NationStates Jolt Archive

I felt like deliberating these questions would force people to think about several very important and interesting philosophical topics, and I would like to see where the people on here go with this, so:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

Can statements about the future be true in the present?
As in, if I make a statement about the future and it subsequently turns out to have been an accurate prediction, was my statement 'true'? Or are you asking something different?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
Define 'knowledge' (well, you did want a philosophical discussion...).

I

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

Yes, in the case of - 'a bomb will detonate in bluewater in exactly sixteen hours."

Yes, in the case of - 'a bomb will detonate in bluewater in exactly sixteen hours."
Ahh, but is that really knowledge, as opposed to a justified belief?

The bomb could be disarmed, for example...

I felt like deliberating these questions would force people to think about several very important and interesting philosophical topics, and I would like to see where the people on here go with this, so:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

Ask Miss Clio.

Simply put no and no, people can make educated guesses based on probability, for example i can say with a reasonable amount of certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, however i do not Know that and it would be impossible for me to do so before it happens.

Simply put no and no, people can make educated guesses based on probability, for example i can say with a reasonable amount of certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, however i do not Know that and it would be impossible for me to do so before it happens.
See, I would say that 'to know' doesn't mean 'to know with 100% certainty', for then we would never 'know' anything at all. I know lots of things, I just don't ever know beyond the shadow of any doubt.

See, I would say that 'to know' doesn't mean 'to know with 100% certainty', for then we would never 'know' anything at all. I know lots of things, I just don't ever know beyond the shadow of any doubt.

And thats a central debate of philosophy, can we truly 'know' anything at all, but anyway what would you say 'to know' means then?

I felt like deliberating these questions would force people to think about several very important and interesting philosophical topics, and I would like to see where the people on here go with this, so:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

Is it true that time travel is impossible, because if it weren't we'd be plagued with futuristic tourists? (Credit: Stephen Hawking)

Is it true that time travel is impossible, because if it weren't we'd be plagued with futuristic tourists? (Credit: Stephen Hawking)

Ha i've never heard that before, i quite like it, its almost discworld-esque

Simply put no and no, people can make educated guesses based on probability, for example i can say with a reasonable amount of certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, however i do not Know that and it would be impossible for me to do so before it happens.
I agree.

See, I would say that 'to know' doesn't mean 'to know with 100% certainty', for then we would never 'know' anything at all. I know lots of things, I just don't ever know beyond the shadow of any doubt.
Not going beyond the shadow of any doubt is a somewhat loose standard by which to claim we "know" things. Isn't it really a tacit admission that you do not know, but your confidence in the probable future is strong enough that you're just going to go ahead on the assumption? In other words, aren't you just being a confident gambler?

what would you say 'to know' means then?
For me, to 'know' something is to have a justified belief that one believes to be true (note the difference from a justified true belief), and that can (usually) be verified.

I think Gettier and others have shown how knowledge isn't JTB, that we can seemingly hold knowledge that isn't JTB, and that the Sceptical Challenge has shown that no knowledge is 100% certain. But to then go on to say that we can't therefore hold knowledge, as some philosophers have done, is IMO incorrect. I'm inclined to use the word 'know' in philosophical terms in much the same way it is used in everyday terms.

Indeed, I find a large amount of epistemology rather fruitless.


Not going beyond the shadow of any doubt is a somewhat loose standard by which to claim we "know" things. Isn't it really a tacit admission that you do not know, but your confidence in the probable future is strong enough that you're just going to go ahead on the assumption?
What else can we do? This level of doubt is present in every single statement of knowledge we, as humans, can make.

In other words, aren't you just being a confident gambler?
To a large extent, I believe that's how we operate in the world; that humans are basically constantly refining probability calculators. That's how we learn, how we work relationships, etc.


Is it true that time travel is impossible, because if it weren't we'd be plagued with futuristic tourists? (Credit: Stephen Hawking)
Only if time travellers can travel 'backwards' in time, or that they wish to make themselves conspicuous to 'past' humans.

For me, to 'know' something is to have a justified belief that one believes to be true (note the difference from a justified true belief), and that can (usually) be verified.

Indeed, I find a large amount of epistemology rather fruitless.

I agree, i guess i was just being picky, I agree with you its perfectly reasonable to claim we know something when we have a justified and verifyable belief.

I agree with you its perfectly reasonable to claim we know something when we have a justified and verifyable belief.
Yes, otherwise we get into the ridiculous position of claiming we know that we can't know anything.

What else can we do? This level of doubt is present in every single statement of knowledge we, as humans, can make.


To a large extent, I believe that's how we operate in the world; that humans are basically constantly refining probability calculators. That's how we learn, how we work relationships, etc.


I agree completely. It's just that I won't pretend that I'm not guessing and betting my way through life.

Yes, otherwise we get into the ridiculous position of claiming we know that we can't know anything.

Indeed, I've always thought I'm not bothered if i really 'know' anything, if i believe something and nobody can prove me wrong then thats good enough for me regardless of whether i truly 'know'.

I agree completely. It's just that I won't pretend that I'm not guessing and betting my way through life.
Oh, I'm not pretending, I'm just calling that (highly refined, probable and justified) guessing 'knowledge'.

Can statements about the future be true in the present?
Yes. Absolutely.
Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
Probably not, but I'm not willign to go so far as to assume linear time, so I hedge.

As in, if I make a statement about the future and it subsequently turns out to have been an accurate prediction, was my statement 'true'?

Yes.

Define 'knowledge' (well, you did want a philosophical discussion...).

Justified true belief is the traditional definition.

See, I would say that 'to know' doesn't mean 'to know with 100% certainty', for then we would never 'know' anything at all.
You haven't studied enough epistemology. Some things can indeed be known with certainty.

And knowledge requires certainty.

Simply put no and no, people can make educated guesses based on probability, for example i can say with a reasonable amount of certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, however i do not Know that and it would be impossible for me to do so before it happens.

But how do you explain for the fact that your prediction would be right much more often than the person who picks at random? It is definitely not luck that causes that, so what is it?

If the sun does rise tomorrow is the statement true today?

Oh, I'm not pretending, I'm just calling that (highly refined, probable and justified) guessing 'knowledge'.
Yeah, I got that. That's what I won't do. Or to be more accurate, it's what I will explain if asked. So if I say the sun will rise tomorrow and someone (like me) were to ask me how I know, I would admit that I don't actually know, I'm just predicting future performance based on past performance.

Yes.

Justified true belief is the traditional definition.
By that standard, then it is possible for someone to have knowledge of the future. It's also possible for them to have knowledge of heaven and hell, life on alien worlds, any number of gods, and whether there is an afterlife.

Yes, absolutely

Why?

Probably not, but I'm not willign to go so far as to assume linear time, so I hedge.

What makes one investor better than another?

But how do you explain for the fact that your prediction would be right much more often than the person who picks at random? It is definitely not luck that causes that, so what is it?

If the sun does rise tomorrow is the statement true today?

My prediction would be right more often because probability and all known information points to it happening, it does not mena i can 100% dead certain know that it will happen.

At this moment the statement is a prediction, tomorrow if the sun rises, it will be a correct prediction.

Yes.
I'd say that (working from the position that the world isn't completely deterministic) the statement wasn't true, it was merely a correct prediction.

Justified true belief is the traditional definition.
As I've said above, I'd challenge that definition.



You haven't studied enough epistemology. Some things can indeed be known with certainty.
Such as...?

And knowledge requires certainty.
Depends on your definition of 'knowledge', obviously.



Yeah, I got that. That's what I won't do. Or to be more accurate, it's what I will explain if asked. So if I say the sun will rise tomorrow and someone (like me) were to ask me how I know, I would admit that I don't actually know, I'm just predicting future performance based on past performance.
I'm down with that.

It's similar to the way I call myself an atheist, for I live my life as if there is no deity/deities, yet when pressed on the issue, I'm not going to defend an argument 'proving' God's non-existence.

By that standard, then it is possible for someone to have knowledge of the future. It's also possible for them to have knowledge of heaven and hell, life on alien worlds, any number of gods, and whether there is an afterlife.

From where do they draw their justification?

Iit was merely a correct prediction.

Snap! same post time and everything... weird

From where do they draw their justification?
Some of them draw it from logic, some of them from interpretation of observed phenomena, some out of their asses. You did not specify what kind of justification you want.

Only if time travellers can travel 'backwards' in time, or that they wish to make themselves conspicuous to 'past' humans.

or that it isn't ridiculously expensive and dangerous, such that maybe 10 people per time-travel-capable civilization ever go anywhere at all.

or, alternatively, we could be in the original 'branch' of time - we might come up with time travel, but time travelers cause splitting rather than changes to the original timeline

My prediction would be right more often because probability and all known information points to it happening, it does not mena i can 100% dead certain know that it will happen.

If we need more justification, what ideas of the present can be counted as knowledge?

If we need more justification, what ideas of the present can be counted as knowledge?

If you use the definition that im 100% certain of it? very very few, that i exist perhaps? the ole 'i think therefore i am'

Justified true belief is the traditional definition.

Define justified.

And knowledge requires certainty.

so what are your epistemic categories? presumably you have some levels between math and wild-ass guessing

or that it isn't ridiculously expensive and dangerous, such that maybe 10 people per time-travel-capable civilization ever go anywhere at all.

or, alternatively, we could be in the original 'branch' of time - we might come up with time travel, but time travelers cause splitting rather than changes to the original timeline
One of my lecturers has this (semi-humorous) theory that at some point in the future, humans will develop time-travel. These future time-travellers figure out that they can prevent any massive catastrophe from befalling the human race, especially from any alien threat; all they have to do is go back in time and destroy the creature that will one day evolve into the alien that kills humanity. Furthermore, humans inhabit all of the universe, in all time frames, and thus can avoid contact with pre-time travel humans.

The mere fact, he claims, that we are alive, prooves that either (a) human beings will invent time-travel in the future, thus ensuring the survival of the human species for eternity, or (b) time travel technology will never be invented. And it's certainly not the case that hostile aliens will invent time travel, for they would have gone back in time to kill the proto-humans.

Snappy, no?

Why?
I don't see what's to explain about my answer. It was a yes/no question.

Statements about the future can be true. Of course. That we don't know now whether they're true doesn't matter.
What makes one investor better than another?
Probability. Knowledge of historical trends.

Such as...?
You can know with certainty the truth value of something relative to the truth value of some other thing.

Conditional statements allow certainty.

so what are your epistemic categories? presumably you have some levels between math and wild-ass guessing
In terms of actually holding things to be true, no I don't.

It is not necessary to accept something as true in order to entertain the possibility.

If you use the definition that im 100% certain of it? very very few, that i exist perhaps? the ole 'i think therefore i am'
Not even that. You can't know with certainty that the thoughts you detect are your own. You could be a figment of someone else's imagination.

The mere fact, he claims, that we are alive, prooves that either (a) human beings will invent time-travel in the future, thus ensuring the survival of the human species for eternity, or (b) time travel technology will never be invented. And it's certainly not the case that hostile aliens will invent time travel, for they would have gone back in time to kill the proto-humans.

Snappy, no?

Unless, of course, developing the time machine is contingent on the existence of those species; if you invent a time machine to prevent the existence of threats to your civilization, then by eliminating them you would likely render the purpose of inventing the time machine irrelevant. So, basically, all you could do is watch other civilizations develop and use that information for your own purposes.

The only truth is logic/tautology. Yeah bitches, I said that.

You can know with certainty the truth value of something relative to the truth value of some other thing.

Conditional statements allow certainty.
To some extent. The conditional proposition "If all men are fools and if Simon is not a fool then Simon is not a man" is one in which we can have full confidence (given the condition that logical implication works in the way we have taken it to). However, this certainty doesn't translate into certainty in the answer to the question "Is Simon a Man" unless we can also confirm certainty in the assertions "all men are fools" and "Simon is not a fool".

I would prefer to assert that conditional statements permit the constructive channelling of certainty. This removes the implication that conditions are entirely sufficient for certainty to exist; after all, you can't be certain in a conditional statement without an implicit condition of the correctness of the system by which conditional statements are constructed. (Try saying that five times fast.)

Not even that. You can't know with certainty that the thoughts you detect are your own. You could be a figment of someone else's imagination.
This could be circumvented by asserting that the "self" is explicitly defined as the origin of thought. After all, if "I" am detecting someone else's thought, then the "me" that he, she or it refers to in thought does not refer to me, but themselves. Consequently, I am the thinker, even if the me that perceives this thought is not that me from which such thought originates.

I felt like deliberating these questions would force people to think about several very important and interesting philosophical topics, and I would like to see where the people on here go with this, so:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

In answer to the first ( I haven't read the thread yet) any statement that is a disjunction of all possible future states of affair of a system can be judged to be presently true.

E.G. Tomorrow the sun will rise or the sun will not rise. - This is necessarily true, and hence true at all times of all times.

However, this does not equate to knowledge. It tells us nothing whatsoever.

Can anyone have knowledge of the future is an unanswerable question. Any claim to knowledge of future events can always be denied as fakery and pure chance if the claimed future states are verified. Knowledge is inherently private anyway - but that is another issue.

Can statements about the future be true in the present?
I can make statements about probabilities that are true. If I say that I am 99.5% confident the ball will land in this area, then that statement is true. It's not exact, but you didn't require that.

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
Again, one can know probabilities, but not exact truths. Regardless whether you just go the boring physicist's way and talk about quantum physics, or you take into account free will as well, making accurate and exact statements about the future is prevented by things which are not yet decided and not yet predictable 100%.

Again, one can know probabilities, but not exact truths. Regardless whether you just go the boring physicist's way and talk about quantum physics, or you take into account free will as well, making accurate and exact statements about the future is prevented by things which are not yet decided and not yet predictable 100%.

Doesn't that depend on the scope of the claim and the time into the future referred to.

I could claim that what is now 150 grams of beryllium 11 will be 75 grams of beryllium 11 and 75 grams of Boron 11 in 13.81 seconds time with absolute certainty. Is this knowledge of the future?

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
Nice questions. Part epistemology, part natural philosophy.

I'm going to assert two things. I haven't thought them through fully, so I don't know if I support them or not, but they're worth throwing in for discussion. I'll think them through for the morning and either flesh them out a bit or totally retract them then.

First, all knowledge comes from memory. There is nothing we know that is neither a recollection of perceptions nor the consequence of interpretations derived from these perceptions.

Second, our understanding of time also originates in memory. We come up with notions of the past to deal with the correlation between what we remember to have happened recently and what we remember to have happened some time ago. The past is that which we perceive ourselves to have perceived - the future is just a projection of a linear correlation of our memories beyond the point at which we perceive it to hold.

With this in mind, I propose that the future is firstly and foremostly conceptual in nature. The future itself being an item of present knowledge, the answers to the two questions would be Yes and Yes.

[QUOTE=Vittos the Apathetic;13954805)

1.Can statements about the future be true in the present?

2.Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?[/QUOTE]

1.Yes, for example-"Gee Dubya Bush=Worst President Ever"
and
2.I predict the next U.S. Prez will be infinitely better than the present troglodyte-er-moron-er-overpriviledged asshole-er- President.:D

Again, one can know probabilities, but not exact truths.
I'm not sure I'm following. Certainly, probability has a greater permissable margin of error when it comes to evaluating the result (since saying something has a 99% chance of success isn't invalidated by the occurrence of the "1%" case that fails), but the idea that this probability can actually be known in advance strikes me as a little odd. Don't you need a conceptual model of the world, whose accuracy is itself unknowable, in order to carry out statistical evaluation of likelihood?

I could claim that what is now 150 grams of beryllium 11 will be 75 grams of beryllium 11 and 75 grams of Boron 11 in 13.81 seconds time with absolute certainty. Is this knowledge of the future?
I'm no physicist, so I have to ask: is there some theoretical probability that, given the uncertainty about the behaviour of subatomic particles, this process would not happen in the predicted way?

Don't you need a conceptual model of the world, whose accuracy is itself unknowable, in order to carry out statistical evaluation of likelihood?
Well, statistics just requires a data set of past experiences. You can evaluate it and build a model, the accuracy of which isn't unknowable - for the data set available.

Maybe you have a point, if I think about it, because if the relationships between things that you detected with past experiences suddenly don't hold anymore when you use the model to attempt some prediction, your model's predictions also won't exhibit the properties you thought they had anymore.

In other words, it's a reasonable shot at knowledge, but not a perfect one.

of course I can tell the future
I am certain some idiot will post after me

It was me!!!!

You can know the future to the same extent that you can know anything in the present. To a given value of knowing, you can't have absolute certainty only justified belief (a how do we know the sky is green and all of us aren't colourblind scenario).

You can know with certainty the truth value of something relative to the truth value of some other thing.
Yet this 'certainty' is based upon an uncertain initial "truth value", as you put it. You cannot be 100% certain about the initial "truth value of some other thing", and thus you cannot be 100% certain about the second, relative, truth value.

Conditional statements allow certainty.
Only on the condition that the initial statement is certain; something we cannot show.

I felt like deliberating these questions would force people to think about several very important and interesting philosophical topics, and I would like to see where the people on here go with this, so:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

Yes to both.

If I live until this time next year I will be 41 years old. I think that statement encompasses both points.

If I live until this time next year I will be 41 years old. I think that statement encompasses both points.
Yes, you can have that level of knowledge about the future, but the statement above (with the all-important 'if' qualifier) is a lot different, obviously, from a statement of, "I will live to be 41 years old".

If I may be so bold, I believe that's what we're talking about, not a 'if' statement.

Yes, you can have that level of knowledge about the future, but the statement above (with the all-important 'if' qualifier) is a lot different, obviously, from a statement of, "I will live to be 41 years old".

If I may be so bold, I believe that's what we're talking about, not a 'if' statement.

Bold way my man, bold away!:D

Bold way my man, bold away!:D
Happily.

In all seriousness though, you raise a good point.

Happily.

In all seriousness though, you raise a good point.

Well yeah some statements about the future are true now. Look in your TV guide to see what is on tomorrow for example.

Well yeah some statements about the future are true now. Look in your TV guide to see what is on tomorrow for example.
But they're not 100% certain, and I'd hesitate to call them 'true'. They're incredibly accurate predictions, or, more accurately, justified schedules of what is supposed to go on TV, all things being equal.

But they are still subject to change.

Yet this 'certainty' is based upon an uncertain initial "truth value", as you put it. You cannot be 100% certain about the initial "truth value of some other thing", and thus you cannot be 100% certain about the second, relative, truth value.

Only on the condition that the initial statement is certain; something we cannot show.
I didn't say that conditionals allow us to know the truth of their antecedents (which is what you're claiming I said).

If we know the truth of something realtive to the truth of another thing, we don't necessarily know the truth or either of those things independently.

I'm saying that's it's possible to know with certainty "precedent therefore antecedent", and you're objecting that I can't know precedent or antecedent. But I never claimed I could.
This could be circumvented by asserting that the "self" is explicitly defined as the origin of thought. After all, if "I" am detecting someone else's thought, then the "me" that he, she or it refers to in thought does not refer to me, but themselves. Consequently, I am the thinker, even if the me that perceives this thought is not that me from which such thought originates.
But you just made your reasoning circular. By claiming that "you" are the one detecting the thought, you just presupposed that "you" exists. Because things that don't exist can't exhibit characteristics.

But they're not 100% certain, and I'd hesitate to call them 'true'. They're incredibly accurate predictions, or, more accurately, justified schedules of what is supposed to go on TV, all things being equal.

But they are still subject to change.
That doesn't change whether they're true. That just changes whether you know they're true.

If tomorrow's programming turns out to be different, then the TV Guide was false. If not, then it was true. But you can't know which until tomorrow.

Doesn't that depend on the scope of the claim and the time into the future referred to.

I could claim that what is now 150 grams of beryllium 11 will be 75 grams of beryllium 11 and 75 grams of Boron 11 in 13.81 seconds time with absolute certainty. Is this knowledge of the future?

Ah, but you can't make that claim. Certainly, if you performed that experiment 1,000 times, the average you would come up with, within the margin of error of your recording devices, would be what you claim. However, the decay is not an absolute. There are billions of particles that have to become Boron 11. The odds of them converting are certainly powerfully in favor of it occurring, but 74.999999 grams of Boron or 75.0000001 grams of Boron forming in 13.81 seconds, in a single measured event, is not outside the realm of possibility.

If we know the truth of something realtive to the truth of another thing, we don't necessarily know the truth or either of those things independently.
Quite, and we cannot know with 100% certainty, any of these two independent things. It's much the same as Peepelonia's 'if' statement above. Sure, you can say that if something happens, another thing will be true, but that's hardly knowing something with 100% certainty, which is what I asked you to show.

But you just made your reasoning circular. By claiming that "you" are the one detecting the thought, you just presupposed that "you" exists.
How, in any way, is that circular reasoning?

I haven't claimed that we can know anything with 100% certainty, indeed I've argued the opposite, and I've never claimed that 'I' know 'I' exist with 100% certainty.

I'm not making the same mistake as Descartes.

That doesn't change whether they're true. That just changes whether you know they're true.

If tomorrow's programming turns out to be different, then the TV Guide was false. If not, then it was true. But you can't know which until tomorrow.
But that's not how we assign truth values.

If, while claiming to be a psychic, Mystic Meg predicts what lottery numbers are going to come up in the lottery tomorrow, and it turns out she was correct, we wouldn't say her previous statement was 'true', we'd say it was a lucky guess. If the weatherman predicts it's going to rain tomorrow, and it does indeed rain tomorrow, his statement wasn't 'true', it was an accurate prediction; and a justified one at that, relying on good weather data and computer models.

Similarly, the TV guide is a justified, and most likely, prediction, or a list of scheduled programs, if you prefer. If the programs appear on TV as scheduled, the TV guide was correct in it's prediction/scheduling, but to say it was true (or could have been false) doesn't quite fit with how we use truth values.

Quite, and we cannot know with 100% certainty, any of these two independent things. It's much the same as Peepelonia's 'if' statement above. Sure, you can say that if something happens, another thing will be true, but that's hardly knowing something with 100% certainty, which is what I asked you to show.
But I just did. We can know the truth value of the 'if' statement with 100% certainty.
How, in any way, is that circular reasoning?

I haven't claimed that we can know anything with 100% certainty, indeed I've argued the opposite, and I've never claimed that 'I' know 'I' exist with 100% certainty.

I'm not making the same mistake as Descartes.
This wasn't directed at you. Note how I was quoting someone else, there.
But that's not how we assign truth values.

If, while claiming to be a psychic, Mystic Meg predicts what lottery numbers are going to come up in the lottery tomorrow, and it turns out she was correct, we wouldn't say her previous statement was 'true', we'd say it was a lucky guess. If the weatherman predicts it's going to rain tomorrow, and it does indeed rain tomorrow, his statement wasn't 'true', it was an accurate prediction; and a justified one at that, relying on good weather data and computer models.

Similarly, the TV guide is a justified, and most likely, prediction, or a list of scheduled programs, if you prefer. If the programs appear on TV as scheduled, the TV guide was correct in it's prediction/scheduling, but to say it was true (or could have been false) doesn't quite fit with how we use truth values.
I'd say that Mystic Meg was lucky to have her statement be true, but it was still true.

I don't need to know whether my statements are true for them to be true. Guesses are sometimes right (but still guesses).

But I just did. We can know the truth value of the 'if' statement with 100% certainty.
Come on now...

That '100% certainty' is based up on an uncertain conditional. See the discussion above about 'if' statements.

You're going to have to do better than play semantics.

This wasn't directed at you.
Apologies.

I'd say that Mystic Meg was lucky to have her statement be true, but it was still true.

I don't need to know whether my statements are true for them to be true. Guesses are sometimes right (but still guesses).
Exactly; they're still guesses.

And guesses (even highly justified, well-researched guesses) aren't true of false; they're accurate or inaccurate. A 'true guess' makes no sense.

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

No, unless inductive reasoning is sufficient proof for a justified belief, and a justified belief = true knowledge

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

If statement a) is false, then no. If statement a) is true then yes, as long as the knowledge-holder has some consistent epistemological model and isn't guessing when producing those statements.

The future is by definition unrealised possibilities, the past is defined by what is realized/actualized/unchangeable. I contend we can only have knowledge of possibilities (which is no real knowledge at all) or make some assumptions of different likelihoods of those possibilities through induction (which is not a reliable enough method for 'truth')

unless inductive reasoning is sufficient proof for a justified belief
And it isn't.

Come on now...

That '100% certainty' is based up on an uncertain conditional. See the discussion above about 'if' statements.

You're going to have to do better than play semantics.
You keep trying to know the individual components of the condition with certainty, and at no point have I claimed that's possible. Let's take Kamsaki-Myu's example from above:
"If all men are fools and if Simon is not a fool then Simon is not a man"
We can know the truth of this statement with 100% certainty. Whether Simon is a man or a fool or whether all men are fools is completely irrelevant.
Exactly; they're still guesses..

And guesses (even highly justified, well-researched guesses) aren't true of false; they're accurate or inaccurate. A 'true guess' makes no sense.
When we're evaluating other people's statements, we don't know whether they're guesses or informed judgemenst or actual knowledge. They're just statements. And statements are either true or false, regardless of whether we can tell if they're true of false.

This is true of all statements. They're either true or false.

This is true of all statements. They're either true or false.

Not so.

"This Statement is False" is neither true nor false.

There are more examples, not all that trivial.

Language cannot be reduced down to a constituent logic of true or false logical assertions either (the British Empiricists tried and failed).

But you just made your reasoning circular. By claiming that "you" are the one detecting the thought, you just presupposed that "you" exists. Because things that don't exist can't exhibit characteristics.
I'm not sure I follow (and perhaps my choice of language didn't help that). The presupposition that the concept of self exists is entirely permitted within the scope of discourse, right? Aren't I allowed to clarify (or explicitly specify) the nature of this concept as an initial step to suggesting the reflection of this concept in perceived reality?

That is, I can say 'The "self" is that from which perceived thought proceeds' as a definition, then assert reasonably that 'Under such an understanding of "self", the existence of perceived thought is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of self - given which, since perceived thought does exist, so too does self'.

No, unless inductive reasoning is sufficient proof for a justified beliefAnd it isn't.

why not?

Not so.

"This Statement is False" is neither true nor false.


That's just being silly, that's not a properly formed statement (even if grammatically it is).

There is no necessary connection between past and future.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

why not?
As far as I can remember, the sun has risen in the morning. Inductive reasoning would have me assert that the sun always rises in the morning, and consequently always will.

Tomorrow, some Dragonball Z villain blows up the sun. Aside from dooming all life on earth to eternal and catastrophic winter, it has also demonstrated that my assertion that the sun will never fail to rise in the morning is not only no longer justified, but also never was, since the possibility of its destruction always existed.

Just an example.

Not so.

"This Statement is False" is neither true nor false.

There are more examples, not all that trivial.
I'll allow exceptions for meaningless or paradoxical statements.
Language cannot be reduced down to a constituent logic of true or false logical assertions either (the British Empiricists tried and failed).
They did not fail. I'm a fan of the British Empiricists (though I'm disappointed Locke backed down when confronted by the church).

That's just being silly, that's not a properly formed statement (even if grammatically it is).

Silly or not, it's still a statement. It makes a declaration.

Some less silly ones might include metaphysical predicates. Or Vagueness, or seemingly unrelated facts - 'Cheese tastes south'

Or Future Contingents: 'The Sun will rise tomorrow' is neither true nor false until tomorrow (crikey, that was actually relevant to the thread!)

Or Future Contingents: 'The Sun will rise tomorrow' is neither true nor false until tomorrow (crikey, that was actually relevant to the thread!)
That is kinda the point being contended, y'know.

Silly or not, it's still a statement. It makes a declaration.

Some less silly ones might include metaphysical predicates. Or Vagueness, or seemingly unrelated facts - 'Cheese tastes south'


If those statement counts, then you can either have true, false or meaningless. Not much of a problem.


Or Future Contingents: 'The Sun will rise tomorrow' is neither true nor false until tomorrow (crikey, that was actually relevant to the thread!)

No, it can only be KNOWN to be true or false tomorrow.

I'll allow exceptions for meaningless or paradoxical statements.

They did not fail. I'm a fan of the British Empiricists (though I'm disappointed Locke backed down when confronted by the church).

Then you need to define 'meaning' and 'meaningless', it's not simple.

I was under the impression that logical positivism couldn't reduce these concepts to logic, without tautology. Who were you thinking of?

If those statement counts, then you can either have true, false or meaningless. Not much of a problem.



No, it can only be KNOWN to be true or false tomorrow.

Then all statements are not true or false, because you cannot know all their truth values at a given time.

Are we talking about logical consistency or empirical evidence? We will have to define 'true' 'false' 'meaning' etc to get to the root of the problem.

btw, time for bed, so I won't be able to reply for a while.

Then you need to define 'meaning' and 'meaningless', it's not simple.

I was under the impression that logical positivism couldn't reduce these concepts to logic, without tautology. Who were you thinking of?

Logic is, essentially, complex tautology. Besides, logical positivists believe in empirically verifiable synthetic statements using the verification principle. Later philosophers like Flew and Popper saw that principle as flawed and upgraded it to the falsification principle.

As far as I can remember, the sun has risen in the morning. Inductive reasoning would have me assert that the sun always rises in the morning, and consequently always will.

Tomorrow, some Dragonball Z villain blows up the sun. Aside from dooming all life on earth to eternal and catastrophic winter, it has also demonstrated that my assertion that the sun will never fail to rise in the morning is not only no longer justified, but also never was, since the possibility of its destruction always existed.

Just an example.

i don't see any necessary connection between whether some agent is justified in holding some belief or not, and that belief turning out to be true. the truth or falsity of it is (sorta) independent of the lines of evidence that would lead to the just formation of that belief. justification is more about intellectual virtue, rather than truth.

as hume noted, even the inductive skeptic must induce and act as though induction justifies beliefs. demands for certainty lead to dying of dehydration. the fact that this claim is itself problematized doesn't change its truth.


also, it could probably be argued that it isn't morning if the sun doesn't rise, what with morning being the time between when the sun appears over the horizon and when it reaches its highest point of the day and such. thus there just aren't any mornings possible without the sun rising. relations of ideas, ftw!

as hume noted, even the inductive skeptic must induce and act as though induction justifies beliefs. demands for certainty lead to dying of dehydration. the fact that this claim is itself problematized doesn't change its truth.
Hume took that too far. It's not necessary for me the believe that drinking water will quench my thirst. It's only necessary that I remember that it worked before and I try it again hoping for thesame result.

Uncertainty does not require paralysis.

Logic is, essentially, complex tautology. Besides, logical positivists believe in empirically verifiable synthetic statements using the verification principle. Later philosophers like Flew and Popper saw that principle as flawed and upgraded it to the falsification principle.
Sextus Empiricus
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Karl Popper

That's really all the epistemology you need.

I mean, you could read a bunch of Hume and Quine if you want, but they don't add much extra.

Let's take Kamsaki-Myu's example from above:"If all men are fools and if Simon is not a fool then Simon is not a man"
We can know the truth of this statement with 100% certainty. Whether Simon is a man or a fool or whether all men are fools is completely irrelevant.
Let's keep reading Kamsaki's post:
"If all men are fools and if Simon is not a fool then Simon is not a man" (given the condition that logical implication works in the way we have taken it to).
The Sceptical Challenge still applies to the bolded text; we can't be sure that our logical inferences are mislead by Descartes' evil daemon, or by a mad scientist tinkering away at a brain in a vat, etc.

Thus, even these, logically certain statements cannot be 100% certain. They're certain beyond all reasonable doubt, certain enough to ignore the possibilities of uncertainty, unless in an epistemological debate (just like the problem of induction). But they're still uncertain.

And statements are either true or false, regardless of whether we can tell if they're true of false.

This is true of all statements. They're either true or false.
The liar paradox would make me disagree; "This sentence is false." seems to hold no truth value. Also, statements such as, "superman can fly" are on shaky truth-value ground, seemingly only holding truth-value in certain contexts.

Though I admit I'm a bit hazy as far as this subject goes; I'm not a huge authority on the philosophy of language.

Ethics are more my game.

Hume took that too far. It's not necessary for me the believe that drinking water will quench my thirst. It's only necessary that I remember that it worked before and I try it again hoping for thesame result.

Uncertainty does not require paralysis.

there are an infinite number of possible alternatives that are all epistemically equal according to your certainty or wild-ass guess dichotomy. why would you choose to drink some water, even given that memory, when you effectively believe that it is just as reasonable to think that you drinking the water this time will cause the world to explode? given the choice between water and rat poison, why don't you drink the rat poison?

Ludwig Wittgenstein

early, late, or both?

early, late, or both?
As the Investigations are, in part, a reaction to Tractatus, both.

But they're not 100% certain, and I'd hesitate to call them 'true'. They're incredibly accurate predictions, or, more accurately, justified schedules of what is supposed to go on TV, all things being equal.

But they are still subject to change.

Well true, but I would suggest that they are damn near gosspel, much 'truer' than say a bus or train timetable!

I don't see what's to explain about my answer. It was a yes/no question.


Was your answer unqualified?

In answer to the first ( I haven't read the thread yet) any statement that is a disjunction of all possible future states of affair of a system can be judged to be presently true.

Is that a statement about the future or a statement about the present?

And I was referring more to a statement about one possible state. Suppose someone, to use Free Soviets philosophical jargon, made a "wild-ass guess" and just happen to get it right. Would that statement be true?

Can anyone have knowledge of the future is an unanswerable question. Any claim to knowledge of future events can always be denied as fakery and pure chance if the claimed future states are verified.

All claims to knowledge can be denied as fakery, that is the point of justification. The question is whether justification can be made for claims to knowledge about the future?

Doesn't that depend on the scope of the claim and the time into the future referred to.

I could claim that what is now 150 grams of beryllium 11 will be 75 grams of beryllium 11 and 75 grams of Boron 11 in 13.81 seconds time with absolute certainty. Is this knowledge of the future?

There may be certainty, but you are saying absolutely nothing about the future. You are only making a statement about the present state and nature of those elements.

The same goes for this statement:

If I live until this time next year I will be 41 years old. I think that statement encompasses both points.

No, unless inductive reasoning is sufficient proof for a justified belief, and a justified belief = true knowledge


If statement a) is false, then no. If statement a) is true then yes, as long as the knowledge-holder has some consistent epistemological model and isn't guessing when producing those statements.


I think you are a little crossed up. You seem to support truth but deny knowledge in your reasoning but in words you do the opposite.

i don't see any necessary connection between whether some agent is justified in holding some belief or not, and that belief turning out to be true. the truth or falsity of it is (sorta) independent of the lines of evidence that would lead to the just formation of that belief. justification is more about intellectual virtue, rather than truth.

Certainly justification doesn't require truth, but knowledge requires both, right?

Well true, but I would suggest that they are damn near gosspel, much 'truer' than say a bus or train timetable!
Depends where you are...

I just got back from Japan, and I'd be willing to put my life on the line for a train timetable in Tokyo!

Hume took that too far. It's not necessary for me the believe that drinking water will quench my thirst. It's only necessary that I remember that it worked before and I try it again hoping for thesame result.

Uncertainty does not require paralysis.

Why would anyone hope for the same result if there was not a little belief that the same result would occur?

You actually show how you justify your belief a sentence after you negate belief.

And you hedge your bet, because uncertainty does not equate to lack of belief.

As the Investigations are, in part, a reaction to Tractatus, both.
Definitely both, as both the Tractatus and On Certainty I would consider essential reading.

Let's keep reading Kamsaki's post:

The Sceptical Challenge still applies to the bolded text; we can't be sure that our logical inferences are mislead by Descartes' evil daemon, or by a mad scientist tinkering away at a brain in a vat, etc.

Thus, even these, logically certain statements cannot be 100% certain. They're certain beyond all reasonable doubt, certain enough to ignore the possibilities of uncertainty, unless in an epistemological debate (just like the problem of induction). But they're still uncertain.
All you've done is add an extra layer to the conditional. Fine. If logical implication works the way we think it does, and if Simon...
The liar paradox would make me disagree; "This sentence is false." seems to hold no truth value.
I did say I was willing to make an exception for paradoxical statements, but I think there's a credible argument to be made that paradoxical statements are false (because they fail to be true, excluded middle)
Also, statements such as, "superman can fly" are on shaky truth-value ground, seemingly only holding truth-value in certain contexts.
I would argue quite strongly that the truth value of statements like "Superman can fly" or "The King of France is bald" is clear. They are false. As neither Superman nor the King of France exists, neither can exhibit chracteristics (the ability to fly, or baldness). Similarly, the statement "Superman cannot fly" would also be false.
Ethics are more my game.
Me too. My degree was in Ethics.

Was your answer unqualified?
Yes.

Statements about the future can be true in the present. Unequivocally.

Can statements about the future be true in the present?
They're either true or not true. When you make the statements only changes how you need to phrase them. It's like saying "if I make a statement about France, can it be true in Spain". In this case, to make it true, you just adjust distances/directions accordingly for your point of reference. It would be analagous with time.

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
Of course. All knowledge must, of course, be imprecise to some degree. The difficulty of prediction + the uncertainty principle cause analagous problems to those that would be caused be imprecise instruments to measure the size of an item of furniture.

There are two kinds of "profound philosophical questions":
- those that are actually quite simple
- those that cannot be answered due to insufficiently clear or self-contradictory meaning

there are an infinite number of possible alternatives that are all epistemically equal according to your certainty or wild-ass guess dichotomy. why would you choose to drink some water, even given that memory, when you effectively believe that it is just as reasonable to think that you drinking the water this time will cause the world to explode? given the choice between water and rat poison, why don't you drink the rat poison?
Assumptions.
Why would anyone hope for the same result if there was not a little belief that the same result would occur?
Experience.

Before one establishes a firm epistemic position, one spent a childhood drinking water to slake thirst. It worked.

So, one has already been working under a pair of important assumptions: The physical world exists largely as I perceive it, and the laws that govern that physical world persist.

All advanced epistemology tells us is that we need not believe those two assumptions in order to entertain them.
And you hedge your bet, because uncertainty does not equate to lack of belief.
I'll admit, I've always been a bit fuzzy on the knowledge/belief distinction. I understand what it takes to know something (certainty). But if I lack certainty, then why would I believe something? I know it might not be true, so believing it strikes me as irrational.

Why does anyone ever believe something?

Assumptions

if you are entertaining them to the point of making actual decisions off of them, they are beliefs.

if you are entertaining them to the point of making actual decisions off of them, they are beliefs.
But I don't hold them to be true.

I doubt religious people would accept your definition of belief.

But I don't hold them to be true.

yes, you do. you clearly don't think they are false, and you don't treat them like things you are legitimately completely agnostic about. you hold them to be true - enough so to base decisions on. add any probably's you like, it still is the case that you think them probably true rather than probably false.

I doubt religious people would accept your definition of belief.

they do when they aren't caught up using the term in their own specialized sense.

Ah, but you can't make that claim. Certainly, if you performed that experiment 1,000 times, the average you would come up with, within the margin of error of your recording devices, would be what you claim. However, the decay is not an absolute. There are billions of particles that have to become Boron 11. The odds of them converting are certainly powerfully in favor of it occurring, but 74.999999 grams of Boron or 75.0000001 grams of Boron forming in 13.81 seconds, in a single measured event, is not outside the realm of possibility.

The fact that there are billions of particles, in the quantity that I chose to use, is the very issue that guarantees that, within the limits of verification - i.e accuracy of the weighing device, clock, separation techniques etc. - there will be exactly 75 grams of Boron 11 and 75 grams of Beryllium 11 after 13.81 seconds.

What I am doing is using the statistics of the situation to enable me to make a true statement about the future. The variation you indicate of 6 positions of accuracy is simply not ever going to happen - statistically speaking. If you were to extend that to start considering in the order of atomic masses, then some variation may occur - but this is not sufficient to make the claim that there will be 75 grams of Boron 11 present untrue, as the variation will be below any measurable threshold. It exists theoretically, like the Higgs boson.

I'll admit, I've always been a bit fuzzy on the knowledge/belief distinction.

knowledge is a species of belief; in other words, not all beliefs are knowledge. in particular, those that are wrong or those that happen to be right but are held for stupid reasons.

Is that a statement about the future or a statement about the present?

The statement is timeless in that it is independent of any time frame reference - as such it is:

A present statement of the past
A present statement of the present
A present statement of the future
A past statement of the past
A past statement of the present
etc.


What is more doubtful is the sense of attaching a truth value to such tautological statements.


And I was referring more to a statement about one possible state. Suppose someone, to use Free Soviets philosophical jargon, made a "wild-ass guess" and just happen to get it right. Would that statement be true?

The statement would be indeterminate until after the event, at which point it acquires a truth value. That truth value does not then acquire a temporal scope to define the statement as having been true before the event, it only applies at and after the event.



All claims to knowledge can be denied as fakery, that is the point of justification. The question is whether justification can be made for claims to knowledge about the future?

Justification in itself is a tricky issue. What counts as justification is limited to a consensus opinion, if we are going to allow anything that goes beyond deduction as knowledge. On that basis then yes we can have justified beliefs of the future- such as 'I will die', but this can not be claimed as knowledge as it fails the other leg of the test for knowledge - truth.
The problem here is that your demands are circular. You want to know if something can be true of the future, and then want to base this on knowledge - where knowledge is grounded on truth. Vicious my friend, vicious.

yes, you do. you clearly don't think they are false, and you don't treat them like things you are legitimately completely agnostic about. you hold them to be true - enough so to base decisions on. add any probably's you like, it still is the case that you think them probably true rather than probably false.
You're conflating a value judgement with a truth judgement. The belief in the truth of a given proposition is an entirely separate issue to the value of acting upon it - where one is an attempt to claim absolute correctness, the other is merely an indication of preference.

I think about this from an AI perspective. Does a machine need to know that a given set of precepts is true in order to make a choice between multiple options they provide? No, it doesn't. Can a machine make a choice between multiple options if the only factors in its calculation is the truth or falsehood of its precepts? Only in the rare circumstance in which there is only one valid choice.

"Next action" decisions are entirely about preference, of which validity is merely one (potential) factor.

You're conflating a value judgement with a truth judgement. The belief in the truth of a given proposition is an entirely separate issue to the value of acting upon it - where one is an attempt to claim absolute correctness, the other is merely an indication of preference.

i'm not sure that distinction can hold here.

if you believe a proposition, you hold that it is true (and this in no way implies you are claiming 'absolute correctness', while we are at it). and for us there can be no preference between propositions without belief. no matter how you try to avoid it, to make any decision at all will ultimately come down to holding some proposition to be true.

The problem here is that your demands are circular. You want to know if something can be true of the future, and then want to base this on knowledge - where knowledge is grounded on truth. Vicious my friend, vicious.

For my own opinion:

I am not sure if there are true statements about the future; I would say that there can, but I don't see that it matters much.

I do believe that there is no knowledge of the future, as all beliefs about the future that can be counted as true and justified are simply beliefs about the current and past state of affairs.

Can statements about the future be true in the present?
No. Present and future are two separate instances.

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
No. Knowledge is only of the past.

In the present, the future is only potential so any statement made, in the present, concerning the future is potentially true and remains true until the future becomes the present, in which case, depending on which future the events of the present created, the statement is either true or false. And since it's been postulated that there are several different paths leading from the present and, therefore, several different futures, in one of those futures, the statement is true.

If the above is true, then everyone can, with accuracy, predict a future.

I felt like deliberating these questions would force people to think about several very important and interesting philosophical topics, and I would like to see where the people on here go with this, so:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

I think I will tackle this question in a few different directions.

In a practical sense, yes. All of us are going to die eventually. Or if I make a statement that includes all possible answers, such as "I am right, or I am wrong, or perhaps a mix of the two".

In theoretical materialism, no. The traditional thought is that, an entity with infinite knowledge, infinite computing power, who know all matters and energy of the world and at the same time process them, has the ability to foresee all future. Since the world as a whole is no different from the mind of such an entity, there's no room for errors or probabilities. It is safe to say that this is a true representation of the universe rather than a simple prediction. Unfortunately, quantum physic and uncertainty principle shatter that school of thought entirely, as probability is in fact a property of sub atomic particles, making absolute predictions impossible.

This brings up the question of rather or not free will exist. To have knowledge of the future is also simultaneously throwing free will out the window. Because it will indicate that the world is predetermined

This can happen either by this world being a kind of video tape being merely being "played", or if the world is entirely governed by laws of cause and effect.

Next I will tackle the problem with the concern of time perception. The question I like to ask is, how can we be sure that future exist to begin with? After all, all we ever exist in is the present, and we have memories of the past, which make us assume that future exist. In this sense, the idea of future can very well be limited to our mind. Imagine that, if time stops right now, and all of us are fixed in time. our brain does not change, and as a result, our conscious are lock in place. Regardless of rather or not time exist, we are still fix in the state of believing in past/present/future.

I probably post more when I think of other directions to tackle this question.

All you've done is add an extra layer to the conditional. Fine. If logical implication works the way we think it does, and if Simon...
And that acknowledgement is all we need. As I've said above, we only need to acknowledge it in our lives in the middle of an epistemological debate such as this; but acknowledge it we must.

There's no point in debating the certainty of knowledge and then ignoring a crucial factor that hampers certainty.

I did say I was willing to make an exception for paradoxical statements, but I think there's a credible argument to be made that paradoxical statements are false (because they fail to be true, excluded middle)
I think if we start labelling paradoxical statements such as, "this statement is false" as false by default, we get into rather tricky water. Better to recognise that statements such as these have no truth value (even if it does mean abandoning your rather extreme position).

I would argue quite strongly that the truth value of statements like "Superman can fly" or "The King of France is bald" is clear. They are false. As neither Superman nor the King of France exists, neither can exhibit chracteristics (the ability to fly, or baldness). Similarly, the statement "Superman cannot fly" would also be false.
Again though, I'd say that relies on the context of discussion. When talking about a Superman comic, I'd think it's very much true that Superman can fly. Outside of the context of the comic, I, again, would maintain that the statement holds no truth-value. If you're saying that "Superman can fly" is false, you seem to be implying that "Superman cannot fly" is true. Similarly, if you maintain that the statement "The King of France is bald" is false, then you seem to be saying that the King of France has hair on his head.

Once again, you seem to be getting into tricky water by sticking to your guns on your position of 'all statements are true or false'.

I'll admit, I've always been a bit fuzzy on the knowledge/belief distinction. I understand what it takes to know something (certainty). But if I lack certainty, then why would I believe something?
As you say yourself: "Assumptions. Experience."

We're justified in believing many things we have no certainty of, because those assumptions have worked out in the past, and we have good grounds for believing them.

If my friend phones up to arrange meeting for a coffee the next day, there's no point in screaming down the phone, "I lack certainty of your arrival, I don't believe you'll come!". I can believe my friend because she's, say, been reliable in the past and has a good reputation for arriving on time. My assumptions and experience allow me to believe without certainty. (Although I'd maintain that this 'allowing to believe' is very much a subconscious process; believing isn't a conscious act, most of the time.)

Although this may be a rather trivial example, I think it works at most (if not all other) levels of knowledge; when we entertain a thought, and judge some factor to justify this thought, we believe in it (again, usually subconsciously). Furthermore, if that justified belief is strongly verified, then I would call that 'knowledge'.

I think you are a little crossed up. You seem to support truth but deny knowledge in your reasoning but in words you do the opposite.


Could you elucidate on that a tad? I'm curious, especially on how my words can say something different to my reasoning!

Could you elucidate on that a tad? I'm curious, especially on how my words can say something different to my reasoning!

No, unless inductive reasoning is sufficient proof for a justified belief, and a justified belief = true knowledge

In this you say that one cannot make a true statement about the future, but truth is not contingent on justified belief.

With this argument you deny knowledge of the future which is contingent on justified belief.

If statement a) is false, then no. If statement a) is true then yes, as long as the knowledge-holder has some consistent epistemological model and isn't guessing when producing those statements.

Here you start to explicitly grant the possibility that a statement about the future can be true but then reference the necessity of justification which you have denied.

In this you say that one cannot make a true statement about the future, but truth is not contingent on justified belief.

With this argument you deny knowledge of the future which is contingent on justified belief.

Here you start to explicitly grant the possibility that a statement about the future can be true but then reference the necessity of justification which you have denied.

Maybe this was due to poor punctuation on my part. I will try and be a bit clearer in my phrasing:

Can statements about the future be true in the present?

IF inductive reasoning is sufficient to provide evidence for a belief about the future AND IF you consider such a belief to equate to truth - THEN you can make a statement about the future that is true.

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?

I took the second question to be "Is it possible for someone to utter such a sentence, believing it to be true"

IF the first premise is true* according to my interpretation, THEN the answer would seem to be yes as you believe such statements can exist, and that they can be come to by inductive reasoning. In retrospect the bit about 'guessing' was unnecessary.

*(or is it the definition of 'true' here that causes the problem?)

I think if we start labelling paradoxical statements such as, "this statement is false" as false by default, we get into rather tricky water. Better to recognise that statements such as these have no truth value (even if it does mean abandoning your rather extreme position).

Again though, I'd say that relies on the context of discussion. When talking about a Superman comic, I'd think it's very much true that Superman can fly. Outside of the context of the comic, I, again, would maintain that the statement holds no truth-value. If you're saying that "Superman can fly" is false, you seem to be implying that "Superman cannot fly" is true. Similarly, if you maintain that the statement "The King of France is bald" is false, then you seem to be saying that the King of France has hair on his head.
But I'm not saying those things. If I hold that the statement "The King of france is bald" is false, I'm not saying that the King of France has hair. In fact, I would assert that the statement "The King of France has hair" or even "The King of France is not bald" is also false.

A true statement would be something like "It is not the case that the King of France is bald".

If the subject of your sentence does not exist, then any description of that subject's characeristics is false. This seems obvious to me.

knowledge is a species of belief; in other words, not all beliefs are knowledge. in particular, those that are wrong or those that happen to be right but are held for stupid reasons.
That would render whether an opinion you hold is knowledge or belief unknown to you.

I object. Knowledge requires certainty, and beliefs are unnecessary.

Then "Unicorns do not exist" is false, as the subject of my sentence does not exist?

IF inductive reasoning is sufficient to provide evidence for a belief about the future AND IF you consider such a belief to equate to truth - THEN you can make a statement about the future that is true.


You don't need any of that to make a true statement, only to make a verifiably true statement where it can be verified before the event happens. For example, if I say the sun will rise tomorrow, and the sun rose tomorrow, then that statement is true, despite only being able to wait till the event actually happens to verify it. It's important to make a distinction between making a true statement, and making a statement you know to be true.

That would render whether an opinion you hold is knowledge or belief unknown to you.

I object. Knowledge requires certainty, and beliefs are unnecessary.

Sorry to be a solipsist, but everything is a belief other than the knowledge of your own existence, conditional/tautological truths and mathematical truths.

You don't need any of that to make a true statement, only to make a verifiably true statement where it can be verified before the event happens. For example, if I say the sun will rise tomorrow, and the sun rose tomorrow, then that statement is true, despite only being able to wait till the event actually happens to verify it. It's important to make a distinction between making a true statement, and making a statement you know to be true.

But at the point it becomes verifiable, it is no longer a statement about the future. We are specifically asking whether statements about the future can be true, not statements about the present or the past.

Could you clarify that truth distinction? I think I'm missing something obvious!

But at the point it becomes verifiable, it is no longer a statement about the future. We are specifically asking whether statements about the future can be true, not statements about the present or the past.


Well, if you go back in time before the sun rose, that statement remains true.


Could you clarify that truth distinction? I think I'm missing something obvious!

The statement 'the sun will rise tomorrow' is either true or false. It can't be anything else. Just because we don't know the answer does not mean there isn't one.

Well, if you go back in time before the sun rose, that statement remains true.

Not this can of worms again!

You can't verify it until you travel back to the point you consider the sun to have risen (after all, you may have changed the future by traveling back in time, eh?), unless you believe all time exists 'at once' so to speak, and is static and unchangeable.

EDIT: it just occurred to me - it would no longer be in YOUR future, so perhaps the statement is therefore no longer about the future from your point of view?


The statement 'the sun will rise tomorrow' is either true or false. It can't be anything else. Just because we don't know the answer does not mean there isn't one.

But until we know the answer, does the truth value exist?
is "The sun will rise tomorrow is a true sentence" true?
is "The sun will rise tomorrow is a true sentence" false?

until the sun has either risen or not?

Not this can of worms again!

You can't verify it until you travel back to the point you consider the sun to have risen (after all, you may have changed the future by traveling back in time, eh?), unless you believe all time exists 'at once' so to speak, and is static and unchangeable.


OK well you don't even have to travel back to the past. Assume I'm now a day in the future, when I said "the sun will rise tomorrow", that statement was true, it was true before the sun rose, and it remains true now. Again, just because you have to wait a bit for a statement to be verified, does not mean the statement was not true before it was verified.


But until we know the answer, does the truth value exist?

Yes, why shouldn't it?


is "The sun will rise tomorrow is a true sentence" true?
is "The sun will rise tomorrow is a true sentence" false?

until the sun has either risen or not?

You cannot know whether it is true or false, but it is one of them, but it can only be verified when the event actually occurs.

That would render whether an opinion you hold is knowledge or belief unknown to you.

I object. Knowledge requires certainty, and beliefs are unnecessary.

a requirement to 'know that you know' in order to count some belief as knowledge leads to an infinite regress. and a certainty requirement just leads to the triumph of skepticism over essentially everything - descartes was not successful at providing a foundation to overcome his own doubt, even with his god-based fudge factor.

in any case, by definition if you have knowledge then you have beliefs. and as a pure matter of fact people hold that some propositions are true that aren't actually true, so we need the distinction.

OK well you don't even have to travel back to the past. Assume I'm now a day in the future, when I said "the sun will rise tomorrow", that statement was true, it was true before the sun rose, and it remains true now. Again, just because you have to wait a bit for a statement to be verified, does not mean the statement was not true before it was verified.

So is there no link between verification and truth?



Yes, why shouldn't it?

Why should it?
(we can start calling each other names next, and bolding type, and saying YOU DONT UNDERSTAND!!!! I AM RIGHT!!!) ;)



You cannot know whether it is true or false, but it is one of them, but it can only be verified when the event actually occurs.

Why should a truth value be retroactively applied to the past, about an utterance in the past? Is it not enough to say that it is true once the event has occurred?

So is there no link between verification and truth?


None, in my opinion. Truth is a property of a statement, verification is a method we use to find out if a statement contains that property.


Why should it?
(we can start calling each other names next, and bolding type, and saying YOU DONT UNDERSTAND!!!! I AM RIGHT!!!) ;)


But I'm right, turd face! :D But seriously, how do you define truth? I define a truthful statement as one a which is actually the case in reality. Since "the sun will rise tomorrow" was the case in reality, at the point that I made that statement, it was true.


Why should a truth value be retroactively applied to the past, about an utterance in the past? Is it not enough to say that it is true once the event has occurred?

Not exactly sure what you're saying here. I'm not saying truth SHOULD be retroactively applied to the past, I'm saying that in SOME cases it's the only way to accurately label a statement as true or false absolutely.

Yes, why shouldn't it?

You cannot know whether it is true or false, but it is one of them, but it can only be verified when the event actually occurs.

1. Truth depends upon verification, as you recognise,
2. Truth values depend upon there being a truth against which a claim can be compared to establish the truth value of the statement.
3. Verification can only occur after the event.

ergo

4. from 1 and 3 truth only exists after the event

and

5. From 2 and 4. Truth values only exist for statements about past events.


(This disconsiders tautologies - as already discussed)

1. Truth depends upon verification, as you recognise,

No, KNOWING the truth depends on verification, knowing a statement is truthful, and a statement being truthful, is not the same thing.


2. Truth values depend upon there being a truth against which a claim can be compared to establish the truth value of the statement.
3. Verification can only occur after the event.


Again, same as above.


4. from 1 and 3 truth only exists after the event

and

5. From 2 and 4. Truth values only exist for statements about past events.


False hypothesis, since it's based on a flawed premise.

None, in my opinion. Truth is a property of a statement, verification is a method we use to find out if a statement contains that property.

well, presumably some subset of true statement are verifiable, while it should also be the case that no false ones are (though we might still be justified in believing those false statements on the basis of the evidence we have). so there is a connection, it just isn't really direct.

well, presumably some subset of true statement are verifiable, while it should also be the case that no false ones are (though we might still be justified in believing those false statements on the basis of the evidence we have). so there is a connection, it just isn't really direct.

Sorry, it might be a problem with your syntax, or with my reading comprehension, but I don't really understand what you're saying here. :confused:

No, KNOWING the truth depends on verification, knowing a statement is truthful, and a statement being truthful, is not the same thing.

Truth then is something that exists independent of knowledge - How is that supposed to work?

Can I quote you?
Sorry to be a solipsist, but everything is a belief other than the knowledge of your own existence, conditional/tautological truths and mathematical truths.

But now, truths concerning reality apparently exist independently of our awareness of them - or do they only come into existence when we verify?

Decide which one you want to hold true :p

well, presumably some subset of true statement are verifiable, while it should also be the case that no false ones are (though we might still be justified in believing those false statements on the basis of the evidence we have). so there is a connection, it just isn't really direct.

Some statements are verifiable

All verifiable statements are true statements

No verifiable statements are false statements

Thus there is some connection between verification and truth.

That is what I understand here.

Truth then is something that exists independent of knowledge - How is that supposed to work?


It works since a statement about reality, can be the case in reality, regardless of whether we know it or not.


Can I quote you?

But now, truths concerning reality apparently exist independently of our awareness of them - or do they only come into existence when we verify?

Decide which one you want to hold true :p

What I meant by that statement is that we cannot know anything for certain other than those exceptions I posted. As I've been saying, just because we don't know whether a statement is true or false for certain, does not mean that statement cannot be true until we know.

None, in my opinion. Truth is a property of a statement, verification is a method we use to find out if a statement contains that property.

But until verification occurs, how can we know the truth value was 'there'?


But I'm right, turd face! :D But seriously, how do you define truth? I define a truthful statement as one a which is actually the case in reality. Since "the sun will rise tomorrow" was the case in reality, at the point that I made that statement, it was true.


At the point you made that statement, it was not the case in reality. At the point you verified it, it was in the past, and the sentence no longer referred to the future.

Pedantically speaking, 'the sun will rise tomorrow' is not proven by the sun rising a day after, as the pure sentence is now referring to a different event. what has been given a truth value is the sentence "the sun has risen today". We then say that proves that an utterance in the past had a truth value - but I don't see how that would follow.

It's like saying "The Future was True" - I don't think it makes sense.


Not exactly sure what you're saying here. I'm not saying truth SHOULD be retroactively applied to the past, I'm saying that in SOME cases it's the only way to accurately label a statement as true or false absolutely.

Why do you need to label a statement as absolutely true or false? Why can't it be time contingent?

It works since a statement about reality, can be the case in reality, regardless of whether we know it or not.



So you assume that the reality exists independent of time then, for a present statement about what we perceive to be the future to be true presently.

If the future already exists then fine a statement about the future can be true now. If, however, the future does not now exist, then a present statement about the future is not a statement about reality - and thus can not be either true or false. Nor can it at some future time acquire a truth value for the present time. It can only acquire that truth value as and when the reality it refers to comes to be.

Some statements are verifiable

All verifiable statements are true statements

No verifiable statements are false statements

Thus there is some connection between verification and truth.

That is what I understand here.

yeah, pretty much.

But until verification occurs, how can we know the truth value was 'there'?


Not relevant, it was there (or not) regardless of us knowing about it.


At the point you made that statement, it was not the case in reality.

Yeah it was, when I said the sun would rise tomorrow, the sun would rise tomorrow, so it was true when I said it.


Pedantically speaking, 'the sun will rise tomorrow' is not proven by the sun rising a day after, as the pure sentence is now referring to a different event. what has been given a truth value is the sentence "the sun has risen today".

You've also proven that when I said "the sun will rise tomorrow", that statement was the truth. What's wrong with speaking in past tense about it? Did I make a statement about the future? Yes. Was it true? Yes. Your point would be valid if I was arguing that it is possible to prove a statement about the future, which of course it isn't with absolute certainty.


We then say that proves that an utterance in the past had a truth value - but I don't see how that would follow.


And I don't see how you don't see how it would follow. ;)


It's like saying "The Future was True" - I don't think it makes sense.


It's more like saying "that statement about the future from his perspective was true."


Why do you need to label a statement as absolutely true or false? Why can't it be time contingent?

Just because it's time contingent, doesn't mean the statement is neither true or false before the event happens.

Just because it's time contingent, doesn't mean the statement is neither true or false before the event happens.

Well actually it does - that is what 'time contingent truth value' means!

So you assume that the reality exists independent of time then, for a present statement about what we perceive to be the future to be true presently.


It exists independent of our perception of time.


If the future already exists then fine a statement about the future can be true now. If, however, the future does not now exist, then a present statement about the future is not a statement about reality - and thus can not be either true or false. Nor can it at some future time acquire a truth value for the present time. It can only acquire that truth value as and when the reality it refers to comes to be.

Well, I believe that the universe is determined. I believe if you were to rewind time, and then play it again and again (without interfering or changing anything in the past), the same thing would happen again and again. So the truth about the future is already set, so to speak. Although I reckon I can argue that a statement can be true about a future event even if the universe isn't determined, but that would be very difficult and very time consuming to prove.

some relevant reading:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/

you know, i'm sorta impressed that we have avoided talking about fatalism thus far, even with people adopting the tenseless view

you know, i'm sorta impressed that we have avoided talking about fatalism thus far, even with people adopting the tenseless view

You were too late with that one. :D

Well actually it does - that is what 'time contingent truth value' means!

OK, the truthful property of a statement is not time contingent, but it's verifiability is. That's what I mean.

Well, I believe that the universe is determined. I believe if you were to rewind time, and then play it again and again (without interfering or changing anything in the past), the same thing would happen again and again. So the truth about the future is already set, so to speak. Although I reckon I can argue that a statement can be true about a future event even if the universe isn't determined, but that would be very difficult and very time consuming to prove.

That is where our differences lie. Your view of reality is profoundly different to mine. As I am a complete non determinist - nothing whatsoever concerning the future can be claimed to be true today as the future does not in any sense exist - and you are a determinist our opinions here are bound to differ.

(My arguments earlier about half lives were to provoke someone to argue for the indeterminate nature of the future with respect to physical laws - but no one bit.)

That is where our differences lie. Your view of reality is profoundly different to mine. As I am a complete non determinist - nothing whatsoever concerning the future can be claimed to be true today as the future does not in any sense exist - and you are a determinist our opinions here are bound to differ.


I am only very reluctantly a determinist. But I don't believe that the future 'exists' as such, nor do I believe that it's possible to make any statement (unless you're some sort of God or something) about the future.

and a certainty requirement just leads to the triumph of skepticism over essentially everything
Yes. Exactly.

and a certainty requirement just leads to the triumph of skepticism over essentially everythingYes. Exactly.

here is a hand. therefore skepticism is false.

Well, I believe that the universe is determined. I believe if you were to rewind time, and then play it again and again (without interfering or changing anything in the past), the same thing would happen again and again. So the truth about the future is already set, so to speak. Although I reckon I can argue that a statement can be true about a future event even if the universe isn't determined, but that would be very difficult and very time consuming to prove.

I am only very reluctantly a determinist. But I don't believe that the future 'exists' as such, nor do I believe that it's possible to make any statement (unless you're some sort of God or something) about the future.

Huh???

I can understand a determinist position, even if I disagree with it, but this just makes no sense.

IF you are a determinist then in some real sense the future exists in the present configuration of affairs. What will be will be and it can not be different.

Under those conditions a present statement can have a truth value about the future as the future exists in the present.

A determinist that does not believe that the future 'exists' in the configuration of the present is not a determinist, they are just a contradiction.

here is a hand. therefore skepticism is false.
How can skepticism lead to any strong conclusion like that? Skepticism leads to the lack of conclusions, not negative conclusions.

IF you are a determinist then in some real sense the future exists in the present configuration of affairs. What will be will be and it can not be different.


Depends what you mean by exist. The future isn't formed yet, but the universe is set to exist in a certain way in the future, but it doesn't exist yet.


A determinist that does not believe that the future 'exists' in the configuration of the present is not a determinist, they are just a contradiction.

What do you mean actually by 'configuration of the present'?

Not relevant, it was there (or not) regardless of us knowing about it.

Of course it's relevant, isn't that precisely what we are disagreeing on?!


Yeah it was, when I said the sun would rise tomorrow, the sun would rise tomorrow, so it was true when I said it.

Only if you consider the future to be as concrete as the present. You are saying the future is real, because a statement about it is the case in reality.


You've also proven that when I said "the sun will rise tomorrow", that statement was the truth. What's wrong with speaking in past tense about it? Did I make a statement about the future? Yes. Was it true? Yes. Your point would be valid if I was arguing that it is possible to prove a statement about the future, which of course it isn't with absolute certainty.


Because we are talking about time-related verification and truth values of sentences, I think that WHEN you utter a sentence and WHEN it refers to and WHEN it was verified become a lot more important, as they imply when or if something is 'real' because it is 'past' . If you talk about a sentence uttered in the past, your subject is something you are talking about in the present, whether or not the sentence you are talking about referred to the future when it was originally uttered. It is no longer a sentence about the future, it is a sentence in the present about a sentence in the past that talked about what was the future and is now the past (Now I'm confusing myself!). This sentence has a truth value in the present, but the original sentence did not.


And I don't see how you don't see how it would follow. ;)

:p


Just because it's time contingent, doesn't mean the statement is neither true or false before the event happens.
I don't think the 'truthiness' exists until the event occurs, and it is just a convention to say it was there beforehand. I don't see a necessary reason for it.

gah. Bedtime again.

How can skepticism lead to any strong conclusion like that? Skepticism leads to the lack of conclusions, not negative conclusions.

i think we are using skepticism in different senses. philosophically skeptical arguments lead to skeptical conclusions - it's not the case that we know that the external world exists, for example.

Captain, the results of logical skepticism appear.................... inconclusive.
http://www.rescuepost.com/photos/uncategorized/2008/03/09/spock.jpg

Depends what you mean by exist. The future isn't formed yet, but the universe is set to exist in a certain way in the future, but it doesn't exist yet.

What do you mean actually by 'configuration of the present'?

I am using exist in a very wide sense here. For me, in this context, something exists, in some manner, if it is necessary that it will come to be. This is a much wider definition than usual, but allows for present truth values of future events in a deterministic universe.

By the configuration of the present, I mean the total present state of the universe.

I am using exist in a very wide sense here. For me, in this context, something exists, in some manner, if it is necessary that it will come to be. This is a much wider definition than usual, but allows for present truth values of future events in a deterministic universe.

By the configuration of the present, I mean the total present state of the universe.

Well in that sense then yes the future does exist.

But I'm not saying those things. If I hold that the statement "The King of france is bald" is false, I'm not saying that the King of France has hair. In fact, I would assert that the statement "The King of France has hair" or even "The King of France is not bald" is also false.
I don't think you are saying these things, I'm pointing out that one of the things must be a conclusion of assigning truth-values to the statements. To say there is a falseness concerning the King of France's hair (or lack of) implies, to me at least, that there is a truth concerning the King of France's hair, and vice versa. Obviously, this can't be the case.

If the subject of your sentence does not exist, then any description of that subject's characeristics is false.
Again, this would suggest that (a) there are characteristics of the subject, and that (b) there are truths that can be assigned to these characteristics.

From my point of view, demanding that there must be a truth-value (of any kind) surrounding the King of France seems nonsensical; unless we are dealing with a fictional character, and are discussing the truth of a statement in the context of the fictional universe said character inhabits.

Why do you feel there must be a truth-value to all statements?


On a slightly different tack, this topic we're discussing may very well, as many philosophers of language have proposed, be simply a quirk (or deficiency) of the language we use.



I am using exist in a very wide sense here. For me, in this context, something exists, in some manner, if it is necessary that it will come to be. This is a much wider definition than usual, but allows for present truth values of future events in a deterministic universe.
When you say, "necessary that it will come to be", do you mean that it is certain that it will come to be?

Why do you feel there must be a truth-value to all statements?Another fun example of this is, of course, the classic "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?"

EDIT: I'm an eejit.

My example is just a specific instance of how his general assumption fails. I was going for something more obviously nonsensical than the king of France's baldness. True, it's a question and not a statement, per se, but it does illustrate the way true/false statements can turn into nonsense.

My example is just a specific instance of how his general assumption fails. I was going for something more obviously nonsensical than the king of France's baldness. True, it's a question and not a statement, per se, but it does illustrate the way true/false statements can turn into nonsense.
Appypolly loggy.

I completely misread your point.

When you say, "necessary that it will come to be", do you mean that it is certain that it will come to be?

Yes I do mean that, but remember that this is in the context of a determinist position - which is a position I do not hold.

Yes I do mean that, but remember that this is in the context of a determinist position - which is a position I do not hold.
I see.

I was going to say how little future events your position covered, but then I also don't hold a deterministic position, and can see how for someone who does hold such a position, your point would be more meaningful

May I also say how delighted I am in this thread; philosophical discussion of this level and civility should be encouraged and applauded.

Can statements about the future be true in the present?
Yes, definitely.

For example, 0+1 will be 1 tomorrow.

Can someone actually have knowledge of the future?
Limited knowledge, yes. Absolute knowledge, maybe.

I've actually thought about this for quite a lot...the apparent determinism of world doesn't work at all when there rises a possible contradiction with certain future.

Let us suppose there is an all-knowing-machine - god-machine, if you will - and an entity - eg. human who is out there to defy absolute knowledge and is capable of basic ambulatory skills - is "sitting" on a chair.

Let us now suppose the entity asks the machine: Will I be sitting on this chair 1 minute from now?

Logically, regardless of the answer given, the entity can defy "absolute knowledge" UNLESS the answer also defines the future - by for example taking away the chair or possibility of standing up.

Hence, I don't believe in internal determinism: That universe will act deterministically for beings bound by laws of the universe. (note: I'm uncertain how relativity of observation might fit into this and whether it is the uncounted deviant factor, see below).

Furthermore, there are several unforeseen consequences written into aforementioned 'free will'...One is time, and hence distance: There is a time & distance limit unto which the machine could predict the future in absolute accuracy which would be dependent of the signal's maximum travel speed and the reaction time of the recipient.

For example, at 1 light minute away (and signal travel speed of c) the reply the machine gives could - and IMO would - be correct to the entity regardless of the actions taken by the entity.

In absolute terms, in my opinion, free will would be bound by the location where the knowledge of the future is known...or rather whether the 'target' of the knowledge "knows" the future and is "capable" (as in sufficient time) of reacting to it.

In relative terms, I think absolute knowledge is bound to not being limited, bound, by the laws of this universe ie. absolute knowledge is not for a being of this material world.

edit:
note: this post is fuelled by almost 2 bottles of wine so it might not, or might, represent my entire opinion ;)

edit 2:
In short my viewpoint could pretty much be translated into the proverb: No man is a prophet in his own land.

May I also say how delighted I am in this thread; philosophical discussion of this level and civility should be encouraged and applauded.

actually, who here has studied philosophy? i know at least a couple of us have...

actually, who here has studied philosophy? i know at least a couple of us have...
I'm currently in my final year of a philosophy degree, and (along with yourself) I think Soheran, Agenda07 and some others have also taken philosophy courses.

That's not to say, of course, that one needs to study philosophy academically to be able to discuss it at all.

That's not to say, of course, that one needs to study philosophy academically to be able to discuss it at all.

oh, indeed. sometimes it probably hurts.