NationStates Jolt Archive

The Imperial Japanese Navy was at one point, arguably the most powerful fleet afloat but in the space of four years from 1941 to 1945, was shattered, never to be remade.

One of the key types of ships for the IJN was the Battleship. Indeed, many of the IJN commanders hoped for a massive Battleship encounter to crush the American Pacific Fleet.

So people of NS, what was that Japanese Battleship you had a soft spot for?

http://www.aeronautic.dk/HARUNA1945-08.jpg
Kongō class

Displacement: 27,500 tons standard
32,200 tons full load
Length: 704 ft (215 m)
Beam: 92 ft (28 m)
Draught: 27.6 ft (8.4 m)
Propulsion: 4 shafts; Parsons turbines; 8/11 boilers; 136,600 shp
Speed: As completed: 27.5 knots (50.9 km/h)
After refit: 30.5 knots (56.5 km/h)
Range: 8,000 nautical miles (15,000 km) at 14 knots (26 km/h)
Complement: 1437
Armament: 8 × 14-inch (356 mm) /45 calibre
16 × 6-inch (152 mm) /50 calibre
8 × 3-inch (76 mm)
8 × 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes
Armor: deck: 2.3–1.5 in (57–41 mm)(later strengthened)
turrets: 9 in (227 mm)
barbettes: 10 in (254 mm)
belt: 8–3 in (203–76 mm)
Aircraft carried: 3

http://www.aeronautic.dk/YAMASHIRO1944-15.jpg
Fusō class

Displacement: 39,154 tons
Length: 213 m (698 ft)
Beam: 30.61 m (100 ft 5 in)
Draught: 9.68 m (31 ft 9 in)
Propulsion: 4 shaft; Brown-Curtis turbines; 24 boilers; 40,000 shp
Speed: 25 knots (46 km/h)
Range: 8,000 nm at 14 knots (26 km/h)
Complement: 1,400
Armament: 12 × 14-inch (356 mm) guns,
16 × 6-inch (152 mm) guns,
8 × 5-inch (127 mm) dual-purpose guns,
up to 37 × 25 mm AA


http://www.aeronautic.dk/ISE-1944-11.jpg
Ise class

Displacement: 35,800 tons (standard); 40,169 tons (laden)
Length: 215.8 m
Beam: 31.75 m
Draught: 9.15 m
Propulsion: Eight oil-fired Kampon boilers
80,000 shaft horsepower (60 MW)
Speed: 25.3 knots (46.9 km/h)
Range: bunkerage: 5,113 tons fuel oil
Complement: 1,370
Armament: 12 × 14-inch (356 mm) / 45 cal 16 × 5.5-inch (140 mm) / 50 cal
8 × 5-inch (127 mm) / 40 cal
20 × 25 mm cannon
Armour: Main belt: 12 in (300 mm)
Decks: 3.75 in (100 mm) max
Main turrets: 12 in (300 mm) face, 10 in (250 mm) sides
Barbettes: 8 in (200 mm) max
Casemates: 6 in (150 mm) max
Conning tower: 13.75 in (350 mm) max
Aircraft carried: 22 with two catapults (after Carrier conversion)


http://www.aeronautic.dk/Mutsu1943-04.jpg
Nagato class

Displacement: 42,850 tons
Length: 221.03 m (725 ft 2 in)
Beam: 34.59 m (113 ft 6 in)
Draught: 9.50 m (31 ft 2 in)
Draft: 2.9 metres
Propulsion: Geared turbines, 4 shafts, 80000 hp (60 MW)
Speed: 27 knots (50 km/h)
Range: 5,500 nm at 16 knots (10,200 km at 30 km/h)
Complement: 1,368
Armament: Eight 16 inch (410 mm) guns
Twenty (later eighteen) 5.5 inch (140 mm) guns
Eight 5 inch (127 mm) anti-aircraft guns
Up to 98 25 mm AA guns
Aircraft carried: 3

http://www.aeronautic.dk/MUSASHI1943-11.jpg
Yamato class

Displacement: 68,200 tons (69,294 tonnes) trial
64,000 tons (65,027 tonnes) standard
72,000 tons (72,820 tonnes) maximum
Length: 256 metres (839 ft 11 in) at water-line
263 metres (862 ft 10 in) overall
Beam: 38.9 metres (127 ft 7 in)
Draft: 10.4 metres (34 ft 1 in)
Propulsion: 12 Kanpon boilers, driving 4 steam turbines
150,000 shp (110 MW)
four 3-bladed propellers, 6 metres (19 ft 8 in) diameter
Speed: 27 knots (50 km/h) (28 knots according to one of the designers)
Range: 7,200 nautical miles (13,300 km) at 16 knots (30 km/h)
Complement: 2,750
Armament: 9 × 46 cm (18.1 inch) (3×3)
12 × 15.5 cm (6.1 inch) (4×3)
12 × 12.7 cm (5 in) (6×2)
24 × 25 mm AA (8×3)
4 × 13 mm AA (2×2)
Armor: 650 mm on face of turrets
410 mm side armor (400 mm on Musashi), inclined 20 degrees
200 mm armored deck (75%)
230 mm armored deck (25%)
Aircraft carried: 7 aircraft, 2 catapults


ALL PICTURES ARE CREDIT OF http://www.aeronautic.dk/Warships%201-700.htm

Other information from Wikipedia.

I'm going with the Fusō class. Those massive Pagoda bridges and all those guns. Very funky. Not as cool as the others but meh.

http://www.godzillamonstermusic.com/COCX31082~3.jpg

Star Ship Yamato. Duh. >.>

Most powerful? Uh... that's a hard claim to swallow indeed.

Hence the word "arguably".

umm, all of those except the last one look exactly the same to me...

What a load of old ship...

umm, all of those except the last one look exactly the same to me...

Look harder then ;)

Did you build the models?

I am an avid ship model builder and have built each of the classes you list (what about the pre-dreadnoughts?), though nowhere near as beautifully.

My favourite is the Fuso. It has to be the most brutal looking ship ever built. The pagoda bridge is awesome.

Most elegant battleship would either be Richelieu or Tiger (if you include battlecruisers).

Nope I didn't build them' My shipbuilding skills are far away from ever being that good. The guy who did is called Lars. I put a link to his site at the end.

The reason they lost is because they sought big batteship battles. If they had stopped trying to building giant battleships, and built carriers, ithey still would have lost, but hey, whatever.

I would make a suggestion that you include in your photo's a refereonce point of some sort for size comparison. AFIK the Yamamoto dwarves the others - but it has been a long time and I forget... With Battleships - size does matter.

The reason they lost is because they sought big batteship battles. If they had stopped trying to building giant battleships, and built carriers, ithey still would have lost, but hey, whatever.

If they'd had more carriers then chances are they might not have lost at Midway.

Tatical ineptitude, bad luck and eventually a lack of good pilots led to the demise of the IJN, along with the Americans being able to outbuild them at such an epic rate and the US learning its lessons quickly so as to not be done over twice.

For example, in 1941, Japan had 6 Fleet and 2 Light carriers with 8 more carriers building. At its peak they had about 27 carriers.

America built in those four years from 1941 to 1945 built 32 Fleet & Light carriers and 125 Escort carriers. The US could just keep outbuilding the Japanese so they had superior numbers.

If Japan had had a bigger carrier fleet and had managed to utterly destroy the US Pacific fleet I reckon they might have forced the US to the negotiating table.

If Japan had had a bigger carrier fleet and had managed to utterly destroy the US Pacific fleet I reckon they might have forced the US to the negotiating table.

They didn't need a bigger carrier fleet. They just needed to have caught the carriers in Pearl Harbor instead of attacking while the carriers were out of harbor.

They didn't need a bigger carrier fleet. They just needed to have caught the carriers in Pearl Harbor instead of attacking while the carriers were out of harbor.

That might have netted them Midway...possibly even Hawaii, and extended the war by 6-12 months, but the end result would have been the same.

Would it?

No Pacific Fleet=No island hopping.

Would it?

No Pacific Fleet=No island hopping.

Killing those carriers does not "wipe out" the Pacific fleet permenantly...you posted the carrier construction figures yourself.

Ahhh but with nothing there in the interim, Japan could have forced the US to make peace and such.

I don't think Japan's intention was to destroy the US, just to keep its nose out of what Japan was doing in the Far East and on mainland China.

That might have netted them Midway...possibly even Hawaii, and extended the war by 6-12 months, but the end result would have been the same.

You're assuming that Japan wouldn't have pressed its advantage to force a peace treaty with America that sees them withdrawing from the Pacific. Without those initial carrier fleets, America would have been forced to protect its shipyards with coastal defenses and whatever ships they had left. Definitely not ideal.

Remember how Germany had problems making enough weapons to keep Allied forces out because the factories were being constantly bombed? Try that, but with American shipyards instead.

Ahhh but with nothing there in the interim, Japan could have forced the US to make peace and such.

I don't think Japan's intention was to destroy the US, just to keep its nose out of what Japan was doing in the Far East and on mainland China.

These two statements contradict one another. Japan was not going to force a peace without occupying the continental US.

You're assuming that Japan wouldn't have pressed its advantage to force a peace treaty with America that sees them withdrawing from the Pacific. Without those initial carrier fleets, America would have been forced to protect its shipyards with coastal defenses and whatever ships they had left. Definitely not ideal.

Remember how Germany had problems making enough weapons to keep Allied forces out because the factories were being constantly bombed? Try that, but with American shipyards instead.

Even Hawaii was not close enough to support large bombing raids on the US west coast. This also does not take into account Atlantic and Gulf Coast based shipbuilding. Getting the IJN close enough to the coast to make a difference would have put them under threat from the US land based aircraft.

Even Hawaii was not close enough to support large bombing raids on the US west coast. This also does not take into account Atlantic and Gulf Coast based shipbuilding. Getting the IJN close enough to the coast to make a difference would have put them under threat from the US land based aircraft.

You are correct, of course, but nothing the US had in the air in 1942 could match the Japanese Zero as a fighter, making land-based planes much less of a threat. With the Hawiians to base from, Japanese carrier strikes could have destroyed the shipbuilding capabilities of San Diego and Seattle, crippling US shipbuilding capacity. The US would then have been forced to make the decision of whether to abandon the Battle of the Atlantic and move the Atlantic fleet to cover the West Coast, or cede the Japanese victory and negotiate a return of Hawaii.

The Japanese failure to follow up their Pearl Harbour strike enabled the US to prepare for the next attack. Their failure at Midway ultimately lost them the war.

You are correct, of course, but nothing the US had in the air in 1942 could match the Japanese Zero as a fighter

Didn't stop us at Midway.

With the Hawiians to base from, Japanese carrier strikes could have destroyed the shipbuilding capabilities of San Diego and Seattle, crippling US shipbuilding capacity.

This assumes Hawaii is taken, which while I concede is possible, was likely unsustainable. The IJN never did come up with an adequate anti-sub doctrine, and resupply of any garrison, to say nothing of the needs of the civilian population, would have been extremely difficult if not impossible.

Such action would also expose the IJN carriers to air and sub attacks...and the Japanese could ill afford the loss of those vessels, as Midway so aptly demonstrated.

The US would then have been forced to make the decision of whether to abandon the Battle of the Atlantic and move the Atlantic fleet to cover the West Coast, or cede the Japanese victory and negotiate a return of Hawaii.

The "Germany First" doctrine would not have been implemented...but that does not mean that the Battle of the Atlantic would have to be "abandoned".

The Atlantic fleet did not need to be transferred. The Imperial armed forces did not attempt an invasion of Hawaii primarily due to insufficient logistical capacity. With no realistic threat of a landing, the US could shift it's focus to sub/air harrassment while (if necessary) shifting ship building to Gulf/Atlantic facilities.

The primary issue would be defending the Panama Canal...but the U.S. would have had no problems stationing a sizeable force in the area, and for the IJN to risk action that far from a friendly port would risk their fleet being cut off and eliminated piecemeal.

Would it?

No Pacific Fleet=No island hopping.

4 carriers lost compared to the hundred+ the US produced would have amounted to a hill of beans in stopping the island hopping campaign.
not to mention longer war = Atlantic fleet comes over to join in after Germany's defeat.

You are correct, of course, but nothing the US had in the air in 1942 could match the Japanese Zero as a fighter, making land-based planes much less of a threat. With the Hawiians to base from, Japanese carrier strikes could have destroyed the shipbuilding capabilities of San Diego and Seattle, crippling US shipbuilding capacity. The US would then have been forced to make the decision of whether to abandon the Battle of the Atlantic and move the Atlantic fleet to cover the West Coast, or cede the Japanese victory and negotiate a return of Hawaii.

Capturing Hawaii was never on the table. Yamaoto had ruled it impossible to subdue the local population (many of which were armed) with the number of troops he could send to Hawaii.
Carrier based bombing raids had little to no impact on WWII production ability.due to small bomb size and limited pay load of the bombers and limited number of bombers. Also japan lacked night bombing abilities, and a non surprise day light attack sounds like suicide.

Land base aircraft would destroy japan's carrier based craft, solely on numbers.

The Japanese failure to follow up their Pearl Harbour strike enabled the US to prepare for the next attack. Their failure at Midway ultimately lost them the war.
it wasn't a failure. it was a wise move a non surprise attack would have cost him too many planes his best pilots and likely resulted in his carriers being sunk.
midway if lost would have represented only a 6 month set back if captured.

Getting back to the original questions. Here's a couple of pictures that demonstrate how extraordinary the Fuso appeared.

http://i55.photobucket.com/albums/g136/regnans/Fuso2.jpg


http://i55.photobucket.com/albums/g136/regnans/Fuso001.jpg

The bridge seemingly defies gravity.

personally i don't give a rat about "battle" anything, from any part of this planet or any other.

my favorite things japanese, besides road and street side little tokonoma-like shrines, with the little stone kitsune, are ki-do-sha's (diesel and other self propelled multiple unit passenger train rolling stock other then third rail or catenary, the latter, den-sha, being it appears the majority, which are also cool too)

personally i don't give a rat about "battle" anything, from any part of this planet or any other.

my favorite things japanese, besides road and street side little tokonoma-like shrines, with the little stone kitsune, are ki-do-sha's (diesel and other self propelled multiple unit passenger train rolling stock other then third rail or catenary, the latter, den-sha, being it appears the majority, which are also cool too)

The appeal of battleships is a bit like the appeal of dinosaurs: big, overly armoured and extinct.

Didn't stop us at Midway.

Actually, it very nearly did. The anti-air CAP of the Japanese carriers prevented the US torpedo bombers from having any measurable effect (faulty ordinance, agreed, did not help). The Japanese force was unlucky in that those strikes drew the CAP down into low-level combat, when the US dive-bomber force arrived and settled the issue.


This assumes Hawaii is taken, which while I concede is possible, was likely unsustainable. The IJN never did come up with an adequate anti-sub doctrine, and resupply of any garrison, to say nothing of the needs of the civilian population, would have been extremely difficult if not impossible.

Horrible as it would be to contemplate, I would expect that in such a situation no attempt would have been made to supply the civilian population. This would have been in accordance with Japanese action in similar situations later in the war.

And this would also have been seen as a solution to the Japanese submarine problem. in 1942, the US had a total of three operational submarine operations bases - one of which was part of the Pearl Harbour facility, one south of Seattle, and one on the east coast. Obviously, occupation of the Big Island would have dprived the US of one, and a concentrated attack on the Seattle area could have crippled US sub ops in the Pacific. This would have eased resupply of a garrison considerably.

Such action would also expose the IJN carriers to air and sub attacks...and the Japanese could ill afford the loss of those vessels, as Midway so aptly demonstrated.

Entirely true. But then, the entire Pacific War was a tremendous gamble on the IJN's part - and it failed partly because they were unwilling to risk sufficiently to win.

Also, US air power in 1942 was not as great as it would soon become. Had the IJN acted quickly, they would have been mainly faced with medium bombers as anti-shipping strikers, and I have grave doubts regarding their ability to penetrate a Japanese CAP.



The "Germany First" doctrine would not have been implemented...but that does not mean that the Battle of the Atlantic would have to be "abandoned".

The Atlantic fleet did not need to be transferred. The Imperial armed forces did not attempt an invasion of Hawaii primarily due to insufficient logistical capacity. With no realistic threat of a landing, the US could shift it's focus to sub/air harrassment while (if necessary) shifting ship building to Gulf/Atlantic facilities.

Air harrassment would not be feasible; no US aircraft of the time could have flown from the west coast to Hawaii, searched out targets and then hit them AND flown home (note that bombing a fixed target is another matter).

Also, whether or not Japan could reasonably have invaded the West Coast (I think we are both in agreement that it could not), fear that they would following a sucessful or semi-successful invasion of Hawaii would have FORCED the US to break off the Battle of the Atlantic and launch every ship they had towards Panama. The populace would have demanded it.

The primary issue would be defending the Panama Canal...but the U.S. would have had no problems stationing a sizeable force in the area, and for the IJN to risk action that far from a friendly port would risk their fleet being cut off and eliminated piecemeal.

Entirely so. The IJN would have been stretched to operate against the US West Coast even with basing in Hawaii; operations against Panama would have been impossible.

You're assuming that Japan wouldn't have pressed its advantage to force a peace treaty with America that sees them withdrawing from the Pacific. Without those initial carrier fleets, America would have been forced to protect its shipyards with coastal defenses and whatever ships they had left. Definitely not ideal.
Japan couldn't get to the coastal US. Attacking Hawaii was the extreme range of Japan's fleet, very extreme, and that was a smash and run raid. Landing an invasion force would have been impossible for Japan without massive base construction in mid-Pacific, which Japan wasn't interested in.

Getting back to the original questions. Here's a couple of pictures that demonstrate how extraordinary the Fuso appeared.

http://i55.photobucket.com/albums/g136/regnans/Fuso2.jpg


http://i55.photobucket.com/albums/g136/regnans/Fuso001.jpg

The bridge seemingly defies gravity.

Never seen those pictures before. great find :)

Japan couldn't get to the coastal US. Attacking Hawaii was the extreme range of Japan's fleet, very extreme, and that was a smash and run raid. Landing an invasion force would have been impossible for Japan without massive base construction in mid-Pacific, which Japan wasn't interested in.

As I understand it, the entire reason for the attack on Pearl Harbor was to cripple America's Pacific fleet capability, thus removing its ability to interfere with its actions there, while posing a credible enough threat, even if only in the raider capacity, that it would be able to force a peace treaty.

The guy who formulated the strategy supposedly knew that Japan would lose any long term conflict against America's superior production capability, so he bet it all on making a knockout blow at the start and then forcing peace after that.

lol casemated secondary battery

As I understand it, the entire reason for the attack on Pearl Harbor was to cripple America's Pacific fleet capability, thus removing its ability to interfere with its actions there, while posing a credible enough threat, even if only in the raider capacity, that it would be able to force a peace treaty.
In a way, yes, but it's a bit too simplistic. For one thing, the High Command was split on just where to go. The Army wanted to keep going west into China whereas the Navy wanted to strike south west into South East Asia. The whole problem was one of keeping the US from interfering with striking the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and the British Colonies and then develop the raw materials there. Japan's plan was a knockout of the Pacific Fleet and then development of an Iron Ring of defense that would, with the Nazi threat, make the US think twice about retaliation and force the US to sue for peace while rebuilding and dealing with Nazi Germany.

Raiding the US or taking over Hawai'i was never really seriously considered. Midway was about the extent that Japan planed for its outer moat.

Of course, that said, early success made the mid-level officers drunk on it and soon they were talking about invading Australia and striking the US and taking California, but that shouldn't be taken as actual plans.

The guy who formulated the strategy supposedly knew that Japan would lose any long term conflict against America's superior production capability, so he bet it all on making a knockout blow at the start and then forcing peace after that.
Oh yes, Yamamoto knew alright, but he had hoped that the world situation would delay the US into going against Japan long enough for Japan to fortify what it had taken and therefore would be able to lay a claim to it at the peace table.

I think we torpedoed the soft spots on those battleships actually, lol...;)

Never seen those pictures before. great find :)

Here's a couple of books you might want to track down. Both have shiploads of great line drawings. There aren't many photos in existence of the Yamato or Musashi so the Yamato book also doesn't have many. The Fuso book has heaps.

http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/515BKEMY00L._SL500_AA240_.jpg http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51QTVX2NPPL._SL500_AA240_.jpg

lol casemated secondary battery

British and American WW1 ships also had casemated secondary batteries in WW2. Only the Italians did away with them when they rebuilt their ships between the wars under the Washington Treaty conditions.

British and American WW1 ships also had casemated secondary batteries in WW2. Only the Italians did away with them when they rebuilt their ships between the wars under the Washington Treaty conditions.

Only the New York Class. The rest had their horribly useless casemates removed during their reconstructions in the 30s or early 40s.

Only the New York Class. The rest had their horribly useless casemates removed during their reconstructions in the 30s or early 40s.

Are you sure they weren't removed after Pearl Harbour?

Are you sure they weren't removed after Pearl Harbour?

Hmmm...I know at least most of them were removed before. I do think some of them were removed in '42.

Point is, lol.