NationStates Jolt Archive

1) I posit that if there is such a thing as an objective truth to anything, then we have not yet discerned it, and it seems likely that we never will.

In support of 1): In the words of Wittgenstein, reality is like a picture. Any way of describing it involves creating a set of rules of description, for example casting a net of squares over the picture (in IT a bitmap), or creating concepts of lines and colours, and describing them relative to one another (in IT a vector image).

Any such device DOES NOT say anything about the nature of what is described (it says absolutely nothing about the reality of the picture). It is a portrait of reality and is self-consistent by necessity, but it only has meaning within its frame of reference (i.e. a bitmap is "true" when read as such. When read as a txt document it is non-sensical). Any such device offers a unique perspective of reality, but says absolutely nothing about the nature of reality, because it has a different nature itself(*), dictated by the rules of interpretation we have established.

Example: A red ball. Let's analyse the concept of "red". We define red as the stimulus ":mad:" <- gives optically. This is one device of description.

Another is the scientific conception. Red is light at a certain wavelength.

Both mechanisms presuppose light. In the absence of light nothing can be said about the nature of the ball in this respect. And since light is not a universal occurence, it is clear there is nothing absolute about the ball's "redness".

Wittgenstein gave other examples but he referred to logic (it's pretty much why I love the guy) primarily. But it is implied for all methods of knowledge: observation, belief, etc.

To return to 1), all methods of knowledge can only give a unique perspective of reality which is "true" and consistent within that strictly applied method, and say nothing about the nature of reality. If we ever find a method whose nature will coincide with that of reality (see (*) above) we may discern at least one objective truth, but we wouldn't know it, and it would be an accident.

2) All modes of thinking are correct (i.e. consistent) only within themselves: all modes of thinking are self-validating.

3) Because no mode of thinking can be known to relate to the nature of reality (see (*) above), all modes of thinking are false to presume to know objectively anything about reality, above any other. => Logic is not inherently superior to belief, and belief is not inherently superior to logic.

4) Because of 3), adopting any mechanism of thinking, any world view etc. is a leap of faith. Any mode of thinking requires a belief in its unprovable axioms (in the case of religion God, in the case of science empricism, in the case of logic the relation of identity, the functions of truth and the laws of causation etc.)

Conclusions:

(a) Arguing about religion is absurd because the axioms of religion and logic and religion and science are at odds. (God would need to be strictly definable and manifest itself physically respectively).

(b) Science is not objective. Science presuposes logic, but logic (as per above) cannot say anything objective about reality.

(c) Trolls are right and absurd. Trolls are persons who happen to be quite confident in their views, but adopt (unknowingly) a different perspective on reality. They are right in what they say, within the scope of their perspective. They are absurd in that they don't argue. To argue, one must be in the frame of thought of the OP (usually logic and science on this forum).

(d) Given (c), flaming is perfectly right in the same sense a troll is right.

(e) Would people be so kind as to try and keep to the frame of thought of the OP if they contribute to a thread?

Peace.:p (Otherwise fuck you:D )

Both mechanisms presuppose light. In the absence of light nothing can be said about the nature of the ball in this respect. And since light is not a universal occurence, it is clear there is nothing absolute about the ball's "redness".

It's a long post so I'm just pulling out one part to pick at.

The existence of light or not doesn't change the fact that the ball reflects eloctromagnetic radiation in the part of the sprectrum we call red. Many object reflect EM radiation in parts of the sprectrum we can see but the radiation is still reflected and this makes up part of the definition of what the object is.

Ergo, the ball is still red and this is still part of what the ball is.

In essence I agree with you. Some medium must be used to understand anything about the universe. Light is required to see. But that doesn't mean it is subjective. If you hit a red ball with white light, it will return light of the specified wavelength. It doesn't matter what you personally believe; the object, when hit with white light, returns light of a specific wavelength. I say that is perfectly valid, and tells you something about the true, real nature of the object.

When you hit it with white light, it returns red. That is part of the reality of the ball. Saying "only white light" doesn't change the validity of the statement. Qualifiers do not destroy reality.

Truth: Rape is evil.

Rape is evil.

Now you're talking about morals and they're entirely subjective.

It's a long post so I'm just pulling out one part to pick at.

The existence of light or not doesn't change the fact that the ball reflects eloctromagnetic radiation in the part of the sprectrum we call red. Many object reflect EM radiation in parts of the sprectrum we can see but the radiation is still reflected and this makes up part of the definition of what the object is.

Ergo, the ball is still red and this is still part of what the ball is.

That's only one definition, which is th epoint of the OP. A ball that reflects red when hit by light containing a component of that wavelength isn't inherently red because it only has that behavior within a particular, defined fraome of reference.

For example? What color is that same ball when hit with light that contains only green wavelengths? The answer: The ball is black.

In the absence of light: Black.

Looking at it through an infrared filter: It would reflect a wavelength and intensity dependent upon its surface temperature and the conductivity of the surrounding medium.

But no, the ball isn't inherently red. In other words, red is not a defining attribute of the ball as it is not true for all frames of reference.

Now you're talking about morals and they're entirely subjective.
You're quite right. Sometimes rape can be good...

When?

Truth: Humans need oxygen to survive.

Conclusions:

(a) Arguing about religion is absurd because the axioms of religion and logic and religion and science are at odds. (God would need to be strictly definable and manifest itself physically respectively).
Lol, non sequitur. Arguing about religion is not necessarily related to arguing about science or logic.

(b) Science is not objective. Science presuposes logic, but logic (as per above) cannot say anything objective about reality.
Not, it doesn't. Science is a set of tools we use to attempt to better understand the universe.Science != logic. Maths is closer to logic.

(c) Trolls are right and absurd. Trolls are persons who happen to be quite confident in their views, but adopt (unknowingly) a different perspective on reality. They are right in what they say, within the scope of their perspective. They are absurd in that they don't argue. To argue, one must be in the frame of thought of the OP (usually logic and science on this forum).
Having an opinion doesn't make one right.

(d) Given (c), flaming is perfectly right in the same sense a troll is right.
Having an opinion still doesn't make one right.

(e) Would people be so kind as to try and keep to the frame of thought of the OP if they contribute to a thread?
I doubt it.

It's a long post so I'm just pulling out one part to pick at.

The existence of light or not doesn't change the fact that the ball reflects eloctromagnetic radiation in the part of the sprectrum we call red. Many object reflect EM radiation in parts of the sprectrum we can see but the radiation is still reflected and this makes up part of the definition of what the object is.

Ergo, the ball is still red and this is still part of what the ball is.

"Red" is a property of light, not of how what light reflects off. Thus, the fact that the ball has the same propensity of reflecting light in this manner is, in the dark is inconsequential.

You're quite right. Sometimes rape can be good...

When?

Truth: Humans need oxygen to survive.

Does a rapist always consider it evil?

"Red" is a property of light, not of how what light reflects off. Thus, the fact that the ball has the same propensity of reflecting light in this manner is, in the dark is inconsequential.

Not at all. In the dark the ball still retains the capacity to reflect red light, it is part of what it is.

In essence I agree with you. Some medium must be used to understand anything about the universe. Light is required to see. But that doesn't mean it is subjective. If you hit a red ball with white light, it will return light of the specified wavelength. It doesn't matter what you personally believe; the object, when hit with white light, returns light of a specific wavelength. I say that is perfectly valid, and tells you something about the true, real nature of the object.

When you hit it with white light, it returns red. That is part of the reality of the ball. Saying "only white light" doesn't change the validity of the statement. Qualifiers do not destroy reality.

As said in my statement, I was talking about "redness" and this is not absolute/objective because it is dependent of a contingency. If the ball is struck by blue light it appears black. This is consistent with the scientific frame of perception but inconsistent with direct observation, as far as its "redness" is concerned. White light is not an absolute/universal occurence, thus anything it leads to is not absolute/objective.

Does a rapist always consider it evil?
No. In fact, some people rape women they think are lesbians to "straighten them out." Why do they have to consider what they are doing evil to be evil? Almost nobody considers themselves or what they are doing evil!

Truth: Humans need food to survive.

Do you like to play poker?

That's only one definition, which is th epoint of the OP. A ball that reflects red when hit by light containing a component of that wavelength isn't inherently red because it only has that behavior within a particular, defined fraome of reference.

For example? What color is that same ball when hit with light that contains only green wavelengths? The answer: The ball is black.

In the absence of light: Black.

Looking at it through an infrared filter: It would reflect a wavelength and intensity dependent upon its surface temperature and the conductivity of the surrounding medium.

But no, the ball isn't inherently red. In other words, red is not a defining attribute of the ball as it is not true for all frames of reference.

But doesn't it tell us something about the nature of the ball? Just because it's not true in all frames of reference doesn't make the observation invalid.

Truth: Rape is evil.

Evil is not objective.

That's only one definition, which is th epoint of the OP. A ball that reflects red when hit by light containing a component of that wavelength isn't inherently red because it only has that behavior within a particular, defined fraome of reference.

For example? What color is that same ball when hit with light that contains only green wavelengths? The answer: The ball is black.

In the absence of light: Black.

Looking at it through an infrared filter: It would reflect a wavelength and intensity dependent upon its surface temperature and the conductivity of the surrounding medium.

But no, the ball isn't inherently red. In other words, red is not a defining attribute of the ball as it is not true for all frames of reference.

The balll still retains the ability to reflect red light regardless of what light is shone upon it. Different lighting conditions don't change the chemical structure of the ball.

Evil is not objective.
Fine. Then how about this: Rape is unjustifiable.

Truth: 2 + 2 = 10 in base 4. I'm fine!

You're quite right. Sometimes rape can be good...

When?

Truth: Humans need oxygen to survive.

Derived from observation, presuposing science. Scientifically that is true. Logically that is probable (use of induction makes it less than strictly true). You can logically conceive an instance where it is false. You can also conceive a frame of perception in which it does not apply.

No. In fact, some people rape women they think are lesbians to "straighten them out." Why do they have to consider what they are doing evil to be evil? Almost nobody considers themselves or what they are doing evil!

Truth: Humans need food to survive.

Do you like to play poker?

So you admit that evil is objective.

Yes I do.

Lol, non sequitur. Arguing about religion is not necessarily related to arguing about science or logic. [quote]

Arguing is presumed to involve logic. :) (if we mean debating as opposed to shouting like a moron)


[quote]Not, it doesn't. Science is a set of tools we use to attempt to better understand the universe.Science != logic. Maths is closer to logic.

You mis-read. Science is a set of tools. One of those tools is logic. I didn't say logic is scientific, but rather the other way around.


Having an opinion doesn't make one right.

The point is that right is relative to the subject. An "opinion" is what we all have. Objective knowledge is what we don't: unless of course you successfully argue against Position 1). :)


Having an opinion still doesn't make one right.

See above.

I doubt it.

"Havinf an opinion doesn't make one right".:)

Not at all. In the dark the ball still retains the capacity to reflect red light, it is part of what it is.

You IMPLY. You DON'T KNOW and CAN'T VERIFY.

But doesn't it tell us something about the nature of the ball? Just because it's not true in all frames of reference doesn't make the observation invalid.

Thus the point. Any observation is valid only in its frame of reference.:)

The balll still retains the ability to reflect red light regardless of what light is shone upon it. Different lighting conditions don't change the chemical structure of the ball.

Colour = visual stimulus.
Chemical structure = scientific theory.

Different frames of perception:)

You IMPLY. You DON'T KNOW and CAN'T VERIFY.

Why not? Even in a dark place it is possible to generate light in the visible sprectrum.

Fine. Then how about this: Rape is unjustifiable.

Justification is subject to moral value judgment, thus subjective.

Truth: 2 + 2 = 10 in base 4. I'm fine!

Exactly. Frame of peception.

Derived from observation, presuposing science.

Depends on what you take science to be. I'm saying that my sensory perception is valid enough to make that statement. If it's not, then I'm quite surprised that humanity has gotten this far.


Scientifically that is true.

Does it really make sense for something to be only contextually true?


Logically that is probable (use of induction makes it less than strictly true).

This burden is unreasonable. We can't observe everything. We know that not a single human deprived of oxygen for a long time has ever survived.


You can logically conceive an instance where it is false. You can also conceive a frame of perception in which it does not apply.
Then conceive of such a frame of perception.

So you admit that evil is objective.

Yes I do.
If evil were not objective, what use would it be?

Truth: My favorite color is blue.

Why not? Even in a dark place it is possible to generate light in the visible sprectrum.

Dark != dark place :)

Dark = absence of light.
dark place = dimly lit place.

No misnomers please.:p

Dark != dark place :)

Dark = absence of light.
dark place = dimly lit place.

No misnomers please.:p

So the basis of this whole thread is that there is a place in the universe with absolutely no EM radiation whatsoever and a red ball?

Thus the point. Any observation is valid only in its frame of reference.:)

That wasn't my point. My point was, that even if it's in a limited frame of reference, it tells us something about the fundamental reality of the ball. The gist of the OP seems to be leaning towards the whole "Reality isn't real, and nothing can be known" viewpoint, and I am butting against that.

But doesn't it tell us something about the nature of the ball? Just because it's not true in all frames of reference doesn't make the observation invalid.

The balll still retains the ability to reflect red light regardless of what light is shone upon it. Different lighting conditions don't change the chemical structure of the ball.

Actually think of it this way:

'Red' is our name for an experience we have as a result of the sensitivity of our eye to wavelengths of a given range. That's not a property of the ball, it's a label we give it but it's actually a property of our eye.

"But Neo Bretonnia, you forget that the ball itself retains the property of reflecting light at specific wavelengths in the first place, which is why we see it as red."

Tha is true but look at the subtle difference: "The ball is red" REALLY means "The material on the surface of the ball reflects light wavelengths of around 625-740nm."

But even THAT definition is subject to the human experience. What's a nm? It's a unit of measure used by human beings to express distances. So even to say a particular ball reflects light at 725nm is a label derived by human beings, not an objective reality.

Everything is frame of reference. Everything.

Actually think of it this way:

'Red' is our name for an experience we have as a result of the sensitivity of our eye to wavelengths of a given range. That's not a property of the ball, it's a label we give it but it's actually a property of our eye.

"But Neo Bretonnia, you forget that the ball itself retains the property of reflecting light at specific wavelengths in the first place, which is why we see it as red."

Tha is true but look at the subtle difference: "The ball is red" REALLY means "The material on the surface of the ball reflects light wavelengths of around 625-740nm."

But even THAT definition is subject to the human experience. What's a nm? It's a unit of measure used by human beings to express distances. So even to say a particular ball reflects light at 725nm is a label derived by human beings, not an objective reality.

Everything is frame of reference. Everything.

It doesn't matter what you call it, though. It could have a glorknak of 43 sportsnicks, but it doesn't change the fundamental reality. It doesn't matter if you measure it in nm, meters, feet, parsecs, or any other human units of measure. The distance between the waves doesn't change, no matter what you call it.

I can call you froteuthge. Does that change who you are?

2) All modes of thinking are correct (i.e. consistent) [u]only[/i] within themselves: all modes of thinking are self-validating.
This, I believe, is the source of the supposed paradoxes in your conclusions. If, indeed, modes of thinking were entirely self-validating then I could not be in error if I were to deny the evidence of my senses.

This is not to say the evidence that my senses present on the nature of an objective reality is infallible. Indeed, assuming senses to be but a projection, illusion is very much possible, whether of reality itself as a consequence of a finite perspective or some intervening agent.

But what is undeniable is that the projection is perceived. That which is truly subjective is also, consequently, verifiably objective. Although I can never be sure about the nature of what it perceived, perception itself is an objective phenomenon.

(By the way, I'm using a Russell-style understanding of direct perception and sense, which includes Memory and Introspection as part of what is "seen", so to speak)

Modes of thinking that act against the direct perception that is experienced is self-delusion, and no amount of ideology can change that. It is patently false of me to say that the images representing my typing that are presented in me right now do not exist.

I'm not saying that this kind of verifiable objectivity applies to the questions of belief. All I'm saying is that as a principle, "it's not objective" isn't universal.

Actually think of it this way:

'Red' is our name for an experience we have as a result of the sensitivity of our eye to wavelengths of a given range. That's not a property of the ball, it's a label we give it but it's actually a property of our eye.

"But Neo Bretonnia, you forget that the ball itself retains the property of reflecting light at specific wavelengths in the first place, which is why we see it as red."

Tha is true but look at the subtle difference: "The ball is red" REALLY means "The material on the surface of the ball reflects light wavelengths of around 625-740nm."

But even THAT definition is subject to the human experience. What's a nm? It's a unit of measure used by human beings to express distances. So even to say a particular ball reflects light at 725nm is a label derived by human beings, not an objective reality.

Everything is frame of reference. Everything.

You are correct in that the labels and units of measurement are arbitrary. It doesn't change the fact that the ball retains the ability to reflect light at a certain wavelength regardless of the lighting conditions it encounters.

Depends on what you take science to be. I'm saying that my sensory perception is valid enough to make that statement. If it's not, then I'm quite surprised that humanity has gotten this far.

Not all Epistemologists are Realists or Empiricists. Have you heard of Solipsism?

This burden is unreasonable. We can't observe everything. We know that not a single human deprived of oxygen for a long time has ever survived.

All science is inductive, and all scientific truths are logically merely probable. This is well known, I don't see why it's such news to you. But logically you have to have perfect knowledge of a set to claim attributes of truth about all the propositions which include it. (Yes, that's exactly IT... we can't have perfect knowledge).


Then conceive of such a frame of perception.

I and everything you know are a figment of your imagination outside which nothing exists (reality = void). We are all your creation, but immaterial. Oxygen is something you have invented. We, as figments of your imagination do not need material oxygen to survive. We depend on your will/mental activity.


If evil were not objective, what use would it be?

It could be a mere human construct and used as a tool of social control. There is no reason to believe "evil" exists as an entity in reality (thus be objective). Ask yourself: if all humans went extint would evil exist?

Truth: My favorite color is blue.

Not a statement involving universals/absolutes. It doesn't challange the position "there is no objective truth".

So the basis of this whole thread is that there is a place in the universe with absolutely no EM radiation whatsoever and a red ball?

No, because the ball wouldn't be red.:D

But even THAT definition is subject to the human experience. What's a nm? It's a unit of measure used by human beings to express distances. So even to say a particular ball reflects light at 725nm is a label derived by human beings, not an objective reality.

Everything is frame of reference. Everything.
Sigh.

Systems of measurement simply rely on standards. We have defined a nanometer. We know exactly what it is, because we have the standard for it (Welcome to France. See this bar of metal shit? That's a meter). Things that can be measured in space span a certain number of nanometers. Therefore, those things are as long as we measure them (subject to the uncertainty of the instrument we are using to measure).

That wasn't my point. My point was, that even if it's in a limited frame of reference, it tells us something about the fundamental reality of the ball. The gist of the OP seems to be leaning towards the whole "Reality isn't real, and nothing can be known" viewpoint, and I am butting against that.

All definitions occur within limited frames of reference. Because by definition, to define, means to establish the limits of an entity/concept, and thus relay its meaning.

In one frame of reference the ball is red, in another "red" doesn't exist. That impacts nothing on the reality of the ball. The whole point was that what is the case, is the case only within the frame of reference used. The ball isn't universally "red" because "red" is not a concept universal to all frames of references. There are no concepts universal to all frames of reference.

No, because the ball wouldn't be red.:D

Why not?

Actually think of it this way:

'Red' is our name for an experience we have as a result of the sensitivity of our eye to wavelengths of a given range. That's not a property of the ball, it's a label we give it but it's actually a property of our eye.

"But Neo Bretonnia, you forget that the ball itself retains the property of reflecting light at specific wavelengths in the first place, which is why we see it as red."

Tha is true but look at the subtle difference: "The ball is red" REALLY means "The material on the surface of the ball reflects light wavelengths of around 625-740nm."

But even THAT definition is subject to the human experience. What's a nm? It's a unit of measure used by human beings to express distances. So even to say a particular ball reflects light at 725nm is a label derived by human beings, not an objective reality.

Everything is frame of reference. Everything.

Thank you. I was starting to believe I was in my own isolated frame of reference ;)

Arguing is presumed to involve logic. :) (if we mean debating as opposed to shouting like a moron)
Welcome to the internets, where we shout like morons :)




You mis-read. Science is a set of tools. One of those tools is logic. I didn't say logic is scientific, but rather the other way around.
I always had science figured more for observations and experimentation. Where does logic come into it?




The point is that right is relative to the subject. An "opinion" is what we all have. Objective knowledge is what we don't: unless of course you successfully argue against Position 1). :)
Oh, so this is one of those we don't really know anything threads. *grows bored*

It doesn't matter what you call it, though. It could have a glorknak of 43 sportsnicks, but it doesn't change the fundamental reality. It doesn't matter if you measure it in nm, meters, feet, parsecs, or any other human units of measure. The distance between the waves doesn't change, no matter what you call it.

I can call you froteuthge. Does that change who you are?

You are correct in that the labels and units of measurement are arbitrary. It doesn't change the fact that the ball retains the ability to reflect light at a certain wavelength regardless of the lighting conditions it encounters.

Sigh.

Systems of measurement simply rely on standards. We have defined a nanometer. We know exactly what it is, because we have the standard for it (Welcome to France. See this bar of metal shit? That's a meter). Things that can be measured in space span a certain number of nanometers. Therefore, those things are as long as we measure them (subject to the uncertainty of the instrument we are using to measure).

Aha but the issue was whether or not the ball is red. What we've done now is left that question far behind as we look for a TRULY objective way to describe the ball.

The point of the OP was that you just can't do that with certain supernatural phenomena, and thus the God question becomes pointless to argue about unless and until a way to describe it truly objectively emerges.

It doesn't matter what you call it, though. It could have a glorknak of 43 sportsnicks, but it doesn't change the fundamental reality. It doesn't matter if you measure it in nm, meters, feet, parsecs, or any other human units of measure. The distance between the waves doesn't change, no matter what you call it.

I can call you froteuthge. Does that change who you are?

The fundamental reality is indiscernable. Distance is not a Universal.:)

...(subject to the uncertainty of the instrument we are using to measure).
*Walks past singing "Heisenberg! Heisenberg!" in an annoyingly syncopated way*

Thank you. I was starting to believe I was in my own isolated frame of reference ;)

You're welcome, but it won't help. You're posting on a board populated by people who, generally speakinig, can't bear to let anyone have the last word ;)

Aha but the issue was whether or not the ball is red. What we've done now is left that question far behind as we look for a TRULY objective way to describe the ball.

The point of the OP was that you just can't do that with certain supernatural phenomena, and thus the God question becomes pointless to argue about unless and until a way to describe it truly objectively emerges.

I disagree. The ball is red, it is also rouge and aka. The word used is unimportant, nothing changes the fact it it red.

You're welcome, but it won't help. You're posting on a board populated by people who, generally speakinig, can't bear to let anyone have the last word ;)
That's because I'm right, dammit! >_<;;

:p

This, I believe, is the source of the supposed paradoxes in your conclusions. If, indeed, modes of thinking were entirely self-validating then I could not be in error if I were to deny the evidence of my senses.

Pretty much. For the sake of the argument, fundamental reality and logic are assumed. "Falseness"/error occrus within logic. If you deny it, then you would not be in error.

This is not to say the evidence that my senses present on the nature of an objective reality is infallible. Indeed, assuming senses to be but a projection, illusion is very much possible, whether of reality itself as a consequence of a finite perspective or some intervening agent.

The bottom line is that whatever your sense DO tell you, it needs have nothing to do with the fundamental reality of what you are seeing. And there is no way of knowing either way.

But what is undeniable is that the projection is perceived. That which is truly subjective is also, consequently, verifiably objective. Although I can never be sure about the nature of what it perceived, perception itself is an objective phenomenon.

Perception itself occurs from one point of view only: yours. It is thus subjective. That it occurs is, of course, necessary, but it can know nothing beyond itself: it is not objective. And since what you think you percieve is only verifiable through perception you cannot claim to be able to see the nature of reality beyond perception.

(By the way, I'm using a Russell-style understanding of direct perception and sense, which includes Memory and Introspection as part of what is "seen", so to speak)

I'm pretty much using a combination of Russel, Wittgenstein and Descartes. But Wittgenstein trumps Descartes so no ontological argument :p

Modes of thinking that act against the direct perception that is experienced is self-delusion, and no amount of ideology can change that. It is patently false of me to say that the images representing my typing that are presented in me right now do not exist.

Perception, as said above, cannot say anything beyond itself. You must presume what you perceive is fundamental reality to exclude everything else. Thus, by your argument, the scientific definition of colour is false, because you do not see wave-lenghts. You see colour.

Any mode of thinking is a mere interpretation of perception, trying to draw inferences about fundamental reality, pressing our conceptions upon said reality. All modes of thinking are self-delusion.

I'm not saying that this kind of verifiable objectivity applies to the questions of belief. All I'm saying is that as a principle, "it's not objective" isn't universal.

It need not be, but you can't verify it, and you can'y know. Anything you presupose of reality from perception is a form of belief.

You are correct in that the labels and units of measurement are arbitrary. It doesn't change the fact that the ball retains the ability to reflect light at a certain wavelength regardless of the lighting conditions it encounters.

If light is inexistent than the ability of reflecting it is not a property of the ball. You infer that it will still reflect light in a certain manner if light existed, but if it doesn't, then that is not a property of the ball. To say that the ball is red when light doesn't exist is non-sensical. Thus this property is not universal.

Sigh.

Systems of measurement simply rely on standards. We have defined a nanometer. We know exactly what it is, because we have the standard for it (Welcome to France. See this bar of metal shit? That's a meter). Things that can be measured in space span a certain number of nanometers. Therefore, those things are as long as we measure them (subject to the uncertainty of the instrument we are using to measure).

Again, space is not a Universal.

Why not?

"Red" doesn't exist if light doesn't exist, by definition.

If light is inexistent than the ability of reflecting it is not a property of the ball. You infer that it will still reflect light in a certain manner if light existed, but if it doesn't, then that is not a property of the ball. To say that the ball is red when light doesn't exist is non-sensical. Thus this property is not universal.

Where does EM radiation not exist?

Why does the chemical structure of the ball change in the absense of light?

That you may not be able to immediately observe the balls' redness is unimportant, it is still there.

I always had science figured more for observations and experimentation. Where does logic come into it?

The axioms of logic: identity, the law of causation etc. etc.
Any scientific theory pressuposes and employs the logical basics, most blatantly causation.

[/quote]Oh, so this is one of those we don't really know anything threads. *grows bored*[/QUOTE]

Ok then, shoo:rolleyes:

You're welcome, but it won't help. You're posting on a board populated by people who, generally speakinig, can't bear to let anyone have the last word ;)

We'll see;)

"Red" doesn't exist if light doesn't exist, by definition.

Light does exist. Logic is a nice tool but it is too often undone by reality.

I disagree. The ball is red, it is also rouge and aka. The word used is unimportant, nothing changes the fact it it red.

The concept of "red" requires a definition (we are not talking about the word, which is irrelevant, but the concept). In the absence of light that definition is nonsensical (this is the thrid time I'm saying this).

Where does EM radiation not exist?

Unless you know the whole vastness of the Universe I'm pretty sure, that is a mere assumption.

Why does the chemical structure of the ball change in the absense of light?

It doesn't. Again: colour is a visual stimulus. By definition it requires light. Chemical structure is not a visual stimulus. If the definition of "red" becomes non-sensical, it has no bearing on the chemical structure of the ball, because the definition of the latter does not require the concept of light.

That you may not be able to immediately observe the balls' redness is unimportant, it is still there.

I did not argue against observing it, but rather it existing. To exist colour necessitates light. One may still observe the ball (through other senses), but all attributes defined in relation to light cease to exist.

Light does exist. Logic is a nice tool but it is too often undone by reality.

Which again was one of my points. Logic says nothing about the nature of reality. And no other system does either.

But you didn't address the argument :)

Unless you know the whole vastness of the Universe I'm pretty sure, that is a mere assumption.

I think this is something we won't agree on. As far as I'm concerned background radiation exists in all parts on the universe due to how it came inot being.

It doesn't. Again: colour is a visual stimulus. By definition it requires light. Chemical structure is not a visual stimulus. If the definition of "red" becomes non-sensical, it has no bearing on the chemical structure of the ball, because the definition of the latter does not require the concept of light.


The potential is still there though.

I did not argue against observing it, but rather it existing. To exist colour necessitates light. One may still observe the ball (through other senses), but all attributes defined in relation to light cease to exist.

They may but the ball is still red, you just can't see it. :)

Which again was one of my points. Logic says nothing about the nature of reality. And no other system does either.

But you didn't address the argument :)

I have addressed the argument. Just because you can't see something, it doesn't mean it isn't there. ;)

I think this is something we won't agree on. As far as I'm concerned background radiation exists in all parts on the universe due to how it came inot being.

If you take science to be absolute/objective truth then you'd be right. I already contended that.

The potential is still there though.

Potential != actual.
Attributes are necessarily actual.

E.g.: I could be dark skinned (with enough time in the sun). I am very pale. Which am I? the potential or the actual?

They may but the ball is still red, you just can't see it. :)

Colour is a visual stimulus. You must be able to see it, for it to exist.

I have addressed the argument. Just because you can't see something, it doesn't mean it isn't there. ;)

An object yes, because an object can be perceived/observed through other means.

An attribute which necessitates a certain concept by definition, does not exist if that concept is absent.

If you take science to be absolute/objective truth then you'd be right. I already contended that.

I know, that's why I said we weren't going to agree.

Potential != actual.
Attributes are necessarily actual.

E.g.: I could be dark skinned (with enough time in the sun). I am very pale. Which am I? the potential or the actual?


A nuke is the most destructive thing mankind has ever devised. That is one of the defining attributes of a nuclear weapon. They look pretty peaceful sat in their tubes don't they?

Colour is a visual stimulus. You must be able to see it, for it to exist.

We can't see background colour of the universe but we know it is beige.

I'm just curious, OP: you've based your argument on the Tractatus. Why not the later Wittgenstein? This kind of objective truth about the nature of reality is dealt with very nicely in the Investigations (not specifically I don't think, but by method), and especially in On Certainty.

but logic (as per above) cannot say anything objective about reality.This was extremely strange to read, given the Tractatus' theme of logic being the mirror of reality (i.e. it's only through logic we know anything).

About solipsism: that view is... not rejected in the Tractatus, but nothing at all can be said about it - for, or against. (5.5571 is the start of the discussion on that). In effect, this collapses the solipsistic viewpoint into something much more like realism (5.64).

Of course, I don't think the later works would really lend themselves to your argument... :p

Perception itself occurs from one point of view only: yours. It is thus subjective. That it occurs is, of course, necessary, but it can know nothing beyond itself: it is not objective.
I understand what you're saying, but that the process of perception is not objective does not contradict sensation being an objective phenomenon, yeah?

And since what you think you percieve is only verifiable through perception you cannot claim to be able to see the nature of reality beyond perception.
This would seem to be so. What is seen is not reality, and it is presumptive to assume so. But the seeing is real, in some form or another. It is not a presumption to say that there is a need for reality to account for the occurrence of sensation, even if it is to assume that what you see is a trustable indication of what reality is. Consequently, any model of reality that fails to meet such a need is found lacking, no matter how self-consistent it may be.

The bottom line is that whatever your sense DO tell you, it needs have nothing to do with the fundamental reality of what you are seeing. And there is no way of knowing either way.
Perception, as said above, cannot say anything beyond itself. You must presume what you perceive is fundamental reality to exclude everything else. Thus, by your argument, the scientific definition of colour is false, because you do not see wave-lenghts. You see colour.
My point was not that perception was an arbiter of reality, but rather that it provides factors of reality. By your argument, it is permissable that someone else's world view might deny the existence of colour at all and still be correct. This is not the case, and the fact that I perceive colour is evidence of the fact that it is not only possible for colour to be perceived but that the reality in which I exist supports the perception of colour. Even though I might be open to the possibility that someone else's world view would not include notions of colour, or even that my perception of colour is anomalous, as long as our reality is shared, that reality must support my perception of colour.

Incidentally, that colour "is" incidental light of a particular wavelength is false. Colour is a property of image, not of form. :p

It need not be, but you can't verify it...
Sure I can. The existence of a single objective statement does so. And I can produce one; namely "Given the existence of observers that can see and/or not see colour, Reality supports the ability to do so respectively."

Truth independent of observation - as true from your perspective as it is from mine. That's objective, ne?

Any mode of thinking is a mere interpretation of perception, trying to draw inferences about fundamental reality, pressing our conceptions upon said reality. All modes of thinking are self-delusion.
That's not what modes of thinking are about. At least, it doesn't need to be, anyway. You're not trying to infer reality, because as we agree, reality is uninferrable. Thought models are about establishing a framework through which we can function within such an uninferrable reality. The fundamental question of Science is not "What is it?" but "How does it work?", and this is the essential difference between an intractable problem and a tractable one.

Most people don't get that, I think.

In support of 1): In the words of Wittgenstein, reality is like a picture. Any way of describing it involves creating a set of rules of description, for example casting a net of squares over the picture (in IT a bitmap), or creating concepts of lines and colours, and describing them relative to one another (in IT a vector image).

I'd suggest that you're making at least one assumption here: you're assuming that the only way of reaching any kind of meaningful objective truth is perception. I'm not sure other ways of approaching reality--like logical reasoning--can be usefully compared to a "picture" at all.

Any such device DOES NOT say anything about the nature of what is described (it says absolutely nothing about the reality of the picture).

It's not supposed to tell us anything about the reality of the picture; it's supposed to describe what's in it. I can come up with a description of something I merely imagine. The "reality" question has nothing to do with the description, but with the source of the picture itself; our description is just a way of grasping that picture. (We may well only have a limited understanding of reality. But that is quite a different claim from the idea that we cannot reach objective truth.)

It is a portrait of reality and is self-consistent by necessity, but it only has meaning within its frame of reference (i.e. a bitmap is "true" when read as such. When read as a txt document it is non-sensical).

Yeah, so? The question is not whether the terms we use to describe objective truth could be understood by anyone; the question is, rather, whether what they describe is actually real or not.

Any such device offers a unique perspective of reality, but says absolutely nothing about the nature of reality, because it has a different nature itself(*), dictated by the rules of interpretation we have established.

Just because we can't conceptualize "pure reality" doesn't mean our concepts have no element of reality in them at all. This is not a matter of "all or nothing." Language, for instance, may always fail to convey the complete truth, but that doesn't mean it fails to convey truth at all.

Both mechanisms presuppose light.

Well, by your definition. I don't like your definition. If I hold a red ball ina dark room, it's still red even though I can't see it at all. More properly, "red" is the quality of appearing like ":mad:" when exposed to light. It's a quality whose expression is limited by circumstance, but that doesn't mean it doesn't have objective truth.

In the absence of light nothing can be said about the nature of the ball in this respect.

Sure something can be said. I can say that when exposed to light it will give off redness. This is a poor argument. I say that my friend Smith is a fast runner. Does the mere fact that he is walking at the moment change the nature of my statement? (Perhaps it means I can't immediately test it, but that's a different direction entirely to take this.)

And since light is not a universal occurence, it is clear there is nothing absolute about the ball's "redness".

Doesn't follow. Light or no light, the ball is still red.

"Red" is a property of light, not of how what light reflects off. Thus, the fact that the ball has the same propensity of reflecting light in this manner is, in the dark is inconsequential.

Oh, now you just say it's "inconsequential"? That's a very different claim, because it has nothing whatsoever to do with the nature of its truth.

As said in my statement, I was talking about "redness" and this is not absolute/objective because it is dependent of a contingency.

When people call a ball "red" they're not saying that in every circumstance always it will give off redness, just that in ordinary circumstances, in the presence of light, it will. And that could be absolutely true even if in other circumstances it would not.

You IMPLY. You DON'T KNOW and CAN'T VERIFY.

Yes, you're right: we can't know that the ball is still red until we actually turn on a light. But what exactly does this prove about objective truth? It tells us nothing, as far as I can tell, about the way "frame of reference" necessarily denies us access to objective truth... because it's quite easy to limit our description of its redness to something that would suit narrow epistemological standards.

Language, for instance, may always fail to convey the complete truth, but that doesn't mean it fails to convey truth at all.This is a small gripe, but language certainly can convey the whole truth. What truth is left out when you say the ball is red to someone? If the purpose of this statement was to describe the color of the ball, then nothing has been left out. It's not supposed to be taken as an attempt to describe the shade of color -- that's an entirely different sentence. What truth is left out when you stub your toe and say, "Damn!"?

There's nothing hidden in those sentences that isn't understood in the circumstances in which they arise.

What truth is left out when you say the ball is red to someone? If the purpose of this statement was to describe the color of the ball, then nothing has been left out.

"Red" is a hopelessly vague term.

It's not supposed to be taken as an attempt to describe the shade of color -- that's an entirely different sentence.

This distinction between "shade" and "color" is a product of language, not of color. It just illustrates my point--we deal in vague "colors" because language only imprecisely conveys truth. Show someone the object in question, and the color is clear, down to the exact shade.

(Ever argued with someone about the color of something?)

What truth is left out when you stub your toe and say, "Damn!"?

None, but only because the statement isn't meant to communicate any truth.

"Red" is a hopelessly vague term.

This distinction between "shade" and "color" is a product of language, not of color. It just illustrates my point--we deal in vague "colors" because language only imprecisely conveys truth. Show someone the object in question, and the color is clear, down to the exact shade.

(Ever argued with someone about the color of something?)I use "red" all the time. It's not vague when I use it. Unless you mean that "red" can be used in many ways, but then again, if you said "red" then you obviously didn't care to make it any more precise (shades). If you don't care, then it's also reasonable to think that you mean it could be ANY of this sort of color -- which is exactly how it's used. I still don't see anything missing here.

None, but only because the statement isn't meant to communicate any truth.It isn't true that stubbing your toe hurts?

I use "red" all the time. It's not vague when I use it.

Sure it is. It's a word with no precise meaning. A variety of colors fit under the heading "red."

Unless you mean that "red" can be used in many ways, but then again, if you said "red" then you obviously didn't care to make it any more precise (shades).

So? Make it as precise as you please; you still won't specify the exact color.

If you don't care, then it's also reasonable to think that you mean it could be ANY of this sort of color -- which is exactly how it's used.

Yes, you're right. The fact that language can't communicate meaning precisely doesn't matter when the only meaning that needs to be conveyed is itself vague. But I'm talking about capacity, not intent. I didn't mean that this problem was always significant.

It isn't true that stubbing your toe hurts?

When you curse after stubbing your toe, that's not a meaning you're trying to convey. (And if you were, there's no way anyone would get that from your mere words.)

We can't see background colour of the universe but we know it is beige.

Actually, more advanced imaging techniques have revealed that the actual background color of the world is "Mariah Carey Mulato".

Sure it is. It's a word with no precise meaning. A variety of colors fit under the heading "red."Right.

Yes, you're right. The fact that language can't communicate meaning precisely doesn't matter when the only meaning that needs to be conveyed is itself vague. But I'm talking about capacity, not intent. I didn't mean that this problem was always significant.Capacity? Make up a new word for this specific red, then. Isn't that what we do? Unless you're troubled by the fact that other people don't understand what your word means until they're taught how to use it. But it would be strange to think of that as a limitation of language.

It would be even stranger to think that "precise" is also a word in language, so it is vague...

When you curse after stubbing your toe, that's not a meaning you're trying to convey. (And if you were, there's no way anyone would get that from your mere words.)Yet it can (and even does!) convey the fact that you're in pain, can't it?

Capacity? Make up a new word for this specific red, then.

How do you convey "this specific red" to someone? Only by showing him or her. And then meaning is not conveyed through language, but perception.

Meaning would only be conveyed through language if you then went around and used your new word to refer to a different object. But unless this new object is somehow exactly the same as the other, this will only be an imprecise description.

It would be even stranger to think that "precise" is also a word in language, so it is vague...

Indeed it is.

Yet it can (and even does!) convey the fact that you're in pain, can't it?

So? I'm not doubting that language can convey things. I'm doubting that it can convey things precisely. (Try precisely describing a sensation of pain.)

Ad Nihlo posits a number cojectures. Mainly I do not agree with him. Therfore, according to my objective view, he is wrong and I am right.

See the red ball bounce, bounce red ball, bounce.

How do you convey "this specific red" to someone? Only by showing him or her. And then meaning is not conveyed through language, but perception.Ok, so ostensive definitions can be misunderstood. But if they're misunderstood you can correct them easily enough. The person will try to use the word in an improper way and you can tell them that their way is wrong.

Meaning would only be conveyed through language if you then went around and used your new word to refer to a different object. But unless this new object is somehow exactly the same as the other, this will only be an imprecise description.I can uniquely name an object. Is that imprecise? No. I have other words that refer to color, shape, etc., so there is a distinction between the name of the object and the attributes of that object. Is there room for error? Sure, why not? That doesn't change the accuracy of the words.

This reminds me of the people that deny knowing any truth based on the idea that we are fallible beings-- yet we do use the word truth, don't we? How strange; we must not really know what ABSOLUTE truth means, then! But what does "absolute truth" refer to? What situations would we use it in? What does it mean to say, "THIS color!"? "THIS purple that I mean right now!"?

Indeed it is.Which would seem to make it a profitable endeavor to find under what circumstances "precise" is actually used, and then argue with that.

So? I'm not doubting that language can convey things. I'm doubting that it can convey things precisely. (Try precisely describing a sensation of pain.)Sure. "My leg feels like it's on fire." Or: "My right bicep is torn." Those are precise measurements of pain. Or maybe you like scales 1-10? I can do that too. What I'm trying to show here is that a "precise description" of something differs with different concepts. I can offer a precise description of a color if I say "FFFFFF." Or I can say "pure white." That's what "being precise" about color means. Now if you want to define "precise" as being only what is seen, well, I'm not going to stop you. But what you decide to do personally has no effect on others who probably will continue to use the words in their usual sense (e.g., pure white is precise) unless they have a reason not to.

*Walks past singing "Heisenberg! Heisenberg!" in an annoyingly syncopated way*
That's not the kind of uncertainty that I'm talking about, silly. :p

What I'm talking about is having a meter stick that measures to millimeters, and I measure something to be 2.3cm. More properly, I should say that what I have measured is 2.3 +/- .05 cm, because I can't see well enough to be sure I have measured 2.30 cm. You see?

What you are talking about is the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle which says that the product of a particle's uncertainty in position and its uncertainty in momentum is at least a half of h-bar.

When I measure the length of something with a meter stick, I am not interested in the object's momentum.

I can uniquely name an object. Is that imprecise? No.

That's because it isn't a description. It doesn't connect a concept to another concept; it just attaches a name (a sound, a word, a symbol) to a concept.

Names help us say things. But naming does not in itself convey meaning. Saying "This is called x" tells me absolutely nothing about what "this" is.

Which would seem to make it a profitable endeavor to find under what circumstances "precise" is actually used, and then argue with that.

And if we find that, as I've said, it is used with some imprecision?

Sure. "My leg feels like it's on fire." Or: "My right bicep is torn." Those are precise measurements of pain.

Um, those are quite imprecise. You convey the fact that you are in pain. To a greater or lesser degree, you may even be able to convey the kind of pain you feel--pain like fire, pain like tearing. But even at that level we are still speaking very vaguely when it comes to sensation. From hearing those words, no person can imagine precisely what you are feeling (though they may be able to approximate it.)

What I'm trying to show here is that a "precise description" of something differs with different concepts. I can offer a precise description of a color if I say "FFFFFF." Or I can say "pure white." That's what "being precise" about color means.

Now you're just equivocating. Come on.

Now if you want to define "precise" as being only what is seen, well, I'm not going to stop you.

No, I'm concerned with "precision" in description, and in the description of real things, not abstractions (which only can be precisely described by language because they themselves are imprecise representations of reality.)

But what you decide to do personally has no effect on others who probably will continue to use the words in their usual sense (e.g., pure white is precise) unless they have a reason not to.

If you recall, my original phrasing was "complete truth", and my reference to "precision" has been in that context: a "precise" description is one that describes something (say, the color of some object) completely--such that another person, hearing and understanding the description, could picture the thing exactly.

The fact that we use relative standards of precision in many contexts is irrelevant. Indeed, we do so because absolute precision is impossible.

What you are talking about is the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle which says that the product of a particle's uncertainty in position and its uncertainty in momentum is at least a half of h-bar.

When I measure the length of something with a meter stick, I am not interested in the object's momentum.
Yep, I know what you were talking about. Buuut... the Uncertainty Principle adds a new dimension of complexity to the question of "What is a nanometer", because when you're dealing with things on a low level it's not as easy as pointing to it and saying "Okay, that". What "that" is is implicitly unknown, after all!

That's because it isn't a description. It doesn't connect a concept to another concept; it just attaches a name (a sound, a word, a symbol) to a concept.

Names help us say things. But naming does not in itself convey meaning. Saying "This is called x" tells me absolutely nothing about what "this" is.I'm not sure what the problem is here. "Red" is just a word we use in certain circumstances. Those circumstances don't have to be completely defined in order for use to judge the use of the word accurately. What would convey meaning if not the use we give to the word? If I say the ball is red (for example, when teaching you colors), I would mean that you are to use the word red in this kind of sentence construction, in these circumstances. We aren't even trying to find out what "this" really is here. There's nothing interesting here that we aren't able to get at.

And if we find that, as I've said, it is used with some imprecision?Then you can correct it. It might also be true that the imprecision is useful in some circumstances.

Um, those are quite imprecise. You convey the fact that you are in pain. To a greater or lesser degree, you may even be able to convey the kind of pain you feel--pain like fire, pain like tearing. But even at that level we are still speaking very vaguely when it comes to sensation. From hearing those words, no person can imagine precisely what you are feeling (though they may be able to approximate it.)
What would a precise description of pain be, then? And if you think there is no precise description possible, then I am not sure what sense it makes to call the descriptions vague.

Now you're just equivocating. Come on. It is uninteresting to find out there's no mystery there, it's true.

No, I'm concerned with "precision" in description, and in the description of real things, not abstractions (which only can be precisely described by language because they themselves are imprecise representations of reality.)Ok. I'm concerned with precise descriptions of real things too.

If you recall, my original phrasing was "complete truth", and my reference to "precision" has been in that context: a "precise" description is one that describes something (say, the color of some object) completely--such that another person, hearing and understanding the description, could picture the thing exactly.How exactly do you mean "picture"? Does that mean: see it exactly as I see it? Well, what constitutes "exactly" here? How would you know if they didn't see it like you did? What would that come to?

It seems like you've set this idea up that doesn't let you be accurate. It was done like this:

I see the red ball.
I see the particular shade of red.
I don't have a word for that shade of red.
I can't teach someone that shade of red without pointing.
I can't be sure that someone knows what shade I'm talking about even after being taught.
Therefore, it is impossible for language to be precise, because there's always room for error.

But you don't seem to realize that "precision" is a variable term, with variable meanings. Of the meanings of precision with regards to color, none of them correspond to "seeing exactly what you see in your mind's eye". Why not? Well, how could it ever gain objective meaning if you're defining it as something subjective? Come now. You can be as precise as you like with colors, as with numbers. What determines the appropriate precision is the circumstance in which you want to distinguish those colors - but a given precision isn't necessarily vague.

Or again: if the meaning of "precision" cannot be subjective, then it must be objective. If it is objective, then what does that mean? It means, for example, that your description could be precise and still be misunderstood! But that possible misunderstanding doesn't change the fact that the description is precise ("pure white", etc).

Yep, I know what you were talking about. Buuut... the Uncertainty Principle adds a new dimension of complexity to the question of "What is a nanometer", because when you're dealing with things on a low level it's not as easy as pointing to it and saying "Okay, that". What "that" is is implicitly unknown, after all!
You are right, but this is not technically true.

We know what a nanometer is: it's 10^-9th of a meter, which is a bar of metal shit somewhere in France or Brussels or something.

What it is that we don't know though, is exactly how long something else is. That doesn't mean that other things don't have definite size. (And by definite size, I mean objects in the solid state on an everyday scale, so don't pull out quantum theory of the atom stuff on me. I am aware that the size of an atom is uncertain.)

I'm not sure what the problem is here. "Red" is just a word we use in certain circumstances. Those circumstances don't have to be completely defined in order for use to judge the use of the word accurately.

I'd suggest that at least half the problem here is that you insist on conflating "precision" and "accuracy." I can use "red" perfectly accurately while still being imprecise. To be imprecise is not to be wrong. An imprecise description is incomplete, partial--it is not false.

If I say the ball is red (for example, when teaching you colors), I would mean that you are to use the word red in this kind of sentence construction, in these circumstances.

There's a way I could quibble with this, but I don't think it's relevant, so I'll let it rest.

Then you can correct it.

Again, just because something is imprecise doesn't mean it's wrong. I can't "correct" an imprecise usage of "red" because all usages of "red" are imprecise: the concept they refer to is itself imprecise. (That's the point.)

It might also be true that the imprecision is useful in some circumstances.

So? I don't believe anyone has claimed that language isn't useful.

What would a precise description of pain be, then? And if you think there is no precise description possible, then I am not sure what sense it makes to call the descriptions vague.

I've already explained the sense: they are vague because they are partial, because they are incomplete, because they can't tell anyone the exact nature of your sensation.

It is uninteresting to find out there's no mystery there, it's true.

And now you're begging the question. ;)

How exactly do you mean "picture"? Does that mean: see it exactly as I see it?

Yes.

Well, what constitutes "exactly" here?

I don't think this is something that can be illuminated much by explanation. It's pretty clear: perfect similarity.

How would you know if they didn't see it like you did?

It's possible that, in generating an image from my words, he or she happens to come up with exactly what I see... but not only is this monumentally unlikely, but, more importantly, that meaning wasn't conveyed by my words. It's not a transfer of information, just a (ridiculously) lucky coincidence.

It seems like you've set this idea up that doesn't let you be accurate.

That would be weird, because I'm quite sure I can be accurate. It's whether I can be precise (and perfectly so) that's at issue.

I can't be sure that someone knows what shade I'm talking about even after being taught.

Perhaps not, but that is not the point.

Imagine I see a red ball. To more precisely describe its shade, I coin the term "ballred." If I want to teach anyone what "ballred" means, I show that person the ball, and say "Ballred is the color of that ball."

But so far I haven't conveyed any meaning. What I've been doing is naming: here is the color, this is what it's called. To convey meaning, I must use "ballred" to describe something else. But once I have turned "ballredness" into a general concept, once I have abstracted it from its particular manifestation in the red ball that gave it birth, it is no longer precise.

Color appears differently in different objects, and in the same object at different times and from different angles. To lump these different manifestations under the same word necessitates imprecision. The term is still accurate, and it still conveys meaning--at least as long as the colors are very similar--but it is not completely precise. It doesn't specify the exact color, just an approximation.

But you don't seem to realize that "precision" is a variable term, with variable meanings.

No, I realize this quite fine.

What you don't seem to realize is that I am here concerned with one particular meaning of precision, and it is equivocation to bring in the others as if they were relevant.

Well, how could it ever gain objective meaning if you're defining it as something subjective?

Why are you asking me? You're the one who apparently thinks we can describe subjective experiences (pain, color) precisely through language. You're the one who objected to me saying that language can't convey complete truth regarding such matters.

We can, of course, speak meaningfully of such subjective experiences, because we are capable of a high degree of intersubjectivity: we have similar subjective experiences, comparable ones to others. But we cannot speak precisely about them. We cannot read each other's minds--and if we could, we would not be using language.

What determines the appropriate precision is the circumstance in which you want to distinguish those colors

"Appropriate precision", yes. Relative precision. Enough precision for a given context, a given use. But not perfect precision. Not complete precision.

This is my ethical philosophy that I express everywhere I may go.

I am a skeptic by nature. I question everything I see, not taking what I am told at face value, but demanding proof, evidence, and corroborations before I accept something as true. Thus, when I am told by liberals that there was a conspiracy of American government officials involved in the terrorist attacks of 9-11, I am skeptical. If I am told by liberals that atrocities were committed in either Afganistan or Iraq by American forces against civilians, I am skeptical. If I am told by conservatives that tax cuts are a way to help the economy grow and that tax hikes hurt the economy, I am skeptical. If I am told by conservatives that the War in Iraq was justified even though no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found there even after being told before that they were there, I am VERY skeptical of that!!! When it comes to skepticism, I don't discriminate politically! I doubt everything!

Another thing I am adamant about is my sense of honor, which I hold more dear to me than my life. It allows for no exceptions whatsoever. So if I have lost friends or even made enemies for standing up for my honor, so be it. If I see someone who comes across to me as a liar, a bully, or just plain rude and stupid, then I usually try to fight back. If I see someone doing or saying things that damage the credibility of the causes I happen to believe in, I deeply take offense at that because I want those causes to be protected, even at the expense of picking fights with those who are unworthy to support those causes. I beleive in absolute standards of right and wrong and so I see no point in ever excusing something that is wrong because the wrongdoer is otherwise a friendly or nice guy. That's how corruption sets in.

Part of my being honorable is refusing to paint the members of any group, whether political, religious, or national, with the same brush. Among my friends, you will see all kinds of people. Conservatives, liberals, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Pagans, Athiests, Americans, Europeans, Asians, Austrailians, meat-eaters and vegetarians. That diversity I deeply treasure. Once I recognize that another soul is honorable, no matter what else may be true of that person, I embrace him as a brother. But if I discover a fellow American, a fellow agnostic, a fellow liberal, or a fellow chess player to be dishonorable in his behavior, he becomes my enemy, period. I distrust and shun him like I would a leper.

Because I am honorable, I sometimes willingly concede points made by my opponents in debates with them. This should never be seen as a sign of weakness. When I know I am right about something, I will fight like a pit bull to prove my case and defeat my opponent because in some cases I do see my battles here as a struggle between light and darkness, good and evil, ignorance and knowledge. But I am also willing at times to listen to my opponent and consider his point of view, especially if that person is known by me to be honorable. If we do not listen to others, how can we ever grow in knowledge?

No matter how great the pressure, I feel that one must never "sell out". It is being able to stand up to the urge to conform to the shallow desires and priorites of others who have a limited vision that makes one truly heroic. I choose my friends according to my ideals; I never bend my ideals for the sake of keeping friends.

Any questions?

Any questions?

Yes. Do you know any other honorable people who write long posts in the Internet about how honorable they are?

I am a skeptic by nature. I question everything I see, not taking what I am told at face value, but demanding proof, evidence, and corroborations before I accept something as true. Thus, when I am told by liberals that there was a conspiracy of American government officials involved in the terrorist attacks of 9-11, I am skeptical. If I am told by liberals that atrocities were committed in either Afganistan or Iraq by American forces against civilians, I am skeptical. If I am told by conservatives that tax cuts are a way to help the economy grow and that tax hikes hurt the economy, I am skeptical. If I am told by conservatives that the War in Iraq was justified even though no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found there even after being told before that they were there, I am VERY skeptical of that!!! When it comes to skepticism, I don't discriminate politically! I doubt everything!

This is more of an epistemological standpoint, but I get it.


Another thing I am adamant about is my sense of honor, which I hold more dear to me than my life.

No offense, but I doubt that. I find it very difficult to imagine people valuing such things over their own lives.


It allows for no exceptions whatsoever. So if I have lost friends or even made enemies for standing up for my honor, so be it. If I see someone who comes across to me as a liar, a bully, or just plain rude and stupid, then I usually try to fight back. If I see someone doing or saying things that damage the credibility of the causes I happen to believe in, I deeply take offense at that because I want those causes to be protected, even at the expense of picking fights with those who are unworthy to support those causes.

A person of integrity.


I beleive in absolute standards of right and wrong and so I see no point in ever excusing something that is wrong because the wrongdoer is otherwise a friendly or nice guy. That's how corruption sets in.

I like you. :fluffle:


Part of my being honorable is refusing to paint the members of any group, whether political, religious, or national, with the same brush.

I will hold you to that.


Among my friends, you will see all kinds of people. Conservatives, liberals, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Pagans, Athiests, Americans, Europeans, Asians, Austrailians, meat-eaters and vegetarians. That diversity I deeply treasure. Once I recognize that another soul is honorable, no matter what else may be true of that person, I embrace him as a brother. But if I discover a fellow American, a fellow agnostic, a fellow liberal, or a fellow chess player to be dishonorable in his behavior, he becomes my enemy, period. I distrust and shun him like I would a leper.

1. e4 ...


Because I am honorable, I sometimes willingly concede points made by my opponents in debates with them. This should never be seen as a sign of weakness.

This is the wrong forum for you... lol


Any questions?

What's your sign?

Any questions?

Why in my thread? Get a blog.

Snip

I see we essentially agree except for one thing. You see all perception as partly (and only partly) true/relevant in regards to fundamental reality.

I would to a certain degree agree, in that from our perspective what we see is likely to be true. To a certian degree, I disagree in that we necessarily impose our (pre-)conception of what reality is and what we should be seeing on what we see (for example there are no such things as "tables" in fundamental reality - "table" is a human concept... apply this ad infinitum and you see where I'm comming from). This is more a matter of predilection (the "jump of faith" I was refering to in the OP).

And lastly, you choose to believe that from impartial truths, you can derive objective knowledge. Again I disagree. We don't even know how "imperfect" our perception is, and we have no real conception of perfection any way. We don't even know what we aim at, so we don't know when we are there. We may have valid interpretations of the world but they will never be objective truth, mainly because of the limits of though and language (as you supported earlier). We cannot think of the world unless we conceptualise it. But Fundamental Reality is independent of our concepts (these mechanisms of simplification/interpretation of reality hide its fundamental nature by necessity).

1) I posit that if there is such a thing as an objective truth to anything, then we have not yet discerned it, and it seems likely that we never will.

Sorry didn't read the whole thing, coz really it all falls down here.

Some truths are objective and some are not.

The problem here is that the OP first says things that may make sense in a way so general as to be meaningless, then uses it to create implications for the world that it is not so general.

Yes, talking about faith and science presumes or requires certain concepts that we must create, and it is theoretically possible that these concepts are leading us astray in some way. Or rather, that we don't create some concepts that should be created.

But given that we are in fact human beings on this planet, we all share these concepts already. Anything at all we can think about or debate is framed within these concepts, and they don't need to vary between people. When they do, it's a matter of avoiding misunderstanding, which just means making sure our terms of reference match up, and we can continue debating. To use your example, "red" may not be a universal a priori truth in itself, but that doesn't mean I'm correct in looking at a blue ball and calling it red. 2 + 2 may be 10 in base 4, but that's not what we mean when we say 2 + 2. Given that we generally do mean base 10, 2 + 2 = 4 is the correct answer and you would not be arguing against this by talking about base 4. So as far as the transfer and acquisition of knowledge is concerned, our claims must necessarily be consistent with our terms of reference, which can be shared with other people. And once we all share the same terms of reference, we can use them to describe the universe in its entirety. You could perhaps argue that we'd end up with that brilliant little invention of a parallel, true world as opposed to the world that we know. And as always, that would be utterly and completely meaningless.

In short: the terms of reference argument doesn't prevent us from having arguments, debates and proving each other wrong. All we need is to share our terms of reference, and it doesn't matter whose we use because the things we describe with them are the same and their reality doesn't change. If there were no light, there'd be no way to discover the particular chemical property that makes us call a ball red, but then it would be irrelevant because the concept of red itself wouldn't have to exist. It would serve no purpose to describe anything at all. The fact that red exists as a concept means that light exists which means that whether or not a ball is red can be determined. Now, to get back to god, the question must then be asked what exactly god is, what exactly we refer to when we say "god". If we are all talking about the same thing, then there is no terms of reference argument involved here, and we can debate all we want.

Of course, that's not even touching the fun part: an OP that claims to know that we can't know anything.

1) I posit that if there is such a thing as an objective truth to anything, then we have not yet discerned it, and it seems likely that we never will.


"I think, therefore I am"? Sounds pretty much 100% true to me..

"I think, therefore I am"? Sounds pretty much 100% true to me..

Heh the problem with that of course is the endless 'I think, therefore I think I am'

I'd suggest that at least half the problem here is that you insist on conflating "precision" and "accuracy." I can use "red" perfectly accurately while still being imprecise. To be imprecise is not to be wrong. An imprecise description is incomplete, partial--it is not false.

Again, just because something is imprecise doesn't mean it's wrong. I can't "correct" an imprecise usage of "red" because all usages of "red" are imprecise: the concept they refer to is itself imprecise. (That's the point.)Someone points at something that's rather orange looking and says it's red. Can you correct them?

I've already explained the sense: they are vague because they are partial, because they are incomplete, because they can't tell anyone the exact nature of your sensation.Ok, explain to me the nature of this sensation.

And now you're begging the question. ;)I don't think I am.

I don't think this is something that can be illuminated much by explanation. It's pretty clear: perfect similarity.What constitutes perfect similarity?

It's possible that, in generating an image from my words, he or she happens to come up with exactly what I see... but not only is this monumentally unlikely, but, more importantly, that meaning wasn't conveyed by my words. It's not a transfer of information, just a (ridiculously) lucky coincidence."Generating an image"? I don't usually see red when I'm listening to someone. I don't have to imagine a red spot in order to know what, for example, "FF0000" is. So, as far as I'm concerned, people have "conveyed meaning" as long as the listener can do something they couldn't do before hearing you speak.

That would be weird, because I'm quite sure I can be accurate. It's whether I can be precise (and perfectly so) that's at issue."Perfectly" precise about a color. What exactly IS that? What is an example of perfect precision?

Perhaps not, but that is not the point.

Imagine I see a red ball. To more precisely describe its shade, I coin the term "ballred." If I want to teach anyone what "ballred" means, I show that person the ball, and say "Ballred is the color of that ball."

But so far I haven't conveyed any meaning. What I've been doing is naming: here is the color, this is what it's called. To convey meaning, I must use "ballred" to describe something else. But once I have turned "ballredness" into a general concept, once I have abstracted it from its particular manifestation in the red ball that gave it birth, it is no longer precise.

Color appears differently in different objects, and in the same object at different times and from different angles. To lump these different manifestations under the same word necessitates imprecision. The term is still accurate, and it still conveys meaning--at least as long as the colors are very similar--but it is not completely precise. It doesn't specify the exact color, just an approximation.I am sure you could describe lighting conditions with language if you really wanted to. Another question: if you want to describe a specific color...why not just use it when the two objects have exactly the same color? You could only use this color word under these lighting conditions, etc.

No, I realize this quite fine.

What you don't seem to realize is that I am here concerned with one particular meaning of precision, and it is equivocation to bring in the others as if they were relevant.They are relevant because this "one particular" meaning of precision is not like some of the others, but you're understanding it on analogy with those (which is the source of your problem).

Why are you asking me? You're the one who apparently thinks we can describe subjective experiences (pain, color) precisely through language. You're the one who objected to me saying that language can't convey complete truth regarding such matters.If I believed we could say anything subjective in language, then I could hardly have said that you were wrong. No, you're the one who has this idea of conveying subjective experiences through language...you're the one that's stumbling over it. Color, for me, is a public experience, like all language. As such its explanations are public and its limits are public. You're the one who has this idea about not being able to describe the color you're thinking of precisely -- and that comes out of this nonsense-subjective idea that you've got.

We can, of course, speak meaningfully of such subjective experiences, because we are capable of a high degree of intersubjectivity: we have similar subjective experiences, comparable ones to others. But we cannot speak precisely about them. We cannot read each other's minds--and if we could, we would not be using language.
Intersubjectivity? :D I'm sorry, but how does that help you? Intersubjectivity tells you about what people do, not what image people have got in the heads. As far as that goes, it fails massively. There is absolutely nothing stopping someone from thinking or perceiving subjectively in a completely different way (inverted qualia and all that), intersubjectivity or no. Guess why? Because it's subjective and even defined as something you can't know. Hilarious.

All you know is that people act in certain ways. That's it. You have absolutely no idea how they're subjectively perceiving anything. To say you do (or even might!) is an incredible assumption-- and one that is completely unnecessary.

Like I said before, language is public. The meanings of color words and even of "precision with colors" is public too. Being public, it has a certain use--and it's not a use based on subjective perceptions. Anything subjective is completely ignored by language because a public language cannot convey private experiences. Some people want to try though, and when they fail they think it's language's problem. It's not. It's almost like expecting a pig without wings to fly and then blaming the pig for not flying. This, I might add, does not appear to be a reasonable expectation. In fact, it seems to stem from a misunderstanding about how words are used.

"Appropriate precision", yes. Relative precision. Enough precision for a given
context, a given use. But not perfect precision. Not complete precision.So let me get this straight: you can take your precision to an arbitrary point, precise enough for any given use. You can keep calculating the number Pi forever. Does that mean the the millionth digit is imprecise? --well, only in context of a given use. It would be incredibly precise for my math homework, but probably would be imprecise if you were calculating something at astronomical distances. Now you've agreed that any need can be met and exceeded. So what's the problem?


edit: I don't care to continue posting in this topic. If you still want to insist on how you can't do anything precisely with language I'm not going to keep arguing with you. Just note that your view is self-imposed. I hope you're happy with it.

"I think, therefore I am"? Sounds pretty much 100% true to me..

Yes, but it says nothing about the Subject. It's a tautology, necessarily true, and independent of reality.

Sorry didn't read the whole thing, coz really it all falls down here.

Some truths are objective and some are not.

Just because you hold some truths as objective, doesn't make them so.

Just because you hold some truths as objective, doesn't make them so.

Heh well that would be subjectivity now huh.

An example of a objective truth then? It is objectivly true that theplanet we inhabit revolves around the body that we call the sun.

Is this not objectivly true, or do you mean some strange thing when you say objective?

The problem here is that the OP first says things that may make sense in a way so general as to be meaningless, then uses it to create implications for the world that it is not so general.

Yes, talking about faith and science presumes or requires certain concepts that we must create, and it is theoretically possible that these concepts are leading us astray in some way. Or rather, that we don't create some concepts that should be created.

But given that we are in fact human beings on this planet, we all share these concepts already. Anything at all we can think about or debate is framed within these concepts, and they don't need to vary between people. When they do, it's a matter of avoiding misunderstanding, which just means making sure our terms of reference match up, and we can continue debating. To use your example, "red" may not be a universal a priori truth in itself, but that doesn't mean I'm correct in looking at a blue ball and calling it red. 2 + 2 may be 10 in base 4, but that's not what we mean when we say 2 + 2. Given that we generally do mean base 10, 2 + 2 = 4 is the correct answer and you would not be arguing against this by talking about base 4. So as far as the transfer and acquisition of knowledge is concerned, our claims must necessarily be consistent with our terms of reference, which can be shared with other people. And once we all share the same terms of reference, we can use them to describe the universe in its entirety. You could perhaps argue that we'd end up with that brilliant little invention of a parallel, true world as opposed to the world that we know. And as always, that would be utterly and completely meaningless.

Communication takes part through perception. You missed the part where the sharing of these frames of reference are as liable of erronous interpretation as anything else. But one of my conclusions was exactly this: don't argue in blatantly different frames of reference (which is what happens most often in religion threads).

In short: the terms of reference argument doesn't prevent us from having arguments, debates and proving each other wrong. All we need is to share our terms of reference, and it doesn't matter whose we use because the things we describe with them are the same and their reality doesn't change. If there were no light, there'd be no way to discover the particular chemical property that makes us call a ball red, but then it would be irrelevant because the concept of red itself wouldn't have to exist. It would serve no purpose to describe anything at all. The fact that red exists as a concept means that light exists which means that whether or not a ball is red can be determined. Now, to get back to god, the question must then be asked what exactly god is, what exactly we refer to when we say "god". If we are all talking about the same thing, then there is no terms of reference argument involved here, and we can debate all we want.

No, it doesn't stop us from arguing within frames of reference. But right and wrong only occur within those frames of reference.
As for God I have yet to see anyone establish a satisfactory definition. Thus why I urged against religious debate.

Of course, that's not even touching the fun part: an OP that claims to know that we can't know anything.

You haven't been reading carefully then. I said we may know objective truth, but only by accident, and then we wouldn't know that what we know is superior to knowledge from other frames of reference.

Heh well that would be subjectivity now huh.

An example of a objective truth then? It is objectivly true that theplanet we inhabit revolves around the body that we call the sun.

Is this not objectivly true, or do you mean some strange thing when you say objective?

How do you know the planet revolves around the sun? (I'm not being daft, please to explain the chain of reasoning).

How do you know the planet revolves around the sun? (I'm not being daft, please to explain the chain of reasoning).

I can see where you are going but it's not going to work.

Science has indeed found out that we do revolve around the sun, we have had people up in space who have seen this is fact. That I subjectivly choose to belive them does not make it suddenly non objective.

Wether you choose to belive it or not does not change the objectivity of the matter.

I can see where you are going but it's not going to work.

Science has indeed found out that we do revolve around the sun, we have had people up in space who have seen this is fact. That I subjectivly choose to belive them does not make it suddenly non objective.

:eek: I'm sorry... you've just short circuited my brainz.

I don't think I could be this absurd if I tried.

1) Science works on observation and induction. I have argued against both already.

2) How can you label something objective in the same sentence in which you admit your belief in it is subjective. You have attributed objectivity to science [full stop]. No proof, no argument no nothing.

3) "It seems likely that the earth revolves around the sun". That is ALL science can claim, and no more. Call it fact, reality, whatever you like. Logically it is merely probable.

Wether you choose to belive it or not does not change the objectivity of the matter.[/quote]

It doesn't change the nature of reality no. But you have yet to provide any argument for your belief being objective truth.

You haven't been reading carefully then. I said we may know objective truth, but only by accident, and then we wouldn't know that what we know is superior to knowledge from other frames of reference.

So, you're saying that there are indeed fundamental truths out there, but we can't know them because we can't determine if they are more valid than another view due to frame of reference limitations?

I argue that the ball returning red light when hit with white is a fundamental truth. I know that fundamental truth is better than the conjecture that it returns green light, because I can measure it with a spectrophotometer and get a number. This number is merely a representation of the fundamental truth, it is not the truth itself. However, this does not mean I can't understand the truth simply because of the limitations of my language. Language is a way of conveying your frame of reference to another person. It has nothing to do with YOUR knowledge of the real.

Heh well that would be subjectivity now huh.

An example of a objective truth then? It is objectivly true that theplanet we inhabit revolves around the body that we call the sun.

Is this not objectivly true, or do you mean some strange thing when you say objective?
An Objective truth as it's generally understood is not just a true and objective statement. Objective truth is that whose validity is objective. In other words, not only is the statement accurate and relevant to the nature of existence independent of a given frame of reference, but so too is the justification of that statement. Or, if you want to think of it in modal logic terms, not only is it true, but it is also true in all possible states of being.

That's why I had to go a round-about way to get my objectively true statement earlier; I have to appeal to the axioms of truth itself in order to actually show something to be objectively true.

Some would argue that in relying on truth axioms, I am depending upon a subjective stance, since the objectivity of such axioms is never confirmed but only asserted. The objectivity of truth itself is up in the air, but the existence of facts independent of an observer's frame of reference suggest that if truth is to mean something, it certainly shouldn't preclude that fact.

Someone points at something that's rather orange looking and says it's red. Can you correct them?

Of course. That description is inaccurate. What does it have to do with imprecision?

Ok, explain to me the nature of this sensation.

Language can't precisely explain sensation.

What constitutes perfect similarity?

I think the term speaks for itself. If you don't think it does, you're going to have to ask a more productive question than that one.

"Generating an image"? I don't usually see red when I'm listening to someone. I don't have to imagine a red spot in order to know what, for example, "FF0000" is.

So? If anything, this just proves the point: "red" is abstract and imprecise enough that you can deal with it without referencing perception at all.

So, as far as I'm concerned, people have "conveyed meaning" as long as the listener can do something they couldn't do before hearing you speak.

That's right (well, no, it isn't, but it's close enough for our purposes). I don't doubt that language can convey meaning. I doubt that language can convey precise meaning.

"Perfectly" precise about a color. What exactly IS that? What is an example of perfect precision?

For the millionth time: a description such that someone else could envision the exact shade. A description that passes along the same information that you have gained from perceiving the color. A complete description.

Do you want me to give an example of such a description in words? But the whole point is that that's impossible.

Another question: if you want to describe a specific color...why not just use it when the two objects have exactly the same color? You could only use this color word under these lighting conditions, etc.

Because exact similarity simply doesn't exist in the real world. A word whose meaning was confined to one precise manifestation would be useless; it would be incapable of describing anything else.

They are relevant because this "one particular" meaning of precision is not like some of the others, but you're understanding it on analogy with those (which is the source of your problem).

No, I'm not. You're the one who has brought in other senses of precision. I, on the other hand, have used the term consistently throughout.

Color, for me, is a public experience, like all language. As such its explanations are public and its limits are public.

"Like all language"? But color isn't language; color is something we experience directly. Perhaps by "color" you mean our names for colors: "red", "orange", etc. But then your argument is circular, useless, and irrelevant, because obviously language can deal perfectly precisely with our linguistic categories of color--they are a part of language, and don't need to be mediated through it.

You're the one who has this idea about not being able to describe the color you're thinking of precisely

Communicating meaning must go beyond the manipulation of symbols. The whole point is to use the symbols to represent something else. The question is, can that something else, mediated through the symbols, be left exactly intact on the other side? Can it be transfered precisely?

There is absolutely nothing stopping someone from thinking or perceiving subjectively in a completely different way (inverted qualia and all that), intersubjectivity or no.

"Nothing" except the fact that we are all human, with human minds and human modes of perception. We are capable of language, of communication, precisely because we experience the world similarly enough that we can understand others.

Guess why? Because it's subjective and even defined as something you can't know.

"Knowledge" in a strict philosophical sense is a very narrow standard. I'm not sure we can "know" much of anything. But that doesn't mean we are incapable of having support for positions regarding the subjective content of other people's minds.

True, I could be a mindless machine responding to your posts... but that's far less plausible than the notion that I'm an actual mind.

All you know is that people act in certain ways. That's it.

Well, that's all I perceive. Certainly I don't know that either.

You have absolutely no idea how they're subjectively perceiving anything.

I could ask them. I could compare my experiences to their depiction of theirs. We could discuss the similarities and differences. Often we know when others experience things differently from us ("know" here used in a loose non-philosophical sense): we can tell, for instance, when people hate activities we love, or love activities we hate.

We don't, admittedly, know whether our experiences of color match up with those of others. We just assume they do--a plausible assumption, in the absence of counter-evidence, that makes sense given the fact that our brains are broadly physiologically similar.

To say you do (or even might!) is an incredible assumption-- and one that is completely unnecessary.

Of course it is necessary. If you didn't believe it, you wouldn't be having this conversation, which, like all meaningful conversation, is the interaction of subjective minds--and depends upon minds similar enough that they do not merely talk past one another, but can understand.

Like I said before, language is public. The meanings of color words and even of "precision with colors" is public too. Being public, it has a certain use--and it's not a use based on subjective perceptions.

Ah, I'm beginning to see our problem.

I insist that language can only imprecisely transmit meaning. You disagree, but only because you don't think language can transmit meaning at all. For you, it's just the "public" element--the common forms, but without the necessarily private meanings behind them. For you, it makes no difference to "communication" whether you are communicating with a self-conscious human being or a well-programmed and utterly mindless robot, as long as they both respond correctly.

In other words, you don't present a solution to the problem; you just abolish the context such that there is no problem. You don't present any possibility for making human interaction more complete, you just pretend that it is necessarily even less than it actually is.

Now you've agreed that any need can be met and exceeded.

Again, who said language isn't useful? Language is remarkably utilitarian: for precisely the reason you point out, we can use it to describe any object in instrumental terms.

But what if I don't want to use something? What if I want to experience it? The mediation and abstraction of symbolic culture is marvelously useful for all the various purposes to which it is put, but in the process it has the potential to erode something that may be even more important: the prospect of an unalienated existence, of a world we live in and experience rather than one we always leap to use.

Just note that your view is self-imposed.

You are not even remotely convincing... so I think I'll take my "self-imposition", thanks.

To a certian degree, I disagree in that we necessarily impose our (pre-)conception of what reality is and what we should be seeing on what we see

Maybe sometimes. Always? I am not convinced.

And lastly, you choose to believe that from impartial truths, you can derive objective knowledge. Again I disagree. We don't even know how "imperfect" our perception is,

Not with exactness, no.

That's why we provisionally accept what the best evidence supports: we use reason and perception as best we can. But we always maintain a critical mind... we examine ourselves, our cultures, our assumptions, and contradictions and ambiguities within our understanding of the world to get at the ways in which we are blinded and misled.

Critique, however, is not the same as absolute rejection.

We may have valid interpretations of the world but they will never be objective truth, mainly because of the limits of though and language (as you supported earlier). We cannot think of the world unless we conceptualise it.

Perhaps. We can never rest, and say "We have THE truth."

But that does not mean that we cannot make progress. The fact that perfect knowledge is impossible does not make the search for any kind of knowledge futile.

But Fundamental Reality is independent of our concepts (these mechanisms of simplification/interpretation of reality hide its fundamental nature by necessity).

But what we "get" is a mixture: some of it the "mechanisms", some of it the reality.

In the absence of any other evidence, it makes sense to provisionally accept our perception as at least an approximation of reality... subject, of course, to further rational investigation of the sort I have referenced above.

Soheran said:
Do you know any other honorable people who write long posts in the Internet about how honorable they are?
That's what philosophers do. They define their values and share them with others. I thought others were doing the same here. Excuse me for attempting to take things in a positive direction!

Ad Nihilo said
Why in my thread? Get a blog.
That WAS a blog I had posted. Get a CLUE!

That's what philosophers do.

Surely a true lover of wisdom would strive to be honorable, not to tell others how honorable he or she is?

They define their values and share them with others.

But they don't claim to epitomize those values. Indeed, they are well aware of their own flaws, they are always on the watch for their failure to uphold their ideals, and they are always very cautious to conclude that they have achieved virtue... aware as they are that it is a constant struggle.

(Except for me. I am always right already.)

I thought others were doing the same here.

As a matter of fact, we weren't--we were responding to the original post.

So, you're saying that there are indeed fundamental truths out there, but we can't know them because we can't determine if they are more valid than another view due to frame of reference limitations?

I argue that the ball returning red light when hit with white is a fundamental truth. I know that fundamental truth is better than the conjecture that it returns green light, because I can measure it with a spectrophotometer and get a number. This number is merely a representation of the fundamental truth, it is not the truth itself. However, this does not mean I can't understand the truth simply because of the limitations of my language. Language is a way of conveying your frame of reference to another person. It has nothing to do with YOUR knowledge of the real.

More or less but take it one step forward. Yes, all frames of reference/thought convey something about fundamental reality but none can be known to be of the same nature from which objective truths follow. Yes, the scientific description of colour tells you something about the ball, as does seeing it, but neither can be known to be of the same nature as the ball's fundamental reality, so language can make relative claims, but no objective ones.

An Objective truth as it's generally understood is not just a true and objective statement. Objective truth is that whose validity is objective. In other words, not only is the statement accurate and relevant to the nature of existence independent of a given frame of reference, but so too is the justification of that statement. Or, if you want to think of it in modal logic terms, not only is it true, but it is also true in all possible states of being.

That's why I had to go a round-about way to get my objectively true statement earlier; I have to appeal to the axioms of truth itself in order to actually show something to be objectively true.

Some would argue that in relying on truth axioms, I am depending upon a subjective stance, since the objectivity of such axioms is never confirmed but only asserted. The objectivity of truth itself is up in the air, but the existence of facts independent of an observer's frame of reference suggest that if truth is to mean something, it certainly shouldn't preclude that fact.

Spot on. All axioms require belief, including the axioms of truth. "If truth is true then it is true, but it may still be false" sort of thing.

Maybe sometimes. Always? I am not convinced.

Look at what you see this second: what of what you see do you not automatically place in a category of meaning (a concept)?

Not with exactness, no.

That's why we provisionally accept what the best evidence supports: we use reason and perception as best we can. But we always maintain a critical mind... we examine ourselves, our cultures, our assumptions, and contradictions and ambiguities within our understanding of the world to get at the ways in which we are blinded and misled.

Critique, however, is not the same as absolute rejection.

Well my position is, strictly speaking, agnostic. But applying logic (something to which I am aware I submit in the form of a leap of faith) it seems reasonable that from what may be and what may not, what may not is more likely to occur. Non-existence is a sort of lowest common denominator.


Perhaps. We can never rest, and say "We have THE truth."

Exactly.

[/quote]But that does not mean that we cannot make progress. The fact that perfect knowledge is impossible does not make the search for any kind of knowledge futile.[/quote]

Any kind of progress in knowledge is bassed on assumptions. It may be useful, but it can never be claimed to be true strictly speaking (like all science fan boys like to trumpet).


But what we "get" is a mixture: some of it the "mechanisms", some of it the reality.

In the absence of any other evidence, it makes sense to provisionally accept our perception as at least an approximation of reality... subject, of course, to further rational investigation of the sort I have referenced above.

No. We accept them out of convenience, but this is not equivalent with "reasonable". Yes we do accept them, but we should do so aware of the limitations. The point of this was that noone can claim to hold absolute truth, and when we can all accept that, certain people will have less moral ground from which to preach/dismiss/discriminate against others.

In the spirit of the OP: Can you claim any knowlege from first-hand experience? Nearly everything I know in the fields of science is taken on authority, not from my personal observations or tests. Anything from the molecular level down is taken on authority. Newtonian physics, while useful for descriptive purposes, has been supplanted by Einstenian theories. Who is to ssay that Einstein has explained physics to the best level possible? There is likely something more accurate yet to be discovered, and several more steps beyond that, and we will still not understand the laws that rule matter. therefore, who is to say science has answered every question when each answer found by science raises multiple new questions?

Look at what you see this second: what of what you see do you not automatically place in a category of meaning (a concept)?

What of it?

The question is, is there anything in that concept that I do not impose upon reality, but rather get from reality?

But applying logic (something to which I am aware I submit in the form of a leap of faith) it seems reasonable that from what may be and what may not, what may not is more likely to occur.

Maybe from point zero: without any sort of evidence at all. But we have the sum total of our perceptions. Is it conceivable that we are all deluded? Of course. But is it plausible--as plausible as the alternative that our experiences reflect truth? I think not.

Standards of "plausibility", of "absurdity", may be "soft" epistemological standards, but they are standards nevertheless. Pure reason may not be able to justify them, but then, insofar as they are always provisional (there is no reason to disallow evidence that contradicts their conclusions), they may by their very nature evade the sort of necessity logic provides.

Any kind of progress in knowledge is bassed on assumptions.

Perhaps. But are the assumptions reasonable? Or not?

No. We accept them out of convenience, but this is not equivalent with "reasonable".

But we don't accept them because they are convenient; we accept them because we are quite sure of their truth, try as skeptics will to dissuade us.

Any number of my perceptions may be quite inconvenient for me. But I still don't run into walls.

Yes we do accept them, but we should do so aware of the limitations.

I believe I have said as much. But being aware of their limitations does not mean that we must deny the possibility of a "high ground": of certain kinds of reasoning and arguments being better than others.

The point of this was that noone can claim to hold absolute truth, and when we can all accept that, certain people will have less moral ground from which to preach/dismiss/discriminate against others.

Under your system, no one has grounds for anything... including opposing any of those things. This kind of relativism allows any person to do as he or she pleases, on the ground that it's all arbitrary anyway.

Only superficially is this notion tolerant. In fact, it legitimates intolerance, both by eliminating the force of ethical limitations on repression, and by denying the possibility of a rational consensus that might allow moral rightness without coercion.

By your theory, there is no real possibility of convincing the fanatic that she is wrong; my worldview is just as arbitrary as hers, so how can I convince her that mine is better? It tends toward the narcissism we see so often these days: "I have the right to my opinion" interpreted as "I can freely ignore the arguments of everyone else against it." And ultimately from that we reach a policy of repression: if I cannot expect fanatics to be dissuaded by a tolerant society promoting free discourse, I must stop them by force.

Communication takes part through perception. You missed the part where the sharing of these frames of reference are as liable of erronous interpretation as anything else.
Yes, you can misunderstand each other while trying to sort out a misunderstanding. So you try again.

You're really just making two claims: our perceptions don't reflect reality because we order them according to certain principles which may not correspond to it. To that I say that it has no bearing on life on earth.

And secondly you're saying that misunderstandings can get in the way of debate. That's certainly the case, but it's not grounds for saying debate is impossible.

As for God I have yet to see anyone establish a satisfactory definition. Thus why I urged against religious debate.
Well, to define is to know. And people shy away from claiming to know god, for cultural reasons if nothing else.

Still, to give one example: most people say that god is omnipotent. Omnipotence is a paradox, because it must include the power to do something that can't be reversed or changed.

Now, this tells us that within the frame of reference that we call logic, omnipotence is not possible. You're saying there might be another frame of reference in which it is. I could of course ask you just what that would look like, but chances are that there is no human being on the planet that would be capable of thinking in these new terms, so you'd have trouble explaining it and I'd have trouble understanding it.

Are those terms of reference real then? Do they serve any purpose whatsoever? Or are they just trying to invent "red" in a universe without light?

You haven't been reading carefully then. I said we may know objective truth, but only by accident, and then we wouldn't know that what we know is superior to knowledge from other frames of reference.
Knowing something also includes being aware of that knowledge. And besides, you're still making an argument using language and a certain frame of reference, which means that you're not conveying any truth that I couldn't shut down simply by using different terms of reference.

"All axioms require belief" was what you said. Do you realise that you're making an axiomatic claim? In fact, that an axiom can no longer be one if it requires belief, that you completely deny the existence of axioms? And that even that denial is axiomatic, and it becomes rather obvious that the non-existence of axioms is impossible? Axioms describe something that must exist, because you can't make a statement, think a thought or live a life without making reference to them. And as such, as long as you live on earth, you can't argue against the existence of axiomatic truths as such.

As much as I hate to once again brand myself a certain way, I rather like a sentence written by a certain lady on the matter: "When he declares that an axiom is a matter of arbitrary choice and he doesn’t choose to accept the axiom that he exists, he blanks out the fact that he has accepted it by uttering that sentence, that the only way to reject it is to shut one’s mouth, expound no theories and die."

Conclusions:

(a) Arguing about religion is absurd because the axioms of religion and logic and religion and science are at odds. (God would need to be strictly definable and manifest itself physically respectively).

"Arguing about religion" could mean many other things than trying to prove or disprove a religious belief. One can profitably compare a religious explanation of events and a scientific one, find one more correct yet still see some value in the other.

"Arguing about religion" could also mean two competing theological explanations, which are at odds as to the meaning of something, yet are based in the same method.

(b) Science is not objective.

It's not subjective either, so I think you're probably just using the word "objective" very loosely.

(c) Trolls are right and absurd. Trolls are persons who happen to be quite confident in their views,

Even that is wrong. We might yell "troll" whenever we don't like someone's view, but more properly a troll is someone who doesn't really believe what they're saying, isn't trying to persuade anyone, and just wants to make other people react. Have you forgotten FreedomAndGlory? Now, that was a troll!

Still, to give one example: most people say that god is omnipotent. Omnipotence is a paradox, because it must include the power to do something that can't be reversed or changed.

"God is so much more powerful than me, that he's effectively omnipotent" is probably as far as it goes for "most people."

I wouldn't blame people for failing to conceptualize an infinite. Failing to try, hmm ...

The God of Christianity is not omnipotent. According to the Bible, He cannot lie. He cannot tolerate that which is not perfectly holy.

I realize I said I wouldn't discuss this subject more, but your post was such an excellent example of philosophical confusion I felt it necessary to respond.


Of course. That description is inaccurate. What does it have to do with imprecision?Merely that you can correct someone to be more precise in their use of the word.

Language can't precisely explain sensation.So you're telling me: "You're wrong, but I can't tell you why!" :D

I think the term speaks for itself. If you don't think it does, you're going to have to ask a more productive question than that one.OK. What would you accept as being perfectly similar? That's essentially what it comes to, anyway.

So? If anything, this just proves the point: "red" is abstract and imprecise enough that you can deal with it without referencing perception at all.I'm not sure what you mean. "FF0000" is pure red -- that's what it means. It is one hundred percent (100%) red and zero (0) percent other colors. That's as good a definition of pure color as you're going to get. And you're telling me that's an imprecise concept? :D

That's right (well, no, it isn't, but it's close enough for our purposes). I don't doubt that language can convey meaning. I doubt that language can convey precise meaning.It can convey meaning as precise as you like.

For the millionth time: a description such that someone else could envision the exact shade. A description that passes along the same information that you have gained from perceiving the color. A complete description.What would constitute someone else being able to envision the same shade? When would you say they could envision the same shade? Never?

Do you want me to give an example of such a description in words? But the whole point is that that's impossible.I imagine that it would help.

Because exact similarity simply doesn't exist in the real world. A word whose meaning was confined to one precise manifestation would be useless; it would be incapable of describing anything else.So basically: you want to use a "color" that is by your own definition inseparable from the object it is on-- and then you say this is a limitation of language? :D

No, I'm not. You're the one who has brought in other senses of precision. I, on the other hand, have used the term consistently throughout. Yes, that's the problem. Being consistently mistaken is not a virtue, I'm afraid.

"Like all language"? But color isn't language; color is something we experience directly. Perhaps by "color" you mean our names for colors: "red", "orange", etc. But then your argument is circular, useless, and irrelevant, because obviously language can deal perfectly precisely with our linguistic categories of color--they are a part of language, and don't need to be mediated through it.Listen to what you just said: "color isn't language." Oh really? Without language you wouldn't be able to even talk about color, much less argue about it. Language is inherently an enabling mechanism, not a limiter. I can talk about any color I like with language. You can't talk (precisely) about any, apparently. A curious situation, to be sure. Something must have gotten fouled up on your end.

Communicating meaning must go beyond the manipulation of symbols. The whole point is to use the symbols to represent something else. The question is, can that something else, mediated through the symbols, be left exactly intact on the other side? Can it be transfered precisely?I reject this completely. It's not wrong--nor right. No, no. It's simply nonsense. "Beyond the manipulation of symbols"? And how would it do that? Please, go on. Do tell about this mystical act of "meaning." But if you can't explain why meaning should be thought of like that (or even any possible benefit of thinking of meaning like that), then why would you ever want to stick with that way of thinking?

"But there's something there I can't say with language!" Something? If it were a something you'd be able to explain it. Clearly it's not a something. Is it a nothing? Maybe, maybe not. I don't care. Subjective somethings hold no interest to me; there's nothing to know or understand about subjective things anyway. Those concepts don't even apply to subjective experiences.

I do know, however, that language is used in certain ways. Those ways are either public or they're meaningless. Why is a one-time pad impossible to crack? Because it contains no meaning-- at least not without the matching pad that lets you decrypt it. There's no need for a metaphysical or subjective explanation of meaning, and indeed I'm none too sure of such a thing's coherence.

"Nothing" except the fact that we are all human, with human minds and human modes of perception. We are capable of language, of communication, precisely because we experience the world similarly enough that we can understand others.Now, I do agree that since we're all human we do things similarly. But the fact stands that you have absolutely zero knowledge of what goes on in someone else's head. That's the subjective bit, remember?

"Knowledge" in a strict philosophical sense is a very narrow standard. I'm not sure we can "know" much of anything. But that doesn't mean we are incapable of having support for positions regarding the subjective content of other people's minds.Support? That's like saying (I paraphrase a famous argument here): "I have a box with a beetle inside, and that guy has a box just like it (though I can't look inside of his box). That means it's likely he has got a beetle inside of his box like I have inside of my box." But suppose the other guy has a box with nothing inside of it? Suppose he has a pair of keys inside of his box? Then you two go off for a beer and say to each other, "It's great that we have the same things inside of our boxes, isn't it? It all makes sense this way."

All that means is that you simply talk about what's in the box in the same way. What's in the box? Well-- it's whatever's in the box! All it means in this case is that you use a certain way of talking about subjective experiences-- but those experiences are totally irrelevant to how you act or how you mean something.

True, I could be a mindless machine responding to your posts... but that's far less plausible than the notion that I'm an actual mind.Mindless? If you were a machine I'd consider you an intelligent machine. As you aren't, however, I'll have to stick to considering you an intelligent human. Regardless, I would have explained my complaint to you.

Well, that's all I perceive. Certainly I don't know that either.Oh geeze. I hate Descartes. I'm sure he was a nice enough guy in person, but his philosophical scepticism based on faulty grounds has caused no end of confusion. -_-

I could ask them. I could compare my experiences to their depiction of theirs. We could discuss the similarities and differences. Often we know when others experience things differently from us ("know" here used in a loose non-philosophical sense): we can tell, for instance, when people hate activities we love, or love activities we hate.And you'd not have gotten into their minds; all you've done there is shown that we have certain behaviors. Also, you've noted that "hating" and "love" are also words with particular behaviors attached, by which you recognize them. Good, good.

We don't, admittedly, know whether our experiences of color match up with those of others. We just assume they do--a plausible assumption, in the absence of counter-evidence, that makes sense given the fact that our brains are broadly physiologically similar.Now you're assuming that people know what color you're talking about? :D

Of course it is necessary. If you didn't believe it, you wouldn't be having this conversation, which, like all meaningful conversation, is the interaction of subjective minds--and depends upon minds similar enough that they do not merely talk past one another, but can understand.And why should I need to assume anything here? If I was indeed taught how to talk from these other beings, surely they taught me something meaningful to me and to them-- which means it isn't, can't be subjective (remember the beetle). If they taught me the objective meaning of "subjective minds," for example, then there is absolutely no need to assume anything.

Ah, I'm beginning to see our problem.

I insist that language can only imprecisely transmit meaning. You disagree, but only because you don't think language can transmit meaning at all. For you, it's just the "public" element--the common forms, but without the necessarily private meanings behind them. For you, it makes no difference to "communication" whether you are communicating with a self-conscious human being or a well-programmed and utterly mindless robot, as long as they both respond correctly.Not at all. I am perfectly agreeable to the fact that language can and does transmit meaning, but I am also aware of what that boils down to. How do you know someone understood your instructions to go buy some 2% milk? They have to do it, and then you know. If there's something else there, then it isn't interesting (meaning I could not possibly have an interest in it). It does make a difference whether I am talking to a human versus a robot, too-- I wouldn't be having this conversation, and I bet the computer could do some cool tricks. Besides, "mindless?" If it's as well spoken as you, I wouldn't say it was mindless -- rather, it would be an intelligent computer (much the way people sometimes refer to the computer's hard drive light flashing as the computer "thinking"). It would be different for a computer to think than for humans to think.

In other words, you don't present a solution to the problem; you just abolish the context such that there is no problem. You don't present any possibility for making human interaction more complete, you just pretend that it is necessarily even less than it actually is.If I've gotten rid of something valuable, tell me what it is. If I haven't, then why are you complaining? Make it more complete? What do you mean?

What I have done is abolish a great many problems without losing anything interesting. Remember, I haven't said that subjective experiences aren't possible (or even unlikely). I simply find them irrelevant, as do we all in practice. The difficult part is remembering what we usually do; that they are, in fact, irrelevant.

But what if I don't want to use something? What if I want to experience it? The mediation and abstraction of symbolic culture is marvelously useful for all the various purposes to which it is put, but in the process it has the potential to erode something that may be even more important: the prospect of an unalienated existence, of a world we live in and experience rather than one we always leap to use.I experience the world every day. I see the trees waving in the wind and the shadows swaying across the leaves on the ground. The children play in the park and the ice cream tastes great and when I run the wind blows across my face. I see the colors of the sunset and I can tell my friends about it. I see beauty everywhere. Is that a use? Well, that's just how I describe it using language.

One of the reasons I eventually was convinced to use the point of view I hold now is that I wanted to get rid of the abominable idea that we are spirits trapped in our bodies, homunculi destined to see the world only through the lenses of our senses. This idea is distinctly Cartesian and distinctly abhorrent to me. I no longer find myself inside of a closed box, unable to be sure of anything, reduced to probabilities in knowing if people REALLY care about me. I know, and I have to tell you it's an extremely good feeling.





Ad Nihilo!

I am still curious to see your reply to my post here (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=13688693&postcount=63).

I thought it was obvious I didn't read later Wittgenstein:p And my local bookstore only has the Tractus. :)

I'm only starting Uni this year and it's not even going to be Philosophy (*sigh*), but International Relations :p

Well this is what I picked up from the Tractus: logic is only the net on the picture, and while it can be used to correctly describe the picture within its limits, it can say nothing of the nature of the picture itself (and it was pretty much expressed exactly like this. I hope I don't have to go through all those numbers again to prove it).

1) I posit that if there is such a thing as an objective truth to anything, then we have not yet discerned it, and it seems likely that we never will.

In support of 1): In the words of Wittgenstein, reality is like a picture. Any way of describing it involves creating a set of rules of description, for example casting a net of squares over the picture (in IT a bitmap), or creating concepts of lines and colours, and describing them relative to one another (in IT a vector image).

Any such device DOES NOT say anything about the nature of what is described (it says absolutely nothing about the reality of the picture). It is a portrait of reality and is self-consistent by necessity, but it only has meaning within its frame of reference (i.e. a bitmap is "true" when read as such. When read as a txt document it is non-sensical). Any such device offers a unique perspective of reality, but says absolutely nothing about the nature of reality, because it has a different nature itself(*), dictated by the rules of interpretation we have established.

Example: A red ball. Let's analyse the concept of "red". We define red as the stimulus ":mad:" <- gives optically. This is one device of description.

Another is the scientific conception. Red is light at a certain wavelength.

Both mechanisms presuppose light. In the absence of light nothing can be said about the nature of the ball in this respect. And since light is not a universal occurence, it is clear there is nothing absolute about the ball's "redness".

Wittgenstein gave other examples but he referred to logic (it's pretty much why I love the guy) primarily. But it is implied for all methods of knowledge: observation, belief, etc.

To return to 1), all methods of knowledge can only give a unique perspective of reality which is "true" and consistent within that strictly applied method, and say nothing about the nature of reality. If we ever find a method whose nature will coincide with that of reality (see (*) above) we may discern at least one objective truth, but we wouldn't know it, and it would be an accident.

2) All modes of thinking are correct (i.e. consistent) only within themselves: all modes of thinking are self-validating.

3) Because no mode of thinking can be known to relate to the nature of reality (see (*) above), all modes of thinking are false to presume to know objectively anything about reality, above any other. => Logic is not inherently superior to belief, and belief is not inherently superior to logic.

4) Because of 3), adopting any mechanism of thinking, any world view etc. is a leap of faith. Any mode of thinking requires a belief in its unprovable axioms (in the case of religion God, in the case of science empricism, in the case of logic the relation of identity, the functions of truth and the laws of causation etc.)

Conclusions:

(a) Arguing about religion is absurd because the axioms of religion and logic and religion and science are at odds. (God would need to be strictly definable and manifest itself physically respectively).

(b) Science is not objective. Science presuposes logic, but logic (as per above) cannot say anything objective about reality.

(c) Trolls are right and absurd. Trolls are persons who happen to be quite confident in their views, but adopt (unknowingly) a different perspective on reality. They are right in what they say, within the scope of their perspective. They are absurd in that they don't argue. To argue, one must be in the frame of thought of the OP (usually logic and science on this forum).

(d) Given (c), flaming is perfectly right in the same sense a troll is right.

(e) Would people be so kind as to try and keep to the frame of thought of the OP if they contribute to a thread?

Peace.:p (Otherwise fuck you:D )

Two things:
A) If you believe in scientific empiricism, the ball only reflects red light, so really the ball is anything but red.
B) The concept of red itself isn't real. The color red is the brain's way of processing and interpreting electromagnetic radiation of a certain wavelength. The color red doesn't exist anywhere in the universe, only in the mind of a human.

Point B has always been my take of it all.
A book I suggest you read is Grendel by John Gardner. Particularly chapter 4

:eek: I'm sorry... you've just short circuited my brainz.

I don't think I could be this absurd if I tried.

1) Science works on observation and induction. I have argued against both already.

2) How can you label something objective in the same sentence in which you admit your belief in it is subjective. You have attributed objectivity to science [full stop]. No proof, no argument no nothing.

3) "It seems likely that the earth revolves around the sun". That is ALL science can claim, and no more. Call it fact, reality, whatever you like. Logically it is merely probable.



It doesn't change the nature of reality no. But you have yet to provide any argument for your belief being objective truth.[/QUOTE]

Bwahahahah you are sooo funny.

So you contend that the earth doesnot revolve around the sun?

1) I have not read your arguments against scientific observation or induction.

2) Of course you can subjectivly belive in an objective, why do you think you cannot? I live on the third floor of a tower block, that is an objective truth, do you belive it? If you do, do you belive it because I have said so, or because you have been to my flat. You have not been to my falt so if you belive me, you belive subjectivly in an objective truth. Nope I have subjectivly acceptted the objective truth that the earth revoles around the sun, that is the only claim I made, I made no other regarding science.

3)Wrong, just plain wrong.

It is not a belife, it is certian, objective knowldege, please show me how it is not.

There is no abject 'good' and 'evil', only good and evil actions, and we weight good and evil based on how it affects our reality and society, for good or ill.

All society have universal 'good' themes such as truth and justice, evil comes when people exchange the valuation of words. In such an instance words retain their agreed-upon meaning but the value assigned to them, that is, how their meanings were enacted in society, changes.

Thus under capitalism values have been transformed: the value of "courage true to the party" for example has changed from a constructive to a destructive one, illustrating how the relationship between words and reality, which rests on convention, is undermined. 'National interest' and the 'greater good' in capitalism is exchanged for private ambition, greed etc.

In capitalism the system itself, not the people, is evil. A capitalist can do greedy things which badly affect other people, yet because the system exults this clearly bad act as good then the valuation is changed. Thus in capitalism 'freedom' does not have it's proper value, it means only the freedom of the few, the freedom to exploit.

All words and values can be distorted, evil always comes in veil of good.

Anyways, that's my turn at playing philosophy for today :)

knowledge as such, begins and ends with scientific method and thought, which is really just another way of saying honesty, and that begins and ends only with an endless array of fine detail, often to many decimal points, that some things happen more often then others, and some things happen more often when other things happen first.

existence, on the other hand, does NOT begin and end with knowledge.

if i thought the existence of anything depended on our understanding of it, i would be forced to aggree with the athiests who insist nothing that is neither tangable nor falls within the perview of science, could or did exist.

but i don't.

because there is, even tangably, such a big universe out there, that all of human knowledge, besides the vastness of its diversity, is no more then one tiney flyspeck.

we can and do experience things that we in no slightest way need, even to pretend to know anything about in order to do so.

could one or more of them be 'close enough for government work' to being god, or a god? certainly. why not?

does this mean that ANY system of belief HAS TO have the slightest idea what it is talking about? no, it does not.

so i believe in and hug my invisible friends. all of them.

while taking with a very large grain of salt the dire nontangable threats of fanatics of every stripe. (the tangable threat of their hatred toward anyone who stops lying to themselves or refuses to is real enough, but generally takes the form of tangable bullits or lynch mobs)

=^^=
.../\..

It is not a belife, it is certian, objective knowldege, please show me how it is not.
The reason for you claiming to know it is because it fits certain models of evidence, yes?

What if, tomorrow, it turned out that the sun didn't rise? Or the next day? Or the day after that? Would you still be certain in your belief that the earth both span and rotated around the sun?

Science as objective certainty requires that what happened yesterday is a perfect indicator of what will happen tomorrow. In actuality, since no two circumstances have exactly the same conditions as a consequence of the passage of time, not even were we to assume that the laws that govern physics are universal and written in stone could we state that yesterday's laws will cause the same effects tomorrow.

That past models future is a convenient assumption to make, since generally the rule of inductive reasoning appears to hold, but it's only that - an assumption. There is no proof that exists that induction works except that which is inductive, and thus invalidated by the prohibition of circular reasoning.

The reason for you claiming to know it is because it fits certain models of evidence, yes?

What if, tomorrow, it turned out that the sun didn't rise? Or the next day? Or the day after that? Would you still be certain in your belief that the earth both span and rotated around the sun?

Science as objective certainty requires that what happened yesterday is a perfect indicator of what will happen tomorrow. In actuality, since no two circumstances have exactly the same conditions as a consequence of the passage of time, not even were we to assume that the laws that govern physics are universal and written in stone could we state that yesterday's laws will cause the same effects tomorrow.

That past models future is a convenient assumption to make, since generally the rule of inductive reasoning appears to hold, but it's only that - an assumption. There is no proof that exists that induction works except that which is inductive, and thus invalidated by the prohibition of circular reasoning.


Yes I can see that, and I actualy agree. However we must draw a line somewhere if we want to aviod our scientific knowledge becomeing meaningless.

Do you doubt that the earth revoles around the sun? Does anybody actualy doubt the validity of that?

What we are then left with is basicaly word games, using such methoeds we can turn night into day, truth into lies, and all and everything inbetween. That would render not only our scientific knowledge worthless, it would render all of our words worthless also.

Objective: Based on facts, unfetterd by personal opinion.

The earth revolves around the sun, is clearly an objective truth. And the test of that is for anybody, just one person to convince me that infact the earth does not revolve around the sun.

Bwahahahah you are sooo funny.

So you contend that the earth doesnot revolve around the sun?

1) I have not read your arguments against scientific observation or induction.

2) Of course you can subjectivly belive in an objective, why do you think you cannot? I live on the third floor of a tower block, that is an objective truth, do you belive it? If you do, do you belive it because I have said so, or because you have been to my flat. You have not been to my falt so if you belive me, you belive subjectivly in an objective truth. Nope I have subjectivly acceptted the objective truth that the earth revoles around the sun, that is the only claim I made, I made no other regarding science.

Ok, I see I'll have to slowly walk you through this:

You believe in a fact. That is subjective.
You believe that the fact is objective. THAT is also subjective.
That you believe a fact is objective has no bearing on the objectivity of the fact. Your subjective belief does not make the corresponding truth of that belief objective.
That you believe something is objective truth, does not change the fact that it may or may not be objective.
You presume facts. What you call facts are by definition objective. But what you take as facts has no bearing on reality. Your belief in said facts has no bearing on the nature of reality and/or any objective truths it may or may not contain.
You have said absolutely nothing to sustain the argument that any of the facts you assume correspond to objective reality. I have provided extensive arguments that it likely doesn't, and if it does, it is merely by accident, and happens without us knowing that what we believe is objective is actually objective.

3)Wrong, just plain wrong.

It is not a belife, it is certian, objective knowldege, please show me how it is not.

Do humanity a favour and read on the scientific method before using it to impose value judgments as absolute truths. (like Nazi racial superiority theory, eugenics etc.)

There is no abject 'good' and 'evil', only good and evil actions, and we weight good and evil based on how it affects our reality and society, for good or ill.

All society have universal 'good' themes such as truth and justice, evil comes when people exchange the valuation of words. In such an instance words retain their agreed-upon meaning but the value assigned to them, that is, how their meanings were enacted in society, changes.

Thus under capitalism values have been transformed: the value of "courage true to the party" for example has changed from a constructive to a destructive one, illustrating how the relationship between words and reality, which rests on convention, is undermined. 'National interest' and the 'greater good' in capitalism is exchanged for private ambition, greed etc.

In capitalism the system itself, not the people, is evil. A capitalist can do greedy things which badly affect other people, yet because the system exults this clearly bad act as good then the valuation is changed. Thus in capitalism 'freedom' does not have it's proper value, it means only the freedom of the few, the freedom to exploit.

All words and values can be distorted, evil always comes in veil of good.

Anyways, that's my turn at playing philosophy for today :)

This is pretty much an epistemology debate. Political philosophy shouldn't have gotten anywhere near this thread.:)

knowledge as such, begins and ends with scientific method and thought, which is really just another way of saying honesty, and that begins and ends only with an endless array of fine detail, often to many decimal points, that some things happen more often then others, and some things happen more often when other things happen first.

existence, on the other hand, does NOT begin and end with knowledge.

if i thought the existence of anything depended on our understanding of it, i would be forced to aggree with the athiests who insist nothing that is neither tangable nor falls within the perview of science, could or did exist.

but i don't.

because there is, even tangably, such a big universe out there, that all of human knowledge, besides the vastness of its diversity, is no more then one tiney flyspeck.

we can and do experience things that we in no slightest way need, even to pretend to know anything about in order to do so.

could one or more of them be 'close enough for government work' to being god, or a god? certainly. why not?

does this mean that ANY system of belief HAS TO have the slightest idea what it is talking about? no, it does not.

so i believe in and hug my invisible friends. all of them.

while taking with a very large grain of salt the dire nontangable threats of fanatics of every stripe. (the tangable threat of their hatred toward anyone who stops lying to themselves or refuses to is real enough, but generally takes the form of tangable bullits or lynch mobs)

=^^=
.../\..

Existence IS independent of knowledge. AND due to the semantic limitations of our mental capacities it is also most likely that knowledge is independent of existence (in the sense that it does not relate to fundamental reality in the way we happen to think).

Ok, I see I'll have to slowly walk you through this:

You believe in a fact. That is subjective

Correct.


You believe that the fact is objective. THAT is also subjective.

Incorrect, the fact IS an objective fact. For me to belive other wise I would require any proof gainsaying the fact.
For instance, what do you thing, does the earth revolve around the sun?



Do humanity a favour and read on the scientific method before using it to impose value judgments as absolute truths. (like Nazi racial superiority theory, eugenics etc.)

Do your self a favour and read my words, and stop trying to tell me what I am saying. Value judgements? I made one claim, one only, stick to that if yuo wish to show me how wrong I am. proove to me that either the earth does not revole around the sun, or show me why it is not objectivly true.

The reason for you claiming to know it is because it fits certain models of evidence, yes?

What if, tomorrow, it turned out that the sun didn't rise? Or the next day? Or the day after that? Would you still be certain in your belief that the earth both span and rotated around the sun?

Science as objective certainty requires that what happened yesterday is a perfect indicator of what will happen tomorrow. In actuality, since no two circumstances have exactly the same conditions as a consequence of the passage of time, not even were we to assume that the laws that govern physics are universal and written in stone could we state that yesterday's laws will cause the same effects tomorrow.

That past models future is a convenient assumption to make, since generally the rule of inductive reasoning appears to hold, but it's only that - an assumption. There is no proof that exists that induction works except that which is inductive, and thus invalidated by the prohibition of circular reasoning.

Thank you.

Yes I can see that, and I actualy agree. However we must draw a line somewhere if we want to aviod our scientific knowledge becomeing meaningless.

Do you doubt that the earth revoles around the sun? Does anybody actualy doubt the validity of that?

What we are then left with is basicaly word games, using such methoeds we can turn night into day, truth into lies, and all and everything inbetween. That would render not only our scientific knowledge worthless, it would render all of our words worthless also.

Objective: Based on facts, unfetterd by personal opinion.

The earth revolves around the sun, is clearly an objective truth. And the test of that is for anybody, just one person to convince me that infact the earth does not revolve around the sun.

"Objective: Based on facts, unfetterd by personal opinion."

You read but you fail to understand, seemingly on purpose.

There is no need for science to become meaningless. I said it once and I'll say it again. Science is useful. And it is even more useful when proven wrong, because then scientists see through past prejudice and seek to establish better theories. But THAT'S IT. Science is a constantly evolving meta-narrative theory. But it is not, and never can be more: Objective Truth.

A scientific fact is a something likely (sometimes very likely). But it is not objective truth and never can be. That is the virtue and limit of the scientific method, and that is what people should understand, before making a new religion from science.

"Objective: Based on facts, unfetterd by personal opinion."

You read but you fail to understand, seemingly on purpose.

There is no need for science to become meaningless. I said it once and I'll say it again. Science is useful. And it is even more useful when proven wrong, because then scientists see through past prejudice and seek to establish better theories. But THAT'S IT. Science is a constantly evolving meta-narrative theory. But it is not, and never can be more: Objective Truth.

A scientific fact is a something likely (sometimes very likely). But it is not objective truth and never can be. That is the virtue and limit of the scientific method, and that is what people should understand, before making a new religion from science.

Hah the same could be leveled at you. I understand perfectly what you are trying to do, and what you are on about. I disagree, and you have not yet swayed me.

Tell me what does the word objective mean to you?

Incorrect, the fact IS an objective fact. For me to belive other wise I would require any proof gainsaying the fact.
For instance, what do you thing, does the earth revolve around the sun?

Shockingly as it may seem, yes I do believe that the earth revolves around the sun. But no, it does not mean it's true. I can accept that, you can't.

Do your self a favour and read my words, and stop trying to tell me what I am saying. Value judgements? I made one claim, one only, stick to that if yuo wish to show me how wrong I am. proove to me that either the earth does not revole around the sun, or show me why it is not objectivly true.

To be objectively true, you would have to have perfect knowledge of the nature of reality, or have perfect knowledge of the premises behind the theory AND have a strictly deductive logic from premises to conclusion (assuming of course logic applies, which you can't know). So to avoid the problems of the latter you need the first. Do you have perfect knowledge of the nature of reality? If so, why haven't you yet enlightened the rest of us 6 billion?

Hah the same could be leveled at you. I understand perfectly what you are trying to do, and what you are on about. I disagree, and you have not yet swayed me.

Tell me what does the word objective mean to you?

Objective = existent entity or attributes independent of perception or conceptualisation.

Do you doubt that the earth revoles around the sun? Does anybody actualy doubt the validity of that?
That's two different questions. I don't actively doubt that it does because it's convenient that I take it for granted. I passively doubt the validity of such a claim, though, because I can't prove it.

It's the difference between axiom and theorem. One is an assertion that is taken for granted in order to establish a complex system, the other is an assertion taken as a consequence of an existing complex system.

What we are then left with is basicaly word games, using such methoeds we can turn night into day, truth into lies, and all and everything inbetween. That would render not only our scientific knowledge worthless, it would render all of our words worthless also.
You misunderstand the notion of Protocol. Words are fundamentally meaningless save in as much as people give them meaning. They're conceptual pointers - they exist to point to a shared idea, rather than actually being ideas in and of themselves. (Well, okay, you could argue that as pointers they're actually higher-order functions and consequently have a conceptual existence as the set of mappings from phenomemes to ideas, but this function is entirely mutable by human intervention.)

In any case, doubting the nature of our assertions is not the same as doubting their consequences. An axiom can be easily removed by making all statements that refer to it conditional upon its correctness, and consequently disproving one of the fundamental assertions of the way things work doesn't alter their truth. You just have to acknowledge that certain items of knowledge are inappropriate to certain circumstances - disproving the fundamental "truths" we rely on merely renders your knowledge that little bit less general rather than actually invalidating it.

The earth revolves around the sun, is clearly an objective truth. And the test of that is for anybody, just one person to convince me that infact the earth does not revolve around the sun.
I could prove that it's not important, you know. Special relativity denies the existence of a universal frame of reference, and consequently the frame of reference of a stationary earth and a stationary sun are equivalent in determining the state of their collaborative system. In other words, I could theoretically create a universal model with the world at its centre that would be equal in meaning to that where it isn't as long as I adhere to the set of rules laid down by Einsteinian physics.

But I don't particularly want to, because it's socially convenient to hold that the view that the sun is the body we orbit around is the best one. If it really doesn't matter then there's no point upsetting people about it, right?

Thank you.
Hey, I'm not doing this for your sake. :p

I agree with Peep that Objective truth exists; it's just not as easy as he thinks it is.

Hey, I'm not doing this for your sake. :p

I agree with Peep that Objective truth exists; it's just not as easy as he thinks it is.

I am completely agnostic on this, as said earlier. But I incline on the side that there isn't, and I concede that this is mere belief.

But I never argued that there is none, simply that it is very unlikely we know it, and if we do, we don't know we do. And since there is nothing pointing either way, I'm happy to go with non-existence because it seems to me to be default.

But for your arguing prowess you get a :fluffle:

Shockingly as it may seem, yes I do believe that the earth revolves around the sun. But no, it does not mean it's true. I can accept that, you can't.

Not shocking at all, in fact quite expected. No you can't accept that it is an objective truth, I can.



To be objectively true, you would have to have perfect knowledge of the nature of reality, or have perfect knowledge of the premises behind the theory AND have a strictly deductive logic from premises to conclusion (assuming of course logic applies, which you can't know). So to avoid the problems of the latter you need the first. Do you have perfect knowledge of the nature of reality? If so, why haven't you yet enlightened the rest of us 6 billion?

And the statement above is that objectively true?

Again I understand where you are coming from, I don't agree. Pefect knowledge is not required for objective truth.

An objective truth can be so if all known actors witness the same. In the example of the earth and the sun, we can see that the earth revolves around the sun, all and any other actors beyond our planet can witness to the same, even if how they percive it is differant.

Instead of telling me how wrong I am, convince me.

This is pretty much an epistemology debate. Political philosophy shouldn't have gotten anywhere near this thread.:)
That's just Andaras. To him, to be is to be Marxist. The line gets kinda fuzzy.

And the statement above is that objectively true?

Again I understand where you are coming from, I don't agree. Pefect knowledge is not required for objective truth.

An objective truth can be so if all known actors witness the same. In the example of the earth and the sun, we can see that the earth revolves around the sun, all and any other actors beyond our planet can witness to the same, even if how they percive it is differant.

Instead of telling me how wrong I am, convince me.

Anything less than perfect knowledge requires inductive reasoning, which can't give you certain truth, but only probable. Thus anything less than perfect knowledge on a subject cannot give you objective truth absolutely.

And it's not a matter of all *known* witnesses. It's a matter of ALL witnesses. If you only get the *known* subset of an indefinite ALL set, then you are left with less than absolute knowledge, less than objective truth (and this again assuming that ALL witnesses do not share any concept which might democratically be imposed upon what is observed despite it not objectively -in itself- having that attribute).

That's just Andaras. To him, to be is to be Marxist. The line gets kinda fuzzy.

Marx ergo sum:p

Objective = existent entity or attributes independent of perception or conceptualisation.

So then you are saying that the Earth would not revolve around the sun, if there was nobody there to witness it.

Which on the surface seems ridiculus.

So then you are saying that the Earth would not revolve around the sun, if there was nobody there to witness it.

Which on the surface seems ridiculus.
You should check out George Berkeley's Dialogues. It's actually not as ridiculous a premise as you might first think. Though it is, of course, impractical.

So then you are saying that the Earth would not revolve around the sun, if there was nobody there to witness it.

Which on the surface seems ridiculus.

Again you read but you fail to understand.

What I mean as objective truth:

1) If it is objectively true that the earth revolves around the sun, then the earth revolves around the sun when there is no witness.

2) If it is objectively true that the sun revolves around the earth, then the sun revolves around the earth despite witnesses seeing/believing the opposite as a "fact", because all the evidence they know of point in that direction.

Where you come short is in acknowledging that all your cosmology is based on imperfect, inductive, contextual evidence not on any acquaintance with objective truth.

You should check out George Berkeley's Dialogues. It's actually not as ridiculous a premise as you might first think. Though it is, of course, impractical.

Well THERE is the fact that to "say" something a witness needs first to exist.:p

You misunderstand the notion of Protocol. Words are fundamentally meaningless save in as much as people give them meaning. They're conceptual pointers - they exist to point to a shared idea, rather than actually being ideas in and of themselves. (Well, okay, you could argue that as pointers they're actually higher-order functions and consequently have a conceptual existence as the set of mappings from phenomemes to ideas, but this function is entirely mutable by human intervention.)

In any case, doubting the nature of our assertions is not the same as doubting their consequences. An axiom can be easily removed by making all statements that refer to it conditional upon its correctness, and consequently disproving one of the fundamental assertions of the way things work doesn't alter their truth. You just have to acknowledge that certain items of knowledge are inappropriate to certain circumstances - disproving the fundamental "truths" we rely on merely renders your knowledge that little bit less general rather than actually invalidating it.


Yes indeed, and again I agree. What I'm talking about is this attempt to shoehorn extra meaning into the word Objective. There is no way to show that the statement 'the earth revolves around the sun' is not objective without trying to make changes, subtle or not, to the very definituion of the word, in which case, as I say, it renders the whole word meaingless.

Yes of course words can change, and strech and flex with new ideas etc.. but as I say there has to be a line drawn, so that we are all talking about the same thing.

An objective truth is a truth that is true independant of ones relative view of it. The the Earth revolves around the sun, IS an example of such a truth and the only way to show it is not, is to re-define what objective means.

An objective truth is a truth that is true independant of ones relative view of it. The the Earth revolves around the sun, IS an example of such a truth and the only way to show it is not, is to re-define what objective means.

The only way to say that the Earth revolves around the sun is objective truth, is to redifine objective as a scientific fact and logical probability.

Again you read but you fail to understand.

What I mean as objective truth:

1) If it is objectively true that the earth revolves around the sun, then the earth revolves around the sun when there is no witness.

2) If it is objectively true that the sun revolves around the earth, then the sun revolves around the earth despite witnesses seeing/believing the opposite as a "fact", because all the evidence they know of point in that direction.

Where you come short is in acknowledging that all your cosmology is based on imperfect, inductive, contextual evidence not on any acquaintance with objective truth.

Not at all.

1) This is repeating, if not the actual words, the meaning of my own words back at me. This is what I have just said to you, and yet once again, you tell me I am not understandig you?

2) Yes quite right. That is objectivity.

No I admit that my knowledge of cosmology is basedon subjective belife in the science of cosmlogists. I belive that they are right, I have subjective belife in their objective evidance.

This is just going to and fro. Let me assure you I understand you, I get your point, you have not proved it to me, so again instead of repaeting your belife, and telling me how I lack understanding of your point, proove to me that your point is correct.

The only way to say that the Earth revolves around the sun is objective truth, is to redifine objective as a scientific fact and logical probability.

Lets try a differant tack, lets leave out that we can go into space and witness the movement of the bodies, lets bring it down to maths.

Maths is bloody usefull in science, it is via maths that many of our theoretric sciences can make predictions, many of which are then proved to be correct at a latter date.

Maths is a wholey objective spehre of reasoning for us. 2+2 will always equal 4 in our 10 base mathematics.

In fact it was mathamtical equations that where responisble for the pardgim shift in the belife of the earth as the center, to the sun being at the center.

Our sciences have since born this out. Do you belive that maths is not objective?

Not at all.

1) This is repeating, if not the actual words, the meaning of my own words back at me. This is what I have just said to you, and yet once again, you tell me I am not understandig you?

2) Yes quite right. That is objectivity.

No I admit that my knowledge of cosmology is basedon subjective belife in the science of cosmlogists. I belive that they are right, I have subjective belife in their objective evidance.

This is just going to and fro. Let me assure you I understand you, I get your point, you have not proved it to me, so again instead of repaeting your belife, and telling me how I lack understanding of your point, proove to me that your point is correct.

Well logically speaking, when arguing between if something is the case or not, the burden of proof lies with whoever argues to positiv point i.e.: what is the case. You get my point. You have to argue against it, because you argue that objectiv knowledge of the universe is the case. All I need to do is to refute your argument, not put forwards any positive arguments of my own.

Lets try a differant tack, lets leave out that we can go into space and witness the movement of the bodies, lets bring it down to maths.

Maths is bloody usefull in science, it is via maths that many of our theoretric sciences can make predictions, many of which are then proved to be correct at a latter date.

Maths is a wholey objective spehre of reasoning for us. 2+2 will always equal 4 in our 10 base mathematics.

In fact it was mathamtical equations that where responisble for the pardgim shift in the belife of the earth as the center, to the sun being at the center.

Our sciences have since born this out. Do you belive that maths is not objective?

No. Maths has absolutely no relation to reality, and logically it is not objective, for the simple fact that Maths operates on human concepts alone (logically speaking, the axiom of identity in logic invalidates any mathematical concept appart from 0 and 1). In reality there are no such things as "tables", because each and every object is individual. Only concepts can be lumped together and concepts are subjective. In reality you cannot add one with another, because they are not quatifiers of identical objects. In reality it is incorrect (strictly speaking) to add one plus one, because you can only have one plus another.

Well logically speaking, when arguing between if something is the case or not, the burden of proof lies with whoever argues to positiv point i.e.: what is the case. You get my point. You have to argue against it, because you argue that objectiv knowledge of the universe is the case. All I need to do is to refute your argument, not put forwards any positive arguments of my own.

Okay fair point.

Well the lets see if we can agree on this one.

Objective truth: That which is true independant of any relative/subjective view.

You posit that there is no such thing as objective truth, and claim that for there to be such, that total knowldge must be shown to be present.

I reject this.

I am currently sitting in my chair in my office at work engaing in debate, via my PC and the internet.

This is true, this is true wether you can see me or not, this true wether you belive it or not. Irrigardless that the whole world is not witnessing the truth of my statement, it is nevertheless true, it is objectivly true.

Please show my how it is not.

No. Maths has absolutely no relation to reality, and logically it is not objective, for the simple fact that Maths operates on human concepts alone (logically speaking, the axiom of identity in logic invalidates any mathematical concept appart from 0 and 1). In reality there are no such things as "tables", because each and every object is individual. Only concepts can be lumped together and concepts are subjective. In reality you cannot add one with another, because they are not quatifiers of identical objects. In reality it is incorrect (strictly speaking) to add one plus one, because you can only have one plus another.

Wrong. Maths is inherent in nature, wheter humanity discovered it or not, it is.

We subjectivly make use of this objective reality.

An objective truth is a truth that is true independant of ones relative view of it. The the Earth revolves around the sun, IS an example of such a truth and the only way to show it is not, is to re-define what objective means.
Time to bring out the Semantics guns, I see. Okay! We're talking about "objective truth". This could potentially mean many different things:

1) Truth that is also objective
2) Truth that is objective in its trueness
3) Truth that relates to objects
4) Truth that objects provide
5) Truth relating to objectivity
6) Truth that objectivity provides
7) Truth that objects (syn. Disagrees)
8) Truth that is prone to objecting (as 7)
9) Any combination of the above
etc. etc.

All of these are valid interpretations of the literal phrase "objective truth". I don't need to shift my understanding of the english language in order to determine that all these are semantically valid ways of reading the phrase when taken in isolation from context.

The question is not "What does the phrase mean" but rather "What meaning of the phrase are we using right now". The meaning I've been using is that which is generally understood as referring to the more philosophical concept of objective truth - namely, (2). If you've been using the definitions of (1) or (3), then what you've been saying is probably true, but isn't directly related to what I've understood to be the matter at hand.

Wrong. Maths is inherent in nature, wheter humanity discovered it or not, it is.

We subjectivly make use of this objective reality.
Mathematicians are divided on this one. In a sense, it's a bit of a chicken-and-egg scenario. Does the notion of having things to count predate the notion of counting them? Or is the absence of any ability to count enough to discount the counted things countability? If you get what I mean.

Count.

I'm of the view that the fact that mathematics today is dependent upon conceptual axioms is enough to support that it's a synthetic system, regardless of whether or not it was inspired by multiplicity in nature in the past. That nature adheres to objective rules that we can apply our subjective mathematics to is certainly a possibility, but mathematics does not itself define or provide those rules, nor is it an immediate consequence of them.

Okay fair point.

Well the lets see if we can agree on this one.

Objective truth: That which is true independant of any relative/subjective view.

You posit that there is no such thing as objective truth, and claim that for there to be such, that total knowldge must be shown to be present.

I reject this.

I am currently sitting in my chair in my office at work engaing in debate, via my PC and the internet.

This is true, this is true wether you can see me or not, this true wether you belive it or not. Irrigardless that the whole world is not witnessing the truth of my statement, it is nevertheless true, it is objectivly true.

Please show my how it is not.

You have used the following concepts: person (specifically I), time (currently), chair, space (in office, at work), debate, PC, the internet. The are abstract human conceptions. They are symbols we attribute to limited perceptions of reality. They say nothing about Fundamental Reality. You could have said:

"Person is now sitting on wood there, debating on glass with plastic and wires."

And this is only one level of conception removed. If you continue, all those words you used to symbolise concepts which belong only to your mind have nothing to do with reality.

Wrong. Maths is inherent in nature, wheter humanity discovered it or not, it is.

We subjectivly make use of this objective reality.

Wrong. There are no "a priori"-s in nature. At BEST there are objects. That's it. All abstractions belong exclussively to the human mind. Maths is an abstraction.

You have used the following concepts: person (specifically I), time (currently), chair, space (in office, at work), debate, PC, the internet. The are abstract human conceptions. They are symbols we attribute to limited perceptions of reality. They say nothing about Fundamental Reality. You could have said:

"Person is now sitting on wood there, debating on glass with plastic and wires."

And this is only one level of conception removed. If you continue, all those words you used to symbolise concepts which belong only to your mind have nothing to do with reality.

Meh, so instead of showing me how my statement is not objectivly true, you wittle on about how we percive reality.

If it matters not which words I use, then whats the point of this debate?

Of course we can only percive reality in accordance with our senses. You still have not explained why that makes what we sense not objective.

If a fly sits on a ceiling, even though the fly senses that ceiling diffrantly than us, it is still on the ceiling. If I look up at the same fly, even though our relative views are differant both the fly and I can agree that it objectivly sits on a ceiling.

Now stop sidetracking me and please show me how my early statment is not objectively true.

Meh, so instead of showing me how my statement is not objectivly true, you wittle on about how we percive reality.

If it matters not which words I use, then whats the point of this debate?

Of course we can only percive reality in accordance with our senses. You still have not explained why that makes what we sense not objective.

If a fly sits on a ceiling, even though the fly senses that ceiling diffrantly than us, it is still on the ceiling. If I look up at the same fly, even though our relative views are differant both the fly and I can agree that it objectivly sits on a ceiling.

Now stop sidetracking me and please show me how my early statment is not objectively true.

By your perception the flies sits on the ceiling. From its point of view it sits on the floor. You both see the same thing but your definitions are not of objective reality. The lowest common denominator is that the fly sits on a layer of such and such atoms, at such and such a position in space and time, facing such and such relative to the centre of gravity of the earth. And you have gotten no further in your search for the truth because each of the concepts you used needs to be defined, and those used to define it with need to be defined ad infinitum, and no definition is objective truth because nothing it is defined in terms of, can be known to be objective truth.

And I see you do really have reading problems, for I have stated clearly why your proposition isn't objective truth, but, for the sake of the argument I'll do it again slowly:

1) Words are symbols of concepts.
2) Concepts are mental descriptions of all the attributes perception can help us identify in objects in reality (if they are assumed to even be there).
3) Concepts != reality. Concepts are abstractions of reality. They are a picture of reality. A subjective picture. A partial picture.
4) Furthermore all concepts refer to classes/sets. Implictly all concepts have limited definitions (i.e. you are telling me nothing when you say you are sitting on a chair because there is no way I would know what object you refer to. You can go into however complex a description of this specific chair you still use sets and operations on sets - intersection in particular).
5) Perception is limited, concepts are even more limited, modes of reasoning are based on infered and assumed relationships between these concepts.

Given all this you wish to claim you can establish objective truth - the complete picture, from limited snapshots. But I say you are incredibly unlikely to do so because you don't even know how large the complete picture is supposed to be, and you don't have, and are unlikely ever to have all the pieces.

Given reality, what you said says something about reality. But it does not say everything, and it never could (humanity does not have all the concepts to cover reality, and some of the concepts it employs are merely speculative or theoretical at best - and this if we assume science is true). It has a ring of truth to it. But it doesn't have complete/objective truth.

I don't need to prove your statement is false. All I need to do is to show that there is more to it, which I have over and over again.

By your perception the flies sits on the ceiling. From its point of view it sits on the floor.

Does it now? You are telling me that the fly does not know what orientation it finds itself in, wether it is upside down or right way up? How do you know that, what sort of truth are you imparting to me?


You both see the same thing but your definitions are not of objective reality. The lowest common denominator is that the fly sits on a layer of such and such atoms, at such and such a position in space and time, facing such and such relative to the centre of gravity of the earth.

So here you are saying that, and lets just asume that flies have eqivilant understanding to humaity, becuase our definitions are not the same, then the fly is not objectvly placed where we can both percive it to be?

If as you say the fly is in such and such a position, relative to the centre of gravity of the earth, does it occupy this space subjectivly or objectivly?


And I see you do really have reading problems, for I have stated clearly why your proposition isn't objective truth, but, for the sake of the argument I'll do it again slowly:

1) Words are symbols of concepts.
2) Concepts are mental descriptions of all the attributes perception can help us identify in objects in reality (if they are assumed to even be there).
3) Concepts != reality. Concepts are abstractions of reality. They are a picture of reality. A subjective picture. A partial picture.
4) Furthermore all concepts refer to classes/sets. Implictly all concepts have limited definitions (i.e. you are telling me nothing when you say you are sitting on a chair because there is no way I would know what object you refer to. You can go into however complex a description of this specific chair you still use sets and operations on sets - intersection in particular).
5) Perception is limited, concepts are even more limited, modes of reasoning are based on infered and assumed relationships between these concepts.

Well forgive me, and please correct me if I'm wrong, coz you know I can hardly read, and I am a bit thick.

But is seems to me all you are saying here is:

Because we can't know 'objectivly' that what we percive is the way things actualy are then any such 'truth' can only be 'subjective' because we are limited by our perceptions.

Which I almost agree with. Yet the very word objective is one of these symobls that you talk about, which means we must have concpetualised such a thing as objectivity.

Which is; that which is, indepentdant of one's realtive position.

So if you look at a tree, whether you percive the tree in it's true form or not, you can say that the tree objectivly exists.

If you and a group of freinds then circle the tree, you can have it's existance verified by others. If you call it an oak, and your freind calls it an elm, it does not detract from the the truth of it's existance.



I don't need to prove your statement is false. All I need to do is to show that there is more to it, which I have over and over again.

What rot. All you have to do is show me how there is more to it, and that invalidates my statement, howso?

I can say for example that I hold in my hand a blue pen. Showing me that there is more to it, maybe describeing which hand I hold it in, or deabeting which shade of blue the ink is, does not detract from my initial statement, nor make it false, it merley shows that my initial statment is basic.

Does it now? You are telling me that the fly does not know what orientation it finds itself in, wether it is upside down or right way up? How do you know that, what sort of truth are you imparting to me?

Your beloved science says so :).

So here you are saying that, and lets just asume that flies have eqivilant understanding to humaity, becuase our definitions are not the same, then the fly is not objectvly placed where we can both percive it to be?

If as you say the fly is in such and such a position, relative to the centre of gravity of the earth, does it occupy this space subjectivly or objectivly?

The definition of space is subjective thus it is subjective.:)

Well forgive me, and please correct me if I'm wrong, coz you know I can hardly read, and I am a bit thick.

But is seems to me all you are saying here is:

Because we can't know 'objectivly' that what we percive is the way things actualy are then any such 'truth' can only be 'subjective' because we are limited by our perceptions.

Which I almost agree with. Yet the very word objective is one of these symobls that you talk about, which means we must have concpetualised such a thing as objectivity.

Quite. Objectivity is a concept. Question is, does it have any relation to reality.

Which is; that which is, indepentdant of one's realtive position.

So if you look at a tree, whether you percive the tree in it's true form or not, you can say that the tree objectivly exists.

No because "tree" is a concept and does not exist independent of your mind. Your perception indicates that something is. Assuming your perception is correct (which it need not be), what you see is not a "tree", because your opinions of reality have no impact on its fundamental reality. Something may be objectively there, but *what* that something is, and *where* it is, is entirely subjective until you can know that at least one of your definitions is absolutely of the same nature like reality.

If you and a group of freinds then circle the tree, you can have it's existance verified by others. If you call it an oak, and your freind calls it an elm, it does not detract from the the truth of it's existance.

You agree that it is a "tree", but you do not agree on the more concise category. "Tree" seems to be the lowest common definition allowed by the group, but that says nothing about the object. The fact that more than one observers agree in belief does not have any more impact on fundamental reality than one observer's belief. Truth in the casual sense may be democratic, but objective truth isn't.


What rot. All you have to do is show me how there is more to it, and that invalidates my statement, howso?

Like this: To any concept you name to describe an object of reality, there is more than that object which fits the definitions, because that's what concepts are: classes. Thus any invocation of concepts cannot refer to individual objects in reality and cannot say everything about that object, merely partial descriptions, which are not objective truth.(see below)

I can say for example that I hold in my hand a blue pen. Showing me that there is more to it, maybe describeing which hand I hold it in, or deabeting which shade of blue the ink is, does not detract from my initial statement, nor make it false, it merley shows that my initial statment is basic.

It doesn't make it false in the sense you meant it, but it does not identify the objects you employ, thus it is imprecise and not objectively true, merely probable.

Logically speaking it's a matter of quantity. Reality > semantic statement. So if we take reality to be the premise, if reality is true then sematic statement of it is true. If, on the other hand, we take semantic statement as premise, if semantic statement of reality is true (and this can only be according to perception) then it is not necessary that reality is true. You cannot deduce it. You may infer that, and you may say it is a fact, but it is not, and cannot be objective truth.
Now since you don't know reality, the only thing you know is your perception of reality, you may only take the latter as a premise and you may only know the first through inference... thus you cannot know objective truth, by virtue of your perception + mental abilities, only by accident, if your inference is correct, which you cannot know if it is the case, because you do not have complete/perfect knowledge of nature.

Merely that you can correct someone to be more precise in their use of the word.

No, you can't.

You're still confusing accuracy and precision. They are not the same thing. Someone can use red (imperfectly) precisely to refer to a limited few shades of green. That's inaccurate, but much more precise than the actual meaning. If I correct that person, I correct them to be less precise in their use of the word... but more accurate.

So you're telling me: "You're wrong, but I can't tell you why!" :D

No. I'm telling you, "You're wrong, and I can tell you why, but like everyone else on the planet there comes a point where I'm tired of saying the same thing in different words, knowing that you'll just ask me exactly the same pointless question again."

OK. What would you accept as being perfectly similar? That's essentially what it comes to, anyway.

That's the same question, pretty much.

I'm not sure what you mean. "FF0000" is pure red -- that's what it means. It is one hundred percent (100%) red and zero (0) percent other colors. That's as good a definition of pure color as you're going to get. And you're telling me that's an imprecise concept? :D

Actually, I wouldn't. But it's precise only because it's not real, like a perfect triangle or a perfect circle. Put it into action, use it to describe actual colors (or shapes, in the other cases), and you get imprecision, because you are always dealing with approximations.

What would constitute someone else being able to envision the same shade?

It seems perfectly clear to me. Any rephrasing would just be saying the same thing in different words, and not helpful.

If you really don't understand what I mean, again, you're going to have to ask a better question. Something more specific, perhaps--about a particular aspect, or with a particular example.

I imagine that it would help.

Yes, it would help you, because it would prove your point.

But it's not possible.

So basically: you want to use a "color" that is by your own definition inseparable from the object it is on-- and then you say this is a limitation of language? :D

This gets tiresome. What I want to do is precisely describe an experience. This involves precisely describing the color on a particular object. By the very nature of the abstraction inherent in language, this description can never be precise.

That is a limitation on language. You're right that it's a limitation that only matters if you want to use language for a particular purpose, but that's true of any limitation... and, indeed, the very fact that language is much more suitable for certain kinds of thinking rather than others is a rather important one.

Listen to what you just said: "color isn't language." Oh really? Without language you wouldn't be able to even talk about color, much less argue about it.

No, but I'd be able to experience it. Experienced color: color without language. Color within language always diminishes color. If you can only conceive color within language, no wonder you have no idea what I'm talking about--you just ignore what is mediated for the form of the mediation.

Language is inherently an enabling mechanism, not a limiter.

Cars are also an enabling mechanism. But try to use one to fly and you'll quickly realize their limitations.

I reject this completely. It's not wrong--nor right. No, no. It's simply nonsense.

I see I was right. ;)

"Beyond the manipulation of symbols"? And how would it do that?

Do you know what a "symbol" is? Symbols always symbolize; that's their point. We convey meaning through symbols when the things we symbolize on one end are understood by the person who interprets the symbols on the other. That's what communicating with symbols is about.

"But there's something there I can't say with language!" Something? If it were a something you'd be able to explain it.

I can, and I have, within the limits of language. I cannot, of course, say what can't be said. This is a perfect example of question-begging: you assume that language is limitless, so, if I cannot say what I insist cannot be said, then that which I say cannot be said must not actually be real.

Subjective somethings hold no interest to me; there's nothing to know or understand about subjective things anyway. Those concepts don't even apply to subjective experiences.

We may be using different understandings of "subjective." Color is objective experience in that it occurs in the world of objects. It is subjective experience in that (like all experience) it is perceived through the mind (and might conceivably be different from person to person). Certainly we are not devoid of knowledge or understanding when it comes to color.

I do know, however, that language is used in certain ways. Those ways are either public or they're meaningless. Why is a one-time pad impossible to crack? Because it contains no meaning-- at least not without the matching pad that lets you decrypt it.

But what does it mean to "crack" something, to understand it? Simply to convert its symbols into concepts, thoughts, meaning.

Now, how absurd would it be for someone to insist that the symbols are all there is?

Now, I do agree that since we're all human we do things similarly. But the fact stands that you have absolutely zero knowledge of what goes on in someone else's head. That's the subjective bit, remember?

That's not what "subjective" means.

Support? That's like saying (I paraphrase a famous argument here): "I have a box with a beetle inside, and that guy has a box just like it (though I can't look inside of his box). That means it's likely he has got a beetle inside of his box like I have inside of my box."

Right, it's a ridiculously poor argument when put that way (though in a case where we have absolutely no other evidence, and no counterexamples, it might still be a plausible assumption.)

But what we actually do need not merely be making arbitrary assumptions about box similarity and content similarity being synonymous. "Box" and "content", in the case of consciousness, are not so neatly separate... because there are external indications of consciousness (most trivially, in human interaction.)

Now, of course, we could have the external signs without any internal elements. But it's not unreasonable to believe, in the absence of any countering reason, that the signs do indicate something about other people's consciousness.

(Matters would be different with AI, with a deliberate attempt to echo the external signs.)

All it means in this case is that you use a certain way of talking about subjective experiences-- but those experiences are totally irrelevant to how you act or how you mean something.

But that's nonsense. When I say "red" to describe something I mean my subjective experience of "red." If somebody else sees red as green, and interprets my "red" to refer to green, then I have been misinterpreted (in an unavoidable way). It might be different if my end were purely utilitarian, but if I'm trying to describe an experience--as we do all the time--that holds true.

You're trying to keep communication alive while dispensing with having to deal with subjectivity, but you can't. It's not possible. Communication only makes sense as the interaction of subjective minds. Otherwise, there is no transfer of meaning, just acts and responses.

Mindless? If you were a machine I'd consider you an intelligent machine. As you aren't, however, I'll have to stick to considering you an intelligent human.

Does not "intelligent" imply something about my mind? Are you not breaking your own rules?

And you'd not have gotten into their minds; all you've done there is shown that we have certain behaviors.

Right. The question is, how do we explain these behaviors? Sometimes, indeed often, the explanations that are the most plausible, that make the most sense, involve conscious traits.

Also, you've noted that "hating" and "love" are also words with particular behaviors attached, by which you recognize them.

Right, but when I speak of them I'm not referring to their external expression. Don't pretend I am. Virtually nobody is. We might be able to program a computer to imitate a person who loves us, but only a truly desperate person would take that option... and to appreciate it, would have to delude himself.

Now you're assuming that people know what color you're talking about? :D

Yes. Do you think this detracts from my argument about precision? Then I think you need to recall--again--the distinction between "accuracy" and "precision."

And why should I need to assume anything here? If I was indeed taught how to talk from these other beings, surely they taught me something meaningful to me and to them--

Wait, you're breaking your own rules again. Why should you assume anything about "meaning"? If you were taught to speak by others, all you have is that you were taught to speak by them. That implies nothing whatsoever about meaning--why should it? Unless you want to make assumptions about what they have in their minds. ;)

which means it isn't, can't be subjective

All meaning is subjective, because all understanding is subjective. That's what meaning is about: the interpretation of symbols representing subjective things (like thoughts and experiences). What else do the symbols represent? Even your own example of meaning incorporated a subjective element: your understanding mind.

(remember the beetle).

Even on the strongest skepticism about consciousness, nothing changes about the essence of communication (though it might seem more futile.) The beetle thought experiment, at best, shows we have no grounds for believing that others have minds, or for believing anything about the minds they might have. It does not show that discussing subjective experience is somehow "meaningless." Its meaning may be misinterpreted by others, who have no minds, or radically different minds. But it is still meaningful.

Not at all. I am perfectly agreeable to the fact that language can and does transmit meaning, but I am also aware of what that boils down to. How do you know someone understood your instructions to go buy some 2% milk? They have to do it, and then you know.

No, you don't. That's not what "meaning" is.

The transfer of meaning has nothing to do with response. (Or, rather, while response might be an indicator of the transfer of meaning, it is so only through causal relations, not logical ones.) If I tell my friend to get me milk from the store, and he doesn't respond in any visible way, he may still have understood my meaning even if he never actually does it. If I order it over my computer, and a completely automated delivery system gets it to me, if neither my computer nor the delivery system had any states of understanding, there was no transfer of meaning.

If there's something else there, then it isn't interesting (meaning I could not possibly have an interest in it).

Of course you could.

Coincidentally--or perhaps not coincidentally at all--your problem here is the same problem you have with language. For you, instrumental rationality is dominant. How can I use this object? Language works fine for that. How can I use this person? Conceiving of them as automatons without mental states works fine for that (though, because of the nature of human psychology, this becomes a bit of a stretch.)

But maybe I don't want to use objects. Maybe I'm more interested in experiencing them. Maybe I don't want to use people. Maybe I'm more interested in interacting with them for its own sake: in, say, having friends whose friendship I can value quite independently of any external utility it brings me.

Maybe I don't really care if my friend actually goes out and buys milk for me. Maybe I'm more interested in whether he loves me, whether he understands me, whether there's some other subject in the world that sympathizes with my problems. And no, not for what he will do as a consequence of those traits--simply for those traits in themselves.

Is this so irrational? Only if you think that the only things I should want in life are directly tangible. I see no reason whatsoever to make that assumption. (Indeed, I think it is quite possibly just a product of a capitalist culture that wants to define human goods in those terms: wealth, power. But there is more to life.)

Ethically, too, the picture you paint here is bankrupt. The heart of ethics is regarding other human beings as subjects. By your theory, it makes no difference if we ignore the question of subjectivity and treat them all as objects. But what kind of obligations would we have then? None at all--just, at most, the concern one might have for a nice object. "Oh, look at that pretty moving statue! Let's not deface it."

I reverse your claim. You say that we lose nothing of "interest" by abandoning consideration of others' subjective experiences. I say we lose pretty much everything that makes life valuable. I refuse to live in an objectified world. Indeed, I would much rather take a leap of faith and assume that everyone has subjective experiences... even without any of the grounds I have provided.

Besides, "mindless?" If it's as well spoken as you, I wouldn't say it was mindless -- rather, it would be an intelligent computer (much the way people sometimes refer to the computer's hard drive light flashing as the computer "thinking").

You are using both "mind" and "intelligent" in ways that I have not been, just as you have redefined "meaning" to do what you want it to.

If I've gotten rid of something valuable, tell me what it is.

Your picture of human interaction is utterly degrading. What is a philosophical discussion? Not a sharing of thoughts for mutual benefit any more--just manipulation of a machine so that it will tell you things to interest you intellectually. What is a friendship? Not a relationship of mutual affection any more--just a way to get a machine to do you favors and treat you nicely. (Or, at best, admiration for a moving human statue.)

Make it more complete? What do you mean?

More precise. What I'm saying is that you aren't really offering a solution to my point about the precision of language; you're just saying that communication in my sense is irrelevant. You're not solving the problem, you're just attempting to demolish its context.

What I have done is abolish a great many problems without losing anything interesting.

You have indeed abolished a great many problems (recall that "abolish" does not mean the same as "solve"), but at the cost of essentially everything worth living for in the world.

I simply find them irrelevant, as do we all in practice.

Speak for yourself.

I experience the world every day. I see the trees waving in the wind and the shadows swaying across the leaves on the ground. The children play in the park and the ice cream tastes great and when I run the wind blows across my face. I see the colors of the sunset and I can tell my friends about it. I see beauty everywhere.

That's nice. (Really! It is.) In what sense is this experience mediated through language? None at all--which is precisely the point.

Is that a use?

Not in the sense I spoke of. Indeed, it's exactly the kind of direct experience I'm talking about--exactly what we cannot do through language. I cannot see what you see, taste what you taste, feel what you feel through your words. I can imagine, but only that--and a pale imitation it is. Much of the content of your experience is lost. It cannot be transferred through a medium as imprecise and limited as language.

What can I do with language? I can talk about the trees in terms of the wood they might provide. I can talk about the children in terms of the revenue they might provide the ice cream seller. I can talk about the ice cream in terms of how much and how fast it sells. I can communicate content perfectly fine in those terms.

That's the point. ;)

I no longer find myself inside of a closed box, unable to be sure of anything, reduced to probabilities in knowing if people REALLY care about me. I know, and I have to tell you it's an extremely good feeling.

So you have abolished your fear of lies by abolishing the distinction between truth and falsity? That's no solution at all.

This is pretty much an epistemology debate. Political philosophy shouldn't have gotten anywhere near this thread.:)

Epistemology is political. Because knowledge is. And because the ways we perceive and understand the world, and attempt to justify our conclusions, are bound up with the society and culture in which we live.

Strictly speaking epistemology is political because it is a debate of it is a conflict of interests in the wider society, yes. I merely pointed out that the larger implications of what we might conclude should be ignored for now, for the sake of the argument we are having. We are trying to establish certain things on their merits, not be utilitarian about what we should establish.

1) I posit that if there is such a thing as an objective truth to anything, then we have not yet discerned it, and it seems likely that we never will.


This sentence is far to vague to have any actual meaning.


Any such device DOES NOT say anything about the nature of what is described (it says absolutely nothing about the reality of the picture).

That (especially the bold) makes no sense, you haven't even defined what 'reality' is yet.


It is a portrait of reality and is self-consistent by necessity, but it only has meaning within its frame of reference (i.e. a bitmap is "true" when read as such. When read as a txt document it is non-sensical). Any such device offers a unique perspective of reality, but says absolutely nothing about the nature of reality, because it has a different nature itself(*), dictated by the rules of interpretation we have established.


How could you deduce such a thing? By your own premise you can only conclude that it has no objective universal nature (since it's all down to relative perspective).


Example: A red ball. Let's analyse the concept of "red". We define red as the stimulus ":mad:" <- gives optically. This is one device of description.

Another is the scientific conception. Red is light at a certain wavelength.

Both mechanisms presuppose light. In the absence of light nothing can be said about the nature of the ball in this respect.

Not true, if you mean that literally, you don't have to see it to evaluate it's shape and weight etc...


And since light is not a universal occurence, it is clear there is nothing absolute about the ball's "redness".


Define universal occurrence, otherwise this statement is nonsensical.


To return to 1), all methods of knowledge can only give a unique perspective of reality which is "true" and consistent within that strictly applied method, and say nothing about the nature of reality.

Again, the bold makes no sense since again you haven't defined what reality is (yes that's a weird thing to ask) and you haven't shown how you can conclude that any object does have one universal objective reality. Methods of knowledge tell you about the ball according to your own perspective, such that you would recognise such an object again if there were more than one. You know how the ball will be perceived, therefore you are able to identify the object and thus it's existence, how is that not sufficient reality?


If we ever find a method whose nature will coincide with that of reality (see (*) above) we may discern at least one objective truth, but we wouldn't know it, and it would be an accident.


Yet you seem to make it impossible to deduce that any object does have one universal objective morality.


2) All modes of thinking are correct (i.e. consistent) only within themselves: all modes of thinking are self-validating.


I don't believe this is true, modes of thinking routinely overlap. Logic can disprove certain religious statements by showing that the statement cancels itself out for example.


3) Because no mode of thinking can be known to relate to the nature of reality (see (*) above)

See my bolded statement.


4) Because of 3), adopting any mechanism of thinking, any world view etc. is a leap of faith. Any mode of thinking requires a belief in its unprovable axioms (in the case of religion God, in the case of science empricism, in the case of logic the relation of identity, the functions of truth and the laws of causation etc.)


You seem to be mixing logic up with the laws of physics there slightly. You have yet failed to show how any method if thinking is actually equal, only that they are based on perceptions and that perceptions are relative. Except logic is a priori not a posteriori, and logic can exist independent of perceptions. Logic is largely about definitions and whether certain properties or statements are consistent with their defined premise or whether they contradict it, this is regardless of whether you attach green to that wavelength on the spectrum or red. This has been my problem with Wittgenstein.


(a) Arguing about religion is absurd because the axioms of religion and logic and religion and science are at odds. (God would need to be strictly definable and manifest itself physically respectively).


Agreed.


(b) Science is not objective. Science presuposes logic, but logic (as per above) cannot say anything objective about reality.


You haven't shown this.


(c) Trolls are right and absurd. Trolls are persons who happen to be quite confident in their views, but adopt (unknowingly) a different perspective on reality. They are right in what they say, within the scope of their perspective. They are absurd in that they don't argue. To argue, one must be in the frame of thought of the OP (usually logic and science on this forum).

(d) Given (c), flaming is perfectly right in the same sense a troll is right.

(e) Would people be so kind as to try and keep to the frame of thought of the OP if they contribute to a thread?

Peace.:p (Otherwise fuck you:D )

:D

Also, by your own premises, the idea that any method of thinking requires a leap of faith applies to itself, since you are clearly making a logical argument, and thus we nor you cannot take any of what you are saying to be objectively true but one leap of faith in itself. In other words, the OP cancels itself out.

Also, by your own premises, the idea that any method of thinking requires a leap of faith applies to itself, since you are clearly making a logical argument, and thus we nor you cannot take any of what you are saying to be objectively true but one leap of faith in itself. In other words, the OP cancels itself out.

Well any argument that means to invalidate the mechanism it uses is bound to cancel itself;). I don't believe in logic any more than I do in anything else, I simply derive pleasure from sophistry, so no, you haven't dealt a fatal blow to my argument. You've just confirmed its purpose.

PS: As for the above post, I have tackeld most of the points raised in the previous pages, so I hope you don't mind if I don't drudge through the whole thing again. I'm not that easily entertained :p

I merely pointed out that the larger implications of what we might conclude should be ignored for now, for the sake of the argument we are having.

That's not possible. What is "truth"? What is "real"? In a sense, this is always a value question--is it worth investigating something further? If we find that we are all brains in vats, does it matter? If it doesn't, then what's the point of the question... and, more broadly, what's the point of the realm of the "real" beyond our perception?

Answers to this question can easily become political... in terms of a social role for philosophy, or an account of human goods bound up with the prevailing social system.

We are trying to establish certain things on their merits, not be utilitarian about what we should establish.

While I agree that we should not be appealing to consequences, I'm not convinced that we can have a discussion that truly is consequence-neutral, either. Should we bother investigating whether there are credible grounds to label certain views "better" in some epistemic sense? Skepticism is at least somewhat persuasive in this respect... so it worth going to the effort to see if there's another way?

That, too, is a value question, and a political one insofar as it necessarily concerns the sort of society we want to see and how we think it can be achieved.

I suppose I am slightly idealistic in this respect. I believe that debate should take its course independent of value judgments on its possible conclusions, and once something useful is established then we can start debating conclusions. But this is just predilection I guess, it won't stop others doing otherwise.

[Peep]You are telling me that the fly does not know what orientation it finds itself in, wether it is upside down or right way up? How do you know that, what sort of truth are you imparting to me?

Your beloved science says so :).

Source?
I have difficulty believing either that this is true, or that science would have a way to ascertain that even if it were.

Soheran, I decided to write up exactly why I think you are mistaken. I hope this will clear up some misunderstandings that appear to have cropped up (by God it had better, I certainly spent long enough on it :D).


I can, and I have, within the limits of language. I cannot, of course, say what can't be said. This is a perfect example of question-begging: you assume that language is limitless, so, if I cannot say what I insist cannot be said, then that which I say cannot be said must not actually be real.

What I have in fact assumed is that language can address the problem in order to disprove your assumption that it makes sense to say it in the first place. What I assume is not that language is limitless, but rather that your statement has meaning. This statement was (I paraphrase): "Language cannot precisely convey the meaning of what I refer to when I say 'this color.' (1)"

What is interesting is that you have declared you cannot express what you mean in language. Statements about reality - that is, descriptions - are said when there is information to be shared. Notice, though, that you've said that what you mean is impossible to formulate in language (I imagine here that you've got some idea of a private subjective experience). But if, by your own admission, no meaning can be formulated, then I deny that the original statement (1) is in fact a description. It does has the superficial grammar of an English description of reality -- quite! -- but it has no meaning, therefore it cannot be a description (although it might serve some other purpose).

Slightly differently:

Question: "Is it possible to more precisely convey the essential meaning of what I refer to when I say 'this color'?"

Questions in this sense are asked when there is information to be gathered. Answers are responses to questions. However, you've said an answer to this question is impossible to formulate in language. But if no answer exists, then also no question exists. It has the superficial grammar of an English question but no answer, therefore it cannot be a question in need of an answer - although it could serve some other purpose. Compare: rhetorical "questions." QED.

Whatever it is you're trying to say, it's not getting through for the very same reason that you want to ask the question in the first place.

Since I do not see your statement as a description (or a question, in the second formulation), I find your interest in it a symptom of a philosophical disease. A thinking man's disease, to be sure-- but a disease nonetheless. For what else can I call it when a normal person goes from being able to know anything they like (within their abilities) to speaking what appears to be nonsense and getting absolutely nowhere? You've gotten sidetracked by the way we talk about experiences, that's all. It's a sin that virtually everyone has committed, or is committing - and to be honest I still do myself sometimes. The way western philosophy has been conducted for hundreds of years has been doing the same thing. Kant's noumenon? Has he really said something about the essential nature of objects? Hardly-- he's just created a new way to talk about phenomena. But it's very difficult to get out of the rut that we're in; our modes of thinking are set upon this one track and it's distinctly unnatural for us to leave it. Personally I thought this (my) view was complete sophistry when I first heard it. I wanted to get at the real mind! Wanted to know the real Truth! But I had to ask myself: What is it that I mean when I say that? What kind of answer am I looking for? It turns out I was looking for the wrong thing. It wasn't an answer that I needed, but rather a coherent question! Similarly here: you need a coherent sentence in order to express something.

But what does it mean to "crack" something, to understand it? Simply to convert its symbols into concepts, thoughts, meaning.

Now, how absurd would it be for someone to insist that the symbols are all there is?

I agree, it would indeed be absurd to insist that symbols are all there is. They'd be forgetting the use we make of those symbols, which can be extremely complex (and which is not contained in the symbols themselves). For example, the contents of a message encrypted via a one-time pad is only called 'encypted' because we are aware that there exists (or did exist) a method to translate those symbols into meaningful words. Otherwise it'd simply be a mass of completely random symbols, which, after all, no one can use (at least, no one can use those random symbols in the sort of way we would call "reading the message" -- though random symbols could be used for other means. See the "Book of Abraham" in Mormon literature. The original Egyptian text was untranslatable at the time - essentially random symbols - but Joseph Smith was able to "translate" the characters to suit his desires).

Right, it's a ridiculously poor argument when put that way (though in a case where we have absolutely no other evidence, and no counterexamples, it might still be a plausible assumption.)

But what we actually do need not merely be making arbitrary assumptions about box similarity and content similarity being synonymous. "Box" and "content", in the case of consciousness, are not so neatly separate... because there are external indications of consciousness (most trivially, in human interaction.)

Now, of course, we could have the external signs without any internal elements. But it's not unreasonable to believe, in the absence of any countering reason, that the signs do indicate something about other people's consciousness.

(Matters would be different with AI, with a deliberate attempt to echo the external signs.)

If you were not aware, the box and the person with the box are the external evidence. You can't use that kind evidence against the argument because they don't even address the same issue. Speech and human interaction are also part of behavior, you'll remember, though very complex parts.

The fact remains that whatever is inside the box cannot possibly have a meaning (a use) other than "Whatever's in the box", regardless of how it is actually talked about in language. As I said (and you agreed!), the box might be empty, the box might be full, the box might have a small man inside of it telling the big one what to do-- whatever the case, it doesn't matter. I might find it reasonable to believe that everyone's got a non-physical little man inside of his head directing his actions. Someone else might also find that it is reasonable to believe that there was a biscuit inside of his mind, an intelligent biscuit, ergo everyone else has one too. A man might even tell you: "I have a goat inside of my box." So? What does that amount to? What is that supposed to explain? It doesn't matter at all which one people "find reasonable" - that just means that we have a certain way of talking about the subjective. The nature of those things is indefinable; or more correctly, to speak of "their nature" as something to be discovered or known is to speak nonsense. The only meaning the man's "goat" could have in language is the way he speaks about it. No properties can be attached to it in the way that properties can be descriptions of physical things. Even if they are, they must only be pseudo-properties, a certain way of speaking that provides no information about the contents of the box. It's possible to say that trying to speak about the "contents of the box" is nonsense itself if taken in a philosophical sense (that is, out of its ordinary context). Because of this, meaning is not necessarily correlated with subjective experiences, although I agree that we often do correlate them.

Countering reasons? Definitionally there's not going to be any countering reasons! I mean, what exactly do you expect here? To be shown someone else's subjective experience or lack thereof?

What does matter is this: "How can the problems caused by this view be solved?"

But that's nonsense. When I say "red" to describe something I mean my subjective experience of "red." If somebody else sees red as green, and interprets my "red" to refer to green, then I have been misinterpreted (in an unavoidable way). It might be different if my end were purely utilitarian, but if I'm trying to describe an experience--as we do all the time--that holds true.

What you do is use the word "red" in certain circumstances, which are more or less in accordance with how you learned to use the word. Yes, I agree that you are perfectly right in that you mean you see red! You're also right when you say you have a subjective experience of the color red. But remember from the beetle-box argument and my exposition above that this particular turn of speech does not convey any information about a private subjective experience.

Suppose there's a society of people who all refer to the contents of their boxes as "goats." Individuals can say that their particular goat has properties like "sharp hooves" and "long horns" and "red, bloodthirsty eyes." OK. But how are they supposed to communicate the meaning of this to anyone if there's no objective criteria to show people? --After all, it shouldn't be a matter of random chance that you use these descriptions, right? "Well," you could say, "it isn't random chance because people say those things when they have this kind of sense-experience." --And how do they know that? Do they measure the kind of experience they have against a yardstick? "I can remember this color and identify it precisely in the future." Oh you can? But what objective standard are you using to define "precisely"? Surely you're not just using your memory-- that's like (another paraphrase here) "buying several copies of the newspaper in order to assure yourself that what is said in it is true." It doesn't amount to anything. You don't get any objective precision if your standards are based on circular reasoning: "The same color is what I believe to be the same color." All that means is simply that you have no standard with which to judge precision.

Suppose you were to take a sample of your color and go around comparing that sample with other colors. You now have a good idea of how that color compares with others, say for example the color of the kitchen's floor tiles. Now you might go around without your sample and say of each tile "this matches" and "this doesn't match." --But here, although you've used your memory of the color sample, you have an objective standard, independent of yourself. This standard allows you to be precise (and imprecise). The standard allows you to be right (and wrong). You can always go back to it to see if your memory was right, and so can other people.

A couple of more quotes that are helpful:

"'But I know what the color green looks like to me'--- surely that makes sense!---Certainly: what use [emphasis added] of the proposition were you thinking of?"

"Imagine someone saying, 'But I know how tall I am!' and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it."


Before you can refer to color, you must have the ability to differentiate colors-- and to our public language, that is what "knowing this color", and similar sentences mean. Any other use - although I hesitate to say it's actually a use, since nothing can be referred to with it - is a product of either a mistaken idea of how language works or is simply a turn of speech that looks deceptively like it's referring to a private subjective experience (note that this is not a coherent idea given the above).

And like the person who thinks they can show how tall they are by putting his hand on his head, your idea that there is something inexpressible which we 'translate' only imprecisely with language falls flat as well. These "private sense experiences" you attempt to speak of are ineffable, incoherent, and completely uninteresting.

You're trying to keep communication alive while dispensing with having to deal with subjectivity, but you can't. It's not possible. Communication only makes sense as the interaction of subjective minds. Otherwise, there is no transfer of meaning, just acts and responses.So tell me, if you know so well: what is exactly is "meaning" and how is it "transferred"? If you give me some subjective "explanation" (haha) after everything I just wrote I'm afraid there's little hope for you. I don't argue that there only are acts and responses; I am certainly not a behaviorist in any sense of the term! What I require-- the only thing I require!-- is that language be objective and therefore comprehensible, meaningful, to you and to me.

Look, I'm not saying it doesn't feel like what you've said is reasonable, and indeed it does sound reasonable. But this feeling is deceptive and easily misconstrued. When we look very closely at how we learn and use language, the idea that "meaning is subjective" is incoherent. It's nonsense in the same way that "The desk is 33 liters long" is, except it's much less obvious; this nonsense is hidden by our form of speech, the ease with which we use language. That's why we don't have problems "knowing" things when speaking to someone conversationally, but try to make a similar philosophical statement and we stumble over it, misinterpreting the use of the word "know" and then not seeing the nonsense we've created for what it is.

We use language so naturally that we don't see what lies right before our eyes.

Does not "intelligent" imply something about my mind? Are you not breaking your own rules?No, look closer. I am not using your ideas on how language works. The use of the word "intelligent" is not something that is up to personal taste.

Right. The question is, how do we explain these behaviors? Sometimes, indeed often, the explanations that are the most plausible, that make the most sense, involve conscious traits.I don't have an objection to explaining these traits in terms of "consciousness" or anything else, just as I have no objection to people using "noumenon" to refer to objects. Remember how those people in my thought experiment used "sharp hooves" etc. to 'describe' what was in their (private subjective) box. That's fine. What I object to is people taking those objective ways of talking as referring to subjective experiences (or taking the noumenon to be the "true" objects, etc).

Right, but when I speak of them I'm not referring to their external expression. Don't pretend I am. Virtually nobody is. We might be able to program a computer to imitate a person who loves us, but only a truly desperate person would take that option... and to appreciate it, would have to delude himself.I agree. People don't have to show they're unhappy in order to be unhappy. But remember how those descriptions are used.

I also agree with your assessment about the computer. It's a computer; of course it's not going to be the same.

Yes. Do you think this detracts from my argument about precision? Then I think you need to recall--again--the distinction between "accuracy" and "precision."From what I recall, precision refers to the amount of possible variation in a measurement. Accuracy refers to the distance of a measurement from the true value. As such I think that your argument has more to do with accuracy than precision. I believe I've shown above that no subjective experience can qualify as a "true value" or standard, so no, I don't think that your argument is able to have anything detracted from it, as I don't think there's anything there to begin with. You merely need to be corrected, that's all.

Wait, you're breaking your own rules again. Why should you assume anything about "meaning"? If you were taught to speak by others, all you have is that you were taught to speak by them. That implies nothing whatsoever about meaning--why should it? Unless you want to make assumptions about what they have in their minds.You're acting as if I agree with your idea that meaning is something in itself, distinct from the words and the way we use them. Fortunately I do not agree with that, and no it's not breaking my own rules. Meaning can be defined as the way we use the words, the situations in which we've learned to use them. We say nothing about private subjective experiences" nor private subjective "meaning" because there's nothing to say about nonsense.

All meaning is subjective, because all understanding is subjective. That's what meaning is about: the interpretation of symbols representing subjective things (like thoughts and experiences). What else do the symbols represent? Even your own example of meaning incorporated a subjective element: your understanding mind.Symbols are used by us in certain situations, that's all. They enable us to do things we otherwise could not. "Interpreting the symbols" (of, for example, this post) merely means that you can, in the future, give an account of what I said here in your own words. Or, it could mean that you decide to use this argument in the future for yourself. Or, you'll be able to reference my post as a prime example of someone totally off the wall (but I don't think I would say you understood me in that case). Symbols don't represent anything. Try saying "go get the highest apple off the tree." What does "apple" mean here? Nothing in particular; the meaning of the sentence is a product of the whole. And "understanding" this sentence would mean that someone responds to it by going and getting the apple, or saying no, or throwing things at you and saying how much you hate the environment, or innumerable other responses. No one has to subjectively imagine an apple in this exchange; there's nothing like that in question here.

What has been very useful to me in understanding how language works in this way is my little brother. He has been learning to say things lately and (aside from being incredibly cute) it is extremely interesting how he learns and is taught things. For example, we have a heater near the floor. When it is on we always pull him away if he gets too close and we say things like "don't go close to there, baby, it's hot", and "it's hot, stay away", and "no, don't touch. hot!" Now, when he sees someone getting close to it while it's on he will say "hot." Is that subjective? Well, he didn't use the word before we taught him (and indeed he uses "hot" to refer to the heater, stove etc even when they're not on - that needs to be corrected).

Even on the strongest skepticism about consciousness, nothing changes about the essence of communication (though it might seem more futile.) The beetle thought experiment, at best, shows we have no grounds for believing that others have minds, or for believing anything about the minds they might have. It does not show that discussing subjective experience is somehow "meaningless." Its meaning may be misinterpreted by others, who have no minds, or radically different minds. But it is still meaningful.I do agree that subjective experiences can be discussed productively. But mind the use of "subjective." The beetle experiment shows that, like I've state above, any private subjective experience is irrelevant to properly use language.

No, you don't. That's not what "meaning" is.

The transfer of meaning has nothing to do with response. (Or, rather, while response might be an indicator of the transfer of meaning, it is so only through causal relations, not logical ones.) If I tell my friend to get me milk from the store, and he doesn't respond in any visible way, he may still have understood my meaning even if he never actually does it.Right. But if your friend never responded in his entire life? Would you say he understood? Would, for example, Terry Schiavo understand, even though there was no indicators of understanding? The possibility of understanding is an attribute of being human; that is, you can say of any human that they "could understand" (even if they do not). But the way they react (immediately, and in the future) to your words shows that (and how) they understand. If someone cannot understand, that just means: they don't (for whatever reason) do as we do.

If I order it over my computer, and a completely automated delivery system gets it to me, if neither my computer nor the delivery system had any states of understanding, there was no transfer of meaning.Right. But that just means computers are different from people and so we talk about them differently.

Of course you could.See above where I addressed private subjective experiences as having no meaning.

Coincidentally--or perhaps not coincidentally at all--your problem here is the same problem you have with language. For you, instrumental rationality is dominant. How can I use this object? Language works fine for that. How can I use this person? Conceiving of them as automatons without mental states works fine for that (though, because of the nature of human psychology, this becomes a bit of a stretch.)

But maybe I don't want to use objects. Maybe I'm more interested in experiencing them. Maybe I don't want to use people. Maybe I'm more interested in interacting with them for its own sake: in, say, having friends whose friendship I can value quite independently of any external utility it brings me.

Maybe I don't really care if my friend actually goes out and buys milk for me. Maybe I'm more interested in whether he loves me, whether he understands me, whether there's some other subject in the world that sympathizes with my problems. And no, not for what he will do as a consequence of those traits--simply for those traits in themselves.Many times I don't have use in mind when I speak about something. For example, I think this song I'm listening to right now is beautiful (Arvo Part's Spiegel im Spiegel (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sh_zPsucV0U)). I may just want to communicate that. I don't have to want anyone to do something with it (except maybe listen to it and enjoy it as I am). I don't consider my friends just things to be used for my purposes. That's ridiculously Machiavellian, and to be honest very alien to me given that I was raised Christian. I very often (virtually all the time, actually) speak to them just because I like speaking to them-- and they enjoy speaking to me. I use language, I don't use people.

Another point is that, well, I don't consider people to be automatons. That's ridiculous, because they aren't. Humans have minds, emotions, loves, joys, happiness, etc, and even more than can be listed. Automatons, as you correctly point out, do not.

You see, I don't have a problem with all of that and I agree with it. Unlike you, however, I simply don't have a problem with knowledge, like "are there other minds?" or "what is reality?" or anything of the sort. You might say that I have direct access to the world in a way that you do not (because of your insistence on subjectivity).

Ethically, too, the picture you paint here is bankrupt. The heart of ethics is regarding other human beings as subjects. By your theory, it makes no difference if we ignore the question of subjectivity and treat them all as objects. But what kind of obligations would we have then? None at all--just, at most, the concern one might have for a nice object. "Oh, look at that pretty moving statue! Let's not deface it."Ethically your picture is bankrupt because it depends entirely on your personal desires. Or is that incorrect?

My picture is that "good" and "evil" are real descriptions of the things people do. They're not a feeling. They're not subjective. Ethically I treat people as human beings, with all the respect that implies. I don't treat them like robots, because they aren't robots! I'm not sure how hard that is to understand.

I refuse to live in an objectified world. Indeed, I would much rather take a leap of faith and assume that everyone has subjective experiences... even without any of the grounds I have provided.There's no need to take a leap of faith to believe that everyone has subjective experiences. People do have them-- that's all there is to it. :)

Note, however, that this is a very deceptive turn of speech. Don't be confused by it.

You are using both "mind" and "intelligent" in ways that I have not been, just as you have redefined "meaning" to do what you want it to.
Certainly I'm not! I wouldn't want to use them in a broken fashion. What's more, I haven't redefined meaning: I've merely made it clear what it is we do when we say the word.

Your picture of human interaction is utterly degrading. What is a philosophical discussion? Not a sharing of thoughts for mutual benefit any more--just manipulation of a machine so that it will tell you things to interest you intellectually. What is a friendship? Not a relationship of mutual affection any more--just a way to get a machine to do you favors and treat you nicely. (Or, at best, admiration for a moving human statue.)A philosophical discussion certainly is a mutually beneficial exchange. In this conversation alone I have been helped by you to streamline my argument. You (hopefully) have gotten some inkling of a different way of doing philosophy that doesn't have the problems you have now. You're thinking that I treat everyone like robots, and that's just patently untrue-- they're human beings, just like me. They have feelings, minds, etc. They intrinsically deserve respect as human beings. I agree with Kant's idea that people are not to be used. I mean, what more do you want me to say? That I think people should be used? I'm not THAT immoral. :p

More precise. What I'm saying is that you aren't really offering a solution to my point about the precision of language; you're just saying that communication in my sense is irrelevant. You're not solving the problem, you're just attempting to demolish its context.Any answer to nonsense will also be nonsense. If someone came up to you and asked "Square vile red green?" is the appropriate response to attempt to answer their "question", or to ask them what they mean? He's not communicating, that's for sure. What I've done here is shown the lack of context that your question has. I haven't demolished anything. Only, perhaps, a house of cards; something that looked like it was meaningful but wasn't.

You have indeed abolished a great many problems (recall that "abolish" does not mean the same as "solve"), but at the cost of essentially everything worth living for in the world.Oh, I do agree that abolish isn't the same as solve. For there's no solving nonsense. For a reply to "everything worth living for", do see the above. I have done nothing of the sort.

That's nice. (Really! It is.) In what sense is this experience mediated through language? None at all--which is precisely the point.Well, the description I gave, was written in words. If I wanted to describe what that situation felt like, I would also use words. I'm not saying that the situation is the same as a description of the situation - that'd be like saying that a picture of a pipe were the same thing as a pipe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/This_is_not_a_pipe), but I am saying that the only intelligible references to the experience must be made through an objective language. Such a description is not imprecise because it's already as precise as it can be and still retain its specific use in language (e.g., there's no such thing as "simpler" description than the simplest description, and it would be nonsense to speak as if there were). If you described the motion of the wind by a mathematical equation, that would be more a more precise (in a certain sense) description of the wind's movement, but would not necessarily have the same use in language, the same effect when spoken. It would not have the same meaning.

Not in the sense I spoke of. Indeed, it's exactly the kind of direct experience I'm talking about--exactly what we cannot do through language. I cannot see what you see, taste what you taste, feel what you feel through your words. I can imagine, but only that--and a pale imitation it is. Much of the content of your experience is lost. It cannot be transferred through a medium as imprecise and limited as language.See above where I disputed the coherence of subjective criteria. You have no grounds with which to say that your image is a "pale imitation" nor "imprecise."

I am not limiting language here. I am not limiting your freedom of expression. I am merely showing you the limit, the boundary between meaning and nonsense, and asking you: "Please, say something sensible so that I might understand." For language is often more limited than we mistakenly believe. You think that language is inadequate, too limited to describe things fully; but you haven't realized that by speaking in that way you've run into the very limit which you've tried to express.

What can I do with language? I can talk about the trees in terms of the wood they might provide. I can talk about the children in terms of the revenue they might provide the ice cream seller. I can talk about the ice cream in terms of how much and how fast it sells. I can communicate content perfectly fine in those terms.And you can do a great many other things, like I just did in my previous post about ice cream and wind. You can also give commands, take them, exclaim, describe something beautiful, scream in terror, discuss quantum physics and woo your lover. But please don't take that as an exhaustive list.

So you have abolished your fear of lies by abolishing the distinction between truth and falsity? That's no solution at all.No. I've abolished my mistaken idea of what constitutes truth and falsity, and in so doing have given those words meaning.



Please realize that I haven't provided evidence for my argument, in the sense that you must (a logical must) accept it. That's because it isn't an argument, per se. What is it, then? It is a correction. What I want you to see here is that you're using words in such an unnatural way that they've become impossible to use. I merely want you to see: "This is what we do with the words. They aren't confusing in this context, so why aren't you doing the same thing as we are?" Because you see, "reality", "truth", etc., in abstraction are very different from their actual use in language. To quote a famous philosopher: "'I set the brake up by connecting up the rod and lever.' ---Yes, given the whole of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and separated from its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything, or nothing." And you think you can ask "What is reality?" as if it some sort of meaning independent of how it is used? Imagine: words used in many ways do not have a single specific meaning! Is that so strange?

So instead of asking, "What is reality?", you should instead ask: "How is the word 'reality' used in X context?"

And that will always have an answer.

What is interesting is that you have declared you cannot express what you mean in language.

No, I haven't. This is conflating accuracy and precision again, in a different form. I can express what I mean in language all the time. I just can't do it precisely, at least as far as descriptions go.

Statements about reality - that is, descriptions - are said when there is information to be shared. Notice, though, that you've said that what you mean is impossible to formulate in language (I imagine here that you've got some idea of a private subjective experience). But if, by your own admission, no meaning can be formulated, then I deny that the original statement (1) is in fact a description.

Of course it's a description. It's just an imprecise description. Where's the imprecision? In the very word "precisely."

But just because "precisely" is not precise doesn't mean it doesn't mean anything. Quite the contrary. It means something, it just doesn't get exactly at the meaning I want to get at.

I believe in human communication. I don't regard it as meaningless. What worries me is our tendency to live in abstracted linguistic categories... our tendency to subordinate experience to them. Reified "time" is perhaps the best example of this: there is no "second", no "hour", and only in a very rough sense a "day", but we insist on counting them up and living our lives by them anyway.

(Of course, in deference to my own argument, I should clarify that there is no "second" only in the sense that there is no "red": as abstractions they may imprecisely but successfully describe certain experiences, but when as abstractions we try to find them in the world, we necessarily fail, exactly because they are imprecise. We experience no red as red, no second as a second--not, at least, until we have already been alienated from the direct experience with all its particularities.)

Question: "Is it possible to more precisely convey the essential meaning of what I refer to when I say 'this color'?"

You're misreading me, I think. "This color" is a stand-in, a variable, representing any color. Who cares about its precision?

My problem with your question was that you were trying to ask (or I interpreted you as asking) for an example of what it is your description left out--an example of a precise description to show that your description was imprecise. That, I could not do.

(Some of your other questions I didn't answer not because of language's limits, but simply because you were asking me to clarify things I thought were perfectly clear. I was trying to get you to give a more particular question or objection, such that I could respond to it more productively than simply by repeating the same thing in different words.)

Has he really said something about the essential nature of objects? Hardly

What is it he is trying to say? Not much at all... just that they are inaccessible to human knowledge.

he's just created a new way to talk about phenomena.

I don't see how you can say this. What sense does it make to say that phenomena are inaccessible to human knowledge? The whole point is that the phenomenal world is the "world of appearances": the world we do experience, the world we can know things about.

They'd be forgetting the use we make of those symbols, which can be extremely complex (and which is not contained in the symbols themselves).

It's telling, I think, that you say "use" here, and not "meaning"--as if they were equivalent.

If you were not aware, the box and the person with the box are the external evidence. You can't use that kind evidence against the argument because they don't even address the same issue. Speech and human interaction are also part of behavior, you'll remember, though very complex parts.

No, you're missing the point. I understand the equation of external evidence with external evidence. My point has to do with kinds of external evidence.

What does the box have to do with the beetle? Nothing whatsoever. Imagine I found the box, having no idea that there was another perfectly similar box with a beetle inside it. Would I conclude that it contained a beetle? Of course I wouldn't.

Now, instead, imagine that we find an apparently intelligent extraterrestrial species whose neural physiology and external appearance is radically different from ours. Would we conclude that they are conscious? In all probability, yes--because even though their "box" would quite different from ours, the external signs of consciousness would be there. (On the other hand, a species that looked exactly like us in most respects, but utterly lacked the particular things we associate with consciousness, would not be judged to be conscious.)

The signs of consciousness are not indicators such as we might get from induction. It's not that we find one being (ourselves) that we know has both certain external features and certain internal (conscious) features, and extrapolate from this observation that every being with the external features has the internal ones. It's that there are certain features, such as the kinds of conversations we have with others, that are best, most plausibly, explained as external manifestations of consciousness.

So? What does that amount to? What is that supposed to explain?

The contents of the box, of course. What else are you looking for?

The nature of those things is indefinable; or more correctly, to speak of "their nature" as something to be discovered or known is to speak nonsense.

You're conflating two things: things that can actually be known and things that can theoretically be known.

We can speak of "'their nature' as something to be discovered or known" because they are things with truth value: they can theoretically be known. The fact that we can't actually know them is immaterial to this.

To make this conflation is to subordinate the very notion of "truth" to human perception, and this is fundamentally corrupt. (I have much more to say on this subject. I'm pretty sure I'll get the opportunity later in this post.)

The only meaning the man's "goat" could have in language is the way he speaks about it. No properties can be attached to it in the way that properties can be descriptions of physical things.

Perhaps we can't know which properties can be attached to it. It does not follow that no properties can be attached to it.

"But what's the point?" For the moment let me grant you your conflation of "know" with "believe with reasonable support" (we can get plenty of the latter, but very little of the former.) Even without any truth-supporting reasons in any direction, we can still productively speak of certain things if their truth value is important to us in other ways. Truth about subjective experience? Truth about free will? Truth about God? Even if we have no basis whatsoever to believe anything about these things, the truth regarding them may nevertheless be highly relevant to us. How, then, could it possibly be "meaningless"?

What does matter is this: "How can the problems caused by this view be solved?"

I agree. We should be trying to solve these problems. Not trying to evade them.

But remember from the beetle-box argument and my exposition above that this particular turn of speech does not convey any information about a private subjective experience.

What you mean here by "convey any information" is something like "justify belief": me saying "I see red" does not justify anyone else thinking, "He is having the subjective experience of seeing red." (That's my reading, anyway).

But what I mean is not so rigorous. The transfer of information need not have anything to do with justification: a lie is still a transfer of information, just a false one. If I say "I see red" and someone else interprets my meaning as "He is seeing red", then information has been transferred regardless of whether or not he believes me and regardless of whether or not it is true.

Suppose there's a society of people who all refer to the contents of their boxes as "goats." Individuals can say that their particular goat has properties like "sharp hooves" and "long horns" and "red, bloodthirsty eyes." OK. But how are they supposed to communicate the meaning of this to anyone if there's no objective criteria to show people?

No objective criteria, true. But there may be intersubjective criteria: subjective experiences that are shared.

When I tell a friend or a family member that I love him or her, I don't mean anything "objective" and I certainly am not speaking nonsense. I expect the person to understand the meaning of "love" because I assume he or she has had similar emotions before, that he or she can understand (perhaps only imprecisely) my emotions in light of his or hers. The meaning is public not because it deals with something "objective", but because it is shared.

This gets right at the heart of why making assumptions about other people's subjective minds is so important to human communication. When I say "love" I don't mean anything but the subjective experience of love. When I hear "love" I don't interpret it as anything but the subjective experience of love. Same with "red." How, then, can it have any other meaning?

After all, it shouldn't be a matter of random chance that you use these descriptions, right? "Well," you could say, "it isn't random chance because people say those things when they have this kind of sense-experience." --And how do they know that? Do they measure the kind of experience they have against a yardstick?

"Measure"? Who said anything about "measure"? What does "measure" have to do with anything? Certainly I am not interested in quantifying this kind of experience.

"I can remember this color and identify it precisely in the future." Oh you can? But what objective standard are you using to define "precisely"?

"Precisely" is your word, not mine. Memory is generally not precise.

Surely you're not just using your memory-- that's like (another paraphrase here) "buying several copies of the newspaper in order to assure yourself that what is said in it is true."

No, it isn't. If it's the truth of my memory I'm looking for (again, not the same as the precision of my memory), checking whether it reconciles with the rest of my memories is a perfectly legitimate test. True, it is not ultimate--my whole memory could be mistaken--but it's a start, and one that's enough, I think, for "reasonable basis."

Rather like direct perception itself, actually. ;)

It doesn't amount to anything. You don't get any objective precision if your standards are based on circular reasoning: "The same color is what I believe to be the same color."

Well, in a sense, yes, but your problem here is that you're equivocating on "believe": you assume that all forms of subjective "belief" in one mind are identical. But this is plainly not true.

Imagine I see a color, and at first think to myself, "Why, that's the same shade of red I saw last Saturday!" But then I check my memories, carefully examining my recollection of the color I saw last Saturday, and I realize that no, it actually isn't the same shade.

A subjective form of fact-checking, true--examining my beliefs in light of my beliefs. But they are different beliefs, and some (my careful recollection as opposed to my superficial reaction) are better supported than others.

This standard allows you to be precise (and imprecise). The standard allows you to be right (and wrong). You can always go back to it to see if your memory was right, and so can other people.

Sure, such direct checking is a better method than memory. What of it? we can "check" subjective emotions, too: we just need to feel them again.

Before you can refer to color, you must have the ability to differentiate colors-- and to our public language, that is what "knowing this color", and similar sentences mean.

In part, yes. Not in entirety. Again, when I say "red", I do not merely mean "something different from green, blue, white, etc." I mean what it is I perceive as red. And if someone else interprets it differently--if, for instance, everything I see as red he sees as green--then he has misinterpreted me. He has gotten the wrong meaning.

That's a simple fact of communication. You can't evade it by pretending that "meaning" isn't what it actually is. You certainly can't evade it by pretending that "meaning" as I use it doesn't work. Well, maybe it doesn't--maybe I don't really have any good reason to believe that the other person has any clue what I mean by "red." But so what? This makes communication, the transfer of meaning, seem futile. But it does not make it other than what it is.

Any other use - although I hesitate to say it's actually a use, since nothing can be referred to with it

No, something can be referred to with it. At most, you have shown that others cannot reasonably believe anything about it, but that is not the same thing.

These "private sense experiences" you attempt to speak of are ineffable,

To a degree, yes. That's my point.

incoherent,

My experiences are not at all incoherent. I suggest that you mean something quite different here.

and completely uninteresting.

What nonsense! This value judgment rings hollow: it depends on an account of "what matters" that nobody believes, and that, as best I can tell, people are only easily persuaded to think they believe because our culture is so utterly fucked up that, to paraphrase you later in your post, they don't see what's right in front of their eyes.

So tell me, if you know so well: what is exactly is "meaning" and how is it "transferred"? If you give me some subjective "explanation" (haha) after everything I just wrote I'm afraid there's little hope for you.

You were doing so well, too, dropping the condescension.... ;)

Here's my "subjective 'explanation' (haha)": "meaning" is the concept to which the word refers, and it is transferred when the concept the word is intended to represent is understood (translated back) by the receiver of the statement.

When I say "This book is red", the meaning of "red" is the color I perceive on the book, and transference happens if the person who hears me takes the word "red" and interprets it to mean that same color.

Now, it may be the case that he can never know anything about my experience of "red", and I can never know anything about his experience of "red", such that communication is always destined to fail... but so what? Failure, difficulty, even impossibility does not change the meaning of the word.

I don't argue that there only are acts and responses; I am certainly not a behaviorist in any sense of the term!

Your argument amounts to it whether you like it or not, precisely because you insist that we restrict ourselves to that which is "objective." What is "objective"? Only that which is external--like the box holding the beetle. What is "external"? Acts, responses.

To deny that we can speak meaningfully about subjective experience is precisely to make the behaviorist jump to a purely act/response understanding of human beings and human minds. You need not say that there are no subjective experiences; you need only say what you have said, that we cannot discuss them, that they are not relevant.

The use of the word "intelligent" is not something that is up to personal taste.

Who said it was? Perhaps you are using yet another definition of "subjective" as "subject to personal preference or taste", but I surely am not. I am merely noting that "intelligence", an advanced capacity of understanding, is a subjective (mental) phenomenon just as understanding itself is.

What I object to is people taking those objective ways of talking as referring to subjective experiences (or taking the noumenon to be the "true" objects, etc).

To say that we cannot take noumena to be "true objects" is really to dismiss the concept of "noumena." The same is true of consciousness. The whole point of discussing noumena is to discuss truth beyond perception, and the whole point of discussing consciousness is to discuss subjectivity. To turn these things "objective" is quite simply to lose sight of what they actually mean.

I agree. People don't have to show they're unhappy in order to be unhappy.

So what "objective" thing are we getting at when we say the word "happy"? How does the sentence you wrote here escape meaninglessness?

I also agree with your assessment about the computer. It's a computer; of course it's not going to be the same.

That's not good enough. Let's say it is, in every external respect. What then?

From what I recall, precision refers to the amount of possible variation in a measurement. Accuracy refers to the distance of a measurement from the true value.

That's right.

As such I think that your argument has more to do with accuracy than precision.

Here, you're wrong. To describe something as "red" is in no sense inaccurate. It's true, it's just imprecise.

Let me give you a quantitative example of my point. The color "red" is like the value 10 +/- 5. All the various shades and permutations of "red" fall within this range: it is a true description of all of them. But if all I have is 10 +/- 5, I don't know if the red I'm talking about is a 6, or an 8, or a 9, or a 14.8694. My description is imprecise. It's truthful, it's accurate, but there is information it doesn't capture: specifically, where within the range the color falls.

Meaning can be defined as the way we use the words, the situations in which we've learned to use them.

No, it can't. That's a judgment of context, not of meaning. "Meaning" attempts to find the mind behind the symbol, the thing the symbol is intended to symbolize. In itself, it need not even be public.

When I say "red", I do not mean "the color of the book, whatever you see it as"--I mean the particular color I see.

Symbols don't represent anything. Try saying "go get the highest apple off the tree." What does "apple" mean here? Nothing in particular; the meaning of the sentence is a product of the whole.

I don't doubt that meaning can be influenced by other words in the sentence, but weirdly enough, that is actually not true in this case. "Apple" means, symbolizes, represents something quite clearly here: the concept of "an apple."

And "understanding" this sentence would mean that someone responds to it by going and getting the apple, or saying no, or throwing things at you and saying how much you hate the environment, or innumerable other responses.

Hah! And you say you are not a behaviorist. ;)

This is precisely my earlier point: unable to speak of "understanding" in its real, subjective terms, you must resort to external, objective phenomena, that is, behavior.

No one has to subjectively imagine an apple in this exchange; there's nothing like that in question here.

What if someone has no perceptible reaction? Does that mean she didn't understand the sentence?

Is that subjective? Well, he didn't use the word before we taught him (and indeed he uses "hot" to refer to the heater, stove etc even when they're not on - that needs to be corrected).

He's using the word "hot" to refer to a certain quality he perceives in them. (Perception, as a part of experience, is of course subjective.) It's just that this quality, at the moment, is not "heat", but an attitude others have towards those objects.

I do agree that subjective experiences can be discussed productively. But mind the use of "subjective." The beetle experiment shows that, like I've state above, any private subjective experience is irrelevant to properly use language.

Now you're confusing me. How can we discuss subjective experiences productively if any discussion of them is meaningless? Do you mean to suggest that there is a distinction between a private subjective experience and other kinds of subjective experience? But as far as I can tell (absent some sci-fi/fantasy mind melding) the only way to make this distinction is to talk about subjective experiences that are similar across people: something like similar experiences of color. But that is precisely what you deny.

Right. But if your friend never responded in his entire life? Would you say he understood? Would, for example, Terry Schiavo understand, even though there was no indicators of understanding?

You're conflating the indicator with the indicated. We judge whether or not someone understands based on their external indicators. But that does not mean that "understanding" is just those external indicators.

It is perfectly conceivable, though not likely, that my friend understands me perfectly and never shows a sign of it. As an explanation of his behavior--"He understands, but chooses not to show it"--it's a poor explanation, and that's why we tend to trust the indicators. But it's not illogical or inconceivable or meaningless. "Understanding" is subjective, not external.

The possibility of understanding is an attribute of being human; that is, you can say of any human that they "could understand" (even if they do not). But the way they react (immediately, and in the future) to your words shows that (and how) they understand.

Actually, it doesn't. It's the same here as with the beetle thought experiment: you see the box (the response), but you don't know what's inside (the understanding). (The Chinese Room thought experiment gets at this idea even more explicitly.)

My friend may go out and get me milk. But maybe he did it just because he felt like it, and not because he understood my statement. Or maybe he did it because he's really a robot programmed to do certain things when certain sounds are made near it. Neither involve understanding. Both involve exactly the response I observed.

Here I'm talking about logical necessity: given the external response, is it necessarily true that he understands? The answer is no. It is, of course, more reasonable to assume that he does it because he understands, and not for some other reason--we might protest that the alternatives seem implausible or absurd (though not impossible.) For this reason, the indicators matter. But not in an analytic, logical sense. Understanding is not what you yourself call the "indicators" of understanding.

Right. But that just means computers are different from people and so we talk about them differently.

You're being disingenuous. What is the difference? Why in one case is it meaning, understanding, and in the other case these elements are absent?

Is it just an arbitrary figure of speech? Is that what you're getting at? Then you're only reinforcing my point: you have deprived those words of their true meaning, and as a consequence you can't make sense of their actual usage.

Many times I don't have use in mind when I speak about something.... I don't have to want anyone to do something with it (except maybe listen to it and enjoy it as I am). I don't consider my friends just things to be used for my purposes. That's ridiculously Machiavellian, and to be honest very alien to me given that I was raised Christian.

You're missing the point. I'm not attacking you as a person. If I thought you were actually interested in exploiting everyone and everything to maximize your advantage, I wouldn't bother with the arguments I've made: your response would just be "Yeah, so?" and that would be the end of that (unless I wanted to turn this into an ethics argument, and I think we have enough on our plate at the moment.)

My point is that, under the assumption that you are a decent human being, the kinds of reasoning you actually do use in your interactions with others--which I'm sure are by and large good-natured and non-objectifying--is in its foundation opposed to the framework for which you are arguing.

Why? Because whether you regard subjective traits as "meaningless" or try to redefine them in objective/external forms, you are still dismissing their subjective character: you're eliminating that aspect from your value scheme. You've already said that such things are irrelevant, immaterial--they don't matter, indeed, you suggested, can't matter.

But then, the only things that can matter are the signs: the external actions. Their objective traits. Affection? Affection is someone treating me well, kindly, like a friend--and since that's all it is, why need I be concerned with how it comes about? The logic of this kind of reasoning, as well as utterly obviating any credible basis for morality, tends toward instrumentalism, exploitation: between someone who treats me affectionately because I have treated him in a friendly manner, and someone who treats me affectionately because I have scared him, or lied to him, or whatever, I need make no distinction. I mean, they act the same, right? Why should I care about what's going on inside their minds, which I have no way of accessing and can't discuss meaningfully, anyway?

What about the difference between manipulating someone and convincing someone? I assume you'd redefine "convincing" as something to the effect of someone acting as if they have been convinced--but redefine "manipulating" in the same way, and the two are nearly indistinguishable.

Humans have minds, emotions, loves, joys, happiness, etc, and even more than can be listed. Automatons, as you correctly point out, do not.

What's the difference? Tell me. In your framework, what are "minds"? "Emotions"? "Loves"? "Joys"? If we are forbidden to discuss "private subjective experience", what is all of that? Are you going to reformulate them the way you reformulated "understanding"? Are you going to say that "My friend loves me" means nothing more than that he is willing to go get milk for me (and similarly have the external indicators of love?)

If that's all there is to it, what's the difference between a human being and an automaton? Is it that other human beings "might" also have subjective experiences? Well, automatons "might", too. Is it because automatons would behave differently from humans? Well, sure--nowadays, anyway. But necessarily? Conceivably an automaton could be programmed that would imitate human behavior exactly.

Ethically your picture is bankrupt because it depends entirely on your personal desires. Or is that incorrect?

It is. Roughly speaking, I'm a Kantian ethically.

My picture is that "good" and "evil" are real descriptions of the things people do. They're not a feeling. They're not subjective.

Different sense of "subjective." Morality has nothing to do with subjective preferences. But it has everything to do with subjective traits.

Ethically I treat people as human beings, with all the respect that implies. I don't treat them like robots, because they aren't robots! I'm not sure how hard that is to understand.

But ethically we are concerned with relevant differences. Human beings aren't robots, true. But what is it about human beings that makes them relevantly different from robots? Subjective traits like free will, like consciousness, like rationality. Things "inside the box."

Note, however, that this is a very deceptive turn of speech. Don't be confused by it.

Too late. I'm not sure what you mean here either. I'm tempted to think you're trying to have your cake and eat it too.

You (hopefully) have gotten some inkling of a different way of doing philosophy that doesn't have the problems you have now.

Actually, this line of thought isn't really new to me... at one point I actually accepted it. I changed my mind.

You're thinking that I treat everyone like robots, and that's just patently untrue-- they're human beings, just like me.

Of course it's patently untrue, and I didn't think that at all. What I'm saying is that this perspective on reality tends toward that kind of reasoning: it is incompatible with genuine respect towards others. That doesn't mean you don't have respect for others, it just means that you believe two incompatible things... and I trust that you're a good enough person to discard the theory you've presented here rather than your respect for others. ;)

They have feelings, minds, etc.

Right, but what does this mean?

Morally, we are concerned with "feelings", with "minds", in the traditional sense: as subjective experiences.

I agree with Kant's idea that people are not to be used.

But do you know why Kant argued that people are not to be used? He tells us, in the third part of the Groundwork: it's essentially because of the moral/rational significance of autonomy. And autonomy is necessarily subjective, and private. Again, it's "inside the box." Indeed, in viewing other human beings externally, objectively, we tend towards understanding them as determined, not free.

You say that you think others deserve respect as "human beings"... but what is a "human being"? A subject, or an object? On your framework, we must say the latter--or, even worse, abolish the distinction itself, which means that we not only lose the foundation of moral respect, but also fail to even recognize the loss.

Well, the description I gave, was written in words. If I wanted to describe what that situation felt like, I would also use words. I'm not saying that the situation is the same as a description of the situation - that'd be like saying that a picture of a pipe were the same thing as a pipe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/This_is_not_a_pipe),

I'm not saying anything about identity (sameness), I'm talking about information. Does the picture of the pipe give a better (visual) description of the pipe than words would? Of course it does: it is more precise, a more complete rendering of the information, because it is not linguistic and need not abstract from the visual particularities it captures.

but I am saying that the only intelligible references to the experience must be made through an objective language.

Maybe. So?

Such a description is not imprecise because it's already as precise as it can be and still retain its specific use in language (e.g., there's no such thing as "simpler" description than the simplest description, and it would be nonsense to speak as if there were).

Who is? "Simpler", "simplest": comparative and superlative. Both relative judgments. It may be impossible to describe an experience more precisely than we can through the most precise use of language. But that does not mean that language isn't imperfectly precise--it just means that, when it comes to description, it is the most precise we can get.

(The conclusion here should be that if we want "precision" we should stop worrying so much about "description" and actually experience... which, insofar as there's a practical point to this part of the discussion, is what I'm getting at.)

I am not limiting language here. I am not limiting your freedom of expression.

Of course you aren't. Language is itself limited.

And you can do a great many other things, like I just did in my previous post about ice cream and wind. You can also give commands, take them, exclaim, describe something beautiful, scream in terror, discuss quantum physics and woo your lover. But please don't take that as an exhaustive list.

Yes, I know. I wasn't trying to be exhaustive, or even particularly objective or rigorous. But you misinterpret me insofar as you (implicitly) suggest that I think human communication is a bad thing. Not at all--it has plenty of highly beneficial uses. My point is simply this: when it comes to description, language's most suited function is not the transfer of experience (which it can only do very inadequately) but the transfer of utilitarian knowledge (which it can do quite fine.)

What I want you to see here is that you're using words in such an unnatural way that they've become impossible to use. I merely want you to see: "This is what we do with the words. They aren't confusing in this context, so why aren't you doing the same thing as we are?"

Because they only "aren't confusing" because they miss a great deal of reality, of what is important. They're not solving the problem, they're dodging it.

And you think you can ask "What is reality?" as if it some sort of meaning independent of how it is used? Imagine: words used in many ways do not have a single specific meaning! Is that so strange?

No, but in this context, it is missing the point. Meaning is, of course, contextual... but so what? You suggest that a word separated from its everyday use is "meaningless", but that's nonsense--it merely has a different context (a philosophical context, perhaps.)

Regardless, it is just different concepts attached to the same sound, and I am concerned for the concept, not the sound. My real question is not "What is reality?", because I don't think reality can be reduced--my question is, "What is real?" I'm looking for the content, not the definition.

And quoting Wittgenstein doesn't make your argument any stronger. ;)

So instead of asking, "What is reality?", you should instead ask: "How is the word 'reality' used in X context?"

That gives me the definition. It tells me nothing useful.