NationStates Jolt Archive

The current edition of FA has a nice article summarising why the "surge strategy" in Iraq has been a long term failure and will lead to increasedf violence there.

For the tl;dr crowd, here's the short version:
Summary: The Bush administration's new strategy in Iraq has helped reduce violence. But the surge is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state and may even have made such an outcome less likely -- by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni tribes and pitting them against the central government. The recent short-term gains have thus come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html

For those too lazy, here are the key exerpts:
More than a year on, a growing conventional wisdom holds that the surge has paid off handsomely. U.S. casualties are down significantly from their peak in mid-2007, the level of violence in Iraq is lower than at any point since 2005, and Baghdad seems the safest it has been since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime five years ago. Some backers of the surge even argue that the Iraqi civil war is over and that victory on Washington's terms is in sight -- so long as the United States has the will to see its current efforts through to their conclusion.

Unfortunately, such claims misconstrue the causes of the recent fall in violence and, more important, ignore a fatal flaw in the strategy. The surge has changed the situation not by itself but only in conjunction with several other developments: the grim successes of ethnic cleansing, the tactical quiescence of the Shiite militias, and a series of deals between U.S. forces and Sunni tribes that constitute a new bottom-up approach to pacifying Iraq. The problem is that this strategy to reduce violence is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state. If anything, it has made such an outcome less likely, by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes and pitting them against the central government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.

Despite the current lull in violence, Washington needs to shift from a unilateral bottom-up surge strategy to a policy that promotes, rather than undermines, Iraq's cohesion. That means establishing an effective multilateral process to spur top-down political reconciliation among the major Iraqi factions. And that, in turn, means stating firmly and clearly that most U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Iraq within two or three years. Otherwise, a strategy adopted for near-term advantage by a frustrated administration will only increase the likelihood of long-term debacle.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html
RECONCILIATION FROM ABOVE

Announcing a withdrawal will entail certain risks. Aware that U.S. forces will finally be departing, Iraqi factions might begin to prepare for a new round of fighting. The Sunnis, aware of their vulnerabilities to attack by militant Shiite
forces without the United States to protect them, might resuscitate their alliance with al Qaeda. The government in Baghdad might be concerned about its own exposure to attack in the absence of a U.S. shield and proceed to forge tighter links with Tehran or encourage greater activism by the Mahdi Army. It is all the more vital, therefore, that the drawdown take place as part of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy designed to limit these risks. The interval between a decision to withdraw and the removal of the bulk of U.S. forces should provide the space in which the UN can convene a multilateral organization to foster a reconciliation process in Iraq.

There is much that can be done to revitalize a top-down approach to reconciliation if it is under UN auspices and led by a credible special envoy. First, the international community should be energized to help Iraq move forward on provincial elections, which would test the popularity of the new Sunni leaders who have emerged during the surge and lash them up to Baghdad. This would have the added benefit of isolating the radical federalists from the majority of Shiites, who would prefer to live in a united Iraq. A UN envoy would have a better chance of brokering a deal on the distribution of provincial and federal powers, the issue that led to the veto of the provincial election law, than would Washington. In a multilateral setting that is not conspicuously stage-managed by the United States, regional states, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, could play a pivotal role in this process. Although Tehran's cooperation is inevitably hostage to its broader relations with Washington, UN sponsorship of this effort might provide the leaders of Iran with the cover they need to act in their own interest. The Saudis, for their part, would like to see the UN involved and are prepared to use their influence and money to impel the parties in Iraq toward reconciliation.

Second, an institutionalized multilateral group of concerned states should mobilize the broader international community to assist with the care, feeding, and permanent housing of the millions of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis who have not been able to get to the United States or Europe. This is essential, since refugee camps and squatter settlements are incubators of radicalism and radiate violence. The longer these populations remain unmoored and cut off from education, employment, and access to adequate social services and health care, the harder it will be to resettle them permanently, whether in Iraq or elsewhere.

Third, before a new and more intense phase of the civil war begins, there should be a multilateral process put in place to prod Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to finance investment projects that provide real employment in Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, should be pressing the Iraqi government to bring far more Sunni Awakening volunteers into the regular Iraqi army and, crucially, into the provincial police forces funded by the central government. The latter step would reinforce the positive effects of the provincial elections and the emergence of politically legitimate local leaders. The current commitment to enlist 20 percent of the Awakening's members is far too small to have an impact.

Finally, the tribes feeding off the surge must be weaned from U.S. assistance and linked firmly to Baghdad as their source of support. Intertwining the tribes with Baghdad in this way, as the Iraq specialist Charles Tripp has noted, would yield something very much like the imperial protectorates in the Middle East of the first half of the twentieth century. The "club of patrons" in the capital would dole out goods to tribes through favored conduits. At this juncture, the U.S. military is performing the role of the patrons -- creating an unhealthy dependency and driving a dangerous wedge between the tribes and the state. Through coordinated action by the UN sponsors of the multilateral process, the government in Baghdad, and U.S. commanders on the ground, payment responsibilities will have to be transferred from the U.S. military to Iraqi government representatives.

There is no guarantee that the old way of giving tribes a taste of the lash followed by a dollop of state largess -- the model that successfully integrated tribes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century -- can be successfully applied to a divided Iraq today. Iraq is heterogeneous, unlike Jordan or Saudi Arabia, where the state and the tribes shared a religious heritage. Furthermore, overestimating Iranian or Saudi influence on Iraqi politics and the willingness of the UN Security Council to plunge into the existing morass is all too easy. In any event, it will be a slow and hazardous undertaking. Many things have to happen more or less simultaneously in a carefully coordinated chain of actions. Washington has to announce that it will begin withdrawing the bulk of its forces. The UN secretary-general, with the backing of the Security Council, must select a special envoy. A contact group of key states must be formed under UN sponsorship. Priorities and milestones will need to be set for the distribution of resources within Iraq, the recruitment of Sunnis to the army, provincial elections, foreign investment, dealing with refugees, and development assistance. Crucially, the phasing of the troop drawdown will have to mesh with this diplomatic process but not hinge on its ultimate success. This course is risky and possibly futile. Yet it is still a better bet than a fashionable, short-term fix divorced from any larger political vision for Iraq and the Middle East.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305-p50/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html

So, I put it to you: was the short term decreasew in violence worth the long term destabilization of Iraq?

Who says its going to be long term?

um...they did.

Who says its going to be long term?

Interesting that there's no vote option of you don't believe that the surge will be a cause of long-term destabilization.

Who says its going to be long term?

In this case the long term would be beyond the time frame of the Surge - ie the cows will come home to roost later this summer...

(Mixed idioms FTW!)

You can tell they're fucked when they have to say they're still "building a viable Iraqi state."

That was what we supposedly already did, you know, with their supposedly sovereign government that we like to ignore.

This isn't a war, this is a game where the US government sets some goal, doesn't meet it, pretends to have met it, and then waits until the people have forgotten it, then sets the same goal with slightly different wording and at slightly more cover-your-ass levels of bullshit.

And who is this they?

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is a nonpartisan foreign policy membership organization founded in 1921 and based at 58 East 68th Street (corner Park Avenue) in New York City, with an additional office in Washington, D.C. Many believe it to be the most powerful private organization to influence United States foreign policy.It publishes the bi-monthly journal Foreign Affairs. It has an extensive website, featuring links to its think tank, The David Rockefeller Studies Program, other programs and projects, publications, history, biographies of notable directors and other board members, corporate members, and press releases.

There...that wasn't that hard.

um...they did.

And who is this they?

God I hate this fucking timewarps.

So, I put it to you: was the short term decreasew in violence worth the long term destabilization of Iraq?

You're assuming the statement in the article is true.

Interesting that there's no vote option of you don't believe that the surge will be a cause of long-term destabilization.

Indeed not. That wasn't a consideration.

You're assuming the statement in the article is true.

Err... Why would I post something I thought was false?

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is a nonpartisan foreign policy membership organization founded in 1921 and based at 58 East 68th Street (corner Park Avenue) in New York City, with an additional office in Washington, D.C. Many believe it to be the most powerful private organization to influence United States foreign policy.It publishes the bi-monthly journal Foreign Affairs. It has an extensive website, featuring links to its think tank, The David Rockefeller Studies Program, other programs and projects, publications, history, biographies of notable directors and other board members, corporate members, and press releases.

There...that wasn't that hard.

And still that means the article is correct how?

Err... Why would I post something I thought was false?

Why would you post something that was an opinion?

So extra US troops were in the country, which cut down violence for about a year, letting the Iraqi army get properly trained instead of thrust into combat to show their ineptitude (although their actions against Al-Sadr's men a couple of months back were pretty piss poor) is going to stop the Iraqi government from functioning in the long run?

Dunno about that.

So extra US troops were in the country, which cut down violence for about a year, letting the Iraqi army get properly trained instead of thrust into combat to show their ineptitude (although their actions against Al-Sadr's men a couple of months back were pretty piss poor) is going to stop the Iraqi government from functioning in the long run?

Dunno about that.
Indeed. Although I don't agree with the governments decision to go in, it has had SOME good effects.

Iraq is a scam to get defense contracts. (as is the failed strategy in Afganistan)

Why would you post something that was an opinion?

Because it's a cogent and well put together analysis of the facts.

So extra US troops were in the country, which cut down violence for about a year, letting the Iraqi army get properly trained instead of thrust into combat to show their ineptitude (although their actions against Al-Sadr's men a couple of months back were pretty piss poor) is going to stop the Iraqi government from functioning in the long run?

Dunno about that.

Did you read the article at all or was this just the blind knee jerk it appears to be?

One plausible consequence of this turmoil would be the emergence of a U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped Iraqi army, increasingly open to former officers of Saddam's military, as a powerful force in Iraqi politics. The professionalism and esprit de corps of the army is already on the rise. Officers who see themselves as having to navigate a maelstrom of unregulated militias, weak and irresponsible government officials, tribes emboldened and then embittered by their U.S. connections, and overbearing but uneven U.S. assertions of control could turn inward, as they did under the British and under Saddam. They might adopt a posture of superiority to politicians, impatience with upstart tribal leaders, and passive-aggressiveness toward their U.S. patrons and then sideline the civilian government and take control of the state. This result might be less disastrous than complete long-term breakdown: to the degree that Iraq needs a mediating military presence to sustain a fragile peace, this role might ultimately be better served by a military with its own corporate identity rather than by U.S. troops. But still, the United States would be confronted by a strong, centralized state ruled by a military junta that would resemble the Baathist regime Washington overthrew in 2003. Rather than an anarchic situation, the United States would face potentially aggressive nationalism and a regime unsympathetic to U.S. regional priorities.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305-p40/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html

Indeed. Although I don't agree with the governments decision to go in, it has had SOME good effects.

Like retribalising Iraq? Or movement towards increased warlordism? Or the myrad other problems the Surge opens up?

The article made a pretty fair argument about tribalism -- that Middle Eastern states which failed to carrot-and-stick their tribes into subordination have turned into lousy near-failed states (Yemen, Pakistan,) whereas Middle Eastern states which have succeeded in bringing the tribes into the fold have succeeded as states (Saudi Arabia, Jordan). "The Surge" is based on empowering the tribes, which is sort of the opposite of subordinating them, therefore it's leading Iraq down the path of Yemen & Pakistan.

I'm not so sure about the article's assertion that encouraging a more unified Sunni front to form, rather than working with the tribes, would have led to a Sunni front that was interested in dealing with the central government rather than trying to take it over or trying to form a separate Sunni state. I'll concede that the author knows a heck of a lot more than I do about Iraq, it just doesn't make sense to me that if you have the Shiite separatists making noise in the South, and the Kurdish separatists making noise in the North, why the Sunnis are going to think reconciliation & integration is a super idea.

I agree with the article that the hard bit is yet to come and that the Iraqi government will need the support of the rest of the world, but I ended up voting "probably," because I don't see that the US could have taken a better course.

Like retribalising Iraq? Or movement towards increased warlordism? Or the myrad other problems the Surge opens up?
Like stopping a genocidal madman, giving Iraq at least the hope of Democracy sometime in the future, and giving them a police force that actually has half a chance of not up and running at the first sight of battle.

One plausible consequence of this turmoil would be the emergence of a U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped Iraqi army, increasingly open to former officers of Saddam's military, as a powerful force in Iraqi politics. The professionalism and esprit de corps of the army is already on the rise. Officers who see themselves as having to navigate a maelstrom of unregulated militias, weak and irresponsible government officials, tribes emboldened and then embittered by their U.S. connections, and overbearing but uneven U.S. assertions of control could turn inward, as they did under the British and under Saddam. They might adopt a posture of superiority to politicians, impatience with upstart tribal leaders, and passive-aggressiveness toward their U.S. patrons and then sideline the civilian government and take control of the state. This result might be less disastrous than complete long-term breakdown: to the degree that Iraq needs a mediating military presence to sustain a fragile peace, this role might ultimately be better served by a military with its own corporate identity rather than by U.S. troops. But still, the United States would be confronted by a strong, centralized state ruled by a military junta that would resemble the Baathist regime Washington overthrew in 2003. Rather than an anarchic situation, the United States would face potentially aggressive nationalism and a regime unsympathetic to U.S. regional priorities.
Uhu, this is actually a Good Thing. I don't care if they like the US or UK after all of this, and indeed know that they won't for a long, long time, so why is them running the country under a junta but keeping down terrorist activity necessarily bad?

Iraq is a scam to get defense contracts. (as is the failed strategy in Afganistan)

That's just a LOLy as when you posted it the other day. (Quick advice: apply Sir Ingham's version of Hanlon's Razor to situations like this: "Cock-up before conspiracy".)

The article made a pretty fair argument about tribalism -- that Middle Eastern states which failed to carrot-and-stick their tribes into subordination have turned into lousy near-failed states (Yemen, Pakistan,) whereas Middle Eastern states which have succeeded in bringing the tribes into the fold have succeeded as states (Saudi Arabia, Jordan). "The Surge" is based on empowering the tribes, which is sort of the opposite of subordinating them, therefore it's leading Iraq down the path of Yemen & Pakistan.

I'm not so sure about the article's assertion that encouraging a more unified Sunni front to form, rather than working with the tribes, would have led to a Sunni front that was interested in dealing with the central government rather than trying to take it over or trying to form a separate Sunni state. I'll concede that the author knows a heck of a lot more than I do about Iraq, it just doesn't make sense to me that if you have the Shiite separatists making noise in the South, and the Kurdish separatists making noise in the North, why the Sunnis are going to think reconciliation & integration is a super idea.

I agree with the article that the hard bit is yet to come and that the Iraqi government will need the support of the rest of the world, but I ended up voting "probably," because I don't see that the US could have taken a better course.

:eek: Somebody here on NSG actually read a long article before responding to it knee jerk fashion!

My good sir, run far and fast from this place... ;)

Even better, you actually make good points.

Uhu, this is actually a Good Thing. I don't care if they like the US or UK after all of this, and indeed know that they won't for a long, long time, so why is them running the country under a junta but keeping down terrorist activity necessarily bad?

So you'd be happy to see another agressive nationalistic anti-US state in the region?

So you'd be happy to see another agressive nationalistic anti-US state in the region?
It's better than what we have now, which is a genuinely failed state.

That's just a LOLy as when you posted it the other day. (Quick advice: apply Sir Ingham's version of Hanlon's Razor to situations like this: "Cock-up before conspiracy".)

It's really quite simple. Claim WMDs as a reason, Never send enough troops or the right equipment to get the job done and profits soar!

Bush keeps writing Isreal blank checks to make sure Iran gets involved so the whole theater of operation is Afghanistan all the way through to Iraq to keep the money rolling in for decades.

NO victory is in sight in Iraq. Afghanistan STILL supplies 91% of the world's opium and the Taliban have made a comeback.

*fixes Daistallia a strong cup of coffee*

Can we wait and see if violence does in fact pick back up???
No, that would defeat the point of making outlandish statements with no supporting evidence. Obviously both sides do it, so feh.

Can we wait and see if violence does in fact pick back up???

Can we wait and see if violence does in fact pick back up???

Sure, you and I can. But then we're not conquered Iraqi citizens who'll die in said violence and can afford that luxury.

It's better than what we have now, which is a genuinely failed state.

Seriously? You really want the Iran option rather than the Somalia option?

It's really quite simple. Claim WMDs as a reason, Never send enough troops or the right equipment to get the job done and profits soar!

Bush keeps writing Isreal blank checks to make sure Iran gets involved so the whole theater of operation is Afganistan all the way through to Iraq to keep the money rolling in for decades.

NO victory is in sight in Iraq. Afganistan STILL supplies 91% of the world's opium and the Taliban have made a comeback.

*fixes Daistallia a strong cup of coffee*

All that assumes conspiracy before cock-up rather than the opposite.

:::Fixes Dragontide a cuppa Reali-tea:::

Seriously? You really want the Iran option rather than the Somalia option?
Absolutely. Why not? I'd rather have a functioning, if brutal state than the painful joke that is Somalia.

Clearly we need to keep sending soldiers to Iraq until a stable democratic government spontaneously appears from the rubble.

All that assumes conspiracy before cock-up rather than the opposite.

:::Fixes Dragontide a cuppa Reali-tea:::

The national debt is sure cocking up!
Link (http://zfacts.com/p/461.html)

And still that means the article is correct how?

It doesn't mean it's true. If you think it is not true then please expound. My biggest indication is that Al Sadr is gearing up his 60,000 strong militia to fight against Allied troops. Not only is he gathering his militia, but he's recruting other organizations to join them. This does not bode well for the "surge" or anything else.

It doesn't mean it's true. If you think it is not true then please expound. My biggest indication is that Al Sadr is gearing up his 60,000 strong militia to fight against Allied troops. Not only is he gathering his militia, but he's recruting other organizations to join them. This does not bode well for the "surge" or anything else.

But at the sametime, if he attacks us, he must know that he will not prevail. Not only will the Allies attack him, the Iraqi Army themselves will also be in the fray.

But at the sametime, if he attacks us, he must know that he will not prevail. Not only will the Allies attack him, the Iraqi Army themselves will also be in the fray.He's not really using them to attack, merely to prevent himself from being removed from power, and to make sure those damn women don't wear make-up or revealing clothes and live to tell the tale.

Even better, you actually make good points.

Thank you! I assure you that if good points were made, it was quite by accident.

So you'd be happy to see another agressive nationalistic anti-US state in the region?
It's better than what we have now, which is a genuinely failed state.

The article posits that a failed state and a junta-controlled state are both possible outcomes. Something to consider is that a repressive military Anti-US state might not simply be bad for the US, it might also be really bad for non-government-aligned groups, like (probably) the Kurds.

Of course, juntas come in all flavors, and we might end up not with simply a Somalia, or an Iran, but an intoxicating combination of the two, unable to either protect its citizens (outside of a central area) or respect their freedoms. (I call this flavor "Myanmar".)

God help the Iraqi army and police force.

Like stopping a genocidal madman, giving Iraq at least the hope of Democracy sometime in the future, and giving them a police force that actually has half a chance of not up and running at the first sight of battle.

Saddam was contained within his region and unable to project power on that scale. Being that he could not even do that, how do you think he was going to do this to the US. Please don't give me the "he could possibly give bleh bleh that he didn't even have to Al Quaeda, that it has been proven he had no link to. If we want to stop genocidal madmen who are not allowing democracy to flourish then the list is long. Some of those dictators were people we did not rebuke, but people we actually were complicit with in their reign of terror.

But at the sametime, if he attacks us, he must know that he will not prevail. Not only will the Allies attack him, the Iraqi Army themselves will also be in the fray.

Right, but just think about this for a minute. 60,000+ insurgents fighting a battle on their own turf. They will also be fighting a non-conventional war with popular support in the area as the people of the militia's tribe give them aid and comfort. Now being in the military you may not know the rule of thumb for fighting a homegrown insurgency. We need numbers 10-1 to hope to be successful. This means we'll have to infuse 600,000 troops. We are simply unable and unwilling to do so.

Saddam was contained within his region and unable to project power on that scale. Being that he could not even do that, how do you think he was going to do this to the US. Please don't give me the "he could possibly give bleh bleh that he didn't even have to Al Quaeda, that it has been proven he had no link to. If we want to stop genocidal madmen who are not allowing democracy to flourish then the list is long. Some of those dictators were people we did not rebuke, but people we actually were complicit with in their reign of terror.
I never said it was the right thing to do, I'm just saying that there was a good side effect or two. Sheesh, did you do anymore then see "Stopping genocidal madmen" before clicking quote?

The article posits that a failed state and a junta-controlled state are both possible outcomes. Something to consider is that a repressive military Anti-US state might not simply be bad for the US, it might also be really bad for non-government-aligned groups, like (probably) the Kurds.
Don't really see how a repressive anti-US state is genuinely bad for the US, seeing as any anti-US sentiment is going to be hollow rhetoric, because they need to sell their oil and all that.
Of course, juntas come in all flavors, and we might end up not with simply a Somalia, or an Iran
Somalia isn't ruled by anyone, there's yer problem, and calling Iran a junta is dubious at best. Myanmar or North Korea are juntas. Not Iran.

the cows will come home to roost later this summer...

(Mixed idioms FTW!)
When the cows come home to roost, the shit will hit the fan like a ton of bricks!

All that assumes conspiracy before cock-up rather than the opposite.

:::Fixes Dragontide a cuppa Reali-tea:::

And that completely dismisses politics, much less nepotism from the equation. You're assuming that cockups can't be deliberately engineered to keep one's business viable. It's the Light Bulb Principle in action.

You're assuming that cockups can't be deliberately engineered...
The definition of "cockup" here is something done by sheer stupidity, and excludes anything deliberate.

Somalia isn't ruled by anyone, there's yer problem, and calling Iran a junta is dubious at best. Myanmar or North Korea are juntas. Not Iran.

You're right -- I was using Somalia as an example of a failed state, and Iran isn't a junta, I should have said something more like "authoritarian nincompoops," or some other less elegant or more general term. I still think a Myanmar-like combination of repression and incompetence is possible.

The definition of "cockup" here is something done by sheer stupidity, and excludes anything deliberate.

"Willful neglect" is the term that comes to mind.

There is a certain percentage of people who have gambled their political credibility on the US losing the protracted conflict in Iraq. These people/groups will not ever allow anything like good news to pass from that conflict without a doom-and-gloom scenario being attached.

Seeing as the items offered up as "evidence" in this article are socopolitical effects far beyond anyone's ability to predict in the short term, let alone the long, I would simply call the wholoe thing Bullshit and move on.

There is a certain percentage of people who have gambled their political credibility on the US losing the protracted conflict in Iraq. These people/groups will not ever allow anything like good news to pass from that conflict without a doom-and-gloom scenario being attached.

Seeing as the items offered up as "evidence" in this article are socopolitical effects far beyond anyone's ability to predict in the short term, let alone the long, I would simply call the wholoe thing Bullshit and move on.

Agreed

You're right -- I was using Somalia as an example of a failed state, and Iran isn't a junta, I should have said something more like "authoritarian nincompoops," or some other less elegant or more general term.
Quite.
I still think a Myanmar-like combination of repression and incompetence is possible.
Yeah, probably. Would it be better than the current situation, though? Not Iraqi so I couldn't rightly say, but would a functioning, if authoritarian, state be better than the joke that is that Maliki government? Probably.

There is a certain percentage of people who have gambled their political credibility on the US losing the protracted conflict in Iraq. These people/groups will not ever allow anything like good news to pass from that conflict without a doom-and-gloom scenario being attached.

There is a certain percentage of people who have gambled their political credibility on the US winning the protracted conflict in Iraq. These people/groups will not ever allow anything like bad news to pass from that conflict without a smile-and-denial scenario being attached.

Of course there's also a certain percentage of people who have gambled their political credibility on Iraq being a real threat to the US, on it having "WMD"s, and of up to a million Iraqi dead being "mission accomplished." Those folks don't currently have their credibility anymore, except to cretins who think (that is to say, who have stalwart faith) just like them anyway.

Seeing as the items offered up as "evidence" in this article are socopolitical effects far beyond anyone's ability to predict in the short term, let alone the long, I would simply call the wholoe thing Bullshit and move on.

Perhaps. Me, I don't need a 'lose' scenario in order to call Iraq a bloody criminal disaster. There was nothing to 'win' in the first place.

Perhaps. Me, I don't need a 'lose' scenario in order to call Iraq a bloody criminal disaster. There was nothing to 'win' in the first place.

No question; it was a war without need. I simply dislike people who throw stones for the sake of throwing stones.