NationStates Jolt Archive

Because I am in a weird mood this fine morning, because life dealt me with an unexpected blow and setback that got me in a hellish temper, I decided to browse through my library (reading always helps me when I feel that my center's lost) and I came upon some of my uni books, some of them dealing with philosophy (like the good liberal arts' student that I was, philosophy was one discipline I had to study many times). One philosopher that always got to me, perhaps because of his similarities with St. Augustin of Aquinas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aquinas), a philosopher I truly like, was Duns Scotus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duns_Scotus#Life).

One topic Scotus studied extensively was Voluntarism, the tendency to emphasize God's will and human freedom in all philosophical issues.[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duns_Scotus#Voluntarism) Voluntarism can refer to too:
- Voluntarism (action), the use of or reliance on voluntary action to maintain an institution, carry out a policy, or achieve an end.
- Voluntarism (metaphysics), a philosophical term emphasising the primacy of the will.
- Voluntaryism, the philosophical position that the only legitimate interactions between and among people are those freely assented to by all parties concerned.

Now, NSG, when one speaks of will (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_(philosophy)), which is what this matter of Scotus deals with, is this subject to the Will of a higher being or do we, as humans and sentient beings, capable of feeling many emotions, do posses it regardless of gods? And, if your answer is yes to this last part of the question, how can one be sure our will and all we do and work for isn't really the plan of an entity in the clouds, so to speak? An entity that many say is omnipresent and omniscient. If you answer is no, why do you think that way?

Help me understand, NSG. My will, my desire is to be not where I am right now. If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?

My will, my desire is to be not where I am right now. If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?

Because we haven't found a way to teleport your ass from where it is to where you want it to be.

Or, to put it another way, what you want has very little bearing on the laws of time and space, which have been here long before you arrive, will continue long after you're gone, and care not for how you happen to feel about them.

Because we haven't found a way to teleport your ass from where it is to where you want it to be.

Or, to put it another way, what you want has very little bearing on the laws of time and space, which have been here long before you arrive, will continue long after you're gone, and care not for how you happen to feel about them.

Ah yes, charming, so charming.

Besides the laws of of time and space, of which I am incredibly well aware of, care to discuss about will?

Ah yes, charming, so charming.

Besides the laws of of time and space, of which I am incredibly well aware of, care to discuss about will?

there's something very....special, about asking a question then getting pissy when it gets answered.

I discussed it within the context of your question. did you forget your actual question? If you have, let me remind you of it: "If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?"

And my answer was equally simple: Because you not being, and not able to be, where you want to be, is not necessarily dependent purely on your will. God need not be involved in the issue that, despite the fact that I really really want to be able to fly and have a 10 inch penis, I can't fly, and my penis is only 9 and a half inches.

Or, to bring it back to your original question of "if god doesn't dictate my will, why can't I be where I want it to be?" with a direct explanation. Free will doesn't work that way. An answer so obvious I'm unsure why ask the question..

there's something very....special, about asking a question then getting pissy when it gets answered.

I discussed it within the context of your question. did you forget your actual question? If you have, let me remind you of it: "If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?"

And my answer was equally simple: Because you not being, and not able to be, where you want to be, is not necessarily dependent purely on your will. God need not be involved in the issue that, despite the fact that I really really want to be able to fly and have a 10 inch penis, I can't fly, and my penis is only 9 and a half inches.

Or, to bring it back to your original question of "if god doesn't dictate my will, why can't I be where I want it to be?" with a direct explanation. Free will doesn't work that way. An answer so obvious I'm unsure why ask the question..

Lets see. Why did I ask the question? Easy. Because I want to discuss will, the term will, Scotus's definition and what NSG thinks of it. Not free will, nothing of the sort. Will, what is it to some people here? How do they define it? The other question about why I can't be where I want to be was due to the will question. Does that clarify it, NA?

Lets see. Why did I ask the question? Easy. Because I want to discuss will, the term will, Scotus's definition and what NSG thinks of it.
What is Scotus's definition of 'will'?

What is Scotus's definition of 'will'?

Scotus thinks of freedom as involving multiple options at the very moment of choice. It's not enough to say that now I will x, but later I can will y. We have to say that at the very moment at which I will x, I also am able to will y. In other words, will is subject to our thoughts. We must think it and will it.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#WilFreMor

Help me understand, NSG. My will, my desire is to be not where I am right now. If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?

I believe that your will(and mine, and all of humanity's)is subject to the will of God. I believe that God reigns sovereign over human affairs, and that He has a plan for each of our lives, and for human history in general.

I make no claims to know what that plan is, but I have faith in a kind and loving God that wants the best for us.

I believe that your will(and mine, and all of humanity's)is subject to the will of God. I believe that God reigns sovereign over human affairs, and that He has a plan for each of our lives, and for human history in general.

I make no claims to know what that plan is, but I have faith in a kind and loving God that wants the best for us.

I see. So, like Aquinas, will to you is a means to happiness. And this happiness is a gift from God.

Aquinas had a definition of will that I find just as interesting as Scotus': The will is natural: it is the God-given capacity to carry out specific activities relating to the end of happiness. It is naturally necessary that the will be aimed at the last end, which is happiness. It is not, however, necessary that the will do something because of extrinsic restrictions. That is coercion, which is repugnant to the will.

http://dinnertabledonts.blogspot.com/2005/02/aquinas-on-will-intellect-happiness.html

What is your duty in the current situation?
When I can not have what I want, I find peace by realizing what I should be doing.
Sometimes you cant control exactly what path your on, but you can always control how you walk it.

What is your duty in the current situation?
When I can not have what I want, I find peace by realizing what I should be doing.
Sometimes you cant control exactly what path your on, but you can always control how you walk it.

Thanks for those words.:)

I see. So, like Aquinas, will to you is a means to happiness. And this happiness is a gift from God.

With the obvious caveat that I do not speak for all of Christendom, and that I am neither a philosopher nor a theologian, I would go so far as to say that 'happiness'='doing the will of God.' Now, while there are certain broad guidelines for humanity at large re:'the will of God', what 'the will of God' is on a personal, unique, level, I couldn't say. I'm reasonably sure I know what it is for me, at this point in my life, but outside of that, I wouldn't like to say.

With the obvious caveat that I do not speak for all of Christendom, and that I am neither a philosopher nor a theologian, I would go so far as to say that 'happiness'='doing the will of God.' Now, while there are certain broad guidelines for humanity at large re:'the will of God', what 'the will of God' is on a personal, unique, level, I couldn't say. I'm reasonably sure I know what it is for me, at this point in my life, but outside of that, I wouldn't like to say.

In your case, you would say that will is subject to what God wants (whatever His will may be) of us, of you, of all. If one doesn't consider will to be subject to a god, would that be, you think, going against His will?

Thanks for those words.:)

your welcome.
If it cheers you up I think i have yet another crazy girl in my life.

your welcome.
If it cheers you up I think i have yet another crazy girl in my life.

Crazy suits you just fine, Greedy.:p
But if it's the will, of something or your own, I hope this new crazy girl makes you happy.

Crazy suits you just fine, Greedy.:p
But if it's the will, of something or your own, I hope this new crazy girl makes you happy.
Trying to abort actually.
I am really trying to get away form the crazies.
Ive determined something is wrong with me, that draws me to the crazies.
To be honest I am tried of getting run through the ringer.
but for some reason I am only drawn to women who are nuts.

Trying to abort actually.
I am really trying to get away form the crazies.
Ive determined something is wrong with me, that draws me to the crazies.
To be honest I am tried of getting run through the ringer.
but for some reason I am only drawn to women who are nuts.

Maybe you're to be their savior. Who knows? I used to think the same as you. Before, I only attracted the nut-cases. Eventually, that too shall pass. Perhaps like Scotus, you must believe x and will it at the time of thinking and taking action.

Maybe you're to be their savior. Who knows? I used to think the same as you. Before, I only attracted the nut-cases. Eventually, that too shall pass. Perhaps like Scotus, you must believe x and will it at the time of thinking and taking action.

Yeah I can see that.
Believe it is not my job to be the knight.
And find women who are not damsels in distress.

Yeah I can see that.
Believe it is not my job to be the knight.
And find women who are not damsels in distress.

Then you need to stay away from the crazies if you can. Hopefully, a normal girl will come soon.

Then you need to stay away from the crazies if you can. Hopefully, a normal girl will come soon.

Don't know your issue. but I hope it work itself out soon.

Don't know your issue. but I hope it work itself out soon.

It will. I know it will, eventually.

Help me understand, NSG. My will, my desire is to be not where I am right now. If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?

As there is no god his will should have no effect on anyone.

As there is no god his will should have no effect on anyone.

Then define will, in your words and applied to your condition as a human being.

In your case, you would say that will is subject to what God wants (whatever His will may be) of us, of you, of all.

Yes, I think I would say that, in the sense that the will, like everything, is subject to God. I believe that God gives us free will, while at the same time knowing ahead of time every decision we are going to make, and what the outcome of those decisions will be.

If one doesn't consider will to be subject to a god, would that be, you think, going against His will?

I think it would, in that doing that you(not you specifically, just 'you' in general)are placing your desires above that of God. You are saying, in essence, that you know better than He does, that you can run things better than He can. The foundation of that mode of thought is Pride, which was the Lucifer sin.

A good treatment of the topic, admittedly from a Protestant Christian/ somewhat Calvinist viewpoint, is Desiring God by John Piper. (http://www.amazon.com/Desiring-God-Meditations-Christian-Hedonist/dp/1590521196/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1242631937&sr=1-1) or really anything by Jonathan Edwards.

Then define will, in your words and applied to your condition as a human being.

Damn you and asking deep questions. :mad:

I guess it's your want. What you desire. But merely desiring something will not make it happen, nor will god's will.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#WilFreMor

This is standard Incompatibilism, with a Kantian bent (well, proto-Kantian) of which I strongly approve. :)

I'm not sure where divine will comes in, though.

I'm not sure how seriously this suggestion will be taken, given that I lean very much to atheism.

You could try praying to God for guidance.

Was it Descartes who said something like "God provided me with the power of reason, so surely intended me to use it." God doesn't seem to give guidance on next week's lottery numbers, but this might be one of the subjects on which He does.

This is standard Incompatibilism, with a Kantian bent (well, proto-Kantian) of which I strongly approve. :)

I'm sure that has a well defined meaning but rather than trying to bend my mind to Kant, I'm just going to giggle foolishly at the phrase "standard Incompatibilism."

Am I the only one who thought this thread would be something to do with the Supreme Court?

Am I the only one who thought this thread would be something to do with the Supreme Court?

Yep. It's only you.

Here is your dunce cap. Go sit in the corner.

Help me understand, NSG. My will, my desire is to be not where I am right now. If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?


Ones will, or ones wants can be achived if:

a) Work is put into it's achivement.
b) It is in fact possible.

It may be my will that I achive true 100% human flight, without the aid of any machinery except my own body.

This though is just not possible, so no amount of willing it to be so, will make it so.

This is standard Incompatibilism, with a Kantian bent (well, proto-Kantian) of which I strongly approve. :)

I'm not sure where divine will comes in, though.

The divine will comes in on the differences Scotus wanted to establish between his thought-line and that of Aquinas. I am dizzy, haven't slept a bit so I'll tackle this later on.

Scotus thinks of freedom as involving multiple options at the very moment of choice. It's not enough to say that now I will x, but later I can will y. We have to say that at the very moment at which I will x, I also am able to will y. In other words, will is subject to our thoughts. We must think it and will it.
Yeah, not too far off the mark, I think.

My own position on will isn't exactly pinned down, and studying Hegel recently has kinda thrown it all out of whack, but I do shine to Thomas Reid's contracausal reply to Hume's compatibilist account:

To have liberty, one must be able to do x and refrain from x. If one cannot refrain, one is not free. While Hume thinks that freedom comes in at the stage between volition and action, Reid thinks free will isn't concerned with acting on volitions, but control over volitions. What controls volition is the agent, not the passions, not external events.

Fundamentally, human action terminates in a person. Passions and beliefs may incline you to act, but they do not cause you to act.



With the obvious caveat that I do not speak for all of Christendom, and that I am neither a philosopher nor a theologian, I would go so far as to say that 'happiness'='doing the will of God.'
But surely not all happiness?

For there are plenty things which can make us happy which would go against the commands of the Christian god.

Yeah, not too far off the mark, I think.

My own position on will isn't exactly pinned down, and studying Hegel recently has kinda thrown it all out of whack, but I do shine to Thomas Reid's contracausal reply to Hume's compatibilist account:

To have liberty, one must be able to do x and refrain from x. If one cannot refrain, one is not free. While Hume thinks that freedom comes in at the stage between volition and action, Reid thinks free will isn't concerned with acting on volitions, but control over volitions. What controls volition is the agent, not the passions, not external events.

Hume's, Reid's and Scotus's thinking were very similar, in some aspects, although centuries apart from each other.

Fundamentally, human action terminates in a person. Passions and beliefs may incline you to act, but they do not cause you to act.

I do like this. Belief and passion as an inclination but not a cause.

Hume's, Reid's and Scotus's thinking were very similar, in some aspects, although centuries apart from each other.
Although Scotus taught mostly in Europe, they are all part of the lengthy Scottish tradition of philosophical enquiry, which I like to picture myself a small part of.

I do like this. Belief and passion as an inclination but not a cause.
Yes, and it also allows us to talk of second-order desires; wanting to want something.

Yes, and it also allows us to talk of second-order desires; wanting to want something.

What do you think of this: asserting what we want will give us what we want. Would that in itself posit will in a way?

Although Scotus taught mostly in Europe, they are all part of the lengthy Scottish tradition of philosophical enquiry, which I like to picture myself a small part of.

That all you're good for.

What do you think of this: asserting what we want will give us what we want.

Would that in itself posit will in a way?
Well, to me, will isn't a power to create events or objects to satisfy our desires, beyond that of willing to make ourselves act to fulfil desires, etc.

If this is what you're getting at, I don't think much of 'asserting what we want will give us what we want'.


That all you're good for.
Scots in general, or myself in particular?

Either way, it's no bad thing.

Well, to me, will isn't a power to create events or objects to satisfy our desires, beyond that of willing to make ourselves act to fulfil desires, etc.

Will acts like a catalyst then?

If this is what you're getting at, I don't think much of 'asserting what we want will give us what we want'.

No, don't worry. That's not what I'm getting at. I was just momentarily influenced by something I read in the local press about "The Art Of Well-Being".

Help me understand, NSG. My will, my desire is to be not where I am right now. If my will is not subject to the will of a god, why can't I be where I want to be?

You can.

Your will is your own. You only have to will it, and then make it happen.

And then deal with whatever comes of that choice.

Example: An imaginary person I have just conjured up for the argument - lives in Japan but wishes she lived in China. She makes the decision to live in China, and hitches a ride on a fishing boat. It cleans out her savings, and she has to live as an illegal immigrant in China, always wary that an oppressive Big Brother is going to snatch her up.

Her will is her own. She makes her own decisions - and then she faces the consequences.

You can.

Your will is your own. You only have to will it, and then make it happen.

And then deal with whatever comes of that choice.

Example: An imaginary person I have just conjured up for the argument - lives in Japan but wishes she lived in China. She makes the decision to live in China, and hitches a ride on a fishing boat. It cleans out her savings, and she has to live as an illegal immigrant in China, always wary that an oppressive Big Brother is going to snatch her up.

Her will is her own. She makes her own decisions - and then she faces the consequences.

You sound like an after-school special.


But, just because you will something to happen doesn't mean it will happen. For instance- that Japanese woman's boat might of capcised.

You sound like an after-school special.


But, just because you will something to happen doesn't mean it will happen. For instance- that Japanese woman's boat might of capcised.

NTSM was commenting on the OP. One of the things Scotus seems to be posing is that if one wills something, one needs to believe in it, assert that it will happen and it will happen. Provided of course one does or will x to do x and not change mid-stride and will y.

NTSM was commenting on the OP. One of the things Scotus seems to be posing is that if one wills something, one needs to believe in it, assert that it will happen and it will happen. Provided of course one does or will x to do x and not change mid-stride and will y.

*sings* I believe I can fly...

*sings* I believe I can fly...

Ass... you know the rest, I'm sure.:fluffle:

NTSM was commenting on the OP. One of the things Scotus seems to be posing is that if one wills something, one needs to believe in it, assert that it will happen and it will happen. Provided of course one does or will x to do x and not change mid-stride and will y.
Tis stupid to all your faith on one thing.
*sings* I believe I can fly...
Give it a try, what's the worst that could happen.

Give it a try, what's the worst that could happen.

the tale of Icarus comes to mind.

NTSM was commenting on the OP. One of the things Scotus seems to be posing is that if one wills something, one needs to believe in it, assert that it will happen and it will happen. Provided of course one does or will x to do x and not change mid-stride and will y.

If you truly will it to happen, you will follow through on whatever it takes to make happen. It's like the idea that 'god helps those who help themselves'.

Of course, the other thing I was pointing out, is that you can will things to happen, but then you have to face the consequences. The motif of 'be careful what you wish for'.

If you truly will it to happen, you will follow through on whatever it takes to make happen. It's like the idea that 'god helps those who help themselves'.

Indeed.

Of course, the other thing I was pointing out, is that you can will things to happen, but then you have to face the consequences. The motif of 'be careful what you wish for'.

Yeah, willing something also carries consequences.

Will acts like a catalyst then?
I'm not too happy about that sort of terminology, as it casts will almost as subordinate to other factors in ourselves. I think I understand what you mean by it being a catalyst, but I feel that such talk kind of does away with any agent present.

As I said above, I've recently been studying Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel talks about will in great length. Like Reid's position, I find aspects of Hegel's to be somewhat attractive (ignoring certain undesirable thoughts on Will and private property, which I won't get into here). Unfortunately, the two positions go against one another somewhat; I'm still making up my mind over the matter.

Hegel sees no difference between Will and thought, unlike most other philosophers, and sees will exhibited in desire-fulfilling action (what he calls 'immediate will' or 'natural will'). For Hegel, echoing Hume, there's always something present in free action that involves desire. So, you are a little bit free in desire-fulfilling action.

However, unlike philosophers such as Hobbes who think free action simply is desire-fulfilling action, Hegel says free action is something more. He argues that Will is capable of self-reflection and abstraction, and thus we're not simply slaves to our passions, as again Hobbes would maintain, but that the willing self can reflect on desires, judge them and make a detached decision as to their suitability.

Thus, we act freely when we choose desires to motivate us. However, though I am free to choose which of my desire to fulfil, I cannot choose what desires I have.

(All of the above shows how unformed my position on the notion of 'Will' really is.)

the tale of Icarus comes to mind.

The one were the guy gets sunburnt and goes for a swim?

I'm not too happy about that sort of terminology, as it casts will almost as subordinate to other factors in ourselves. I think I understand what you mean by it being a catalyst, but I feel that such talk kind of does away with any agent present.

As I said above, I've recently been studying Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel talks about will in great length. Like Reid's position, I find aspects of Hegel's to be somewhat attractive (ignoring certain undesirable thoughts on Will and private property, which I won't get into here). Unfortunately, the two positions go against one another somewhat; I'm still making up my mind over the matter.

Hegel sees no difference between Will and thought, unlike most other philosophers, and sees will exhibited in desire-fulfilling action (what he calls 'immediate will' or 'natural will'). For Hegel, echoing Hume, there's always something present in free action that involves desire. So, you are a little bit free in desire-fulfilling action.

However, unlike philosophers such as Hobbes who think free action simply is desire-fulfilling action, Hegel says free action is something more. He argues that Will is capable of self-reflection and abstraction, and thus we're not simply slaves to our passions, as again Hobbes would maintain, but that the willing self can reflect on desires, judge them and make a detached decision as to their suitability.

Thus, we act freely when we choose desires to motivate us. However, though I am free to choose which of my desire to fulfil, I cannot choose what desires I have.

(All of the above shows how unformed my position on the notion of 'Will' really is.)

Allow me some time to get home and I will read your post more calmly.

But surely not all happiness? For there are plenty things which can make us happy which would go against the commands of the Christian god.

Maybe substitute 'true happiness' or 'lasting happiness' then. See, to the best of my understanding(and again, like before, I make no claims of being either a philosopher or a theologian)Christian thought would posit that going against the commands of God would be sin, and that sin, while admittedly momentarily pleasant, is going to leave you wretched and miserable, and eventually in Hell

If I may indulge in an analogy, it's like the difference between sex in a one-night stand and sex in a loving relationship. Both are going to involve the momentary pleasure of the orgasm, but given the choice, I would think people are going to choose the latter, rather than the former. Of course, there are some people who would choose the former, but that illustrates both the nature of people and where the analogy breaks down.

What do you think of this: asserting what we want will give us what we want.

In one sense, this might be accurate, in that you could assert an outcome to motivate yourself to achieve that outcome. When I was younger, my little brother taped signs saying '4.0' (his desired GPA)on his bathroom mirror, and around his room. He asserted what he wanted, and he got what he wanted.

Of course, he didn't achieve it by just sitting there and saying that he had a 4.0 GPA, there was a bit of work involved as well. As I'm sure has been demonstrated on this very forum before, merely saying something is so, does not make it so. Asserting that America has a Republican president will not give me what I want, no matter how many times I say it, and may mark me as dangerously delusional.

Maybe substitute 'true happiness' or 'lasting happiness' then.
Or, 'happiness in the next life', even.


Allow me some time to get home and I will read your post more calmly.
Of course; no rush.

Or, 'happiness in the next life', even.

Even better, yeah. A key piece of the Christian definition/viewpoint/concept of 'happiness' is the belief that your time in this world is transitory and it's experiences are ephemeral and that it's eternity and where you spend it that matters more.

A key piece of the Christian definition/viewpoint/concept of 'happiness' is the belief that your time in this world is transitory and it's experiences are ephemeral and that it's eternity and where you spend it that matters more.
My old Kirk minister might have quibbles (following Christian Aid's "We believe in life before death" mantra), but I take your point.

I'm not too happy about that sort of terminology, as it casts will almost as subordinate to other factors in ourselves. I think I understand what you mean by it being a catalyst, but I feel that such talk kind of does away with any agent present.

As I said above, I've recently been studying Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel talks about will in great length. Like Reid's position, I find aspects of Hegel's to be somewhat attractive (ignoring certain undesirable thoughts on Will and private property, which I won't get into here). Unfortunately, the two positions go against one another somewhat; I'm still making up my mind over the matter.

Hegel sees no difference between Will and thought, unlike most other philosophers, and sees will exhibited in desire-fulfilling action (what he calls 'immediate will' or 'natural will'). For Hegel, echoing Hume, there's always something present in free action that involves desire. So, you are a little bit free in desire-fulfilling action.

However, unlike philosophers such as Hobbes who think free action simply is desire-fulfilling action, Hegel says free action is something more. He argues that Will is capable of self-reflection and abstraction, and thus we're not simply slaves to our passions, as again Hobbes would maintain, but that the willing self can reflect on desires, judge them and make a detached decision as to their suitability.

Thus, we act freely when we choose desires to motivate us. However, though I am free to choose which of my desire to fulfil, I cannot choose what desires I have.

(All of the above shows how unformed my position on the notion of 'Will' really is.)

I think, Chumbly, that when it comes to definitions of will and what will can accomplish, you may be more clear on the subject than others, me included.

Now, you brought something quite interesting to the discussion here, the subject of detachment. Can we suppose that, perhaps, when we choose, when we will, we enter a certain stage that consists of detachment?

I'm not too happy about that sort of terminology, as it casts will almost as subordinate to other factors in ourselves. I think I understand what you mean by it being a catalyst, but I feel that such talk kind of does away with any agent present.

As I said above, I've recently been studying Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel talks about will in great length. Like Reid's position, I find aspects of Hegel's to be somewhat attractive (ignoring certain undesirable thoughts on Will and private property, which I won't get into here). Unfortunately, the two positions go against one another somewhat; I'm still making up my mind over the matter.

Hegel sees no difference between Will and thought, unlike most other philosophers, and sees will exhibited in desire-fulfilling action (what he calls 'immediate will' or 'natural will'). For Hegel, echoing Hume, there's always something present in free action that involves desire. So, you are a little bit free in desire-fulfilling action.

However, unlike philosophers such as Hobbes who think free action simply is desire-fulfilling action, Hegel says free action is something more. He argues that Will is capable of self-reflection and abstraction, and thus we're not simply slaves to our passions, as again Hobbes would maintain, but that the willing self can reflect on desires, judge them and make a detached decision as to their suitability.

Thus, we act freely when we choose desires to motivate us. However, though I am free to choose which of my desire to fulfil, I cannot choose what desires I have.

(All of the above shows how unformed my position on the notion of 'Will' really is.)

But we don't 'choose' desires to motivate us - we either indulge them or we don't, but there was no choice to desire, in the first place.

We can weigh the risks and the returns. We can pick our methodology, and what we are able (or willing) to do to reach our ends... and, under some circumstances, then, we will set about fulfilling our 'will' - but our 'will' is what we chose, not our 'desire'.

I think, Chumbly, that when it comes to definitions of will and what will can accomplish, you may be more clear on the subject than others, me included.
I suspect I merely have more time and opportunity to read, study and discuss the topic.

But thank you.

Now, you brought something quite interesting to the discussion here, the subject of detachment. Can we suppose that, perhaps, when we choose, when we will, we enter a certain stage that consists of detachment?
I think so, and this is what I like about Hegel's account (though he's by no means the only theorist who discusses this detachment).

The concept of a will which is detached from pleasures and beliefs, which can consider the position and desires of oneself while still be in some way apart from them, sits rather well with me and perhaps goes some way in explaining some tricky issues to do with choice and desire.

Or, as Hegel wonderfully and labouredly puts it:

The will contains the element of pure indeterminacy or of the 'I''s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved: this is the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of oneself.

G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §5



But we don't 'choose' desires to motivate us - we either indulge them or we don't, but there was no choice to desire, in the first place.
No, you're right, and Hegel agrees with you (as do I). We can't choose what we desire or even what we desire to desire; interestingly, this is perhaps the root of much of the problems surrounding the treatment of paedophiles or serial rapists.

However, I think we do have some choice in which desires we fulfil or which desires we let lie.

We can weigh the risks and the returns. We can pick our methodology, and what we are able (or willing) to do to reach our ends... and, under some circumstances, then, we will set about fulfilling our 'will' - but our 'will' is what we chose, not our 'desire'.
Again I agree with you.

I'm not saying that our will is our desire. In fact, that's a sort of Hobbesian view that I would argue against.

I suspect I merely have more time and opportunity to read, study and discuss the topic.

But thank you.

You're welcome.


I think so, and this is what I like about Hegel's account (though he's by no means the only theorist who discusses this detachment).

The concept of a will which is detached from pleasures and beliefs, which can consider the position and desires of oneself while still be in some way apart from them, sits rather well with me and perhaps goes some way in explaining some tricky issues to do with choice and desire.

Or, as Hegel wonderfully and labouredly puts it:

The will contains the element of pure indeterminacy or of the 'I''s pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires and drives, or given and determined in some other way, is dissolved: this is the limitless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of oneself.

G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §5

But wouldn't this detachment, this separation of being (if I'm understanding correctly) bring in dualism of the self?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism
Dualism denotes a state of two parts. The word's origin is the Latin duo, "two" . The term 'dualism' was originally coined to denote co-eternal binary opposition, a meaning that is preserved in metaphysical and philosophical duality discourse but has been diluted in general usage.

Can dualism also serve accomplish will? And is this dualism a desired effect?

But wouldn't this detachment, this separation of being (if I'm understanding correctly) bring in dualism of the self?
Not for Hegel, at least. Note the phrases, "pure reflection into itself", and, "pure thinking of oneself"; this is discussion of a single entity considering itself.

The detachment Hegel talks about is the detachment from pleasures when willing a decision; not the detachment of mind and body, to use the example of Cartesian dualism.

Not for Hegel, at least. Note the phrases, "pure reflection into itself", and, "pure thinking of oneself"; this is discussion of a single entity considering itself.

Quite. I think I will ponder these phrases a bit more and apply them to my situation. I am, after all, a single entity that needs to consider itself and what steps to take in order to action the will.

The detachment Hegel talks about is the detachment from pleasures when willing a decision; not the detachment of mind and body, to use the example of Cartesian dualism.

Freed of emotions, the being can choose better.

Quite. I think I will ponder these phrases a bit more and apply them to my situation. I am, after all, a single entity that needs to consider itself and what steps to take in order to action the will.
Pondering is an honourable action indeed.

A word of warning, however: Hegel's writing is notoriously difficult, especially surrounding his conceptions of Right, Will and Spirit. I'd be wary of delving too far into his works without a good commentary. If you're so inclined, I'd point you towards Allan Wood's Hegel's Ethical Thought.

That's not to say, of course, that a bright gal such as yourself is unable to ponder efficiently.

Freed of emotions, the being can choose better.
Aye, that's a good basic summation.

Pondering is an honourable action indeed.

A word of warning, however: Hegel's writing is notoriously difficult, especially surrounding his conceptions of Right, Will and Spirit. I'd be wary of delving too far into his works without a good commentary. If you're so inclined, I'd point you towards Allan Wood's Hegel's Ethical Thought.

I do try not to dwell much on philosophical matters. Tbh, the only reason Scotus came to mind was because I was in mood that brought to mind Scotus' ideas of will. I think they soothed me while my mind worked with rearranging what was happening around me.

That being said, I would like study Hegel. My study of him was too brief and he always seemed like an interesting contemporary philosopher. Your pointers are, indeed, much appreciated.

That's not to say, of course, that a bright gal such as yourself is unable to ponder efficiently.

Thanks Chumbly.

Aye, that's a good basic summation.

Then I'll approach it like that, but I won't dwell much on it.

Freed of emotions, the being can choose better.

Can you ever really free yourself of emotions though? I don't think that anyone(outside of some truly stunning personality disorders)can truly consider something dispassionately to the degree where 'free of emotion' could be applied. It's like the myth of 'journalistic objectivity', you're always going to get a little 'personal' bleeding in.

Speaking of the will, I remember how I read Nietzsche once, to try and impress a girl. I found Nietzsche to be kind of whiny and loser-ish and to be honest, the whole thing kind of screamed 'Look at me, I'm being shocking, aren't you shocked?' The Girl was less than impressed when I passed on this insight. Apparently, I lack 'depth.' I do remember one thing I read, though, that kind of stuck with me. (I'm paraphrasing here)‘To desire an end is to desire the means necessary to achieve that end.’ I did like that.

My old Kirk minister might have quibbles (following Christian Aid's "We believe in life before death" mantra), but I take your point.

A Kirk Minister? Would he be from The Church of the Holy James T.? (p.s. the 'T' stands for 'triumphant.')


(For the record, let me point out that, even with being a colonial, I'm aware that 'kirk' is Scottish for 'church.')

Can you ever really free yourself of emotions though? I don't think that anyone(outside of some truly stunning personality disorders)can truly consider something dispassionately to the degree where 'free of emotion' could be applied. It's like the myth of 'journalistic objectivity', you're always going to get a little 'personal' bleeding in.

One word: mathematics.

One word: mathematics.

While the numbers themselves may be free of emotion, I doubt the mathematicians themselves are. If nothing else, they have the love of numbers and systems(or maybe it's a love of order)that led them to become mathematicians in the first place.

Can you ever really free yourself of emotions though? I don't think that anyone(outside of some truly stunning personality disorders)can truly consider something dispassionately to the degree where 'free of emotion' could be applied. It's like the myth of 'journalistic objectivity', you're always going to get a little 'personal' bleeding in.

To be completely devoid of emotion is false, I agree with you there. I was merely showing my understanding of what Chumbly was explaining about Hegelian thought. To me, what this philosopher postulated was that to choose well, one must go through detachment. The self analyzing itself, perhaps forgoing some emotion, in order to choose, to will.

In practice, there aren't very many humans who can completely put aside emotion. To feel is an intrinsic part of us, as humans.

(I'm paraphrasing here)‘To desire an end is to desire the means necessary to achieve that end.’ I did like that.

That is quite similar to what Scotus stated about Voluntarism. It's all about the 'means to an end''.

It's like the myth of 'journalistic objectivity', you're always going to get a little 'personal' bleeding in.

You mistake the normative claim for the positive one... or, more precisely, since we are discussing free will, you take the positive claim of "can" to be the positive claim of "will."

Our perception of the will's independence, when making a decision, is a positive fact (though whether or not the will is actually free is a separate question entirely). We are not "pushed" into making a decision; we cannot simply remain passive and have a decision make itself. We must actually make a choice, volitionally act--and while we may feel ourselves pushed or pulled (inclined) in certain directions, we must actually choose to go with them.

It follows that (again, from our perspective as decision-makers) we can choose independently of emotion. There is no necessity attached to the various desires that strive to influence our will: we can consciously analyze them and recognize them as non-determinative, as things we can resist if we choose to.

Now, does any actual human being have the strength of will to actually make a choice that bespeaks of no influence of emotion whatsoever? No. But this is the difference between necessity and probability. It seems to us at the moment of decisionmaking that we can escape emotions. Whether or not we actually manage to is a separate question entirely.

how can your will be realised and you go to exactly where you want to be if that conflicts with someone elses will and where they want to be, theres simply to many of us to all realise our will, someone has to lose, sometimes that someone is you, sometimes its not, so will can drive us to beat down the will of others to realise our own, so this entity in the clouds would be playing favorites there wouldnt he/she/it?

One word: mathematics.

mathematics isn't free of emotion at all, it just restricts it, the mathematician still feels all of his emotions they're just held back from the data, most of the time, say the mathematician who spends his life creating a formula, he loves it so much that it has become his life, this could alter his calculations and thoughts, therefore altering his work (the math)

While the numbers themselves may be free of emotion, I doubt the mathematicians themselves are.

That is not the question. No one is free of emotion, full stop. Nor does any philosopher insist that we be so.

The question in the context of mathematics would be, "To what extent are mathematicians capable of adhering to cold mathematical reason against their emotional inclinations?" Can they recognize a good proof even when it goes against their pride, perhaps because they have defended a contrary position? Does their taste for mathematical elegance blind them to areas where "true" mathematics may not be elegant at all? The answer to both is, of course, "To some degree"--but the point is just that such adherence is possible, not that it is necessary or even particularly likely.

If nothing else, they have the love of numbers and systems(or maybe it's a love of order)that led them to become mathematicians in the first place.

Right, and Plato (rightly) says that philosophers are at bottom driven by a passion for wisdom... but their achievement of wisdom nevertheless leads them to call into doubt their passions (or at least the rule of their passions).

Speaking of the will, I remember how I read Nietzsche once, to try and impress a girl.
It happens.

I found Nietzsche to be kind of whiny and loser-ish and to be honest, the whole thing kind of screamed 'Look at me, I'm being shocking, aren't you shocked?'[ The Girl was less than impressed when I passed on this insight. Apparently, I lack 'depth.'
Nietzsche does get a bit... huffy at times, though he is an important philosopher. One of the biggest problems is he doesn't write in a style typical to philosophy (at times, Ecce Homo is more autobiography than treatise) and it can get hard-going.

Still, if you're interested in objective truth, existentialism, much literary theory, etc., he's a go-to theorist.

mathematics isn't free of emotion at all, it just restricts it, the mathematician still feels all of his emotions they're just held back from the data, most of the time, say the mathematician who spends his life creating a formula, he loves it so much that it has become his life, this could alter his calculations and thoughts, therefore altering his work (the math)

Heinleinites said "I don't think that anyone ... can truly consider something dispassionately to the degree where 'free of emotion' could be applied."

There are a few different ways to take that. It seems to at least say that while considering something, one will always be feeling some emotion. Soheran contends that while existing, one will always feel some emotion!

I really didn't think this was what Heinleinites meant though. Because of the example H gave in the same paragraph:

It's like the myth of 'journalistic objectivity', you're always going to get a little 'personal' bleeding in.

I took it to mean that no-one could, in "considering" something, reach a conclusion which was not affected by the emotions they felt while considering. This "reaching a conclusion" may not be a part of every process of "considering" but I thought the example (and the context of this discussion, choice, in which a decision is indeed a conclusion of considering) pretty clearly focussed the question on whether the conclusion reached could be unaffected by the emotions felt at the time.

In which case mathematics is the perfect counterexample. Whether the thinker is feeling joy, pride, boredom or frustration, this will affect their conclusion only in the bluntest way: they may give up before completing a proof or disproof, or overlook a mistake of their own ... and either of these things could also happen in the presence of any other emotion.

In mathematics, there are not infinitely subtle degrees of bias as in journalism. You either reach a conclusion (proof or disproof) or you fail to reach a conclusion (stop for some reason, or simply don't know how.)

Perhaps Heinleinites was making an assertion about the inescapability of emotion, not about whether it affects "conclusions" ... but in that case, why introduce "considering" into the question at all, let alone the example of journalistic objectivity? Simply say: one cannot exist without feeling emotion.

Soheran's answer is excellent, btw. Particularly note, that by deliberately compensating for the emotions they feel while considering, a thinker might not be certain of "objectivity" but the process can be repeated and repeated (thinking the same question over and examining the emotions which come up) to get any desired degree of certainty.

I took it to mean that no-one could, in "considering" something, reach a conclusion which was not affected by the emotions they felt while considering. This "reaching a conclusion" may not be a part of every process of "considering" but I thought the example (and the context of this discussion, choice, in which a decision is indeed a conclusion of considering) pretty clearly focussed the question on whether the conclusion reached could be unaffected by the emotions felt at the time.

You're right here. That was what I was getting at, that since the process is influenced by emotion, it follows that the product of that process is also influenced by emotion, even if at one removed.

In which case mathematics is the perfect counterexample. Whether the thinker is feeling joy, pride, boredom or frustration, this will affect their conclusion only in the bluntest way: they may give up before completing a proof or disproof, or overlook a mistake of their own ... and either of these things could also happen in the presence of any other emotion.

Given that this is more nuanced than the original one-word assertion, I would agree with you here. With the caveat that even though emotion may affect the conclusion "only in the bluntest way" it is still affecting it. Which would seem to make even mathematics subject.

Perhaps Heinleinites was making an assertion about the inescapability of emotion, not about whether it affects "conclusions" ... but in that case, why introduce "considering" into the question at all, let alone the example of journalistic objectivity? Simply say: one cannot exist without feeling emotion.

Chalk this one up to stylistic differences. I talk pretty figuratively, lots of idiom and so forth, and I tend to write the same way. I use lots of analogies, and metaphors, and sometimes, instead of clarifying my thoughts, it has the opposite effect.

Soheran's answer is excellent, btw. Particularly note, that by deliberately compensating for the emotions they feel while considering, a thinker might not be certain of "objectivity" but the process can be repeated and repeated (thinking the same question over and examining the emotions which come up) to get any desired degree of certainty.
And that's exactly Hegel's point: not only can we abstract from and examine the situation, we can abstract from and examine our emotions as well.

Are you guys still going with this? Surely there's only so many intelligent things you can say to one another without getting bored.

And that's exactly Hegel's point: not only can we abstract from and examine the situation, we can abstract from and examine our emotions as well.

Yes, we can. The thing is that each of the philosophers discussed in this thread postulates an idea that can be followed, studied, understood and applied.