by 1918!).Perhaps I should write a similar thread about naval strategy?

The French didn't simply suffer from little to no space - they had enough to defeat a numerically inferior German army with worse technology. The factor of their defeat was the crushing German air power, when the French air force failed to put up a fight and the RAF was in the midst of re-deployement north of the Thames for fear of German bombing. Poor communications was also a major problem, take in mind that their overall Commander, Gamelin, refused to install a phone line in his headquarters, and instead opted for a drive to commander's quarters, which meant by the time he got there orders would be obsolete. Moreover, the French divisions, especially those in the Ardennes were under equipped, with only a fourth of the anti-tank guns. The two armored divisions deployed at Sedan failed in coordination due to poor command and leadership and inactiveness and when they counter-attacked they did so late and piecemeal - when I have time I will put up my narrative on the battle of Sedan which I wrote for a magazine.

The Poles lost for different reasons - mostly over extension of the lines..however, that's all I can post right now as I have to run to class.

No, I agree. But by the time they got their act together and started using hedgehog defence, the germans had already penetrated too deeply for it to be effective... by THAT time they didn't have enough defencive depth.

And yes, the Frenc made the same mistake with their aircraft as the poles did, carefully husbanding them and saving them throughout the war. Now we know that you need to put EVERYTHING up, because the country that maintains air superiority for 48 hours tends to keep it regardless of numbers. The french actually ended up having more aircraft than the Germans, and the British had even more, and yet Germany maintained air superiority. Germany also had far more and better artillery, which was an enormous factor. And french communications were rediculously bad, I agree.

Even more depressingly, two german flack units claimed over 500 aerial kills, while the french and british had no air defence to speak of. That alone was a recipe for disaster. It was also interesting that the germans were flying twice as many sorties as the british and french, and actually had more aircraft deployed at the front. And Gamilain was incompitant.

Of course Poland was overextended, she was fighting numerically superior enemies on two fronts! True they could have given up more land at the begining and shrunk the defended area, but there simply was no way for them to win a conventional war.

According to Len Deighton the Poles had 1.5 million infantry put up against the 1 million (750,000 to 1 million) German infantry... but of course, the German armored fist was much better equipped and much better trained. Anyways... if anybody cares..the article on Sedan:


Guderian flew to Kleist’s headquarters, at Elby, at six o’ clock May 12 in his Fieseler Storch. The Panzer Leader held the right to be pleased with himself, as he had just traversed the once thought impenetrable Ardennes with the largest concentration of armor the world had seen yet. In just two days his XIX Korps had reached the Meuse River, opposite Sedan, the site of the gravest of the French defeat during the Franco-Prussian War, and were poised to once again fulfill this victory.
At the meeting Kleist, thrilled by the recent victories, directed Guderian to strike while the iron was hot the following day at 1500 in order to catch the French defenders full off guard. Guderian was outraged, after two days of relentless drive his 2nd Panzer Division, 1/3 of his korps, had not yet reached the Meuse. Guderian was skeptical that an attack without the 2nd Panzer Division would succeed, attempting to gain more time for his offensive. Nonetheless, Kleist pushed for the attack date and Guderian was forced to agree after Kleist cut him short.
To the XIX Korps’ leader’s bewilderment Kleist had also asked the Luftwaffe commander in the sector, General Loerzer, to keep the attack to one short but heavy bombardment. Guderian was shocked and in his words “the whole attack was placed in jeopardy.” In fact, Guderian had asked Loerzer to keep up a perpetual bombardment to keep the French head’s low allowing an easy crossing of the Meuse, but of course, Kleist thought better.

OKW (German High Command) and OKH (German Army High Command) had originally appointed Kleist to Panzergruppe command level not only because he was one of the quieter generals, when it came time to argue with his superiors, but because this characteristic masked his personality to ignore and even argue his way to his subordinates. As it became known later, in France, Kleist also became known to be in extreme paranoia when it came to French abilities and counter attack, which would play a vital role for the final push to Dunkirk weeks later. In fact, he had even ordered Guderian to divert the 2nd Panzer Division to counter a supposed French thrust to his flank, which of course never materialized. Lucky for the Germans, it was also an order which was quickly ignored as Guderian strove to breakthrough to the Meuse defenses.

Guderian, in turn, was a relatively young general who was the first advocate of armored warfare and deep flanking attacks, a primordial blitzkrieg, which he would perfect in his subsequent studies and campaigns of war. In the Polish campaign, Fall Weiss, he had overran much of Northern Poland, and her overstretched armies, reaching Brest-Litovsk in just a few weeks (although the actual attack into the city would take a bit longer). He was known infamously for his tactical ideology of “striking with a fist”, referring to large clumps of armor and for his non-stop energetic attitude towards war, making him Germany’s finest soldier. So well known for his push for speed he was dubbed Schnelle Heinz, or “Hurrying Heinz”, by his troops. Strangely, for his attack on Sedan, he desired more time to concentrate his forces, although for now he would have to do with whatever time he had.

Guderian planned accordingly. Using a three prong attack to pierce the French Sedan defenses he wanted to crush all French resistance before they could reform their lines. The 1st Panzer Division, crossing at Glaire, a half a mile downstream from Sedan, would push towards the Marfeé Woods and then south, attacking a line running from Chaumont to Chéréry. On the left the 10th Panzer Division would traverse the Meuse two miles south of Sedan and then occupy the nearby heights, eliminating much of the French artillery threat. If the 2nd Panzer Division arrived on time it would strike across the Meuse on the 1st Panzer Division’s right and either help occupy the heights south of the crossing or advance with the 1st Panzer Division, the latter being preferred by Guderian.

What the Panzer Leader was counting on was Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Balck’s 1st Rifle Regiment, four battalions of Lieutenant Colonel Graf von Schwerin’s Gross Deutschland Regiment and his assault engineer companies to storm across the river, break through the rows of pillboxes and bunkers and then hold their positions until a set of bridges were completed to allow the crossing of his panzers.

Guderian placed most of the initial weight of the success of this operation on these regiments and the infantry had to be able to destroy French resistance and then hold against numerous French forces. Balck and von Scwerin had promised him this and it was vital that they did so without failing. Once all his forces were well settled on the other side of the Meuse, Guderian designed an attack to pivot into the French rear, disrupting French communications and throwing most of the Meuse line into disorientation.

To counter this massive assault the French placed General Huntziger’s 2nd Army around the Sedan sector. Huntziger was an outspoken man who had never betted on a German attack claiming that the Germans were so foolish to commit such an act of stupidity. In the French General Staff and in the officer corps he was revered for his “genius” although at Sedan he would prove completely the opposite, which sadly enough was a factor for the entire French general staff.

Generalissimo Gamelin, Commander and Chief of the entire French Army, ordered Sedan to be defended at all costs, but defiant of this Huntziger left the east bank of the city to be left virtually undefended, due to purely strategic reasons. Huntziger, seemingly unaware on French moral, hoped to hold Guderian farther east, at the edge of the Ardennes, by a fairly reliable string of fortifications but to his despair most of the French garrison would run at the sight of the Germans, far before the battle even begun.

The Meuse River banks were another subject of concern for Huntziger. Their sharply rising banks on the east and lower banks on the right exposed his men to German gunfire and furthermore a bend in the river north of Sedan called the Mushroom of Glaire exposed his army on three sides. To counter the latter Huntziger opted to withdraw from the peninsula arguing that it would merely give the Germans a bridgehead, although the 55th Infantry Division would be kept at the base to protect from a German breakthrough.

More disappointedly was the fact that although on paper the 2nd Army had a clear advantage over Guderian’s XIX Korps but in reality most of the army was made up of “B” divisions, or reserve divisions which were poorly commanded by old and inexperienced officers. Discipline was terrible exemplified by the fact that on May 10 7,000 of 17,000 soldiers in the 71st were on sick leave. Only the 3rd North African Division seemed slightly fit to fight such a battle but with its weak flanks provided by the 55th and 71st Divisions Huntziger could hope for little.

The 55th Infantry Division had only a quarter of its anti-tank guns although the storage areas to the rear had around 520, enough for 10 divisions. The division was also short of the necessary anti-aircraft guns, an armament which would soon become more than essential. Although all these shortcomings only worsened the situation the division did have double the normal amount of artillery guns and most of the corps’ artillery also. It was a “B” class division and inexplicably most of the officers were World War I veterans trained to fight in trench warfare, not Blitzkrieg.

On top of this Sedan’s fortifications were deplorable. The easternmost defenses were unoccupied after the German emergence from the Ardennes, which left only the river defenses. Hence the only true barrier to the XIX Korps was a line on the southern banks of the Meuse but moreover these weren’t even finished by May. Although Gamelin, upon hearing of this, ordered for a series of blockhouses to be built along the river line to complement the defensive line, they also were never completed.

At 3:30 P.M. May 12 Huntziger sent a telegram to General Goerges’s headquarters requesting reinforcements after alarming reports of a German breakthrough through the forest. General Roton, filling in for Goerges (Goerges was to report to headquarters by car, a ghastly example of France’s poor communication between generals), ordered the 3rd Armored Divisions and 3rd Motorize Division to reinforce the 2nd Army. Roton also sent up the crack 14th Infantry Division, stationed behind the Maginot Line, by rail to Sedan. But at 5:00 P.M. Huntziger sent a surprisingly illogical message stating that he felt the front was “calm” and that the reinforcements were not to be “rushed”, thus meaning that Huntziger would not have the troops necessary to repel Guderian’s XIX Korps.

The following day the sky opened as a clear, beautiful day, perfect weather for aircraft. This peaceful setting soon transformed into Dante’s inferno at 10:00 A.M. as 200 Stukas and 310 Dornier 17’s escorted by 200 fighters blasted at the French river fortifications. For four hours straight wave upon wave, squadron upon squadron, of Stukas and bombers hit French positions all along the line. French inside the bunkers were terrified and did exactly as the Germans predicted, ducked down into the bunker. The sounds of the Stuka became unbearable and the yells of the wounded supplemented by the screams of the dead forced live men too weep.

The Stukas attacked in waves releasing their armaments on the French bunkers and pillboxes. They were followed by the Dornier 17’s which bombed the already scarred defenses. As the Stukas rose and then returned they poured hell into the French. It was a magnificently deadly sight, and at the same time grossly terrifying. To Guderian’s astonishment his original Luftwaffe plan had been followed and in a later conversation with Loerzer the Luftwaffe general claimed that, “…too late. They would have muddled the air fleet. So I didn’t pass them [Kleist’s orders] on.” This eventual turn of events was a major tactical advantage for Guderian whose triumph remained in the hands of all his cards playing out well.

The worst was to come and with their heads down the French wondered where was their own air force, at one time considered the best or only second to the Soviets. It was one of the more demoralizing aspects that not a single French fighter contested the bombardment for most of the day. Though Georges gave priority to Sedan for air support General Bilotte, air commander of the sector, merely ignored the order.
At 2:00 P.M. the air strikes gradually increased in ferocity and in momentum until it hit its climax at around 3:00 P.M. with an all out attack by over 1,000 aircraft. Then at 4:00 the inferno ceased and the Meuse was covered with a thick blanket of smoke and dust. As it cleared the figures of Germans already puncturing the bunkers could be seen.

As the Luftwaffe continued the assault Schwerin’s Gross Deutschland Regiment and Balck’s 1st Infantry Regiment began their crossing of the Meuse.

Von Schwerin’s first rafts were chewed up as they attempted to go into the water. The second raft met the same fate and not until a 37mm flak gun and two 75mm assault guns opened fire on the bunkers, covering the opposing side, were the French finally silenced. Although now both the artillery and Luftwaffe were hammering French areas of concentration the going was still dangerous. Small arms fire still plagued Balck and his men but nonetheless the regiment crossed and continued towards the bunkers.

At 4:50 A.M. Gross Deutschland’s 2nd Battalion crossed the Meuse and spread into the village of Glaire hunting for French defenders. Shocked French were flushed out with grenades and small arms, which developed into extremely bloody fighting. As the small conflict died down French with overstrained faces filed into German hands with arms over their heads while other French under a sergeant retreated south to the Frénois Line, a serried of crudely built blockhouses working themselves for the next attack.

Lieutenant Courbiere’s company quickly advanced towards his objective, Hill 247, just under two miles away but were yielded by extremely accurate artillery fire from Torcy and Les Forges. Torcy was silenced by Gross Deutschland’s 3rd Battalion while Les Forges was occupied by the 1st Regiment which had a considerably easier crossing that Gross Deutschland.

Balck’s crossing was a peaceful stroll across the river compared to that of the Gross Deutschland Regiment. The bunkers across the river had been effectively silenced by the air attack and armored units on the German side of the river. Only a few French soldiers remained and most of them had ineffective weapons and no artillery attack could be called in since the telephone wires had been consequently cut by the bombardment. Thus Balck’s crossing was virtually uncontested.
The French were incapable of contesting Balck as their guns were destroyed, somehow silenced or clogged by dust while the defenders were too stunned to give effective resistance. Crossing the Meuse silently Balck’s soldiers leaped onto land and charged the French bunkers with grenades, small arms, flamethrowers and powder charges. Although a French sergeant had viewed the entire crossing his machine gun was jammed and communication lines had been severed by the bombardment eliminating the possibility of artillery to rain death upon Balck, a serious deficiency which had saved Guderian from total destruction. After eliminating the first line of bunkers Balck immediately began to march towards the village of Frénois and the second line of bunkers.

On German appearance most of the Frénois Line was evacuated and the Germans found supplies, ranging from food to soda pop, which was greedily taken by the German soldiers. But west of Frénois, at Château de Bellevue spectacular French resistance held up the German attack. Led by a Lieutenant Verron two blockhouses blocked the main route south towards Bellevue. Verron, although lacking in infantry support as well as communications with each other, was able to hold the German advance for hours. At 6:00 P.M. several Stukas made a run at Verron’s bunker and blockhouse 103, which Verron occupied, was hit directly, mostly without effect. But then a grenade destroyed the air vent and the blockhouse was forced to surrender after heavy hand to hand fighting. An hour later blockhouse 104, the second obstacle, also fell to the Germans after using up 10,000 cartridges of ammunition and suffering 50% casualties.
Not willing to let such easy territory to be re-occupied by French Balck pushed his weary regiment further and further until capturing Chéréry and the area near the St. Quentin farm, a mile and a half north of Bulson, creating an exposed neck that the French half heartedly attempted to cut off.
The 10th Panzer Division only managed to cross the Meuse at 7:30 P.M. and at that, only a few soldiers truly made it across. French bunkers were left mostly in tact and managed to concentrate unusual accuracy on German rafts attempting to cross the river, destroying 48 rafts out of 50 trying to make it to the other side. Luckily for the Germans two rafts did make it under the leadership of Sergeant Rubarth.

On the rafts Rubarth and his men were able to cross the 60 yards of river past whizzing bullets and crashing rounds. The two rafts began to sink into the river, burdened with the heavy weight of the soldier’s tools. With a quick sigh Rubarth said, “No digging for us, either we get through, or that’s the end,” telling his comrades to throw over digging and entrenching tools. The sergeant ordered his machine gunners to fire into the bunkers’ slits and his soldiers did as ordered, placing the machinegun on the shoulders of their comrades to provide a stable base. As the rafts neared the western banks the soldiers quickly set foot on land and continued to silence the bunkers. Hand to hand fighting was common as was the sound of grenades as Germans pumped the French out of the steadily weakened bunkers. From the opposite bank they could here “the sound of loud cheers from our comrades.” But for Rubarth and his men it wasn’t the end, for they continued into a swamp covering their thighs and moved to knock out another two bunkers, opening a gap in the primary French line. As more and more German troops made their way to Rubarth he was able to lead an attack into the second line and open yet another gap, while at the same time beating off French counter attacks. This outstanding action earned Rubarth the Iron Cross and a promotion to lieutenant.

The infantry of the panzer division were advancing up the east of the Marfeé Woods by midnight spending the night knocking out machinegun nests and artillery batteries around their positions. Finally with a last exhaustion the German infantry made an effort to capture Thélonne which was met with feeble resistance, using grenades to flush the French out. Although this “last effort” cost the Germans maybe up to 50% casualties it never allowed the French the chance to counter attack. This would remain the difference between the quality of the French and the quality of the Germans for the entire war; the Germans were always ready to sacrifice for complete victory.

The last division to cross was the 2nd Panzer Division, which was only able to cross after artillery systematically destroyed the defending bunkers. The division’s reconnaissance and motorcycle battalion had been the only elements able even get close to the river and even theses were stopped cold in front of the village of Donchéry by French fire from Bellevue, Glaire and Villette. To combat this lull the Germans brought up a group of Panzers to put some pressure on the French defenses and to allow a German breakthrough. It was effective and after intense fighting the Germans were able to capture a railway embankment but French flanking fire still poured into the German positions. Frantic effort to shut down the French barrage failed when the summer sun made it almost impossible to accurately hit the French artillery emplacements. On by 10:00 P.M. was the 2nd Panzer Division able to make a small grasp across the river.

That May 14th General Lafontaine seemed happy. But he had received false information on the German advances. Instead he had been told that the front was near stability and the Germans had either been fought to a standstill or repelled. He had believed that his 55th Division, originally thought ill prepared for this war, had checked the advance of the invading swine, far from the truth. His smug look was erased, however, when a wave of soldiers, terrified, swept upon the road in trucks or on foot. To Lafontaine it became quite clear that most of his 55th Division was on the run. The results were deadly, for this unforeseen route would leave the German’s route of advance unimpeded. He hysterically looked over his reports; he had made contact again with Corap’s 53rd Infantry Division and Frénois was still no entirely in German hands.

With his officers Lafontaine ran to block the rampage of French men but the soldiers purely bypassed them and the flight continued until the soldiers reached Reims, a full 60 miles away. It was quite a catastrophic loss and it resulted into the ultimate defeat of the French at Sedan.

Gamelin finally received a report from Sedan at 9:25 P.M. on May 13 where Huntziger alleged that only a “small slice has been bitten off south of Sedan,” which was quite misleading since the Marfeé woods were as good as taken and the 55th was no longer available for resistance.

At the Meuse French artillery batteries started to empty its barrels, firing at the 16 ton bridge which was being built across from Gaulier. Fortunately, although the German engineers had only brought 70 meters of bridging material for that section, they had found a region just under 70 meters of length and had the French destroyed part of the bridge the Meuse would have been left without a bridge for days. The bridge was opened at 2:00 A.M. May 14.

Upstream the 2nd Panzer Division engineers worked hard to build a bridge near Donchéry but it was delayed by fairly accurate French artillery, opening at 4:00 A.M. May 14, well after the first rafts had entered the water. Still, Guderian was quite pleased that at least some panzers were crossing the Meuse, and even telegrammed General Busch of the 16th Army about the success. Busch, who had once bet a bottle of champagne that Guderian would not be able to cross until after the 5th day, rapidly replied with gratefulness, and with a bottle of champagne.

At the same time, while Busch and Guderian were celebrating, divisional German generals were worriedly concentrating anti aircraft guns around the extremely unprotected bridges. Nehring, Guderian’s Chief of Staff, recognized the weakness of the bridges’ defenses and its vitality to the operations around Sedan, not only as a crossing for tanks, but as a supplying vein to forces on the other side of the river.
General Billotte, also saw the grave importance of the bridges, and on May 13 he attempted to make sure that the Gaulier Bridge was destroyed. Billotte explained that the Sedan bridges must be destroyed, “as soon as possible,” and then implied his desperate measures by saying, “Victory or defeat hangs on those bridges.”
On May 14 170 French and RAF bombers sped towards the bridges towards the Sedan valley. Around the Gaulier Bridge some 200 anti aircraft guns waited for them. The attack was unsuccessful with German AA guns bringing down 50 of 170 bombers. More importantly, the bridge was yet intact. In one of those ironical moments of war, Guderian and Rundstedt approached each other on the bridge having a dry conversation, while in the center of the bombardment.
Rundstedt, looking nervously around at the bombers attempting their suicidal task of taking out the bridges asked, “Is it always like this here?”
Of course, Guderian’s only reply was, “Yes, it was.”

On May 14 Lafontaine, the same man who had witnessed the rout of the 55th Infantry Division, was given command of the 7th and 4th Tank Battalions, supplemented by the 213th and 205th Infantry Regiments. General Gransard ordered an immediate counter attack on German positions on the Meuse towards Bulson and then head on to the Meuse. Gransard structured the attack to take place at 3:00 P.M. May 13 although certain “developments” would force this date to an even later start time.
At Chémery General Lafontaine had retreated his staff further back after the retreat of his 55th division to an area with barely any communication systems to the point that Lafontaine did not even know which troops were going to be available for his supposed counterattack. This he attempted to change as he sent out three officers to three different locations to mark unit placements. Upon reaching to their destinations the officers found the 7th Tank Battalion completely swarmed with fleeing infantry from the 55th Division, all the while the first officer was supposed dead (or failed to return) while the third returned with the word of failure.
Lafontaine then began a journey to meet Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Labarthe, commander of the 213th Infantry Regiment, who expressed his wishes for a complete opposite change of plans. Labarthe pleaded a stop to the attack but then Gransard’s deputy chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Cachou arrived with urgent orders to begin the counterattack which prompted Lafontaine to cut the colonel off and go on with the attack.
At dawn May 14 Lafontaine’s long awaited counter attack began with the 213th Infantry Regiment led by the 7th tank battalion from Chémery. The 205th Infantry Regiment, spearheaded by the 4th Tank Battalion, rolled out towards Bulson from Maisoncelle. German intelligence, from reconnaissance units, had warned Guderian of French columns moving towards the German pocket and the Panzer Leader hurriedly ordered all of his anti tank and tank units to reinforce his lines at Bulson. The tanks arrived just in time, right before Balck’s men were to meet the attack head on.
10 French tanks, grouped tightly together were badly mauled by quick action Panzer commanders who managed to knock out 7 tanks while the other 3 were pulled out yet abandoned moments after. By 9:00 A.M., 2 hours after the start, the attack for the 4th Tank Battalion had ended, which virtually meant the end for the 205th Infantry Division. The 4th, without proper coordination with the 7th tank battalion, lost over ¾ of its armor.
The 7th Tank Battalion, along with the 213th Infantry Battalion, also met similar results. German anti-tank companies kept up a steady rate of fire, even as their 37mm rounds simply “bounced” off the French armor. Some French tanks came in at 200 yards before being knocked out. Another group of tanks arrived from the south but to no vain as the 2nd Panzer Regiment arrived to aid its anti-tank comrades.
The 2nd Panzer Regiment quickly took advantage of French disorder and drove in Chémery hitting tense resistance but nonetheless the village was cleared by 11:00 A.M. This timely arrival of the German armor had most probably saved the Germans from losing its territory across the Meuse and had the French attacked earlier Balck and the Gross Deutschland Regiment would have been most likely overrun.

At 6:30 the commander of the 71st Infantry Division, General Baudet, received a telephone call telling him to form a defensive loops around Bulson in order to halt a German piercing in the area but 10 minutes later he was informed that Bulson was already in German hands and that Lafontaine, the general who had lost control of the 55th Division, had evacuated his headquarters. Thus Baudet also decided to move his command post as well, 7 miles further to the back.
This had disastrous consequences which then turned into the full rout of the 71st Infantry Division. Cries of, “German tanks are in Bulson,” and reasoning such as, “We want to go home, back to our little jobs,” plagued the ranks of the division. By May 15 little remained of the 71st Infantry Division and most of the divisional artillery was in repair ships leaving only the 3rd North African Division intact.
The 3rd North African was part of Gransard’s 18th Corps but Huntziger decided to move the division under the command of General Flavigny, general of the 21st Corps. Flavigny was to lead yet another counter attack with this new division, as well as the 3rd Armored and 3rd Motorized Divisions.
But with the entire French front almost at the point of collapse Guderian decided that it was time to take a final step of destroying the contact between Huntziger’s 2nd Army and Corap’s 9th Army by throwing his entire korps towards the town of Rethel, southwest of Sedan on the Aisne River.
This strategy was at first contested by his weak southern flank which would be extremely prone to a French counter attack, which Guderian knew. Thus Hurrying Heinz placed the 10th Panzer Division to hold the south while the rest of the tanks advanced towards Rethel. When Kleist received this information his first act was to order a halt of the korps which Guderian read with complete disgust. A heated argument ended up in Kleist giving Guderian 24 hours more before the final halt.

Meanwhile at French lines Flavigny had spread his 3rd Armored Division along the front leaving his tanks helpless against massed panzer attacks. Not only this but when it came time for the final counter attack the 3rd Armored couldn’t regroup rapid enough thus burning the chance of a well coordinated offensive towards Sedan and the Meuse.
Receiving hot pressure from higher positions Flavigny strived to get the 3rd Armored out towards the French but the division was already fighting for dominance of Stonne, a key town in the Sedan defense. Although only certain elements of the armor were there the 3rd Motorized Division, already assembled, preformed in an almost perfect defense although it ultimately lost the village to the German armored superiority.
Thus with this the counter attack was dead in the water, forcing Huntziger to leave the sector towards Verdun, over 40 miles from Sedan. The lack of a concerted attack left a massive gap in the French lines allowing Guderian to take those 24 hours granted to him by Kleist to destroy Corap’s Right Wing and therefore closing the Sedan battle and opening the beginning of the end for France’s western line of defense.
All over the world the news of the breakthrough rung vividly in the ears of hundreds of thousands of people and news casts and diaries reported the incident without hesitation. William L. Shirer, in his journal The Berlin Diary, described the news:

Very long, stunned faces among the foreign correspondents and diplomats today. The High Command claims to have broken through the Maginot Line near Sedan and that German forces have crossed the Meuse River both at Sedan… To anyone who has seen that deep, heavily wooded Meuse Valley, it seems almost incredible that the Germans could get across it so quickly, provided there is any army at all defending the western bank.

What had gone wrong? The French had massive artillery superiority, and massive amounts of infantry, and unlike other armies further north an armored division as well as two smaller armored elements.
But the French were diseased with poor leadership that caused the collapse of both the 71st and 55th Infantry Divisions. Not only that, but high command, starting with Gamelin and all the way down to Billotte, did not recognize the importance of the events taking place around the epic city of Sedan. Thus when it came time to defend the skies, or the send vital reinforcements, high command was reluctant to do so allowing the Germans to bomb and destroy, uncontested by the French Air Force. This latter fact was the reason for such a break of moral in the most important hours of fighting, when the German infantry regiments were actually crossing the river Meuse.
Later, French lack of coordination in any type of counter attack at any right time resulted in the freedom of movement granted to the Germans and hence their ability to move at their pleasure and attack when the iron was hot. Had the French counter attacked against Balck before the 2nd Panzer Regiment had crossed Balck would have been most likely overrun and the entire German offensive put in jeopardy.

These simple mistakes would be committed by the French for the remainder of their war and June Dunkirk was surrounded and only days away from destruction. The French campaign would be an example of French folly during the war but it would also hold testimony to the greatest acts of mankind not ending or beginning with Dunkirk. And although France would be lost in a matter of weeks, as British Prime Minster Winston Churchill said, “…we shall defend… whatever the cost may be…will carry on the struggle…”

"Most battles have a certain brutal simplicity to them. You fix the enemy forces in place with part of your forces and hit them in the flank or rear with the rest."

"Wars happen when one side or the other misjudges its chances or wishes to commit suicide."

Despite the many good points made in Macabee's original post, the defender still retains the advantage in warfare. All other factors being equal, the defender will almost always have the advantage of prepared terrain and shorter internal lines of communication. However, the attacker has several advantages that can partially or wholly obviate the defenders' advantages. The attacker has the advantage of strategic and tactical initiative (most of the time, anyway). The attacker knows when and where he will attack. Still, when all other factors (total strength, technology, etc) are equal, the defender has the edge. But there are proven ways to reduce or remove this edge: Superior numbers, superior technology, and superior doctrine are some of these.

In NS, battle is closer to fencing than anything else. Well-played war RPs are a stylized set of moves and counter-moves intended to allow your units to inflict the most damage on your enemy while sustaining as little damage as possible themselves.

Having trouble landing your troops on the enemy beaches because of mines? Clear the mines with dedicated minesweepers.

The minesweepers can't clear the mines because of air attacks? Support the sweepers with your own airpower.

SSM attacks are disrupting the minesweeping activity while a huge air battle rages overhead? Use counterbattery fire from your own long-range SSMs.

SAMs are shooting down enough of your SSMs to reduce their counterbattery effectiveness? Shoot a few missiles equipped with jammers mixed in with the strike missiles, destroy the enemy power grid from a different attack point, activate a previously planted fifth column to sabotage the enemy air defenses, and send in a few dozen Wild Weasel aircraft to clear the way for the counterbattery fire.

And so on and so forth.

Cut and parry and thrust and riposte. The key to this sort of RP battle will turn out to be the prior logistical planning of both sides. Realize this if you learn nothing else: Modern war uses up military assets several hundred times as fast as they can be replaced.

In the highly simplistic little scenario I wrote above, sooner or later one side or the other will run out of equipment to accomplish the fencing match. Can the attacker degrade the enemy defenses before he runs out of missiles and aircraft? Will the defender run out of aircraft and SAMs (even temporarily) under the constant attacks? The outcome will hinge on the integrity of the players. Which player is honest and honorable enough to acknowledge losses and a superior gambit?


TEO

As for the latter part perhaps it should be suggested that all RPs should be moderated...not by default, but if you ask someone to do so.

Perhaps I should write a similar thread about naval strategy?
Yes, that would be awsome!

Yeah. one thing that needs to be stressed is quality over quantity. However, it does help if you do have some mass units in reserve, to just overwhelm the softened enemy forces.

One of the more famous battles in the history of Siap was aiding in the repression of Militant insurgents. The city was by the sea, and the Siapian special forces were grossly outnumbered by insurgents. The Siapian airforce destroyed all water tanks and contaminated standing resevoirs, while the special forces seized control of desinilization camps, trapping the enemy in the city without water, while themselves hording water. The Siapian air force dropped leaflets over the city, and the insurgents, delerious from dehydratiohn, gladly surrendered their arms for water.

numbers always win oh yeah and having enough bombs to kill everything helps to

OOC: Lol, taking a leaf of mine and Voll's book or what Mac?

If you remember I did say on the forums that RPing a strategy and tactics is very hard simply because people refuse on the most part to loose in war even if they are blatently doing so.

If me and Voll play Hearts of Iron to settle the matter of who is the best strategically, do you want to come and be a third power in our little death match.
HoI? I love that game. Have you got Hearts of Iron 2?

[bump]

" military impotence "

their military can't get it on

" military impotence "

their military can't get it on
Ja, one of the major problems..which is why I added a few ideas/tactics/strategies..not much, but perhaps enough.

numbers always winI think this thread and others quite capably demonstrate your statement to be false.

It is worth noting that the larger your opponent's military is, the more supplies it will need-- if he's invading you, have some of your allies hit his supply line!

Also, don't get too caught up in getting lots of new shiny toys for your military to play with. Find something that's simple and effective and not too exotic (thus relatively cheap) and your forces will be OK with that.

It's also worth noting that nukes are entirely a waste of money. No one ever lets themselves get hit by them in character, so you're better off just RPing a massive SDI system instead.

I'd say that still, no matter the high-tech stuff, robots, missiles and such, the moralof the troops and, even more important, the nation behind them is the desicive factor. If nation A with 3 billion people invades nation B with 10 million people, it CAN'T win if the B is determined enough. yes, they can ruin the cities and yes, they can destroy the conventional army but the war will go on until they are forced to leave or they slaughter the whole population.
Checsniya (no clue how to type that in english, sorry), Vietnam. Poland, Yugoslavia and Belorussia in 40's. if the population keeps on fighting, the invader is doomed to loose. This is somewhat off-topic though... But still good to keep in mind I think.

About examples of small armies fighting unguerilla-wars succesfully, I think (as beeing Finn by myself :D ) that Finland's defensive victory over the Soviets in Winter War is unmatched achievement. The reasons are somewhat different than said in here prewiously. As far as I have understood it, it wasn't really because of our machineguns on submachineguns - in fact, Finnish infantry company had 2/3 of Russian counterpatrs machineguns, and the whole finnish army had less than 5000 submachineguns. Neither was it because of mechanization, as Finnish army actually had less trucks than 2 Soviet DIVISIONS during the winter war, and even in WW2 the mechanization wasn't what made my grandfather ( :D )to beat those Ryssä's.

It was the knowledge about the terrain, forests and lakes that is. Soviets used their usual tactic of "proletarian masses", and that worked pretty well in steppes of Ukraine, but was doomed in our forests. Second reason was that Stalin had shot most of his officers just 2 years before the war, and the Red Army wasn't even nearly recovered from that. No one dared to be original, to use his BRAINS in fear of getting shot. But, most of all, it was because of the
determination of Finnish soldiers. Just like it is the determination of Czhecniks and Iraqis at the moment, showing to the superpowers that having larger army and high-tech aren't same thing as victory.

I think this thread and others quite capably demonstrate your statement to be false.
Maybe in the beginning, but didn't Hitler's Germany, Lee's South, and Napoleon's France get defeated in the end by superior numbers?

As to the Winter War, It's always been one of my favourite conflicts. Field Marshal von Mannerheim, at the end of the war was quoted saying that the russians would have done much better had they had any proper ski training. Finnish ski troopers would ride out, the Russians called them something like: White Devils, raid a soviet position, then ride back into the wilderness. The Finns were damn tough fighters, and they knew the enviroment and weather well. I think I read that close to 25% of the Russian casualties were from Frostbite and hypothermia. Another reason the Finns held out so long is because of the Mannerheim Line. It was so well constructed, that in one dawn to dusk bombardment, not one finnish casualty was reported.

Maybe in the beginning, but didn't Hitler's Germany, Lee's South, and Napoleon's France get defeated in the end by superior numbers?

As to the Winter War, It's always been one of my favourite conflicts. Field Marshal von Mannerheim, at the end of the war was quoted saying that the russians would have done much better had they had any proper ski training. Finnish ski troopers would ride out, the Russians called them something like: White Devils, raid a soviet position, then ride back into the wilderness. The Finns were damn tough fighters, and they knew the enviroment and weather well. I think I read that close to 25% of the Russian casualties were from Frostbite and hypothermia. Another reason the Finns held out so long is because of the Mannerheim Line. It was so well constructed, that in one dawn to dusk bombardment, not one finnish casualty was reported.

That's one of the legends about that war. Actually, Mannerheim Line wasn't really as much as fortress than a bunch of bunkers and trenches. It was still under construction, and even though pretty strong in few points, mostly just usual trenches and wooden bunkers. Much has been talked about the line though, it has been even compared to Maginot Line or the Westwall, but mostly by Russian professors and ex-generals trying to explain their failure and losses.

The real problem concerning the first Soviet offensive into Finland during the winter of '39 was that the Red Army had just undergone severe purges in the high command, and more importantly, in the junior officer corp, meaning much of the leadership of the army was gone and replaced by less than capable officers. As a consequence, the Red Army offensive into Finland in the winter of '39 was poorly planned and poorly done. During the investment of Finland the Finns were able to isolate seperate units of Red Army soldiers and slaughter them.

However, after the reforms of Timoshenko in the early winter of '40 the Soviets preformed much better. Although, still, the Red Army relied a little bit too much on mass artillery strikes and just pummeling the hell out of their foes. Regardless, the tactical cooperation between the Red Air Force, Red Artillery and the Red Army was done incredibly well after Timoshenko took command.

Therefore, I could only deduct that the true force behind the dismal preformance of the Red Army during the Winter War of '39-'40 was not a superb Finnish army, nor the vaunted Mannerheim line - which was not as strong as you would think, consedering the Soviet penetration to Volkhov in the summer and fall of '44 - but on the Red Army's situation at the given time.

If you want to read more on the pre-Barbarossa Red Army I really suggest reading David M. Glantz's Stumbling Colossus, and if you want to read on the Volkhov Offensive read his The Battle for Leningrad.

Yes. I tried to say the same thing, but due your superior skills on English language and writing you said it better than I managed to do. :(

By the way, Maccabee, where are you from if I may ask?

Yes. I tried to say the same thing, but due your superior skills on English language and writing you said it better than I managed to do. :(

By the way, Maccabee, where are you from if I may ask?

I live in San Diego, California, USA - but I hail from El Provencio, Spain.

Ok.

What do you guys think if I take the time to write up a long, long guide on warfare covering all aspects I can think of. However, said guide would be several chapters long, and I suspect lengthy character wise, per chapter, as well.

Would you guys care to read it? Or would it be a waste of time?

What do you guys think if I take the time to write up a long, long guide on warfare covering all aspects I can think of. However, said guide would be several chapters long, and I suspect lengthy character wise, per chapter, as well.

Would you guys care to read it? Or would it be a waste of time?

I'd read it. You can count on that.

What do you guys think if I take the time to write up a long, long guide on warfare covering all aspects I can think of. However, said guide would be several chapters long, and I suspect lengthy character wise, per chapter, as well.

Would you guys care to read it? Or would it be a waste of time?Would it be a compilation thread including contributions like the Air Force thread or would it be all your work?

I'd most likely sit down and read it. I'd even print it out to take with me on the subway.

If I can be bothered to skim through a bunch of actual military leaders talk war I'm sure I can sit down and read what you've written, besides its always better to read it coming from a fellow gamer than some guy in a real army, that'd be freaky.

So go write stuff.

Would it be a compilation thread including contributions like the Air Force thread or would it be all your work?

I'd most likely sit down and read it. I'd even print it out to take with me on the subway.

I would probably just write it myself, of course, using the already existant threads as sources and basis for information.

[NOTE: Don't worry thread creators, if I quote you I will give you credit... ]

theses things are very important

Ok, so my outline so far consists of the following sections, although they are marked the order is probably going to change:

[Part I: Generalizations]
The Historical Abstract
Mechanization
Cooperation Between Infantry and Mechanization
Cooperation Between Ground, Air and Sea
Logistics
Partisan Warfare
Naval Warfare in the 21st Century
Aerial Warfare in the 21st Century
Technology versus Determination
Cultural Knowledge of All Variant Nations

[Part II: Down and Dirty]
Armored Operations
Amphibious Operations
In-depth Defense in Detail
Close Air Support
Breaking Out of Encirclements


If you think anything should be added, or subtracted, please tell me.

Perhaps something dealing with infantry and using it in combination with armour and artillery?

You certainly need a combined operations section, although that would probably need to be split up to give a short intro to the options available with particular branchs of a combined force.

You might also want to go in to geogaphical requirements on the military, considering military geography has a big impact it deserves a mention really. I advise skimming this site as it is focused entirely on that topic, Military geography for the professional and the public (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/Military%20Geography%20March%2098/milgeocontents.html)

Dont forget a ratios/statistics glossary or something... I know it would save me alot of time like when Im trying to find a reasonable length to beam ratio (1::5 - 1::8) or draft to beam, etcetera... in sort there arer alot of rations or atleast ball park fiquires that would be helpful for those working on designs and a military.

Oh yes and you might want to add something about the N-squared law for those naval junkies considering armament ( here (http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-076.htm))

hmmm... thats all I can think of now... i'll edit this post if I come across something else useful.

I added Sarzonia's and Tom Joad's ideas - I don't think I edited the list, but it's edited on my computer. Mekugi, I was thinking of adding some "appendixes" and that could certainly be included in it.

One of the best examples for use in NS Warfare (since it parallels the usual ground warfare seen in I.I) is the Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil War.

Through superior command, morale and aggressiveness the Confederate Army of Northern Virgina was able to bottle up and whip the much more well armed and larger (at times over 5 times the size) Union Army of the Potomac.

Two of the most imporatant factors in the possiblity of a smaller force defeating a larger, seemingly more capable force is 1) mobility and 2) interior lines.


1) If you are mobile enough you can conduct hard hitting, lightening raids and attacks against your enemy. In the case of an invasion, even if you are outnumbered 3 to 1, you can still divide your force and hit your opponent while they ready themeselves to fight.

A brilliant example of this IRL is General Stonewall Jackson's flanking maneuver at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The Confederates were outnumbered more than 2 to 1 but Lee decided to split his forces. The risk was great for he risked having the entire Union Army placed between the two sections of his own smaller Army. However, the advantages would allow him to carry the day. By splitting his forces and sending a highly trained, effective and swift force to meet the enemy before they were ready to fight Lee effectively turned the numerical superiority of the Union into a liablity.

2) Interior Lines- If your lines of supply, logistics, and movement lie solidly within your control, you can face a force several times your size and still win. Interior Lines allow you to quickly move your forces to where they are needed. You can quickly move in small units to fight holding actions while you move larger units from other fronts to fight off the attacks. An Army with strong Interior Lines could, very likely, stand against a force many times their size

It can also be pointed out that both Robert E. Lee and Julius Caesar relied on sheer aggressiveness and a good understanding of the enemy's psychology. Caesar at the beginning of his Civil War with the Senate advanced into Italy at the head of fewer than 2,000 men, against roughly ten times that many senate forces. However, his aggressiveness and quick movements kept his enemies off balance and unnerved them to a great extent, prompting Pompey to retreat to Greece, giving Caesar a chance to gather resources and forces to level the playing field.

In Robert E. Lee's Seven Days Campaign, he inflicted defeat after defeat on the Army of the Potomac by attacking aggressively, regardless of his losses, in many different places, not giving his enemies time to recover, keeping his enemies guessing where he would strike next, causing them to overestimate his strength, and it greatly unnerved Union troops.

Most know that the holder of the defense has the advantage, and this idea has persisted throughout history. Indeed, so engraved is this that many still believe it to be true. Consequently, smaller nations believe it to be a lost cause to fight against a larger nation.

As they should, history has shown time and again that smaller nation(s) should fear/respect their larger brethren. As a smaller nation, even though you might have some/most of the advantages. Their's one you'll never have and that's the ability to better handle the attrition of war. When your larger opponent can suffer defeat after defeat and yet keep on fighting, that's when you know your in a lost cause. If, all else fails-Attrition wins wars.

Well, I present a much different perspective, which preaches that the advantage lies in superb tactics and strategy, but foremost the fact that stratigical numerical advantage is less important than tactical numerical advantage, and in that respect the offensive army, whether smaller of larger, and even a defensive army, will have the advantage.

I'm sure your already familiar with this statement, but it seems to me that you seem to have forgotten the importance of it. "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics." or put another way "Amateurs talk about strategy, dilettantes talk about tactics, and professionals talk about logistics."-You want a guaranteed way to win that war, hit him where it hurts-his supply lines. If, he can't feed, cloth or supply in any way his army for a given period of time. That army is as good as dead and which opens up new advantages for you to pursue.

When it comes down to it, the side that has more to fight for almost always wins. If you are fighting to defend "home and hearth" you can be damned sure you'll fight harder than if you are fighting for some abstract sense of national glory.

Agreed.

Since this is a bit on strategy and how to beat numerically superior foes, I have a question. I have 11,000 Infantry units, low on food, ammo, and weaponry. They have no resources or means of communication, they haven't eaten in three days, and they have been fighting for almost a month with minimum rest. So they are fighting a force of 200,000 or so with another 300,000 not to far away to aid them if need be. The enemy has tanks, IFVs, air support, a naval advantage, and have had a good nights rest. They also have a better location. My men are out in the open surrounded by them. They are fighting on an allies terrirtory, not a big ally just an ally that we met through this war. Any ideas or tips for how to possibly win that battle or just take out a lot of enemies?

You're royally screwed and any decent commander would simply surrender. For that matter, most of your forces will simply surrender upon contact with the enemy if you're halfway realistic.

Since this is a bit on strategy and how to beat numerically superior foes, I have a question. I have 11,000 Infantry units, low on food, ammo, and weaponry. They have no resources or means of communication, they haven't eaten in three days, and they have been fighting for almost a month with minimum rest. So they are fighting a force of 200,000 or so with another 300,000 not to far away to aid them if need be. The enemy has tanks, IFVs, air support, a naval advantage, and have had a good nights rest. They also have a better location. My men are out in the open surrounded by them. They are fighting on an allies terrirtory, not a big ally just an ally that we met through this war. Any ideas or tips for how to possibly win that battle or just take out a lot of enemies?

Who are you fighting? :eek:

Probably the best idea is too surrender.

Since this is a bit on strategy and how to beat numerically superior foes, I have a question. I have 11,000 Infantry units, low on food, ammo, and weaponry. They have no resources or means of communication, they haven't eaten in three days, and they have been fighting for almost a month with minimum rest. So they are fighting a force of 200,000 or so with another 300,000 not to far away to aid them if need be. The enemy has tanks, IFVs, air support, a naval advantage, and have had a good nights rest. They also have a better location. My men are out in the open surrounded by them. They are fighting on an allies terrirtory, not a big ally just an ally that we met through this war. Any ideas or tips for how to possibly win that battle or just take out a lot of enemies?

You're going to die.

Seriously.

Since this is a bit on strategy and how to beat numerically superior foes, I have a question. I have 11,000 Infantry units, low on food, ammo, and weaponry. They have no resources or means of communication, they haven't eaten in three days, and they have been fighting for almost a month with minimum rest. So they are fighting a force of 200,000 or so with another 300,000 not to far away to aid them if need be. The enemy has tanks, IFVs, air support, a naval advantage, and have had a good nights rest. They also have a better location. My men are out in the open surrounded by them. They are fighting on an allies terrirtory, not a big ally just an ally that we met through this war. Any ideas or tips for how to possibly win that battle or just take out a lot of enemies?

BANZAI CHARGE! (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banzai_charge)

*Remembers Iwo Jima...

You're royally screwed and any decent commander would simply surrender. For that matter, most of your forces will simply surrender upon contact with the enemy if you're halfway realistic.

That is the problem, most did surrender, it is impossible to retreat because they would be gunned down and they are surrounded and surrendering would result in their death as well. I notice I was screwed a while ago when they had to get rid of their Grestonians citizenships. It's a very long story.

Since this is a bit on strategy and how to beat numerically superior foes, I have a question. I have 11,000 Infantry units, low on food, ammo, and weaponry. They have no resources or means of communication, they haven't eaten in three days, and they have been fighting for almost a month with minimum rest. So they are fighting a force of 200,000 or so with another 300,000 not to far away to aid them if need be. The enemy has tanks, IFVs, air support, a naval advantage, and have had a good nights rest. They also have a better location. My men are out in the open surrounded by them. They are fighting on an allies terrirtory, not a big ally just an ally that we met through this war. Any ideas or tips for how to possibly win that battle or just take out a lot of enemies?

The commander of that unit should be executed, if he makes it out alive.

Honestly, your men will probably all die. At least if surrendering is a worse death option, you can count on some suicidal final days from them as they will have to accecpt death and if there is no relief, they'll make sure they don;t go out without a fight.

Can't you airlift stuff to them?

In your situation, Greston, if surrender/retreat ain't an option, I'd start laying as many traps and tricks for the enemy as possible ASAP. After that, start using smaller teams to engage the forces and use all cover avalibale. In fact, make cover as well if you can't find any. You'll die, yeah, but you should be able to take down more than a 1:1 proportion of them if you play your cards right here.

Can't you airlift stuff to them?

Someone will probably bring up Stalingrad, but although this force is small enough to make airlifting feasible, I feel like he'd still be tying up a proportionally large number of aircraft (plus fighters to protect the transports) to supply a force that won't last anyway.

Sometimes to beat foes, you may not need a large army. I remember from college classes on European history 200 years ago, Austria was led by Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich. When he took power, Austria quite was weak and an easy target while the nations around Austria (particularly Russia and France) were strong politically and militarily. Metternich, however was an intelligent, calculating strategist and used his charm and political mind to keep Austria free. Basically, whenever one country started to become too strong and gain the upper hand in europe, Metternich organized an alliance of the other European nations against it. He would bring Europe to the brink of war time and time again and secure more rights for his country (which had been lost in the Treaty of Schönbrunn), and then everybody thanked him when he kept war from breaking out. Had literally a minuscule army, but with his political maneuvering he had Europe by the privates.

Beyond that, he was fairly oppressive to his own people.

The best bet is use guirella tactics anyway.
Still if your men is low on morale you're going to die. Just maybe give more morale by? How about eating enemies' blood and vein?

All very well, but here you run into the huge porblme of text-based RP: it's really, really hard to show what you're doing.

Well, it's not as if it's impossible or hard to do with the addition of an image, even one without terrain features. I'm not sure why this isn't done more, since there's really nothing to hinder it, save time.

in all the 4 most well known battles of china , it was all won at a ratio of 10 to1 or 20 to 1 .

In the battle of Ju Lu , Xiang Yu lead 20000 men and defeated 300000 men of the Qin Dynasty .

In the battle of Peng City , Xiang Yu used 20000 men and trashed Liu Bang ( 600000 men ) although few years later liu bang's generals won Xiang Yu and Liu Bang established the Han Dynasty

In the battle of Guan Du , Cao Cao ( 70000 men ) trashed Yuan Shao ( 700000 men )

In the battle of Red Cliffs , Zhuge Liang brought the allies of Shu and Wu ( about 50000 men ) to victory over Cao Cao ( claiming the have 1000000 men )

the first , two battles is during the final years of Qin dynasty and the Birth of Han dynasty, the rest are during the three kingdoms peroid , during the last years of han dynasty .
Info can be found at wikipedia .

its always quality not quantity.....although a lil quantity goes a long way..

Well, to much improvising quality and not quantity can make you a bit lost againts some one who only have a lower quality but outnumbered you 50 to one and got strategical weapon...:D

If you're outnumbered 50 to 1, you won't be able to produce enough to get matching quantity, so ALL you have is quality. Even then, you're probably lost anyway, even disregarding the enemy's strategic weapons.

Its possible to win when you are outnumbered 50 to 1. There is something called, God Mode :p. Ok I was just Joking.

To Greston's problem I've just a few things that might be almost worth saying. First, if the men have been fighting for almost a month without respite, you've probably got something cripplingly like 90% psychological casualties. People just can't take that kind of stress, can't deal with killing other human beings and having no chance to process and rationalise or recover from what they've done, and can't cope with the broken schedule and erratic, disrupted sleep pattern. Probably all you've got left are one or two thousand worn-out sociopaths and nine or ten thousand immobile unresponsive wrecks.

Still, in your position, Beddgelen troops, assuming that they're either from a committed revolutionary Soviet or from one of the traditionalist Celtic tribes in our nation (they'd have given-up by now if they weren't), would neck the last of their alcohol rations, fix bayonets, draw swords, blast warhorns, and charge with a mighty "Jai Hind!" (Victory to (Soviet) India).

Everyone who can still move and comprehend the most basic of orders -and that probably wouldn't be everyone- would sound off odd and even numbers. The odds would then lay suppressing fire on the target of the charge, and the evens would sprint a few dozen metres before going prone and opening in turn, where upon the odds would charge through them and repeat until one group or other hits the enemy vanguard and engages hand-to-hand. At this point the other half gets up and piles in.

Yeah, you're probably going to die, but there's always a chance that it'll put the wind right up the enemy and cause at least a localised rout. After all, the notorious Highland Charge once resulted in one of precious few historic collapses of an established line of British redcoats, and the British army has conducted one or two victorious do-or-die bayonet charges even in Iraq, not to mention the Falklands.

...it probably helps if your average recruit is two metres tall, naked and painted blue with spiked hair, waving a sword and screaming through a narcotic haze as he takes off people's heads and fails to go down until you've shot him at least three or four times.

I suppose the other option is to try digging shallow tunnels and confusing the hell out of the enemy when he comes for you, but I don't know if your guys would have the strength for a major earthworks project at this stage, plus they could still be bombed into ruin or starved out.

Since this is a bit on strategy and how to beat numerically superior foes, I have a question. I have 11,000 Infantry units, low on food, ammo, and weaponry. They have no resources or means of communication, they haven't eaten in three days, and they have been fighting for almost a month with minimum rest. So they are fighting a force of 200,000 or so with another 300,000 not to far away to aid them if need be. The enemy has tanks, IFVs, air support, a naval advantage, and have had a good nights rest. They also have a better location. My men are out in the open surrounded by them. They are fighting on an allies terrirtory, not a big ally just an ally that we met through this war. Any ideas or tips for how to possibly win that battle or just take out a lot of enemies?


Find an escape route, then pick the weakest point in the enemy's line that will allow you to take this route, then concentrate all your men and firepower on this area and break out (try to use a wedge formation and watch your flanks while doing so). Your only other options are to surrender or be killed when air support comes in.

Here is an update. All of you thought those 11,000 men would all die. Well it just happens that over 10,000 of them survived and get away. Even better they took out almost 5,000 more of the enemy soldiers before making an escape route and exited through it.

Here is an update. All of you thought those 11,000 men would all die. Well it just happens that over 10,000 of them survived and get away. Even better they took out almost 5,000 more of the enemy soldiers before making an escape route and exited through it.

Obviously whoever you roleplayed with is an idiot.

Obviously whoever you roleplayed with is an idiot.
Quite. Greston link to the post/thread were you made such a miraculous escape.

Seeing as how I'm the so called idiot, I've posted the thread. The problem is that nowhere in the thread does it mention his soldiers surviving. However, there are several threads on the go and in one of them, I posted my soldiers retreating and fleeing the nation, not because he was going to win, but because I may need them to defend my homeland.

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=544241&page=12

Orbath isn't an idiot, I just took AMF's tip and it worked was all.

Seeing as how I'm the so called idiot, I've posted the thread. The problem is that nowhere in the thread does it mention his soldiers surviving. However, there are several threads on the go and in one of them, I posted my soldiers retreating and fleeing the nation, not because he was going to win, but because I may need them to defend my homeland.

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=544241&page=12

My apologies then, was rather the fact Greston misled as to what happened.

Orbath isn't an idiot, I just took AMF's tip and it worked was all.

Good to hear.

Greston, good work on the escape.