NationStates Jolt Archive

We havn't had it for a while. 'Free Will', do we have it?

I say yes, come persuide me otherwise. :D

We havn't had it for a while. 'Free Will', do we have it?

I say yes, come persuide me otherwise. :D

We've got the capacity to have free will.
Not everybody lives up to it, though. It's a lot of work to acutally figure out what you as an individual really want, and most folks don't like work like that.

We have the appearance of free will, but to prove free will, you have to prove there is a conscious 'I' driving your thoughts, rather than random thoughts creating the illusion of an 'I'.

Epiphenominalism ftw.

We have the appearance of free will, but to prove free will, you have to prove there is a conscious 'I' driving your thoughts, rather than random thoughts creating the illusion of an 'I'.

Epiphenominalism ftw.

I belive Dacartes has already dealt with that!:p

We might, though (AFAIK) the human brain so far just appears to be a rather complicated biological computer. Therefore if the same brain in the same state were exposed to the same stimuli, the same reaction should occur every time. Of course, this is basically impossible to test.

We might, though (AFAIK) the human brain so far just appears to be a rather complicated biological computer. Therefore if the same brain in the same state were exposed to the same stimuli, the same reaction should occur every time. Of course, this is basically impossible to test.

Well, two exaclty identical situations are hard to come by, that's true. But similar situations and people's reactions can be explored.

To give an example I find highly interesting and somewhat amusing : My BF has an identical twin brother. His brother is married, and his wife is on the short side, definitely overweight, has got red hair and considers herself to be an artist. Sound familiar?

What usually makes me laugh is how my BF can't stand his brother's wife, yet went for someone very, very similar in his choice of partner.

I belive Dacartes has already dealt with that!:p

I think not!

Descartes posed a conundrum whose answer was "something must exist", but the nature of what that was is still not fully answered. Unless you have the answer to how neurons firing equate to an "I", and if neurons can be said to have free will and not be driven by purely deterministic chemistry.

There was a movie called Free Willy. Willy is the same name as Will, so yes, the movie theaters definitely had Free Will. :p

Seriously, however, I see no reason to oppose the idea of free will -- especially since there are likely parts of the brain that science doesn't fully understand yet.

Well, two exaclty identical situations are hard to come by, that's true. But similar situations and people's reactions can be explored.

To give an example I find highly interesting and somewhat amusing : My BF has an identical twin brother. His brother is married, and his wife is on the short side, definitely overweight, has got red hair and considers herself to be an artist. Sound familiar?

What usually makes me laugh is how my BF can't stand his brother's wife, yet went for someone very, very similar in his choice of partner.

I expect several studies have been done with twins in regards to thinks like this.

I think not!

Descartes posed a conundrum whose answer was "something must exist", but the nature of what that was is still not fully answered. Unless you have the answer to how neurons firing equate to an "I", and if neurons can be said to have free will and not be driven by purely deterministic chemistry.

No I don't think that is right?

Descartes showed that 'something does exist' something capable of thought, of conception of ideas, of Self awarness, that thing he reasliesd was his Self. Not my self his Self. The 'I' that thinks is the 'I' which is I.

To deny this means to deny the 'Self' do you deny the Self, and if so who is doing the denying?

Determinism is also I beive a false road to go down

I expect several studies have been done with twins in regards to thinks like this.

Indeed several hundred maybe thousands by now.

A long time ago I used to work for Guys & ST Thomas' hospital trust, and was there as part of the team installing all the IT infrastructure for the then new(now old) Twins Studies Unit. That was almost 20 years ago now. It is fasicnating and highlights just how much of our 'personality' comes from our genes.

I expect several studies have been done with twins in regards to thinks like this.

Except that twins already have different fingerprints, so chaos theory has something to work with. Yes, the fingerprints may have no real effect, but they may also lead to one being a psychotic VP while the other becomes an aged lawyer. >_>

No I don't think that is right?

Descartes showed that 'something does exist' something capable of thought, of conception of ideas, of Self awarness, that thing he reasliesd was his Self. Not my self his Self. The 'I' that thinks is the 'I' which is I.

To deny this means to deny the 'Self' do you deny the Self, and if so who is doing the denying?

Determinism is also I beive a false road to go down

I'm not denying there is a 'self', but it does not follow that the 'self' is anything more than a by-product of deterministic physical processes (unless you are a full dualist).

I'm a bit rusty on Descartes tbh, but his 'proof' was a thought experiment and did not take into consideration what the nature of mind might be and the consequences thereof (or just assumed it to be a soul-like thing, removing those complications).

His thesis was "why would something that does not exist be deceived" which does not contradict the idea that conscious experience is a symptom of complex physical brain processes, but not a driver of them.

Silly argument. Either it has a biological source, or it's magic. You don't believe in magic, do you?

I'm not denying there is a 'self', but it does not follow that the 'self' is anything more than a by-product of deterministic physical processes (unless you are a full dualist).

I'm a bit rusty on Descartes tbh, but his 'proof' was a thought experiment and did not take into consideration what the nature of mind might be and the consequences thereof (or just assumed it to be a soul-like thing, removing those complications).

His thesis was "why would something that does not exist be deceived" which does not contradict the idea that conscious experience is a symptom of complex physical brain processes, but not a driver of them.

That the 'self' is a product of the brain I am in no doubt. A by prodcut of deterministic physical process though, I just don't buy into that one. Determinisin in itself is a flawed premise, unless one can show each and every veriable, would you not agree?

Silly argument. Either it has a biological source, or it's magic. You don't believe in magic, do you?

Well actualy I do, but that is another think entirly, and yes of course the self is in the brain, where else would it be.

That the 'self' is a product of the brain I am in no doubt. A by prodcut of deterministic physical process though, I just don't buy into that one. Determinisin in itself is a flawed premise, unless one can show each and every veriable, would you not agree?

I'm saying the brain is deterministic system insofar as it obeys physical laws, so if you knew all the variables you could predict the system. So unless there was something other than the physical, free will as experienced by a consciousness is more of an 'after the fact' rationalization of an action already started by the unobserved physical brain processes.

Because you currently don't know all variables, doesn't mean you can't predict a system (e.g. statistical prediction), or that it is necessarily impossible to do so. What makes you think so?

I expect several studies have been done with twins in regards to thinks like this.

I know, I've read about a few of them.
It's still spooky when it happens to you ;)

I'm saying the brain is deterministic system insofar as it obeys physical laws, so if you knew all the variables you could predict the system. So unless there was something other than the physical, free will as experienced by a consciousness is more of an 'after the fact' rationalization of an action already started by the unobserved physical brain processes.

Because you currently don't know all variables, doesn't mean you can't predict a system (e.g. statistical prediction), or that it is necessarily impossible to do so. What makes you think so?

Ahhh I see what you mean. So you belive that because the 'self' is a function of the physical brain that it is illusionary? In which case I need to ask what you mean when you say 'self'?

We havn't had it for a while. 'Free Will', do we have it?

I say yes, come persuide me otherwise. :D
Dunno, mate. How could we tell?

I'm not denying there is a 'self', but it does not follow that the 'self' is anything more than a by-product of deterministic physical processes (unless you are a full dualist).

.....

Nor does it follow that the self is solely a by-product of deterministic physical processes. Believing in determinisim as opposed to free will (or vice-versa) is based on faith, as we have no evidence either way.

Silly argument. Either it has a biological source, or it's magic. You don't believe in magic, do you?

Tell me, does Earth's magnetic field have a biological source? If not, is it magic?

Ahhh I see what you mean. So you belive that because the 'self' is a function of the physical brain that it is illusionary? In which case I need to ask what you mean when you say 'self'?

I'm not saying the self is illusory to the extent that it doesn't exist at all, I'm saying that as a by-product of all that goes on in the brain it's a mistake to ascribe any separate 'power' to it as free agent that makes decisions.

When I say "self" I am referring to what appears to me, to be "me" in my inner stream of consciousness. The incessant stream of thought that digresses and wanders, but that I seem to control. The contradiction I find is that "I" cannot direct "I" - it just happens. I can't decide to think a thought; I just think it. To that extent I believe I am directed by physical processes I have no control over.

It's difficult to express, because you have to keep using the word "I" which just begs the question.

Dunno, mate. How could we tell?

There are many ways, do something that you don't want to do, but do it anyway.

There are many ways, do something that you don't want to do, but do it anyway.
No reason that wasn't predestined in the first place.

Nor does it follow that the self is solely a by-product of deterministic physical processes. Believing in determinisim as opposed to free will (or vice-versa) is based on faith, as we have no evidence either way.

If the mind is physical, and subject to physical laws that can in principle be predicted, it seems a reasonable conclusion. Do you disagree with the premise?

I'm not saying the self is illusory to the extent that it doesn't exist at all, I'm saying that as a by-product of all that goes on in the brain it's a mistake to ascribe any separate 'power' to it as free agent that makes decisions.

When I say "self" I am referring to what appears to me, to be "me" in my inner stream of consciousness. The incessant stream of thought that digresses and wanders, but that I seem to control. The contradiction I find is that "I" cannot direct "I" - it just happens. I can't decide to think a thought; I just think it. To that extent I believe I am directed by physical processes I have no control over.

It's difficult to express, because you have to keep using the word "I" which just begs the question.

I do understand you, I mean to say I do get what you are trying to say, in short because the brain is a biological machine then any output from it can only be a product of the way it works.

This is most certianly true, but that still does not negate the fact that you and I can make free choices. When you reply to this no doubt you first construct the sentance in you head and then start your provisional typing, perhaps when you have finished you'll read through it, and make some changes, cutting out parts, changeing words etc. You will do whatever you think is nesicary to sucintcly put your point across and make sure that others understand it.

That is an example of you engageing your choice making mechanisms. Yes it all takes place in your brain, but the chioces you make as to the contents of your reply, are conciousely your choices, yes?

No reason that wasn't predestined in the first place.

And theres the rub. I was heading that way with Cheese, but GoG has beat me to it. You really can't claim that predetermisim effects any of our choices untill you can show that it effects them all, and how can you know all of the veribles that go into the choice making process? You can't so a claim of determisim is one based on faith and thus not reasonable.

We do have free will. However there are really few choices.

Option: Do I pay my taxes or not?

Well not much of a choice really. If I do not pay them there will be fines and penalties. If I refuse to pay them further they can take the money. If I resist further they can put me in jail.


There are two or more equally wrong choices. Very rarely there are two right choices or at least no wrong choices.


There are choices that do not matter.

With consequences was the ever really a choice in the first place? Not unless you enjoy pain or are not afraid of the consequences.

And theres the rub. I was heading that way with Cheese, but GoG has beat me to it. You really can't claim that predetermisim effects any of our choices untill you can show that it effects them all, and how can you know all of the veribles that go into the choice making process? You can't so a claim of determisim is one based on faith and thus not reasonable.
This is all based on faith and thus not reasonable. The very same goes for free will, too. Is it proveably free? Dunno.

This is all based on faith and thus not reasonable. The very same goes for free will, too. Is it proveably free? Dunno.

I refer you to post #23.:D

I do understand you, I mean to say I do get what you are trying to say, in short because the brain is a biological machine then any output from it can only be a product of the way it works.

This is most certianly true, but that still does not negate the fact that you and I can make free choices. When you reply to this no doubt you first construct the sentance in you head and then start your provisional typing, perhaps when you have finished you'll read through it, and make some changes, cutting out parts, changeing words etc. You will do whatever you think is nesicary to sucintcly put your point across and make sure that others understand it.

That is an example of you engageing your choice making mechanisms. Yes it all takes place in your brain, but the chioces you make as to the contents of your reply, are conciousely your choices, yes?

It's the way it works that is the key. As a biological machine, it necessarily produces particular outputs for particular inputs. These outputs depend upon the patterns within it, which depend upon previous inputs. It is determined by those patterns and brain chemistry. There is no freedom to change that, you cannot make a decision outside of those confines.

You say "I make free choices" - but what is the "I" that "makes a choice"? If it is the result of a physical process that had to happen a particular way because of the physical conditions and the chemical laws involved, the I is not 'free' to do as it likes.

I refer you to post #23.:D
Post 24 gives a perfect response to that :tongue:

Post 24 gives a perfect response to that :tongue:

And I belive that post #27 deals with that one!:D

Okay I guess we can go on this circle for ages, ummm how to brake it?

And I belive that post #27 deals with that one!:D

Okay I guess we can go on this circle for ages, ummm how to brake it?
"Yootopia, you crazy maverick, you've won me 'round to your point of view" :)

And I belive that post #27 deals with that one!:D

Okay I guess we can go on this circle for ages, ummm how to brake it?

You can't -it's predestined :p

It's the way it works that is the key. As a biological machine, it necessarily produces particular outputs for particular inputs. These outputs depend upon the patterns within it, which depend upon previous inputs. It is determined by those patterns and brain chemistry. There is no freedom to change that, you cannot make a decision outside of those confines.

You say "I make free choices" - but what is the "I" that "makes a choice"? If it is the result of a physical process that had to happen a particular way because of the physical conditions and the chemical laws involved, the I is not 'free' to do as it likes.

Well lets simplyfy this a little.

You have a sense of your self as differant from others, this we could call sentiance. It is this sentiance this sense of you that is differant and apart from others that is the 'I'.

Free will equates to the freedom to choose one thing or course of action over another.

You are of course also free to change your brain chemistry, takeing excersise does this, as do certian drugs, the choice to do either excersise or drugs, or do neither is one that you and 'I' take.

What about the desicion to fix parts of your personality that you may want to fix? In effect this forces a change in whatever parts of the brain are responsible for the personality, so does this mean that contary to your assurtion that the 'self' cannot drive the brain, that in fact it can?

"Yootopia, you crazy maverick, you've won me 'round to your point of view" :)

Bwhahahahah now, I know you are slightly mad.

Bwhahahahah now, I know you are slightly mad.
Only now? :)

It's the way it works that is the key. As a biological machine, it necessarily produces particular outputs for particular inputs. These outputs depend upon the patterns within it, which depend upon previous inputs. It is determined by those patterns and brain chemistry. There is no freedom to change that, you cannot make a decision outside of those confines.

You say "I make free choices" - but what is the "I" that "makes a choice"? If it is the result of a physical process that had to happen a particular way because of the physical conditions and the chemical laws involved, the I is not 'free' to do as it likes.

I would go so far as saying the "I" isn't even free to decide what it likes and what it doesn't.
I think this is where the limit on free will actually already kicks in.

Only now? :)

Heh I had to be sure.

If the mind is physical, and subject to physical laws that can in principle be predicted, it seems a reasonable conclusion. Do you disagree with the premise?

Even those things that are known to be entirely physical and subject to physical laws, such as electrons, cannot be completely predicted in principle or in action.

So, even if we assume that the self is entirely a physical process, which I highly doubt, there is still the possibiity that it does not have to follow predetermined and predictable behaviours.

And I belive that post #27 deals with that one!:D

Okay I guess we can go on this circle for ages, ummm how to brake it?

Well lets simplyfy this a little.

You have a sense of your self as differant from others, this we could call sentiance. It is this sentiance this sense of you that is differant and apart from others that is the 'I'.

Free will equates to the freedom to choose one thing or course of action over another.

You are of course also free to change your brain chemistry, takeing excersise does this, as do certian drugs, the choice to do either excersise or drugs, or do neither is one that you and 'I' take.

What about the desicion to fix parts of your personality that you may want to fix? In effect this forces a change in whatever parts of the brain are responsible for the personality, so does this mean that contary to your assurtion that the 'self' cannot drive the brain, that in fact it can?

If the self is the brain, the brain drives the brain.

If the brain is physical, the activity within it is governed by predictable physical laws. Any outputs are governed by those physical factors, not an "I" that somehow is outside of that.

Even if those outputs result in inputs that cause the patterns of neuron firing to change, it's still ultimately driven by those initial predictable processes. In fact, whatever happens the inputs will change based upon the previous outputs - whether it's turning a newspaper page, eating less chocolate or taking LSD. That doesn't necessarily imply "you" have changed "yourself", it's an evolving complex physical feedback system whatever happens.

I still can't see a necessary connection between experiencing "I-ness" and having free will. Nor can I see how system governed by predictable laws can behave in any way other than the way in which it's construction allows, which means it is determined.

I would go so far as saying the "I" isn't even free to decide what it likes and what it doesn't.
I think this is where the limit on free will actually already kicks in.

I think you are wrong. I'm not a racist, but I certianly grow up in such a household. Now wheter you belive nature or nurture wins out here it is clare that by both I should be racist, yet I abhour, becaue my intelect infomred me many years ago just what a wrong, stupid idea it is, I choose to not be racist.

Even those things that are known to be entirely physical and subject to physical laws, such as electrons, cannot be completely predicted in principle or in action.

So, even if we assume that the self is entirely a physical process, which I highly doubt, there is still the possibiity that it does not have to follow predetermined and predictable behaviours.

But having randomness in a system still doesn't make it less problematic. If every decision is based on a coin toss (or random radiation emission - poor cat), it may be less predictable but still does not confer some special power of 'choosing'. It means the system is driven by randomness, the self 'chooses' based on random events. Is that any better for a free will argument?

If the self is the brain, the brain drives the brain.

If the brain is physical, the activity within it is governed by predictable physical laws. Any outputs are governed by those physical factors, not an "I" that somehow is outside of that.

Even if those outputs result in inputs that cause the patterns of neuron firing to change, it's still ultimately driven by those initial predictable processes. In fact, whatever happens the inputs will change based upon the previous outputs - whether it's turning a newspaper page, eating less chocolate or taking LSD. That doesn't necessarily imply "you" have changed "yourself", it's an evolving complex physical feedback system whatever happens.

I still can't see a necessary connection between experiencing "I-ness" and having free will. Nor can I see how system governed by predictable laws can behave in any way other than the way in which it's construction allows, which means it is determined.

That nether-the-less can be directed by the 'I' that is your self. Breathing happens automatialy, but if you so choose you can hold your breath, even at times in which your body does not have to do so.

Try it now, you'll find that you'll suceed, yet can you point to either previous input or output that goverens why this should happen, at this perticular time?

In short, you decide to hold your breath for no other reason than you decied to, and thus, your breath is held.

This is free will, the ability to make choices.

That nether-the-less can be directed by the 'I' that is your self. Breathing happens automatialy, but if you so choose you can hold your breath, even at times in which your body does not have to do so.

Try it now, you'll find that you'll suceed, yet can you point to either previous input or output that goverens why this should happen, at this perticular time?

In short, you decide to hold your breath for no other reason than you decied to, and thus, your breath is held.

This is free will, the ability to make choices.

The previous input was reading your post, combined with the predispositions in the construction of my brain to react to it in particular ways which itself is the sum of all previous inputs and it's initial physical construction.

What exactly is making the decision? Can you define it?

My argument is that it is physical, and constrained by its physicality to behave in certain ways and so is not truly free.

But having randomness in a system still doesn't make it less problematic. If every decision is based on a coin toss (or random radiation emission - poor cat), it may be less predictable but still does not confer some special power of 'choosing'. It means the system is driven by randomness, the self 'chooses' based on random events. Is that any better for a free will argument?

Since the randomness exists, we can say that the situation is not wholly predetermined. This allows space for free will. If you want to show 'choice' you run into the problem of proving the existence of a chooser. I don't really care about that, because my senses tell me that I exist and I am choosing.

I think you are wrong. I'm not a racist, but I certianly grow up in such a household. Now wheter you belive nature or nurture wins out here it is clare that by both I should be racist, yet I abhour, becaue my intelect infomred me many years ago just what a wrong, stupid idea it is, I choose to not be racist.

That goes back to what I initially said... we've got the capacity to think about our own thoughts, and thereby change them. Most people don't, though.

Things like racism are as inate to us as cooperation, we've got the capacity and string tendency for both. But experience can and will change our attitudes. I'm willing to bet that your family wasn't the only contact you had growing up. And important as family is in development, non-family contacts can be just as strong an influence, if not stronger sometimes.
Do you think that if you had grown up in the rural Southern US in, say the 1920s, you would have changed your views on races so quickly?

People's minds are not static and set, they change all the time. But I've very, very rarely seen somebody change anything without impulse from the outside. So there is an argument to be made that our "I"s are the product of biology and external input.

Since the randomness exists, we can say that the situation is not wholly predetermined. This allows space for free will. If you want to show 'choice' you run into the problem of proving the existence of a chooser.

I don't see a connection between randomness existing and space for free will. If free will is random it's not free. If free will is determined by predictable processes it's not free.

I don't really care about that, because my senses tell me that I exist and I am choosing.

And senses are known never to deceive.

That goes back to what I initially said... we've got the capacity to think about our own thoughts, and thereby change them. Most people don't, though.

Things like racism are as inate to us as cooperation, we've got the capacity and string tendency for both. But experience can and will change our attitudes. I'm willing to bet that your family wasn't the only contact you had growing up. And important as family is in development, non-family contacts can be just as strong an influence, if not stronger sometimes.
Do you think that if you had grown up in the rural Southern US in, say the 1920s, you would have changed your views on races so quickly?

People's minds are not static and set, they change all the time. But I've very, very rarely seen somebody change anything without impulse from the outside. So there is an argument to be made that our "I"s are the product of biology and external input.

Well you are right, I was as a child very gregarious, and had many freinds. But I well remeMber growing up, and I can say for sure that the changes to my belifes, and my attitudes over the years stem more from wanting to not be like the role models I had. It seemed that intrinsicly I knew they where not good people to want to be like. Of course as I got older I did indeed meet many people whos company I enjoyed better, but that initial state of rebelion has been there from a very young age.

And senses are known never to deceive.


Which is what Descartes addressed.

I don't see a connection between randomness existing and space for free will. If free will is random it's not free. If free will is determined by predictable processes it's not free.

And senses are known never to deceive.

If randomness exists, we can say that it is impossible for it to be entirely predetermined. In the range of behaviour that can not be predicted, there lies the possibility of actions that are not or can not be predetermined. if free will is going to manifest itself anywhere, that is where we will see it. For example, flight is determined by the mathematics of aerodynamics, etc. No amount of free will on my part is going to make me fly. So, if I am going to have any free will, it has to occur in a setting or contextthat is not deterministic. That is th econnection between randomness and free will.

I have no idea what you mean by, "If free will is random, it's not free".

Nor have I suggested in any way that free will is determined by predicatble processes.

Well you are right, I was as a child very gregarious, and had many freinds. But I well remeMber growing up, and I can say for sure that the changes to my belifes, and my attitudes over the years stem more from wanting to not be like the role models I had. It seemed that intrinsicly I knew they where not good people to want to be like. Of course as I got older I did indeed meet many people whos company I enjoyed better, but that initial state of rebelion has been there from a very young age.

I'm not contesting that, believe me. But as I said, human minds and human behaviour is malleable at all times, and all we are really born with are capacities and aptitudes. How those will turn out is determined by our experiences.

Imagine you had been born into an fanatically religious family... your rebellious tendencies might have turned you into an ardent atheist.

If randomness exists, we can say that it is impossible for it to be entirely predetermined. In the range of behaviour that can not be predicted, there lies the possibility of actions that are not or can not be predetermined. if free will is going to manifest itself anywhere, that is where we will see it. For example, flight is determined by the mathematics of aerodynamics, etc. No amount of free will on my part is going to make me fly. So, if I am going to have any free will, it has to occur in a setting or contextthat is not deterministic. That is th econnection between randomness and free will.

Because an outcome cannot be determined due to random factors, it does not follow that free will is in action. How do we prove it is free will and not randomness determining the result?

I have no idea what you mean by, "If free will is random, it's not free".

Nor have I suggested in any way that free will is determined by predicatble processes.

I didn't say that you did, that was my point I was making. I was alluding to what mechanism might be beneath the appearance of free will, and that whether deterministic or random that still doesn't make it 'free'.

Benjamin Libet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet), a pioneer in research into human consciousness, is best known for some particular experiment. He showed that whenever we think about a conscious decision, we just recommend that our brains unconsciously already formulated this a quarter second before. Our brain said "Now stretch your arm” before we are aware of the wish to extend our arm. Libet concluded that free will is a fiction. We think that we are the ones who decide, but we are just passive implementers of unconscious neuronal processes, which were already executed before the decision in our minds showed up. It is our brain that at an unconscious level decide and not us.

Which is what Descartes addressed.

Not to the degree of proving free will.

Benjamin Libet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet), a pioneer in research into human consciousness, is best known for some particular experiment. He showed that whenever we think about a conscious decision, we just recommend that our brains unconsciously already formulated this a quarter second before. Our brain said "Now stretch your arm” before we are aware of the wish to extend our arm. Libet concluded that free will is a fiction. We think that we are the ones who decide, but we are just passive implementers of unconscious neuronal processes, which were already executed before the decision in our minds showed up. It is our brain that at an unconscious level decide and not us.

That's interesting... however, it poses the question if this just means that an "I" is not conscious thought, but rather a brain. To put it more Freudian, is our Ego our Id?

I'm not contesting that, believe me. But as I said, human minds and human behaviour is malleable at all times, and all we are really born with are capacities and aptitudes. How those will turn out is determined by our experiences.

Imagine you had been born into an fanatically religious family... your rebellious tendencies might have turned you into an ardent atheist.

Yes I see that. However the issue with which you and I disagree is one of choice, despite all of the geneitics involved and an upbringing in a racist family, I choose to rebel agains that. In essance I choose to dislike racism.

Not to the degree of proving free will.

No but as you have yourself said, he made the conection, that if there are sense to decive then those sense belong to whom?

It is I that see's and hears and tastes, it is I that my sense may decive.

If I have a sense that I exist, than who is the I that senses such a thing?

Yes I see that. However the issue with which you and I disagree is one of choice, despite all of the geneitics involved and an upbringing in a racist family, I choose to rebel agains that. In essance I choose to dislike racism.

Ah, but did you?
If you look around you, you might find that a rather generous proportion of children and teenagers rebell against their parents, for no apparent reason whatsoever. If the parents are lefty hippies, chances are their kids will at one point turn to fanatic religion, or plain corporatism. If the parents are ultra-religious, the kids are likely to at one point turn "against god" (as my gran put it).
For some this is only a phase, for some it'll become their way of life. But it is a necessary part of human development, distancing oneself from parents and family.
Who can say if your brain didn't just follow its program?

Benjamin Libet (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet), a pioneer in research into human consciousness, is best known for some particular experiment. He showed that whenever we think about a conscious decision, we just recommend that our brains unconsciously already formulated this a quarter second before. Our brain said "Now stretch your arm” before we are aware of the wish to extend our arm. Libet concluded that free will is a fiction. We think that we are the ones who decide, but we are just passive implementers of unconscious neuronal processes, which were already executed before the decision in our minds showed up. It is our brain that at an unconscious level decide and not us.

Yes I have heard of this data before, and I must ask was this not only relevant to actions? What about thoughts, contemplations, or mediatations?

No but as you have yourself said, he made the conection, that if there are sense to decive then those sense belong to whom?

It is I that see's and hears and tastes, it is I that my sense may decive.

If I have a sense that I exist, than who is the I that senses such a thing?

I'm not disputing the "I" exists, but nothing follows on from that involving free will. And nothing follows from that about how accurate the "I" is when making sense of itself and the world.

That's interesting... however, it poses the question if this just means that an "I" is not conscious thought, but rather a brain. To put it more Freudian, is our Ego our Id?

Do you mean 'is our Ego our I?' Because I am a little confused.

From what I remember from school, and in short:

ID: drives and instincts
Ego: The consciousness part of our I.

Ah, but did you?
If you look around you, you might find that a rather generous proportion of children and teenagers rebell against their parents, for no apparent reason whatsoever. If the parents are lefty hippies, chances are their kids will at one point turn to fanatic religion, or plain corporatism. If the parents are ultra-religious, the kids are likely to at one point turn "against god" (as my gran put it).
For some this is only a phase, for some it'll become their way of life. But it is a necessary part of human development, distancing oneself from parents and family.
Who can say if your brain didn't just follow its program?

That could all be true, it could be, but does that not normaly occour during the teen years?

The point is one of choice, you belive that you can't choose what you like, or dislike?

I don't like brussel sprouts, and I can say for certian this IS because of my childhood, it turned me off of them. But you know I think that if I went home and cooked them better, perhaps smothered them in buter and pepper, with a little salt, that I can train my pallete into releshing that taste. What do you think?

Because an outcome cannot be determined due to random factors, it does not follow that free will is in action. How do we prove it is free will and not randomness determining the result?

I didn't say that you did, that was my point I was making. I was alluding to what mechanism might be beneath the appearance of free will, and that whether deterministic or random that still doesn't make it 'free'.

It may not be free will that is the determining factor. When we are looking at an electron and are unable to predict the velocity and location of the electron, we can be reasonably sure that it is not due to the free will of the electron.

But human behaviour is another thing entirely. Free will could easily be the reason why we do stuff. I think this is unprovable though, much as I feel predeterminism as the sole cause of human action is also unprovable. This is why I rely on my senses and my immediate impression of actually having free will unless I am presented with evidence that shows otherwise.

It is possible that there is some underlying mechanism that makes me think I have free will even when I do not, but i have no evidence for such a mechanaism.

I'm not disputing the "I" exists, but nothing follows on from that involving free will. And nothing follows from that about how accurate the "I" is when making sense of itself and the world.

Then think of it this way.

The human body evolved, as all things do, in a way that is best suited to the enviroment in which it finds itself.

What are the evolutionary pluses to an evolved being that percieves it's envoriment incorrectly? I would say none at all, so a conclusion can be reached that the human senses and the human brain working together are very adapt at perciving the enviroment as it actualy is, or making sense of the world.

Yes I have heard of this data before, and I must ask was this not only relevant to actions? What about thoughts, contemplations, or mediatations?

I don't know.

I know that the philosopher Daniel Dennett didn't like this idea. He called it the Cartesian theater (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_theater).

In short:

This is a place in your brain where a small man is sitting who collects information from your brain and then take decisions: the awareness.

Dennett doesn't believe it works that way.

BUT...

My own opinion is that there's no pure free will, because all what we do is determined by previous actions or circumstances. We often say 'If I knew then, what I know now, I would have act differently'

This can not be determined as free will anymore.

But human behaviour is another thing entirely. Free will could easily be the reason why we do stuff. I think this is unprovable though, much as I feel predeterminism as the sole cause of human action is also unprovable. This is why I rely on my senses and my immediate impression of actually having free will unless I am presented with evidence that shows otherwise.

It is possible that there is some underlying mechanism that makes me think I have free will even when I do not, but i have no evidence for such a mechanaism.

Do you know what's bizarre? I have the opposite viewpoint based on the same argument! :eek2:

It seems to me the balance of evidence shows everything, and therefore the mind, to be rooted in the physical and therefore subject to its physical nature (whether that be randomness or predictability). To me 'free will' seems an unnecessary addition - the fact I like to believe I have free will doesn't convince me there is any evidence for it.

Occam's razor cuts both ways, apparently.

My own opinion is that there's no pure free will, because all what we do is determined by previous actions or circumstances. We often say 'If I knew then, what I know now, I would have act differently'

This can not be determined as free will anymore.

You see I totaly reject this idea, it is unprovable, and faulty logic, it is an unreasonable supersition. Where as even if 'free will' turns out to be an illusion(not that I belive that) at least I can say I know I made a choice about which flavour ice cream to get.

This is certian knowldge vs deterministic supersition.

Do you know what's bizarre? I have the opposite viewpoint based on the same argument! :eek2:

It seems to me the balance of evidence shows everything, and therefore the mind, to be rooted in the physical and therefore subject to its physical nature (whether that be randomness or predictability). To me 'free will' seems an unnecessary addition - the fact I like to believe I have free will doesn't convince me there is any evidence for it.

Occam's razor cuts both ways, apparently.

You see and though I can admit that the self is held physicaly in the brain, and so can only work with the confines of that, I belive that your basing a lack of freedom of will on this is wrong.

Everything can only ever work within the limitations of it's design(for want of a better word) so that renders the word free meaningless if we were to take your stance on it.

For me the freedom comes with the ability to make a choice. There is no predetermined thing or things that force me into choosing A over B, although there are certianly some facets of the past that may well predispose me to choose A over B, I still get to make the final choice.

Do you know what's bizarre? I have the opposite viewpoint based on the same argument! :eek2:

It seems to me the balance of evidence shows everything, and therefore the mind, to be rooted in the physical and therefore subject to its physical nature (whether that be randomness or predictability). To me 'free will' seems an unnecessary addition - the fact I like to believe I have free will doesn't convince me there is any evidence for it.

Occam's razor cuts both ways, apparently.

You see and though I can admit that the self is held physicaly in the brain, and so can only work with the confines of that, I belive that your basing a lack of freedom of will on this is wrong.

Everything can only ever work within the limitations of it's design(for want of a better word) so that renders the word free meaningless if we were to take your stance on it.

For me the freedom comes with the ability to make a choice. There is no predetermined thing or things that force me into choosing A over B, although there are certianly some facets of the past that may well predispose me to choose A over B, I still get to make the final choice.

Gahh and now I'm off bye!

Then think of it this way.

The human body evolved, as all things do, in a way that is best suited to the enviroment in which it finds itself.

What are the evolutionary pluses to an evolved being that percieves it's envoriment incorrectly? I would say none at all, so a conclusion can be reached that the human senses and the human brain working together are very adapt at perciving the enviroment as it actualy is, or making sense of the world.


But it doesn't follow that we are evolved for accurate self-perception, in fact possibly the opposite, as up until very recently we had to expend all our efforts merely on survival with little opportunity for reflection. Questions about free will, what the self is and how it functions are fundamentally different to "where is the nearest food and how do I kill it?"

You see I totaly reject this idea, it is unprovable, and faulty logic, it is an unreasonable supersition. Where as even if 'free will' turns out to be an illusion(not that I belive that) at least I can say I know I made a choice about which flavour ice cream to get.

This is certian knowldge vs deterministic supersition.

Is it? It could be based on some algorithm. There are many flavours. You can delete the ones you don't like. Depending the circumstances you take a choice (not vanilla, I had it yesterday, but I will take strawberry because my brother is taking it as well.) The circumstances and previous actions could determine your pick.

Gahh and now I'm off bye!

Your choice!

Or not :p

Do you know what's bizarre? I have the opposite viewpoint based on the same argument! :eek2:

It seems to me the balance of evidence shows everything, and therefore the mind, to be rooted in the physical and therefore subject to its physical nature (whether that be randomness or predictability). To me 'free will' seems an unnecessary addition - the fact I like to believe I have free will doesn't convince me there is any evidence for it.

Occam's razor cuts both ways, apparently.

I think that has more to do with our weird way of assuming that true means scientifically true, i.e. has physical evidence to indicate its truth. But , of course, there is truth that can not be directly supported with physical evidence. My love for pizza, for instance. My opinion that Ella Fitzgerald is a better singer than Billie Holliday. The joy of dancing, the existence of the patriarchy, etc. I could go on, but you get the picture.

If we were to assume that only those things that have physical evidence for them exist, we would have to assume that things like emotions or ideals do not exist or are illusory.

By the way, Occam's razor does not describe reality. Reality is more complicated than we would like it to be.

First you need to define free will. Trust me, it's harder than you think.

First you need to define free will. Trust me, it's harder than you think.

Free will: the ability to make and enact decisions consciously.

You see I totaly reject this idea, it is unprovable, and faulty logic, it is an unreasonable supersition. Where as even if 'free will' turns out to be an illusion(not that I belive that) at least I can say I know I made a choice about which flavour ice cream to get.

This is certian knowldge vs deterministic supersition.

Peepelonia,

Are you aware that attractiveness in other people, and I mean pure the exterior, is determined by mathematics?

You could produce a wireframe of the ideal face. If you draw it on a transparent paper and hoover it over the pictures of real attractive people, you will notice that they match closely the wireframe of the ideal face.

John Cleese showed this in a documentary by using Elizabeth Hurley her face.

Free will: the ability to make and enact decisions consciously.

Here's where the pedantry comes in, define consciously.

Here's where the pedantry comes in, define consciously.

Now that I think about it, does free will need to be conscious?

I think that has more to do with our weird way of assuming that true means scientifically true, i.e. has physical evidence to indicate its truth. But , of course, there is truth that can not be directly supported with physical evidence. My love for pizza, for instance. My opinion that Ella Fitzgerald is a better singer than Billie Holliday. The joy of dancing, the existence of the patriarchy, etc. I could go on, but you get the picture.

Indubitably. However, I am of the opinion that physical brain functions sit inside the realms of scientific truth, so my position stems from that.

If we were to assume that only those things that have physical evidence for them exist, we would have to assume that things like emotions or ideals do not exist or are illusory.

Ontology now? That question deserves a whole other thread.

By the way, Occam's razor does not describe reality. Reality is more complicated than we would like it to be.

Or maybe it's simpler than we would like it to be.

Now that I think about it, does free will need to be conscious?

Or, conversely, can a choice be made unconsciously?

Indubitably. However, I am of the opinion that physical brain functions sit inside the realms of scientific truth, so my position stems from that.

I think part of it does, and some of it may not. However, just because something can be looked at scientifically does not mean that it then is entirely predetermined.

Ontology now? That question deserves a whole other thread.

What's ontology?

Or maybe it's simpler than we would like it to be.

You should meet my ex. Proof positive that things are often more complicated than we would wish. On a serious note, though, if the universe was that simple, light would be a ray or a particle.

Or, conversely, can a choice be made unconsciously?

I think so. Many athletes train their body to react to stimuli faster than thought in order to satisfy some weird goal like putting a spherical object through a hoop. They are choosing to do this action so that their goals may be met, and they are not doing it entirely consciously.

I think part of it does, and some of it may not. However, just because something can be looked at scientifically does not mean that it then is entirely predetermined.

What parts may not?

What's ontology?

The study of the nature of existence and the classification of different categories of being http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology

Not a slim subject.

You should meet my ex. Proof positive that things are often more complicated than we would wish. On a serious note, though, if the universe was that simple, light would be a ray or a particle.
Been there!

It's both; that's simple. We complicate things by somehow thinking this is mysterious.

I was thinking more of the simple nature of a merely physical universe contrasted with a more complicated one layered with metaphysical objects to explain everything we find counter-intuitive.

What parts may not?

Oops. Misread. I meant the self. The physical parts of the brain, as you say, are in the realm of the scientifically knowable.

The study of the nature of existence and the classification of different categories of being http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology

Not a slim subject.

EDIT: Thanks.

Been there!

It's both; that's simple. We complicate things by somehow thinking this is mysterious.

I was thinking more of the simple nature of a merely physical universe contrasted with a more complicated one layered with metaphysical objects to explain everything we find counter-intuitive.

There is no reason to believe that the universe or reality tends towards simplicity. Even if it did, that does not exclude the metaphysical. The idea that the universe, or our self, is some sort of machine that can be totally understood and quantified only makes sense when we completely ignore huge slabs of human experience. It takes faith to believe that the human appreciation for Michelangelo's David is somehow completely explainable by neurobiology.

That could all be true, it could be, but does that not normaly occour during the teen years?

The point is one of choice, you belive that you can't choose what you like, or dislike?

I don't like brussel sprouts, and I can say for certian this IS because of my childhood, it turned me off of them. But you know I think that if I went home and cooked them better, perhaps smothered them in buter and pepper, with a little salt, that I can train my pallete into releshing that taste. What do you think?

Taste in food is not entirely determined by free will but more by training, in particular in your childhood.

If your parents ‘trained’ you to eat brussel sprouts, then after a while you could be used to the taste and would eventually like them.

But many parents serve something different when their child is not liking some meal. And there starts the problem. The child can’t get used to the taste and will create a kind of reverse Pavlov effect. The child will condition him or herself that sprouts are not yummy and will continue refuse to eat them. The more the parents are giving an alternative meal, the better the paths in your brain will be designed to refuse a particular meal. After a while it’s almost hopeless to change the taste of the little one.

Same goes for beer. Most children do not like beer. It’s too bitter. But when they are teenagers often the environment is pushing them to drink it. Most will do, to conform to the social situation. In the beginning they will still not like it, but the social pressure of the group is often high enough to get them trained. After a while they learn the ‘new’ taste, accept it and eventual start to like it.

Most of us will not eat insects, we consider it as disgusting and dirty. But many people in the jungle consider it as a delicates. They learned the taste from early young age and do not have our western condemnation regarding eating insects. Those jungle people do not feel any disgust when they put a worm in their mouth and will enjoy their wormy meal. If you was raised in the jungle, you would probably like them as well.

So, is this all free will? No. The previous circumstances and actions created the situation that one is liking or disliking particular food.

Or, conversely, can a choice be made unconsciously?

Sure. To name one: falling in love for someone. You don't actual think 'Mmm, I want to be in loved with him or her, so I'll do what's needed to enter that stage'

Or riding a bike. There's no need to make conscious choices to ride one.

I think part of it does, and some of it may not. However, just because something can be looked at scientifically does not mean that it then is entirely predetermined.



What's ontology?



You should meet my ex. Proof positive that things are often more complicated than we would wish. On a serious note, though, if the universe was that simple, light would be a ray or a particle.



I think so. Many athletes train their body to react to stimuli faster than thought in order to satisfy some weird goal like putting a spherical object through a hoop. They are choosing to do this action so that their goals may be met, and they are not doing it entirely consciously.

Ontology is a branch of philosophy.

Check this one:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology

There is no reason to believe that the universe or reality tends towards simplicity. Even if it did, that does not exclude the metaphysical. The idea that the universe, or our self, is some sort of machine that can be totally understood and quantified only makes sense when we completely ignore huge slabs of human experience. It takes faith to believe that the human appreciation for Michelangelo's David is somehow completely explainable by neurobiology.

There is no reason to believe either way, I suppose we have chosen our views based on whatever inherent biases we have.

Every assertion we make depends to a degree on faith in something, whether it be a scientific paradigm or mystical anima. It's something that is inherent in all claims we make, so the same criticism applies to any metaphysical claim.

The trouble with metaphysical claims is that they appear essentially unprovable by any means - at least with something tangible we have a hope of getting to grips with it.

The only 'free will' so to speak, is the unique structure and working of your brain. However, such is indistinguishable from free will, so we call it that.

Do you mean 'is our Ego our I?' Because I am a little confused.

From what I remember from school, and in short:

ID: drives and instincts
Ego: The consciousness part of our I.

No, I meant Id. The way I understood it, the Id is our subconscience, what we do and think and feel without being aware of it. Part of that is certainly instinct, but part of it is more individual than that.

That could all be true, it could be, but does that not normaly occour during the teen years?

The point is one of choice, you belive that you can't choose what you like, or dislike?

I don't like brussel sprouts, and I can say for certian this IS because of my childhood, it turned me off of them. But you know I think that if I went home and cooked them better, perhaps smothered them in buter and pepper, with a little salt, that I can train my pallete into releshing that taste. What do you think?

Possibly, I think you'd have to give it a try ;)
To stay with the food and drink examples, I know for a fact that I never chose to dislike coffee the way I do. My whole family loves it, and in Germany there really isn't the choice between tea or coffee... it's always coffee.
Yet the taste of it make me retch, and it made me throw up a few times when I tried to train myself to like it...

I think your likes and dislikes stem from your predisposition and your experiences. If you went and made nice Bruxelles sprouts, wouldn't that amount to a positive experience leading to you liking sprouts? It would simply be an update to an earlier experience that made you dislike them...

But it doesn't follow that we are evolved for accurate self-perception, in fact possibly the opposite, as up until very recently we had to expend all our efforts merely on survival with little opportunity for reflection. Questions about free will, what the self is and how it functions are fundamentally different to "where is the nearest food and how do I kill it?"

Heh I recon that the physchiarty profession would disagree with you, and all of theose cognative specialist out there also.

I think also that you'll be able to provide yourself with some evidance that will disprove what you say here.

You seem to me to be a thoughtfull, intelegent, and articulate persons, you can't tell me that you have never once given any time to self analys and decide to brink about a change in attitudes, or behaviour that you have found wanting in your self can you?

And when you did this thing, how can you be sure of your findings?

Is it? It could be based on some algorithm. There are many flavours. You can delete the ones you don't like. Depending the circumstances you take a choice (not vanilla, I had it yesterday, but I will take strawberry because my brother is taking it as well.) The circumstances and previous actions could determine your pick.

Yes they could, or they could merely inform my pick.

Your choice!

Or not :p

Heh yes most assuredly yes. You see it was work finished time, and although I could have happyily stayed to chat a while longer, I wanted to get home, so I made that choice to go rather than stay.

Peepelonia,

Are you aware that attractiveness in other people, and I mean pure the exterior, is determined by mathematics?

You could produce a wireframe of the ideal face. If you draw it on a transparent paper and hoover it over the pictures of real attractive people, you will notice that they match closely the wireframe of the ideal face.

John Cleese showed this in a documentary by using Elizabeth Hurley her face.

Yes I know about this, the golden mean I believe has much to do with it. Yet I also know that for some people a symetrica face is considered beuatiful and for some an asymeterical face is.

Now that I think about it, does free will need to be conscious?

Yeah of course, because of that little word 'will'.

Or, conversely, can a choice be made unconsciously?

Yeah I believe that is the default setting for us, we react emotionaly more I belive than we act rationaly, would you say so?

Here's where the pedantry comes in, define consciously.

Concious is the state of sentiance, being aware that you are you and are differant from others and being aware that others exist who are diffeant from you. Counciously then is pertaining to thoughts and actions deriving from your own sense of self, rather than say a reflex actions, or instinctual actions.

It is unconcious that when in a potentialy dangerous situation that the body is flooded with fight or flight chemicals, it is a concious desiction to put up the fists or turn and run when this happens.

Taste in food is not entirely determined by free will but more by training, in particular in your childhood.

If your parents ‘trained’ you to eat brussel sprouts, then after a while you could be used to the taste and would eventually like them.

But many parents serve something different when their child is not liking some meal. And there starts the problem. The child can’t get used to the taste and will create a kind of reverse Pavlov effect. The child will condition him or herself that sprouts are not yummy and will continue refuse to eat them. The more the parents are giving an alternative meal, the better the paths in your brain will be designed to refuse a particular meal. After a while it’s almost hopeless to change the taste of the little one.

Same goes for beer. Most children do not like beer. It’s too bitter. But when they are teenagers often the environment is pushing them to drink it. Most will do, to conform to the social situation. In the beginning they will still not like it, but the social pressure of the group is often high enough to get them trained. After a while they learn the ‘new’ taste, accept it and eventual start to like it.

Most of us will not eat insects, we consider it as disgusting and dirty. But many people in the jungle consider it as a delicates. They learned the taste from early young age and do not have our western condemnation regarding eating insects. Those jungle people do not feel any disgust when they put a worm in their mouth and will enjoy their wormy meal. If you was raised in the jungle, you would probably like them as well.

So, is this all free will? No. The previous circumstances and actions created the situation that one is liking or disliking particular food.

Yes I agree, the free will bit comes when you make that choice to train your pallet to something that you do not like.

There is no reason to believe either way, I suppose we have chosen our views based on whatever inherent biases we have.

Every assertion we make depends to a degree on faith in something, whether it be a scientific paradigm or mystical anima. It's something that is inherent in all claims we make, so the same criticism applies to any metaphysical claim.

The trouble with metaphysical claims is that they appear essentially unprovable by any means - at least with something tangible we have a hope of getting to grips with it.

Not quite. Different things can have different evidence for them, despite not having any scientific evidence. For example, no one doubts that the patriarchy exists even though no one has ever touched or smelt or seen a physical object that is patriarchy. So we can safely say that there are ways of showing the existence of metaphysical things.

Heh I recon that the physchiarty profession would disagree with you, and all of theose cognative specialist out there also.

I think also that you'll be able to provide yourself with some evidance that will disprove what you say here.

They don't specialize in questions like "do we have free will" generally speaking, they specialize in treating illness. Neuroscientists are perhaps closer to that sort of question, but they aren't close to the answer.

You seem to me to be a thoughtfull, intelegent, and articulate persons,
You forgot charming and debonair, now I'm offended :p

you can't tell me that you have never once given any time to self analys and decide to brink about a change in attitudes, or behaviour that you have found wanting in your self can you?

And when you did this thing, how can you be sure of your findings?

It is precisely that self analysis that has led me to this conclusion. What is bringing about this change in myself? It's something within me, yes, but that doesn't mean it does it freely. The fact that a system changes in no way proves it changed "freely", it could have been a natural evolution that would have to happen. The fact we then say "I chose to do that" is after the fact.

Not quite. Different things can have different evidence for them, despite not having any scientific evidence. For example, no one doubts that the patriarchy exists even though no one has ever touched or smelt or seen a physical object that is patriarchy. So we can safely say that there are ways of showing the existence of metaphysical things.

The existence of a concept bears no relation to the existence of the object that concept refers to.

I can doubt patriarchy exists until you present some sort of evidence for its existence in the world (by looking at who holds powerful positions etc), until then it is just an idea. I could say matriarchy, filiarchy or equinarchy are all valid things in language, but that does not mean they have ever or will ever exist outside of language.

Talking about metaphysics does not prove metaphysics is valid. Language can lie. Ideas can be fiction.

They don't specialize in questions like "do we have free will" generally speaking, they specialize in treating illness. Neuroscientists are perhaps closer to that sort of question, but they aren't close to the answer.

Umm you do realise that this was in response your asertion that we are not evolved for accurate self reflection, I thing cognative therapists would disagree with you.



It is precisely that self analysis that has led me to this conclusion. What is bringing about this change in myself? It's something within me, yes, but that doesn't mean it does it freely. The fact that a system changes in no way proves it changed "freely", it could have been a natural evolution that would have to happen. The fact we then say "I chose to do that" is after the fact.

Hah but by your own admision you could be wrong, I mean you did say that we are probably not setup for acurate self reflection, so how I wonder did such self reflection lead you to these conclusions?

The existence of a concept bears no relation to the existence of the object that concept refers to.

I can doubt patriarchy exists until you present some sort of evidence for its existence in the world (by looking at who holds powerful positions etc), until then it is just an idea. I could say matriarchy, filiarchy or equinarchy are all valid things in language, but that does not mean they have ever or will ever exist outside of language.

Talking about metaphysics does not prove metaphysics is valid. Language can lie. Ideas can be fiction.

Yes. It is possible to doubt the existence of the patriarchy, but it would be unreasonable to do so. Just because there are things that are obviously fictional and can be expressed in language (e.g. Yoda), does not mean that all non-physical things that can be expressed in language are fictional.

Things like the patriarchy or aesthetics or irrational numbers definitely exist on some level even if it is not the physical, and we know this because they affect our lives.

To tie this back to free will, it is entirely possible that our will is partly metaphysical and thus partly free from the laws that regulate physical phenomena.

But even in a totally physical world, it would be possible to have free will. Evolution is an example of a totally physical phenomena that produces unpredictable results. Therefore it must be possible for other natural, i.e. physical, processes to produce results that cannot be predetermined. It is entirely possible that our brains are of sufficient complexity to engage in such processes.

Umm you do realise that this was in response your asertion that we are not evolved for accurate self reflection, I thing cognative therapists would disagree with you.

Why would they disagree?

Hah but by your own admision you could be wrong, I mean you did say that we are probably not setup for acurate self reflection, so how I wonder did such self reflection lead you to these conclusions?

My viewpoint isn't based solely on self-reflection. I modified the conclusions of my self-perception heavily by taking into account the consequences of having a physical mind subject to physical laws.

Yes. It is possible to doubt the existence of the patriarchy, but it would be unreasonable to do so. Just because there are things that are obviously fictional and can be expressed in language (e.g. Yoda), does not mean that all non-physical things that can be expressed in language are fictional.

Things like the patriarchy or aesthetics or irrational numbers definitely exist on some level even if it is not the physical, and we know this because they affect our lives.

How can you tell the difference between the "obviously fictional" and "true" non-physical things?

I disagree, I don't think abstractions affect our lives. They are useful descriptions or explanations of complex phenomena (Do doo be-do-do) which affect our lives.

To tie this back to free will, it is entirely possible that our will is partly metaphysical and thus partly free from the laws that regulate physical phenomena.

It is possible, but it seems like a convenient invention which allows us to justify our intuitive belief, which the available evidence contradicts.

But even in a totally physical world, it would be possible to have free will. Evolution is an example of a totally physical phenomena that produces unpredictable results. Therefore it must be possible for other natural, i.e. physical, processes to produce results that cannot be predetermined. It is entirely possible that our brains are of sufficient complexity to engage in such processes.

1. Can you prove it is necessarily impossible to predict evolution?

2. Even if it is unpredictable, does that make it an example of free will in action? Because if it does not, then why should the unpredictability of the brain be evidence of free will and not just a complex natural phenomenon? (Doo do-do do)

If something is too complex for us to understand, how do you logically infer anything out of that apart from "we can't yet understand it"? Why must we invoke metaphysics or free will to explain it?

How can you tell the difference between the "obviously fictional" and "true" non-physical things?

Like I said, by how they affect us, for one. Yoda affects me as much as you would expect a fictional though very wise character from our modern mythology to affect me, i.e. people quote him as a role model in a semi-ironic way, and that's about it. Aesthetics, which also has no physical properties but obviously exists, informs things like who gets arts funding from the government, what current trends in architecture (and therefore my urban environment) are going to realise, and the design of the very keyboard you are typing at.

There are other differences. Someone who has actually studied ontology would be better for answering this.

I disagree, I don't think abstractions affect our lives. They are useful descriptions or explanations of complex phenomena (Do doo be-do-do) which affect our lives.

Racism is an abstraction in that it has no physical properties, as is sexism. Are you going to tell black people and women that these things do not affect their lives? The word itself does not, but the complex phenomena we call racism (which, again, have no physical properties) obvioulsy does affect people's lives.

It is possible, but it seems like a convenient invention which allows us to justify our intuitive belief, which the available evidence contradicts.

What evidence is this? I had no idea that you had evidence showing that the will cannot be partly metaphysical.

1. Can you prove it is necessarily impossible to predict evolution?

No, just as you cannot prove that it is possible to predict evolution. But our current understanding of mutation and natural selection definitely implies that such new genetic information is randomly created, and has yet to be proven wrong through experimentation. Of course, if you have any evidence to suggest that this is wrong, i would like to see it.

2. Even if it is unpredictable, does that make it an example of free will in action? Because if it does not, then why should the unpredictability of the brain be evidence of free will and not just a complex natural phenomenon? (Doo do-do do)

I was suggesting that free will, if it is purely physical, is a complex natural phenomenon.

If something is too complex for us to understand, how do you logically infer anything out of that apart from "we can't yet understand it"? Why must we invoke metaphysics or free will to explain it?

We don't have to. It's just that often it is the most sensible approach.

Like I said, by how they affect us, for one. Yoda affects me as much as you would expect a fictional though very wise character from our modern mythology to affect me, i.e. people quote him as a role model in a semi-ironic way, and that's about it. Aesthetics, which also has no physical properties but obviously exists, informs things like who gets arts funding from the government, what current trends in architecture (and therefore my urban environment) are going to realise, and the design of the very keyboard you are typing at.

There are other differences. Someone who has actually studied ontology would be better for answering this.

I wish one would turn up! I'm not an expert either.
Can you define the metaphysical component of free will? Then we can look at what evidence there is for it, and whether it is the same sort of evidence for aesthetics existing, for example.

Racism is an abstraction in that it has no physical properties, as is sexism. Are you going to tell black people and women that these things do not affect their lives? The word itself does not, but the complex phenomena we call racism (which, again, have no physical properties) obvioulsy does affect people's lives.
The individual acts of discrimination affect people. If there were no actions that fit into the category of racism, then racism would be a fantasy, a mere idea.

What evidence is this? I had no idea that you had evidence showing that the will cannot be partly metaphysical.
It's the proving of the positive i.e. the will being partly metaphysical that I can find no evidence for. What evidence is there for that? Why is a metaphysical component of free will any more likely to be real than an invisible pink unicorn?

Our current understanding of the mind is that it is the brain and is physical, do you have evidence to prove this is wrong? (this is the stance you took on evolution being unpredictable so I am applying your rigour to this argument)

No, just as you cannot prove that it is possible to predict evolution. But our current understanding of mutation and natural selection definitely implies that such new genetic information is randomly created, and has yet to be proven wrong through experimentation. Of course, if you have any evidence to suggest that this is wrong, i would like to see it.

I was suggesting that free will, if it is purely physical, is a complex natural phenomenon.


But why should complexity and randomness have anything to do with there being free will? I'm still not convinced that because something is so complex we won't be able to predict it, has any bearing on that system not always evolving in a set way depending on its initial state and inputs given. How does our ignorance help?

I wish one would turn up! I'm not an expert either.
Can you define the metaphysical component of free will? Then we can look at what evidence there is for it, and whether it is the same sort of evidence for aesthetics existing, for example.

The evidence for a non-physical component to will, in my mind, would be the simple fact that two identical twins do not want the same things at the same time, or even choose similar careers, or have similar personalities. If the brain is a product of genes and the self is a product of the brain, then two people with the same genetic make-up should have the same brain and therefore the same self.

The individual acts of discrimination affect people. If there were no actions that fit into the category of racism, then racism would be a fantasy, a mere idea.

The same action could be either racist or not. A killing, for example, could be based on racism, or it could have some other motive. So, when you say 'acts of discrimination', you are giving an intent or motive to the action. So, when we ask which actions fit into the category of racism, we are not looking at the physical aspect of the act, but at a non-physical aspect of it, i.e. intent.

Again, a purely physical universe is not enough to adequately describe what we experience.

It's the proving of the positive i.e. the will being partly metaphysical that I can find no evidence for. What evidence is there for that? Why is a metaphysical component of free will any more likely to be real than an invisible pink unicorn?

But I was asking if you had any evidence that suggested that there could be no metaphysical aspect to the self. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

Our current understanding of the mind is that it is the brain and is physical, do you have evidence to prove this is wrong? (this is the stance you took on evolution being unpredictable so I am applying your rigour to this argument)

You seem to be misunderstanding me. I am not arguing that the brain, and therefore consciousness or the 'self', is not physical. It must be, at least partially. If not, people wouldn't get mental difficulties from brain damage.

But why should complexity and randomness have anything to do with there being free will? I'm still not convinced that because something is so complex we won't be able to predict it, has any bearing on that system not always evolving in a set way depending on its initial state and inputs given. How does our ignorance help?

Our ignorance has nothing to do with it. The fact of our ignorance is merely the common theme between two different situations. There is a difference between 'what we are too ignorant to predict' and 'what we will never be able to predict because it is inherently unpredictable'. In a completely determined universe, we could only have the former. In a universe where true novelty exists, it would be possible to have some of the latter. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle strongly implies that there are inherently unpredictable things in our universe. Therefore, we cannot be in a completely determined universe.

The tie-in to free will is that if true novelty exists, then it is possible to have free will. This is not evidence for free will, as much as it is evidence that our universe could possibly have free will.

Sorry for the hiatus, didn't have PC access for a bit.

The evidence for a non-physical component to will, in my mind, would be the simple fact that two identical twins do not want the same things at the same time, or even choose similar careers, or have similar personalities. If the brain is a product of genes and the self is a product of the brain, then two people with the same genetic make-up should have the same brain and therefore the same self.
If only genes determined the brain then I might agree. But the inputs into the brain shape it, so the different experiences the twins have create the differences between them, we don't need a metaphysical component.

There are also physical differences between identical twins such as susceptibility to diseases, based on genetic divergence. So they aren't completely identical.
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=197287&sectioncode=26 (a news article but it links to the study at the end)

The same action could be either racist or not. A killing, for example, could be based on racism, or it could have some other motive. So, when you say 'acts of discrimination', you are giving an intent or motive to the action. So, when we ask which actions fit into the category of racism, we are not looking at the physical aspect of the act, but at a non-physical aspect of it, i.e. intent.

Again, a purely physical universe is not enough to adequately describe what we experience.
But we infer 'intent' using the physical act, and physical evidence. There is a link to empirical world (but still down to guesswork as we can't get inside people's heads). This is a convenience of language, not evidence for metaphysical objects.



But I was asking if you had any evidence that suggested that there could be no metaphysical aspect to the self. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence

Asking me to prove a negative? And if I ask for some evidence for your view, you admit you have none? There's no evidence for an awful lot of stuff, so why is your view more likely than invisible noodley appendages dictating our choices?

Our ignorance has nothing to do with it. The fact of our ignorance is merely the common theme between two different situations. There is a difference between 'what we are too ignorant to predict' and 'what we will never be able to predict because it is inherently unpredictable'. In a completely determined universe, we could only have the former. In a universe where true novelty exists, it would be possible to have some of the latter. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle strongly implies that there are inherently unpredictable things in our universe. Therefore, we cannot be in a completely determined universe.

The tie-in to free will is that if true novelty exists, then it is possible to have free will. This is not evidence for free will, as much as it is evidence that our universe could possibly have free will.

2 points;
Does the uncertainty principle sufficiently affect brain chemistry for it to in principle thwart predictions? (i.e. is it on a small enough scale to be subject to it, or is sufficiently large-scale for quantum behaviour to be irrelevant). Just because novelty might exist, does not mean the brain is novel system.

Secondly I still struggle to see why unpredictability based on uncertainty allows for free will. We could program a robot to choose choice 1 based on quantum phenomenon A occurring, where A is something inherently unpredictable, choice 2 for phenomenon B etc. That in no way makes the robot free, just unpredictable.

Why would they disagree?

Remembering that this is in reply to our asertion that we are not evolved for correct self anylasis, then it is obviouse that the job of a cognative therepist involes just that.

They provide their patients with ways to understand exacly what is going on in the head.



My viewpoint isn't based solely on self-reflection. I modified the conclusions of my self-perception heavily by taking into account the consequences of having a physical mind subject to physical laws.

And all of this contemplation took place where?

Remembering that this is in reply to our asertion that we are not evolved for correct self anylasis, then it is obviouse that the job of a cognative therepist involes just that.

They provide their patients with ways to understand exacly what is going on in the head.


I wasn't aware they were experts on how the brain works, they just have a system to treat illness. I'm not an expert on CBT, but it doesn't need to explain what goes on the mind, only that 'input y' results in 'output x', and base therapy on that.

If they are such experts, why have they not answered the questions of free will and defined consciousness to everyone's satisfaction?

And all of this contemplation took place where?

Are you saying EVERYTHING is an act of self-reflection, because it goes on in our minds? In that case you're back to Descartes and all you can prove is that there is something that exists and all the world could be a dream.

I wasn't aware they were experts on how the brain works, they just have a system to treat illness. I'm not an expert on CBT, but it doesn't need to explain what goes on the mind, only that 'input y' results in 'output x', and base therapy on that.

Ohh I wouldn't have said that, but they are adept and helping people understand why they feel this way or that and helping people with coping mechanisms. I would say that in effect they help to facilitate good mental health by giving their patients the tools by which to examine their Selves and make their life better. Now if that isn't self anyasis then what is it? Also that it works shows that indeed we have evolved for correct self anyais.

But you know, I know you know that. So now I'm trying to understand your reasons for trying to derail my point there?


If they are such experts, why have they not answered the questions of free will and defined consciousness to everyone's satisfaction?

That really is irrelevant, as you know that my point was merely to show you that your asertion was incorret.



Are you saying EVERYTHING is an act of self-reflection, because it goes on in our minds? In that case you're back to Descartes and all you can prove is that there is something that exists and all the world could be a dream.


No not at all, but your initial claim was that we are not evolved for accurate self anyalsis. Yet you then go on to claim that your stance come from such self anyalsis, coupled with logical reasoning on the workings of the brain. Again, all in all these last few posts of mine are all to do with disputing your inital claim, we can of course move on whenever you are ready.

Ohh I wouldn't have said that, but they are adept and helping people understand why they feel this way or that and helping people with coping mechanisms. I would say that in effect they help to facilitate good mental health by giving their patients the tools by which to examine their Selves and make their life better. Now if that isn't self anyasis then what is it? Also that it works shows that indeed we have evolved for correct self anyais.

But you know, I know you know that. So now I'm trying to understand your reasons for trying to derail my point there?

That really is irrelevant, as you know that my point was merely to show you that your asertion was incorret.

The question is relevant because if we are evolved to self-perceive accurately, then why can we not answer those questions?

Also, the fact that something works has no bearing on whether we know the reasons it works. In the same way that performing an exorcism that seems to cure someone mentally ill is not proof of demons.

No not at all, but your initial claim was that we are not evolved for accurate self anyalsis. Yet you then go on to claim that your stance come from such self anyalsis, coupled with logical reasoning on the workings of the brain. Again, all in all these last few posts of mine are all to do with disputing your inital claim, we can of course move on whenever you are ready.

I'm talking about the difference between pure self analysis (like Descartes) and then putting that in the context of physical evidence about the nature of the brain.
This was replying to your original assertion that "you can't tell me that you have never once given any time to self analys and decide to brink about a change in attitudes, or behaviour that you have found wanting in your self can you?" which is PURE self analysis with nothing to back it up.

No. Free will is an illusion. We are determined by many variables, and any choice we encounter is a product of those variables. Even a self-conscious rejection of that choice is in fact a determined outcome.

No. Free will is an illusion. We are determined by many variables, and any choice we encounter is a product of those variables. Even a self-conscious rejection of that choice is in fact a determined outcome.

Thanks, I was feeling a bit lonely!

Thanks, I was feeling a bit lonely!

In my experience it's something many people find difficulty accepting. Although, in my mind, it's practically self-evident, it appears to make others uncomfortable to think that while they have macroscopic control of their lives, they are nonetheless determined by a bio-enviromental determinist reality. People "feel" like they are in control, and to many, that is equated to actually being in control. To me, this subjective experience can be discarded because we are discussing an inherently subjective philosophical topic. Objectively, we are shaped by our experiences and by our biology. That's quite simply the objective fact.

In my experience it's something many people find difficulty accepting. Although, in my mind, it's practically self-evident, it appears to make others uncomfortable to think that while they have macroscopic control of their lives, they are nonetheless determined by a bio-enviromental determinist reality. People "feel" like they are in control, and to many, that is equated to actually being in control. To me, this subjective experience can be discarded because we are discussing an inherently subjective philosophical topic. Objectively, we are shaped by our experiences and by our biology. That's quite simply the objective fact.

The problem is though, determinism is really an unreasonable offering. Unless you can point to each and every variable, then it is just a best guess.

The other problem comes when defining what we mean be 'free will'. I have always defined it as the ability to make a choice.

Now unless you can show me why I would choose to eat the bacon sandwhich rather than the peanut butter sandwhich when I clealy like them both. Then you have no evidance of what parts of my past have 'forced' me to make the one choice that I could not aviod making, and so you are only guessing.

I have no qualms realising that we are the sum parts of our geneitic material and our experiances, yet I think it false to then assume that we are incapable of making choices.

Our genetics and our experiance I can say helps colour our choice but force it? No, unless you can show me?

The problem is though, determinism is really an unreasonable offering. Unless you can point to each and every variable, then it is just a best guess.

The other problem comes when defining what we mean be 'free will'. I have always defined it as the ability to make a choice.

Now unless you can show me why I would choose to eat the bacon sandwhich rather than the peanut butter sandwhich when I clealy like them both. Then you have no evidance of what parts of my past have 'forced' me to make the one choice that I could not aviod making, and so you are only guessing.

I have no qualms realising that we are the sum parts of our geneitic material and our experiances, yet I think it false to then assume that we are incapable of making choices.

Our genetics and our experiance I can say helps colour our choice but force it? No, unless you can show me?

This is an irrelevant argument. Just because we cannot know the specifics of our causal determination doesn't mean we are not determined. As for the illusion of choice between peanut butter and bacon? You've been determined to like both, the choice isn't actually a choice in the sense that you are not straying from your determined likes.

This is an irrelevant argument. Just because we cannot know the specifics of our causal determination doesn't mean we are not determined.

Hardly, if we cannot point to these things then how can we be claim they exist? That is not reasonable, that is faith.

As for the illusion of choice between peanut butter and bacon? You've been determined to like both, the choice isn't actually a choice in the sense that you are not straying from your determined likes.

Yes I agree, but then I am not claiming that is what free will is. All things can only ever work within their parameters, but making a choice between two things (in this case sandwhiches) is still making a choice. Choice = freewill.

Think also that if I decided, I could make myself two sandwhiches. One that I liked and one that I disliked, I could even choose to eat the one I do not like.

That is because I have this free will. The ability to do those things you do not want to, is an example of my ability to choose.

No, that is an illusion of choice. You choose to make a sandwich that you dislike, in order to prove to yourself that you have a choice? You've been determined to do that. All choices are illusions.

The ability to chose does not equate to free will when the choice is predetermined.

No, that is an illusion of choice. You choose to make a sandwich that you dislike, in order to prove to yourself that you have a choice? You've been determined to do that. All choices are illusions.

The ability to chose does not equate to free will when the choice is predetermined.

Ahhh and there we are. Prove to me that my choice is predetermined. Or that I could make none other.

Do you say then when the choice has not been predetermined, that the ability to make a choice does equate to free will?

The problem is though, determinism is really an unreasonable offering. Unless you can point to each and every variable, then it is just a best guess.
Determinism is considered unreasonable by many people, that is true. This does not necessarily make it unreasonable. Determinism is a logically valid conclusion if you accept the existence of causality.*
This will not necessarily invalidate free will, there is one definition that is compatible with determinism. It is not a definition that most people find palatable, however. (It states that free will only requires voluntary action, and not the ability to do otherwise. In other words, free will is linked to desire, not choice.)

*For those interested, the argument is roughly as follows. All events are causally determined, that is, they follow inevitably from their cause. If they follow inevitably from their cause, then they are unavoidable. One's actions are events, and as such one's actions are unavoidable. Thus, determinism.**

**There may or may not be ways around this. I've been working on this problem for some time out of sheer boredom. I can find a way to deny the first premise without denying causality, but even then it still may lead to a denial of free will. It did require a slight redefinition of causality, but one that is, as far as I know, compatible with our knowledge of the universe. It, however, begins to run afoul of indeterminism. I have yet to devise a working method of avoiding that pitfall.

Determinism is considered unreasonable by many people, that is true. This does not necessarily make it unreasonable. Determinism is a logically valid conclusion if you accept the existence of causality.*
This will not necessarily invalidate free will, there is one definition that is compatible with determinism. It is not a definition that most people find palatable, however. (It states that free will only requires voluntary action, and not the ability to do otherwise. In other words, free will is linked to desire, not choice.)

*For those interested, the argument is roughly as follows. All events are causally determined, that is, they follow inevitably from their cause. If they follow inevitably from their cause, then they are unavoidable. One's actions are events, and as such one's actions are unavoidable. Thus, determinism.**

**There may or may not be ways around this. I've been working on this problem for some time out of sheer boredom. I can find a way to deny the first premise without denying causality, but even then it still may lead to a denial of free will. It did require a slight redefinition of causality, but one that is, as far as I know, compatible with our knowledge of the universe. It, however, begins to run afoul of indeterminism. I have yet to devise a working method of avoiding that pitfall.


Yet it remains that in choosing the sandwhich I actuly can choose one, change my mind and choose the other and then change it back and choose the original one. The ability then 'to do otherwise' is there and as we can see remains. This is what choice is. If for example my choice of sandwhich was predetermined then that is no choice.

No choice = no free will.
Choice = free will.

Again though unless you can show that I could have performed no other choice than the one I have done, then my choice cannot not have been predetermined, my past may have 'informed' my choice, but it has not predetermined it.

...

If only genes determined the brain then I might agree. But the inputs into the brain shape it, so the different experiences the twins have create the differences between them, we don't need a metaphysical component.

There are also physical differences between identical twins such as susceptibility to diseases, based on genetic divergence. So they aren't completely identical.
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=197287&sectioncode=26 (a news article but it links to the study at the end)

There is the basic fact that we all sense ourselves as having free will. You may then argue that this is an illusion, but then we would need some evidence for the claim of illusion. After all, we accept the evidence of our senses in other areas, so to not accept the evidence of our senses in this area is arbitrary.

Now that I think about it, I am not sure that there is a metaphysical component to free will, but I don't think it matters really. Whether free will comes from a metaphysical source or a physical source so complex that it can not be causally determined, it would appear the same to us.

But we infer 'intent' using the physical act, and physical evidence. There is a link to empirical world (but still down to guesswork as we can't get inside people's heads). This is a convenience of language, not evidence for metaphysical objects.

I do not believe that racism or intent is merely a convenience of language. But if you want to talk about language, look at how you use words. You claim that we infer thing. But what, exactly, is this 'inference' of which you speak? Is it physical and tangible? No. Yet you obviously believe it exists.

Of course everything goes back to the physical world. It is how we communicate. But just because we live in a physical does not mean that all things are therefore physical. Getting back to racism, it obviously links back to the physical in ways that we can quanitfy, so we know it exists and affects people, but that does not mean that racism itself must be physical.

Asking me to prove a negative? And if I ask for some evidence for your view, you admit you have none? There's no evidence for an awful lot of stuff, so why is your view more likely than invisible noodley appendages dictating our choices?

Yes. It is possible to prove a negative. If I were to say that my nipples affected gravity to an extent that I affected tidal activity, and then you observed that the tides are apparently unaffected by my nipples, you would have proven a negative.

Let me ask you a question. What would you consider to be evidence for a metaphysical component to free will? Of if you want to drop the meatphysics discussion, free will itself?

2 points;
Does the uncertainty principle sufficiently affect brain chemistry for it to in principle thwart predictions? (i.e. is it on a small enough scale to be subject to it, or is sufficiently large-scale for quantum behaviour to be irrelevant). Just because novelty might exist, does not mean the brain is novel system.

I was using the uncertainty principle as two things: evidence that the universe is not inherently predetermined, and as an analogy for the brain. I have no idea how quantum mechanics affects the brain. I don't think quantum mechanics is responsible for the novelty we see in biological evolution, or the unpredictable currents of a raging river either. It would appear that unpredictability is a trait of complex systems. And the brain is a complex system.

Secondly I still struggle to see why unpredictability based on uncertainty allows for free will. We could program a robot to choose choice 1 based on quantum phenomenon A occurring, where A is something inherently unpredictable, choice 2 for phenomenon B etc. That in no way makes the robot free, just unpredictable.

It's because you are confusing the possibility of free will with free will itself. It would be impossible to have the latter without the former.

...That's quite simply the objective fact.

An objective fact, scientifically speaking, is something that has been observed, e.g. we observe apples falling to the ground. Predeterminism is not an objective fact in that sense.

Yet it remains that in choosing the sandwhich I actuly can choose one, change my mind and choose the other and then change it back and choose the original one. The ability then 'to do otherwise' is there and as we can see remains. This is what choice is. If for example my choice of sandwhich was predetermined then that is no choice.

No choice = no free will.
Choice = free will.

Again though unless you can show that I could have performed no other choice than the one I have done, then my choice cannot not have been predetermined, my past may have 'informed' my choice, but it has not predetermined it.

I did show that. Unless you want to reject causality, I showed just that. Your argument consists entirely of the assertion that you do have choice, without any actual attempt at demonstrating such.

I did show that. Unless you want to reject causality, I showed just that. Your argument consists entirely of the assertion that you do have choice, without any actual attempt at demonstrating such.

Sorry mate that is wrong. I answered your causeality bit, and I do not deny it.

As I have said, events in my past can only have restricted the choices I have. My likeing for both bacon sandwhiches and peanut butter sandwhiches are due to this 'causeality'.

However what events have predetermind that I now choose one over the other? Unless you can point to it(or them) then you are only guessing that an event or some events have made it so that 'I can make no other choice'.

In fact I have been on this line for a few posts now, do you really call that me not attempting to demonstrate my stance?

Just in case you are still not getting it, the key phrase here is ''I can make no other choice'. If you can show me why this is true when I make my descicion on what sandwhich(you see that example again!) to eat, then you'll be on the road to convinceing me.

Poster A: Have you noticed, any thread, if left long enough, will eventually turn into a discussion about free will?

Poster B: Do you think that's because people choose to do so, or are their actions inevitable?

Sorry mate that is wrong. I answered your causeality bit, and I do not deny it.

As I have said, events in my past can only have restricted the choices I have. My likeing for both bacon sandwhiches and peanut butter sandwhiches are due to this 'causeality'.

However what events have predetermind that I now choose one over the other? Unless you can point to it(or them) then you are only guessing that an event or some events have made it so that 'I can make no other choice'.

In fact I have been on this line for a few posts now, do you really call that me not attempting to demonstrate my stance?

Just in case you are still not getting it, the key phrase here is ''I can make no other choice'. If you can show me why this is true when I make my descicion on what sandwhich(you see that example again!) to eat, then you'll be on the road to convinceing me.

It's in the definition of causality. If something is caused by something else, then by definition that something could not have happened in any other way.
Let me try to explain more clearly. x causes y. By the definition of causality, y must happen as long as x happens. Since all events are caused, that means that z causes x. And as long as z happens, x has to happen. Thus, as long as z happens, y has to happen. It doesn't stop with z. It extends backwards indefinitely. The only way to break the chain without denying causality is for the original event to have been extratemporal, and thus not bound by causality.

There is the basic fact that we all sense ourselves as having free will. You may then argue that this is an illusion, but then we would need some evidence for the claim of illusion. After all, we accept the evidence of our senses in other areas, so to not accept the evidence of our senses in this area is arbitrary.

We all sense that when we fall in love we get butterflies in our stomach, or that our heart is where all the feelings of love are. In reality that isn't physically true. I think the appearance of free will is similar to that, a very convincing illusion that feels very tangible. The fact that the brain is a physical system that obeys predictable processes (even if the sum of those processes is complex) leads me to the conclusion that there cannot be free will, and that therefore the appearance is a delusion as such delusions can exist in the mind.

Now that I think about it, I am not sure that there is a metaphysical component to free will, but I don't think it matters really. Whether free will comes from a metaphysical source or a physical source so complex that it can not be causally determined, it would appear the same to us.

But equally any determined physical system that is so complex we cannot yet predict it (even if in principle we can) would appear the same to us. How do we tell the difference?


I do not believe that racism or intent is merely a convenience of language. But if you want to talk about language, look at how you use words. You claim that we infer thing. But what, exactly, is this 'inference' of which you speak? Is it physical and tangible? No. Yet you obviously believe it exists.

Of course everything goes back to the physical world. It is how we communicate. But just because we live in a physical does not mean that all things are therefore physical. Getting back to racism, it obviously links back to the physical in ways that we can quanitfy, so we know it exists and affects people, but that does not mean that racism itself must be physical.

Do you mind if we leave this digression - it's getting quite off-topic (although if you disagree we can carry on)


Let me ask you a question. What would you consider to be evidence for a metaphysical component to free will? Of if you want to drop the meatphysics discussion, free will itself?

I don't know, as I have yet to find any in my opinion. Do you think it is an impossible task? (metaphysical or otherwise)


I was using the uncertainty principle as two things: evidence that the universe is not inherently predetermined, and as an analogy for the brain. I have no idea how quantum mechanics affects the brain. I don't think quantum mechanics is responsible for the novelty we see in biological evolution, or the unpredictable currents of a raging river either. It would appear that unpredictability is a trait of complex systems. And the brain is a complex system.

Ah, so more Chaos Theory.... I'll have to read up on that then.

It's because you are confusing the possibility of free will with free will itself. It would be impossible to have the latter without the former.


I'm trying to pin down what it is about uncertainty that leaves room for free will. If it's not uncertainty in the brain, then what is it about uncertainty?

We havn't had it for a while. 'Free Will', do we have it?

I say yes, come persuide me otherwise. :D
Yes. Because I choose not to debate you on this. ;)

It's in the definition of causality. If something is caused by something else, then by definition that something could not have happened in any other way.
Let me try to explain more clearly. x causes y. By the definition of causality, y must happen as long as x happens. Since all events are caused, that means that z causes x. And as long as z happens, x has to happen. Thus, as long as z happens, y has to happen. It doesn't stop with z. It extends backwards indefinitely. The only way to break the chain without denying causality is for the original event to have been extratemporal, and thus not bound by causality.


Yeah yeah I get all of that. However what you are denying is the possibilty that such causal links may not work in such a clear cut way.

Could X not cause a desition to be made on wheter the out come is Y or Z?

It is clearly mad to deny that we have some degree of control over where our lives take us. In fact I was reading just the other day a reasonable reason why even if freewill is illusionary it is better NOT to take the nilhistic road, and opt to 'do nothing'.

To do nothing truely leaves you at the whim of causality, yet to take action(any action) gives a degree of control to us.

Imagine I'm an old man at home feeling the cold. I can opt to take the nilhist route and do nothing, or I can choose to stand up and turn the heating on.

Imagine then that I belive that freewill does not exist. In this case, the cause is my belife about freewill, and we can clearly see that the causal action begets the choice of either action A(do nothing) or action B(turn the heating on). My choice to make, makeing choice = freewill.

We all sense that when we fall in love we get butterflies in our stomach, or that our heart is where all the feelings of love are. In reality that isn't physically true. I think the appearance of free will is similar to that, a very convincing illusion that feels very tangible. The fact that the brain is a physical system that obeys predictable processes (even if the sum of those processes is complex) leads me to the conclusion that there cannot be free will, and that therefore the appearance is a delusion as such delusions can exist in the mind.

We do not all sense butterflies in our stomach when we are in love. Love does cause all sorts of odd physical reactions, like any other strong emotion, but they are rarely consistent, even in the same person. Also, when we cut open a human chest, we can see the heart pumping away, and we can see that it is actually a pump instead of the seat of emotions. We can do heart transplants, and see that the person doesn't have different emotional reactions than they did previously.

In other words, there is physical evidence indicating that the belief that the heart is the seat of emotions is false. There is no evidence that free will is itself false or illusory.

Yes, the brain does follow some predictable physical processes. If you took a brain and subjected it to heat, it would warm up, like any other physical object, or if you threw it in the air, it would come back down and make a mess on the sidewalk in a visceral example of gravity, fluid mechanics and surface texture gradients. But that does not indicate that all the physical processes in the brain are equally predictable.

But equally any determined physical system that is so complex we cannot yet predict it (even if in principle we can) would appear the same to us. How do we tell the difference?

If you are asking how scientists are able to determine which physical processes can be predicted and which can not, I would argue that scientists assume that the system can be fully determined unless they have evidence indicating it cannot, like Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, or developments in chaos theory that show that weather forecasts can not be reliable beyond a week.

The assumption of determinism is not a description of reality. It is merely a convenient way of looking at physical phenomena before it gets studied. If we assumed it did not follow deterministic laws, we could not design experiments.

Do you mind if we leave this digression - it's getting quite off-topic (although if you disagree we can carry on)

No. I can drop it.

I don't know, as I have yet to find any in my opinion. Do you think it is an impossible task? (metaphysical or otherwise)

Until you determine what constitutes evidence, it is impossible to say if it is impossible.

Ah, so more Chaos Theory.... I'll have to read up on that then.

Me too.

I'm trying to pin down what it is about uncertainty that leaves room for free will. If it's not uncertainty in the brain, then what is it about uncertainty?

You're thinking about it too much. It just shows that we don't live in a completely predetermined universe.

In other words, there is physical evidence indicating that the belief that the heart is the seat of emotions is false. There is no evidence that free will is itself false or illusory.

I was calling into question the evidence of "my brain believes x about the way I feel" being valid. It's not necessarily true just because you think it, so I don't see any reliable evidence for "free will is true" either.

Yes, the brain does follow some predictable physical processes. If you took a brain and subjected it to heat, it would warm up, like any other physical object, or if you threw it in the air, it would come back down and make a mess on the sidewalk in a visceral example of gravity, fluid mechanics and surface texture gradients. But that does not indicate that all the physical processes in the brain are equally predictable.

Those are obviously not the sort of processes I'm talking about. I'm talking about ion exchange through membranes, neurotransmitter concentrations etc. which are predictable as biological and chemical processes, and at that level of detail have been shown to affect behaviour and thought.

he assumption of determinism is not a description of reality. It is merely a convenient way of looking at physical phenomena before it gets studied. If we assumed it did not follow deterministic laws, we could not design experiments.

Science presupposes cause and effect which leads to determinism where through experiment it can be shown cause A leads to effect B. Do you dispute cause and effect?

Until you determine what constitutes evidence, it is impossible to say if it is impossible.

In all honesty, I'm not sure, because any evidence presented to me has not been convincing so far. Taking the underlying axioms of my position, you would somehow need to show normal brain chemical processes are somehow spontaneous (have no obvious cause - but also not be random). Or present some logical proof of a metaphysical driver for the brain, or that the mind is not in the brain. Is that impossible? Perhaps, but that's because summed up it's "prove an apparently determined system is in fact not determined and not random".

You're thinking about it too much. It just shows that we don't live in a completely predetermined universe.

I find that too general a notion to relate to free will being possible, unless you can somehow show the relation between free will and processes subject to the uncertainty principle.

I was calling into question the evidence of "my brain believes x about the way I feel" being valid. It's not necessarily true just because you think it, so I don't see any reliable evidence for "free will is true" either.

If I hit my thumb with a hammer, my brain tells me that I am in pain. Why is this pain more 'valid' than the sensation of free will? I mean, it's not necessarily true just because I think it, so there's no reliable evidence for this 'pain'.

Those are obviously not the sort of processes I'm talking about. I'm talking about ion exchange through membranes, neurotransmitter concentrations etc. which are predictable as biological and chemical processes, and at that level of detail have been shown to affect behaviour and thought.

If I were to excessively heat your brain or move it around such that it causes the same trauma as lobbing it onto the sidewalk, I would think it would affect your behaviour and thought as well. Let us not experiment.

I think there is an issue of assumed causation here, that the ions exchanges, neuro-etceteras and other biochemical processes are causing thought and will and volition. I think it is more complicated than that.

Science presupposes cause and effect which leads to determinism where through experiment it can be shown cause A leads to effect B. Do you dispute cause and effect?

I dispute the universality of cause and effect. I think it is definitely a part of reality, but I do not believe it completely controls all the change in the universe.

In all honesty, I'm not sure, because any evidence presented to me has not been convincing so far. Taking the underlying axioms of my position, you would somehow need to show normal brain chemical processes are somehow spontaneous (have no obvious cause - but also not be random). Or present some logical proof of a metaphysical driver for the brain, or that the mind is not in the brain. Is that impossible? Perhaps, but that's because summed up it's "prove an apparently determined system is in fact not determined and not random".

How would you show that brain chemical processes are spontaneous?

I find that too general a notion to relate to free will being possible, unless you can somehow show the relation between free will and processes subject to the uncertainty principle.

Let me back up and get even more general then. Do you think that all things are predetermined?