NationStates Jolt Archive

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective? If objective, what is it and what makes it so? If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another? Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means? Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

Is Morality objective or subjective?

"Objective"--at least in the sense that there are particular absolute moral standards.

If objective, what is it and what makes it so?

Morality is a product of reason as applied to the question of "What should I do?" Its power to prescribe absolutely is derived from reason's own binding character.

Going down into smaller questions, do the means justify the ends?

Do you mean "Do the ends justify the means"? They do not; the greatest good in the world cannot justify mistreating one individual. Neither, for the matter, do the means justify the ends.

Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

I've always thought this is a fairly useless question, though for some reason it comes up a lot. As a person, what matters in terms of fulfilling my moral obligation must necessarily be my intentions--I can't ensure that certain effects happen, I can only try. As an observer, though, my attitude toward the actions of others (with respect to whether or not I am inclined to prevent them, at least) is going to be focused on their actual effects.

Both of these seem fairly trivial truths to me, true for any credible moral theory.

Morality is objective, and everything you could ever possibly do is wrong because Hell is the destiny of humanity. Sorry, but that's just the way it is.

It's time for a discussion of ethics.
Is it?
What do you fellows think?
I think it's not.
Is Morality objective or subjective?
The latter.
If objective, what is it and what makes it so?
It's not.
If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another?
Nope.
Going down into smaller questions, do the means justify the ends?
Huh?
The ends don't justify the means.
Don't know what to make of the means justifying the ends.
Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?
The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Intentions are all nice and dandy, but it's the deeds that have an impact. So, no.

"Objective"--at least in the sense that there are particular absolute moral standards.



Morality is a product of reason as applied to the question of "What should I do?" Its power to prescribe absolutely is derived from reason's own binding character.

So how have you resolved the "is-ought" problem?

Do you mean "Do the ends justify the means"? They do not; the greatest good in the world cannot justify mistreating one individual. Neither, for the matter, do the means justify the ends.

Yeah, thanks, I edited it.


I've always thought this is a fairly meaningless question. As a person, what matters in terms of fulfilling my moral obligation must necessarily be my intentions--I can't ensure that certain effects happen, I can only try. As an observer, though, my attitude toward the actions of others (with respect to whether or not I am inclined to prevent them, at least) is going to be focused on their actual effects.

Both of these seem fairly trivial truths to me, true for any credible moral theory.

It's time for a discussion of ethics.
Is it?
Yes, but first I believe that you were going to do a Powerpoint presentation on St. Augustine and Plato.

Nope.

So how can we have any basis for condeming the moral actions of, say, a murderer? How can we create a more moral society? How can we prescribe goals to reach (greater happiness overall, more security, ect.) for a society if we have no moral basis?

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective? If objective, what is it and what makes it so? If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another? Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means? Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

Morality is defined by that which defines all, the black and white laws of science.

So how have you resolved the "is-ought" problem?

By not founding morality in "is."

By not founding morality in "is."

How does your reason lead you to a moral sytem? What conclusions have you found?

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective? If objective, what is it and what makes it so? If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another? Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means? Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

sometimes

How does your reason lead you to a moral sytem? What conclusions have you found?

Both of those questions are too broad to answer completely and thoroughly, at least here, at the moment.

I ascribe by a broadly Kantian framework: I'd argue that reason provides us with certain necessary conditions for what can and cannot qualify as a legitimate moral rule of action, simply from the necessary content of the concept of "moral."

Furthermore, respect for the binding power of this moral rationality in other persons (on the same grounds that we respect it in our own) gets us to respect the dignity and inviolability of their freedom... which means that we recognize ourselves as absolutely forbidden to treat them in certain ways.

Yes, but first I believe that you were going to do a Powerpoint presentation on St. Augustine and Plato.
Uhm, no. Already did a presentation on Plato once at university. That should suffice. ;)
So how can we have any basis for condeming the moral actions of, say, a murderer? How can we create a more moral society? How can we prescribe goals to reach (greater happiness overall, more security, ect.) for a society if we have no moral basis?
Note that the question was "If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another?"
I have my doubts whether there is a basis for putting one moral system above another moral system.

Any such moral system is based on what members of a society have agreed upon to be the right thing to do, the right behavior to follow. Another society may have established a moral system based on different, or even constrasting values.

Therefore, it's truly subjective which set of morals you would like to apply as the basis of your moral system.

I always compare this with the example of a warrior society. In said society, it is completely acceptable, if not expected, that might makes right and killing others is a way of personal advancement, a valid means of furthering one's personal goals, and of establishing the pecking order and hierarchy of said society.

Now, should a person decide not to participate in said behavior, from an internal point of view of said society, the person behaves amorally since he doesn't follow the rules established and agreed upon by the majority of the society's members.

From an outsiders point of view, however, the exceptional behavior of one person could be judged as moral whereas the whole society would be regarded as acting amorally.

That, however, is based solely on which set of morals one applies. In most human societies today, it seems that things like the Golden Rule (Do not do unto others what you would not want them do unto you.), or something like the 10 Commandments (Honor your father and mother, You shall not murder, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor, You shall not covet your neighbor's house, You shall not covet your neighbor's wife) are agreed upon by most.

The reason for that, in my opinion, is that to disregard those codes of behavior are a source for social unrest and interpersonal conflict. To follow those codes of conduct, however, makes living together in a society a lot easier. That's why I believe that most societies have agreed on a certain set of moral guidelines, a certain intersection can be pretty much found everywhere people live together.

People who disregard those morals like thieves, murderers and such are regarded as outcasts of the society.

(As an interesting side note - in many stories in which there is, for example, a guild of thieves, even those have established a code of conduct with a certain set of morals, even though it is based on the morals of a shadow society existing underneath the cover of society with a different set of rules.)

Kant's Categorical Imperative is a starting point to see which set of rules could be used as a basis on which morality could be based.

Uhm, no. Already did a presentation on Plato once at university. That should suffice. ;)
But you're still in University, and it's time to take your last exam! It should be relatively easy, though, it's just your standard Ancient Egyptian Naked Calculus exam. And here's your mother and aunt and grandmother to cheer you on, provided you don't develop a distracting erection.

I always compare this with the example of a warrior society. In said society, it is completely acceptable, if not expected, that might makes right and killing others is a way of personal advancement, a valid means of furthering one's personal goals, and of establishing the pecking order and hierarchy of said society.?
Could you elaborate what sort of examples you're thinking of? Both for warrior societies and for killing with no justification beyond self-advancement?
Sounds like a recipe for disaster rather than a stable society. I thought people always at least needed an excuse to kill someone from their own society; such as imagined crimes, or offenses against one's honour.

I'm of the opinion that yes, there is an "objective" standard for moral action, in as much as "objectivity" means anything, but that it is almost certainly unknowable, and consequently, only subjective interpretations can actually be practically applicable. That is to say, there is no objective system of morality, but subjective systems can be informed by experience.

Let's look at it this way. Reality can be said to consist of two agencies - there is me (or you, or "the subjective", if you will), and there is the rest of reality other than me. Morality is what is in the interests of reality as a whole. These interests are subjective to reality, but reality's subjective is our objective.

The assumption I make is that perception acts as a form of informative, bidirectional communication between these two agencies. I, as an observer, am unable to directly experience what is in reality's interests, but by probing reality and seeing how it responds, I can roughly grasp some idea of what it does and does not like. To use the obvious example, human agency's role in environmental decline would appear to suggest that it is a mistake to casually leave waste by-products lying around.

Obviously, this communication is as temperamental and uncertain as communication between people. Reality might be in a bad mood today, I might be misinterpreting due to issues in the language barrier, or it might be stringing me along for some unknown purpose. The thing is, just like with any other mature relationship, treating the world with both grace and a strong will seems to work to our mutual benefit. So, y'know, I trust it. After all, without it, I wouldn't be where I am today, would I?

Now, what about me? :D

*snip* After all, without it, I wouldn't be where I am today, would I?

The mental asylum?

Is Morality objective or subjective?No.
Not in their usual sense in this type of discussion. It is neither written in the fabric of the universe, nor arbitrary. It's a societal construct subject to cultural evolution; which provides a continuity from past to present to future. As circumstances change, morality should change; because morality is about choices, and the available choices vary with circumstances.

do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another?Live in both, and decide which one works out better. Now, this also means some moral systems are incomparable, because we cannot even imagine what it is like to live in their society.
Taking the evolutionary view, the better is whichever one survives in the struggle of cultural competition. (But note, that our choice is important there. We have some influence on what path we take.)

Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means?Specific ends, no, not usually. But if you include enough in "the ends", sure; just don't forget to include people's distress or elation about one's intentions as part of the end state.
A badly botched breakfast in bed by your children may not by itself justify the mess in the kitchen; but if in addition their intentions made you happy, then with this added resultant it may have been worth it after all.

Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?I'd say they are both important. A decision you make no can't be based on what the effects will be, only on what they may be. So it would be unfair to judge them on the former.
But merely intending the best state of affairs is not enough, for the same reason. The desired state may be unlikely; and adjacent states in the phase-space of possible futures may be bad. So it's a matter of making a best judgment based on the knowledge and insight you have.
Intending the best when you really ought to know it won't happen is not commendable.

The mental asylum?
NSG, but close enough.

Was that a genuine inquiry? :(

there is only one true morality and that is the avoidance of causing suffering.

it has absolutely nothing to do with any belief nor lack of it, though it does have subtle implications seldom considered outside of them.

neither makiavellianism nor procustianism qualify. though of the two, makiavellianism is the further from it, at least in principal.

NSG, but close enough.

Was that a genuine inquiry? :(

Can an action be morally good despite bad intent?

EDIT: I ask because I feel this makes morality non-objective, if morality is defined by, if I read you right, consequences.

...and no, merely jesting you sensitive soul you

Can an action be morally good despite bad intent?

...and no, merely jesting you sensitive soul you

certainly it CAN, but without doing much positive for its perpitrator's kharma

Morlaity is wholey, and quite spectactuly subjective. That is all folks move along now, debate over.

Morlaity is wholey, and quite spectactuly subjective. That is all folks move along now, debate over.

wholy and exactly WRONG, other then of the popular sense in which the word is almost invariably abused.

(why do i call the avoidance of causing suffering absolutely objective? because we all have to live individualy in the kind of world all of us togather create, and the more suffering there is floating arround, for damd sure the more likely each and everylast one of us are, to encounter the unpleasant end of it. reguardless of whether anything being offended has anything to do with it, but rather as a simple statistical reality)

wholy and exactly WRONG, other then of the popular sense in which the word is almost invariably abused.

Okay, you can easily change my mind. Name me just one moral rule that is objective?

Okay, you can easily change my mind. Name me just one moral rule that is objective?

there is no "moral rule", only the avoidance of causing suffering for the simultaniously self concerned AND altruistic reason already cited.

the phrase "moral rule" is unfamiliar to me. sounds like some sort of priestly propiganda. the sort of thing i can perfectly understand and for the most part aggree with objecting to.

my point again though, is that nothing in nor outside of any organized belief, brand name of idiology, or any damd thing else has a damd thing to do with it. real morality is just that one thing, for just that one reason.

there is no "moral rule", only the avoidance of causing suffering for the simultaniously self concerned AND altruistic reason already cited.

the phrase "moral rule" is unfamiliar to me. sounds like some sort of priestly propiganda. the sort of thing i can perfectly understand and for the most part aggree with objecting to.

my point again though, is that nothing in nor outside of any organized belief, brand name of idiology, or any damd thing else has a damd thing to do with it. real morality is just that one thing, for just that one reason.


*Sigh* Okay then can you name me one moral act and one immoral act that is objectively reconised as such?

*Sigh* Okay then can you name me one moral act and one immoral act that is objectively reconised as such?

already have, no? isolating acts is missing the point.

perhaps the incentives created by refusing to connect the dots?

its really a lot more simple then beliefs and idologies make out of it, all of which obscure its simple point to grind their own axes.

everything we fail to take into consideration statistically contributes to the creating of incentives. these in turn motivate choices of policy which create conditions we all experience.

the only rocket science is getting past culturaly preconditioned denial and emotional attatchment to it. and that, i haven't seen any entirely fool proof means of, which i do believe to have been the initial intent of all beliefs in all their forms.

it isn't an "act" nor a "rule", but a simple statistical reality. one that is almost too obvious, or would be, if we weren't all culturally conditioned to deny it.

already have, no? isolating acts is missing the point.

perhaps the incentives created by refusing to connect the dots?

its really a lot more simple then beliefs and idologies make out of it, all of which obscure its simple point to grind their own axes.

everything we fail to take into consideration statistically contributes to the creating of incentives. these in turn motivate choices of policy which create conditions we all experience.

the only rocket science is getting past culturaly preconditioned denial and emotional attatchment to it. and that, i haven't seen any entirely fool proof means of, which i do believe to have been the initial intent of all beliefs in all their forms.

it isn't an "act" nor a "rule", but a simple statistical reality. one that is almost too obvious, or would be, if we weren't all culturally conditioned to deny it.


Well you may have already done, so but I have not yet seen it. Please if you do not mind repeating yourself, or at leats give me the number of the post and I'll go and check.

Ahhh I see, so then you wish to change what is meant when somebody uses the word moral, or morality?

Or if is as easy as you say it is please do explain it to me.

*Sigh* Okay then can you name me one moral act and one immoral act that is objectively reconised as such?
That's the biggest problem right here.

"Objective" doesn't mean "everyone agrees to it". Whether you're going to base it on some supernatural being declaring it so, or because you can make an argument based on reason and logic that can't be refuted, you'll have some cause for believing that the end result is objective (there being a huge difference between the former and the latter with regards to the use of the word "believing", but that's another story not immediately important).

But that doesn't mean that everyone agrees to it. I've been saying for some time that the rule "don't initiate violence against other people" is a universal, objective moral statement. That doesn't mean there aren't cultures or people who don't consider it such. In fact, you could argue that there has never been a society in which this rule was properly respected. But that doesn't mean I'm wrong.

A moral code is objective because the reasons for them are independent of the observer. Much like the truth contained in a mathematical equation not depending on who reads it, the validity of a moral argument doesn't depend on who makes it or who listens to it. This is where the religious' claim to objectivity starts breaking down somewhat, because being able to transmit information and truth based on reason should be possible for all mankind, while transmitting "my god said so" across religious divides is a bit of a problem.

I think that's where the misunderstanding is when some of us say "morality is objective". We're not saying that everyone behaves that way, we're saying that everyone should behave that way (and that is necessarily implied by the word "morality"). The majority of mankind doesn't, and that may be because they haven't heard the argument, or they don't understand it, or they have heard and cannot refute it, but just don't care (making them immoral people). None of that has any effect on the argument itself.

As a question on the side to the people who think morality is entirely subjective (and which the OP was sort of asking, though perhaps not obviously enough):

Say some guy in the mountains in country X rapes a girl, who is then forced to marry him.

Is this wrong? And if you say it is, then you'd be using your code of morality. Can you use it to judge the actions taking place in a different society? What if they happened to happen not in X, but in your neighbourhood? What if for some reason an elected politician were to declare it legal - would that make it right? What if it happened in a part of town where everyone is from X and considers it okay - would the standards accepted in the community come before law?

I'm trying to sort out those who think that might makes right in the end (which in itself is something of a morally absolute statement), and those who just refuse to face up to the dilemma by following some sort of moral code, but failing to apply it universally, in some sort of gigantic "what do I know" type thing, pulling the rug out from underneith themselves.

yes, objective, well reality, means consistent with that big universe out there, that doesn't begin and end with what anyone wants to believe nor disbelieve about it, no matter how big a majorty nor small a minority might also aggree.

what "might" makes isn't "right" but wrong, because everyone to some degree looses, and many to a great degree loose a lot. what "might" does make, is feate accompli, which is another thing entirely and seperate and appart from morality, though also part of the universe, at least as perceived.

but is might other then perception unless you're actually in jail or being exicuted?

well that's all, to me at least, a totally other subject/question.

to a makiavellianist everything that isn't makiavellianism is procustianism. personally i have no use for either one.

nature tolerates hierarchy, it doesn't default to it. if humanity were as wise as it pretends to be, that is an example we would all learn from.

subjective or objective, the exciement of beating each other over the head ceases to be fun when one looses one's own eye in the proccess. the more suffering there is, the more likely we are each to experience it. the more we create, contribute to, contribute to the incentives for, the more there is.

anything else that is called morality may be a good or bad thing, but that one thing stands on its own, pretty much unconditionally. the only context i can think of where it wouldn't, mightn't, would be among some sorts of things, supposing such sorts of things exist or could exist, that were incapable of experiencing suffering. this might be completely limited to minerals and simple mechanical devices.

Morals change depending on the "popular vote". Right now in the US, the country seems split 50/50 as to whether abortions are morally abhorrent, or whether it is morally unethical to force a woman to go through nine physically and mentally straining months for something she doesn't want. There doesn't seem to be any naturally intrinsic answer in nature as to this dilemma. It is therefore not unreasonable to deduce that morals are subjective, and not intrinsic to nature. i.e. you make your own morals.

This certainly does seem to be the case, as we observe in the growth and development of our own society. 300 years ago, it was a woman’s fault if she was raped. Morally, this was how things were. Nowadays, we would find such a belief sexist and degrading. Over the years, our society’s moral values changed. For better or worse is not for me to judge. But they did change. Was it right to think that it is a woman’s fault for being raped? Is such a belief inherently evil? The answers to those questions are irrelevant. Some might use their religious beliefs to justify it, others might use their own personal value of civil rights to condemn it.

The point to take home from all this is that morals are not set in stone. There is no 'correct' set of moral values. Some might base their moral values on their beliefs, others might base theirs on what is best for everyone, what is best for them, what is best for their children, whatever. There is no ultimate set of morals, there is only what is perceived to best for the given scenario.

Some might argue that the existence of a god might include the existence of some set of morals outlined by this god, and thus, a 'set in stone' set of morals which are 'true', but since god is an unscientific idea, and since scientific methodology is the most proven method we have for looking at the universe, this notion can be dismissed.

Morals change depending on the "popular vote". ...

this is what i meant by ABUSE of the term "morality".

what chainges depending on popular perception has NOTHING to do with (any sort of REAL) "morality". nor do the 'bylaws' of any organized belief. these may or may not be all, many, or at least several, good and bennificial things, but the one thing that stands on its own, is the same one thing i've mentioned before in this thread. "the avoidance of causing suffering". which serves BOTH self intrest AND altruism. as also previously explained.

that there is little or no aggreement as to what to call morality, also has no bearing on the intrinsicness of that same one thing; the avoidance of causing suffering. it doesn't even matter whether you CALL it "morality" or not. the more one contributes to suffering and the causes of suffering, the more one contributes to their own probability of experiencing it. not because something big, friendly and invisible, picks someone every thousand years to channel itself to remind us so, but simply because directly it statistically works that way.

For better or worse is not for me to judge.
Why not? How can you claim to have an opinion, to act according to any sort of conception of right or wrong, if it's "not for you to judge"?

Right there you are basically denying your own ability to act as a moral agent, to determine and follow a conception for what you should do at any given time. You can't deny that, because if you have some standard and some way of establishing such a standard, then there is no reason whatsoever for why you can't use the same thought process to think about the actions of others, both today and 500 years ago.

But they did change. Was it right to think that it is a woman’s fault for being raped? Is such a belief inherently evil? The answers to those questions are irrelevant.
They aren't. They are absolutely central to what you are and how you exist on earth (or beyond, if you swing that way). Humans exist because they acquire and use knowledge, and morality is just about the most essential form of knowledge possible since it governs everything about you, not least the way you learn and apply more things about the world.

Saying that any moral judgement is irrelevant is the same as saying that your own capacity for making such judgements is irrelevant. But there is nothing to you other than the capacity to judge, to weigh up information and to choose a course of action. You're calling yourself irrelevant - and by extension anything you say.

this is what i meant by ABUSE of the term "morality".

what chainges depending on popular perception has NOTHING to do with (any sort of REAL) "morality". nor do the 'bylaws' of any organized belief. these may or may not be all, many, or at least several, good and bennificial things, but the one thing that stands on its own, is the same one thing i've mentioned before in this thread. "the avoidance of causing suffering". which serves BOTH self intrest AND altruism. as also previously explained.

Morals are what we define them to be. If one person can morally justify mass genocide, then that's good for them. If you believe that there is some intrinsic set of morals embedded in the fabric of the universe, then ask yourself "if the universe were devoid of sentience, would morals still exist?” Can there be evil without intent? Sentience is a prerequisite for intent, and without intent there can be no morals. Since sentience isn't a prerequisite for the universe, the universe is devoid of any built-in moral code. Morals are what we create.

Why not? How can you claim to have an opinion, to act according to any sort of conception of right or wrong, if it's "not for you to judge"?

Right there you are basically denying your own ability to act as a moral agent, to determine and follow a conception for what you should do at any given time. You can't deny that, because if you have some standard and some way of establishing such a standard, then there is no reason whatsoever for why you can't use the same thought process to think about the actions of others, both today and 500 years ago.


They aren't. They are absolutely central to what you are and how you exist on earth (or beyond, if you swing that way). Humans exist because they acquire and use knowledge, and morality is just about the most essential form of knowledge possible since it governs everything about you, not least the way you learn and apply more things about the world.

Saying that any moral judgement is irrelevant is the same as saying that your own capacity for making such judgements is irrelevant. But there is nothing to you other than the capacity to judge, to weigh up information and to choose a course of action. You're calling yourself irrelevant - and by extension anything you say.

I was speaking of irrelevance in relation to the universe. Of course morals are relevant to human life on Earth (and other life on Earth, if your moral code acknowledges their existence as being worthy too).

As for whether it is "my place to judge", it isn't. I can say that I disagree with certain moral beliefs, and that my own personal moral beliefs say that the moral beliefs in question are 'wrong', but I cannot judge whether they are absolutely wrong or not. Since absolute morals don't exist. Morals are entirely relative. Your set of morals might seem morally acceptable to me. But that's all. I can't look at my moral beliefs or yours relative to the universe, since the universe has no moral code with which to compare. I can observe the measurable effects of my morals on the people around me, the society I live in, and the planet I live on, and I can make a judgement as to the validity of my morals based on what I observe. But since there is no frame of reference for morals, morals are entirely relative. Therefore no one has the ability to say that any set of morals are 'right' or 'wrong', only whether they are 'right' or 'wrong' relative to other moral beliefs. Hence, in relation to the universe, any moral judgement is irrelevant.

these may or may not be all, many, or at least several, good and bennificial things, but the one thing that stands on its own, is the same one thing i've mentioned before in this thread. "the avoidance of causing suffering". which serves BOTH self intrest AND altruism.Perpetuating existence* causes incalculable suffering in the future. So let's kill everything now, for the moral good.

(* of humans, animals, and potentially other entities subject to suffering)

Since sentience isn't a prerequisite for the universe, the universe is devoid of any built-in moral code. Morals are what we create.
Or, morals exist since we do, not because of our choosing, but as a necessary part of our existence. A sentient being with the capacity to act must necessarily have the choice between acting one way, and acting another. Morality is the study of knowing which one to choose - that choice isn't created by us, it is a prerequisite for us being sentient at all.

Morals are what we define them to be. If one person can morally justify mass genocide, then that's good for them. If you believe that there is some intrinsic set of morals embedded in the fabric of the universe, then ask yourself "if the universe were devoid of sentience, would morals still exist?” Can there be evil without intent? Sentience is a prerequisite for intent, and without intent there can be no morals. Since sentience isn't a prerequisite for the universe, the universe is devoid of any built-in moral code. Morals are what we create.

that is one deffinician. just not one i find useful.

we still increase the probability of our own suffering in the hear and now, by contributing, however directly or nondirectly, to the amount of suffering there is.

this is the absolute core and motivation behind any existence of any such concept of morality. it is the practical reality which we might not conciously acknowledge, but which is the power behind that naging unease when violated called conscounse.

Or, morals exist since we do, not because of our choosing, but as a necessary part of our existence. A sentient being with the capacity to act must necessarily have the choice between acting one way, and acting another. Morality is the study of knowing which one to choose - that choice isn't created by us, it is a prerequisite for us being sentient at all.

But what is to say which choice is 'correct'? How do you define the correctness of the choices made? By your own set of morals. If one choice results in your life being saved at the cost of 10 puppies, well, maybe your moral code is fine with that, so it's the right choice. But someone elses moral code might say "10 lives vs. 1 life? I should die so those 10 lives should live", and so the right choice is for them to die. We create our own morals based on how we think we ought to get by in life. Oncemore, there is no intrinsic universal standard independent of our existence which determines the 'right' choice in any of the 'decisions' we make.

that is one deffinician. just not one i find useful.

we still increase the probability of our own suffering in the hear and now, by contributing, however directly or nondirectly, to the amount of suffering there is.

this is the absolute core and motivation behind any existence of any such concept of morality. it is the practical reality which we might not conciously acknowledge, but which is the power behind that naging unease when violated called conscounse.

But how do you define suffering? With morals!

You cannot derive the existance of morals from something which is defined by morals. Circular argument. Morals only exist if they exist. Hmm.

That's the biggest problem right here.

"Objective" doesn't mean "everyone agrees to it".

No really?. Oohh my days and all of these years...
Dude I know what objective means an does not mean.


I've been saying for some time that the rule "don't initiate violence against other people" is a universal, objective moral statement."

Which it blatantly is not. Just have quick peek at hman history and you'll see that if anything it's opposite appeas to be objectively true. Mankind does great violence to itself and has done since it's inception.

Now of course if I was asked whether it is moraly correct that we do so, I have to say yes it is. The question of whether or not it SHOULD be moraly correct or incorrect is a totly diferant thing. The question asked was not SHOULD morals be objective, but ARE they.



That doesn't mean there aren't cultures or people who don't consider it such. In fact, you could argue that there has never been a society in which this rule was properly respected. But that doesn't mean I'm wrong.

Ahh but it does. What is moral is only that which you think is good. If I think the opposite, then am I working outside the sphere of morlaity? No of curse not, any question on good vs bad is a moral question, no matter that my personal moral system differs from yours it is still morality and thus it is subjective.


A moral code is objective because the reasons for them are independent of the observer. Much like the truth contained in a mathematical equation not depending on who reads it, the validity of a moral argument doesn't depend on who makes it or who listens to it.

Then present me with such a code, and the objective reasoning of it.


I think that's where the misunderstanding is when some of us say "morality is objective". We're not saying that everyone behaves that way, we're saying that everyone should behave that way (and that is necessarily implied by the word "morality").

Then why not say "Morality should be objective"? Morality is nothing but what you view as right and wrong. It is soooo clear that this differs in people that it is also clear to see that indeed "Morality is subjective".


The majority of mankind doesn't, and that may be because they haven't heard the argument, or they don't understand it, or they have heard and cannot refute it, but just don't care (making them immoral people). None of that has any effect on the argument itself.

Which is?


As a question on the side to the people who think morality is entirely subjective (and which the OP was sort of asking, though perhaps not obviously enough):

Say some guy in the mountains in country X rapes a girl, who is then forced to marry him.

Is this wrong? And if you say it is, then you'd be using your code of morality. Can you use it to judge the actions taking place in a different society? What if they happened to happen not in X, but in your neighbourhood? What if for some reason an elected politician were to declare it legal - would that make it right? What if it happened in a part of town where everyone is from X and considers it okay - would the standards accepted in the community come before law?

There are a lot of IF's and BUT's to take into consideration to answer this question. What is the year, what does the community feel, what are the local and statelaws regarding it?


I'm trying to sort out those who think that might makes right in the end (which in itself is something of a morally absolute statement), and those who just refuse to face up to the dilemma by following some sort of moral code, but failing to apply it universally, in some sort of gigantic "what do I know" type thing, pulling the rug out from underneith themselves.

Thats actulay a good place to begin. I personaly don't subscribe to the 'might makes right' menatlity. But agian if we look at human history there is no denying that this seems to be a moral imperitive for the majority of those setup to rule over us.

So human morality would seem to bear out that 'might makes right' is moraly acceptable, but my personal morality would suggest the opposite.

Perpetuating existence* causes incalculable suffering in the future. So let's kill everything now, for the moral good.

(* of humans, animals, and potentially other entities subject to suffering)

lovely grin, but for the suffering of the dying.

now if you could do that absolutely painlessly, instantaniously, with no anexiety of impending doom, THEN this might be a valid point. have you considered the voluntary human extinction movement?

a simple, though profound reduction in human birth rate, (no killing required) would bennifit all life, including human, in this reguard.

Morals are what we define them to be. If one person can morally justify mass genocide, then that's good for them. If you believe that there is some intrinsic set of morals embedded in the fabric of the universe, then ask yourself "if the universe were devoid of sentience, would morals still exist?” Can there be evil without intent? Sentience is a prerequisite for intent, and without intent there can be no morals. Since sentience isn't a prerequisite for the universe, the universe is devoid of any built-in moral code. Morals are what we create.

And to that I would add, that since in the sphere of human sentience there are many belifes and ways, then of course morlaity is subjective, as subjecticve as humanity is.

Morals are what we define them to be.No they're not. Most people act along moral notations that go undefined. The basis of people's morality is instinct, and copying other's behaviour. The norms are distilled from marching along with the rest of the flock; and the occasional thwap on the head if you go astray. It rarely lies in abstract reasoning and teachings. People are 'taught' lying is bad, and yet they know in some cases it's better than the alternative.

If one person can morally justify mass genocide, then that's good for them.But not for society. Morality doesn't exist in a single person, it exist in communities of people. If you can't justify it to anyone other than yourself, then it's not moral.

But how do you define suffering? With morals!

You cannot derive the existance of morals from something which is defined by morals. Circular argument. Morals only exist if they exist. Hmm.

i take it from this you must be a nonphysical entity incapable of experiencing either mental anguish nor physical pain. the last i checked, these do not require some theoretical morals to experience.

have you considered pinching yourself?

Or, morals exist since we do, not because of our choosing, but as a necessary part of our existence. A sentient being with the capacity to act must necessarily have the choice between acting one way, and acting another. Morality is the study of knowing which one to choose - that choice isn't created by us, it is a prerequisite for us being sentient at all.

Or knowing which choice would adversly affect the less people?

However even there we can run into problems, as that invokes a whole slewgh of 'Is it okay to kill, to save' type questions.

that is one deffinician. just not one i find useful.

we still increase the probability of our own suffering in the hear and now, by contributing, however directly or nondirectly, to the amount of suffering there is.

this is the absolute core and motivation behind any existence of any such concept of morality. it is the practical reality which we might not conciously acknowledge, but which is the power behind that naging unease when violated called conscounse.

Yet even suffering is relative, so any talk of lessing suffering rest on subjective understanding on what you mean by the word 'suffering'

Is Morality objective or subjective?

Most likely subjective.


If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another?

Certainly, pragmatism - to ensure happiness for a society.


Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means?

Depends on what the means are and what the ends are, and what your perspective is, if morality is subjective, then the answer to that question can only be subjective also.


Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

Also subjective.

Of course morals are relevant to human life on Earth (and other life on Earth, if your moral code acknowledges their existence as being worthy too).
Is there anything else about you that isn't covered by "human life on earth"? If not, then isn't this moral code relevant to you, as long as you qualify as being a human, alive on earth? Doesn't that mean that for as long as you exist, these morals apply and are correct? And by extension, doesn't that also go for all other humans alive on earth, in the past, present and future?

Morality being absolute or objective doesn't mean it's some physical object floating about. It's an abstract concept, but if it applies to all of human life, and if we have no way of looking at it from outside this perspective (nor any reason to) then it is universal and real. If there is a moral code for the behaviour of lions (for example that it is wrong to be a vegetarian), then it doesn't apply to deer - but it must apply to all lions, regardless of where or when they live. It is determined by the nature of lions and by the prescriptions for behaviour imposed by it. And even if lions didn't exist, if we imagined that they did, then this morality would have to apply to these imagined things.

As for whether it is "my place to judge", it isn't. I can say that I disagree with certain moral beliefs, and that my own personal moral beliefs say that the moral beliefs in question are 'wrong', but I cannot judge whether they are absolutely wrong or not.
If you did that, then you couldn't judge your own actions either. You'd be acting in the full knowledge of at best being amoral.

But since there is no frame of reference for morals, morals are entirely relative.
Some people say that the frame of reference is existence and life.

Others claim they have started with so basic truths that regardless of any reference, the outcome they have arrived at must be valid (and again others combine the two somewhat). Maybe it's a little odd to say it this way, but if we derive that 2+2=4, we don't need to decide whether that's "better" than the alternative. It's correct, and that's what matters. Morality is similar, except that by the particular nature of the subject the thing that turns out to be correct also happens to be "good". But if we can imagine a "2" and define it properly, then the truth of the statement is a given, and we don't need a frame of reference to decide it.

Do not kill, do not rape, do not steal, these are principles which every man of every faith can embrace. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKzM8xsQ5-U)

Yet even suffering is relative, so any talk of lessing suffering rest on subjective understanding on what you mean by the word 'suffering'

have you tried "relatively" slamming your thumb in your car door?

pain is only relative in the sense of being related to the person suffering it.

No they're not. Most people act along moral notations that go undefined. The basis of people's morality is instinct, and copying other's behaviour. The norms are distilled from marching along with the rest of the flock; and the occasional thwap on the head if you go astray. It rarely lies in abstract reasoning and teachings. People are 'taught' lying is bad, and yet they know in some cases it's better than the alternative.

But not for society. Morality doesn't exist in a single person, it exist in communities of people. If you can't justify it to anyone other than yourself, then it's not moral.

Morals exist individually. Generally however, communities share common morality, and generally, this morality will have developed and adopted because the community interpret it (subconsciously or consciously) as the best set of moral guidelines to follow. But, like I said, if someone can morally justify genocide, then it is morally justified. End of story. It can be for better or worse of other people, but those people are irrelevant (you would presume). Again, it all goes back to the relative position of morals. Since the universe has no set of morals in itself, all moral values are created by us for whatever reason, and all moral judgements are relative to other morals, which too can be judged.

lovely grin, but for the suffering of the dying.

now if you could do that absolutely painlessly, instantaniously, with no anexiety of impending doom, THEN this might be a valid point. have you considered the voluntary human extinction movement?

a simple, though profound reduction in human birth rate, (no killing required) would bennifit all life, including human, in this reguard.Well, I think that whatever the suffering of killing everyone now would be insignificant to the sumtotal of future suffering if humanity (and other life) continues for another billion years.
I think the problem is that, rather, we need to look at it much more locally. Life is worth it despite some suffering. Which isn't to say we shouldn't reduce suffering, but not at the cost of living (or other important things); some suffering is an inevitable part of life and probably makes the rest all the more worthwhile.
A victory is all the more sweet after suffering the race to win.

Morals exist individually.But not independant of others. If there was only one moral agent on earth, no matter how hard he tried, he could not be moral. Because morality relates to behavior toward other moral beings. You can't have your cake and eat it if there isn't any cake; and you can't be moral without sharing morality with others.

But, like I said, if someone can morally justify genocide, then it is morally justified. End of story.Well, you can say that. But I don't buy it. End of story.
At least that saves us a lengthy argument :)

Again, it all goes back to the relative position of morals. Since the universe has no set of morals in itself, all moral values are created by us for whatever reason, and all moral judgements are relative to other morals, which too can be judged.Notwithstanding people grow up as part of a community from which they get their morals; they don't invent them on their own. And there's a whole evolutionary history (both biological and cultural) leading up to it. It is not relative in an arbitrary sense. It is heavily constrained.

Recently, having done a bit of reading for a class that I am in, I've been considering morality as a pseudo-concept, wherein moral words like "right" and "wrong" do not add factual value to a statement, but are merely expressions of approval or disapproval, essentially equivalent to saying something in an approving or a disapproving tone of voice.
That is, "it was wrong for you to steal that" is equivalent to saying "You stole that!" in a negative tone.

Moral disagreement, then, is only meaningful when you argue about the facts of the situation, because morality is essentially a taste.

It's an interesting idea, though I do not know if I subscribe to it fully.

More generally, though, I do tend to agree that you cannot go from is to ought, and the only way to debate morality, then, is to debate the objective facts about the situation. At some point, you will find that each side has conflicting evaluative claims that cannot be meaningfully debated. That is not to say that evaluative claims are inherently undebatable-- if a given evaluative premise is based on other premises that include descriptive claims, then those descriptive claims can be challenged. The situation where they cannot be debated is when they are either based only on other evaluative claims, or when they are held in their own right, without other support.

So, yes, I would suppose that morality is subjective generally, but given a shared set of evaluative beliefs, it is objective and can be rationally derived.
(That is, if two people both agree that the harm-benefit principle is the only one that exists, they can objectively argue about morality because they share the same evaluative premises.)

But not independant of others. If there was only one moral agent on earth, no matter how hard he tried, he could not be moral. Because morality relates to behavior toward other moral beings. You can't have your cake and eat it if there isn't any cake; and you can't be moral without sharing morality with others.


Jumping in, I don't know if I agree with this. I think that there may be moral patients that are not also moral agents. Dogs, for example, are not moral agents, but I would argue that they are moral patients and deserve a certain level of moral treatment.

But not for society. Morality doesn't exist in a single person, it exist in communities of people. If you can't justify it to anyone other than yourself, then it's not moral.

What a really strange thing to say. Morality, I mean the word Morality, means pertaining to right conduct.

Are you saying that not one single person in the whole history of people ever had a moral or immoral thought in their individual heads, and that somehow morality only exists once you have a group of said individuals?

Now of course if I was asked whether it is moraly correct that we do so, I have to say yes it is. The question of whether or not it SHOULD be moraly correct or incorrect is a totly diferant thing. The question asked was not SHOULD morals be objective, but ARE they.
Morals and morality are being confused here, I think. If by morals you mean "the things people think are right", then of course they're not all the same. But that's not what I'm talking about, and I don't think you are either.

What I mean is: if I walk along a river, and someone is drowning in it, should I go and save that person?

My position is that there is a correct answer to that question. That answer is good/moral, and it is correct regardless of who the people in question or any outside observer happens to be, ie it is objective. What happened in all of human history doesn't matter here, nor does the fact whether humans even exist - even if we just imagine something like a human (and we can argue about what exactly that means), the definition would then imply an answer.

Ahh but it does. What is moral is only that which you think is good. If I think the opposite, then am I working outside the sphere of morlaity? No of curse not, any question on good vs bad is a moral question, no matter that my personal moral system differs from yours it is still morality and thus it is subjective.
Morality isn't an opinion. Morality is more like the answer to a math problem. We can both get different answers, and we may both be operating within the sphere of mathematics when trying to get them, but that doesn't change the fact that there is a right answer.

Then present me with such a code, and the objective reasoning of it.

I'd suggest you go and grab the books yourselves, because that'll make it a lot easier on both of us, plus it'll minimise misunderstandings. To pick two very different approaches, go for Kant's Categorical Imperatives and John Galt's monologue from Atlas Shrugged, for example.

Mind you, just as with the math problem, every attempt so far could be wrong. Even if they were however, that doesn't mean that the question doesn't have an answer.

Then why not say "Morality should be objective"? Morality is nothing but what you view as right and wrong. It is soooo clear that this differs in people that it is also clear to see that indeed "Morality is subjective".
Only if you were to misunderstand what I mean by morality.

There are a lot of IF's and BUT's to take into consideration to answer this question. What is the year, what does the community feel, what are the local and statelaws regarding it?
Let's make it a normal western town, today, with the usual western laws regarding rape and marriage.

So human morality would seem to bear out that 'might makes right' is moraly acceptable, but my personal morality would suggest the opposite.
Which would make you...not human?

If you can't justify it to anyone other than yourself, then it's not moral.
Not necessarily. If I can justify it to myself using reasoning that has to be accepted by any rational being, it doesn't matter whether I ever do so. Other people are only a means of testing whether the reasoning is correct, and more often than not, they're not a very good one.

In short, other people don't replace the bit of grey matter between your ears.

Or knowing which choice would adversly affect the less people?
Those are criteria used to make the choice. They come afterwards.

have you tried "relatively" slamming your thumb in your car door?

pain is only relative in the sense of being related to the person suffering it.

So you equate suffering only with physical pain? What of those that pay to be beaten, or otherwise enjoy physical pain? If I punch a man in the head and he likes it, can he be said to be suffering?

Well, I think that whatever the suffering of killing everyone now would be insignificant to the sumtotal of future suffering if humanity (and other life) continues for another billion years.
I think the problem is that, rather, we need to look at it much more locally. Life is worth it despite some suffering. Which isn't to say we shouldn't reduce suffering, but not at the cost of living (or other important things); some suffering is an inevitable part of life and probably makes the rest all the more worthwhile.
A victory is all the more sweet after suffering the race to win.

suffering happens yes; CONTRIBUTING TO IT is a CHOICE.

So you equate suffering only with physical pain? What of those that pay to be beaten, or otherwise enjoy physical pain? If I punch a man in the head and he likes it, can he be said to be suffering?

wherefrom this conclusion? of course not ONLY physical pain. the anxiety to avoid physical and other forms of pain of course.

masochism is a caveat certainly, but not a general negation of the concept.

the only reason there is so much denial of the general principal is really unfounded emotional attatchment to the pretentions of justification of makiavellanism. this is transparently self evident.

and why cling to makiavellanism? because of the shortcommings of procustianism?

the lie that hasn't died, left over from the 'cold war' flim flam, is that our only choice is between them or worse, which is utter and outright nonsense. of course no one sees anything else when they absolutely refuse to look, when their absolutely emotionally attatched to refusing to look.

we do have to stop overloading nature's cycles of renewal if we want our own species to survive. that one IS an "if". my emotional attatchments are to the gratifications of creating and exploring, and to the kind of world we all have to live in. that doesn't mean procustianism, but it damd sure doesn't mean mackiavellanism either.

Can an action be morally good despite bad intent?

EDIT: I ask because I feel this makes morality non-objective, if morality is defined by, if I read you right, consequences.

...and no, merely jesting you sensitive soul you
I'd say that yeah, intent isn't necessarily the arbiter of what makes a morally good action. Malintent is often an indication that a person will contribute more "wrong" than "right", and is reasonable grounds for restraint, but if in trying to create a race of dominant genius tomatoes to take over the world someone accidentally solves world hunger with tomatoes large and resiliant enough to feed whole families while remaining environmentally neutral in their production, I'd say s/he did the right thing, even if unintentionally.

Now there is a subjective element to my interpretation here. That is, I don't know whether or not it's in the "greater good" that humans become able to self-support in that way. Generally, however, we would expect the feedback from our sensory experience of the world that comes about from solving world hunger to be positive, and that would suggest that the reality we are involved in is improved as a result of that action.

Or something like that.

... thanks. :)

Ultimately, any choice, for me, is a morally good choice. It has no value in terms of good or bad, it is simply a catalyst for action.

One can take a % view of action, that certain actions generally result in better outcome.

Yet, for me, the logical conclusion is to experience as much as this world has to offer, good or bad, because only through total experience can one make the most informed decision as to likely outcome.

However, leading a life based merely on experiencing everything would be chaotic, possibly unsustainable.

And an utterly unstable, experience-led society seems not to progress as fast as a fairly stable society, some balance between change and stability.

Yet that merely entails that morals are simply suited for the time we live in, ever changing.

Suits me.

Morals and morality are being confused here, I think. If by morals you mean "the things people think are right", then of course they're not all the same. But that's not what I'm talking about, and I don't think you are either.

What I mean is: if I walk along a river, and someone is drowning in it, should I go and save that person?

My position is that there is a correct answer to that question. That answer is good/moral, and it is correct regardless of who the people in question or any outside observer happens to be, ie it is objective. What happened in all of human history doesn't matter here, nor does the fact whether humans even exist - even if we just imagine something like a human (and we can argue about what exactly that means), the definition would then imply an answer.

Ohh that's a really bad example to prove your point. what if the persona drowning had just raped the person watching? What if the person drowning could be saved and then turn into the kind of person that flies planes into buildings? In any question of 'what is the right thing to do', there are sooo many things to take into consideration, that even if there was only one objectivly correct moral action to take, some body somewhere will more than likely come back to you with reasons why you made the wrong choice.


Morality isn't an opinion. Morality is more like the answer to a math problem. We can both get different answers, and we may both be operating within the sphere of mathematics when trying to get them, but that doesn't change the fact that there is a right answer.

No you are talking about moral actions instead of immoral actions, both come under the heading of morality, and so the choice to make the moral or immoral action is exactly an option.


Only if you were to misunderstand what I mean by morality.

Perhaps that is the case, but I can assure you I am the one going by the defintion. If you wish to change that in order to make your argument work, feel free to go right ahead.


Let's make it a normal western town, today, with the usual western laws regarding rape and marriage.

Then I would proclaim that immoral.


Which would make you...not human?

No which would mean that my personal morality does not agree that 'might makes right' even though is is evidant that it does.

there is indeed, more suffering and harm caused by negligently considered good intentions, then by all of premeditated maliciousness.

does that mean we'd do less harm by setting out to? not even.

wherefrom this conclusion? of course not ONLY physical pain. the anxiety to avoid physical and other forms of pain of course.

masochism is a caveat certainly, but not a general negation of the concept.

the only reason there is so much denial of the general principal is really unfounded emotional attatchment to the pretentions of justification of makiavellanism. this is transparently self evident.

and why cling to makiavellanism? because of the shortcommings of procustianism?

the lie that hasn't died, left over from the 'cold war' flim flam, is that our only choice is between them or worse, which is utter and outright nonsense. of course no one sees anything else when they absolutely refuse to look, when their absolutely emotionally attatched to refusing to look.

we do have to stop overloading nature's cycles of renewal if we want our own species to survive. that one IS an "if". my emotional attatchments are to the gratifications of creating and exploring, and to the kind of world we all have to live in. that doesn't mean procustianism, but it damd sure doesn't mean mackiavellanism either.


Let me stop you right there and lets make something clear so that I don't misunderstand you.

What do you mean by 'procustianism?

Morality is defined by that which defines all, the black and white laws of science.

I rather take issue with this viewpoint. People who believe that science is the only answer tend to try to make everything into a mathematical equation. This is rather absurd when applied to the fields of philosophy, history, music, and language. While there is some overlap between all of the fields of knowledge, it is absurd to declare that science must always reign supreme even when there is no proper application.

You could say that morality is subjective in that your argument is based on your initial premises about the value of the individual vs. the group, personal property vs. community property, etc. and so the root question here is whether any of these premises are objective or subjective.

A victory is all the more sweet after suffering the race to win.
But the flip side is "does the victory justify the suffering?". If only the victory makes the suffering worthwhile, and the victory is only given value by the suffering that goes into it, then why waste time on it?

I know what you're getting at; there is a certain artistry in the pursuit of a goal against pressures. Yet we put ourselves, and others, under a lot of unnecessary strain and pressure simply so it can be put up on a pedestal as an accomplishment. The beauty of suffering for the sake of suffering is but synthetic and derivative in comparison to that which is suffering against genuine adversity. Isn't it essentially beneficial, even from an artistic perspective, to limit the occurrence of suffering where at all possible?

But you're still in University, and it's time to take your last exam! It should be relatively easy, though, it's just your standard Ancient Egyptian Naked Calculus exam. And here's your mother and aunt and grandmother to cheer you on, provided you don't develop a distracting erection.
Fair enough. *draws hieroglyphs*

(Although, to be honest, I only have to take the final exam interviews. The written tests are already over. ;))
?
Could you elaborate what sort of examples you're thinking of? Both for warrior societies and for killing with no justification beyond self-advancement?
Sounds like a recipe for disaster rather than a stable society. I thought people always at least needed an excuse to kill someone from their own society; such as imagined crimes, or offenses against one's honour.
My example - certainly constructed - was to demonstrate that our set of morals need not exist in another, separate society.

In what I established with said warrior society, the "excuse" to kill others is an ingrained part of makes said society organize itself.

You apply our set of morals to the example I have given, that's why it might puzzle you.

To give you another example. Let's say you're a Viking, set sail to go South to visit your neighboring people. You're there to plunder, they live there as farmers. As a member of a farmer society, you would need a solid excuse to harm others because it wouldn't help the tilling of the land if you killed your neighbors or family members. As an invader, your goal is to reap what others have sown, therefore it's perfectly acceptable by the standards of the invader's society to kill others. And should you disagree with your chieftain and could take him down, that's perfectly fine - as long as you can pay the wergeld. (Which, in itself, was established to stabilize the Viking society. You would have to be able to afford killing another person. But that's different from my more basic, barbarian example society.)
I'm of the opinion that yes, there is an "objective" standard for moral action, in as much as "objectivity" means anything, but that it is almost certainly unknowable, and consequently, only subjective interpretations can actually be practically applicable. That is to say, there is no objective system of morality, but subjective systems can be informed by experience.

Let's look at it this way. Reality can be said to consist of two agencies - there is me (or you, or "the subjective", if you will), and there is the rest of reality other than me. Morality is what is in the interests of reality as a whole. These interests are subjective to reality, but reality's subjective is our objective.

The assumption I make is that perception acts as a form of informative, bidirectional communication between these two agencies. I, as an observer, am unable to directly experience what is in reality's interests, but by probing reality and seeing how it responds, I can roughly grasp some idea of what it does and does not like. To use the obvious example, human agency's role in environmental decline would appear to suggest that it is a mistake to casually leave waste by-products lying around.

Obviously, this communication is as temperamental and uncertain as communication between people. Reality might be in a bad mood today, I might be misinterpreting due to issues in the language barrier, or it might be stringing me along for some unknown purpose. The thing is, just like with any other mature relationship, treating the world with both grace and a strong will seems to work to our mutual benefit. So, y'know, I trust it. After all, without it, I wouldn't be where I am today, would I?
Nicely said.
No.
Not in their usual sense in this type of discussion. It is neither written in the fabric of the universe, nor arbitrary. It's a societal construct subject to cultural evolution; which provides a continuity from past to present to future. As circumstances change, morality should change; because morality is about choices, and the available choices vary with circumstances.

Live in both, and decide which one works out better. Now, this also means some moral systems are incomparable, because we cannot even imagine what it is like to live in their society.
Taking the evolutionary view, the better is whichever one survives in the struggle of cultural competition. (But note, that our choice is important there. We have some influence on what path we take.)

Specific ends, no, not usually. But if you include enough in "the ends", sure; just don't forget to include people's distress or elation about one's intentions as part of the end state.
A badly botched breakfast in bed by your children may not by itself justify the mess in the kitchen; but if in addition their intentions made you happy, then with this added resultant it may have been worth it after all.

I'd say they are both important. A decision you make no can't be based on what the effects will be, only on what they may be. So it would be unfair to judge them on the former.
But merely intending the best state of affairs is not enough, for the same reason. The desired state may be unlikely; and adjacent states in the phase-space of possible futures may be bad. So it's a matter of making a best judgment based on the knowledge and insight you have.
Intending the best when you really ought to know it won't happen is not commendable.
Good reading!
NSG, but close enough.

Was that a genuine inquiry? :(
Aw... http://www.studip.uni-goettingen.de/pictures/smile/taetschel.gif
Can an action be morally good despite bad intent?

EDIT: I ask because I feel this makes morality non-objective, if morality is defined by, if I read you right, consequences.

...and no, merely jesting you sensitive soul you
I doubt it. The action itself, based on bad intent, cannot be morally good. The outcome of said amorally action, however, can happen to be good. But if that should happen, and I'd wager it a rare case to be.

As an example, take a look at the Firefly episode "Jaynestown". Jayne steals the colony's earnings from the magistrate, tries to run, but has to abandon his loot to save his own skin and make his escape. Therefore he drops the money from his transport and spills it all over town, giving the working class mudders back some of their hard-earned money.

Jayne's intend was bad, his action of stealing was bad, even his action of dumbing the cargo was based on solely personal interest, yet the outcome of his action was not. Did he intend the good outcome? No. Therefore I would say it's impossible to behave morally willfully with bad intend. That cancels itself out.

Ballad of Jayne (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGwyzSFwemc) <= Enjoy!

Others claim they have started with so basic truths that regardless of any reference, the outcome they have arrived at must be valid (and again others combine the two somewhat). Maybe it's a little odd to say it this way, but if we derive that 2+2=4, we don't need to decide whether that's "better" than the alternative. It's correct, and that's what matters. Morality is similar, except that by the particular nature of the subject the thing that turns out to be correct also happens to be "good". But if we can imagine a "2" and define it properly, then the truth of the statement is a given, and we don't need a frame of reference to decide it.

But 2+2 only equals 4 for addition as we have defined it. We have defined it in such a way because it is what we observe to be the form of addition most useful for our calculations and understanding in this universe. The universe itself hasn't said that 2+2=4, we meerly observe that to seemingly hold true for most things most of the time. So, yes, we do determine that the method we use to derive 2+2=4 is better than some other method, which might result in 2+2=2, or 2+2=6.

Moreover, 2+2 only equals 4 within our particular set of axioms, which we chose, because they seemed to have the best fit to what we observe. There is actually a big issue at the moment as to whether Axiomatic Set Theory I believe it's called (the axioms which basically define all of mathematics as we know it) is consistent with the universe. For all we know, the universe might have some amazingly odd quirk whereby if you have two apples, and you get two more apples, a fifth apple is created spontaneously on some planet in a galaxy some several billion light years away as a result of the combination of these two sets of two apples. Thus 2+2=5, and so, in our physical universe, we would say that the truth of 2+2=4 is questionable.

We choose our mathematics based on what works best for dealing with the universe. Likewise, we choose* our morals based on what works best for dealing with life.


*I want to note since some people haven't picked up on it that when I say "we", I don't mean every individual person chooses their morals for themselves (some do), I mean "we" as a species, culture, community, society, etc. And when I say "choose", I mean that they are meerly human constructs, are completely arbitrary, and can change at any moment. There is no absolute moral which states that murder is wrong, and indeed, at some points, murder can cause more 'benefit' than 'bad'. Morals are not just relevative to us as a species, but relevative to different situations too.

Morality has to be subjective. Morality is the accepted code of conduct to live in a society at that time.

I'll show a few counter examples. "Killing someone is always wrong" In certain societies it was the greatest honour to be sacrificed to your god. In this case, for this person, being killed was a good thing. Is the killer immoral? I wont even go in to the greyer area of euthenasia.

"Stealing is always wrong". If the choice is to steal so that you and your family survive, and you are stealing from people such as Marie Antoinette, is that wrong?

Let's look in the past. Is every slave owner, including the founding fathers of USA immoral?

Let's imagine some possible futures? 200 years from now, it may be thought that eating meat is morally abhorrent. Does that make 99% of the people on the planet now immoral? 500 years from now, homosexuality may be deemed the only moral way to have sex for fun,and heterosexual sex is a distasteful thing done only to continue the species. Does that make95+% of the planet immoral?

Morality is the accepted code of conduct to live in a society at that time.
Isn't that Law, as opposed to Morality?

Isn't that Law, as opposed to Morality?

Some cultural morals make it into law and some do not.

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective?

Darwin is objective, morality is subjective.

If objective, what is it and what makes it so? If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another?

Yes, whatever functions best with society.

Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means?

Always.; although I would think it noble if a group of human beings would not sacrifice one of their own for prosperity.

Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

I would prefer someone try to kill me, but accidentally save my life, than the reverse motive and effect--hm, actually, death is fine.

Isn't that Law, as opposed to Morality?
No. Law and morality are not the same. Morality is what the majority of people in a culture feel is right. Law is legislation, pure and simple.
Here's some examples. Many people use "minimisation" strategies on their taxes. It is immoral, because if you don't pay your fair share someone else has to carry your tax burden themselves, but it's not illegal.

Going 3 miles per hour over the speed limit to overtake is illegal. Most people wouldn't call it immoral. Euthenasia and abortion are in some places are legal, in some places illegal. Some say abortion and euthenasia are the right moral choice, some say they are immoral.

Is it possible to arrive at a logical basis for morality? Possible line of thought: I have immediate and direct control over my physical body and nothing else. I can use my strength and intellect to turn natural materials into useful items, thus creating a useful product. If I create something, does it belong to me or is it immediately the property of whoever can use it? Do I really even own my own physical body or intellect? In truth, these basic concepts are all at the root of the concepts of individual rights, collectivism, proerty rights, community rights, the use of coercive force, and every other issue about morality.

Can the basic concept of ownership of onesself extend to the onwership of any other person owning himself? How does this affect interpersonal relations? These questions are at the root of all moral questions.

The old saying goes something like "Posession is 9/10ths of the law." If true, it is as much an appeal to the concept of "natural law" as it is to legislative actions. If I make something, but someone else seizes posession of it without my consent, does he have a right to claim ownership? Do I have a right to claim ownership? What if I exchange my widget for someone else's doodad. Is that an exchange of ownership, or do I still own the widgwt & vice versa? Do either of us have some title to either item?

I know that these examples relate to property rights. Do your conclusions about property rights extend to personal rights? Suppose I give 10 widgets to someone withthe understanding that he must deliver 9 to a third party. If I do not posess them, to the belong to the delivery agent, the intended recipient, to me still, or to no one? Is it morally acceptable for the delivery agent to exchange his service for a material good?

For all we know, the universe might have some amazingly odd quirk whereby if you have two apples, and you get two more apples, a fifth apple is created spontaneously on some planet in a galaxy some several billion light years away as a result of the combination of these two sets of two apples. Thus 2+2=5,

No, we would say that 2 (the two apples you have) + 2 (the two apples you get) + 1 (the apple created spontaneously) = 5.

You're confusing empirical causality with rational necessity, and it's at the heart of your confusion regarding the basis of mathematics. It may be the case, as a matter of physical laws, that two apples mixed with two other apples produce five apples. But 2 + 2 would still be 4. It would simply be the case that the physical act of mixing two apples with another two apples caused a physical process that created a fifth apple: 2 + 2 + 1.

2 + 2 could only 5 if, say, 2 was somehow the same as 3... which is a clear logical impossibility.

We choose our mathematics based on what works best for dealing with the universe.

No, we "choose" our mathematics based on what makes sense to us, on our sense of rationality and truth. And the same is the case, properly, with morality.

Morality has to be subjective. Morality is the accepted code of conduct to live in a society at that time.

Question-begging. If there are absolute, independent moral standards independent of what is "accepted" by a given society, then morality is not an "accepted code of conduct to live in a society" at all.

I'll show a few counter examples. "Killing someone is always wrong" In certain societies it was the greatest honour to be sacrificed to your god. In this case, for this person, being killed was a good thing. Is the killer immoral?

Two different senses of "absolute." There can be absolute moral standards that take into account morally relevant circumstances like the choice of the person who is to be killed.

"Stealing is always wrong". If the choice is to steal so that you and your family survive, and you are stealing from people such as Marie Antoinette, is that wrong?

Also irrelevant. Again, absolute moral standards can take into account morally relevant circumstances.

Let's look in the past. Is every slave owner, including the founding fathers of USA immoral?

Slavery is always wrong. Judgments of persons are a little harder to make, not because slavery can ever be justified, but because there are mitigating factors: we are not perfectly rational beings for whom morality is clear and self-evident, we are imperfectly rational beings whose cultural upbringing can interfere massively with our capacity to perceive moral truths. Slave-owners were wrong to commit the acts they did, but that does not mean that they can be held completely accountable for them.

None of this reasoning involves breaking with absolute moral standards.

Let's imagine some possible futures? 200 years from now, it may be thought that eating meat is morally abhorrent. Does that make 99% of the people on the planet now immoral?

If eating meat is actually morally abhorrent, again, it makes their actions immoral, but their personal moral guilt is mitigated by the strong cultural barriers to recognizing this moral truth.

However, as vegetarianism and the ethical arguments become more prominent, this mitigatory excuse becomes less and less compelling.

500 years from now, homosexuality may be deemed the only moral way to have sex for fun,and heterosexual sex is a distasteful thing done only to continue the species. Does that make95+% of the planet immoral?

I'm not going to repeat myself for a third time.

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective? If objective, what is it and what makes it so? If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another? Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means? Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

The ends do not justify the means. This is, I think, most obvious in conflicts between ideologies. After all, if you sink to the level of those you are fighting in order to beat them, it doesn't really matter who wins. Evil still triumphs.

However, the ends never really justify the means. If you undertake immoral acts for a moral goal, you will inevitably be corrupted to a certain extent. You will be adopting an attitude that you can do heinous things if your intention is noble, and once you start down that path, attrocities pile on attrocities. Furthermore, others will repay your actions in kind, creating a spiral downwards into savagry.

You can see all this clearly at work in the war on terror. Freedoms and rights are violated, and innocent civillians bombed in the name of fighting terror and spreading democracy. Which costs America its global support and respect, undermines Constitutional Government thus allowing further crimes in the future, and provides propoganda for Al Quaida and incentives for those who have been wronged to join their ranks. Thus leading to more attacks which are used to justify further immoral acts essentially on the basis that the ends justify the means.

No, we would say that 2 (the two apples you have) + 2 (the two apples you get) + 1 (the apple created spontaneously) = 5.

Wrong. The equation would be...

2 (the two apples you had in one hand) + 2 (the apples you had in your other hand) = 4 (the apples you have in both hands) + 1 (the apple created somewhere else in the universe) = 5

You're confusing empirical causality with rational necessity, and it's at the heart of your confusion regarding the basis of mathematics. It may be the case, as a matter of physical laws, that two apples mixed with two other apples produce five apples. But 2 + 2 would still be 4. It would simply be the case that the physical act of mixing two apples with another two apples caused a physical process that created a fifth apple: 2 + 2 + 1.

2 + 2 could only 5 if, say, 2 was somehow the same as 3... which is a clear logical impossibility.

I can make 2 + 2 = 5 logically and quite easily. Observe...

We shall make a vector space consisting of the integers. In this vector space, we shall define addition for two elements a and b as follows

a + b = a + (b + 1)

Now, lets let a = 2 and b = 2, and lo and behold

2 + 2 = 2 + (2 + 1) = 5

There you go. I've simply created a vector space with a slightly different definition of addition.

The numbers you are familiar with, and are talking about when you say 2+2=4 are only elements of a particular vector space with a particular definition for addition. The choice of this form of addition is completely arbitrary. The numbers as you know them are simply belonging to one set of rules which are completely arbitrary. The rules can be changed at a moments notice (as you just saw me doing quite easily and logically).

Moreover, the very logic you speak is arbitrary too. Logic works on a few axioms which we accept, but haven't proven. Hence why they are axioms. If logic is found to be wrong (and I know of at least one hypothesis which, if evidence shows, would disprove logic), then all arguments we have fail.

But, as I have clearly shown, our rules for addition as you are familiar with them are completely arbitrary and we choose which rules we use and work with, based on how applicable they are to given situations.

The laws of mathematics are only true given the axioms. But we chose the axioms based on our own intuition and observation. We would not see it as sensical to define a + b = a + (b + 1), but we can. It's all up to choice. However, given the set of axioms we currently have chosen to use, and those with which you are familiar with using, 2 + 2 does indeed logically equal 4. But, if we choose to change the axioms, we can make it equal something else, very easily.

No, we "choose" our mathematics based on what makes sense to us, on our sense of rationality and truth. And the same is the case, properly, with morality.

You said it yourself, we choose based on what makes sense to us. Not all moral values will make sense to everyone all of the time. The best example is the abortion issue in the US. Two opposing moral beliefs, both chosen by each side because it makes the most sense to each side, yet they are polar opposites. We choose our morals based on what makes the most sense given a particular context, and there will not always be agreement, because everyones mind works diferently. Morals are as subjective as the person making them.

There you go. I've simply created a vector space with a slightly different definition of addition.

using a slightly different definition means not talking about the same thing. also, your definitional change is incoherent without making even more major changes. to =, for one thing. and to 2 for another. and i don't see any place where you'd get to stop. it just falls apart.

Not all moral values will make sense to everyone all of the time. The best example is the abortion issue in the US. Two opposing moral beliefs, both chosen by each side because it makes the most sense to each side, yet they are polar opposites.

actually, the burning fertility clinic seems to suggest that one side just hasn't actually thought about it

Wrong. The equation would be...

2 (the two apples you had in one hand) + 2 (the apples you had in your other hand) = 4 (the apples you have in both hands) + 1 (the apple created somewhere else in the universe) = 5

I don't know why you think so. 2 + 2 = 4, yes, and 4 + 1 = 5... but the physical processes you refer to are logically separate.

Two apples are added to another two apples; 2 + 2 = 4. This physical act causes another apple to be created somewhere; 4 + 1 = 5. But the additional 1 is in no sense a necessary mathematical result of 2 + 2 in the same sense 4 is. It's just a contingent empirical fact about the way the universe works. That's why we add it in separately. That's how math works.

Mathematics is not empirical. It is rooted in logical reasoning, in the fact that (for instance) 2 is 2 and not 3. Your error is that you beg the question: you assume that it refers to an empirical truth in the universe (put two and two apples in a basket, and they make four with no apple spontaneously created elsewhere), and this is the support for your argument that mathematics is not a matter of rational necessity. But insofar as math is a matter of rational necessity, the empirical result of that act is irrelevant: whatever the result is, we can still model it mathematically. And we can, as I've shown.

There you go. I've simply created a vector space with a slightly different definition of addition.

A nonsensical definition of addition. If a + b = a + b + 1, then a + b = a + b + 2, and a + b + 3, and so forth. The expression a + b ceases to have any particular meaning; it turns into self-contradictory nonsense in exactly the same way that making 2 = 3 does.

Mathematics lose all logical coherence when you break the rules in this manner. That's why the rules are not arbitrary.

Moreover, the very logic you speak is arbitrary too. Logic works on a few axioms which we accept, but haven't proven. Hence why they are axioms.

"Unproven" is not the same as "arbitrary." Logic ultimately rests on the distinction between truth and falsity, and is essential to the task of understanding the world.

We would not see it as sensical to define a + b = a + (b + 1), but we can.

Yes, we can. But my argument has never been that we cannot. My argument has been that our choice not to do so is not arbitrary.

You said it yourself, we choose based on what makes sense to us.

But not on the visceral "gut feeling" level... indeed, to go with that does not, ultimately, make sense to us.

Not all moral values will make sense to everyone all of the time. The best example is the abortion issue in the US. Two opposing moral beliefs, both chosen by each side because it makes the most sense to each side, yet they are polar opposites.

You assume that every person's position is in fact the best expression of their sense of truth, rationality, and rightness. That's an absurd assumption; among other things, it would make it impossible for people to change their minds.

You assume that every person's position is in fact the best expression of their sense of truth, rationality, and rightness. That's an absurd assumption; among other things, it would make it impossible for people to change their minds.

it is technically possible that mind changing could be explained by sudden (and perhaps random) shifts in fundamental senses of truth, etc.

it is technically possible that mind changing could be explained by sudden (and perhaps random) shifts in fundamental senses of truth, etc.

True. But that doesn't really encompass well the actual way convincing people of things tends to work, and it doesn't explain the differences in opinion among people who do share common assumptions.

I don't know why you think so. 2 + 2 = 4, yes, and 4 + 1 = 5... but the physical processes you refer to are logically separate.

Two apples are added to another two apples; 2 + 2 = 4. This physical act causes another apple to be created somewhere; 4 + 1 = 5. But the additional 1 is in no sense a necessary mathematical result of 2 + 2 in the same sense 4 is. It's just a contingent empirical fact about the way the universe works. That's why we add it in separately. That's how math works.

Mathematics is not empirical. It is rooted in logical reasoning, in the fact that (for instance) 2 is 2 and not 3. Your error is that you beg the question: you assume that it refers to an empirical truth in the universe (put two and two apples in a basket, and they make four with no apple spontaneously created elsewhere), and this is the support for your argument that mathematics is not a matter of rational necessity. But insofar as math is a matter of rational necessity, the empirical result of that act is irrelevant: whatever the result is, we can still model it mathematically. And we can, as I've shown.

Your argument here is quite wrong. In the example I gave, it is incorrect to give the 2 (apples in one hand) + 2 (apples in other hand) + 1 (new apple) = 5. You say...

2 (apples in one hand) + 2 (apples in other hand) = 4 (apples in both hands) + 1 (new apple the universe gained) = 5 (apples all up).

The first addition is telling you how to add two elements together, and the second is telling you what happens next. So all up, 5 apples now exist, but you only added 4 apples together. It is incorrect to place the newly gained apple before the equation, with the addition of the two apples + two apples side of the equation, as you're not adding two apples plus two apples plus one apple, you are only adding two apples to two apples, and on the other side of the equation, you get a fifth apple by some magic of the universe.

A nonsensical definition of addition. If a + b = a + b + 1, then a + b = a + b + 2, and a + b + 3, and so forth. The expression a + b ceases to have any particular meaning; it turns into self-contradictory nonsense in exactly the same way that making 2 = 3 does.

Mathematics lose all logical coherence when you break the rules in this manner. That's why the rules are not arbitrary.

This is all pretty much false. We can easily define addition in this way, and have done many times before. It's an entire field of mathematics and algebra. For instance, one important vector space is this vector with only one element. We define addition for this element as a+a=a, and we define scalar multiplication by a constant c as c.a=a. This to you seems nonsensical and illogical, but this particular definition has extreme importance and use. Just because you yourself have not been exposed to it, it doesn't mean it is illogical.

Also, the expression a + b has extensive meaning, even in the context of a + b = a + (b + 1). It shows you how you add two elements in the space together. You take two elements a and b, and you add the value of a to the value of (b+1), since a and b are integers. Simple. Logical. Well defined. Just because you haven't seen it before, doesn't mean it isn't a fundamentally important area of mathematics, with deep roots in algebra.

I haven't broken any rules. I've simply created a space with different rules. The numbers, as you know them, follow a set of rules which we have CHOSEN because they make the most sense to us, and have many real-world correlations.

"Unproven" is not the same as "arbitrary." Logic ultimately rests on the distinction between truth and falsity, and is essential to the task of understanding the world.

All logic breaks down and fails if...

The set of all statements which are true intersected with the set of all statements which are false is not an empty set.

Since we do not know whether this is the case or not, we take it as accepted. If something could be both true and false, then all logic would break down, and we would have to start over again. Since we have no proof that the intersection between the set of all statements which are true and the set of all statements which are false is an empty set, we take it as a definition.

Yes, we can. But my argument has never been that we cannot. My argument has been that our choice not to do so is not arbitrary.

It is arbitrary though. We choose it based on what works best with the universe. Our own ideas of logic and intuition have developed within the universe with which we exist. All of the mathematics we currently know is based on a few axioms, which we have chosen. We have chosen them because they seem intuitive and logical to choose given this universe. However, the axioms themselves are completely arbitrary, and nowhere does the universe say we have to choose those axioms. We just do because it suits us best.

You assume that every person's position is in fact the best expression of their sense of truth, rationality, and rightness. That's an absurd assumption; among other things, it would make it impossible for people to change their minds.

But now you're imposing your views on other people. How do you know your morals are better than someone elses? You don't. You just think they are. But you are bias by your own morals. Oncemore, people choose their morals based on what makes the most sense for them. They can change their morals when they no longer make sense (like some new scientific discovery showing babies to be sentient and conscious might make some pro-choice people reconsider their moral view that abortions are acceptable or whatever).

Since you cannot prove your moral code is true, you can only judge other moral codes next to yours, and hence those judgements are only relative. Since the universe gives us nothing with which to base our morals on, we have nothing but our own morals to base our moral judgements on. Thus, all moral judgements are bias and relative to other morals, which in themselves can be judged.

Every person decides for themselves (whether they are aware of it or not) what is morally "right" and what is morally "wrong". These morals are chosen because they seem to be the be the morals that will get them through life the best, based on what they anticipate life to be. If life were to change in some fundamental way, then morals may change. An example of this would be something which happened in Battlestar Galactica (yes, I am quoting a sci-fi show, but it does demonstrate what I mean with a good example) where the president had to outlaw abortions despite her past pro-choice stance, because humanity was on the brink of extinction and people needed to start having babies. Thus, her old moral idea that abortions were acceptable had to change so that the human race could survive.

Again, morals are entirely relative to context and situation.

2 (apples in one hand) + 2 (apples in other hand) = 4 (apples in both hands) + 1 (new apple the universe gained) = 5 (apples all up).

No, it doesn't. You're still not separating the separate concepts. You're still treating a contingent empirical fact as if it were a mathematical property.

The first addition is telling you how to add two elements together, and the second is telling you what happens next.

Not at all. This not a causal relation.

2 + 2 = 4 does not imply, in and of itself, that "If I put two apples and two apples into a basket, I will end up with four apples." Identity is not causation. 2 + 2 = 4 means that two apples considered together with two other apples are four apples. This is a necessary truth. It's conceptual, not causal, and it doesn't necessarily apply across space and time (because the identity breaks down.)

So all up, 5 apples now exist, but you only added 4 apples together.

Physically, yes: I only placed four apples together. Conceptually, no. I realize that a fifth apple has been created, due to the physical laws of the universe; in generating my result, therefore, I add that one in. 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.

This to you seems nonsensical and illogical, but this particular definition has extreme importance and use.

Maybe in a particular limited context, with a justification appropriate to that context... but not for addition as such, where it clearly makes no sense.

Also, the expression a + b has extensive meaning, even in the context of a + b = a + (b + 1). It shows you how you add two elements in the space together. You take two elements a and b, and you add the value of a to the value of (b+1), since a and b are integers.

I think you're equivocating.

In the chance that you're not, you're still left with the problem I noted before: if a + b = a + b + 1, then a + b = a + b + 2 = a + b + 3 and so forth. The meaning of a + b ceases to be stable.

I haven't broken any rules.

Of course you have. You've violated the whole idea of identity.

It is arbitrary though. We choose it based on what works best with the universe.

No, we don't. Logic is not about pragmatism; it speaks not to utility but to necessity. We might accept certain causal scientific theories because they are useful, but logic goes further: we cannot conceive of a world where logic does not hold true. It is not dependent on particular features of our universe.

But now you're imposing your views on other people.

"Imposing" suggests force. Nonsense.

How do you know your morals are better than someone elses?

Rationally: I conclude that certain moral statements have objective support for them, and others do not.

For instance, when someone says "Homosexuality is wrong", I generally ask them why, and I get answers that are arbitrary and illogical. It becomes clear that this viewpoint is founded on prejudice rather than on reason.

You don't. You just think they are. But you are bias by your own morals.

Ah, question-begging.

They can change their morals when they no longer make sense (like some new scientific discovery showing babies to be sentient and conscious might make some pro-choice people reconsider their moral view that abortions are acceptable or whatever).

That's not changing a moral position, that's changing which moral positions apply to a particular circumstance (based upon a changed understanding of the circumstance).

But people evidently do change their moral positions all the time nevertheless. Take me: at one point I held that meat-eating was morally unproblematic, and now I'm not only an ethical vegetarian but also a rather radical defender of animal rights. My understanding of the circumstances animals suffer has not changed in the intervening period. My understanding of the ethical duties human beings owe to non-humans has.

Since you cannot prove your moral code is true, you can only judge other moral codes next to yours, and hence those judgements are only relative.

More question-begging!

These morals are chosen because they seem to be the be the morals that will get them through life the best, based on what they anticipate life to be.

Nonsense. I'm quite sure that my ethical positions, in some respects, interfere with my capacity to live the best life I'd like for myself... at least on a definition of "best" that doesn't reduce your statement here to mere tautology.

Thus, her old moral idea that abortions were acceptable had to change so that the human race could survive.

Again, not a change in moral position, only a change in circumstance.

A person could consistently hold that (a) abortions are moral when they do not threaten the survival of the species and (b) abortions are immoral when they do threaten the survival of the species. If abortions, having once not threatened human survival, do come to threaten human survival, the changed attitude does not represent a change in moral position, which is still encompassed by those two statements.

No, it doesn't. You're still not separating the separate concepts. You're still treating a contingent empirical fact as if it were a mathematical property.

Let's explain it a little differently then.

Somehow, in this weird universe, when you add two groups of two apples, a fifth apple magically appears somewhere else in the universe. Thus, to define the addition of two groups of two apples, you define it as

(apple + apple) + (apple + apple) = (apple + apple + apple + apple) + (apple)

Not at all. This not a causal relation.

2 + 2 = 4 does not imply, in and of itself, that "If I put two apples and two apples into a basket, I will end up with four apples." Identity is not causation. 2 + 2 = 4 means that two apples considered together with two other apples are four apples. This is a necessary truth. It's conceptual, not causal, and it doesn't necessarily apply across space and time (because the identity breaks down.)

But you are still only using the common definition of +. There are other definitions, they are used for various contexts. Are you denying the existance of an entire field of algebra because it doesn't make sense to you?

It is a fact that, with the particular chosen definition of addition, along with the particular chosen axioms, that 2 + 2 = 4. However, those defintions and axioms are chosen, not inherrent to the universe.

I will admit that our limited human minds are not capable of conceiving much else, or imagining how other axioms might work. But that doesn't mean they aren't out there. Requiring that 2 + 2 = 4 might be a necessity for some peoples sanity, it is not a requirement for mathematics. It is meerly a result of a particular set of chosen definitions.

Physically, yes: I only placed four apples together. Conceptually, no. I realize that a fifth apple has been created, due to the physical laws of the universe; in generating my result, therefore, I add that one in. 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.

But you're not adding them correctly. The process of adding two apples results in another apple being created. So, oncemore, it looks like this...

2 + 2 = 2 + 2 + 1 = 5

With + representing addition as the universe makes it, and the black +'s being addition as you understand it.

Maybe in a particular limited context, with a justification appropriate to that context... but not for addition as such, where it clearly makes no sense.

Such addition makes perfect sense. You add something to itself, and you get itself in return. This "particular limited context" is used millions of times per day all around the world. You've used it before. You just don't realise it.

I think you're equivocating.

In the chance that you're not, you're still left with the problem I noted before: if a + b = a + b + 1, then a + b = a + b + 2 = a + b + 3 and so forth. The meaning of a + b ceases to be stable.

But then you're not understanding the definition of a vector space. Which is a lack of knowledge of mathematics on your part. I have simply defined a simple rule for adding two elements in a set I gave. I have violated no laws. Defied no logic. Just simply modified an addition rule. a + b is what you put in, a + (b + 1) is what you get out. It's a staggaringly simple concept. The addition rule simply tells you how to add two elements in a set together. You are only familiar with one addition rule. That does not make it the only addition rule. I have conjured up another, perfectly valid addition rule. Logic does not break down.

You're looking at (a + b) as being the same as (a + (b + 1)), which it isn't. You're just only familiar with cases where it is. The rule which I outlined was
+: a + b = a + (b + 1)
Since a and b are integers, this reads as
To add two integers together, you take the first one, and add it to (the second one added to 1) in the fashion you are familiar with. Let me explain it more basically...

We have this rule, called +. + is as I have defined it to be. We have another rule, +, which is how you are familiar with it. The rule for + is...
+: a + b = a + (b + 1)
+ tells you how to add two elements in this set together. + is just an addition you are familiar with.

Of course you have. You've violated the whole idea of identity.

Not at all. Identity still exists. Except, instead of 0 being the additive identity, -1 is. Simple. If you add -1 to something, you get that something back.

You seem to not grasp that I have done nothing more than give an example from an area of mathematics commonly studied by pretty much anyone who has studied mathematics at some point. I have done nothing wrong at all. Just presented you with something you are not familiar with and failed to explain it adequately to you. Sorry about that.

No, we don't. Logic is not about pragmatism; it speaks not to utility but to necessity. We might accept certain causal scientific theories because they are useful, but logic goes further: we cannot conceive of a world where logic does not hold true. It is not dependent on particular features of our universe.

So now you're saying that because we cannot imagine something different, it must therefore not be the case? You do know that quantum physics violates logic, don't you? That something can be in two places at once, that something does not have a fixed position in space, and that therefore it is correct to say that it's position is here, but that it is also here. You may not be able to conceive a world where logic does not hold true, but you do live in such a world.

I remember reading an article last year about how logic was having to be rewritten because it no longer made sense because of quantum physics.

"Imposing" suggests force. Nonsense.

Not quite. By judging someones morals, you are making your own moral judgement on them. You can not judge morals without being affected by your own morals. Therefore, any moral judgement you make is inherrently bias due to your own set of morals.

Rationally: I conclude that certain moral statements have objective support for them, and others do not.

For instance, when someone says "Homosexuality is wrong", I generally ask them why, and I get answers that are arbitrary and illogical. It becomes clear that this viewpoint is founded on prejudice rather than on reason.

Homosexuality is wrong because our genetic imperitive is to reproduce, which requires attraction and desire to mate with members of the opposite sex. Thus, homosexuality is wrong in that it goes against our biological imperitive.

Homosexuality is right because members of the same sex know how to please you better than members of the opposite sex.

Homosexuality is acceptable because they were born that way and have no control over it.

Homosexuality is acceptable, but wrong, because their brains are broken in that their brains are giving them the incorrect biological imperitive.

There you go. Four different yet completely morally valid arguments about homosexuality. Every one of these arguments is logical and makes sense. Yet they are somewhat contradictory. You have to choose which, if any, of these moral statements you agree with. You can do a bit of deduction, but ultimately, it's up to choice. There is nothing in the universe saying which of these statements is "true", and which are "false".

That's not changing a moral position, that's changing which moral positions apply to a particular circumstance (based upon a changed understanding of the circumstance).

But people evidently do change their moral positions all the time nevertheless. Take me: at one point I held that meat-eating was morally unproblematic, and now I'm not only an ethical vegetarian but also a rather radical defender of animal rights. My understanding of the circumstances animals suffer has not changed in the intervening period. My understanding of the ethical duties human beings owe to non-humans has.

But then, morals are not definite, but reliant on context. In one context, abortions are morally acceptable. In another context, abortions are exterminating the species, and are thus morally unacceptable.

While we're on it, why do you have a beef* with meat eating? Is it because killing animals is wrong? Is it the way they are killed? Is killing animals okay but eating them is wrong? Animals eat other animals, so meat eating is certainly natural. At least we have the courtesy to kill them first, then eat them. Whereas the lion might just as well take down the zebra and eat it while it is still squirming.

Or is it just the pain the animals are put through? If so, then where do you draw the line? Do you swat a fly when it is trying to drink your blood? Do you think the fly cares about the pain/discomfort it is putting you through when it drinks your blood? Do you own anything at all made of wood? If so, then you have killed a living being for your own comfort. Do you use disinfectants on your dirty dishes? If so, then you are killing millions of bacteria. So, what makes the life of a cow more valid and important than that of a tree, or fly, or bacteria? Is it size? Complexity? Intelligence? Cuteness? What? But then, how do you define where the line is drawn? It's okay to kill bacteria because they are small and numerous, but not cows because they are big and not as numerous?

You make a moral judgement based on what you know. But it is still a moral judgement, and is likely to be different from someone elses moral judgement. It is a purely moral definition, and is therefore not universal.


*Pardon the pun

Nonsense. I'm quite sure that my ethical positions, in some respects, interfere with my capacity to live the best life I'd like for myself... at least on a definition of "best" that doesn't reduce your statement here to mere tautology.

I never said easiest, I said best. They let you feel most comfortable with yourself. They help you live with yourself. They help you make decisions that let you live in society fine. Again, you've just taken one definition of a word, and assumed it was what I meant.

Again, not a change in moral position, only a change in circumstance.

A person could consistently hold that (a) abortions are moral when they do not threaten the survival of the species and (b) abortions are immoral when they do threaten the survival of the species. If abortions, having once not threatened human survival, do come to threaten human survival, the changed attitude does not represent a change in moral position, which is still encompassed by those two statements.

But then, who defines when the survival of the species is no longer at stake? Perhaps some figures could come up suggesting that with a population of a specified amount would likely be able to sustain itself with one or two abortions per year etc. etc. But those would only be statistics, and would not be guaranteed. Moreover, some people argue that the complete legalisation of abortions could result in an abnormally large number of abortions which could be detrimental to the survival of the species. So where is the line drawn? It doesn't matter, because wherever the line is drawn, it will have been morals drawing it.

Somehow, in this weird universe, when you add two groups of two apples, a fifth apple magically appears somewhere else in the universe.

Alright. Then we have an equation for the physical act of putting two groups of two apples together: 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.

But you are still only using the common definition of +.
So?

It is a fact that, with the particular chosen definition of addition, along with the particular chosen axioms, that 2 + 2 = 4.

Two things.

First, "chosen definition" is immaterial. Definitions don't actually interfere with results; they just determine what symbol we use to represent various concepts. So far I've been assuming that you mean something more along the lines of "conception", that is to say the particular mathematical act that best models a constant concept of "addition", but I'm not sure of that anymore--now it seems to me that you might just be pretending that the arbitrariness of the conventional symbols somehow has bearing on the alleged arbitrariness of the concepts themselves. I don't see how else you could say that 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact according to these arbitrary definitions, but not those ones.

Second, tellingly, you've just admitted ("It is a fact") the assumption that was at the heart of this whole debate: Neu Leonstein pointed out that there was a sense in which mathematics could be said to be correct, and that this might apply similarly to morality.

So you do admit to objective truth in mathematics, which is a human construct, and not founded in the universe in any direct empirical sense. Why, then, do you insist that such truth is impossible in morality? People do not, after all, generally dispute the axioms of rationality.

It is meerly a result of a particular set of chosen definitions.

But while we could make the number "2" mean "3" and the symbol "+" mean "to the power of", the concept of two added to the concept of two would still have a relationship of conceptual equality to the concept of four even if the phrase "2 + 2 = 4" no longer held true.

The process of adding two apples results in another apple being created. So, oncemore, it looks like this...

2 + 2 = 2 + 2 + 1 = 5

You're still equivocating on "add", between mathematical and physical addition. If I add two apples to the highway and watch them get crushed by trucks, I don't have two apples anymore... but that doesn't mean that 2 = 0. "=" does not mean "results in." Logical identity is not the same as causation.

Again: mathematical addition is not causal, it is conceptual. I think about two apples, I think about another two apples. Between those two groups of apples, I have four apples. The fact that the physical act of putting the two groups together might, in some universe, add a fifth apple in somewhere does not alter this mathematical result. It simply alters the equation we use to model the physical act: rather than 2 + 2 = 4, we recognize the way the universe works and use 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.

We have this rule, called +. + is as I have defined it to be. We have another rule, +, which is how you are familiar with it. The rule for + is...
+: a + b = a + (b + 1)
+ tells you how to add two elements in this set together. + is just an addition you are familiar with.

See, now this is starting to sound like equivocation you don't even bother to veil.

There's nothing incoherent about + as you have defined it. But it also has no bearing whatsoever on the actual discussion. 2 + 2 = 4. 2 + 2 = 5. Two separate concepts (whatever the similarity in the symbols used) generating separate answers. What of it? No mathematically relativist conclusions result from this. None should. 2 + 2, by the ordinary concept of addition, still generates 4. This is still an objective mathematical truth; someone who denies it is wrong. The fact that we can redefine "+" to mean something different is trivially true, but immaterial.

Again, I thought that you were actually being a little more substantive, and were making an objection that, if supported, might actually get you somewhere: namely, that the particular mathematical conception we attach to the concept of addition (not the symbol of addition) is in fact an arbitrarily chosen one, rather than a necessary truth stemming from the concept. Instead, however, you have merely noted the arbitrariness of symbols and their rootedness in convention, by noting two different concepts of addition that can be referenced by the same symbol. I'm perfectly aware of this. It proves nothing in this context, because it's just symbol manipulation. If we had a mathematical language where the two versions of "+" were differentiated clearly every time, as you have just shown is perfectly possible, there would be no issue at all.

So now you're saying that because we cannot imagine something different, it must therefore not be the case?

But it's not the limits of our imagination either. I cannot imagine a circumstance where I would want to play football, but I'm sure it's logically possible. "Conceivability" here is just a convenient intuitive way to get at the idea of "necessity": logic strikes us as a necessary truth, a necessary element of what it is for something to exist, for something to be true, in such a way that it qualifies for analyzing all concepts.

You do know that quantum physics violates logic, don't you?

I cannot "know" things that are false.

That something can be in two places at once, that something does not have a fixed position in space, and that therefore it is correct to say that it's position is here, but that it is also here.

These are counter-intuitive, but not illogical. They require us to question our ordinary intuitive assumptions about the nature of position and velocity. They do not require us to hold by a contradiction: it's not that a particle is in two positions at once in the traditional exact sense of "position", it's that a particle's position is imprecise.

Not quite. By judging someones morals, you are making your own moral judgement on them.

Well, on their ethical beliefs, yes. So?

You can not judge morals without being affected by your own morals. Therefore, any moral judgement you make is inherrently bias due to your own set of morals.

Well, generally I would "judge" a moral system by referencing the moral system that I think is true, yes, but if I have objective support for this contention, that is not indicative of bias any more than any other standard of judgment inherently is.

Homosexuality is wrong because our genetic imperitive is to reproduce, which requires attraction and desire to mate with members of the opposite sex. Thus, homosexuality is wrong in that it goes against our biological imperitive.

Arbitrary. Violation of is-ought gap: any "genetic imperative" cannot be a foundation for moral obligation, because the naturalness of something does not suggest the rightness of something. A genetic imperative for rape would not suggest to us that rape is morally acceptable.

Homosexuality is right because members of the same sex know how to please you better than members of the opposite sex.

Arbitrary. Also a violation of is-ought gap: the pleasurableness of something has no inherent bearing on it being right or wrong. A cruel person might gain pleasure from the torture of others, but we don't judge that his or her behavior is justified as a consequence.

Homosexuality is acceptable because they were born that way and have no control over it.

More defensible, insofar as we have independent rational support for this kind of tolerance (as we don't really for the other two premises): it well expresses the kind of conclusion we might get from the sort of rational empathy embodied in the (first formulation of the) categorical imperative.

Homosexuality is acceptable, but wrong, because their brains are broken in that their brains are giving them the incorrect biological imperitive.

Again, is/ought. Even if we can deem something unnatural or contrary to biological imperatives, it does not follow that we can deem it to be wrong.

Yet they are somewhat contradictory.

I should add that I actually do think there can be contradictory "correct" moral judgments. While absolute moral standards exist, they cannot resolve every conflict. We will always be left with an element of relativism.

But they can take us very far.

But then, morals are not definite, but reliant on context.

It's not morality that isn't definite, it's the circumstances that aren't. Morality rests on the application of moral principles to circumstances.

Essentially all moral theorists agree that context, circumstances, consequences, etc. are relevant sometimes, in some ways. That's a trivial truth.

While we're on it, why do you have a beef* with meat eating? Is it because killing animals is wrong?

Outside of the context of natural survival needs, yes.

Is it the way they are killed?

Yes.

Animals eat other animals, so meat eating is certainly natural.

Without question. But meat-eating as human beings do it nowadays is certainly not natural.

Do you swat a fly when it is trying to drink your blood?

Flies are not sentient.

Do you think the fly cares about the pain/discomfort it is putting you through when it drinks your blood?

No, but I'm not fond of a vengeance ethic. My moral duties to other entities are not dependent on their fulfillment of moral duties to me.

So, what makes the life of a cow more valid and important than that of a tree, or fly, or bacteria? Is it size? Complexity? Intelligence? Cuteness?

None of the above. Sentience.

You make a moral judgement based on what you know. But it is still a moral judgement, and is likely to be different from someone elses moral judgement.

Of course.

It is a purely moral definition, and is therefore not universal.

Question-begging (again). You can't stop, can you?

(Unless by "universal" you mean "actually shared by everyone" rather than "holding true for everyone", in which case you'd merely be pointing out--again--a trivial and irrelevant truth. People disagree about all sorts of objective matters.)

They let you feel most comfortable with yourself.

No, they don't. Indeed, at times they demand that I make myself much less comfortable with myself, that I be honest even when it is awkward or socially problematic, that I refuse to do wrong even in response to the emotional appeal of a friend.

Of course, it is true that, having concluded that a given moral system holds true, I can use my acceptance to alleviate the discomfort of such situations: emotions sometimes do respond to reason. But then you have the causal relation reversed: it's not that I accept the ethical system that makes me most comfortable, it's that my acceptance of that particular ethical system causes my adherence to it to be less uncomfortable.

Certainly the standard by which I judge moral systems is not "Which one makes me most comfortable?" I look at actual arguments.

They help you make decisions that let you live in society fine.

Why do you assume this? The moral theory I accept sometimes obligates me to do socially unacceptable things: to, for instance, tell the truth over the convenient lie, or to oppose other people's wrong behavior even in an atmosphere that doesn't approve of that kind of questioning.

Again, you've just taken one definition of a word, and assumed it was what I meant.

Actually, that's what you did just now, when you assumed that when I used "best", I meant "easiest." I did not.

All human experience is subjective. That which we call 'objectivity' is more of an ideal aspiration than an absolute term to describe an idea. That being said, certain standards can be called 'objective' in this limited though meaningful sense. There are certain universal biological functions and aspirations the fulfillment of which is essential to our well being. Helping to assure that others are able to fulfill these functions is ethical. A society that guarantees the fulfillment thereof is an ethical society.

For example: you know from experience that it is a terrible thing for a person to be hungry. It is thus ethical to help save others from starvation and it is unethical to wittingly contribute to starvation. A society that strives to ensure that all are fed is an ethical society.

In short: Do onto others as you would have done onto you. And as you want others to do onto you as you would have done onto you; do onto others as they would have done onto them.

Alright. Then we have an equation for the physical act of putting two groups of two apples together: 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.

Your insistance on this false statement is puzzling. You do NOT add the apple that has newly been created. The process of adding two groups of two apples together results in four apples in one group, and another apple newly created.

The act of addition results in something being created. This something does not take part in the addition itself, it is a result of the addition. Thus, you are still incorrect to put the 1 on the left side of the equation.

Two things.

First, "chosen definition" is immaterial. Definitions don't actually interfere with results; they just determine what symbol we use to represent various concepts. So far I've been assuming that you mean something more along the lines of "conception", that is to say the particular mathematical act that best models a constant concept of "addition", but I'm not sure of that anymore--now it seems to me that you might just be pretending that the arbitrariness of the conventional symbols somehow has bearing on the alleged arbitrariness of the concepts themselves. I don't see how else you could say that 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact according to these arbitrary definitions, but not those ones.

Definitions, or rather, axioms, define how things in mathematics react. Without the axioms, we would have no mathematics. If we can't prove something, but require it for the mathematics we need, we take it as an axiom. Thus, we choose it, largely out of convenience.

Second, tellingly, you've just admitted ("It is a fact") the assumption that was at the heart of this whole debate: Neu Leonstein pointed out that there was a sense in which mathematics could be said to be correct, and that this might apply similarly to morality.

So you do admit to objective truth in mathematics, which is a human construct, and not founded in the universe in any direct empirical sense. Why, then, do you insist that such truth is impossible in morality? People do not, after all, generally dispute the axioms of rationality.

If you'll actually read what I said, you would have noted that I said something along the lines of "2+2=4 is a fact, given the axioms". In that it is true only within the axioms, and is false outside them.

The axioms, we take as a base. We then work from there. Morality has no such base. Therefore everything is subjective. However, the axioms of mathematics are themselves subjective. Everything that follows from the axioms of mathematics (such as 2+2=4 under certain specified circumstances) is true, given the truth of the axioms. However, we are not given that - we meerly assume it.

But while we could make the number "2" mean "3" and the symbol "+" mean "to the power of", the concept of two added to the concept of two would still have a relationship of conceptual equality to the concept of four even if the phrase "2 + 2 = 4" no longer held true.

You've clearly missed what I've been saying on that, so I'm not even going to bother anymore. I tried explaining to you some simple algebraic concept, and I failed. I've already explained it more clearly than it was ever explained to me, and I managed to grasp the concept just fine. So I shaln't bother trying to re-explain it to you any simpler than I already have.

You're still equivocating on "add", between mathematical and physical addition. If I add two apples to the highway and watch them get crushed by trucks, I don't have two apples anymore... but that doesn't mean that 2 = 0. "=" does not mean "results in." Logical identity is not the same as causation.

But you would still have the two apples, just in a different state.

"=" means many things in mathematics. It can mean identity. It can mean relationship. It can mean equivalence. It can mean other things. Again

+: a + b = a + (b + 1)

I am stating how to add two elements together. I am telling you how to add a to be. On the left hand side, you have the two elements with which you wish to combine. On the right, you are told how to combine them. The red + is the + I am defining, the purple + is the form of addition you are familiar with. Since we have already defined the purple +, we can define the new red + in this way. The red + tells you how to add things in this particular space I defined earlier. The purple + tells you how to add things in another space. It is really that simple. Red + just tells you how to add two elements together in a particular space (one YOU are not used to working in).

Your inability to accept this simple mathematical concept serves to prove my point. Your own bias, in that you have not encountered the mathematics I am describing, is affecting how you percieve my argument. In this case, your ignorance is affecting how you judge my argument.

Again: mathematical addition is not causal, it is conceptual. I think about two apples, I think about another two apples. Between those two groups of apples, I have four apples. The fact that the physical act of putting the two groups together might, in some universe, add a fifth apple in somewhere does not alter this mathematical result. It simply alters the equation we use to model the physical act: rather than 2 + 2 = 4, we recognize the way the universe works and use 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.

I'm not even going to bother. You're not getting it. I'll stop.

See, now this is starting to sound like equivocation you don't even bother to veil.

There's nothing incoherent about + as you have defined it. But it also has no bearing whatsoever on the actual discussion. 2 + 2 = 4. 2 + 2 = 5. Two separate concepts (whatever the similarity in the symbols used) generating separate answers. What of it? No mathematically relativist conclusions result from this. None should. 2 + 2, by the ordinary concept of addition, still generates 4. This is still an objective mathematical truth; someone who denies it is wrong. The fact that we can redefine "+" to mean something different is trivially true, but immaterial.

Again, I thought that you were actually being a little more substantive, and were making an objection that, if supported, might actually get you somewhere: namely, that the particular mathematical conception we attach to the concept of addition (not the symbol of addition) is in fact an arbitrarily chosen one, rather than a necessary truth stemming from the concept. Instead, however, you have merely noted the arbitrariness of symbols and their rootedness in convention, by noting two different concepts of addition that can be referenced by the same symbol. I'm perfectly aware of this. It proves nothing in this context, because it's just symbol manipulation. If we had a mathematical language where the two versions of "+" were differentiated clearly every time, as you have just shown is perfectly possible, there would be no issue at all.

Your failure to understand what I was saying earlier has affected the validity of your further statements on it. So, again, I'm not even going to bother.

But it's not the limits of our imagination either. I cannot imagine a circumstance where I would want to play football, but I'm sure it's logically possible. "Conceivability" here is just a convenient intuitive way to get at the idea of "necessity": logic strikes us as a necessary truth, a necessary element of what it is for something to exist, for something to be true, in such a way that it qualifies for analyzing all concepts.

The axioms of mathematics and logic are necessary for mathematics and logic, but that doesn't make the axioms true. We just accept them as true because we cannot prove them. Our entire perception of mathematics and logic are based on a few chosen axioms. Change the axioms, change the logic/mathematics.

I cannot "know" things that are false.

Yet you do not know this inherrent universal truth. Read up on the double-slit experiment (it's a very famous experiment, which completely defies logic).

...

Now that you've read up on it, you should know that the photon goes down both paths, simultaneously. We cannot say whether it went through one slit or the other, but that it went through both. Yet the photon is a particle. It can only go through one or the other, which is what we see when we measure which path it takes. But when we don't measure which path it takes, it goes through both. The truth is not that it went through one path or the other and we do not know which, it went down both. Therefore the photon had two positions at the same time.

These are counter-intuitive, but not illogical. They require us to question our ordinary intuitive assumptions about the nature of position and velocity. They do not require us to hold by a contradiction: it's not that a particle is in two positions at once in the traditional exact sense of "position", it's that a particle's position is imprecise.

It's position is not imprecise. It is in all positions simultaneously. Again, double slit experiment demonstrates that it is in two positions at once.

Well, generally I would "judge" a moral system by referencing the moral system that I think is true, yes, but if I have objective support for this contention, that is not indicative of bias any more than any other standard of judgment inherently is.

You may have some objective support for your moral views, as I believe most people like to think they do, but ultimately, there is no set of morals which are 100% inherrently true to the universe. No set of morals are true or false, since the universe has no moral code.

Arbitrary. Violation of is-ought gap: any "genetic imperative" cannot be a foundation for moral obligation, because the naturalness of something does not suggest the rightness of something. A genetic imperative for rape would not suggest to us that rape is morally acceptable.

Moral statement in bold. Everything following is just a moral opinion, and is not inherrently true to the universe, but meerly opinion.

Arbitrary. Also a violation of is-ought gap: the pleasurableness of something has no inherent bearing on it being right or wrong. A cruel person might gain pleasure from the torture of others, but we don't judge that his or her behavior is justified as a consequence.

Same as above.

More defensible, insofar as we have independent rational support for this kind of tolerance (as we don't really for the other two premises): it well expresses the kind of conclusion we might get from the sort of rational empathy embodied in the (first formulation of the) categorical imperative.

This argument requires the existance of free will. Since free will hasn't been proven scientifically, it is meerly a philosophical conjecture. If free will doesn't exist, then we have no control over any choice we make, because it is all determined by laws of physics. Prove the existance of free will, and that the human brain defies the deterministic laws of physics, and you might have an argument. Until then, moral judgement on anything is wrong, since the universe is deterministic, the human brain being no exception, every choice we make is determined by physical laws, and as such, we have no choice, therefore we have no intent, thus, no blame, and so, no moral infringement.

Again, is/ought. Even if we can deem something unnatural or contrary to biological imperatives, it does not follow that we can deem it to be wrong.

Moral opinion which is not inherrently true to the universe. Mute point.

I should add that I actually do think there can be contradictory "correct" moral judgments. While absolute moral standards exist, they cannot resolve every conflict. We will always be left with an element of relativism.

But they can take us very far.

But there are no morals that are inherrently true to the universe. Only morals which might seem best for various circumstances. </discussion>

It's not morality that isn't definite, it's the circumstances that aren't. Morality rests on the application of moral principles to circumstances.

Essentially all moral theorists agree that context, circumstances, consequences, etc. are relevant sometimes, in some ways. That's a trivial truth.

Mute point, since morals are not inherrent to the universe, they are man-made, just like cars, computers, and evil. If all of humanity were to die tomorrow, the universe would have no morality.

Without question. But meat-eating as human beings do it nowadays is certainly not natural.

Define natural.

Are ant-hills natural? They are made out of things found in nature. Are huts natural? They are made from things found in nature. Either everything is natural, or nothing is natural. Since we humans are part of nature, everything we do is natural.

Flies are not sentient.

And cows are?

How do you know flies aren't sentient? How do you determine whether something is sentient or not? How do you know this method of determining is correct, or even adequatE?

None of the above. Sentience.

Define sentience for me. And then prove that your definition of sentience is infallable, 100% objective, and inherrent to the nature of the universe.

Question-begging (again). You can't stop, can you?

(Unless by "universal" you mean "actually shared by everyone" rather than "holding true for everyone", in which case you'd merely be pointing out--again--a trivial and irrelevant truth. People disagree about all sorts of objective matters.)

But again, since morals are not written into the universe, they cannot be "true" to everyone. Sure, you might have some objective evidence to support your morals, but that doesn't make them 100% definite indesputible complete fact. It meerly makes them morals that have some objective evidence supporting them. Maybe it makes them more valid than other arguments. But it doesn't make them inherrent to the universe.

No, they don't. Indeed, at times they demand that I make myself much less comfortable with myself, that I be honest even when it is awkward or socially problematic, that I refuse to do wrong even in response to the emotional appeal of a friend.

Of course, it is true that, having concluded that a given moral system holds true, I can use my acceptance to alleviate the discomfort of such situations: emotions sometimes do respond to reason. But then you have the causal relation reversed: it's not that I accept the ethical system that makes me most comfortable, it's that my acceptance of that particular ethical system causes my adherence to it to be less uncomfortable.

Certainly the standard by which I judge moral systems is not "Which one makes me most comfortable?" I look at actual arguments.

This discussion isn't relevant to what I was originally talking about anyway. Comfort with our morals is irrelevant to whether morals are inherrent to the universe or not.

I'm done with this particular line of discussion. It's no longer relevant to the initial point I was making.

We have this rule, called +. + is as I have defined it to be. We have another rule, +, which is how you are familiar with it.

kripke did it better and pointed out an actual problem here

kripke did it better and pointed out an actual problem here

Problem? There is no problem. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vector_space

Problem? There is no problem. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vector_space

you are just equivocating on what the symbol + means. openly and blatantly. that is the only thing that allows you to even attempt the argument you are making. kripkenstein did something at least philosophically interesting with a similar move. you haven't.

you are just equivocating on what the symbol + means. openly and blatantly. that is the only thing that allows you to even attempt the argument you are making. kripkenstein did something at least philosophically interesting with a similar move. you haven't.

Not at all. I created a vector space with a rule for addition which I defined, and this rule for addidion resulted in 2 + 2 = 5, without any logical impossiblity, as Soheran said must clearly ensue if 2 + 2 did indeed equal 5. A vector space is defined as a set of objects with a rule for addition of two elements, and a rule for scalar multiplication of an elements and a real number, along with some properties that must follow. The numbers, as everyone is familiar with them, are part of one particular vector space, and I simply gave another, with a different rule for addition. Simple.

http://www.math.ucla.edu/~tao/resource/general/121.1.00s/vector_axioms.html

Not at all. I created a vector space with a rule for addition which I defined, and this rule for addidion resulted in 2 + 2 = 5, without any logical impossiblity, as Soheran said must clearly ensue if 2 + 2 did indeed equal 5. A vector space is defined as a set of objects with a rule for addition of two elements, and a rule for scalar multiplication of an elements and a real number, along with some properties that must follow. The numbers, as everyone is familiar with them, are part of one particular vector space, and I simply gave another, with a different rule for addition. Simple.

yes, you used a different function entirely. pluess rather than plus, if you will. the point is that you tried to say that this meant there wasn't an objective answer about 2 plus 2. this is quite simply wrong. it is logically impossible for 2 plus 2 to equal 5. pluess doesn't enter into it.

Do you mean "Do the ends justify the means"? They do not; the greatest good in the world cannot justify mistreating one individual. Neither, for the matter, do the means justify the ends

Would you then, not be able to kill one innocent person if the result, for some sick and twisted reason, would be that you unlocked the cure of cancer (of all different types, since we are speaking hypothetically), and thus, by direct result, saved millions and millions of lives?

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective? If objective, what is it and what makes it so? If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another? Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means? Are peoples intentions morally important, or just the effects they have?

Great topic!

Morality is both objective and subjective. Some moral questions have objective answers and some are subjective. The analysis has to begin with the objective analysis and then if the moral dillemna is not objectively immoral then it is up to the individual to use his subjective moral reasoning.

The apporach that I like to use as the objective filter is "If everybody chose to act in this manner, would the result be fucked up?" If the answer is in the negative then the subjective level analysis is "does this disturb my personal sense of right and wrong?"

An example is whether it is moral to have protected sex with a prostitute. Objectively, I cannot see how the world would be a rather fucked up place if everyone had sex with prostitutes. Heck, it might even do society some good in the stress reduction department and possibly in the area of rape reduction. We do not need to get into the contraversial question of whether a ready supply of cheap and safe prostitutes reduces rape as I think that would be a whole other topic in itself.

Then I look at it subjectively. The question becomes, "Should I have protected sex with a prostitute?". The answer here is also in the negative because I just think that there is something slimy about paying someone to have sex with me. It just seems icky in a subjective way. However, my view would change if I became older and uglier and the only way I could get a pretty lover would be to pay a whore.

I'm going to ignore most of this, but a few points deserve further treatment, at least insofar as I haven't effectively rebutted them yet.

Yet the photon is a particle. It can only go through one or the other

Not so fast. This is your intuitive assumption coming in, and it's that that quantum mechanics contradicts, not logic itself. The weirdness of the experimental result is that the photons behave in some respects as particles and in others as waves--that they have a dual nature. This is indeed counter-intuitive, but it is not illogical.

Moral statement in bold.

Yes, that is a moral statement, but more importantly it is a rational statement: it stems from the logical truth that "is" does not imply "ought." That's objectively true.

Until then, moral judgement on anything is wrong, since the universe is deterministic, the human brain being no exception, every choice we make is determined by physical laws, and as such, we have no choice, therefore we have no intent, thus, no blame, and so, no moral infringement.

What nonsense. Determinism is not any more provable than free will. Certainly, in actual decision-making, it seems to us that we are acting freely (and we necessarily assume that we are), and since that's the setting for the application of ethical principles, there's nothing wrong with assuming free will in that context.

Define natural.

Wait, you're the one who brought in considerations of "natural", not me.

Are ant-hills natural? They are made out of things found in nature. Are huts natural? They are made from things found in nature. Either everything is natural, or nothing is natural. Since we humans are part of nature, everything we do is natural.

This is all equivocation, but it also irrelevant. If "everything" or "nothing" is natural, then vegetarianism is certainly equally natural to meat-eating, so pointing out the naturalness of meat-eating of any variety does not justify it. "Natural" ceases to be a term that makes any kind of distinction, which is clearly how you were using it in your original argument.

And cows are?

Almost certainly, yes.

How do you know flies aren't sentient? How do you determine whether something is sentient or not?

Fairly interesting epistemological questions, but beyond the scope of this discussion. They neither address the meta-ethical question of the relativity or absoluteness of moral standards, nor the ethical question of the duties humans have to non-human sentient beings.

Define sentience for me. And then prove that your definition of sentience is infallable, 100% objective, and inherrent to the nature of the universe.

You're very confused about the nature and role of definitions, aren't you?

Sure, you might have some objective evidence to support your morals, but that doesn't make them 100% definite indesputible complete fact.

Now you've departed from the ontological/meta-ethical question ("What is the nature of moral truth?", a subject on which you've just repeatedly and blatantly begged the question) and moved on to the epistemological question ("How can we know for sure?").

I don't claim that the moral theory by which I hold is "definite" or "indisputable" or even "complete." But, then, the same is true of judgments I make regarding other areas of objective truth.

Comfort with our morals is irrelevant to whether morals are inherrent to the universe or not.

It's not a question of whether or not they're "inherent to the universe", it's a question of whether they can speak with the authority of absolute truth (as opposed to relative perspectives.)

Rational morality, like mathematics, is an a priori human construct of reason, and is thus not "inherent to the universe" in the same sense as, say, the laws of physics. It would make more sense to say that it is inherent to our sense of truth, our attempt to substantively understand how we ought to behave.

In this context, "comfort with our morals" is certainly relevant. The relativist must maintain that any assertion of moral belief ultimately comes down to some subjective element: culturally-induced values, subjective moral feelings, or a sense of comfort that it induces.

Would you then, not be able to kill one innocent person if the result, for some sick and twisted reason, would be that you unlocked the cure of cancer (of all different types, since we are speaking hypothetically), and thus, by direct result, saved millions and millions of lives?

Yes, that's right. Those saved lives may not be purchased at the price of murder. It may make the world a better place, but you don't have the authority to forcibly deprive another of life to serve that end.

Yes, that's right. Those saved lives may not be purchased at the price of murder. It may make the world a better place, but you don't have the authority to forcibly deprive another of life to serve that end.

But how can you come to such a judgement through a priori reasoning alone?

But how can you come to such a judgement through a priori reasoning alone?

Simply from the fact that consequences do not alter truth. If it is the case that each individual person ought to be free, then it is not rational for me to deny this truth: I can at no point will the deprivation of another's freedom, for that would be equivalent to stating that that person ought not to be free. The fact that sometimes this prohibition prevents me from saving lives is no more relevant to the validity of the moral statement than the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 may be inconvenient when I want 3 is relevant to the validity of the mathematical statement.

If it is the case that each individual person ought to be free

Are you saying that you can show that this 'if' is also the case through a priori reasoning?

Are you saying that you can show that this 'if' is also the case through a priori reasoning?

Yes. It has to do with recognizing other human beings as subjects rather than objects, for whom reason ought to determine their will on exactly the same grounds that it ought to determine our own. And just as reason demands that we find autonomous, independent foundations for our own behavior, it demands that we respect the capacity of others to determine themselves according to autonomous, independent foundations as well.

And just as reason demands that we find autonomous, independent foundations for our own behavior, it demands that we respect the capacity of others to determine themselves according to autonomous, independent foundations as well.

I know this is an annoyingly pedantic question, but how does reason demand this?

I know this is an annoyingly pedantic question, but how does reason demand this?

Ah, the joys of the Socratic Method.

well the subjectivity dodge is still really of no pertinence to the question of morality. it applies, quite nicely, is the point many have been hammering away at, to civil law, and even social principals of organized beliefs. the only little detail is that both of these are entirely seperate subjects from any question of real morality.

you can take it stocastically, statistically, selfishly or altruistically, it still comes out to the more suffering you cause, the more there is floating arround, and the more there is floating arround, the more likely you are to find yourself in a pile of something that doesn't smell like roses.

and i mean suffering, however subjectively the details of it might be experienced, not exlusively pain, which in some contexts some people might get off on feeling, which is fine, or at least up to them, and still of no pertinence to the question at hand.

statistical probability of the most and least suffering, a totally impersonal effect in a totally impersonal universe.

an impersonal universe that may be filled with all sorts of wonderful loving straingeness, such as i believe it to be, but a universe itself, however otherwise might or might not be its origen, completely neutral.

we have a choice to not hurt ourselve by not hurting each other, ignore it and we do hurt ourselves, whatever we might otherwise appear to gain, and i'm not talking about some 'after life', but the hear and now.

and not by offending anything, but directly by the conditions our behaiviors create incentives for among each other.

Not so fast. This is your intuitive assumption coming in, and it's that that quantum mechanics contradicts, not logic itself. The weirdness of the experimental result is that the photons behave in some respects as particles and in others as waves--that they have a dual nature. This is indeed counter-intuitive, but it is not illogical.

So, you're saying our intuition about the nature of the universe is completely wrong, and that our logical understanding of it has been undermined by physical observations? Because if the nature of particles are counter-intuitive (which they inarguably are), and the way matter behaves on the quantum scale goes against the logic we develop about the world is wrong, then we have seen something in nature (something pretty damn fundamental to nature) go completely against our own intuition and logic. Our old preconceptions of position are wrong. As are our ideas of particles. In fact, everything we would derive on the everyday scale is wrong when you look deep enough, and since most people don't, most people have an incorrect intuition about the universe.

So, since we have demonstrated the flaws of our own intuition and logic (but not of logic itself, just of the logic we develop in our everyday experiences with the universe), and since your base argument for morals was that they are based on intuition and logic, OUR intuition and logic, it is then reasonable, if not necessary, to assume that our logic and intuition about the universe can be wrong about other things, since they have been proven so drastically wrong about something fundamental to the very nature of the universe. Thus, by your own arguments, morals, even logical, intuitive ones, can be very wrong. And so we can safely conclude that all moral arguments are bias by our human perception of the universe, and are thus not in any way universal. Which is my argument, drawn from your own statements.

Yes, that is a moral statement, but more importantly it is a rational statement: it stems from the logical truth that "is" does not imply "ought." That's objectively true.

And, as above, rationality as we know it is based on logic and intuition, and rationality applied to the universe is based on logic and intuition about the universe, which you yourself have stated as being fallable.

What nonsense. Determinism is not any more provable than free will. Certainly, in actual decision-making, it seems to us that we are acting freely (and we necessarily assume that we are), and since that's the setting for the application of ethical principles, there's nothing wrong with assuming free will in that context.

What evidence do you have for things acting outside physical laws? Find me just one instance of something in the universe going against physical laws. Something magic and airy-fairy that can not, nor can ever be, explained by physics. Once you give me just one example of this, I will concede that the universe doesn't always follow physical laws, and so determinism is out the window. However, since absolutely everything so far, can in some way be explained by physical laws (whether we fully realise or even know these laws is another matter), we can deduce that everything in the universe follows a set of laws which are in turn deterministic, therefore, free will doesn't exist.

Determinism is quite provable. Free will is much more difficult. So, going by observations that everything is in some way physical, including our brains, we can claim quite safely that our brains are not magical airy-fairy things which are not confined to the laws of physics, which is what is required for free will.

This is all equivocation, but it also irrelevant. If "everything" or "nothing" is natural, then vegetarianism is certainly equally natural to meat-eating, so pointing out the naturalness of meat-eating of any variety does not justify it. "Natural" ceases to be a term that makes any kind of distinction, which is clearly how you were using it in your original argument.

The term "natural" is in itself inherrently bias, therefore I dismiss it as being a mere human creation and not being relevant to the universe in general.

But, again, what makes something we do unnatural, while some other creature doing that same thing is perfectly natural?

Almost certainly, yes.

How are cows sentient?

Again, since you haven't defined sentience, and indeed, since the very definition of sentience (and that of life itself) is sketchy and incomplete, we can say that moral arguments containing sentience (or life) are incomplete.

So what constitutes sentience? Self-awareness? Awareness of location? Thought? Of the few cows I've come face to face with, I certainly didn't see any of that. The cow just seemed to stand there eating grass. So, unless you explain your definition of sentience, and justify it, I can say that you're just being prejudice against smaller life forms because it is inconvenient to not be.

Fairly interesting epistemological questions, but beyond the scope of this discussion. They neither address the meta-ethical question of the relativity or absoluteness of moral standards, nor the ethical question of the duties humans have to non-human sentient beings.

So, we somehow owe nature something simply because we are intelligent? Or what? Your argument is quite vague here, and not well-defined.

You're very confused about the nature and role of definitions, aren't you?

Definitions tend to be chosen for a reason. Whilst ultimately, they are arbitrary, they generally have some backing for their choosing. I was basically asking you why your definition was the best one, and why it was indeed, more valid than any other definitions.

Now you've departed from the ontological/meta-ethical question ("What is the nature of moral truth?", a subject on which you've just repeatedly and blatantly begged the question) and moved on to the epistemological question ("How can we know for sure?").

I don't claim that the moral theory by which I hold is "definite" or "indisputable" or even "complete." But, then, the same is true of judgments I make regarding other areas of objective truth.

So, oncemore, I ask you, what makes your morals better than any others? We come to the resounding conclusion that they aren't. They are simply your morals. You may be able to justify them in some way, but then, most people can justify their morals in some way, and shoot down your morals in some way. We go back down to my statement that morals are meerly human creations with no relevance to the universe, meerly how we inhabit it. Again, if all of humanity died tomorrow, all of its morals would cease to exist too. Because morals are not inherrent to the universe, but simply human creations designed to help us cope with this thing we call life.

It's not a question of whether or not they're "inherent to the universe", it's a question of whether they can speak with the authority of absolute truth (as opposed to relative perspectives.)

Rational morality, like mathematics, is an a priori human construct of reason, and is thus not "inherent to the universe" in the same sense as, say, the laws of physics. It would make more sense to say that it is inherent to our sense of truth, our attempt to substantively understand how we ought to behave.

In this context, "comfort with our morals" is certainly relevant. The relativist must maintain that any assertion of moral belief ultimately comes down to some subjective element: culturally-induced values, subjective moral feelings, or a sense of comfort that it induces.

Morals are reliant on our existance, mathematics is not. Alien species would have the exact same value for what we call pi, as they would for e and other such numbers. Mathematics, when starting with the same axioms, is more than universal. Morals require a "human touch", and are thus, reliant on our existance. If all of humanity ceased to exist, pi would still be pi. Nothing will ever change its numerical value. Ever. Mathematics is context independent. Morals would not exist without our existance.

Also irrelevant. Again, absolute moral standards can take into account morally relevant circumstances.
Then how are they absolute? They are absolute except when they aren't? It seems you are somehow suggesting there is this mystical set of perfect morality. For the sake of discussion, I'll accept your premise of this absolute morality existing. If we don't know what this mystical absolute morality is, then what is the point of it existing?

If eating meat is actually morally abhorrent, again, it makes their actions immoral, but their personal moral guilt is mitigated by the strong cultural barriers to recognizing this moral truth.
Morality isn't about should the future judge this person harshly, it is "Are the actions that person is doing, right". If the only reason to be moral is so you don't feel guilty, then you are looking at it the wrong way.

So, you're saying our intuition about the nature of the universe is completely wrong, and that our logical understanding of it has been undermined by physical observations?

yes to the first (in certain instances), no to the second, presumably. i mean, that is what S said and all...

Thus, by your own arguments, morals, even logical, intuitive ones, can be very wrong. And so we can safely conclude that all moral arguments are bias by our human perception of the universe, and are thus not in any way universal.

doesn't follow

So, you're saying our intuition about the nature of the universe is completely wrong, and that our logical understanding of it has been undermined by physical observations? Because if the nature of particles are counter-intuitive (which they inarguably are), and the way matter behaves on the quantum scale goes against the logic we develop about the world is wrong, then we have seen something in nature (something pretty damn fundamental to nature) go completely against our own intuition and logic.

You're equivocating on "logic."

There is no apparently necessary truth undermined by quantum mechanics. What is undermined are various intuitive assumptions we make about the way things work... assumptions that we would probably not claim hold true in all possible worlds.

Find me just one instance of something in the universe going against physical laws. Something magic and airy-fairy that can not, nor can ever be, explained by physics.

I have a better question. Why don't you suggest what kind of proof you would accept here?

Surely your determinism should be falsifiable, right? So what would falsify it? What kind of event would suffice to demonstrate to you that something is not explicable, nor ever could be explicable, by physical causal laws?

However, since absolutely everything so far, can in some way be explained by physical laws (whether we fully realise or even know these laws is another matter), we can deduce that everything in the universe follows a set of laws which are in turn deterministic, therefore, free will doesn't exist.

You're actually not "deduc" here, you're inducing.

In any case, you oversimplify grievously. Human decision-making (which is the aspect of the universe under discussion) can be explained in subjective, free-willed terms as well as objective deterministic ones. It seems to us, looking at human beings as physical beings, that the deterministic explanations should hold sway for all the reasons you've given... but at the same time it seems to us, looking at human decision-making as we experience it as decision-makers, that free-willed explanations should hold sway.

This is a fundamental tension in our understanding of reality, a tension founded in the fragmented way we perceive things. We have no basis to simply cut off either part of the tension: we must live with it. (But as decision-makers, we pretty much have to go with the assumption of free will.)

Determinism is quite provable.

You have not proven it. And you cannot. You can never [I]prove that the causal explanation is right and the free will explanation is wrong. We cannot "see" causality.

Free will is much more difficult. So, going by observations that everything is in some way physical, including our brains, we can claim quite safely that our brains are not magical airy-fairy things which are not confined to the laws of physics, which is what is required for free will.

But physical or not, it's fairly clear that our minds are not reducible to the objective physical phenomena science is concerned with: this is the old problem of consciousness. You can see neural structures that may correlate with subjective mental states, but you cannot see the mental states themselves, by the very nature of subjectivity.

But, again, what makes something we do unnatural, while some other creature doing that same thing is perfectly natural?

By the fact that the development in human societies has radically altered the conditions of human life and the instruments of human ends, a development that has not been conditioned by natural processes like evolution but rather by artificial cultural factors that are quite contrary to what is innate and natural.

But this is another discussion, and not really relevant here.

How are cows sentient?

By feeling things.

Your argument is quite vague here, and not well-defined.

We have duties to sentient non-humans on the same basis that we have duties to sentient humans: in their place, we could not accept being abused and made to suffer without suffer.

Definitions tend to be chosen for a reason. Whilst ultimately, they are arbitrary, they generally have some backing for their choosing. I was basically asking you why your definition was the best one, and why it was indeed, more valid than any other definitions.

But the goodness or badness of my definitions is immaterial precisely because definitions are arbitrary.

Whether I call it "sentience" or "ecneitnes" makes no difference to the argument.

So, oncemore, I ask you, what makes your morals better than any others?

And, once more, I answer you, because they are founded in reason.

For some reason you seem inclined to discount this possibility a priori, but you have yet to advance a credible argument as to why. Instead you have just repeated your dismissal... again and again and again.

:rolleyes:

Morals are reliant on our existance, mathematics is not. Alien species would have the exact same value for what we call pi, as they would for e and other such numbers.

Right, and this applies to rational morality as well: if it is truly founded in reason, it is valid for all rational beings (including rational alien species.)

If all of humanity ceased to exist, pi would still be pi.

And if all humanity ceased to exist, moral truths would remain what they are. But just as with pi, there would be no one to use or conceive of them.

Nothing will ever change its numerical value. Ever.

Numbers are abstractions. We apply them to the universe; they are not strictly present in the universe itself.

Then how are they absolute? They are absolute except when they aren't?

No, they are always absolute, but they need not be narrow in their range of consideration. There is nothing non-absolute about, say, consequentialism, except in a very limited and probably mostly misleading sense of the word (and one that has nothing whatsoever to do with the sense at issue here.)

It could theoretically be an absolutely true moral statement that "No person may dance during summer." The absolute truth of this statement is not diminished by the fact that it does not prohibit dancing during winter. It is still true in any season of the year, but due to its content it only is relevant during summer.

This is one of the most common, and most frustrating, confusions people have about ethics.

If we don't know what this mystical absolute morality is, then what is the point of it existing?

Does truth need a "point" to exist?

Morality isn't about should the future judge this person harshly, it is "Are the actions that person is doing, right". If the only reason to be moral is so you don't feel guilty, then you are looking at it the wrong way.

Wrong sense of "guilt." I mean "culpability", not the emotion.

I know this is an annoyingly pedantic question, but how does reason demand this?

By rejecting any external influence in the determination of what we ought to do.

Kant puts this fancily in the Groundwork, but it's really just is-ought. I cannot found my justification on anything in the empirical world; I must look for independent justification.

I cannot found my justification on anything in the empirical worldYou can empirically identify behavior in others that is injurious to you and you can empirically determine that the qualities that make this behavior undesirable to you can be found in other beings. Take something that is undesirable to you and rationally extend its undesirability to others who posses the relevant qualities. You have eyes. Being poked in your eye is injurious to you. You see that I too have eyes. Thus you ought to know that you oughtn't to poke me in my eyes.

The key to the most basic foundation of anything that can be called 'universal' ethics is simply realizing that you are not so fucking special:p

Kant puts this fancily in the Groundwork, but it's really just is-ought. I cannot found my justification on anything in the empirical world; I must look for independent justification.

So when you're talking about independent justification, are you talking about justification to do good (duty for duties sake) or a basis to distinguish the correct action from the wrong action (categorical imperative).

What I say to both of them is: what makes either of them objective?

You can empirically identify behavior in others that is injurious to you and you can empirically determine that the qualities that make this behavior undesirable to you can be found in other beings. Take something that is undesirable to you and rationally extend its undesirability to others who posses the relevant qualities. You have eyes. Being poked in your eye is injurious to you. You see that I too have eyes. Thus you ought to know that you oughtn't to poke me in my eyes.


But as Soheran was saying, that's not an empirical basis, due to the is/ought problem. The hypothesis "you shouldn't do action A" does not objectively follow from the premise - "the majority/everyone finds such an action undesirable".

How does that apply to things that you find undesirable when they are done to you?

How does that apply to things that you find undesirable when they are done to you?

Because the 'is' (you find such an action undesirable, and you can rationally assume that other humans do also) does not allow you to deduce an 'ought' ( you should NOT do that action) from it in any purely logical way.

If you couple the observation that something is harmful to you with the observation that a being that is akin to you shares the very capacity that makes it harmful to you, then you can logically deduce that this would be harmful to them as well. The 'ought to' comes from what you think 'he ought to' do or not do to you.

If you couple the observation that something is harmful to you with the observation that a being that is akin to you shares the very capacity that makes it harmful to you, then you can logically deduce that this would be harmful to them as well.

Yes, but I'm not disputing this, this is not a moral judgement.


The 'ought to' comes from what you think 'he ought to' do or not do to you.

Yes but this 'ought' cannot be based empirically, in the sense that it can't be proven that you ought to do such an action based on the statements before.

It's time for a discussion of ethics. What do you fellows think? Is Morality objective or subjective?

It is 100% subjective. Anyone who says differently has a lot to prove, in that somewhere, somehow, there exists some type of physical law that dictates how humans should behave towards one another. Even if one believes in a god of some kind (I don't, but that's beside the point), then moral standards are still subjective to that deity, because theoretically that deity could change his mind at any time. Plato did a good job of point out the flaws of this in Euthypro some 2500 years ago. I highly recommend everyone to read it, btw.

If subjective, do we have any basis for putting any moral system above another?

Not necessarily, but I reject the claims of moral/cultural relativity on several grounds. For one, it's the people in charge who make the decisions about morals and laws, not those whom the law is intended for. For instance, it's not the newborn baby or the 12-year-old girl who chooses to have their clitoris removed or horribly scarred, but instead the religious extremists in charge of those countries that demand it. I think personal freedom of the individual to choose until those choices begin to restrict the freedom of others is a good place to start building a system of law/ethics.

Going down into smaller questions, do the ends justify the means?

For a lot of people, the ends do indeed justify the means. The real question is: should the ends justify the means. It's a tricky question, but ultimately I do not think they should. Strong justification has been given for heinious crimes through-out history. One can justify any action to oneself, but that doesn't mean those actions should be followed through.

Good questions. I'm eager to read some responses.

So when you're talking about independent justification, are you talking about justification to do good (duty for duties sake)

This.

or a basis to distinguish the correct action from the wrong action (categorical imperative).

"Duty for duties sake" is the foundation of the categorical imperative.

What I say to both of them is: what makes either of them objective?

The objectivity of reason. "Duty for duty's sake" is a matter of choosing the only possible justification for our actions: right itself, duty. Anything else is, by the very nature of the concept of "right", an abandonment of justification: if I go with (say) what makes me happy rather than what is right, I am no longer answering the fundamental decision-making question of what I should do, but rather the quite different question of what makes me happy (which I have no reason to grant authority over my will.)

Kant's moral argument, especially in its beginning stages, is largely formal: he derives his conclusions from how we ought to approach duty and right, without dealing with their content directly.

Anyone who says differently has a lot to prove, in that somewhere, somehow, there exists some type of physical law that dictates how humans should behave towards one another.

If it is a physical law, it is a law of "is", not "ought", and cannot be concerned with how humans "should" behave toward one another.

This is why I find the term "objective" a little problematic: insofar as we can construct absolute moral standards, they are not literally "objective" in the sense of external phenomena, but rather are constructs of a rational mind.

("Absolute", of course, suffers from the problem of people confusing it with the idea of absolute rules. Ethics is a terminological mess.)

Not necessarily, but I reject the claims of moral/cultural relativity on several grounds.

You can be a moral relativist without insisting on absolute non-interference with the actions of others. One is a positive/descriptive meta-ethical conclusion ("Moral 'truth' is fundamentally relative to the individual or to the culture") and the other is an ethical, normative conclusion ("We are not entitled to interfere with other people's behavior.")