NationStates Jolt Archive

Yep, and I'm sick of people pretending they're not. Chances are, unless you follow some strict form of natural law, are very deeply religious or are a very strict follower of the categorical imperative, you act according to some form of utilitarian system of thought (act, rule, preference.. whatever) a lot of the time. For instance, do you support abortion? Then you almost definitely are a utilitarian, you're never going to say that aborting a foetus is, regardless of the reasons, a good end in itself. It's inherently a means to an end position to hold, aborting the foetus being the means to end pregnancy or save the mothers life or whatever. What about taxing? Again, it will be very difficult to argue that taking money from someone is in itself is a good end, whether they are poor or rich. It is again a means to an end, the end being to pay for essential governmental services, welfare, and other roles of government. Even if you specifically follow another ethical theory, ethical theories can and do overlap, all it means is that you adjust what to calculate in the felicific calculus so to speak, which really means that you may have a slightly different perspective on what is the greater outcome. I'm not saying you always act in a utilitarian way, of course many people act in an intuitionist or emotive sense, they do things because it 'feels' right. However, in dealing with politics and complex ethical dilemmas, you almost certainly do end up thinking in a utilitarian way.

Utilitarianism is a broad belief system, which doesn't at all necessarily mean you treat people as a means to an end themselves ever at all. I think often the reason people seem to have a hatred for the idea of utilitarianism is that it has this connotation of people treading on the rights of others for selfish interests or economic interests. All that is happening is that you don't in those cases think the ends justify the means, this doesn't mean you can't be a utilitarian, it just means you have a different idea on what constitutes a greater good.

Yeah, so what are your thoughts on this incoherent repetitive rant I just had?

I live by my own personal set of morals, so yes, I'm a utilitarian.

Yeah, so what are your thoughts on this incoherent repetitive rant I just had?

The utility of bulleted lists and/or paragraph marks comes to mind.

The utility of bulleted lists and/or paragraph marks comes to mind.

I'm a total n00b when it comes to presentation.

Yep, and I'm sick of people pretending they're not.

You will see that your sickness is quite ironically inconsequential.

You will see that your sickness is quite ironically inconsequential.

To you.

I have a utilitarian belt on my Bat costume!

To you.

To the greatest number. That's the true irony.

To the greatest number. That's the true irony.

But then isn't pretty much every post on NSG inconsequential? Why should that stop me from posting?

But then isn't pretty much every post on NSG inconsequential? Why should that stop me from posting?

And that's where you stopped being a utilitarian and undermined your entire OP. Leading you to water was quite easy, I thought it would take at least more than one page...

So is anyone gonna... you know... debate?

I already said my peace... so heh! :D

And that's where you stopped being a utilitarian and undermined your entire OP. Leading you to water was quite easy, I thought it would take at least more than one page...

I didn't say people always act in a utilitarian way, it's right there in my post if you want to read it. But I don't see how what I'm doing is un-utilitarian. I have some issues that I'm annoyed about that I want to get off my chest, should I a) keep it to myself.. or b) vent it out onto NSG and hopefully as an aside experience some constructive and enjoyable debate. I determined that b was the greater good (the greater good doesn't at all have to be to do with the amount of people that will experience it). So where did I stop being a utilitarian?

I determined that b was the greater good (the greater good doesn't at all have to be to do with the amount of people that will experience it). So where did I stop being a utilitarian?

Right there, because that's not utilitarianism. That's hedonism. And when you say "the greater good doesn't at all have to be to do [sic!] with the amount of people that will experience it" shows clearly that you have a poor understanding of ethics in general, since "the greater good" is what all of the -isms strive for, not just utilitarianism. They define it differently, though, and the central core of utilitarianism is "the greatest good for the greatest number" so, you don't even understand utilitarianism, which is why I stopped reading your OP half-way through.

I already said my peace... so heh! :D

Don't worry, I'm kind of debating with fass now, I think. Though he probably wont admit to it being a debate.

Don't worry, I'm kind of debating with fass now, I think. Though he probably wont admit to it being a debate.

But then you'll be debating wether you are having a debate or not...

*Smells hypocrosy* :D

Though he probably wont admit to it being a debate.

Quite, since I don't actually have time to be posting here anyway. Sorry for being a cock tease.

Quite, since I don't actually have time to be posting here anyway. Sorry for being a cock tease.

An apology infers a desire or attempt not to repeat the occurrence. I think that not only do you like being a cock tease, but you have every intention of being a cock tease again in the future.

Yeah, so what are your thoughts on this incoherent repetitive rant I just had?

I don't see what you're getting at.

Right there, because that's not utilitarianism. That's hedonism. And when you say "the greater good doesn't at all have to be to do [sic!] with the amount of people that will experience it" shows clearly that you have a poor understanding of ethics in general, since "the greater good" is what all of the -isms strive for, not just utilitarianism. They define it differently, though, and the central core of utilitarianism is "the greatest good for the greatest number" so, you don't even understand utilitarianism, which is why I stopped reading your OP half-way through.

'Number' hasn't always included people depending on which philosopher you read, it can include anything, or any animal for that matter (why don't you read a bit of Peter Singer). And whatever Bentham meant exactly by utilitarianism, so many other philosophers have described their position as utilitarian which hardly even consider the amount of people affected that saying it must always be about the amount of good people can experience is completely absurd. The greatest number is there because it compliments Bentham's core philosophy, noting that a good experienced by many is better than a good experienced by few (something some utilitarians say will not always be the case). But what if there is in this particular case only one person to consider? How the hell could you consider the greatest number in that situation and why the fuck (unless you were a little insane) would you expect someone to? Don't be ridiculous. Utilitarianism is a much deeper philosophy than that. And even if what you're saying is completely true, and utilitarianism can only be concerned with the number of people it affects, that fact does not in any way undermine my OP, since for the billionth time, I specifically stated that people don't ALWAYS act in a utilitarian way. You need to read more about utilitarianism, seems you only think the word applies to Bentham's 'pig ethics'.

I don't see what you're getting at.

Have you not noticed the rising number of people who moan about utilitarian styles of thought?

Have you not noticed the rising number of people who moan about utilitarian styles of thought?
Oh, every day. I can't tell you what a constant source of pain and anxiety it is for me. I say to them "Hume do you think you are?!" But they don't stop. :(

Have you not noticed the rising number of people who moan about utilitarian styles of thought?

Perhaps moaning about utilitarian styles of thought serves a worthwhile purpose.

I try to judge everything I believe in by the libertarian non-aggression axiom. I would not consider myself a utilitarian politically, but in my personal beliefs I most certainly am to an extent.

the libertarian axiom states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another. That is, in the free society, one has the right to manufacture, buy or sell any good or service at any mutually agreeable terms. Thus, there would be no victimless crime prohibitions, price controls, government regulation of the economy, etc.

I'm not utilitarian, politically, by any means.

I do not see myself being utilitarian. Unless someone can explain to me why I should care about anyone, or even myself, without my privative drives and emotions. It's no surprise that, when it comes down to a real situation, I care about myself more than others, my peers over those I don't know. I know it is easier to kill 1000 men I never seen before, than it is to kill even one of my friend.

Last I check utilitarian is describe by "the greatest good for the greatest number". With all the emotional and intuitive undertones I have yet to see anyone truly act in such a fashion. People feeling something is right and then spend their time rationalizing around it is not the same as cold hearted numbers and facts. It's like saying, if you are in an accident and you are only able to save one person, would you save a child or an adult? If I want to put hard numbers into it I can see that a person in the workforce is more valuable to a society than a youth still in the age of consumption without contribution. Yet I can picture that there are good number of people who would choose to help a child over an adult.

On a joking side, I am sick of people who deny how their own feeling of sickness dictates the actions of which they take.

An apology infers a desire or attempt not to repeat the occurrence. I think that not only do you like being a cock tease, but you have every intention of being a cock tease again in the future.

I am not usually a cock tease. Once I consciously entice a cock, I leave no ball blue.

Oh, every day. I can't tell you what a constant source of pain and anxiety it is for me. I say to them "Hume do you think you are?!" But they don't stop. :(

You have earned this: :fluffle:

Yep, and I'm sick of people pretending they're not. Chances are, unless you follow some strict form of natural law, are very deeply religious or are a very strict follower of the categorical imperative, you act according to some form of utilitarian system of thought (act, rule, preference.. whatever) a lot of the time. For instance, do you support abortion? Then you almost definitely are a utilitarian, you're never going to say that aborting a foetus is, regardless of the reasons, a good end in itself. It's inherently a means to an end position to hold, aborting the foetus being the means to end pregnancy or save the mothers life or whatever. What about taxing? Again, it will be very difficult to argue that taking money from someone is in itself is a good end, whether they are poor or rich. It is again a means to an end, the end being to pay for essential governmental services, welfare, and other roles of government. Even if you specifically follow another ethical theory, ethical theories can and do overlap, all it means is that you adjust what to calculate in the felicific calculus so to speak, which really means that you may have a slightly different perspective on what is the greater outcome. I'm not saying you always act in a utilitarian way, of course many people act in an intuitionist or emotive sense, they do things because it 'feels' right. However, in dealing with politics and complex ethical dilemmas, you almost certainly do end up thinking in a utilitarian way.

Utilitarianism is a broad belief system, which doesn't at all necessarily mean you treat people as a means to an end themselves ever at all. I think often the reason people seem to have a hatred for the idea of utilitarianism is that it has this connotation of people treading on the rights of others for selfish interests or economic interests. All that is happening is that you don't in those cases think the ends justify the means, this doesn't mean you can't be a utilitarian, it just means you have a different idea on what constitutes a greater good.

Yeah, so what are your thoughts on this incoherent repetitive rant I just had?

Wall of text crits you for 60000 damage. You die

Wall of text crits you for 60000 damage. You die

*auto-phoenix down*

Oh, every day. I can't tell you what a constant source of pain and anxiety it is for me.

Seriously, I lie awake just thinking about it. Now I know what it's like to be in true pain, I think I have a true bond with those dying of leprosy in Africa or something now.


"Hume do you think you are?!"

*groan*

If I want to put hard numbers into it I can see that a person in the workforce is more valuable to a society than a youth still in the age of consumption without contribution. Yet I can picture that there are good number of people who would choose to help a child over an adult.
Actually, you could make an argument for the child. Since the child will probably grow up to be a worker like the other person, and since the adult has probably used up a few years of working, the saving of the child would provide more work hours to the economy then saving the adult.

I would probably flip a coin though.

You have earned this: :fluffle:

I feel honoured. :)

the libertarian axiom states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another. That is, in the free society, one has the right to manufacture, buy or sell any good or service at any mutually agreeable terms. Thus, there would be no victimless crime prohibitions, price controls, government regulation of the economy, etc.


But what purpose do you think this libertarian axiom provides? There are two ways of looking at it, the objectivists and some left libertarians tend to think that the right to that sort of freedom is inherent and not arbitrarily set by the state. Others are a libertarian because they feel that it provides the best outcome for the greatest number. Why are you a libertarian?

Maybe you just feel slightly guilty about your utilitarian morals and seek to console yourself by viewing the actions of others through the lens of your own utilitarianism?

Maybe you just feel slightly guilty about your utilitarian morals and seek to console yourself by viewing the actions of others through the lens of your own utilitarianism?

Nah.

.

But passing the buck would be a very utilitarian response....

Hey, I don't remember saying I actually was a utilitarian! Maybe I'm like, beyond it or some shit like that.

And that's where you stopped being a utilitarian and undermined your entire OP. Leading you to water was quite easy, I thought it would take at least more than one page...

ienjoy.

ienjoy.

I cannot let fass have any victory here. I mean please, its based on many flawed assumptions. One being that even making a thread is somehow a moral choice, it has nothing to do with ethics, so whether I applied utilitarian thought to it or not is irrelevant.

If all you're saying by "overlapping" is: given two alternatives that comply with my non-utilitarian ethical system and I decide between them on the basis of trying to generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number, then duh.

But that's not what being a utilitarian is. Utilitarianism is to declare all considerations other than aggregate utility a figment of someone's imagination and irrelevant. That's why it's such a cop-out, and since the elder days and Deleuze there hasn't been a utilitarian on here willing to put up a decent argument - and even that was more an argument against natural rights than one for utilitarianism. Plus now it's been deleted. Dammit.

Tl;dr.:D

Kidding of course. I suppose if I read it right, I'm a ultitar-whatever?

If all you're saying by "overlapping" is: given two alternatives that comply with my non-utilitarian ethical system and I decide between them on the basis of trying to generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number, then duh.


More then that, if you subscribe to another ethical theory, it may in itself change what you consider the good to be. For Bentham it was simply pleasure, for Mill for instance, he differentiated between higher and lower pleasures. Singer differentiates between different peoples pleasures and considers the fact that different people have different preferences. And so on.


But that's not what being a utilitarian is. Utilitarianism is to declare all considerations other than aggregate utility a figment of someone's imagination and irrelevant.

This sounds a little incoherent to me, utilitarians can consider as many different things as they want (see felicific calculus) before considering what is the greatest good, many also impose rules as safeguards to stop it from getting out of control (see rule utilitarian). I'm not exactly sure what utilitarians declare as irrelevant, it depends on what type of utilitarianism you support. Can you give some examples?

Chances are, unless you follow some strict form of natural law, are very deeply religious or are a very strict follower of the categorical imperative, you act according to some form of utilitarian system of thought (act, rule, preference.. whatever) a lot of the time.

Well, that's interesting.

I thought "pretty much everyone is a utilitarian." But now you explain that you only mean some people... and those some people only act so "a lot of the time."

If you have to backpedal in some of the first few words you write to defend your position, before anyone has replied, perhaps you should re-evaluate its merits.

For instance, do you support abortion? Then you almost definitely are a utilitarian, you're never going to say that aborting a foetus is, regardless of the reasons, a good end in itself. It's inherently a means to an end position to hold, aborting the foetus being the means to end pregnancy or save the mothers life or whatever.

You're confused. Everyone uses "means to an end" reasoning all the time. Very few of the ends we pursue in our immediate actions are truly ends-in-themselves. Some of the means we use to pursue our ends will always be unpleasant or even morally troublesome, even in non-consequentialist theories. The philosophical debate is not about using means to ends as such; it's about using particular actions or entities merely as means to an end.

Abortion doesn't apply here for at least two reasons. First, fetuses are not persons, and at the time when the vast majority of abortions occur, are not sentient: they lack the intrinsic worth that underlies the prohibition. Second, even if they were, the norms of treatment that moral agents would be bound to follow toward them would not include giving up their bodies for their use. It does not degrade a person to refuse to make exceptional sacrifices for his or her sake; in making a decision, we need not say anything about their worth as people (we may perfectly consistently wish for them full happiness and freedom), we simply do not actively pursue their welfare at that moment.

What about taxing? Again, it will be very difficult to argue that taking money from someone is in itself is a good end, whether they are poor or rich. It is again a means to an end, the end being to pay for essential governmental services, welfare, and other roles of government.

Again, so? I can accept plenty of means that are bad or unpleasant. The question is, are they intrinsically wrong? More specifically, do they degrade any person to a mere object, a thing with only relative worth?

Taxation is perfectly consistent with the dignity of persons. No inherent right makes one external thing one person's, and another another person's, because no individual has the right to bind everyone else to respect what she deems to be hers. All rights to private property begin with positive right, socially-established right, and if society establishes the rules of rightful ownership, it can also regulate and tax it as it sees fit.

Even if you specifically follow another ethical theory, ethical theories can and do overlap, all it means is that you adjust what to calculate in the felicific calculus so to speak, which really means that you may have a slightly different perspective on what is the greater outcome.

Wrong. We are not just different varieties of consequentialist.

I'll give you an example. For me, every life has equal value, and thus each instance of preventing the unjust taking of life also has equal value. But it would still be wrong to murder one person to stop a murderer from killing ten others--not because some "greater outcome" says so, but because the "greater outcome" (making the world a better place, a world with the fewest possible murders) does not excuse mistreating the individual.

I'd much rather live in a world where one person is murdered than where ten people are murdered. No question. But I am not entitled to murder to bring such a world about.

I'm not saying you always act in a utilitarian way, of course many people act in an intuitionist or emotive sense, they do things because it 'feels' right. However, in dealing with politics and complex ethical dilemmas, you almost certainly do end up thinking in a utilitarian way.

Again, wrong. Another example: eight years of Bush Administration rule have been disastrous for the country and the world. Utilitarian, or even broadly consequentialist, reasoning would justify a great deal to successfully prevent another Republican from taking office--say, various forms of ballot tampering, or, for the weak of stomach, comparatively mild (and common) tactics like dishonest or manipulative campaigning from the Democrats. But I would say that such tactics would be wrong, period--again, not because I disapprove of the greater outcome, or (necessarily) because I include different things in it, but because it is not right to degrade democracy for any end, however worthy.

All that is happening is that you don't in those cases think the ends justify the means, this doesn't mean you can't be a utilitarian, it just means you have a different idea on what constitutes a greater good.

No. Non-consequentialists don't necessarily have a different idea of what constitutes the "greater good"; rather, we simply have a different understanding of the significance and role of "greater good" considerations.

They may be valuable guides to the fulfillment of our positive duties, to our efforts to make the world a better place. But they do not justify ignoring our negative duties; they cannot justify mistreating people.

Soheran, I need to go to bed now, I'll reply tomorrow when I am more awake. Let me just quickly say though, I am generalising, and I'm certainly not saying that all non-consequentialists are just utilitarians who say they are not, I'm rather saying that most people are consequentialists, even if they say they are not. Most people haven't read that much into philosophy or ethics. You on the other hand have and follow the categorical imperative, very few people these days follow these kinds of deontological style of ethics, so I stick with most rather than some.

Most people haven't read that much into philosophy or ethics.

That's right. But this only means that most people do not consult any ethical theory for their decisions--neither some variety of consequentialism nor some variety of deontology (or natural law, or whatever.) Their ethical decision-making, and the reasoning behind it, generally tends to be a blend... but certainly there are examples of non-consequentialist reasoning in most people's decisions.

How many people would support, say, boiling an innocent child to death, however many lives it saved?

I cannot let fass have any victory here. I mean please, its based on many flawed assumptions. One being that even making a thread is somehow a moral choice, it has nothing to do with ethics, so whether I applied utilitarian thought to it or not is irrelevant.

Someone's got to have the "victory" here, since you're wrong to believe that "pretty much everyone" is an ethical utilitarian. That we're all subject to the hedonistic (felicific in British English? Weird.) calculus might be true, but that's hardly enough to make one a utilitarian, or even a part of what makes a person ethically utilitarian.

Me, I adhere to an ornate and nearly incomprehensible set of virtue ethics whose primary purpose is to allow me to work as many ancient Greek words as possible into conversation. It's nice. :)

(felicific in British English? Weird.)

Latin/Greek.

More then that, if you subscribe to another ethical theory, it may in itself change what you consider the good to be.
Yeah, but then utilitarianism isn't an ethical system, but a tool. Say I believe in natural rights that shouldn't be violated - I can then afterwards say "if they are, it'll make everyone unhappy". But that doesn't mean that my initial judgement was a utilitarian one.

For Bentham it was simply pleasure, for Mill for instance, he differentiated between higher and lower pleasures. Singer differentiates between different peoples pleasures and considers the fact that different people have different preferences. And so on.
I think the difference between Bentham and Mill tells you a lot about utilitarianism. Bentham happily designed the Panopticon, having developed utilitarianism formally and therefore sticking to its basic pretext most thoroughly.

Mill realised that someone who could do this really had no ethical or moral foundations at all, and began to qualify things. That qualification is already a deviation from utilitarianism, because the judgement of what constitutes higher or lower pleasures isn't meaningful if it only concerns what the individual him- or herself thinks. There has to be another yardstick, and it's not really a utilitarian one.

That's why I think that utilitarianism usually isn't used as an ethical system at all, and when it is, it's plain evil.

This sounds a little incoherent to me, utilitarians can consider as many different things as they want (see felicific calculus) before considering what is the greatest good, many also impose rules as safeguards to stop it from getting out of control (see rule utilitarian).
Yeah, but I am wondering about how they make these calculations and decisions? To use Soheran's example: boiling that child might make the gods happy and save everyone. Now, a pure utilitarian might agree and do it, but a rule utilitarian would think this is a bad idea.

But why is it bad? There is no reason to believe that if we continuously decide to kill people if it produces the greatest happiness we would end up in a worse situation than if we didn't. We are, afterall, deciding on a case-by-case basis.

Contrary to your suggestion that most people are utilitarian, I would say that most utilitarians (with the exception of the pure, Benthamite act utilitarians) in fact aren't.

Now, a pure utilitarian might agree and do it, but a rule utilitarian would think this is a bad idea.

Maybe.

Rule-utilitarianism is really an attempt to reduce the elements of bias and subjectivity from utilitarian decision-making; it's a way to make utilitarianism less individualist, more accountable.

Perhaps the most common immediate response to utilitarianism is how dangerous its reasoning is: "If you think that, then you can justify anything." Doesn't every proponent of atrocities use "the greater good" as his or her justification? Rule-utilitarianism wants to deal with this justification: it wants to provide a mechanism that can get rid of the truly dangerous reasoning, while at the same time preserving utilitarianism's many merits.

Consider the rule "To maximize happiness, I may boil an innocent child to death." If I think to myself, "What would happen if everyone followed this rule?", I realize that it's a dangerous line of reasoning: sure, perhaps some of the cases would be genuine utilitarian benefits, but many of them would also be utilitarian losses, because we are not possessed with perfect judgment, and sometimes our sight might be clouded by frustration toward children or fear of the consequences. Some people would be boiling children without maximizing happiness at all.

But we can tinker with the rule somewhat, make it more acceptable. We could, for instance, consider the rule, "As a last resort effort to prevent the detonation of a nuclear bomb in a major population center, I may boil an innocent child to death." If everyone followed this rule, there might still be some utilitarian losses--cases where truly deluded individuals boiled innocent children to death without preventing any nuclear explosion--but the utilitarian benefits, all those millions of lives saved, far outweigh them.

Rule-utilitarianism isn't non-utilitarian at all. It's a perfectly sane and reasonable attempt to deal with utilitarian decision-making in situations of bias and imperfect judgment, and it makes some cases of utilitarian judgment (especially those involving collective action) much more intuitive to deal with.

Ultimately, it's just as cold-blooded as the original theory.

Latin/Greek.

Wise ass. You knew what I meant. :)

Yep, and I'm sick of people pretending they're not.Really? Because I'm sick of people pretending they know what I believe better than I do.

Chances are, unless you follow some strict form of natural law, are very deeply religious or are a very strict follower of the categorical imperative, you act according to some form of utilitarian system of thought (act, rule, preference.. whatever) a lot of the time.Okay, first of all this is setting the bar extremely low. Unless I am a "very strict" adherent to some other system, I am necessarily a utilitarian? But not the other way around, presumably? You wouldn't like me saying, "Unless you are a VERY STRICT utilitarian, you necessarily behave as if there are some pure duties (i.e. behaviors that are right or wrong regardless of the consequence)."

While we're at it, what is necessarily NON-utilitarian about natural law? You're depriving yourself of that one? Even when Aquinas himself points to the "common good" as a reader on natural law, and John Austin admits that if there is any such thing, it has to be the utilitarian principle itself? All right... I guess... if you don't want it, we non-utilitarians will pick it up. But this reminds me: you know what's really REALLY annoying? Even more annoying than people presuming they understand my moral philosophy better than I do? It's when the people who make that presumption, all high and mighty, don't appear even to understand the principles of their own. It makes me get all surly and start digging around for notions of "humility" and "respect" that--oh, wait; those are all in the deontological toolbag, no? Sorry, I forgot. Only utilitarians allowed.

For instance, do you support abortion? Then you almost definitely are a utilitarian, you're never going to say that aborting a foetus is, regardless of the reasons, a good end in itself.No, I'm not. But I am going to argue from a deontological perspective that respect for a woman's personal and bodily autonomy prohibits the state from interfering with her decision no matter the consequence. How, again, am I a utilitarian?

It's inherently a means to an end position to hold,No, it's not. As a society, deciding to keep our meddling hands out of a woman's decision is not a "means to an end." What end? Do we want abortions? Are we attempting to encourage them? No, in fact we may (even while refusing to forbid them) take all kinds of other actions to decrease abortions--like encouraging birth control or making adoption an attractive option.

In certain respects, abortion rights are inherently anti-utilitarian to the extent that even rule-utilitarianism winds up struggling with the notion of rights within legal theory. (This may be the heart of your confusion regarding natural law: while utilitarians are perfectly comfortable with the notion of natural law, they generally see no basis for natural rights--that is, rights inviolable from the perspective of a sovereign government advancing the utilitarian "greatest good.")

aborting the foetus being the means to end pregnancy or save the mothers life or whatever.Yes, a legal or ethical theory on abortion may treat the foetus as a means to the mother's ends. (It does not necessarily have to, or it can draw various lines; the Roe line regarding "personhood" is, to many deontological theorists, very well thought out.) To the extent that a theory treats the foetus as a means to an end, does that make it utilitarian--or rather, does it violate a principle of duty toward the foetus? Only insofar as you believe the foetus is a proper ethical subject. I use rocks and sticks as means-to-ends all the time, but this does not in itself violate a duty ethic, because I owe them no respect as moral entities. If I refuse to a foetus rights to which I do not believe it is entitled, I violate no duty at all.

What about taxing? Again, it will be very difficult to argue that taking money from someone is in itself is a good end, whether they are poor or rich. It is again a means to an end, the end being to pay for essential governmental services, welfare, and other roles of government.Okay, I'm not going to respond to each of these in detail, since I think they represent the same basic confusion: doing "something" as a "means to an end" does not a utilitarian make.

Utilitarians believe that proper ethical/legal decisions should be judged on a standard relating to the aggregate happiness/utility produced. The clearest opponents to utilitarian theory believe that decisions should be judged on standards relating to duties properly so called: moral "rights" or "wrongs" that are so by the nature of the act rather than the consequences entailed. Hence, I might state a general prohibition on lying because, for various reasons, I think deceit is wrong--including in my prohibition the so-called "white lie" which has favorable consequences. The best-articulated theory in this vein holds, among other things, that it is inherently wrong to treat other human beings (or, more broadly, moral subjects) as "means-to-an end."

The question, then, is not whether taxation itself is a means to an end, but whether the activity of taxing treats the people taxed as means to some other end. The answer gets us very deeply into theories of government, of law, and of justice. A deontological theorist holds (very loosely) that human beings have positive obligations to the state; and, in democratic societies in particular, the individual's relation to the state is as both Citizen and Subject in such a way that the individual can identify with public policy as a participant rather than merely an object of law--hence, that public duties are grounded in a mode of consent or willingness that precludes the simple formulation of the subject as a "means to an end," since the ends involved are her/his own ends by way of the relation to citizenship.

But that would be a very long debate indeed. The point is, surely you are not so firmly entrenched in my head that you "know" I don't believe any such thing; that I am, in point of fact, "really" a utilitarian.

Even if you specifically follow another ethical theory, ethical theories can and do overlap, all it means is that you adjust what to calculate in the felicific calculus so to speak, which really means that you may have a slightly different perspective on what is the greater outcome.No. I'm telling you outright I don't care about outcomes. I care about the character of behaviors.

I'm the person, some may recall, who believes you shouldn't lie to the Nazi soldier looking for Jews hiding in your basement. You should fight him instead.

You may think I'm wrong, but I defy you to show how I'm using a utilitarian calculus of any sort whatsoever. I simply don't weigh the consequence in that decision.

I'm not saying you always act in a utilitarian way, of course many people act in an intuitionist or emotive sense, they do things because it 'feels' right. However, in dealing with politics and complex ethical dilemmas, you almost certainly do end up thinking in a utilitarian way.Nope, sorry. And I'm neither intuitionist nor emotive; in fact I try to keep my emotions out of it.

Intuitionists, without a doubt, routinely lie to Nazis.

I live by my own personal set of morals, so yes, I'm a utilitarian.Certainly that doesn't follow by definition... What is this personal set of morals you espouse, and in what way is it utilitarian?

One being that even making a thread is somehow a moral choice

Well, you could be making threads and arguing with people in them, or you could be using the privilege of your free time to help people in need. Which better maximizes utility?

Why should we exempt your thread-making from ethical consideration?

Ultimately, it's just as cold-blooded as the original theory.
The way you put it, it isn't any different to the original theory. Whether or not I make the rules more specific doesn't make a difference if I have no way of measuring and verifying outcomes. We can believe and assume things, but if we accept that information just isn't available in sufficient quantities for others to be act utilitarians without causing more damage than it's worth, then we have no actual reason to believe that the rules I might come up with are any different. It might even be possible that the constraints of these rules actually prevent properly utilitarian actions to be taken - the child could be a suicidal masochist for all we know. Real utilitarianism is purely empirical, that's the way Bentham saw it. You make decisions based on evidence, and if it says something different to last time, that's the way to go. Making rules, even if they're still motivated by wanting to maximise aggregate happiness, is contrary to that since we'd be generalising things that shouldn't be.

The point is that people talk about Mill as a sort of alternative utilitarian as opposed to Bentham, who few people would 100% agree with - but he introduced all sorts of alternative ideas into the equation, and some of those didn't really have a sound footing in utilitarianism as such. What I'm saying is that being purely utilitarian without any "external" ways of judging things is not what most people do.

The way you put it, it isn't any different to the original theory.

That's the point.

There's not anything less "pure" utilitarian about rule-utilitarianism. The difference is not on the conceptual or theoretical level, but simply at the level of generating a practical mechanism for use by imperfect human beings.

Whether or not I make the rules more specific doesn't make a difference if I have no way of measuring and verifying outcomes. We can believe and assume things, but if we accept that information just isn't available in sufficient quantities for others to be act utilitarians without causing more damage than it's worth, then we have no actual reason to believe that the rules I might come up with are any different.

Why not? We know that some instances of utilitarian reasoning are "causing more damage than [they're] worth", but we have no reason to believe that all instances of utilitarian reasoning suffer from that problem.

Eventually, the evidence and/or the consequences of inaction become great enough to offset the countervailing considerations of bias and imperfect information.

It might even be possible that the constraints of these rules actually prevent properly utilitarian actions to be taken - the child could be a suicidal masochist for all we know.

That's true. Making the rules stricter reduces utilitarian losses, but also reduces utilitarian benefits. You try to find the optimal point.

Real utilitarianism is purely empirical, that's the way Bentham saw it. You make decisions based on evidence, and if it says something different to last time, that's the way to go.

But do you make decisions based on evidence? Can anyone be so sure of her judgment?

The point is that people talk about Mill as a sort of alternative utilitarian as opposed to Bentham, who few people would 100% agree with - but he introduced all sorts of alternative ideas into the equation, and some of those didn't really have a sound footing in utilitarianism as such.

True, but rule-utilitarianism, at least formulated as such, doesn't come from Mill.

What I'm saying is that being purely utilitarian without any "external" ways of judging things is not what most people do.

Most people aren't utilitarians, and I don't think Hydesland means to suggest they are in a strict sense. He's trying to show that broadly consequentialist reasoning is the dominant form of ethical thinking.

But there are plenty of people who will defend some variety of "pure" utilitarianism.

OP

Yup, stating the obvious never goes out of style!

"Chances are, unless you follow some strict form of natural law, are very deeply religious or are a very strict follower of the categorical imperative, you act according to some form of utilitarian system of thought (act, rule, preference.. whatever) a lot of the time."

You forgot the newly-resurged Virtue Ethics, now a viable option in ethical theory again.

However, I would argue that the vast majority of people do not, in fact have a utilitarian view of ethics, as utilitarianism, even in its most basic form, is a very structured, if utterly wrongheaded, theory. Those without philosophical training have probably not read the arguments for utilitarianism, and likely have not worked out the logic, such as it is, of the theory for themselves in order to pattern their lives around it.
It seems likely to me that the majority of people who are not philosophically trained, and who do not pattern their ethics on religion, follow a generally relativistic internal ethics, a reflexive "yuck-factor" to certain things like murder and rape, and a "yea-factor" to certain things like charity and honesty. They cobble together a semi-coherent structure of behaviour based on these internal leanings. For them, "X is unethical" would simply mean "I am averse to X" rather than a claim to be able to defend the immorality of X.

Well, that's interesting.

I thought "pretty much everyone is a utilitarian." But now you explain that you only mean some people... and those some people only act so "a lot of the time."

If you have to backpedal in some of the first few words you write to defend your position, before anyone has replied, perhaps you should re-evaluate its merits.


Nope, I stick with most people, because very few people actually fall under the mentioned categories.


Abortion doesn't apply here for at least two reasons. First, fetuses are not persons

Arbitrary decision, but I'll accept that for the sake of argument.


, and at the time when the vast majority of abortions occur, are not sentient

So?


: they lack the intrinsic worth that underlies the prohibition. Second, even if they were, the norms of treatment that moral agents would be bound to follow toward them would not include giving up their bodies for their use. It does not degrade a person to refuse to make exceptional sacrifices for his or her sake; in making a decision, we need not say anything about their worth as people (we may perfectly consistently wish for them full happiness and freedom), we simply do not actively pursue their welfare at that moment.


I don't see what you're getting at here, by not considering the foetus' worth in making your decision, how are you not treating it as means to an end?


Again, so? I can accept plenty of means that are bad or unpleasant. The question is, are they intrinsically wrong?

I debate that there is even such a thing as an action being intrinsically or objectively wrong, but if there is, why wouldn't taking money from someone be that?


More specifically, do they degrade any person to a mere object, a thing with only relative worth?


Relative to the welfare of society in this case, then in a way yes. But utilitarians need not degrade people into mere objects, you can still acknowledge their intrinsic worth if you want, yet still subjugate their wants for a greater good.


Taxation is perfectly consistent with the dignity of persons. No inherent right makes one external thing one person's, and another another person's, because no individual has the right to bind everyone else to respect what she deems to be hers.

This is getting a little too simplistic. You wouldn't argue that me breaking into your house and stealing something can be anything but bad, regardless of whether property inherently exists in reality or not.


All rights to private property begin with positive right, socially-established right, and if society establishes the rules of rightful ownership, it can also regulate and tax it as it sees fit.


Then perhaps the societies decision in this case is at fault, just because it can do as it sees fit does not mean that anything they decide to do with your money is of equal worth.


Wrong. We are not just different varieties of consequentialist.


You, no. But many people who say they aren't, are.


I'll give you an example. For me, every life has equal value, and thus each instance of preventing the unjust taking of life also has equal value. But it would still be wrong to murder one person to stop a murderer from killing ten others--not because some "greater outcome" says so, but because the "greater outcome" (making the world a better place, a world with the fewest possible murders) does not excuse mistreating the individual.


I could, if I wanted to, just label this as rule utilitarian. And you could even form a pure utilitarian argument for not murdering the person, say that it perhaps sets a dangerous precedent in the future and that preventing this precedent is a greater good. Basically there are two main types of people: the pragmatists, who may agree with you about everything concerning what is wrong and what is right, but do so because they feel that it would make the world a better place if these ideas were respected; and then there are those people like you who feel that some actions in themselves are intrinsically wrong etc.... I'm arguing that most people fall under the pragmatist category most of the time and then further argue that its very difficult to pragmatically make ethical decisions without applying utilitarian thought.


Again, wrong. Another example: eight years of Bush Administration rule have been disastrous for the country and the world. Utilitarian, or even broadly consequentialist, reasoning would justify a great deal to successfully prevent another Republican from taking office--say, various forms of ballot tampering, or, for the weak of stomach, comparatively mild (and common) tactics like dishonest or manipulative campaigning from the Democrats. But I would say that such tactics would be wrong, period--again, not because I disapprove of the greater outcome, or (necessarily) because I include different things in it, but because it is not right to degrade democracy for any end, however worthy.


Same as above, you could easily form a utilitarian argument saying that its wrong to do those things because again it may set some dangerous precedents and form a slippery slope to corruption in politics and thus the greater good is to prevent such precedents. I think many people base their ethical theories on very broad considerations of the consequences which may be so broad that they wouldn't realise it and not label what they are doing utilitarian.


No. Non-consequentialists don't necessarily have a different idea of what constitutes the "greater good"; rather, we simply have a different understanding of the significance and role of "greater good" considerations.


Yes, but as I have been saying, very few people truly fall under the non-consequentialist category.

The fact is, I think to actually be an individualist and a believer in 'negative' rights you have to have your heart removed and coated in a permanent block of ice. I believe Ayn Rand actually survived this operation, though few others have.

Yeah, but then utilitarianism isn't an ethical system, but a tool.

Perhaps this is true.


Say I believe in natural rights that shouldn't be violated - I can then afterwards say "if they are, it'll make everyone unhappy". But that doesn't mean that my initial judgement was a utilitarian one.


But I don't think many people actually believe in natural rights in the way you or soheran do.


That qualification is already a deviation from utilitarianism

Is it? What if these qualifications are made for utilitarian purposes?


, because the judgement of what constitutes higher or lower pleasures isn't meaningful if it only concerns what the individual him- or herself thinks.

Yes but other philosophers have formed more complex utilitarian systems that handle problems like this.


There has to be another yardstick, and it's not really a utilitarian one.


Why not? What if there are no meaningful yardsticks, and that its all subjective?


That's why I think that utilitarianism usually isn't used as an ethical system at all, and when it is, it's plain evil.


I think Bentham in some cases just used utilitarian thought badly, he was too discriminating sometimes on who can be considered part of the 'greatest number' just to name one example.


Yeah, but I am wondering about how they make these calculations and decisions? To use Soheran's example: boiling that child might make the gods happy and save everyone. Now, a pure utilitarian might agree and do it

But he might not, see my reply to soheran, you could form a pure utilitarian argument to show how that's a bad idea.


But why is it bad? There is no reason to believe that if we continuously decide to kill people if it produces the greatest happiness we would end up in a worse situation than if we didn't.

Isn't there? Perhaps not doing it would prevent people from trying to use that method of ransom in order to get what they want. Or perhaps having such little respect for the intrinsic worth of people will lead to general chaos and anarchy.

Nope, I stick with most people, because very few people actually fall under the mentioned categories.

The trouble is that you are setting yourself up for non-falsifiability. You say "Everyone is a utilitarian"--but when someone says, "No, I'm not," you always have the "out" of saying, "Well, everyone but you."

Further, you run the risk of evading the real issues. Even the strictest defender of deontological reasoning will admit that much of the time cost-benefit considerations should influence our behavior. It's the consequentialist argument that it is the exclusive, determining element of morality that we object to. If the most you are willing to say is "most people" "a lot of the time"... how much does that really tell us about moral theory, anyway?

Arbitrary decision

It's interesting that you immediately leap to that conclusion, despite having not heard anything about the reasoning behind my judgment.

So?

Hey, you're the utilitarian--I'm just going by Bentham's standard there. "Can they suffer?"

I don't see what you're getting at here, by not considering the foetus' worth in making your decision, how are you not treating it as means to an end?

It's the negative/positive distinction, and I think it's at the heart of the whole consequentialist/deontological dispute.

To acknowledge someone as an end-in-herself is to will her autonomy. It is to accept it as an inherent good.

A person recognized as an end-in-herself, therefore, absolutely cannot be treated in certain ways: having committed ourselves to believing she ought to be free, we cannot turn around and say that she ought not to be. We cannot intentionally deprive her of freedom--we cannot kill her, or enslave her, or coerce her, or manipulate her. These are "negative" duties: we are held to them strictly, narrowly. We must not do these things.

But while there is an inherent, necessary contradiction in accepting both that a person ought to free and that she ought not to be free, there is no inherent contradiction in accepting both that she ought to be free and that I need not concern myself with her freedom at the moment. From "It is a good thing if she is free" it does not logically follow that I must make any particular sacrifice to ensure that she is. I will see it as wonderful if she is free, and as a tragedy if she is not--but I need not interfere either way. It is a good thing to do, yes--an end-in-itself--but there is no rational necessity to it.

In the case of abortion, therefore, even if I accept the fetus as a person, I can think to myself, "While it would be a great thing if the fetus survived, and it is a horrible tragedy that it does not, we are not strictly required to sacrifice our very bodies to secure every great thing and prevent every tragedy. And, certainly, we are not entitled to deprive another person of freedom to do such a thing."

In making this judgment, in no way do we treat the fetus as a mere means to an end. What we intend is the fetus's removal from the mother's body, where, person or not, it has no inherent right to be. The fetus's death is an unfortunate side-effect: we regret it, but that's the way of the world. Just as we do when we refrain from using every last superfluous resource we possess to feed starving children in Africa.

I debate that there is even such a thing as an action being intrinsically or objectively wrong,

"Intrinsic" here does not mean "objective" in the meta-ethical sense. It refers to the idea of something being worthy (or unworthy) in itself, regardless of whether or not it serves some other purpose.

but if there is, why wouldn't taking money from someone be that?

In a broad sense, any act of property allocation is "taking money from someone": to say "This is mine, but not yours" is always to deny resources to someone. That's why we must do it with social sanction: we form a political community, and the decisions we make regarding property stem from our collective public will. If the rules grant me something and deny it to you, this exclusivity is legitimate because you have participated in the decision-making that brought those rules about; you are not a slave, forced to obey whatever an external master decrees.

Taxation properly viewed is not the legislation of morality, an attempt to coerce people to fulfill duties of altruism, but rather is simply part of the allocation of property: there's no inherent reason society need abide strictly by the original free-market capitalist distribution. We do not deprive anyone of what is rightfully theirs; we simply alter what is, in fact, rightfully theirs.

Theft is indeed an inherent wrong. But theft rests upon a very different relation between moral persons. It is not a political one, public to individual, where the individual can still be free as long as he is part of the public, but a private one, individual to individual, where one imposes upon the other in contravention of the rules that are the product of rightful (free and equal) decision-making procedures.

Relative to the welfare of society in this case, then in a way yes. But utilitarians need not degrade people into mere objects, you can still acknowledge their intrinsic worth if you want, yet still subjugate their wants for a greater good.

No, you cannot. If their worth is truly inherent, then nothing can compensate for denying it. To say that another good is "greater" requires a standard of comparison, but any standard of comparison requires degrading inherent worth to a common denominator. Utilitarians turn everything into a utility comparison, but to do this is to degrade everyone: it is to say they are not worthy as themselves, for themselves, but only insofar as they possess "utility." It does not respect people as individual persons, but only "respects" them as part of an amorphous mass of happiness.

This is getting a little too simplistic.

Haha... nothing "simplistic" about it. ;)

You wouldn't argue that me breaking into your house and stealing something can be anything but bad, regardless of whether property inherently exists in reality or not.

True, but see above.

Then perhaps the societies decision in this case is at fault, just because it can do as it sees fit does not mean that anything they decide to do with your money is of equal worth.

The trouble here is your assumption of "your money" prior to the point where any such thing has been decided.

I could, if I wanted to, just label this as rule utilitarian.

Yes, you could. But that wouldn't make it so. The rule-utilitarian framework is not mine. Make the rule strict enough, and it's surely possible to construct a rule-utilitarian justification for murder in all kinds of cases. For me, never--it's an inherent wrong, always.

More importantly, our reasons differ: the rule-utilitarian wants to say that a rule legitimating murder is dangerous (an overall utility loss) when exposed to imperfect human judgment, while I want to say that a rule legitimating murder is evil (whatever its overall utility consequences) even if we are dealing with omniscient, perfectly impartial super-beings who only use it when it is truly appropriate.

And you could even form a pure utilitarian argument for not murdering the person, say that it perhaps sets a dangerous precedent in the future and that preventing this precedent is a greater good.

Of course you could. Utilitarianism is a very flexible ethical theory. But, again, our reasons differ--and there comes a point where utilitarian defenses of "rights" reasoning are obviously an incredible stretch. Utilitarians are better off biting the bullet. Their theory does have some real merits, but it simply does not square well with some human moral intuitions, and they should face that.

I'm arguing that most people fall under the pragmatist category most of the time

And I'm pretty sure you're wrong. Most people don't think that the only reason we shouldn't murder innocent people to save others is utilitarian caution. Their gut reaction is usually something along the lines of "We shouldn't think that way about people", which is really a rather deontological kind of thinking. It's the cold, degrading mathematics of it that offends them--and rule-utilitarianism is no different in that respect.

I think many people base their ethical theories on very broad considerations of the consequences which may be so broad that they wouldn't realise it and not label what they are doing utilitarian.

Oh, come on. How much are you going to read into people's minds to force your conclusion? Sure, maybe this is the case--and maybe utilitarians are really deontologists who don't understand the reasons for their own moral beliefs. But to me it seems more plausible, and more respectful, to think that they actually mean what they say, at least until we have convincing reasons to believe otherwise... and judging by the fact that people can make philosophically compelling defenses of deontological thinking, I don't think we have anything of the sort.

Really? Because I'm sick of people pretending they know what I believe better than I do.


I don't remember naming any names.


Okay, first of all this is setting the bar extremely low. Unless I am a "very strict" adherent to some other system, I am necessarily a utilitarian?

Probably, not necessarily, those two words are very different.


But not the other way around, presumably? You wouldn't like me saying, "Unless you are a VERY STRICT utilitarian, you necessarily behave as if there are some pure duties (i.e. behaviors that are right or wrong regardless of the consequence)."


No, I wouldn't like you saying that, but then I never said you are necessarily anything in the first place.


John Austin admits that if there is any such thing, it has to be the utilitarian principle itself?

And yet the term natural law itself pretty much is never used to refer to the utilitarian principle.


It's when the people who make that presumption, all high and mighty, don't appear even to understand the principles of their own. It makes me get all surly and start digging around for notions of "humility" and "respect" that--oh, wait; those are all in the deontological toolbag, no? Sorry, I forgot. Only utilitarians allowed.


I have no idea what you're talking about here.


No, I'm not. But I am going to argue from a deontological perspective that respect for a woman's personal and bodily autonomy prohibits the state from interfering with her decision no matter the consequence. How, again, am I a utilitarian?


Right, but unless you believe in some metaphysical basis of life, there is no philosophical reason to regard this as objectively true, is/ought and all that. And you're still practising a means to an end here, respect for a woman's personal and bodily autonomy is an end we must pursue where allowing the woman to abort her foetus is a means to secure that end.


No, it's not. As a society, deciding to keep our meddling hands out of a woman's decision is not a "means to an end." What end? Do we want abortions? Are we attempting to encourage them? No, in fact we may (even while refusing to forbid them) take all kinds of other actions to decrease abortions--like encouraging birth control or making adoption an attractive option.


Irrelevant, abortion when it has no purpose, would never be considered something deontologically good in itself. And who said we are talking about the state here? What about the merits of the woman's personal choice herself?


In certain respects, abortion rights are inherently anti-utilitarian to the extent that even rule-utilitarianism winds up struggling with the notion of rights within legal theory. (This may be the heart of your confusion regarding natural law: while utilitarians are perfectly comfortable with the notion of natural law, they generally see no basis for natural rights--that is, rights inviolable from the perspective of a sovereign government advancing the utilitarian "greatest good.")


No, I certainly do not see any basis whatsoever for natural rights, it may be a nice theory, but its still subjective at heart. Rights in my opinion are entirely man made, and made for a purpose, the purpose is the ends that we pursue.


Yes, a legal or ethical theory on abortion may treat the foetus as a means to the mother's ends. (It does not necessarily have to, or it can draw various lines; the Roe line regarding "personhood" is, to many deontological theorists, very well thought out.) To the extent that a theory treats the foetus as a means to an end, does that make it utilitarian--or rather, does it violate a principle of duty toward the foetus? Only insofar as you believe the foetus is a proper ethical subject. I use rocks and sticks as means-to-ends all the time, but this does not in itself violate a duty ethic, because I owe them no respect as moral entities. If I refuse to a foetus rights to which I do not believe it is entitled, I violate no duty at all.


But nobody ever realistically treats a foetus the same way they treat a rock. You would have a very different reaction if I were to smash up a foetus than if I were to smash up a rock.


Okay, I'm not going to respond to each of these in detail, since I think they represent the same basic confusion: doing "something" as a "means to an end" does not a utilitarian make.


No shit, but tax is a means to aggregate happiness.


Utilitarians believe that proper ethical/legal decisions should be judged on a standard relating to the aggregate happiness/utility produced.

At its most basic then yes that's what it is.


The clearest opponents to utilitarian theory believe that decisions should be judged on standards relating to duties properly so called: moral "rights" or "wrongs" that are so by the nature of the act rather than the consequences entailed.

And what if I were to tell you that these 'rights' and 'wrongs', these standards many people have been almost conditioned to believe in, were originally set up for ultimately utilitarian purposes?


The question, then, is not whether taxation itself is a means to an end, but whether the activity of taxing treats the people taxed as means to some other end. The answer gets us very deeply into theories of government, of law, and of justice. A deontological theorist

Some deontological theorists...


... holds (very loosely) that human beings have positive obligations to the state; and, in democratic societies in particular, the individual's relation to the state is as both Citizen and Subject in such a way that the individual can identify with public policy as a participant rather than merely an object of law--hence, that public duties are grounded in a mode of consent or willingness that precludes the simple formulation of the subject as a "means to an end," since the ends involved are her/his own ends by way of the relation to citizenship.


Most people however don't have this deep philosophical perspective.


But that would be a very long debate indeed. The point is, surely you are not so firmly entrenched in my head that you "know" I don't believe any such thing; that I am, in point of fact, "really" a utilitarian.


No, I'm fairly certain that you're not utilitarian, nor Soheran, nor Neu. You misunderstand what I'm arguing, I'm saying that most people are utilitarian, not that everyone is. But I mainly set up this thread in order to debate the merits of utilitarianism, not to get too bogged down on whether you are one or not.


No. I'm telling you outright I don't care about outcomes. I care about the character of behaviors.


I'm fairly sure you do. I mean I find it very difficult to believe that you would help an old lady across the road if you knew that this somehow would cause the world to explode, just to think of a ridiculous example.


I'm the person, some may recall, who believes you shouldn't lie to the Nazi soldier looking for Jews hiding in your basement. You should fight him instead.


But the act of fighting is intrinsically wrong, isn't it? Violence could only be seen as a good thing if you were considering what the purpose of the violence was? Isn't that, a means to an end? Anyhow, I believe that you're not as deontological as Kant then, since I'm pretty sure he would tell the Nazi the truth.


You may think I'm wrong, but I defy you to show how I'm using a utilitarian calculus of any sort whatsoever. I simply don't weigh the consequence in that decision.


Well, I think you do (I'm not saying I know), it's just that the immediate consequence is so obvious that you don't need to consider it.


Nope, sorry. And I'm neither intuitionist nor emotive; in fact I try to keep my emotions out of it.

Intuitionists, without a doubt, routinely lie to Nazis.

I know you're not going to like me saying this, but I really can't think of a way that's it's really possible to believe in natural rights in any other way but intuitively.

The trouble is that you are setting yourself up for non-falsifiability. You say "Everyone is a utilitarian"--but when someone says, "No, I'm not," you always have the "out" of saying, "Well, everyone but you."


Well yes, I was being deliberately cheeky to get peoples attention. My main intention is to discuss the merits of utilitarianism and try and stop people from thinking that its so far away from mainstream thinking and further, stop them from thinking it is evil.


It's interesting that you immediately leap to that conclusion, despite having not heard anything about the reasoning behind my judgment.


Well, I have read a lot about personhood and when it should be applied to a foetus, I do not think it is possible to come to a concluding as to when exactly a foetus becomes a person (if at all) without it being somewhat arbitrary.


Hey, you're the utilitarian--I'm just going by Bentham's standard there. "Can they suffer?"


Well I personally think the state shouldn't prohibit woman from making that decision, so I'm not going to attempt to defend anti-choice arguments. Maybe that wasn't such a good example to use, because its ambiguous whether the death of a foetus is in itself amoral or a bad thing.


It's the negative/positive distinction, and I think it's at the heart of the whole consequentialist/deontological dispute.

To acknowledge someone as an end-in-herself is to will her autonomy. It is to accept it as an inherent good.

A person recognized as an end-in-herself, therefore, absolutely cannot be treated in certain ways: having committed ourselves to believing she ought to be free, we cannot turn around and say that she ought not to be.

But we do, all the time. I don't think you'll find any serious debater on this forum who, for instance, doesn't support some form of imprisonment for those who break the law. Yet doing that is exactly saying 'you ought not to be free'.


we are not strictly required to sacrifice our very bodies to secure every great thing and prevent every tragedy. And, certainly, we are not entitled to deprive another person of freedom to do such a thing."


Right, this is something we should not do, and it is a good end not to do this, therefore it is good to allow women to have the choice of aborting her foetus (the means) in order to secure her continued freedom (the end). See what I'm getting at?


In making this judgment, in no way do we treat the fetus as a mere means to an end. What we intend is the fetus's removal from the mother's body, where, person or not, it has no inherent right to be. The fetus's death is an unfortunate side-effect

You call it a side-effect, I call it a means, all I'm seeing here is differing perspectives.


In a broad sense, any act of property allocation is "taking money from someone": to say "This is mine, but not yours" is always to deny resources to someone. That's why we must do it with social sanction: we form a political community, and the decisions we make regarding property stem from our collective public will. If the rules grant me something and deny it to you, this exclusivity is legitimate because you have participated in the decision-making that brought those rules about; you are not a slave, forced to obey whatever an external master decrees.


Thing is, this is a slightly unrealistic assessment of society at this time. We are essentially forced to obey, and we don't really participate in the decision, other than in a very vague sense by voting for the party you support.


Taxation properly viewed is not the legislation of morality, an attempt to coerce people to fulfill duties of altruism, but rather is simply part of the allocation of property: there's no inherent reason society need abide strictly by the original free-market capitalist distribution. We do not deprive anyone of what is rightfully theirs; we simply alter what is, in fact, rightfully theirs.


Right, but we only make alterations for the purpose of improving the welfare of its citizens. If a state just needlessly made alterations, causing many to loose money, but that had no effect on the general welfare of its people, then why couldn't this be labelled as wrong?


No, you cannot. If their worth is truly inherent, then nothing can compensate for denying it. To say that another good is "greater" requires a standard of comparison, but any standard of comparison requires degrading inherent worth to a common denominator. Utilitarians turn everything into a utility comparison, but to do this is to degrade everyone: it is to say they are not worthy as themselves, for themselves, but only insofar as they possess "utility." It does not respect people as individual persons, but only "respects" them as part of an amorphous mass of happiness.


This is getting into the old debate of whether you can quantify the value of life. You seem to be suggesting that life has infinite value, I'm saying that life has an extremely high value, but not infinite. But I agree, treating life as having an infinite value has its merits, it means that one life is of equal value to 50 life's for instance, and safeguards against people from murdering people if they think it will cause more people to live. But so can rule utilitarianism.


The trouble here is your assumption of "your money" prior to the point where any such thing has been decided.


Let me rephrase it then: perhaps the societies decision in this case is at fault, just because it can do as it sees fit does not mean that anything they decide to do with the money is of equal worth.


For me, never--it's an inherent wrong, always.


Is it? What about in self defence, if its absolutely the only way possible to protect your family, would you murder a man trying to kill them?


More importantly, our reasons differ: the rule-utilitarian wants to say that a rule legitimating murder is dangerous (an overall utility loss) when exposed to imperfect human judgment, while I want to say that a rule legitimating murder is evil (whatever its overall utility consequences) even if we are dealing with omniscient, perfectly impartial super-beings who only use it when it is truly appropriate.


I want to do that as well, but I can only say it is evil in mine and most other peoples opinion, I cannot say that not to murder is a moral absolute or objectively true since I do not believe in moral absolutes. So if I'm forced to justify why I make a law not allowing murder, I can only use utilitarian reasons to give a non emotive reason why.


Of course you could. Utilitarianism is a very flexible ethical theory. But, again, our reasons differ--and there comes a point where utilitarian defenses of "rights" reasoning are obviously an incredible stretch. Utilitarians are better off biting the bullet. Their theory does have some real merits, but it simply does not square well with some human moral intuitions, and they should face that.


Well yes, there maybe some things that I think is intuitively wrong, but I cannot form a utilitarian argument for their prohibition, but I don't see the problem in having an ethical theory clash with your intuitions.


And I'm pretty sure you're wrong. Most people don't think that the only reason we shouldn't murder innocent people to save others is utilitarian caution. Their gut reaction is usually something along the lines of "We shouldn't think that way about people", which is really a rather deontological kind of thinking. It's the cold, degrading mathematics of it that offends them--and rule-utilitarianism is no different in that respect.


Of course, I did specifically mention that people do tend to act in a intuitive sense. But whenever most people set out a proper argument as to why it should not be done, they wont usually just say "it just feels wrong", but they will usually use some sort of utilitarian argument.


people can make philosophically compelling defenses of deontological thinking,

I disagree with this. Whether they are compelling or not, they are usually so incredibly complex that most people wouldn't bother to think about it so deeply. Utilitarianism on the other hand is really quite simple.

Well yes, I was being deliberately cheeky to get peoples attention. My main intention is to discuss the merits of utilitarianism and try and stop people from thinking that its so far away from mainstream thinking and further, stop them from thinking it is evil.

Oh, I'm quite sure utilitarianism is everywhere in mainstream thinking (though I'm not sure that's a point in its favor), and I'm pretty sure it's wrong, not evil. Most utilitarians seem fairly well-intentioned.

But we do, all the time. I don't think you'll find any serious debater on this forum who, for instance, doesn't support some form of imprisonment for those who break the law. Yet doing that is exactly saying 'you ought not to be free'.

That's right... this is an important point of tension. We believe in freedom, we know we need laws to have freedom within society, but how do we construct coercive political authority that is consistent with freedom?

The answer is by joining the categories of "ruler" and "ruled": democracy, collective autonomy, people held accountable only to the laws they have given to themselves.

Right, this is something we should not do, and it is a good end not to do this, therefore it is good to allow women to have the choice of aborting her foetus (the means) in order to secure her continued freedom (the end). See what I'm getting at?

Yes, but I don't see how it's remotely relevant. There's nothing wrong with means-end reasoning as such. It is only when you degrade a person to a mere means that there is a problem. To give the choice to the woman degrades no one, any more than a person's choice not to donate an organ does.

You call it a side-effect, I call it a means, all I'm seeing here is differing perspectives.

Yes, "differing perspectives"... founded in your misunderstanding of what it means to treat someone as a means.

A "side-effect" is not a means, because I do not will it. When I refrain from sending my money to feeding the hungry, I don't intend to bring about their continued suffering and poverty. To the contrary, I hope very much that it ends as soon as possible. It's not a "means" because I don't seek it; it doesn't serve any end of mine.

You're too concerned with the word "means", perhaps. What's important is that we always respect others as end-in-themselves. That means that we must always view their freedom as an inherent good. But nothing about that demands that anyone sacrifice his or her body for the sake of others.

Thing is, this is a slightly unrealistic assessment of society at this time. We are essentially forced to obey, and we don't really participate in the decision, other than in a very vague sense by voting for the party you support.

Then our political obligations are not as strong as they might be otherwise... but strong enough, I think, to get us to respect basic rules of property.

Right, but we only make alterations for the purpose of improving the welfare of its citizens.

That's very utilitarian of you.

We make the alterations the public wills for itself, for the purposes it seeks.

If a state just needlessly made alterations, causing many to loose money, but that had no effect on the general welfare of its people, then why couldn't this be labelled as wrong?

It would depend on why. If the public decided that there were other worthy ends to pursue than their own welfare--protection of the environment, preservation of important works of art, whatever--that's its free choice. I see no wrongness.

This is getting into the old debate of whether you can quantify the value of life. You seem to be suggesting that life has infinite value, I'm saying that life has an extremely high value, but not infinite.

No, I'm going back to your first sentence and saying, no, the value of life (of autonomy, really) cannot be quantified.

Assigning numbers to it, even "infinity", can be misleading.

Let me rephrase it then: perhaps the societies decision in this case is at fault, just because it can do as it sees fit does not mean that anything they decide to do with the money is of equal worth.

"Equal worth" according to whom?

People undoubtedly have particular values and judgments, and support some decisions over others. But democracy remains the only legitimate means to pursue them.

Is it? What about in self defence, if its absolutely the only way possible to protect your family, would you murder a man trying to kill them?

Self-defense isn't murder. I am not entitled to act in self-defense because of the consequences. I am entitled to do so because the relation between me and someone trying to attack me is not the same as the relation between me and a person who is not doing anything to me.

I want to do that as well, but I can only say it is evil in mine and most other peoples opinion, I cannot say that not to murder is a moral absolute or objectively true since I do not believe in moral absolutes. So if I'm forced to justify why I make a law not allowing murder, I can only use utilitarian reasons to give a non emotive reason why.

How does utilitarianism somehow evade your lack of moral absolutes? How is it non-emotive, anyway? "Happiness is good"? Seems pretty emotive to me.

Of course, I did specifically mention that people do tend to act in a intuitive sense. But whenever most people set out a proper argument as to why it should not be done, they wont usually just say "it just feels wrong", but they will usually use some sort of utilitarian argument.

In some cases, yes... but in some cases, perhaps even many, the utilitarian argument works perfectly fine.

When it comes to the actually difficult cases, though, the story is quite different. Killing children to save others? Most people would say that's wrong, and when pressed they'll say something about how people shouldn't think that way. Nothing about "maximizing utility."

I disagree with this. Whether they are compelling or not, they are usually so incredibly complex that most people wouldn't bother to think about it so deeply.

Philosophical theories of "meaning" are also rather complex... but does that mean that people don't understand language?

They define it differently, though, and the central core of utilitarianism is "the greatest good for the greatest number" so, you don't even understand utilitarianism, which is why I stopped reading your OP half-way through.

No, I think the central core of utilitarianism, the way Jeremy Bentham described it, was that the "greatest good" was the greatest happiness. So if Hydesland's post makes all of us mildly irked but makes him ecstatic, that's good. If it makes all of us angry and just makes him mildly pleased with himself, that's bad.

That's right... this is an important point of tension. We believe in freedom, we know we need laws to have freedom within society, but how do we construct coercive political authority that is consistent with freedom?

The answer is by joining the categories of "ruler" and "ruled": democracy, collective autonomy, people held accountable only to the laws they have given to themselves.


But people don't just 'give laws' to themselves, well not in any existing society at the moment.


Yes, but I don't see how it's remotely relevant. There's nothing wrong with means-end reasoning as such. It is only when you degrade a person to a mere means that there is a problem. To give the choice to the woman degrades no one

Except the foetus... but I don't want to debate whether a foetus can be considered a person or not, so perhaps we should just leave this example.


Yes, "differing perspectives"... founded in your misunderstanding of what it means to treat someone as a means.

A "side-effect" is not a means, because I do not will it. When I refrain from sending my money to feeding the hungry, I don't intend to bring about their continued suffering and poverty. To the contrary, I hope very much that it ends as soon as possible. It's not a "means" because I don't seek it; it doesn't serve any end of mine.


Well I was originally not actually talking about the state refraining from interfering in a woman's choice. I'm talking about the woman herself choosing to have an abortion, that means she is actively willing to abort the foetus.


Then our political obligations are not as strong as they might be otherwise... but strong enough, I think, to get us to respect basic rules of property.


Well people never sign a contract saying "I agree to abide by these laws in exchange for such and such...", they are forced to obey these laws and give the state money. I don't have a problem with this idea and do not therefore think the social contract is nonsensical, I just don't think it literally means everyone in society consents to the contract.


That's very utilitarian of you.

We make the alterations the public wills for itself, for the purposes it seeks.


And the purpose it seeks is almost always a higher quality of living for its citizens.


It would depend on why. If the public decided that there were other worthy ends to pursue than their own welfare--protection of the environment, preservation of important works of art, whatever--that's its free choice. I see no wrongness.


OK but that doesn't contradict what I say, needlessly means totally without purpose. Even purposes that don't affect the welfare of its citizens. So surely this kind of action by the state, where it harms individuals but brings no greater benefit, can be considered wrong?


No, I'm going back to your first sentence and saying, no, the value of life (of autonomy, really) cannot be quantified.

Assigning numbers to it, even "infinity", can be misleading.


Semantics, infinity can just simply mean that no value can be assigned to it, but I see your point.


"Equal worth" according to whom?

People undoubtedly have particular values and judgments, and support some decisions over others. But democracy remains the only legitimate means to pursue them.


But a legitimate decision can still be immoral, can it not?


Self-defense isn't murder. I am not entitled to act in self-defense because of the consequences. I am entitled to do so because the relation between me and someone trying to attack me is not the same as the relation between me and a person who is not doing anything to me.


Yes, the relationship is dependent on the consequences though, right? If you left the person not trying to attack you to himself, you would not suffer the consequence of injury or death, the person trying to attack you however, you are very likely to suffer that consequence. The relationship changes because of the possible consequence.


How does utilitarianism somehow evade your lack of moral absolutes?

What do you mean by this?


How is it non-emotive, anyway? "Happiness is good"? Seems pretty emotive to me.


True, but its pragmatic. People want to be happy, so arguing that something will make people happy, or stop suffering, is an argument consistent with what people want.


In some cases, yes... but in some cases, perhaps even many, the utilitarian argument works perfectly fine.

When it comes to the actually difficult cases, though, the story is quite different. Killing children to save others? Most people would say that's wrong, and when pressed they'll say something about how people shouldn't think that way. Nothing about "maximizing utility."


They may say "imagine what society would be like if we treated people in such a way.. I wouldn't want to live in a society like that", which is a broad utilitarian argument. But politics doesn't normally create such difficult ethical dilemmas.


Philosophical theories of "meaning" are also rather complex... but does that mean that people don't understand language?

I'm not sure what you're getting at, when someone says "that's wrong", they obviously know what they mean, I'm just saying they're unlikely to have a complex deontological basis for their moral judgement.

But people don't just 'give laws' to themselves, well not in any existing society at the moment.

First, so what? Do you see me eagerly endorsing the status quo?

Second, the public does concretely have substantial policy influence in representative democracies. Participation need not strictly be direct.

Except the foetus...

No. Not the fetus, either. If an adult depended on use of my body to survive, I would have the right to cut him or her off, too. It doesn't "degrade" anyone to deny to them what they have no right to.

Persons have the right to freedom. It degrades them to deny them their freedom. But it does not degrade them to exercise our own.

Well I was originally not actually talking about the state refraining from interfering in a woman's choice.

Nor am I.

I'm talking about the woman herself choosing to have an abortion, that means she is actively willing to abort the foetus.

She is actively willing to exercise control over her own body, to remove the fetus from it. In the process, the fetus dies. But this need not be an intended result.

Well people never sign a contract saying "I agree to abide by these laws in exchange for such and such...", they are forced to obey these laws and give the state money.

Right, but this is really only a problem for libertarian natural rights theories.

My answer is simpler: the only way anyone has ANY claim to property is by social sanction. If an individual refuses to participate, why should we respect their right to property in the first place?

And the purpose it seeks is almost always a higher quality of living for its citizens.

Do you think it is so simple?

Are we entitled to tolerate a minority living in misery, even if providing for them might be expensive enough to be an overall utilitarian loss? A deontological approach to political morality means that sometimes the answer might be "no": the justification of overall social welfare is not good enough to justify mistreatment of the few. Its fundamental principle is universality ("Could I will this even from their perspective?"), not utility maximization.

Should we sacrifice equality for all for the sake of appeasing the preferences of bigots? Utilitarianism says the answer might sometimes be yes. I say the answer is always no (unless the concern is not for the preferences themselves, but for potential consequences like severe social instability, which strikes me as a more reasonable justification for compromise with principle.)

OK but that doesn't contradict what I say, needlessly means totally without purpose.

Arbitrary or irrational actions would be wrong, yes. (But respect for democracy might still oblige us to refrain from interfering.)

But a legitimate decision can still be immoral, can it not?

Yes, it can. But the standard here is not utility maximization.

Yes, the relationship is dependent on the consequences though, right? If you left the person not trying to attack you to himself, you would not suffer the consequence of injury or death, the person trying to attack you however, you are very likely to suffer that consequence. The relationship changes because of the possible consequence.

No, it doesn't. The relationship changes because, to use an ugly analogy, my attacker has crossed my borders--he has violated my freedom. I have a right to my freedom. I may expel him--but because I am only asserting my freedom rather than denying his (as I must not), I must only do what is necessary to attain that end. I may not take any further revenge.

The consequences have nothing to do with it. If I am in need of a certain medical procedure to survive, and the only person capable of performing it refuses, I may not coerce her into it, even though the consequence of not doing so is my death.

What do you mean by this?

You reject your intuitive alternatives to utilitarianism because you don't believe in absolute morality, but how is utilitarianism any more absolute?

True, but its pragmatic. People want to be happy, so arguing that something will make people happy, or stop suffering, is an argument consistent with what people want.

No, it isn't. People want their own happiness. Utilitarianism demands that we treat everyone's happiness equally. This is a highly unnatural way for people to think. (That is not an objection to the moral theory, just an observation about it.)

They may say "imagine what society would be like if we treated people in such a way.. I wouldn't want to live in a society like that", which is a broad utilitarian argument.

Not in this case, where it typically refers to shame resulting from living in such a society--because such utilitarian treatment is viewed as unjust and degrading.

We might all be better off if we tortured terrorists for information, or punished criminals with extraordinary cruelty for maximum deterrence. If we wouldn't want to live in such a society, we are referencing a moral objection, not a utilitarian preference.

I'm not sure what you're getting at, when someone says "that's wrong", they obviously know what they mean, I'm just saying they're unlikely to have a complex deontological basis for their moral judgement.

My point is that deontological theories are complicated because philosophy in general is... it takes things and analyzes them extensively.

But that doesn't mean that its objects of analysis are themselves extraordinary. Deontological thinking is not beyond the reach of most people just because its most philosophically rigorous forms are.

First, so what? Do you see me eagerly endorsing the status quo?


Well no, but you don't seem to be suggesting that tax is immoral either.


Second, the public does concretely have substantial policy influence in representative democracies. Participation need not strictly be direct.


Its not the same though as a society literally deciding on their own laws.


No. Not the fetus, either. If an adult depended on use of my body to survive, I would have the right to cut him or her off, too. It doesn't "degrade" anyone to deny to them what they have no right to.


It does if the only way to stop them is to cause their death however.


Persons have the right to freedom. It degrades them to deny them their freedom. But it does not degrade them to exercise our own.


Isn't that a bit of a generalisation? Surely it depends on the situation.


She is actively willing to exercise control over her own body, to remove the fetus from it. In the process, the fetus dies. But this need not be an intended result.


Exactly. But my point was, that if it were the intended result, it could never be described as 'good', and would most likely be described as bad. Hence abortion is not good in itself, only when you consider the purpose can it become good.


Right, but this is really only a problem for libertarian natural rights theories.

My answer is simpler: the only way anyone has ANY claim to property is by social sanction. If an individual refuses to participate, why should we respect their right to property in the first place?


Again, there is legitimate and there is moral. The state could bulldoze this man's house down legitimately if he refused to pay taxes, but that doesn't make it moral.


Are we entitled to tolerate a minority living in misery, even if providing for them might be expensive enough to be an overall utilitarian loss? A deontological approach to political morality means that sometimes the answer might be "no": the justification of overall social welfare is not good enough to justify mistreatment of the few. Its fundamental principle is universality ("Could I will this even from their perspective?"), not utility maximization.


Yes but this is going back to very basic forms of utilitarianism. One could easily place more importance on some basic needs like food and shelter over luxury cars, perhaps even infinitely more important, and determine that this minorities need is the greater good.


Arbitrary or irrational actions would be wrong, yes. (But respect for democracy might still oblige us to refrain from interfering.)


Ok, so only when this action is done with a specific good purpose can it be considered good, right?


The consequences have nothing to do with it. If I am in need of a certain medical procedure to survive, and the only person capable of performing it refuses, I may not coerce her into it, even though the consequence of not doing so is my death.


Now THIS is a challenging analogy. Hmm, I'm going to need to think about that one for a while.


You reject your intuitive alternatives to utilitarianism because you don't believe in absolute morality, but how is utilitarianism any more absolute?


I don't reject my intuitions, I just don't use it when I'm arguing a case, "my conscience says it's wrong" is not much of an argument. Nor would I use deontological style thinking because it's too complicated and some pedantic wise ass could easily nit pick or label me as basing my arguments on metaphysical ideas etc... The way I would argue it is show how proceeding with action A would have a much better result than proceeding with action B, or how action B would cause much more suffering than action A.


No, it isn't. People want their own happiness. Utilitarianism demands that we treat everyone's happiness equally.

Not all forms.


Not in this case, where it typically refers to shame resulting from living in such a society--because such utilitarian treatment is viewed as unjust and degrading.


I didn't mean it in that way. I meant that the person might argue that everyone would be miserable at the state of society if it were to be that way, thus it would be better if it wasn't.


We might all be better off if we tortured terrorists for information, or punished criminals with extraordinary cruelty for maximum deterrence. If we wouldn't want to live in such a society, we are referencing a moral objection, not a utilitarian preference.


This is where I bring in overlapping theories, moral objections that are a given for most people could be incorporated into some form of rule utilitarianism style of thinking.


My point is that deontological theories are complicated because philosophy in general is... it takes things and analyzes them extensively.

But that doesn't mean that its objects of analysis are themselves extraordinary. Deontological thinking is not beyond the reach of most people just because its most philosophically rigorous forms are.

But it's very difficult to form a deontological argument to someone who's not used to philosophical terminology and who may not share the same assumptions that underline most non-consequentialist arguments. Which means you may have to end up breaking everything down to its most basic, which would be a long process.