NationStates Jolt Archive

Virtue-based or deontological environmental ethics/policy, for example.
You know when I said that Kant made me curl up in a little ball and cry? That's precisely what I meant. The idea of making the value of an action independent of its consequences is pure insanity and could, as far as I can tell, only possibly have been made up to justify hurting people. I just can't see any other reason to adhere to it.

Anyways, the point is that one can't base policy on these things. We can listen to randoms bring forward random arguments for why X is a duty or a virtue, and Y isn't. We'll have a disagreement and nothing happens, since there is no way to prove either point. Great for those people who value the environment so highly that they'd be happy for people to go hungry or homeless, bad for everyone else.

And why? What has actually been achieved once this is finished? Whatever it is, it doesn't matter, right? We'll just act, and ignore the consequences entirely. Of course, how a being that follows such a rule can be called "human", I don't know.

You know when I said that Kant made me curl up in a little ball and cry? That's precisely what I meant. The idea of making the value of an action independent of its consequences is pure insanity...
Why?

I'm no Kantian, but I'd like to hear your argument.

...and could, as far as I can tell, only possibly have been made up to justify hurting people. I just can't see any other reason to adhere to it.
Och, nonsense.

Are you saying, for example, Soheran and others simply want to hurt people? That's just a deficient understanding of deontological ethics.

Anyways, the point is that one can't base policy on these things.
Why not?

We can happily base (environmental) policy on duty/universalised maxims or virtue based accounts. Indeed, there's explicit accounts of just how to do so.

Examples would be Ronald Sandler's Character and Environment or Working Virtue edited by Rebecca Walker and Philip Ivanhoe.

We can listen to randoms bring forward random arguments for why X is a duty or a virtue, and Y isn't.
Virtue ethicists aren't bring forward 'random' arguments, that's pure tripe.

Just because you have a poor understanding of a whole range of ethical positions, doesn't mean they're useless.

Great for those people who value the environment so highly that they'd be happy for people to go hungry or homeless, bad for everyone else.
That's a rather strange objection to lay solely at the feet of non-consequentialist ethics, for one can clearly construct a consequentialist argument that would do exactly the same.

See the famous Repugnant Conclusion (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/) argument.

And why? What has actually been achieved once this is finished? Whatever it is, it doesn't matter, right? We'll just act, and ignore the consequences entirely.
Once again, you're attacking a strawman position. You make it sound as if deontological or agent-centred ethics would sanction any wild action; but this is patently false. Further, neither Kantians nor virtue ethicists disregard consequences entirely, they simply believe duty to the laws of rationality and the agent, respectively, come first. (And this doesn't even cover pluralist accounts.)

I don't want to hijack this thread into a discussion on the merits of various ethical systems, but if you're going to post such blatant nonsense, I can't resist.

A deontological approach would eventually have to apply some kind of quantifiable or teleological type approach. Deontological ethicists concern themselves with defining exactly what good is, and what our duties are. So it's easy to create a set of duties and systems that outline how we should and shouldn't act in regards to the environment, but eventually you're going to come across a situation where you're going to have to choose which duty takes precedence. Say there is a duty to increase the living standards of people where possible, but also a duty to protect natural beauty of certain environments (a simplistic example, I know). If it is shown that a huge hydro-electric damn that destroys the natural beauty of some area but also considerably increases the living standards of the people receiving the generated power, you're going to have to decide which duty should be respected. You're thus going to be quantifying the good of different actions, and will no doubt be assessing the consequences of the action, and what effect it will have on other duties. You will be effectively 'maximising' the duties you are able to follow - cost benefit analysis. Another example is the fact that we have scarce resources, and limited funds, so will have to allocate funds to a limited amount of measures and will have to therefore quantify which measures deserve extra funding and which ones are not quite beneficial enough. And so on...

NL, it's really rather simple, at this level.

A utilitarian approach treats its elements as resources to be used: how do we make use of them to maximize aggregate utility?

A deontological approach treats (certain of) its elements as ends-in-themselves: what kind of treatment is consistent with what they are entitled to by virtue of their inherent worth?

A utilitarian approach like yours to the natural world (which could be adopted by a utilitarian or a deontologist in the general sense) treats the environment as a resource to be utility-maximized, to the MSC = MSB point.

A deontological approach to the natural world insists, contrary to that depiction, that there are certain parts of the natural world that are entitled to norms of treatment regardless of its impact on our utility, that there are parts of the natural world that are inherently worthy regardless of their use to us.

This is not inspired by a desire to see humans suffer, but rather by a commitment to the principle that the ends don't justify the means.

As a side-note, it has always surprised me that a libertarian with Objectivist sympathies could have such disdain for non-consequentialist reasoning... don't you protest how redistributive schemes in effect use the rich for the welfare of others?

(I leave virtue ethics out because I don't trust myself to give them an fully accurate presentation.)

Another example is the fact that we have scarce resources, and limited funds, so will have to allocate funds to a limited amount of measures and will have to therefore quantify which measures deserve extra funding and which ones are not quite beneficial enough.

Fine with me. Now, how does this have any bearing on the question of whether, say, we may destroy habitats for utilitarian benefit?

I don't believe anyone's denied that cost-benefit analysis is sometimes relevant: the question is whether it is an absolute rule or a principle appropriate to certain circumstances and not others.

(Also, as I've said to you before, even this positive process of funds allocation need not/should not be purely utilitarian, as in one that harms particularly a given disadvantaged minority for the benefit of the majority, which may conceivably represent both a net utility gain and a non-universalizable maxim. In the particular case of environmental ethics, a decision on the part of the world that, say, the destruction of island societies and coastal areas by global warming is an "acceptable" price to pay for greater economic growth would be a questionable ethical decision.)

I don't believe anyone's denied that cost-benefit analysis is sometimes relevant: the question is whether it is an absolute rule or a principle appropriate to certain circumstances and not others.


Well, is cost benefit analysis relevant to every situation? I think it is, even if in many cases, incredibly crudely. For instance, person A wants to burn the Amazon rainforest with napalm, for teh lulz. It would seem that cost benefit analysis would be not relevant here, there is only a cost, and therefore person A should not do this. However, there is some sort of gain, that being the persons happiness, or joy (which in itself I believe would be argued as a good thing by any deontological ethicist), which may be marginally increased temporarily by him burning the rainforest. Now, this benefit is so negligible it wont even be considered, that doesn't mean the analysis is not there.


In the particular case of environmental ethics, a decision on the part of the world that, say, the destruction of island societies and coastal areas by global warming is an "acceptable" price to pay for greater economic growth would be a questionable ethical decision.)

Of course, but people conceive of the lives of these island societies as much higher (or infinite) worth than economic growth. In other examples, such as perhaps the use of oil, which is still essential to the economy, but also destructive to the environment, it becomes more complex, since I doubt you would say we should stop burning oil altogether. More likely you would set some sort of threshold where there is no need to reduce oil consumption any longer since the effect on the environment is negligible, which is teleological.

Now, this benefit is so negligible it wont even be considered, that doesn't mean the analysis is not there.

It's not (in the relevant case set) that it's not there, or that it's negligible: it's that it's not relevant.

To give a clear-cut example: for the deontologist inclined toward Tom Regan-like defenses of animal rights, the exploitation of animal life suffusing modern economies bespeaks a lack of regard for the inherent worth of the animals so treated. The fact that human beings gain utility from such treatment is irrelevant regardless of quantity. Whatever the benefit to human beings--even if we're speaking in terms of infinite utility!--we're not entitled to treat animals in such a manner.

The reason for this is not that deontologists have no care for increasing utility, for (more broadly and non-reductionistically speaking) making the world a better place, but that the significant and non-negligible importance and consideration we attach to those objectives can never serve as a justification for evil acts.

Utilitarians (and all consequentialists) speak only of "the good", and maximizing it; deontologists speak both of "right" and "good", and subordinate "good" to "right."

To give a clear-cut example: for the deontologist inclined toward Tom Regan-like defenses of animal rights, the exploitation of animal life suffusing modern economies bespeaks a lack of regard for the inherent worth of the animals so treated. The fact that human beings gain utility from such treatment is irrelevant regardless of quantity. Whatever the benefit to human beings--even if we're speaking in terms of infinite utility!--we're not entitled to treat animals in such a manner.


Theoretically, but I don't believe any deontologist is ever like this in reality or at least not always, I find there is always a threshold. If these suffering animals were the only thing preventing humanity from from burning to death in an immensely painful way, would you still find this utility irrelevant? Also, as I've already said, there are times where you have to choose between duties, the axe murderer example, as I'm sure you're aware, is a classic case. There is a duty to truth, there is a duty to protect life and stop senseless killing. Although this example is not strictly to do with choosing between imperatives, one can apply it to that. If you choose to protect life, you are essentially saying that following that imperative is more beneficial than following the imperative of honesty. Now, what I'm saying is that this always happens a lot more than many deontologists think, because I believe it's impossible to be a deontologist, without thinking that someone's emotional state is relevant. If it's not relevant, then suffering does not matter, and if that does not matter, practically any action is justifiable.

If these suffering animals were the only thing preventing humanity from from burning to death in an immensely painful way, would you still find this utility irrelevant?

Yes.

I'll make it even easier for you: I would not deceitfully manipulate a person into flipping a switch for the sake of sparing every last sentient being in the universe from suffering eternal, horrific agony.

Also, as I've already said, there are times where you have to choose between duties, the axe murderer example, as I'm sure you're aware, is a classic case. There is a duty to truth, there is a duty to protect life and stop senseless killing.

The latter duty--like all positive duties--does not apply by any means necessary (as a matter of fact, it does not apply as a matter of necessity at all--I am not obliged to sacrifice everything I have, or even a proportionate amount, to "protect life and stop senseless killing", though it would be noble of me to do so.)

Usually the criticism that "Deontological ethics involves contradictory duties" fails to understand the deontological distinction between negative duties ("Don't lie", "Don't murder") and positive ones ("Make others happy", "Protect others from aggressors.") But to collapse this distinction (which is a corollary of the "intentionally brought about"/"allowed to happen" distinction) is really to presuppose consequentialism.

Now, what I'm saying is that this always happens a lot more than many deontologists think, because I believe it's impossible to be a deontologist, without thinking that someone's emotional state is relevant. If it's not relevant, then suffering does not matter, and if that does not matter, practically any action is justifiable.

False dichotomy. You assert, in effect, that suffering (as unintended consequence) must either always be relevant or never be relevant. The deontological answer (in general) is that both options are to be rejected: suffering matters, but it does not suffice as a claim on another person's inherent worth.

Yes.

I'll make it even easier for you: I would not deceitfully manipulate a person into flipping a switch for the sake of sparing every last sentient being in the universe from suffering eternal, horrific agony.


Really? What if that person is actually a dictator, and the switch was a button to abort a weapon he created to inflict such suffering.


Usually the criticism that "Deontological ethics involves contradictory duties" fails to understand the deontological distinction between negative duties ("Don't lie", "Don't murder") and positive ones ("Make others happy", "Protect others from aggressors.") But to collapse this distinction (which is a corollary of the "intentionally brought about"/"allowed to happen" distinction) is really to presuppose consequentialism.


I didn't say the duties were contradictory, but I said that choosing to follow a positive duty, may in some circumstances, go against a negative one, but still be considered by any reasonable man, the right thing to do, because the benefit of following such a duty outweighs the cost of going against negative duties. As in, the benefit of protecting your friend from death outweighs the cost of lying to the axe murderer by claiming your friend is not hiding in your house. Whether or not such decision making processes are relevant to deontological ethical theories, does not mean they are not relevant at all, you are going to have to quantify or assign worth to the outcomes.


False dichotomy. You assert, in effect, that suffering (as unintended consequence) must either always be relevant or never be relevant. The deontological answer (in general) is that both options are to be rejected: suffering matters, but it does not suffice as a claim on another person's inherent worth.

Are you against imprisoning someone then?

Yah, fuck dentists. Wankers.

Hydesland: We are getting way off topic, and we have discussed this (seemingly non-productively) before.

The important element is this: there is such a thing as an objection on principle that does not admit of cost-benefit analysis. Whether and how dictators pulling switches, murderers brandishing axes, and criminals confined to prison fit into this framework is not really at issue as long as this basic point is acknowledged.

Whether or not such decision making processes are relevant to deontological ethical theories, does not mean they are not relevant at all, you are going to have to quantify or assign worth to the outcomes.

If deontological ethical theories are correct, then in certain circumstances such considerations should not be relevant to our decisions about what to do.

Since we are dealing, after all, with models of rational decision-making, that plainly does seem to pertain to whether or not we should be including them in our analysis.

Yah, fuck dentists. Wankers.

You have now two quotes in the quote section of my sig (if you can find it hidden in those spoilers. You should be very proud, you make up 2/3rds of the quotes in there now. :eek2:

Hydesland: We are getting way off topic

I'm happy to start a new thread.


(seemingly non-productively)

I know I'm being really pedantic and simplistic, but I'm doing it deliberately, I was going somewhere with it, but I've forgotten where now. :p


The important element is this: there is such a thing as an objection on principle that does not admit of cost-benefit analysis. Whether and how dictators pulling switches, murderers brandishing axes, and criminals confined to prison fit into this framework is not really at issue as long as this basic point is acknowledged.


I agree, sort of, obviously if you're a deontologist, certain actions will always be wrong, regardless of the consequences, otherwise that would go against the very definition of deontological. However, I feel that people generally do not act in such a way, I think very few people are purely 100% deontological. There are many things you could consider, like that you could just call deontologists pre-emptive consequentiality, since many duties created by them are based upon teleological style of thinking - certainly, thinking about if you could universalise something for instance is a teleological approach. But this is a digression. My main point is, as with the oil example, it may just not be possible to adhere to predefined rules in many situations - as the actions are not wrong in themselves, but can still have disastrous consequences.

I'm happy to start a new thread.

And I'm happy to go to sleep.

But go ahead if you like. I will reply when I'm awake, have time, and have the energy for intellectual concentration, which will probably be in less than twenty-four hours.

I think very few people are purely 100% deontological.

Perhaps not. But most people don't act (or think) purely rationally either. Cost-benefit analysis too is a matter of "ought", not "is"--that's why economists use it for policy critique.

My main point is, as with the oil example, it may just not be possible to adhere to predefined rules in many situations

And no honest deontologist should deny this.

And I'm happy to go to sleep.

But go ahead if you like. I will reply when I'm awake, have time, and have the energy for intellectual concentration, which will probably be in less than twenty-four hours.


I think I might ask the mods for a split.

Might as well report for flaming. That's not even remotely constructive.

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?p=14604792#post14604792


It's also 'not even remotely' flaming.

Maybe if I'd said YOU were horseshit, it might have been - but I didn't. You have continued making the same kind of baseless assertions, for which your support is a somewhat circular reference to the assertion itself.

I could have said 'bullshit, I suppose.


I'll explain what I mean when I say implicit.


http://img5.imageshack.us/img5/5457/costcurve.jpg

On the curve, when you move to the left or the right, you are not producing or consuming enough. Whatever units costs are measured in, it doesn't matter. Producing more will cost more than you gain. Producing less will not provide the net good. Does that make sense, or does it not?

What other variables would you propose we use?

I propose that your constant insistence that the whole balance of the equation can be summed up in permutations of two variables, is evidence of exactly what I've kept on saying.

This is an absurdly redundant sentence. In every decision that anyone has ever made in the entire history of the universe, a decision is based on the variables they or someone else chooses to consider.

Which is neither absurd, not redundant, actually - since I'm sure you'll concede that - in some large proportion of those instances - they were wrong.

I propose that your constant insistence that the whole balance of the equation can be summed up in permutations of two variables, is evidence of exactly what I've kept on saying.

But what other variables could there possibly be after cost and benefit? That's as general as it gets.

But what other variables could there possibly be after cost and benefit? That's as general as it gets.

Is cloudy weather a cost or a benefit?

Is cloudy weather a cost or a benefit?

Whether or not it's hard to quantify what is or isn't a cost and a benefit, seems separate from your criticism.

Whether or not it's hard to quantify what is or isn't a cost and a benefit, seems separate from your criticism.

Not at all. What you count as a benefit in your tables can be a cost in mine, and is entirely unaccounted in your scheme. Or it can be something that is effectively neutral, from the point of view of your math, but is a noticable value according to mine.

That's the problem - the assertion selects characteristics that 'you' (that's a collective 'you') desire to be considered, and ignores everything else.

the assertion selects characteristics that 'you' (that's a collective 'you') desire to be considered, and ignores everything else.

What assertion? Andulacie never defined in detail what counts as a cost, and what counts as a benefit.

Really? What if that person is actually a dictator, and the switch was a button to abort a weapon he created to inflict such suffering.

Insofar as I am sabotaging his own imminent project of destruction, I am effectively acting in self-defense, and that's acceptable.

But not if he is just a bystander.

I didn't say the duties were contradictory, but I said that choosing to follow a positive duty, may in some circumstances, go against a negative one, but still be considered by any reasonable man, the right thing to do, because the benefit of following such a duty outweighs the cost of going against negative duties.

Well, "any reasonable man" who accepts that such "benefits" and "costs" can be meaningfully quantified, perhaps.

But that is already to presume consequentialism.

As in, the benefit of protecting your friend from death outweighs the cost of lying to the axe murderer by claiming your friend is not hiding in your house.

The deontologist does not make this comparison.

I may well accept that a world in which my friend lives and the axe murderer is lied to is a better world than a world in which my friend is murdered and the axe murderer lives. This, I agree, is a reasonable conclusion, perhaps even the reasonable conclusion. But in the context of this particular circumstance, the question is, may I expend the axe murderer's autonomy so as to bring about my friend's life? No: I have no authority to rule over another person so as to bring about my preferred value distribution in the world.

What, then, of my obligation to my friend? I am obliged to regard her continued life as worthy and important, but to value it as an end, in abstract, is not the same as to value it in the context of a concrete means: if she were to will that another's autonomy be sacrificed for her own life, I cannot respect such a position that degrades the dignity of another person.

As a matter of fact, if I accept this kind of "weighing", I degrade both: my friend and the axe murderer cease to be valuable inherently as subjects but only relatively as objects, only insofar as they fulfill my value system for how the world should be. Indeed, only within this framework can it be said that the gain to one compensates for the gain of the other: it follows that their worth must be measurable in some other unit, which means that it is not inherent but rather reducible.

(I leave aside here the question of whether we might be able to lie to the axe murderer on legitimate deontological grounds like self-defense.)

Are you against imprisoning someone then?

I am against imprisoning an innocent person for the sake of, say, promoting the public perception of deterrence and/or calming social unrest.

I deny that imprisoning a criminal constitutes a wrong.

Insofar as I am sabotaging his own imminent project of destruction, I am effectively acting in self-defense, and that's acceptable.

But not if he is just a bystander.


Why is the distinction so important? Also, does self defence require malicious intent? I don't think it does.


Well, "any reasonable man" who accepts that such "benefits" and "costs" can be meaningfully quantified, perhaps.


It's not like you're applying some sort of quantitative value to different duties, you can just decide based on their relative worth - 'duty A > duty B'. You have to decide anyway, so it may as well be based on which you view to be better.


No: I have no authority to rule over another person so as to bring about my preferred value distribution in the world.


Why not? Perhaps this axe murderer case shows that the maxim 'you have no authority to rule over another person as to bring about your preferred etc...' cannot be universalised if it ends up with situations like this, and if it doesn't stand the test of universality, then it shouldn't become an imperative.


As a matter of fact, if I accept this kind of "weighing", I degrade both: my friend and the axe murderer cease to be valuable inherently as subjects but only relatively as objects, only insofar as they fulfill my value system for how the world should be.

Right, but perhaps that's the case in reality.


Indeed, only within this framework can it be said that the gain to one compensates for the gain of the other: it follows that their worth must be measurable in some other unit, which means that it is not inherent but rather reducible.


Again, I don't think that comparing a worth of something inherently means that it's possible to measure an individuals worth in some sort of quantifiable unit of measurement.


(I leave aside here the question of whether we might be able to lie to the axe murderer on legitimate deontological grounds like self-defense.)

I am against imprisoning an innocent person for the sake of, say, promoting the public perception of deterrence and/or calming social unrest.

I deny that imprisoning a criminal constitutes a wrong.

But can't making these qualifications only come about through consequential/circumstantial styles of thinking?

Why is the distinction so important?

Because in one case I am stopping someone from harming me and in another case I am harming someone else.

The first affirms my own freedom, the second denies the freedom of another.

Also, does self defence require malicious intent?

No, but it requires that someone else's behavior directly threatens mine. It's not a matter of "desert" (I can defend myself against someone not in his or her right mind), but of the relation my conduct establishes between persons.

You have to decide anyway

No, the duties are consistent with each other; you don't have to decide unless you make the consequentialist assumption that ends necessarily imply means, that it is impossible to recognize the worth of something without committing yourself to a means of fulfilling it.

But this is precisely what deontologists reject; that's what "the ends don't justify the means" signifies.

Perhaps this axe murderer case shows that the maxim 'you have no authority to rule over another person as to bring about your preferred etc...' cannot be universalised if it ends up with situations like this, and if it doesn't stand the test of universality, then it shouldn't become an imperative.

But certainly I can universalize it: "If I were in the place of my friend, I would not begrudge another person not lying to protect me, because I am not so arrogant as to believe that my life should be bought at the price of mistreating others." Is it so hard for you to conceive of a reasoning principled enough to reject benefits attained through exploitation?

What I cannot universalize is the opposing maxim, "To fulfill my value judgments, I may rule over others": I know that if I were in the place of that other person, I would think to myself, "By what right does that person lay claim on my life, when it is mine, to make use of in non-harmful ways as I see fit?"

I can never justify the mistreatment of the mistreated individual to that individual. I can, however, justify letting bad things happen to the people who suffer from those bad things--they do not own me, and they do not own any of the people I may have to mistreat to prevent the evils done to them.

Again, I don't think that comparing a worth of something inherently means that it's possible to measure an individuals worth in some sort of quantifiable unit of measurement.

Then what meaning does it have to say that "Person A's saved life compensates for Person B's being manipulated"?

But can't making these qualifications only come about through consequential/circumstantial styles of thinking?

"Circumstantial", perhaps, but all moral theories make distinctions of circumstance.

"Consequential", no. The distinctions of circumstance a deontological theory makes are (at least sometimes) distinctions pertaining to the relations between people and the character of the act, not its consequences.

Why?...


You know, I was going to post a pro-Kantian reply to the OP, but I think you've covered pretty much what I was going to say anyway.

Really good one, old chap.

Because in one case I am stopping someone from harming me and in another case I am harming someone else.

The first affirms my own freedom, the second denies the freedom of another.



No, but it requires that someone else's behavior directly threatens mine. It's not a matter of "desert" (I can defend myself against someone not in his or her right mind), but of the relation my conduct establishes between persons.



No, the duties are consistent with each other; you don't have to decide unless you make the consequentialist assumption that ends necessarily imply means, that it is impossible to recognize the worth of something without committing yourself to a means of fulfilling it.

But this is precisely what deontologists reject; that's what "the ends don't justify the means" signifies.



But certainly I can universalize it: "If I were in the place of my friend, I would not begrudge another person not lying to protect me, because I am not so arrogant as to believe that my life should be bought at the price of mistreating others." Is it so hard for you to conceive of a reasoning principled enough to reject benefits attained through exploitation?

What I cannot universalize is the opposing maxim, "To fulfill my value judgments, I may rule over others": I know that if I were in the place of that other person, I would think to myself, "By what right does that person lay claim on my life, when it is mine, to make use of in non-harmful ways as I see fit?"

I can never justify the mistreatment of the mistreated individual to that individual. I can, however, justify letting bad things happen to the people who suffer from those bad things--they do not own me, and they do not own any of the people I may have to mistreat to prevent the evils done to them.



Then what meaning does it have to say that "Person A's saved life compensates for Person B's being manipulated"?



"Circumstantial", perhaps, but all moral theories make distinctions of circumstance.

"Consequential", no. The distinctions of circumstance a deontological theory makes are (at least sometimes) distinctions pertaining to the relations between people and the character of the act, not its consequences.

I haven't really read much philosophy (I know shame on me :tongue:) so appologies if this a.) misses the point or b.) is a fairly cliched question but in regards to the "lying to the axeman" senario, would you consider lying to Nazi soilders about Jews hiding in your house to be morally wrong?

would you consider lying to Nazi soilders about Jews hiding in your house to be morally wrong?

No. But would you consider the Nazis looking for Jews to kill to be ethically right?
Categorical imperative. Look it up on the wiki.

Why?
I was going to find a specific psychotic disorder that explicitly talks about a disconnection in the perception of cause and effect, but I got bored. You get what I was saying though: people act because they presume their acts to have consequences. We do that for every single action we undertake, and its the thing that we do so well that it has become our main distinguishing feature as a species and that has allowed our survival and evolutionary success.

But when we evaluate ethics, all of a sudden this is irrelevant and we're supposed to ignore the consequences of an action? Properly considering an action separate from its consequences is not something the sane human brain is equipped to do.

Are you saying, for example, Soheran and others simply want to hurt people?
No, I think they've been roped into a system that justifies hurting people, written by people with less than honest motives.

What is important isn't what "categorical imperatives" or anything of the sort actually say. By their nature they're so vague as to be useless 100% of the time. What is important is the way of arguing for them, because in the process of deriving them one has imposed a concept of epistemology that completely ignores reality. So any opposition which is grounded in reality can't apply. There is no defense and no argument.

Examples would be Ronald Sandler's Character and Environment or Working Virtue edited by Rebecca Walker and Philip Ivanhoe.
I had a look at the former in particular (to the extent that I could), and I don't see the basic problem overcome at all. He talks about virtues and "flourishing". But if we're looking at the flourishing of some group of animals, and some group of humans, both are looking to consume the same resources, I don't see how he gets past the need for comparing and making a judgement - sometimes an either/or judgement. At best he'll end up with an economist doing some number-crunching and him looking and saying "Option B produces a higher number, but we won't choose it because of that, but because it corresponds with a more 'flourishing'". Which it always will.

Just because you have a poor understanding of a whole range of ethical positions, doesn't mean they're useless.
I want an ethical position to tell me what to do when I (not some other thing that doesn't have to distort the world by perceiving it) encounter Situation X. If it can't do that, and no system that doesn't refer to the real world (= consequences) can, then it's not a whole lot of use. See my objection above about "flourishing" being a rather empty term.

And yes, an ethical system has to have a use.

That's a rather strange objection to lay solely at the feet of non-consequentialist ethics, for one can clearly construct a consequentialist argument that would do exactly the same.
But we would have reasons for doing so. We wouldn't be shutting down the debate entirely at the first point by not just claiming that real-world comparison between options is impossible, but in fact that it is entirely irrelevant.

See the famous Repugnant Conclusion (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/) argument.
You see, to me the idea that everyone is unhappy and that no one actually gets the chance to be happy is a bad (=evil) thing. The idea that to you it is not is what baffles me, that you could conceive of a situation in which you would actively bring about such a world and afterwards stand there and problaim that you didn't do anything wrong.

Once again, you're attacking a strawman position. You make it sound as if deontological or agent-centred ethics would sanction any wild action; but this is patently false.
Of course they wouldn't. But whatever they do sanction, the problem is that I can't actually attack it, because I can't point at the terrible consequences. I'm just supposed to be virtuous or dutiful and suffer.

A deontological approach to the natural world insists, contrary to that depiction, that there are certain parts of the natural world that are entitled to norms of treatment regardless of its impact on our utility, that there are parts of the natural world that are inherently worthy regardless of their use to us.

This is not inspired by a desire to see humans suffer, but rather by a commitment to the principle that the ends don't justify the means.
I don't actually think that you want to see humans suffer. I just think that you would actually sit there and defend people having to suffer because the nest of a rare bird is in the way.

Things don't just have value. They have value because of the characteristics they have, and plants and animals (or most of them) just don't have the kind of characteristics that make us ethically relevant. They have no sense of identity and no reason, no conception of future or past and hence no ability to make choices. They're not moral agents, and so I don't see how they enter any system of morality at all any more than any other lump of matter does.

With your view I'm always reminded of a question I ask myself sometimes: how is killing a fly different from killing an elephant? Is it rarity? The amount of living matter? Brains?

As a side-note, it has always surprised me that a libertarian with Objectivist sympathies could have such disdain for non-consequentialist reasoning... don't you protest how redistributive schemes in effect use the rich for the welfare of others?
I protest the idea that I have to be sacrificed for some greater cause. Some people make that cause some utilitarian concern about aggregate welfare, which I'd attack just as seriously as I attack non-consequentialism. Others make it whatever system of duty or virtue they have come up with. In no case am I ever expected to do anything but do my part for something other than my own interest.

I don't have that ability in me to stand here and proclaim a universal duty or virtue that makes everyone else leave me alone. If I sat down and thought for a while, I could probably come up with it. And if I used complicated enough language, I could probably even make people believe it. But I don't want to, I'm not that horrible a person. I would prefer to give people reasons for why they should leave me alone, actual reasons that apply to the real world and to humans as they are. Practical reasoning, the thing that makes us exist. No making stuff up (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pure_practical_reason).

And if we're only concerned about the world and ourselves in it, then we should understand that we exist for one reason and one reason only: to do what we want to do (as individuals because that's how we exist). We understand that we can't exist if we proclaim doing what we want to do evil. We can't exist if we don't call not doing what we want to do evil. And if we're all going to take part in a common ethical system that allows us to exist (which is recommended given our difficulty in existing without ethics), it is one that seeks to maximise the ability of everyone to do what they want to do. So that means a protection from the choices of others.

That's appealing to consequences because our existence and thus our doing what we want to do are in fact real, and the yardsticks of the system. And it's appealing to universality because humans are all the same and wherever there are humans, the above applies.

It's also 'not even remotely' flaming.

Maybe if I'd said YOU were horseshit, it might have been - but I didn't. You have continued making the same kind of baseless assertions, for which your support is a somewhat circular reference to the assertion itself.

I could have said 'bullshit, I suppose.


It's very strongly baity, as it adds utterly nothing to the conversation besides a particularly crude term, and a repeated unwillingness to address what I'm saying. That's what I reported, attempt to inflame.



I propose that your constant insistence that the whole balance of the equation can be summed up in permutations of two variables, is evidence of exactly what I've kept on saying.

You've failed to provide any alternative variables to measure goods and bads. Please do.

Not at all. What you count as a benefit in your tables can be a cost in mine, and is entirely unaccounted in your scheme. Or it can be something that is effectively neutral, from the point of view of your math, but is a noticable value according to mine.

That's the problem - the assertion selects characteristics that 'you' (that's a collective 'you') desire to be considered, and ignores everything else.

First, SC takes into account all costs incurred by all individuals, regardless of preference. SB takes into account all benefits derived by all individuals, regardless of preference. That's why they're not called Private Cost or Private Benefit.

In the real world, the MSC=MSB framework is designed to provide policy makers a powerful tool to determine the appropriate level of service that their policies are designed to provide, it's not an outcome in and of itself. When dealing with which variables to take into consideration, we must do that on an individual basis within the policy process, for each individual policy or regulation.

You guys remind me of those non-bathing smelly bearded guys who always hung out in the philosophy department discussing Kant and Hegel and Marx as though your lives depended on it - not realizing that your personal hygiene had gone to the rats.

Whew, I can almost smell it from here.

You guys remind me of those non-bathing smelly bearded guys who always hung out in the philosophy department discussing Kant and Hegel and Marx as though your lives depended on it - not realizing that your personal hygiene had gone to the rats.

Whew, I can almost smell it from here.

That's why I'm Policy ;)

We have a penchant for Gillette and Dial.

If deontological ethical theories are correct I'm curious, what would be required to show a deontological theory is correct?

You guys remind me of those non-bathing smelly bearded guys who always hung out in the philosophy department discussing Kant and Hegel and Marx as though your lives depended on it - not realizing that your personal hygiene had gone to the rats.

Whew, I can almost smell it from here.

Bit rich, coming from someone whose location is my underwear, which you suppose it's not very clean. :D

Bit rich, coming from someone whose location is my underwear, which you suppose it's not very clean. :D

I'm scrubbing as fast as I can...

I'm scrubbing as fast as I can...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandpaper is the thing for you.

They have value because of the characteristics they have,

So?

They're not moral agents, and so I don't see how they enter any system of morality at all any more than any other lump of matter does.

Because of the moral agent/moral patient distinction. I don't know if you've ever bothered to read through an animal rights thread on NSG, but this aspect has been discussed extensively, usually by FS more than me. There is no inherent logical reason why "entities that have moral obligations" and "entities that I have moral obligations toward" need be synonymous. Indeed, some things that are generally considered worthy of moral consideration--like suffering--are obviously independent of moral agency.

(Of course, none of this has anything to do with Kant specifically, who unlike consequentialist utilitarians like Bentham and Mill did make the argument that we have duties toward moral agents alone.)

With your view I'm always reminded of a question I ask myself sometimes: how is killing a fly different from killing an elephant? Is it rarity? The amount of living matter? Brains?

Um, sentience? The massive difference in the psychological capacity to experience pain? Elephants are actually especially intelligent and emotionally complex animals, like other "advanced" social animals (e.g. chimpanzees and dolphins, and, well, humans.)

This kind of slippery slope reasoning is rather analogous to Christian Right arguments against same-sex marriage. It rests on the same fallacy that just because we reject your distinctions we must reject all distinctions.

I protest the idea that I have to be sacrificed for some greater cause.

Then you are already sounding like a deontologist, not a consequentialist.

If I may not sacrifice you "for some greater cause", than I am obliged to respect your inherent worth regardless of the consequences--regardless of the neglect to that "greater cause." That is precisely the deontological position.

In no case am I ever expected to do anything but do my part for something other than my own interest.

Perhaps such a consensus against you suggests that you are missing something crucial about the nature of morality?

I would prefer to give people reasons for why they should leave me alone, actual reasons that apply to the real world and to humans as they are. Practical reasoning, the thing that makes us exist. No making stuff up (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pure_practical_reason).

Severe question-begging. You are approaching this dogmatically, and, really, lazily: having failed to attain any further than a confused and limited understanding of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (and it is hard for me to come to any other conclusion from your posts on the subject), you decide that the philosophy is confused and limited as such, and ultimately reducible to "twisted" motives (being a "horrible person") or intellectual dishonesty ("making stuff up").

I suppose I should appreciate that when push comes to shove, you do seem unable to stand by the courage of your convictions and say the same about me.

And if we're only concerned about the world and ourselves in it, then we should understand that we exist for one reason and one reason only: to do what we want to do (as individuals because that's how we exist).

Because you say so? (Because Ayn Rand says so?)

And if we're all going to take part in a common ethical system that allows us to exist (which is recommended given our difficulty in existing without ethics), it is one that seeks to maximise the ability of everyone to do what they want to do.

Seems to imply a bit of a duty-ethic, doesn't it?

Suddenly you say that there is a limit to doing what I, personally, want to do: I must respect the choices of others to do what they want to do, regardless (presumably) of whether or not I want to.

Indeed, you are thinking in terms of "we": in a sense, you are presuming the very universalization principle you would in other contexts be inclined to reject. "I believe that I should be allowed to do what I want, and thus I must acknowledge that others should be allowed to do what they want, too."

But this is obviously incompatible with the dogmatic statement that "we exist for one reason and one reason only: to do what we want to do", "as individuals." For if it is so, then no idea of respect for the choices of others should motivate me to restrain my own wants.

You know, I was going to post a pro-Kantian reply to the OP, but I think you've covered pretty much what I was going to say anyway.

Really good one, old chap.
Thankee kindly.


You get what I was saying though: people act because they presume their acts to have consequences.
I wouldn't say that people act because they presume their acts to have consequences. They know that their actions will have some consequences, but that's a different thing from the motivation(s) of action.

We do that for every single action we undertake, and its the thing that we do so well that it has become our main distinguishing feature as a species and that has allowed our survival and evolutionary success.

But when we evaluate ethics, all of a sudden this is irrelevant and we're supposed to ignore the consequences of an action? Properly considering an action separate from its consequences is not something the sane human brain is equipped to do.
So now all non-consequentialists are mad?

I don't see how 'the ends don't justify the means' (a simple formulation of deontology) or 'the agent matters, not the act' ( a simple formulation of virtue ethics) are either insane notions, nor ones removed from 'real' life. You try and make out that only consequentialism is applicable to reality, but this is simply not the case.

No, I think they've been roped into a system that justifies hurting people, written by people with less than honest motives.
Again, I'd query what "less than honest motives" you believe Kant has?

What is important isn't what "categorical imperatives" or anything of the sort actually say. By their nature they're so vague as to be useless 100% of the time.
I fail to see how something like 'never break promises' is vague to the point of uselessness.

What is important is the way of arguing for them, because in the process of deriving them one has imposed a concept of epistemology that completely ignores reality.
Could you expand this thought?

I had a look at the former in particular (to the extent that I could), and I don't see the basic problem overcome at all. He talks about virtues and "flourishing".
Yes, eudaimonic virtue ethics.

The stuff Aristotle talked about:

By virtue I mean virtue of character; for this is about feelings and actions... We can be afraid, for instance, or be confident, or have appetites, or get angry, or feel pity, and in general have pleasure and pain, both too much and too little, and in both ways not well. But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way is the... best condition, and this is proper virtue.
- Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b17-24

But if we're looking at the flourishing of some group of animals, and some group of humans, both are looking to consume the same resources, I don't see how he gets past the need for comparing and making a judgement - sometimes an either/or judgement.
You've got to get out of consequentialist thinking if you're too deal with virtue effectively. Virtues guide action for the virtue ethicist, whether an action does or does not accord with virtue that is the reason to complete it, instead of its consequences or its compliance with deontological rules or contractual constraints. Character traits are evaluated as virtues or vices teleologically, while actions, practices, and policies are not. This is important because a particular action might have good consequences, yet be cruel, arrogant or dishonest.

When confronted with a dilemma, we ask what is the virtuous course of action, based upon our understanding of what are and are not virtuous character traits (which is a whole huge subject in itself, and not one I want to get into; there is a large range of opinions within virtue ethics on this), based upon the persons, the agents, that we are.

Point being, we don't need to rely on consequentialist thinking if we have a virtue-based framework.

I want an ethical position to tell me what to do when I (not some other thing that doesn't have to distort the world by perceiving it) encounter Situation X.
Then you should have no qualms with virtue ethics.

If it can't do that, and no system that doesn't refer to the real world (= consequences)
The real world is consequences?

I think the 'real world' is made up of people, not the results of their actions.

You see, to me the idea that everyone is unhappy and that no one actually gets the chance to be happy is a bad (=evil) thing. The idea that to you it is not is what baffles me
I have never indicated anything of the sort.

What makes you say this?

Of course they wouldn't. But whatever they do sanction, the problem is that I can't actually attack it, because I can't point at the terrible consequences.
If you can show that any action recommended by virtue-based or deontological ethics leads to terrible consequences, then you'd have a decent argument that the two approaches are flawed.

I doubt you'd come to such a conclusion, however.

I'm curious, what would be required to show a deontological theory is correct?

A good argument... as with anything in philosophy?

Kant offers one, though a surprisingly small number of his critics actually bother to try to understand and critique it, preferring to focus on appeals to consequences about his conclusions (or various straw man versions of them).

The real world is consequences?

I think the 'real world' is made up of people, not the results of their actions.


I don't think it's an either-or. Both are present.

I don't think it's an either-or. Both are present.
Both are important, obviously, but I don't see consequences walking down the street.

Both are important, obviously, but I don't see consequences walking down the street.

That you didn't stay where you were.

That you didn't stay where you were.
No, not the consequences of walking down the street, I don't see consequences walking about.

In other words, I'm uncomfortable with NL's suggestion (which I have perhaps misread) that consequences are the real world.

No, not the consequences of walking down the street, I don't see consequences walking about.

In other words, I'm uncomfortable with NL's suggestion (which I have perhaps misread) that consequences are the real world.

Consequences are an integral part of the real world, and our decision making processes and we deal with them all the time, although not in a formal mental architecture.

Because in one case I am stopping someone from harming me and in another case I am harming someone else.


In both cases you are stopping someone from harming you (him not flicking the switch to defuse the bomb is a behaviour that results in harm), it's defence against harm, whether intentional harm or not.


The first affirms my own freedom

By denying a freedom of the other.


No, but it requires that someone else's behavior directly threatens mine.

In both cases they do.


Then what meaning does it have to say that "Person A's saved life compensates for Person B's being manipulated"?


For one thing, you're not really comparing the relative worth of people, but of duties, but apparently you're convinced they do not conflict in that scenario, so I shall just use a generalised hypothetical: person X is in a situation where he is forced to make a choice (there is no way he can abstain), A or B. A will involve you killing an innocent person, B will involve you spilling drink on the floor you promised your mother you would never get dirty. Is there a deontological approach to such a situation? In this case, you're assessing the relative worth of duties, the duty not to break a promise, and a duty not to kill - saying that the duty not to kill an innocent is more important than the duty not to break a trivial promise does not constitute degrading the people themselves tied to the duties.


"Circumstantial", perhaps, but all moral theories make distinctions of circumstance.

"Consequential", no. The distinctions of circumstance a deontological theory makes are (at least sometimes) distinctions pertaining to the relations between people and the character of the act, not its consequences.

Why is circumstantial any better? I could say that you're still adjusting the worth of someone due to the circumstance, what about circumstance gives you the ability to do that, but not consequence?

In both cases you are stopping someone from harming you

No, if he does not flick the switch, he does not harm me. He merely does not stop me from being harmed. But while he has no right to harm me, I also have no claim on his autonomy such that I may force him to act against his will to prevent harm to me.

By denying a freedom of the other.

To harm me, yes.

To adopt a slightly different angle: I am obligated to will freedom universally, but when another's freedom attacks mine (or somebody else's) I cannot consistently do so, and thus am entitled to choose.

(But when someone's mere inaction allows my or another's freedom to be violated, his or her conduct is not inconsistent with our freedom: it is the third-party cause that is. Without that cause, it would not be an issue.)

In both cases they do.

Only if you deliberately confuse the meaning of "threaten." Seriously, if you want to say that my distinction is arbitrary, go ahead and do so. But don't pretend that it's incoherent.

Is there a deontological approach to such a situation?

You break your promise and do not commit murder. A promise is not a pledge to do something by any means necessary: we accept that sometimes people fail to fulfill their pledged obligations for good reasons.

If I did make a promise to do something by any means necessary, then I still must break my promise, but I am morally at fault for making such a promise in the first place, which by its very nature is illegitimate.

(In neither case, strictly speaking, have I lied, because in both cases I, presumably, made my promise on the assumption that I would actually fulfill it.)

I could say that you're still adjusting the worth of someone due to the circumstance

But I'm not. It's just that respect for the worth of people means different things in different circumstances.