NationStates Jolt Archive

SCOTUS just issued a 5-4 ruling in the case of Herring v. United States (http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-513.pdf), No. 07-513 (Jan. 14, 2009) (pdf). The issue was: does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search? The majority held that: When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

Facts of the Case

The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could “result in appreciable deterrence” of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that “as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply." The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008.

Question

Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search?

Conclusion

Held: When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Pp. 4–13.

(a) The fact that a search or arrest was unreasonable does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223. The rule is not an individual right and applies only where its deterrent effect outweighs the substantial cost of letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free. United States v. Leon,, 468 U.S. 897, 908–909. For example, it does not apply if police acted “inobjectively reasonable reliance” on an invalid warrant. Id., at 922. In applying Leon’s good-faith rule to police who reasonably relied onmistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 14–15, the Court left unresolved the issue confronted here: whether evidence should be suppressed if the police committed the error, id., at 16, n. 5. Pp. 4–7.

(b) The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by its deterrent effect varies with the degree of law enforcement culpability. See, e.g., Leon, supra, at 911. Indeed, the abuses that gave rise to the rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S 383. An error arising fromnonrecurring and attenuated negligence is far removed from the coreconcerns that led to the rule’s adoption. Pp. 7–9.

(c) To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be suffi-ciently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and suffi-ciently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. The pertinent analysis is objective, not an inquiry into the arresting officers’ subjective awareness. See, e.g., Leon, su-pra, at 922, n. 23. Pp. 9–11.

(d) The conduct here was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. The marginal benefits that might follow from suppressingevidence obtained in these circumstances cannot justify the substan-tial costs of exclusion. Leon, supra, at 922. Pp. 11–13.

(source (http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07_513/)for the above facts and question, the conclusion comes from the syllabus of the case and is not the official opinon. The opinion is linked in my first sentence of this post --but also here (http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-513.pdf).)

I am working on a summary of the dissent. Then I'll make more comments.

EDIT: Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinoin which was joined by Justices Steven, Souter, and Breyer.

Well, I'm not convinced that putting some punk behind bars for 27 months for some meth and a gun is of greater societal interest than making sure the local police review their procedures and personnel to make sure these things don't happen again.

Direct quote from the dissent:

Petitioner Bennie Dean Herring was arrested, and subjected to a search incident to his arrest, although no warrant was outstanding against him, and the police lacked probable cause to believe he was engaged in criminal activity. The arrest and ensuing search therefore violated Herring’s Fourth Amendment right “to be secure. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Court of Appeals so determined, and the Government does not contend otherwise. The exclusionary rule provides redress for Fourth Amendment violations by placing the government in the position it would have been in had there been no unconstitutional arrest and search. The rule thus strongly encourages police compliance with the Fourth Amendment in the future. The Court, however, holds the rule inapplicable because careless recordkeeping by the police—not flagrant or deliberate misconduct—accounts for Herring’s arrest.

I would not so constrict the domain of the exclusionary rule and would hold the rule dispositive of this case: “f courts are to have any power to discourage [police] error of [the kind here at issue], it must be through the application of the exclusionary rule.” [I]Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 22–23 (1995) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The unlawful search in this case was contested in court because the police found methamphetamine in Herring’s pocket and a pistol in his truck. But the “most serious impact” of theCourt’s holding will be on innocent persons “wrongfully arrested based on erroneous information [carelessly maintained] in a computer data base.” Id., at 22.

....

Negligent recordkeeping errors by law enforcement threaten individual liberty, are susceptible to deterrence by the exclusionary rule, and cannot be remedied effectively through other means. Such errors present no occasion to further erode the exclusionary rule. The rule “is needed to make the Fourth Amendment something real; a guarantee that does not carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained by its violation is a chimera.” Calandra, 414 U. S., at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In keeping with the rule’s “core concerns,” ante, at 9, suppression should have attended the unconstitutional search in this case.

Well, I'm not convinced that putting some punk behind bars for 27 months for some meth and a gun is of greater societal interest than making sure the local police review their procedures and personnel to make sure these things don't happen again.

I believe I agree with you and the dissent. Police negligence can be and should be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule.

AP article: Court says evidence valid despite police error (http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hPfLqVou2xAJIUronkbTWjMElLkgD95N0TF80)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that evidence found after an arrest based on incorrect information from police files may be used against a criminal suspect.

In a 5-4 split, the court upheld the conviction of an Alabama man on federal drug and gun charges.

Bennie Dean Herring was arrested on what the Coffee County, Ala., sheriff's department thought was a valid warrant from a neighboring county. It turned out that the warrant for Herring's arrest had been recalled five months earlier.

Herring argued that police negligence should automatically lead to the suppression of evidence found after an unjustified arrest.

But Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the court, said the evidence may be used "when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements."

Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas sided with Roberts.

In a dissent for the other four justices, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the ruling "leaves Herring, and others like him, with no remedy for violations of their constitutional rights."

Ginsburg said accurate police record-keeping is of paramount importance, particularly with the widespread use of electronic databases. Justices Stephen Breyer, David Souter and John Paul Stevens also dissented.

Herring was arrested after a neighboring Dale County sheriff's employee found a computer entry noting that Herring was wanted for failing to appear in court on a felony charge. The sheriff's computer database had not been updated to reflect the recall of the warrant for Herring's arrest.

Meanwhile, in a search after Herring's arrest, Coffee County deputies found methamphetamine in Herring's pockets and an unloaded gun under the front seat of his truck.

Some courts have ruled that as a deterrent to police misconduct, the fruits of a similar search may be excluded from evidence.

But the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta said that suppressing evidence in Herring's case would be unlikely to deter sloppy record keeping.

The majority held that: When police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

By "isolated negligence", does that mean simply, "I forgot..." ?

Does "systemic error" imply a continuing pattern of similar behavior?

Does "reckless disregard" mean "yeah, we know the 4th, but fuck it..." ?


I disagree with the ruling. Besides, if the guy was really a meth head, he'll be arrested tomorrow, because he won't be able to stop himself from doing something stupid again.

Yikes, sounds like the US is moving closer to the Canadian position that police action made in error, yet in good faith, will not automatically trigger exclusion unless NOT excluding the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

I have yet to decide, for myself, which approach I support more. The automatic exclusionary rule (USian, perhaps until now...) or the contextual exclusion rule (Canadian).

I see this ruling as problematic in terms of precedent, and in introducing a 'contextual' response to violations, but once again, I'm not sure I fully oppose it. Automatic exclusion has been justified by providing redress for constitutional violations, which generally brings to one's mind issues of malice, etc...is it really the most effective way to prevent incompetence? Essentially, is prevention of incompetence a goal of the automatic exclusionary rule?

I tend to lean in the direction of 'yes'....because malice can often be disguised as incompetence. Nonetheless, I think the argument that allowing such 18th-century style 'technicalities' to defeat 'substantive justice' actually undermines public confidence in the judicial system.

And here I sit, firmly on the fence...very helpful, no?

But the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta said that suppressing evidence in Herring's case would be unlikely to deter sloppy record keeping.

Did they just diss Alabama? :p

Yikes, sounds like the US is moving closer to the Canadian position that police action made in error, yet in good faith, will not automatically trigger exclusion unless NOT excluding the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

I have yet to decide, for myself, which approach I support more. The automatic exclusionary rule (USian, perhaps until now...) or the contextual exclusion rule (Canadian).

I see this ruling as problematic in terms of precedent, and in introducing a 'contextual' response to violations, but once again, I'm not sure I fully oppose it. Automatic exclusion has been justified by providing redress for constitutional violations, which generally brings to one's mind issues of malice, etc...is it really the most effective way to prevent incompetence? Essentially, is prevention of incompetence a goal of the automatic exclusionary rule?

I tend to lean in the direction of 'yes'....because malice can often be disguised as incompetence. Nonetheless, I think the argument that allowing such 18th-century style 'technicalities' to defeat 'substantive justice' actually undermines public confidence in the judicial system.

And here I sit, firmly on the fence...very helpful, no?

Prevention of abuse is the purpose of the exclusionary rule. Since abuse cannot always be proven (they can say, "well, we forgot this time"), it's best to err on the side of exclusion.

Prevention of abuse is the purpose of the exclusionary rule. Since abuse cannot always be proven (they can say, "well, we forgot this time"), it's best to err on the side of exclusion.
Devil's advocate:

It can go too far.

In the good 'olden' days of 18th century British justice, listing the accused's profession as 'farmer' instead of 'weaver' would result in the charge being dropped entirely. That kind of legal formalism doesn't really serve any purpose.

If the police believe, in good faith, that they are acting within their legal powers, following all other steps properly, has there really been a great injustice done? Do we want to force the police to double/triple/quadrupal check all warrants to ensure that they are still valid? Is this a useful restriction, or does it tie the hands of law enforcement too firmly? Will essential time be lost if we require law enforcement to second guess the decisions made at the higher judicial levels?

Yikes, sounds like the US is moving closer to the Canadian position that police action made in error, yet in good faith, will not automatically trigger exclusion unless NOT excluding the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

I have yet to decide, for myself, which approach I support more. The automatic exclusionary rule (USian, perhaps until now...) or the contextual exclusion rule (Canadian).

I see this ruling as problematic in terms of precedent, and in introducing a 'contextual' response to violations, but once again, I'm not sure I fully oppose it. Automatic exclusion has been justified by providing redress for constitutional violations, which generally brings to one's mind issues of malice, etc...is it really the most effective way to prevent incompetence? Essentially, is prevention of incompetence a goal of the automatic exclusionary rule?

I tend to lean in the direction of 'yes'....because malice can often be disguised as incompetence. Nonetheless, I think the argument that allowing such 18th-century style 'technicalities' to defeat 'substantive justice' actually undermines public confidence in the judicial system.

And here I sit, firmly on the fence...very helpful, no?

FWIW, the dissent (accurately, I think) discusses two of the primary viewpoints regarding the U.S. Exclusionary Rule:

A
The Court states that the exclusionary rule is not a defendant’s right, ante, at 5; rather, it is simply a remedy applicable only when suppression would result in appreciable deterrence that outweighs the cost to the justice system, ante, at 12. See also ante, at 9 (“[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”).

The Court’s discussion invokes a view of the exclusionary rule famously held by renowned jurists Henry J. Friendly and Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. Over 80 years ago, Cardozo, then seated on the New York Court of Appeals, commented critically on the federal exclusionary rule, which had not yet been applied to the States. He suggested that in at least some cases the rule exacted too high a price from the criminal justice system. See People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24–25, 150 N. E. 585, 588–589 (1926). In words often quoted, Cardozo questioned whether the criminal should “go free because the constable has blundered.” Id., at 21, 150 N. E., at 587.

Judge Friendly later elaborated on Cardozo’s query. “The sole reason for exclusion,” Friendly wrote, “is that experience has demonstrated this to be the only effective method for deterring the police from violating the Consti-tution.” The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 951 (1965). He thought it excessive, in light of the rule’s aim to deter police conduct, to require exclusion when the constable had merely “blundered” — when a police officer committed a technical error in an on-the-spot judgment, id., at 952, or made a “slight and unintentional miscalculation,” id., at 953. As the Court recounts, Judge Friendly suggested that deterrence of police improprieties could be “sufficiently accomplished” by confining the rule to “evidence obtained by flagrant ordeliberate violation of rights.” Ibid.; ante, at 8.

B
Others have described “a more majestic conception” of the Fourth Amendment and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule. Evans, 514 U. S., at 18 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Protective of the fundamental “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the Amendment “is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1983). I share that vision of the Amendment.

The exclusionary rule is “a remedy necessary to ensure that” the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions “are observed in fact.” Id., at 1389; see Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A “Principled Basis ”Rather Than An “Empirical Proposition”? 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 600 (1983). The rule’s service as an essential auxiliary to the Amendment earlier inclined the Court to hold the two inseparable. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560, 568–569 (1971). Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 469–471 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id., at 477–479, 483–485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Beyond doubt, a main objective of the rule “is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). But the rule also serves other important purposes: It “enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness,” and it “assur[es] the people—all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 13 (1968) (“A rule admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.”); Kamisar, supra, at 604 (a principal reason for the exclusionary rule is that “the Court’s aid should be denied ‘in order to maintain respect for law [and] to preserve the judicial process from contamination’” (quoting Olmstead, 277 U. S., at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

The exclusionary rule, it bears emphasis, is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment violation. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 652 (1961)(noting “the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies”); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 360 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as “the primary instrument for enforcing the [F]ourth [A]mendment”). Civil liability will not lie for “the vast majority of [F]ourth [A]mendment violations—the frequent infringements motivated by commendable zeal, not condemnable malice.” Stewart, 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1389. Criminal prosecutions or administrative sanctions against the offending officers and injunctive relief against widespread violations are an even farther cry. See id., at 1386–1388.

I join the dissent in endorsing the second viewpoint.

Devil's advocate:

It can go too far.

In the good 'olden' days of 18th century British justice, listing the accused's profession as 'farmer' instead of 'weaver' would result in the charge being dropped entirely. That kind of legal formalism doesn't really serve any purpose.

If the police believe, in good faith, that they are acting within their legal powers, following all other steps properly, has there really been a great injustice done? Do we want to force the police to double/triple/quadrupal check all warrants to ensure that they are still valid? Is this a useful restriction, or does it tie the hands of law enforcement too firmly? Will essential time be lost if we require law enforcement to second guess the decisions made at the higher judicial levels?

There is a limited role for a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but this ruling expands that exception beyond reasonableness. Here the "mistake" is entirely the fault of the police and without said mistake, they would never have been able to conduct the search. This is not a case where the police had probable cause and there is some minor error in the warrant. The whole basis for the arrest and search was due to a police error.

Remember, the violation of the 4th Amendment has occurred. No one disputes that the search was illegal. The question is whether we should overlook the violation of the 4th Amendment out of some "higher" purpose of punishing wrongdoers.

It'd be a lot easier as defence counsel in Canada if there was an automatic exclusionary rule, that's for damn sure :P

I'm going to have to think about this a bit more...I don't like the amazing leeway given in Canada even in situations where there have been constitutional violations...I think it really erodes certainty, and encourages a 'well let's try and maybe we'll get away with it' attitude amongst law enforcement. So I do think that any exception to exclusion needs to be rather extraordinary. Is incompetence extraordinary? I'm not convinced that it is.

There is a limited role for a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but this ruling expands that exception beyond reasonableness. Here the "mistake" is entirely the fault of the police and without said mistake, they would never have been able to conduct the search. This is not a case where the police had probable cause and there is some minor error in the warrant. The whole basis for the arrest and search was due to a police error.

Remember, the violation of the 4th Amendment has occurred. No one disputes that the search was illegal. The question is whether we should overlook the violation of the 4th Amendment out of some "higher" purpose of punishing wrongdoers.

It does break down to whether or not you believe the exclusionary rule is a right - or not a right. It's rather alarming that someone could opine that it's not a right.

How important is the "systemic" criteria to this?

If their computers were reviewed, and found to have only one such error in ten years, would the premise of "careless" record keeping have been less in play here?

If their computers were found to be rife with such errors, and this is just the first time defense counsel was able to find out about it, would that shift the balance?

In terms of the value of deterring police misconduct, I see the value in including deterring the use of anything less than the most rigorous, diligent, controlled, and verified record keeping systems.

If this were an honest error, some instances of which would occur even if agencies allocate the greatest possible resources to training, technology, and policy, and it could be shown that there was no intentional disregard for constitutional protections for the accused, but it remains that the warrant was improper, applying the exclusionary rule would still give impetus for the agency to yet further refine the system, even if the approach to a perfect system is asymptotic?

It does break down to whether or not you believe the exclusionary rule is a right - or not a right. It's rather alarming that someone could opine that it's not a right.

It's a procedural rule.

You have the severed head of a child in your suitcase. Police are not allowed to search your suitcase, and they do so anyway. They find the head. You are charged. You get off because they shouldn't have looked.

Some people would argue that this is not justice. Yes. Very alarming, those crazies.

Oh wait. Aren't you one of those?

It does break down to whether or not you believe the exclusionary rule is a right - or not a right. It's rather alarming that someone could opine that it's not a right.

Its a limitation on government power, the purpose of which is to protect citizen rights.

So, to me, that's a right, or at least a mechanism to preserve a right.

It's a procedural rule.

You have the severed head of a child in your suitcase. Police are not allowed to search your suitcase, and they do so anyway. They find the head. You are charged. You get off because they shouldn't have looked.

Some people would argue that this is not justice. Yes. Very alarming, those crazies.

Oh wait. Aren't you one of those?

After all these years, you still don't know me...

"I think the Constitution should be used less as a shield for the guilty and more as a sword for their innocent victims."

It's supposed to be a shield for the innocent, too. Unfortunately there is no way to make it a shield for the innocent unless it is a shield for everyone.

After all these years, you still don't know me...

You say that like this is something I should regret...

"I think the Constitution should be used less as a shield for the guilty and more as a sword for their innocent victims."

Its separating the two in a given case that these protections help to accomplish.

If we already knew who was guilty and innocent, as easily as is often thought, a lot of Constitutional rights wouldn't be necessary.

It's supposed to be a shield for the innocent, too. Unfortunately there is no way to make it a shield for the innocent unless it is a shield for everyone.

This is actually a key point. If we were to engage too much in after the fact reasoning (as is done in Canukistan), then a person's guilt or innocence would determine whether or not an 'acceptable' violation had occurred. That violation should be judged 'acceptable' or at the outset. This is the biggest problem I have with s.24(2) analysis (exclusion based on constitutional violation) in my own country.

You say that like this is something I should regret...

Yes.

"I think the Constitution should be used less as a shield for the guilty and more as a sword for their innocent victims."

With all due respect to you and Jack McCoy, this sentence is nonsensical.

Think about it. What provisions of the Constitution only "shield the guilty" and could be used "as a sword for [the] innocent"?

How does the 4th Amendment protect only the guilty? How could it be used as a "sword"?

EDIT: The 4th Amendment (like other constitutional rights) is a fundamental element of liberty and a requirement of good government. It is not some mere technicality.

Yes.

As usual, your argument lacks substance.

I am firmly on the side of the dissent here. How do we determine what exactly constitutes as "isolated negligence"?

I fear a hole has just been made that has the distinct possiblity of getting much, much larger.

I was going to make this thread and entitle it something like: "Protection from unreasonable search and seizure? Not any more!" or "The neocon court hates America."

After all these years, you still don't know me...

So the answer is "only if the Democrats are against it"?

I am firmly on the side of the dissent here. How do we determine what exactly constitutes as "isolated negligence"?

I fear a hole has just been made that has the distinct possiblity of getting much, much larger.

We don't, and therein lies the problem. We get to judge isolated negligence based on what the cops tell us. And given the trustworthiness of police departments, which ones do you think are going to admit they were actively violating the 4th Amendment instead of "accidentally" violating it so the evidence can be admitted?

This is pretty much rewarding the police for being unscrupulous and/or incompetent.

Meh, long as he doesnt shoot anyone, provided its not self defense, then I dont care if he has Meth and a gun....in fact I think it should be his right to own it if he chooses...

Its more Important, imo, to keep the police from just pulling warrants out of their ass whenever they please....the lack of cause for the cop to have one around here is ridiculous....

With all due respect to you and Jack McCoy
Thank you sir. You get a thumbs up!

We don't, and therein lies the problem. We get to judge isolated negligence based on what the cops tell us. And given the trustworthiness of police departments, which ones do you think are going to admit they were actively violating the 4th Amendment instead of "accidentally" violating it so the evidence can be admitted?

This is pretty much rewarding the police for being unscrupulous and/or incompetent.

This. I dont trust cops. I dont like that they just got a free pass for abusing the 4th ammendment.

I dont like that they just got a free pass for abusing the 4th ammendment.

This is what I see as the point of the affirming judges. The cops didn't abuse anything. They acted on a warrant to arrest a wanted man and found some drugs and a gun. There is no vast conspiracy to violate people's rights - you can't blame the patrolmen for a clerical error. Perhaps this should be a case of sure it happened this once so you're ok this time, but don't do it again.

This is what I see as the point of the affirming judges. The cops didn't abuse anything. They acted on a warrant to arrest a wanted man and found some drugs and a gun. There is no vast conspiracy to violate people's rights - you can't blame the patrolmen for a clerical error. Perhaps this should be a case of sure it happened this once so you're ok this time, but don't do it again.

But then you sacrifice some of the impetus for making the utmost effort to make sure they "don't do it again".

There is no vast conspiracy to violate people's rights
Probably not in this case, no, but the ruling opens up that capability for the police. The ruling awards police departments for being unscrupulous and/or incompetent - if they "accidentally" don't follow procedure or law when investigating and arresting some one, they get a free pass to prosecute that person with whatever evidence they found.

"Oh sorry, I meant to break down the door of a house on another street.. in another city... - hey is that some pot? You're going to jail."
No recourse.

Probably not in this case, no, but the ruling opens up that capability for the police. The ruling awards police departments for being unscrupulous and/or incompetent - if they "accidentally" don't follow procedure or law when investigating and arresting some one, they get a free pass to prosecute that person with whatever evidence they found.

"Oh sorry, I meant to break down the door of a house on another street.. in another city... - hey is that some pot? You're going to jail."
No recourse.

^^^This

Probably not in this case, no, but the ruling opens up that capability for the police. The ruling awards police departments for being unscrupulous and/or incompetent - if they "accidentally" don't follow procedure or law when investigating and arresting some one, they get a free pass to prosecute that person with whatever evidence they found.

"Oh sorry, I meant to break down the door of a house on another street.. in another city... - hey is that some pot? You're going to jail."
No recourse.

Police, fortunately, are held accountable to government documentation standards as well, and egregious negligence is documentation (which will be found, given the oversight and auditing powers that exist in most states) will result in termination of funding, loss of certification, removal from employment, state takeover and criminal charges. All types of government auditing powers exist that can do this (in Ohio, for instance, the Attorney General, the Auditor of State, DAS and local elected officials have the ability to review police practices, and all of these folks regularly do).

The courts aren't the only thing holding police powers in check, the civil service and politicians do as well. When the police overstep their bounds, we typically wind up with case law that not only restricts what they do, but also what we (in the overseeing civil service) do.