NationStates Jolt Archive

I just got done reading a Christian apologetics book last night about the certainty of there being a real Jesus. Anyways, there were two different comments I read that got me thinking. I will post them(in paraphrase form) and see what you think:

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense? I mean, you have people who believe with absolute certainty that nothing is certain, and other people who hold every idea as equal in some way, unless its exclusive, in which case they disregard it.

I just got done reading a Christian apologetics book last night about the certainty of there being a real Jesus. Anyways, there were two different comments I read that got me thinking. I will post them(in paraphrase form) and see what you think:

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense? I mean, you have people who believe with absolute certainty that nothing is certain, and other people who hold every idea as equal in some way, unless its exclusive, in which case they disregard it.

Yes, and the entertainment comes when you see the way they dance and jig to try to make it look reasonable and consistent.

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

Skeptics aren't "certain about uncertainty." Playing fancy word games won't discount skepticism. Skeptics begin from the presumption of uncertainty, and look to verify belief with deduction, induction, and observation. This is not the same as being "certain" that everything is "uncertain."


2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right.

I agree that relativism is incoherent. I would not say it's hypocritical because allowing for the "equal bearing" of mutually exclusive beliefs doesn't mean that you're applying standards to others that you don't apply to yourself.


So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

This sounds like a straw man to me. Some relativists may believe such incoherent things, but not all do. Relativism isn't monolithic. Neither is Christianity. Some Christian beliefs are fine, but others are stupid and evil.


Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense? I mean, you have people who believe with absolute certainty that nothing is certain, and other people who hold every idea as equal in some way, unless its exclusive, in which case they disregard it.
Who are these people exactly?

Surely a good measure of skepticism, relativism and belief is better than either extreme? I don't know anyone who is always a skeptic or always a relativist.

I just got done reading a Christian apologetics book last night about the certainty of there being a real Jesus. Anyways, there were two different comments I read that got me thinking. I will post them(in paraphrase form) and see what you think:

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

You're going to have to define 'sceptic' more precisely. Certainly, the statement "we can never be certain about anything" is self-contradicting, but in the more common usage of scepticism to mean "I want evidence before I'll believe that" doubt is a methodological axiom, and a pragmatic one at that, so it isn't hypocritical.

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

Yes, relativism in this sense is ridiculous. Most sceptics would agree with you on this point.

Yes, and the entertainment comes when you see the way they dance and jig to try to make it look reasonable and consistent.
It's actually really easy. There is an option it can be true, or there is an option it's not true. That's uncertainty. Being skeptic about something is because of something isn't reliable for some reason. What Zilam is talking about, more looks like hardcore agnostism and not skepticism.

The relativism you talk about, is something else. Namely that lots of beleives claim to be the only true one, or the only true way or something like that. Because of that, for an outsider like me, they're equal in thay way: they all claim to be the one, and all have equal "proof".

Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense? I mean, you have people who believe with absolute certainty that nothing is certain, and other people who hold every idea as equal in some way, unless its exclusive, in which case they disregard it.
There's a lot of "usually"s and "many"s there, which means I can't really argue with it without greater knowledge about the wider frame of skepticism and relativism.

One thing I would say is that you can't be certain about uncertainty, and I certainly don't claim to be so (see what I did there? Nudge nudge wink grin). However, given that there are more things to know that I can possibly know about, I think it wise to acknowledge that in the general case, I do not know. Maybe you do know something I don't, but I don't know that. I don't even know what I know, except in as much as I remember it.

I can't argue that skepticism is correct. I can acknowledge that it's what I have to do, as a consequence of the implicit lack of confidence that information sources in the world that I perceive provides. I can also acknowledge that belief systems are no more objective as a source of information as any other, and although I can't assert anything about the truth or falsehood about such belief, I can tell you that I can't trust where it's coming from. Maybe you are right, but damned if I know that. If you're in a similar position to me, maybe this makes sense. If you know better, then good for you!

It's actually really easy. There is an option it can be true, or there is an option it's not true. That's uncertainty. Being skeptic about something is because of something isn't reliable for some reason. What Zilam is talking about, more looks like hardcore agnostism and not skepticism.

The relativism you talk about, is something else. Namely that lots of beleives claim to be the only true one, or the only true way or something like that. Because of that, for an outsider like me, they're equal in thay way: they all claim to be the one, and all have equal "proof".

No, what Zilam is talking about in the second part is the moral relativism that says that all systems of belief are morally equivalent... That, in theory, if I had a belief that Ronald MacDonald was the savior of mankind that would be no more or less valid than believing in Bhuddism. The problem Zilam is indicating is that often the very people who espouse such a system are very quick to conclude that Christianity, as an example, is false.

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

I'm not sure this one is really hypocritical. If your premise is that all beliefs are equal, then a statement that one belief is the "one true belief" is completely inconsistent with that premise. It has to be rejected.

Suppose I start with the premise that taste is relative - and that different people will like different flavors of ice cream better. Then you come along and say, "Chocolate is the only good flavor for everyone." I would have to either reject that statement or cease being an ice cream relativist, because it directly contradicts the relativist premise.

I'm not sure this one is really hypocritical. If your premise is that all beliefs are equal, then a statement that one belief is the "one true belief" is completely inconsistent with that premise. It has to be rejected.

Suppose I start with the premise that taste is relative - and that different people will like different flavors of ice cream better. Then you come along and say, "Chocolate is the only good flavor for everyone." I would have to either reject that statement or cease being an ice cream relativist, because it directly contradicts the relativist premise.

The problem is that in order to reach that conclusion you have to get into the business of evaluating the belief in question, which is a no-no in moral relativism.

Note: Moral relativism has no problem with atheism despite the fact that atheism, by definition, categorically excludes deity-centered religion.

The problem is that in order to reach that conclusion you have to get into the business of evaluating the belief in question, which is a no-no in moral relativism.

I guess it depends on how you look at it. Is "this is the one true belief" itself, a belief? Or is it a statement about the particular belief you subscribe to?

A relativist would likely look at it from the latter perspective, and thus could reject a statement about exclusivity without rejecting or even caring what the proposed "one two belief" is.

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.


That applies more to skeptics who haven't actually read skeptical philosophy than skepticism itself. I do occasionally hear people reject moral propositions by saying "You can't possibly know x", while of course, taking as given that x and proven by assertion that x is unknowable.


2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.


That isn't quite the way to suggest hypocrisy in relativism. I'd say rather that relativism is possibly contradictory, because it suggests there are no absolutely true moral principles. . .except the principle that there are no absolutely true moral principles. The idea that any one system that holds to exclusivity isn't in contradiction to a relativistic principle; what you're pointing out is the practical fact that relativists seem to reserve special venom for relativism.

This is way beyond "strawman". You are arguing about what hypocritical things "they" believe, when there aren't any of "them" here, and I'm not sure there are any "them" anywhere. Don't you need some actual statements by some actual people before you can argue against them?

I just got done reading a Christian apologetics book last night about the certainty of there being a real Jesus. Anyways, there were two different comments I read that got me thinking. I will post them(in paraphrase form) and see what you think:

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense? I mean, you have people who believe with absolute certainty that nothing is certain, and other people who hold every idea as equal in some way, unless its exclusive, in which case they disregard it.

I think you misunderstand something fundamental about the two positions. Sceptics are by definition sceptical of everything. Claiming that being certain about being uncertain is hypocritical is on the same level as claiming that being intolerant of intolerance makes you intolerant in turn.

Relativists don't accept the claim to exclusivity that Christianity makes. That doesn't mean they dismiss Christianity as an idea equal to all other religious ideas, for good or bad. Refusing to belief in the exclusivity of Christianity (or any other religion with a claim to exclusivity for that matter) does not mean dismissing it as a philosophical concept and as a religion equal to all others.

No, what Zilam is talking about in the second part is the moral relativism that says that all systems of belief are morally equivalent... That, in theory, if I had a belief that Ronald MacDonald was the savior of mankind that would be no more or less valid than believing in Bhuddism. The problem Zilam is indicating is that often the very people who espouse such a system are very quick to conclude that Christianity, as an example, is false.

That would only be hypocritical if they conclude any of the other religions to be true, now, wouldn't it? If they look upon them all as valid ideas, but dismiss them all when it comes to believing in any of them, how is that dishonest, hypocritical or in any way objectionable?

You're going to have to define 'sceptic' more precisely. Certainly, the statement "we can never be certain about anything" is self-contradicting, but in the more common usage of scepticism to mean "I want evidence before I'll believe that" doubt is a methodological axiom, and a pragmatic one at that, so it isn't hypocritical.

Yes, an axiom. Which, by definition, has no proof or evidence. The only problem with this is the alternative: to not be skeptical, at least about some stuff, can also be contradictory. If I believe everything I am told, some of it is bound to go against other information I just as happily believe. So skepticism is not a bad thing, but it's silly to make it a personal philosophy. I don't think most people who call themselves skeptics do that, though.

I'm just attacking the comments here, not you Zilam.


1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.


And?


2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next

Ahh I hate it when people say this, this is missing the point of relativism entirely. The idea is that every belief has no objective quantifiable value, so in a sense you could say every belief is 'equal', but not equal in value, only in the sense that they all equally hold no OBJECTIVE value.


So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.


This doesn't make any sense, relativists alone do not hold each god as equal, what God is like doesn't come into this.

I'll take the position of "them" for the skeptics. I know with absolute certainty that no human can know, with absolute certainty, the motives of the higher power(s), much less anything else about them.

As humans, we are limited in our perception of the universe. We cannot be entirely sure of any knowledge achieved through empirical means, and even less sure of knowledge achieved through the spirit or faith. Since there has been no empirical evidence supplied regarding the higher power(s), we are dependent entirely upon the spirit and faith. Now, if these methods could give us an accurate picture of the higher power(s), shouldn't everyone have the same image? Since we do not, someone must be wrong. Rather than being egotistical and claiming that my image is correct, I instead assert that my image, your image, and everyone else's, is wrong.

No, what Zilam is talking about in the second part is the moral relativism that says that all systems of belief are morally equivalent... That, in theory, if I had a belief that Ronald MacDonald was the savior of mankind that would be no more or less valid than believing in Bhuddism. The problem Zilam is indicating is that often the very people who espouse such a system are very quick to conclude that Christianity, as an example, is false.

Moral relativism says there is no objective, universal, inherent morality (such as is preached by most religions). When I say "That's wrong!" I am not making a falsifiable statement, since there is no measure of "wrongness" other than people's moral beliefs. It's more or less an opinion, which is how I categorize most if not all religious beliefs.

I dunno who the strawmen are you and Zilam are talking about, but I don't "conclude" that Christianity is "false," i merely reject its teachings the same way I reject Ronald MacDonaldism. In any case, whether I reject it has little to do with how "morally equivalent" it compares to other religions.

Now, if these methods could give us an accurate picture of the higher power(s), shouldn't everyone have the same image? ... Rather than being egotistical and claiming that my image is correct, I instead assert that my image, your image, and everyone else's, is wrong.
One thing I would say is you've no reason, beyond the fact that their explanation is different, to think that the images are different. What you see could well be exactly what others do, but with a different spin on interpretation and perspective put on it. Or, perhaps, the various images all share a joint root cause.

Sure, I'm speculating, but that's my point - it's all speculation. You can't just dismiss your own image out of hand like that just because other people say they're seeing something completely differently, since they might be speculating just as much as you are.

I don't think it's necessary to assert that anyone's Image is wrong. I think it's useful, and probably helpful, to act on the assumption that our explanations for such images are inevitably mistaken in some way, but raw perception, whether of a physiological nature or otherwise, is probably one of the few things we can be reasonably confident in.

This is way beyond "strawman". You are arguing about what hypocritical things "they" believe, when there aren't any of "them" here, and I'm not sure there are any "them" anywhere. Don't you need some actual statements by some actual people before you can argue against them?

nah, we're talking about hypothetical hapless hypocrites

I don't deny the possibility of a single inspiration for the image, just the reliability of it. Unfortunately, most people assume that their image is entirely correct when it is definitely distorted. This tends to lead to the more repressive types of religions. Given the damage those religions have done through history and in my own life, it's pretty safe to say that depending on that image has bad results.

The idea of speculation tends to support my position though. Since the majority of their belief is speculation, skepticism is the best response to it. Sure, people can "know" some things, but, without a full bird's eye view of existence, they shouldn't be absolutely certain. Since the person claiming the belief shouldn't be certain, anyone listening to them should be even less certain.

Sorry if my points are a bit mixed, I think the summer brain rot is coming early (with one more set of finals to go...)

I just got done reading a Christian apologetics book last night about the certainty of there being a real Jesus. Anyways, there were two different comments I read that got me thinking.

The usual sophistry no doubt.

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

Scepticism isn't an end. It is not a belief. It is a method, an axiom. It is of the same nature like empiricism. They cannot be true or false.

What scepticism is sceptical about are ends/conclusions. They can be true or false. Scepticism, as a method, takes that any proposition is false until proven true.

The fact that the evidence of truth for most things can be found to be lacking, and thus the extreme conclusion of scepticism is that nothing is certain says nothing about scepticism itself. This extreme conclusion is based on an inductive reasoning, and is thus a leap of faith, and thus it may be be said to be inconsistent with the method.

BUT: This extreme conclusion != the method of scepticism, thus your point = phail. (in short "equivocation")

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

No. Relativists believe objective truths are not known. All truths are necessarily true relative to their frame of reference, but we do not know how they translate to reality. "Equal bearing" is nonsensical here. If the premisses of Christianity are true, the Christianity is true. If on the other hand, the premisses of Islam are true, then Islam is true. The position of relativism is that we do not know which, if any, of these premises are true, and thus no position has more claim to truth than any other. Nothing more nothing less. There is no comparison between the points of view, there is no "equal bearing", there is no "all is false". The point of relativism is agnosticism: we do not know. It doesn't discount anything. It seeks to accommodate everything.

Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense? I mean, you have people who believe with absolute certainty that nothing is certain, and other people who hold every idea as equal in some way, unless its exclusive, in which case they disregard it.

In short: No.

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.


Here endeth the lesson.

Skeptics doubt. That doesn't mean they are "certain about uncertainty". It's a nonsense premise, and thus makes the whole endeavour about worthless.

You're going to have to define 'sceptic' more precisely. Certainly, the statement "we can never be certain about anything" is self-contradicting, but in the more common usage of scepticism to mean "I want evidence before I'll believe that" doubt is a methodological axiom, and a pragmatic one at that, so it isn't hypocritical.

there is also the richer sense of skeptic (both spellings are right, but i can't bring myself to write it without a k) as a school of thought, which entails the denial that we have (or can get) knowledge about certain categories of things which people typically think they know - the external world, or example.

and all a global skeptic has to do to fix her claim above is to say something like "as far as i can tell, we can't be certain about anything."

Relativists believe objective truths are not known.

that doesn't sound very relativistic to me. the relativist would be much better characterized by claiming that there isn't a universal objective truth to be had on some matter. from there they can branch out and say the whole thing is entirely subjective, or the truth of the matter is determined by society (in which case there actually is an objective truth to be had, just not a universal one), etc.

some people do take the further step of declaring all things equal - i've met them - and that does seem problematic. especially if they don't leave themselves an opening for ruling out internally inconsistent belief structures, thus requiring themselves to believe nonsense.

that doesn't sound very relativistic to me. the relativist would be much better characterized by claiming that there isn't a universal objective truth to be had on some matter. from there they can branch out and say the whole thing is entirely subjective, or the truth of the matter is determined by society (in which case there actually is an objective truth to be had, just not a universal one), etc.

Common preconception. Relativism merely acknowledges the context to which truths in certain conclusions are relative - thus the use of the word. "If these set of premises are true, then these conclusions are true". You would immediately recognise said relativism if you think all those premisses are assumed to be false. But that is not the case. They are merely unknown, and since some are axiomatic in nature, unknowable.

some people do take the further step of declaring all things equal - i've met them - and that does seem problematic. especially if they don't leave themselves an opening for ruling out internally inconsistent belief structures, thus requiring themselves to believe nonsense.

Thus why the initial argument was a straw-man. It takes these people as ideally representative of relativism.

The problem is that in order to reach that conclusion you have to get into the business of evaluating the belief in question, which is a no-no in moral relativism.

Note: Moral relativism has no problem with atheism despite the fact that atheism, by definition, categorically excludes deity-centered religion.

Evaluation only comes into play if you wanted to rank beliefs in any sort of hierarchy. Which is what moral relativism doesn't do.
The simple fact that there ARE people who prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla ice cream is evidence that both preferences do exist, however they cannot be evaluated on an objective basis as they are purely personal.

Moral relativism has no problem with either religion or atheism. Both exist, both are equaly valid choices.

Common preconception. Relativism merely acknowledges the context to which truths in certain conclusions are relative - thus the use of the word. "If these set of premises are true, then these conclusions are true". You would immediately recognise said relativism if you think all those premisses are assumed to be false. But that is not the case. They are merely unknown, and since some are axiomatic in nature, unknowable.

but the 'premises' are things more like 'within the confines of language x' or 'amongst cultural group w'. they aren't really premises which are true or false, but boundary conditions within which statements have a certain truth value that they might not outside of them.

but the 'premises' are things more like 'within the confines of language x' or 'amongst cultural group w'. they aren't really premises which are true or false, but boundary conditions within which statements have a certain truth value that they might not outside of them.

And that is cultural relativism. I don't get your point. It doesn't affect that objective truth may or may not exist, and to which of the cases it applies, either, or indeed both, which Relativism accommodates.

And that is cultural relativism.

not really. i mean, cultural relativism, as a form of relativism generally, does include those sort of claims but not exclusively and not necessarily normatively. i was thinking more like moral and epistemological relativism.

I don't get your point. It doesn't affect that objective truth may or may not exist, and to which of the cases it applies, either, or indeed both, which Relativism accommodates.

the point is that relativism (of a sort that deals with truth claims) isn't the inability to decide between various sets of premises, but is instead the claim that certain propositions do not have universal truth values - the truth value of a proposition is relative to some other thing.

Yes, an axiom. Which, by definition, has no proof or evidence.

It's a statement of method, not belief, and so a lack of evidence for it would not make it self-contradictory.

There is a fact statement similar to it, which is "proportioning belief to the available evidence is a reliable method of acquiring knowledge": we can be expected to justify this with evidence, and indeed we can: the whole of science is a testimony to sceptical methodology.

there is also the richer sense of skeptic (both spellings are right, but i can't bring myself to write it without a k) as a school of thought, which entails the denial that we have (or can get) knowledge about certain categories of things which people typically think they know - the external world, or example.

and all a global skeptic has to do to fix her claim above is to say something like "as far as i can tell, we can't be certain about anything."

Absolutely, but I was limiting my post to the loose definition of scepticism to avoid complicating the matter unduly.

Personally I always use 'scepticism', but that's just because I'm English and we roll like that. :p

the point is that relativism (of a sort that deals with truth claims) isn't the inability to decide between various sets of premises, but is instead the claim that certain propositions do not have universal truth values - the truth value of a proposition is relative to some other thing.

Well then I guess I'm a different type of relativist. I think objective truth may exist, but due to lack of convincing arguments I believe that it doesn't. I don't hold it as objectively true that there are no objective truths.

Sort of like weak atheism translated to epistemology ;)

I just got done reading a Christian apologetics book last night about the certainty of there being a real Jesus. Anyways, there were two different comments I read that got me thinking. I will post them(in paraphrase form) and see what you think:

1) Skeptics, who are normally uncertain about a great many things, are usually so certain about uncertainty.

2)Relativists, such as those the believe that every belief holds equal bearing, and no one belief is better than next are in a sense hypocritical because they believe that the exclusive ideas are not right. So, for instance, many relativists will hold all sorts of ideas of gods/goddesses/divines/morals as equal, except when its a belief like Christianity, which believes that Christ is the only way. Its exclusive, so they discount it.

Aren't both 1 and 2 hypocritical in some sense?
2 certainly is hypocritical.

But the skeptic's position only looks hypocritical if you think the adoption of the rational default position on uncertainty is somehow dogmatic, or based on belief. But it isn't. Skeptics aren't uncertain because they think it's important they be uncertain, or that they think uncertainty is better. Skeptics are uncertan because uncertainty is different in kind than certainty, and they know it because its demonstrably true. The only way to dispute that is to assert the existence of a priori knowledge, and that's not somehing you're going to be able to defend.

Skepticism as a philosophical doctrine =/= tempermental skepticism. Skeptics are skeptics because they have reached the definitive conclusion that certain forms of knowledge are by their nature unprovable. Hume was pretty damned dogmatic about his skepticism, but he was damned dogmatic because he had a damned fine argument demonstrating that when induction was concerned (and in his thinking, when isn't it?), skepticism was the only rational position to take.

Well then I guess I'm a different type of relativist.
But are all types of relativism equally valid?

I don't know anyone who is always a skeptic

Hi, I'm (probably) Seth. Now you do.

Hi, I'm (probably) Seth. Now you do.

incorrect. the correct response was:

I don't know anyone who is always a skepticthat's ok, they don't know you either

Both of these comments are true only through a misinterpretation of skepticism and relativism. skeptics do not believe that everything is uncertain per se, rather they believe that things should have some legitimate logic and/or evidence to back them up, and that ideas or facts are really only as true as what proves them/ backs them up. Technically a skeptic is not even sure that skepticism is the right world view, but rather believe that based on current evidence, it seems to be the best way to view the world.
Relativists believe that each religion has its merits, and its faults, and that it is not important to follow one single religion. They do not necessarily believe every portion of every religion is equal, or even good, they rather believe that each religion should be taken for its merits.

It's a statement of method, not belief, and so a lack of evidence for it would not make it self-contradictory.

There is a fact statement similar to it, which is "proportioning belief to the available evidence is a reliable method of acquiring knowledge": we can be expected to justify this with evidence, and indeed we can: the whole of science is a testimony to sceptical methodology.

That's circular: we only believe what science says is true because we accept the skeptical methodology. If I choose to disagree, for whatever reason, I won't see science as proof, either.

I can't help noticing that our resident missionary hasn't replied to any of the corrections made to the strawman argument he posted...

But are all types of relativism equally valid?


That made me chuckle :p

Skeptics aren't "certain about uncertainty." Playing fancy word games won't discount skepticism. Skeptics begin from the presumption of uncertainty, and look to verify belief with deduction, induction, and observation. This is not the same as being "certain" that everything is "uncertain."

Elegantly put.


I agree that relativism is incoherent. I would not say it's hypocritical because allowing for the "equal bearing" of mutually exclusive beliefs doesn't mean that you're applying standards to others that you don't apply to yourself.

I'm a relativist, so obviously I don't believe it's totally incoherent, but I agree with the rest of what you said.

I judge all belief systems based on the same set of criteria. Those criteria are my own, and I freely acknowledge that they're subjective. I define what I believe to be "good" and then evaluate how various belief systems live up to my standard of "good." My process of evaluation is pretty objective, in the sense that I use objectively-verifiable information which anybody else could access as well as I can, but my subjective concept of what "good" is may not be shared by anybody else. Hence, they may not agree with my conclusions unless they choose to embrace my initial premise.

That's what I think of as "relativism." I recognize that my evaluations include a fundamental subjective element, and I believe everybody else's do, too. I don't think my "good" is any more objectively real than anybody else's.

Elegantly put.


I'm a relativist, so obviously I don't believe it's totally incoherent, but I agree with the rest of what you said.

I judge all belief systems based on the same set of criteria. Those criteria are my own, and I freely acknowledge that they're subjective. I define what I believe to be "good" and then evaluate how various belief systems live up to my standard of "good." My process of evaluation is pretty objective, in the sense that I use objectively-verifiable information which anybody else could access as well as I can, but my subjective concept of what "good" is may not be shared by anybody else. Hence, they may not agree with my conclusions unless they choose to embrace my initial premise.

That's what I think of as "relativism." I recognize that my evaluations include a fundamental subjective element, and I believe everybody else's do, too. I don't think my "good" is any more objectively real than anybody else's.


Spot on.

I don't think my "good" is any more objectively real than anybody else's.

but do you think that some 'goods' are objectively 'bads'?

but do you think that some 'goods' are objectively 'bads'?
Not really. Though there are many things which can be either good or bad depending on context.

For instance:

This morning I poked my finger with a pin and ended up bleeding. Under many circumstances, this would qualify as a "bad thing," albeit a very minor bad thing, because I experienced pain and a (minor) injury to my body. However, in this case, the finger-poke was a good thing. I needed a blood test.

Whether something is "good" or "bad" largely depends on what you're trying to accomplish, and that's rooted in your larger idea of "good" itself!

That's circular: we only believe what science says is true because we accept the skeptical methodology. If I choose to disagree, for whatever reason, I won't see science as proof, either.

i don't see an necessary contradiction between accepting empirical evidence as a method of belief justification along with some other method(s). the problem only comes in when particular allegedly justified beliefs conflict - though it is at least possible that they never would.

Not really. Though there are many things which can be either good or bad depending on context.

For instance:

This morning I poked my finger with a pin and ended up bleeding. Under many circumstances, this would qualify as a "bad thing," albeit a very minor bad thing, because I experienced pain and a (minor) injury to my body. However, in this case, the finger-poke was a good thing. I needed a blood test.

Whether something is "good" or "bad" largely depends on what you're trying to accomplish, and that's rooted in your larger idea of "good" itself!

oh, i agree that both intentions and consequences provide vital context which is required to distinguish between essentially identical actions - that an actual physical activity itself is at least sometimes neither good nor bad, but can be both.

but i was thinking more like genocide. are you willing to say that a system in which genocide was given a positive value holds the same moral standing as one which holds the opposite?

but i was thinking more like genocide. are you willing to say that a system in which genocide was given a positive value holds the same moral standing as one which holds the opposite?
Objectively speaking? Yes. Morality is 100% subjective, after all, so there's not really much alternative in this case.

However, according to my moral system, the answer is a definite no. I don't, personally, give genocide-favoring systems the same moral value as genocide-opposing moral systems.

The thing that most people don't seem to get about relativism is that it doesn't stop me from judging things as moral or non-moral. Just because I recognize that my morality is subjective doesn't stop me from applying it! I think I'm right. I think the world would be better if it all worked my way. So that's what I work to accomplish.

You're going to have to define 'sceptic' more precisely. Certainly, the statement "we can never be certain about anything" is self-contradicting, but in the more common usage of scepticism to mean "I want evidence before I'll believe that" doubt is a methodological axiom, and a pragmatic one at that, so it isn't hypocritical.



Yes, relativism in this sense is ridiculous. Most sceptics would agree with you on this point.

That's the central tenet of the Unitarian Universalist Church, though. They are the ultimate believers in that sort of relativism.

Objectively speaking? Yes. Morality is 100% subjective, after all, so there's not really much alternative in this case.

However, according to my moral system, the answer is a definite no. I don't, personally, give genocide-favoring systems the same moral value as genocide-opposing moral systems.

The thing that most people don't seem to get about relativism is that it doesn't stop me from judging things as moral or non-moral. Just because I recognize that my morality is subjective doesn't stop me from applying it! I think I'm right. I think the world would be better if it all worked my way. So that's what I work to accomplish.

Then I have a question:

Who is right?

Let's say that as history plays out, the system that sees genocide and slavery as a positive value wins out over the other systems that see those as bad things.

In the end, is mere survival an indication that a system is correct? After all, that's the criteria in nature.

Would the world "work" any less well? On a scale of thousands of years, and populations of billions - does it really matter if a few tens of millions are wiped out by direct or indirect means? Certainly individuals might object - but does that count for anything on the large scale? Does what they believe even matter?

Objectively speaking? Yes. Morality is 100% subjective, after all, so there's not really much alternative in this case.

well, there are two separate sorts of subjectivity, one of which partakes in something like objectivity - there is stuff clearly happens exclusively in our heads but also can be objectively wrong. for example, the seeing of colors is an entirely subjective phenomena. green doesn't exist, it is just the way we subjectively perceive certain spectra given our evolutionary and biological makeup. if we were different sorts of beings, we might not experience green at all. in fact, we know this is possible because of the existence of colorblindness in our own species. but we still make normative declarations about whether something is green or not, and someone whose color judgments differ is wrong.

it seems possible that morality might be at least partially subjective in this sense, and not entirely in the 'anything goes' sense.

The thing that most people don't seem to get about relativism is that it doesn't stop me from judging things as moral or non-moral. Just because I recognize that my morality is subjective doesn't stop me from applying it! I think I'm right. I think the world would be better if it all worked my way. So that's what I work to accomplish.

oh, i get that. i just worry when arguments lead us to conclude that there is nothing that we can possibly say to someone to rationally sway them and must instead move on to either coercion or deception to get our way (or, i suppose, let them be and hope the genocide doesn't come our way). seems like the sort of thing we should try desperately to avoid if we can - if only because those guys always seem so much better armed than i am.

That's circular: we only believe what science says is true because we accept the skeptical methodology. If I choose to disagree, for whatever reason, I won't see science as proof, either.

The proof is, as they say, in the pudding.

However much someone may claim not to be convinced by Science, they'll have a hard time explaining away aviation, polio vaccines, electricity and (dare I say it?) the internet. The success of science isn't some theoretical postulation, it's a fact that someone in the western world can't help but be reminded of everyday of their life.

That's the central tenet of the Unitarian Universalist Church, though. They are the ultimate believers in that sort of relativism.

Yeah, they're an odd bunch. That kind of naive relativism is still contradicted by scepticism though.

That made me chuckle :p

I'm a skeptic, so I'm going to have to ask you to prove that.

Oops forgot about this thread...I might try to catch up on it..:p

Actually, just to save time, did anyone prove me wrong in anyway? Any insults? Any love offers?

The thing that most people don't seem to get about relativism is that it doesn't stop me from judging things as moral or non-moral. Just because I recognize that my morality is subjective doesn't stop me from applying it! I think I'm right. I think the world would be better if it all worked my way. So that's what I work to accomplish.
But how do you convince anyone to work for your subjective view of how the world should be, or indeed, if morality is 100% subjective, what justification do you have in asking/arguing for folks to comply with your subjective view of morality?

I mean, if you think rape is a bad thing, but admit that this is a subjective view, who are you to tell others not to rape or punish/support a system which punishes those who do?

Actually, just to save time, did anyone prove me wrong in anyway? Any insults? Any love offers?

1. Yes.
2. No particularly interesting ones.
3. No more than usual. :p

i don't see an necessary contradiction between accepting empirical evidence as a method of belief justification along with some other method(s). the problem only comes in when particular allegedly justified beliefs conflict - though it is at least possible that they never would.

I know; I'm not saying they are contradictory. Agenday07 said science could be used to support the skeptical methodology, and I just said that if I don't accept one, I won't accept the other.
The proof is, as they say, in the pudding.

I've never heard this expression, but really, really want to find a way to use it in conversation. :)

However much someone may claim not to be convinced by Science, they'll have a hard time explaining away aviation, polio vaccines, electricity and (dare I say it?) the internet. The success of science isn't some theoretical postulation, it's a fact that someone in the western world can't help but be reminded of everyday of their life.
I could find some other explanation. I'm not sure why I would, because to do so would be neither natural nor rational, but I could deny away anything. Considering the number of things that don't work the way they appear, denial wouldn't be as crazy as it sounds.

I'm a relativist, so obviously I don't believe it's totally incoherent, but I agree with the rest of what you said.

I judge all belief systems based on the same set of criteria. Those criteria are my own, and I freely acknowledge that they're subjective. I define what I believe to be "good" and then evaluate how various belief systems live up to my standard of "good." My process of evaluation is pretty objective, in the sense that I use objectively-verifiable information which anybody else could access as well as I can, but my subjective concept of what "good" is may not be shared by anybody else. Hence, they may not agree with my conclusions unless they choose to embrace my initial premise.
I'm a skeptic, so I see that any subjective measure of anything is necessarily baseless, and I can't imagine why you'd ever use it for anything.

Why does your subjective concept of "good" matter to you? Without a decent answer to that myself, I can't reasonably grant any weight to any concept of good, even my own.

I know; I'm not saying they are contradictory. Agenday07 said science could be used to support the skeptical methodology, and I just said that if I don't accept one, I won't accept the other.

yeah, but i mean that it would be very weird to find someone truly unconvinced by at least the framework of 'empirical evidence as belief justification' which science bases itself on. the success of science, when compared to the abject failure of most everything else, would seem to thereby provide evidence for the strength of its method and for expanding that method's role beyond what science might initially claim for itself. if it is circular, it is not viciously so.

yeah, but i mean that it would be very weird to find someone truly unconvinced by at least the framework of 'empirical evidence as belief justification' which science bases itself on. the success of science, when compared to the abject failure of most everything else, would seem to thereby provide evidence for the strength of its method and for expanding that method's role beyond what science might initially claim for itself. if it is circular, it is not viciously so.
I agree. I cannot imagine why anyone would disagree with the framework for science, as it is really just a formalized version of common sense. On the other hand, I don't think you can make any logical argument for it, at least no more than you can make an argument for common sense.