NationStates Jolt Archive

Inspired by the scepticism/relativism thread, I had a thought and I wish to see how the good folk of NS would discredit it mercilessly :p

"There is no objective truth".

This proposition is held as necessarily contradictory, and it is sometimes invoked as an argument against nihilism. But it has occurred to me that there may in fact be no contradiction because the proposition may be true in a different manner than the "truth" invoked in it. I mean:

It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth.

Or something of the sort. I might have confused the two, but the basic idea is the the proposition is true in a different sense than the term "truth" invoked in it, thus no contradiction occurs.

Thoughts?

So it isn't out there? :(

It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth.
So what you're saying is that it might be the case you can't have true knowledge, even if there are certain things that you know that are true?

I'd accept that, if not for the fact that there are some ontological truths that have equivilents in epistemological truth by virtue of immediate perception. But it's certainly a much more insightful assertion than "there is no truth".

"There is no truth" and "It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth" is a very different claim. Before we get anywhere, what is your exact definition of truth?!

"What is real? How do you define real? If you're talking about what you can hear, what you can smell, taste and feel then real is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain."

There's no objective evidence that all of reality isn't a delusion of my brain. This could all be a persistently annoying dream for all I know.

"What is real? How do you define real? If you're talking about what you can hear, what you can smell, taste and feel then real is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain."
I love it when people crack that one, largely because I really disagree with it. Neo's immediate sensations, whether caused by machine or by his free agency, were real in both cases - regardless of whether or not they are to be trusted, my senses communicate information to some perceiving context, and this is an objective fact.

It was the idea that what caused these sensations was nature - that they were a consequence of a particular understanding of reality - that was the fabrication of the participants in the Matrix. Morpheus's statement is no different. His "reality" is purely inferential, whether in the Matrix or out.

If you reduce everything down, then there's no way to prove anything, and ofcourse, there's no universal truth.

Being pretty sure there's universal truth is close enough for practicality's sake.

I love it when people crack that one, largely because I really disagree with it. Neo's immediate sensations, whether caused by machine or by his free agency, were real in both cases - regardless of whether or not they are to be trusted, my senses communicate information to some perceiving context, and this is an objective fact.

It was the idea that what caused these sensations was nature - that they were a consequence of a particular understanding of reality - that was the fabrication of the participants in the Matrix. Morpheus's statement is no different. His "reality" is purely inferential, whether in the Matrix or out.

Well once again sensation is all in the brain. If you notice a feeling then you're feeling it. Otherwise you don't. We don't notice the weight of our bodies, or the feel of our clothing because our minds ignore it. The sensation only exists if we think it does.

Nothing can be really objective, because there's always another option, however mind-boggling. Hell, even an omniscient and omnipotent deity can't be sure: "I know everything and can do everything... I think..." - and yet, one cannot exclude the possibility of an ever higher being, just sitting there, doing nothing, and another, and another and whatever.

And as soon as you start saying "But he's omniscient as per definition and thereby really knows it all", you're making multiple assumptions (that true omniscience exists, that logic is valid, that you are in a position to make that judgement, that you even fucking exist etc. and yes, Descartes, I'm talking to you), and such axiomatic assumptions aren't really objective, even when they appear to make sense, because there's, as already said, the possibility of another option and so we've come full circle and I'll stop now because I am tired. The possibility of a possibility is enough to invalidate the whole thing called "objectivity" as far as something called "truth" is concerned, because, like, you can't know, man.

All that remains is the concept on ultimate uncertainty (This beast can even attempt to devour itself, yay) and what you make of it.

Addressing the Matrix Argument: And how do you know we are not a logic-defying random bloop of nothingness? You don't. You assume we aren't. And that, my friend, is the crux of the matter.

No more fancy words.

Well once again sensation is all in the brain...
But that's an assertion based on a model, not based on immediate observable fact. Maybe if we don't notice something, it's not there to notice, rather than it being there and us not properly processing it. You can't say that for sure. On the other hand, you can with certainty state that although you might not know whether you actually saw a particular thing, you can say that you have a memory that registers some sort of visual data flicker. The understanding of what is "real" that focuses on the physiological structure of the observer ignores the truth inherent within observation itself.

But that's an assertion based on a model, not based on immediate observable fact. Maybe if we don't notice something, it's not there to notice, rather than it being there and us not properly processing it. You can't say that for sure. On the other hand, you can with certainty state that although you might not know whether you actually saw a particular thing, you can say that you have a memory that registers some sort of visual data flicker. The understanding of what is "real" that focuses on the physiological structure of the observer ignores the truth inherent within observation itself.

The simple fact with observation is that it's impossible to tell what you really observed and what is illusion created by your mind and your memory. As I said before there's no real testability when the whole of reality could be my delusions.

Thoughts?

Things go better with Coke.

Inspired by the scepticism/relativism thread, I had a thought and I wish to see how the good folk of NS would discredit it mercilessly :p

"There is no objective truth".

This proposition is held as necessarily contradictory, and it is sometimes invoked as an argument against nihilism. But it has occurred to me that there may in fact be no contradiction because the proposition may be true in a different manner than the "truth" invoked in it. I mean:

It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth.

Or something of the sort. I might have confused the two, but the basic idea is the the proposition is true in a different sense than the term "truth" invoked in it, thus no contradiction occurs.

Thoughts?

Let me see if I got this right. What you're basically proposing is that truth IS a subjective thing? Truth IS truth according to personal experience? That Truth is, like reality, relative? (as per your reference to ontology) Or, that there is no way to truly know truth (epistemology wise) because, as you've put it, truth can be subjective to every human?

How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!

Or, more plainly: what does it matter ?

The simple fact with observation is that it's impossible to tell what you really observed and what is illusion created by your mind and your memory. As I said before there's no real testability when the whole of reality could be my delusions.
But illusions are still observed, even if the nature of that observation may be different to that of sensory exposure according to the typical existential world model. I don't need to distinguish between illusion and reality in determining that there are true things, which hold independently of what physiological model we choose. That's why you can't use "electrical signals" as the basis of reality.

"There is no truth" and "It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth" is a very different claim. Before we get anywhere, what is your exact definition of truth?!

Truth is a possible value of a proposition, whereby what is says is the case in reality. There is also the point of tautologies, which are necessarily true, and thus we come to my point.

"There is no truth" may or may not be a tautology (i.e. necessarily true), when "truth" refers to the ability of propositions to reflect reality.

"There is no truth" reflects on propositions, thus it may be true, even if what those propositions reflect of reality is not the case in reality (i.e. they are false).

I am saying that there is no inconsistency because "There is no truth" reflects on semantics, and thus it may be true in the case of semantics, while the term "truth" in it refers to reality.

They are different statements, in that what I propose is less vague than the original.

I love it when people crack that one, largely because I really disagree with it. Neo's immediate sensations, whether caused by machine or by his free agency, were real in both cases - regardless of whether or not they are to be trusted, my senses communicate information to some perceiving context, and this is an objective fact.

It was the idea that what caused these sensations was nature - that they were a consequence of a particular understanding of reality - that was the fabrication of the participants in the Matrix. Morpheus's statement is no different. His "reality" is purely inferential, whether in the Matrix or out.

It is theoretical objective fact that he has a subjective experience. But there is no way for anyone else to objectively know he has had said experience. Furthermore, even if he objectively had the experience, it is disputable if said experience reflects objectively on reality. The point of the film is that it doesn't. All his experiences are true subjectively, but not all are of objective reality. The bottom line is you simply don't know how true subjective experience relates to objective reality.

Let me see if I got this right. What you're basically proposing is that truth IS a subjective thing? Truth IS truth according to personal experience? That Truth is, like reality, relative? (as per your reference to ontology) Or, that there is no way to truly know truth (epistemology wise) because, as you've put it, truth can be subjective to every human?

Uhm let me see if I can clarify a bit:

"Truth" is a value of propositions: of what can be said.

Truth is easily discernible in subjective experiences. What you experience is the case that you experience and is true.

Truth is not so easily, if at all discernible when propositions deal with objective reality, because we are only acquainted with it through the medium subjective experience, and we have no idea how this experience relates to actual reality.

This leads to some to claim that "There is no truth". And this statement is not self-contradictory because it can be the case that in reality, propositions never say anything truthful about reality. "There is no truth" as an expression can have the function of truth when applied to propositions (I'm not sure if ontological is the word I'm looking for here, thus why I posted this thread), when the term "truth" in it applies to reality (epistemologically).

It is theoretical objective fact that he has a subjective experience. But there is no way for anyone else to objectively know he has had said experience. Furthermore, even if he objectively had the experience, it is disputable if said experience reflects objectively on reality. The point of the film is that it doesn't. All his experiences are true subjectively, but not all are of objective reality. The bottom line is you simply don't know how true subjective experience relates to objective reality.
Obviously said experiences do not "reflect" objectivity. There's no reason to assume that the common sense interpretation of what I see is the right one (though it might be functionally convenient).

But, right now, sensation is going on. Regardless of the identity of the subjective observer, that observation is happening cannot be refuted. In whatever context in which it's happening, something, somewhere, "senses" what "I" appear to be "sensing" right "now" (quotations for lack of ability to better phrase). You might not be able to verify that that is true for me, but you can that it is true for you, and that's what makes it truly objective - the fact that it's purely subjective.

Obviously said experiences do not "reflect" objectivity. There's no reason to assume that the common sense interpretation of what I see is the right one (though it might be functionally convenient).

But, right now, sensation is going on. Regardless of the identity of the subjective observer, that observation is happening cannot be refuted. In whatever context in which it's happening, something, somewhere, "senses" what "I" appear to be "sensing" right "now" (quotations for lack of ability to better phrase). You might not be able to verify that that is true for me, but you can that it is true for you, and that's what makes it truly objective - the fact that it's purely subjective.

I agree with this entirely. The only point I have is that the only knowable objective truth, to my mind is that "I observe". The "I" is undefined, what "I" observe says nothing about the subject of observation. Furthermore, "observe" is a subjective experience, and is unknowable to anyone else, as anything else's observation is unknowable to me.

Truth is a possible value of a proposition, whereby what is says is the case in reality. There is also the point of tautologies, which are necessarily true, and thus we come to my point.

"There is no truth" may or may not be a tautology (i.e. necessarily true), when "truth" refers to the ability of propositions to reflect reality.

"There is no truth" reflects on propositions, thus it may be true, even if what those propositions reflect of reality is not the case in reality (i.e. they are false).

I am saying that there is no inconsistency because "There is no truth" reflects on semantics, and thus it may be true in the case of semantics, while the term "truth" in it refers to reality.

They are different statements, in that what I propose is less vague than the original.

You are talking complete crap. Try at least to make a plain statement which does not involve switching terms half-way through.

Firstly, give a definition of "truth of a proposition" which does not involve "reality." Then you'll be half-way there.

You are talking complete crap. Try at least to make a plain statement which does not involve switching terms half-way through.

Firstly, give a definition of "truth of a proposition" which does not involve "reality." Then you'll be half-way there.

I'm sorry, you lost me:confused:

Truth is a possible value of a proposition, whereby what is says is the case in reality. There is also the point of tautologies, which are necessarily true, and thus we come to my point.

"There is no truth" may or may not be a tautology (i.e. necessarily true), when "truth" refers to the ability of propositions to reflect reality.

"There is no truth" reflects on propositions, thus it may be true, even if what those propositions reflect of reality is not the case in reality (i.e. they are false).

I am saying that there is no inconsistency because "There is no truth" reflects on semantics, and thus it may be true in the case of semantics, while the term "truth" in it refers to reality.

They are different statements, in that what I propose is less vague than the original.

Right so it seems to me that you are basically talking about analytic truths (1+1 = 2, all widows are women etc...) and synthetic truths (the sky is blue, the ball is round etc...). Thus it would be easier for you to just say there are no synthetic truths, only analytic or tautological truths. Am I right or way off with that?

Firstly, give a definition of "truth of a proposition" which does not involve "reality."

and for your next trick, define 'red' in a way that involves neither perception nor the electromagnetic spectrum.

"There is no objective truth".


True. *nod*

There may be no objective truth, but we have to postulate that it exists or we have nothing on which to build. It may be a construct, but it works and is useful.

Right so it seems to me that you are basically talking about analytic truths (1+1 = 2, all widows are women etc...) and synthetic truths (the sky is blue, the ball is round etc...). Thus it would be easier for you to just say there are no synthetic truths, only analytic or tautological truths. Am I right or way off with that?

Almost right. Analytic truths are true because they are subjective, while synthetic truths are most likely unknowable. And of course "There is no truth" may be true analytically where the term "truth" refers to synthetic truth. Sort of. I'm still not entirely sure they are the most appropriate terms to use, but they do satisfy the purpose.

Truth is a possible value of a proposition, whereby what is says is the case in reality.

1 + 1 = 2 ... right ?

Is this the case in reality ?

First, define what "1" is in reality. One orange is one orange, and without the orange it is not. One person is one person, and without the person it is not.

Even such a simple concept as "1" has no objective existence. Yet we can use it to make the proposition.

Almost right. Analytic truths are true because they are subjective, while synthetic truths are most likely unknowable. And of course "There is no truth" may be true analytically where the term "truth" refers to synthetic truth. Sort of. I'm still not entirely sure they are the most appropriate terms to use, but they do satisfy the purpose.

How about a priori and a posteriori truths?

There may be no objective truth, but we have to postulate that it exists or we have nothing on which to build. It may be a construct, but it works and is useful.

I was never a fan of pragmatic arguments, but for the sake of convenience I do indeed assume reality, and objective truth.

In a sort of twist of Pascal's wager, we don't know either way, but while we're here we might as well presume objective truth, if only not to get bored out of existence. If nothing is true and everything is pointless then we lose nothing by playing the game for a while.

1 + 1 = 2 ... right ?

Is this the case in reality ?

First, define what "1" is in reality. One orange is one orange, and without the orange it is not. One person is one person, and without the person it is not.

Even such a simple concept as "1" has no objective existence. Yet we can use it to make the proposition.

Hydesland just covered that with the dichotomy of analytic/synthetic truths.

How about a priori and a posteriori truths?

What about them? A prioris are implied from the axioms we choose, thus are analytic except if our axioms are a posteriori, in which case all we know is a posteriori: synthetic, and thus possibly subject to "there is no truth".

and for your next trick, define 'red' in a way that involves neither perception nor the electromagnetic spectrum.

I'll try. Red is whatever you just asked me to define.

I have faith that what you mean by red and what I mean by red are the same thing. Without that faith (trying to give a definition when you have a will to not accept it) we are just where the OP started -- a negative position which excludes truth as faith.

Interestingly "there is truth" IS a tautology. "There is no truth" may be the complementary opposite statement and therefore catagorically untrue ... but I suspect there is some other reason which makes inverting "there is truth" unsound. Can't quite put my finger on it.

Hydesland just covered that with the dichotomy of analytic/synthetic truths.

Thanks to Hydes then. I was busy elsewhere.

Uhm let me see if I can clarify a bit:

"Truth" is a value of propositions: of what can be said.

Truth is easily discernible in subjective experiences. What you experience is the case that you experience and is true.

Got you there.

Truth is not so easily, if at all discernible when propositions deal with objective reality, because we are only acquainted with it through the medium subjective experience, and we have no idea how this experience relates to actual reality.

Relativity applies there too, it seems. What we percieve to be the truth it is so because we experience it and it's true to us.

This leads to some to claim that "There is no truth". And this statement is not self-contradictory because it can be the case that in reality, propositions never say anything truthful about reality. "There is no truth" as an expression can have the function of truth when applied to propositions (I'm not sure if ontological is the word I'm looking for here, thus why I posted this thread), when the term "truth" in it applies to reality (epistemologically).

Yes, I though that's what you meant.

I'll try. Red is whatever you just asked me to define.

I have faith that what you mean by red and what I mean by red are the same thing. Without that faith (trying to give a definition when you have a will to not accept it) we are just where the OP started -- a negative position which excludes truth as faith.

Interestingly "there is truth" IS a tautology. "There is no truth" may be the complementary opposite statement and therefore catagorically untrue ... but I suspect there is some other reason which makes inverting "there is truth" unsound. Can't quite put my finger on it.

You are equivocating darling.

"There is truth" in your meaning and "there is no truth" in mine are not opposites, because in the latter, I have already underlined that the term "truth" is used with a different meaning and applying to a different logical set.

Furthermore "There is truth" is not a tautology. It is merely consistent.

I'll try. Red is whatever you just asked me to define.
I'd never have thought of that escape. Good going!

What the hell?

I tried to answer Free Soviets' question (which I believe to be unanswerable) and Ad Nihilo comes back at me as though I was still answering him.

Are there teams here or something?

Red is whatever you just asked me to define.

that ain't a definition. that's barely even a gesture.

But illusions are still observed, even if the nature of that observation may be different to that of sensory exposure according to the typical existential world model. I don't need to distinguish between illusion and reality in determining that there are true things, which hold independently of what physiological model we choose. That's why you can't use "electrical signals" as the basis of reality.

And Immanuel Kant throws his hat in the ring!

Here's the thing: "It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth" is very weak in that it doesn't really SAY anything. "Mays" and "coulds" are speculative in the most literal sense, and I don't really see what they can tell us.

How about this: "provided that we cannot know anything other than our own experiences, 'objective' truths, if they exist at all, can never be known to us."

Note that "objective" here refers to a sort of truth that lay outside one's experience (think "if a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?" -- according to the argument provided above, the answer is neither "yes" nor "no," but rather "there is no way one can know").

What about them? A prioris are implied from the axioms we choose, thus are analytic except if our axioms are a posteriori, in which case all we know is a posteriori: synthetic, and thus possibly subject to "there is no truth".

My point was that, at least from your premise, a priori statements (as in a priori reasoning not from a posteriori axioms which is what the word normally is used for) can be true but not a posteriori statements.

You are equivocating darling.

"There is truth" in your meaning and "there is no truth" in mine are not opposites, because in the latter, I have already underlined that the term "truth" is used with a different meaning and applying to a different logical set.

"Underlined" is a polite way of saying that you started using the term before you had defined it (and it IS a priori, can't be defined) and then tried to redefine it ... and to what purpose?

What is this whole thread but an intellectual wank?

I mean, are you going to somehow draw conclusions about how people should construct their view of "reality" or how people can reach agreement on matters of the world they share, from what may be different methods of determining truth?

Furthermore "There is truth" is not a tautology. It is merely consistent.

Tautology is the word you used. I wouldn't have chosen it.

"Merely consistent" ...? Surely you can say more about it than that. Like, for instance, that it has no explanatory power beyond itself. There would be a better word for that than "merely consistent" ... perhaps Hydesland can assist.

that ain't a definition. that's barely even a gesture.

If it looks like a gesture to you, I will leave to your imagination what gesture it was. :p

You ask me to define red, arbitrarily excluding the two most obvious ways of defining it. Not that I would have used the "wavelength" definition anyway, it depends on many other assumptions (have you ever seen a wavelength?)

Then you make fun of me for trying.

This kind of hostile approach to definition leads exactly nowhere.

But I will try one more time.

"Red" is the colour of blood, among other things. If you will not accept that blood is red, then I will stop using the word and in fact make no attempt to describe the colour of blood to you. Red does not exist without the word for it, a perception of colour may exist (though you forbid me to speak of it) but without the differentiation of language, all colours are varieties of the same thing. Certainly animals can distinguish colours from each other, and the higher animals can use a word or a sign for classes of colour (red, blue etc) but the fact that we must teach them to do that shows that the distinctions between colours are artifacts of our language.

I cannot define red without using words. Nor could I define "one" or define "truth" without a word for it. Red is a word for something, and we must take on faith that there is some connection between the word and the thing.

Getting oddly close to the first post there.

If it looks like a gesture to you, I will leave to your imagination what gesture it was. :p

You ask me to define red, arbitrarily excluding the two most obvious ways of defining it. Not that I would have used the "wavelength" definition anyway, it depends on many other assumptions (have you ever seen a wavelength?)

Then you make fun of me for trying.

This kind of hostile approach to definition leads exactly nowhere.

not intended to be either hostile or making fun. the problem is that it is absurd to try to define red without recourse to some more basic notions that are key to explaining what it is - just as it is absurd to try to define truth without some sort of link to the concept of reality.

Are you the reincarnation of Rene Descartes?

not intended to be either hostile or making fun. the problem is that it is absurd to try to define red without recourse to some more basic notions that are key to explaining what it is - just as it is absurd to try to define truth without some sort of link to the concept of reality.

Au contraire! The names of the colours are among the first words one learns of any language, and for good reason. You can point and say.

:)

What the hell?

I tried to answer Free Soviets' question (which I believe to be unanswerable) and Ad Nihilo comes back at me as though I was still answering him.

Are there teams here or something?

My apologies. Do quote when you post, so we can avoid this;)

And Immanuel Kant throws his hat in the ring!

Here's the thing: "It may be ontologically true that there is no epistemological truth" is very weak in that it doesn't really SAY anything. "Mays" and "coulds" are speculative in the most literal sense, and I don't really see what they can tell us.

How about this: "provided that we cannot know anything other than our own experiences, 'objective' truths, if they exist at all, can never be known to us."

Note that "objective" here refers to a sort of truth that lay outside one's experience (think "if a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?" -- according to the argument provided above, the answer is neither "yes" nor "no," but rather "there is no way one can know").

I agree with you, but that goes beyond the scope of the thread. This thread is only about how that phrase isn't inconsistent.

My point was that, at least from your premise, a priori statements (as in a priori reasoning not from a posteriori axioms which is what the word normally is used for) can be true but not a posteriori statements.

Well not entirely. I didn't say "There is no truth" is true, and even though I believe it is, that is not the purpose of the thread. The purpose of the thread is to discuss whether "There is no truth" is necessarily inconsistent. So far it seems people seem to agree with me that it isn't. The secondary purpose of the thread is to express this as clearly as possible, and so far the dichotomy of analytical/synthetic truths seems to be the most appropriate.

I mean, are you going to somehow draw conclusions about how people should construct their view of "reality" or how people can reach agreement on matters of the world they share, from what may be different methods of determining truth?

I'm not trying to write a book here. All I seek is to see if this argument against nihilism (i.e. "There is no truth" is contradictory) holds any water.

Tautology is the word you used. I wouldn't have chosen it.

"Merely consistent" ...? Surely you can say more about it than that. Like, for instance, that it has no explanatory power beyond itself. There would be a better word for that than "merely consistent" ... perhaps Hydesland can assist.

In a different context darling. "There is truth" can either be true or false. In it's form there is absolutely nothing that eliminates the possibility that it is false (unlike "all wives are women" which is a tautology, because it is necessarily true). "There is truth" is self consistent if it is true, but it is not an analytical statement, and certainly not tautological.

Well not entirely. I didn't say "There is no truth" is true, and even though I believe it is, that is not the purpose of the thread. The purpose of the thread is to discuss whether "There is no truth" is necessarily inconsistent. So far it seems people seem to agree with me that it isn't. The secondary purpose of the thread is to express this as clearly as possible, and so far the dichotomy of analytical/synthetic truths seems to be the most appropriate.


Cool, glad I can be of assistance then. :cool:

In a different context darling. "There is truth" can either be true or false. In it's form there is absolutely nothing that eliminates the possibility that it is false (unlike "all wives are women" which is a tautology, because it is necessarily true). "There is truth" is self consistent if it is true, but it is not an analytical statement, and certainly not tautological.

You're trying to defeat one expression of "the nihilist argument" by showing it to be a contradiction, so pedantically that you wave aside the "There is truth" statement as having no bearing on the truth of "There is no truth."

Then you wave vaguely in the direction of "reality." I really don't think your thinking is focussed on any end, detailed though it may be.

"I'm just attacking the nihilist position" is a bit like "I'm not a member of the Klan, but at that rally the other night ..."

Because it pertains, and some people have them turned off, here's the second line of my sig:

Language is a filter which distorts our perceptions. In order to truly experience reality, one must transcend language.

You're trying to defeat one expression of "the nihilist argument" by showing it to be a contradiction, so pedantically that you wave aside the "There is truth" statement as having no bearing on the truth of "There is no truth."

You seem confused. I am a nihilist, but that has no bearing here. The thread is about that phrase, and I'm trying to crystallize an argument as to why that phrase isn't contradictory.

"There is truth" may or may not be true, but is consistent, regardless of whether the term "truth" refers to analytical or synthetic statements. "There is no truth" is only consistent as a analytical statement about synthetic "truths", and in that case it may or may not be true.

Thus "there is truth" as an expression f(x) is not equivalent with "there is no truth" as an expression f(-x), but is rather represented as f(-y), because "truth" in the first applies to one set (analytical OR synthetic), and in the other to another (not-analytical AND synthetic). Thus the two propositions are not opposites, unless you equivocate the two words "truth".

Then you wave vaguely in the direction of "reality." I really don't think your thinking is focussed on any end, detailed though it may be.

Well, this might be just me, but if refuse to follow a premise to its conclusion because of an ulterior purpose you are not employing logic. I'm not focused towards any end, I'm merely following the logic.

"I'm just attacking the nihilist position" is a bit like "I'm not a member of the Klan, but at that rally the other night ..."

:confused:

Just want to say, the truth is either of no importance or of absolute importance. Seeing as nothing within the universe can ever necessarily be proven to be true, the universe itself is the only thing which can be. Mathematics is absolute truth - given certain conditions, certain results will ALWAYS occur. Adding, multiplying, subtracting or dividing certain values will give certain answers, and these absolute facts are used in the construction of the universe - if it is mathematically impossible, it can't happen. If it does happen, you got your maths incorrect.

You're trying to defeat one expression of "the nihilist argument" by showing it to be a contradiction, so pedantically that you wave aside the "There is truth" statement as having no bearing on the truth of "There is no truth."

Then you wave vaguely in the direction of "reality." I really don't think your thinking is focussed on any end, detailed though it may be.

"I'm just attacking the nihilist position" is a bit like "I'm not a member of the Klan, but at that rally the other night ..."

If I'm reading this correctly, I don't think Ad Nihilo is attacking the nihilist position.

I believe (and I could be in error) that he is actually seeking to defend nihilism from one particular attack, that which claims that "To state as truth, 'there is no truth' is a contradiction".

If I'm following, his position is that the statement itself is subject to one kind of truth, and the truth that the statement refers to is a different kind of truth, thus allowing that one may exist and the other not.

I think that, once his terms are thus defined, it addresses the problem. However, I would see discourse best served if the qualifications on and distinctions between esoteric kinds of truth that he uses in resolving the statement be worked into the statement itself, for clarity.

Because it pertains, and some people have them turned off, here's the second line of my sig:

Language is a filter which distorts our perceptions. In order to truly experience reality, one must transcend language.

I am clumsy with language, yet worse with reality.

May I punt?

Well, this might be just me, but if refuse to follow a premise to its conclusion because of an ulterior purpose you are not employing logic. I'm not focused towards any end, I'm merely following the logic.


I don't know about any ulterior motive, but if your explicit end was to establish a premise under which "There is no truth" could be presented as non contradictory, I think you've put the ball in the pocket.

If I'm following, the statement "It is analytically true that there is no synthetic true" is one that, while not necessarily proven yet, at least survives the test of internal consistency, and so would not be well assailed on grounds of contradiction.

I could be wrong, though.

So, the only truth is there is no truth? I smell a paradox.

Inspired by the scepticism/relativism thread, I had a thought and I wish to see how the good folk of NS would discredit it mercilessly :p

"There is no objective truth".

Thoughts?

That I found this oddly suitable.

What if Truth was like a tiny speck of sand?
A speck that has been washed and weighed, polished, smoothed and curbed into one shiny point, the Universal Truth.
What if we could take this grain of sand and collect it into a book? We would treasure the book like our own life. We would lock it with the purpose of our mind.
And when we craved the truth we would open it up and let the grains wash over us. We would soak ourselves in its depth and bask in its radiance.
But the book is flawed. We can take more truth from it than we have earned. And soon we would be turning empty pages.
Thus the search begins. The search for the truth; the truth we crave; the truth that has the only meaningful value in an otherwise meaningless world.
The search continues, it goes on and on. In this search for the ultimate truth everything is allowed. We learn to lie and cheat in hope of progress. We see no success, no breakthrough of any kind.

We’re flooded by substitute truth, made up truth, whose only purpose is to sooth us and lull us.
Absolute truth loses its meaning. There is no absolute truth, only greater and lesser truth. We’ve lost our standards, we’ve lost our talent to distinguish what is real from what is deception. We no longer know the difference between the right truth and the wrong truth. All we care for is truth in any form and any guise; corrupted, filthy truth, we want it all, need it all.
So this truth can make us free, like any other truth. Maybe this substitute truth suffices? Maybe.
But when we’ve become enslaved to this freedom, then it is freedom no longer.
It is the worst kind of prison.

A prison with no walls and no chains. We cannot break free for we cannot see what binds us.
We talk of freedom like it was something to hope for. I hope real freedom never finds us, because we wouldn’t know what to do with it.
Yet we continue the search, for the searching has become a way of life for us. We know no other. It is what we’ve become.
Let us only hope the search never ends, that the Absolute Truth stays hidden forever. For if the search ends, we end.
Then we become nothing more than dust, specks of sand on the shore of universal lie.
And maybe, just maybe, this has already happened.

snip

Quite beautiful. Though it does assume that there was a truth to begin with and we simply lost it, by craving for more than there is. Still... beautiful.

If I'm following, the statement "It is analytically true that there is no synthetic true" is one that, while not necessarily proven yet, at least survives the test of internal consistency, and so would not be well assailed on grounds of contradiction.

Yep you are following. "There is no synthetic truth" may or may not be an analytical truth. But there is no contradiction.

Au contraire! The names of the colours are among the first words one learns of any language, and for good reason. You can point and say.

:)

well, yeah. but that really just shows understanding rather than expressing a definition. colors aren't defined by particular objects.

Au contraire! The names of the colours are among the first words one learns of any language, and for good reason. You can point and say.

:)

No. We have several names for a handful of colours, but the rest we have to give all sorts of other names. Greeny-Yellow (or is it Yellowy Green?), Mauve, Indigo/Violet etc are all just finite names for infinite colours, and two people could look at a colour and see completely different things, or think two different colours to be the same. Colour is complete perception - nothing chemical ever happens (optical illusions - look at a white grid on a black background and you see black spots. Wire yourself up to a brain scanner and repeat, and there is nothing to prove that you ever saw those black spots).