NationStates Jolt Archive

tl;dr: This is about Lincoln's plan to emancipate the slaves by buying their freedom.

Something that came up in the secession thread regarding slavery, and I came across a news article regarding a letter Lincoln wrote outlining his "gradual compensated emancipation" plan.

Some of the details:
Paying slave-holders $400 for each of the 1,798 slaves in Delaware listed in the 1860 Census, he wrote, would come to $719,200 at a time when the war was soaking up $2 million a day.

Buying the freedom of an estimated 432,622 slaves in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri and Washington, D.C., would cost $173,048,800 — nearly equal to the estimated $174 million needed to wage war for 87 days, he added.

Lincoln suggested that each of the states, in return for payment, might set something like a 20-year deadline for abolishing slavery.

The payout "would not be half as onerous as would be an equal sum, raised now, for the indefinite prosecution of the war," he told McDougall.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23434604/

A link to the actual letter may be found here: http://www.library.rochester.edu/index.cfm?page=531

And here's Britannica on the subject, with another primary document:

Abraham Lincoln: A Plea for Compensated Emancipation

Primary Source Document

Compensated emancipation was a scheme to allow the government to free the slaves and reimburse slave-owners. The Republican platform of 1860 recognized it as a desirable solution to the slavery issue. President Lincoln initially viewed it as the best solution because it was gradual and would distribute the financial burden of emancipation. In response to growing antislavery sentiment, Lincoln sent the following special message to Congress urging a joint resolution on compensated emancipation on March 6, 1862. Congress approved the resolution, but the border states failed to support it. The plan was realized only in the District of Columbia by an act of Congress on April 16, 1862.
I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be substantially as follows:

Resolved, that the United States ought to cooperate with any state which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such state pecuniary aid, to be used by such state, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.

If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there is the end; but if it does command such approval, I deem it of importance that the states and people immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it. The Federal government would find its highest interest in such a measure as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave states north of such part will then say, "The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section." To deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion, and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the states initiating it.

The point is not that all the states tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation but that, while the offer is equally made to all, the more northern shall by such initiation make it certain to the more southern that in no event will the former ever join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say "initiation" because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for all. In the mere financial or pecuniary view, any member of Congress with the census tables and Treasury reports before him can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named state. Such a proposition on the part of the general government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within state limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the state and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them.

In the annual message last December, I thought fit to say "the Union must be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed." I said this not hastily but deliberately. War has been made and continues to be an indispensable means to this end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease. If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue; and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem indispensable or may obviously promise great efficiency toward ending the struggle must and will come.

The proposition now made (though an offer only), I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the states and private persons concerned than are the institution and property in it in the present aspect of affairs.

While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject.
Source: A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897, vol. 6, James D. Richardson, ed., 1920, pp. 68-69.
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9116926/Document-Abraham-Lincoln-A-Plea-for-Compensated-Emancipation

As the Britannica says, the plan didn't get the needed suport.

What would have happened if the US ferdeal government had paid to free the slaves instead of forcing the slave states to do so? How would the US be different?

that price wouldnt cover the value of the slaves. i dont see it avoiding war.

that price wouldnt cover the value of the slaves. i dont see it avoiding war.

A few counter-points:
The resolution didn't set a price - the figure named was a working figure.
It doesn't appear too far off the mark. See the prices listed here: http://www.brooklynpubliclibrary.org/civilwar/cw003_4x.html (note: that's listed as 1847 (http://www.brooklynpubliclibrary.org/civilwar/cw_doc_slavery.html), so yes the prices would be higher. But the cost of war and it's aftermath would have been worth much more.)

what im thinking is that the south felt that slavery was an integral part of the plantation system and the southern gentelman's way of life. they went to war before there was any actual movement toward the abolishment of slavery. the election of lincoln alone was enough to send them to secession. i just dont see money as a reason for them to change their way of life.

what im thinking is that the south felt that slavery was an integral part of the plantation system and the southern gentelman's way of life. they went to war before there was any actual movement toward the abolishment of slavery. the election of lincoln alone was enough to send them to secession. i just dont see money as a reason for them to change their way of life.

I agree. Slavery went beyond economics. It was so ingrained in Southern culture that even vast sums of money wouldn't disloge slavery. Note that the Southern plantation owner considered himself superior to the Northern Capitalist because he had slaves and didn't put profit first. They consiered it noble to have slaves, like they were doing the slaves a favor by giving them food and shelter in exchange for work. While removing slaves would have been an economically sound idea, economics were not the first concern of a southern plantation owner.

The plan might have worked on the fringes of slavedom, where the Southern lifestyle was not as influential, but it would have never worked in the cotton belt.

what im thinking is that the south felt that slavery was an integral part of the plantation system and the southern gentelman's way of life. they went to war before there was any actual movement toward the abolishment of slavery. the election of lincoln alone was enough to send them to secession. i just dont see money as a reason for them to change their way of life.

I agree.

Charles B. Dew's Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (http://books.google.com/books?id=Zz7kGwAACAAJ&dq=of+secession+civil+war) gives excellent insight into the thinking of the seceeding states. The idea that freeing slaves would lead to the rape of white women was a common theme. :rolleyes:

I think it would have done little, if anything, to prevent a civil war. Slavery was only one component of the reasons behind secession; providing a peaceful method for emancipation would have taken some of the wind out of Confederate sails, at least in the border states, but there were many other issues that would have needed to be resolved to prevent a Civil War.

plus

once you have purchased all these slaves, what do you DO with them?

I agree.

Charles B. Dew's Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War (http://books.google.com/books?id=Zz7kGwAACAAJ&dq=of+secession+civil+war) gives excellent insight into the thinking of the seceeding states. The idea that freeing slaves would lead to the rape of white women was a common theme. :rolleyes:

And all those "interracial" porn on the interweb tubes proved them wrong. It ain't rape if the white women want it.

-----

But seriously, I was under the impression that Lincoln was neutral or apathetic to the plight of blacks and that the EP was merely a strategy to destabilize the South during the Civil War.

But seriously, I was under the impression that Lincoln was neutral or apathetic to the plight of blacks and that the EP was merely a strategy to destabilize the South during the Civil War.

I don't think he personally supported slavery, and would have liked movement towards emancipation, but wasn't willing to wage a war or to risk any kind of civil instability to achieve it.

I swear to god I read this thread as "constipation emancipation".

Was going to suggest prunes..

I don't think he personally supported slavery, and would have liked movement towards emancipation, but wasn't willing to wage a war or to risk any kind of civil instability to achieve it.

That's pretty much the impression you get from his speeches and writings. There's little doubt he disliked slavery as a moral position, but he accepted that the price of rapid emancipation was simply too high to pay - until the actions of the South changed the equation and made it politically positive instead.

While the idea of compensated emancipation is unsettling in a few ways - namely, the idea that human beings can have monetary values attached or need to be bought to be set free - it's better than no emancipation at all, and certainly better than war.

I would prefer a slave uprising like Lysander Spooner suggested and John Brown attempted to start combined with the secession of the north so as to nullify Federal pro-slavery laws like the Fugitive Slave Act. Compensated emancipation is a distant second, because it entails robbing taxpayers to pay off slaveowners. However, that is preferable to war, which always entails centralization and led to greater American imperialism and coercion.

Edit: I do not think war is ever justifiable.

I would prefer a slave uprising like Lysander Spooner suggested and John Brown attempted to start combined with the secession of the north so as to nullify Federal pro-slavery laws like the Fugitive Slave Act.

True.

Compensated emancipation is a distant second, because it entails robbing taxpayers to pay off slaveowners.

Yeah, forgot that part.

However, that is preferable to war, which always entails centralization and led to greater American imperialism and coercion.

Agreed.

*snip*

Point of clarification: I didn't notice that the plan, well, planned to buy any slaves from the South.

Assuming the Emancipation Proclamation was designed, primarily as a political tool, but to free those slaves held in the South, this idea of gradual emancipation would have no effect on the war but rather only effect what the North had the right to do under its own recognized jurisdiction, but failed to implement until the 13th amendment.

I would prefer a slave uprising like Lysander Spooner suggested and John Brown attempted to start combined with the secession of the north so as to nullify Federal pro-slavery laws like the Fugitive Slave Act. Compensated emancipation is a distant second, because it entails robbing taxpayers to pay off slaveowners. However, that is preferable to war, which always entails centralization and led to greater American imperialism and coercion.

Edit: I do not think war is ever justifiable.

Is it not? Is not the use of force justified by having it?

Anything can be justified, but not everything is just.

And I find it ironic, if not hypocritical, that you support a violent slave uprising but not war. How do you reconcile this?

I swear to god I read this thread as "constipation emancipation".

Was going to suggest prunes..

SO DID I! i was about to say that. well not the prunes bit, but still.
spooky
>.>
<.<

Is it not? Is not the use of force justified by having it?

Anything can be justified, but not everything is just.

And I find it ironic, if not hypocritical, that you support a violent slave uprising but not war. How do you reconcile this?

Seizure of rightful liberty from opressors is just. Invasion and violence using liberation as an excuse to cover your intent to crush dissent is not.

Seizure of rightful liberty from opressors is just. Invasion and violence using liberation as an excuse to cover your intent to crush dissent is not.

Rightful liberty as defined by whom?

Rising up against perceived or legitimate threats to your own liberty does not make violence just, though the cause may be.

Is it not? Is not the use of force justified by having it?

No. The use of force is only justified in defending one's rights.

Anything can be justified, but not everything is just.

If it is not just, then it cannot be justified (i.e. not capable of being shown to be just through argumentative power.)

And I find it ironic, if not hypocritical, that you support a violent slave uprising but not war. How do you reconcile this?

Because war is conflict between territorial monopolies on jurisdiction, which by their very nature fight wars through expropriating the just property titles of innocent people, even their right to life. Whereas, a violent slave uprising is, insofar as it does not involve the slaves attacking innocents but only slaveholders and fellow aggressors, is merely the slaves using self-defense to protect their self-ownership.

No. The use of force is only justified in defending one's rights.

I'm afraid I'm going to have to disagree with you there. Might makes right; we have no rights except those which are created and duly enforced.


If it is not just, then it cannot be justified (i.e. not capable of being shown to be just through argumentative power.)

Not quite. 'Just,' in this sense, refers to a moral right (vs. a moral wrong). Something may be justifiable without being just, because the root does not dictate the meaning of the word, so that a justifiable action can be always be found by appealing to the perspective of a particular party, regardless of whether it carries across all perspectives. In essence, we may have something to be 'justifiable'--punching your neighbor, for instance, for the sole reason that you felt like it (implying that you could in the first place)--but that is certainly not 'just.'

Because war is conflict between territorial monopolies on jurisdiction, which by their very nature fight wars through expropriating the just property titles of innocent people, even their right to life. Whereas, a violent slave uprising is, insofar as it does not involve the slaves attacking innocents but only slaveholders and fellow aggressors, is merely the slaves using self-defense to protect their self-ownership.

Is not a violent uprising another way of expropriating jurisdiction?

I'm afraid I'm going to have to disagree with you there. Might makes right; we have no rights except those which are created and duly enforced.

Wrong. The very nature of propositional exchange means that we accept that we find truth through exchanges of logical propositions, not physical force. If we live like animals and our only method of interaction is the application of physical force against one another, the question of validity never arises, and as such violence is not the method of discerning truth. Hence why argumentum ad baculum, 'appeal to force', is a logical fallacy, and hence why the idea of 'might makes right' cannot be argumentatively justified.

Not quite. 'Just,' in this sense, refers to a moral right (vs. a moral wrong). Something may be justifiable without being just, because the root does not dictate the meaning of the word, so that a justifiable action can be always be found by appealing to the perspective of a particular party, regardless of whether it carries across all perspectives. In essence, we may have something to be 'justifiable'--punching your neighbor, for instance, for the sole reason that you felt like it (implying that you could in the first place)--but that is certainly not 'just.'

No. Justification is the exchange of logical propositions to find validity, and as an injustice is invalid it cannot be justified.

Is not a violent uprising another way of expropriating jurisdiction?

No, because one is merely defending one's rights.

If it is not just, then it cannot be justified (i.e. not capable of being shown to be just through argumentative power.)

That's not true.

War is never just. War is always a matter of the right of the stronger: the person who wins is not the one who is most right, but the one who has more power. It is incompatible with justice, which states that right, not power, should decide.

But war might be justified. In a circumstance where justice is impossible, where good faith efforts fail due to the intransigence of the other party (or parties), there can be no other choice.

This is an important distinction. Something unjust may be justified, but only as a concession to reality, never as an ideal. And its end must be its own negation: war must be compatible with perpetual peace.

That's not true.

War is never just. War is always a matter of the right of the stronger: the person who wins is not the one who is most right, but the one who has more power. It is incompatible with justice, which states that right, not power, should decide.

But war might be justified. In a circumstance where justice is impossible, where good faith efforts fail due to the intransigence of the other party (or parties), there can be no other choice.

This is an important distinction. Something unjust may be justified, but only as a concession to reality, never as an ideal. And its end must be its own negation: war must be compatible with perpetual peace.

I never thought about it that way, but it's true. The only reason people assume war must sometimes be just is that they assume there must always be justice, which is sometimes a luxury we cannot afford.

I never thought about it that way, but it's true.

I actually stole the idea from Immanuel Kant, so... ;)

The only reason people assume war must sometimes be just is that they assume there must always be justice, which is sometimes a luxury we cannot afford.

It's not a matter of "afford." If we can achieve justice, we must. But sometimes we can't. Sometimes our enemies refuse to deal with us on those terms. We do no wrong in fighting back. We are required to respect others as equals, not as tyrants.

I actually stole the idea from Immanuel Kant, so... ;)



It's not a matter of "afford." If we can achieve justice, we must. But sometimes we can't. Sometimes our enemies refuse to deal with us on those terms. We do no wrong in fighting back. We are required to respect others as equals, not as tyrants.
"Achieve," that's what I meant. Not afford.

The war was not about slavery. It was about states' rights and a rebellion.

The war was not about slavery.

Yes, it was.

It was about states' rights

The South didn't give a shit about states' rights when they applied to any states but their own.

and a rebellion.

A rebellion motivated by fears that the Republican Party was going to restrict slavery.

The secessionists were quite open about this.

The war was not about slavery. It was about states' rights and a rebellion.

No. While the proximate cause of the rebellion was state's rights, the underlying cause was the South's support of slavery and fear that they would not be able to continue it.

However, the proximate cause of the war was that the South attacked the North.

That's not true.

War is never just. War is always a matter of the right of the stronger: the person who wins is not the one who is most right, but the one who has more power. It is incompatible with justice, which states that right, not power, should decide.

But war might be justified. In a circumstance where justice is impossible, where good faith efforts fail due to the intransigence of the other party (or parties), there can be no other choice.

This is an important distinction. Something unjust may be justified, but only as a concession to reality, never as an ideal. And its end must be its own negation: war must be compatible with perpetual peace.

In order to justify something, one must be able to show through argumentative force that the proposition in question is morally valid, i.e. just. The two must go hand in hand, for what is morally invalid cannot be just, and what is injust cannot be morally valid. And that justness must be demonstrable through argumentation, i.e. through justification.

The war was not about slavery. It was about states' rights and a rebellion.

ROTFLASTC.

One can argue that from the view of the North the war was not just about slavery. Slavery was just one factor, but maintaining the Union was a stronger one.

For the CSA, however, preserving and expanding slavery was the unifying theme. The Declarations of Secession make this clear, as does Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephen's "Cornerstone" speech.

A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the State of Mississippi from the Federal Union. (http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/reasons.html#Mississippi)

.... Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery-- the greatest material interest of the world. Its labor supplies the product which constitutes by far the largest and most important portions of commerce of the earth. These products are peculiar to the climate verging on the tropical regions, and by an imperious law of nature, none but the black race can bear exposure to the tropical sun. These products have become necessities of the world, and a blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and civilization. That blow has been long aimed at the institution, and was at the point of reaching its consummation. There was no choice left us but submission to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution of the Union, whose principles had been subverted to work out our ruin.
....

Alexander H. Stephen's Cornerstone Speech (http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=76):
...

But not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the better, allow me to allude to one other —though last, not least. The new constitution has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the "rock upon which the old Union would split." He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands, may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the "storm came and the wind blew."

Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science. It has been so even amongst us. Many who hear me, perhaps, can recollect well, that this truth was not generally admitted, even within their day. The errors of the past generation still clung to many as late as twenty years ago. Those at the North, who still cling to these errors, with a zeal above knowledge, we justly denominate fanatics. All fanaticism springs from an aberration of the mind—from a defect in reasoning. It is a species of insanity. One of the most striking characteristics of insanity, in many instances, is forming correct conclusions from fancied or erroneous premises; so with the anti-slavery fanatics. Their conclusions are right if their premises were. They assume that the negro is equal, and hence conclude that he is entitled to equal privileges and rights with the white man. If their premises were correct, their conclusions would be logical and just—but their premise being wrong, their whole argument fails. I recollect once of having heard a gentleman from one of the northern States, of great power and ability, announce in the House of Representatives, with imposing effect, that we of the South would be compelled, ultimately, to yield upon this subject of slavery, that it was as impossible to war successfully against a principle in politics, as it was in physics or mechanics. That the principle would ultimately prevail. That we, in maintaining slavery as it exists with us, were warring against a principle, a principle founded in nature, the principle of the equality of men. The reply I made to him was, that upon his own grounds, we should, ultimately, succeed, and that he and his associates, in this crusade against our institutions, would ultimately fail. The truth announced, that it was as impossible to war successfully against a principle in politics as it was in physics and mechanics, I admitted; but told him that it was he, and those acting with him, who were warring against a principle. They were attempting to make things equal which the Creator had made unequal.

In the conflict thus far, success has been on our side, complete throughout the length and breadth of the Confederate States. It is upon this, as I have stated, our social fabric is firmly planted; and I cannot permit myself to doubt the ultimate success of a full recognition of this principle throughout the civilized and enlightened world.

....

In order to justify something, one must be able to show through argumentative force that the proposition in question is morally valid, i.e. just.

"Morally valid" in the sense of "morally permissible" doesn't mean the same thing as "just" at all.

When I fight someone who attacks me, I don't pretend that this means of settling disputes--force--is somehow "just." I know it's not. All I say is that my actions are morally valid: I can justify them in a case where we can't reach anything better.

And that justness must be demonstrable through argumentation, i.e. through justification.

"Justified" and "just" don't mean the same thing.

You'd see this more clearly, perhaps, if you had ever been a consequentialist. I might think that killing the innocent is never just, because they do not deserve to be killed, but still is justified, because the good outweighs the bad.

I am not a consequentialist anymore, but I think the distinction can reasonably be preserved. "Justice" is a condition: people get what they deserve. "Justification" is the end result of moral reasoning: it is the establishment of something as morally permissible. War is not just, because it does not give people what they deserve, only what they have enough force to keep or take. But war might still be justified, when there is no just alternative.

that price wouldnt cover the value of the slaves. i dont see it avoiding war.

No, don't you get it? Slavery, and slavery alone caused the civil war.

Nevermind long-felt political unrest, and severe socio-economic differences in the two regions.

I agree. Slavery went beyond economics. It was so ingrained in Southern culture that even vast sums of money wouldn't disloge slavery. Note that the Southern plantation owner considered himself superior to the Northern Capitalist because he had slaves and didn't put profit first. They consiered it noble to have slaves, like they were doing the slaves a favor by giving them food and shelter in exchange for work. While removing slaves would have been an economically sound idea, economics were not the first concern of a southern plantation owner.

The plan might have worked on the fringes of slavedom, where the Southern lifestyle was not as influential, but it would have never worked in the cotton belt.

Well... what do you do with one time monies? If you have two families of slaves living on your plantation, you'd get quite the reimbursment for abolition, on the other hand, with the slaves you get generations worth of practically free labour, and what happens when all that extra money dries up from hiring hands to help on your plantation... and you still own the plantation?

plus

once you have purchased all these slaves, what do you DO with them?

Expand the army and conquer Europe?

Oh wait, Europe didn't have slavery, imagine the percentage of soldiers abroad disbanding. :D

No, don't you get it? Slavery, and slavery alone caused the civil war.

Nevermind long-felt political unrest, and severe socio-economic differences in the two regions.

i do get it. a man who would go to war to keep his slaves is not a man who would accept less than half price for them.

I don't think he personally supported slavery, and would have liked movement towards emancipation, but wasn't willing to wage a war or to risk any kind of civil instability to achieve it.

Oh, he absolutely was an abolitionist. At the same time, he was definately a racist. Whats fun is telling a bunch of kids at the local textbook-fed high school students that Lincoln was racist, and of course they all shout that he's the most un-racist American Superhero there is.

Then explain that he was, indeed, anti-slavery, but just because blacks aren't slaves, doesn't mean they deserve equality either. (Now, of course, I am pro-equality here).

It's fun to attempt to expand the minds of children who can't think outside a textbook.

i do get it. a man who would go to war to keep his slaves is not a man who would accept less than half price for them.

I actually misread your post, I didn't catch your "n't" on the end of 'would' so I thought the message of your post was a little bit different from what it was.

Because war is conflict between territorial monopolies on jurisdiction, which by their very nature fight wars through expropriating the just property titles of innocent people, even their right to life. Whereas, a violent slave uprising is, insofar as it does not involve the slaves attacking innocents but only slaveholders and fellow aggressors, is merely the slaves using self-defense to protect their self-ownership.

You're right, and America's part in WWII was wrong because (according to you) we only wanted other peoples land... it's a good thing we were conned into not keeping the half of Europe that we conquered from the Germans, or most of Oceania, or much of North Africa.

Oh wait, if the US didn't gain any significant holdings abroad, and if thats not why we made war, then perhaps this whole outlook on war is completely and utterly skewed... hmmm, a resonable person would re-examine so fragile a standpoint.

I actually misread your post, I didn't catch your "n't" on the end of 'would' so I thought the message of your post was a little bit different from what it was.

ahhh no problem.

it gave me a chance to make the point again.

Is not a violent uprising another way of expropriating jurisdiction?

:fluffle:

Yes, it was.



The South didn't give a shit about states' rights when they applied to any states but their own.



A rebellion motivated by fears that the Republican Party was going to restrict slavery.

The secessionists were quite open about this.

Oh yeah, slavery certainly was a factor. However, as opposed to your very linear (and quite incorrect) perspective, it was not only about slavery.

When we start assuming that something so complex as the American Civil War can be boiled down to 'slavery' we start generalizing in a way that is both incorrect, and harmful.

Please, do some research, and you should find plenty to show you that Salvery was certainly a cause, albeit not a huge one.

"Morally valid" in the sense of "morally permissible" doesn't mean the same thing as "just" at all.

When I fight someone who attacks me, I don't pretend that this means of settling disputes--force--is somehow "just." I know it's not. All I say is that my actions are morally valid: I can justify them in a case where we can't reach anything better.



"Justified" and "just" don't mean the same thing.

You'd see this more clearly, perhaps, if you had ever been a consequentialist. I might think that killing the innocent is never just, because they do not deserve to be killed, but still is justified, because the good outweighs the bad.

I am not a consequentialist anymore, but I think the distinction can reasonably be preserved. "Justice" is a condition: people get what they deserve. "Justification" is the end result of moral reasoning: it is the establishment of something as morally permissible. War is not just, because it does not give people what they deserve, only what they have enough force to keep or take. But war might still be justified, when there is no just alternative.

Well, Hitler and the NSDAP justified killing Jews, did that make it any more right, or just? Not at all.

All justification is, really, is the idea that we can explain away otherwise immoral actions, for example: "Normally, killing innocent civilians is wrong, however the Jews have wronged Germany horrible, and now I am comfortable with putting them to the slaughter." might have been a Nazi standpoint. does this make their reasoning valid? Not even close, is it still a justification, regardless of how flawed? Of course.

I suggest dictionaries to those who state that justification, and justice are necessarily related.

ps, so that you know, I agree with the general message of the quoted post.

However, as opposed to your very linear (and quite incorrect) perspective, it was not only about slavery.

No war is "only" about anything. But slavery was still the principal cause.

Please, do some research

Why don't you?

The Cat-Tribe has already helped you out. ;)

Well, Hitler and the NSDAP justified killing Jews, did that make it any more right, or just? Not at all.

That's because their justifications failed. Their killing of Jews wasn't justified.

All justification is, really, is the idea that we can explain away otherwise immoral actions, for example: "Normally, killing innocent civilians is wrong, however the Jews have wronged Germany horrible, and now I am comfortable with putting them to the slaughter." might have been a Nazi standpoint. does this make their reasoning valid? Not even close, is it still a justification, regardless of how flawed? Of course.

No, it isn't. A "flawed" justification isn't a justification at all. It doesn't succeed at justifying.

I think our difference here is purely semantic, so now that I have clarified my usage of the terms, I see no point in continuing this.

You're right, and America's part in WWII was wrong because (according to you) we only wanted other peoples land... it's a good thing we were conned into not keeping the half of Europe that we conquered from the Germans, or most of Oceania, or much of North Africa.

Oh wait, if the US didn't gain any significant holdings abroad, and if thats not why we made war, then perhaps this whole outlook on war is completely and utterly skewed... hmmm, a resonable person would re-examine so fragile a standpoint.

I don't think I ever said we wanted to take other people's lands, concerning World War II. However, I do think that we entered the war for the benefit of certain powerful Anglophilic interests, specifically industrialists and financiers, and to establish hegemony by way of the concept of collective security embodied in the UN and organizations like the IMF, not to defend the civil rights of the Jews or Eastern Europeans (hence why the latter and many of the former were left to the mercy of the Soviets who the West had used as a means to power.) Hitler definitely was a monster, but trading one empire for another is hardly an improvement.

"Morally valid" in the sense of "morally permissible" doesn't mean the same thing as "just" at all.

I don't see the difference. Just is rendering each their due, and if something is morally permissible it means that it is someone's due to be able to do that.

When I fight someone who attacks me, I don't pretend that this means of settling disputes--force--is somehow "just." I know it's not. All I say is that my actions are morally valid: I can justify them in a case where we can't reach anything better.

No, self-defense is just because one has a right to their body. Anyone who physically disputes this must be repelled in order to insure that that person is not harmed, i.e. is rendered his due. Self-defense is justice.

"Justified" and "just" don't mean the same thing.

If something is justified, it is capable of being shown to be true through argumentative force. Something that is unjust, being in some way logically deficient and thus false, cannot be justified.

You'd see this more clearly, perhaps, if you had ever been a consequentialist. I might think that killing the innocent is never just, because they do not deserve to be killed, but still is justified, because the good outweighs the bad.

No, aggressing against people is always wrong because it presumes one has control over that person, but only the innocent has control over his body by way of his being able to object. Being that value is subjective, that innocent may simply argue that the benefits do not outweigh the costs of his death.

I am not a consequentialist anymore, but I think the distinction can reasonably be preserved. "Justice" is a condition: people get what they deserve. "Justification" is the end result of moral reasoning: it is the establishment of something as morally permissible. War is not just, because it does not give people what they deserve, only what they have enough force to keep or take. But war might still be justified, when there is no just alternative.

As I said before, self-defense is just because it is an act of rendering each their due. However, war is always wrong because it aggresses against the innocent in order to perpetuate itself (through taxation, regulation, conscription, rationing, etc.) and often harms innocents through collateral damage or even deliberate targetting. This is most certainly not their due. Thus, it cannot be justified, as it is inherently illogical and unjust.

I don't see the difference. Just is rendering each their due,

Agreed.

and if something is morally permissible it means that it is someone's due to be able to do that.

Here we break. Sometimes it is impossible to render everyone their due. In such a case, we are excused from our failure to do so: we may act unjustly with justification.

No, self-defense is just because one has a right to their body. Anyone who physically disputes this must be repelled in order to insure that that person is not harmed, i.e. is rendered his due. Self-defense is justice.

No. One person, the person who acts in self-defense, is rendered his due. The attacker is not rendered his due. Force is used against him, even though he did not consent.

The use of force is justified, but it is not just. We have denied to him the freedom that is his by right. Just relations would not involve violence at all: the freedom of each would harmonize with the freedom of the other, without one imposing on the other as occurs in a violent confrontation. Self-defense is thus a departure from the ideal, which is why we must never accept it as an acceptable permanent condition: we must always attempt to move beyond it, to seek peace.

What does that mean practically? That the moment the attacker is willing to make peace--to stop attacking the victim in such a way that the victim can be convinced it will endure--the victim must accept. (Even if the victim thinks he deserves worse. It is not the victim's place to impose punishment upon him.)

Unjust means can be justified, but only if their end is their own negation: only if they are consistent with seeking justice (even as we may sometimes not be able to achieve it.)

If something is justified, it is capable of being shown to be true through argumentative force. Something that is unjust, being in some way logically deficient and thus false, cannot be justified.

This definition does not accord with your last. Something is "unjust" not if it is "logically deficient", but if it does not give everyone his or her due.

The real question is whether I can rationally show that something can be right even if it does not give everyone his or her due. I say I can--assuming such justice is impossible.

No, aggressing against people is always wrong because it presumes one has control over that person, but only the innocent has control over his body by way of his being able to object. Being that value is subjective, that innocent may simply argue that the benefits do not outweigh the costs of his death.

I'm not saying the conclusion is right; I think it's wrong. I'm just trying to illustrate the distinction.

As I said before, self-defense is just because it is an act of rendering each their due.

But it's not. Say I'm attacked, and in self-defense I kill my attacker. Have I rendered him his due? No--he did not consent to his death, and he rightfully has the freedom to make that choice. I may judge that he "deserved" it, but I don't have the authority to kill him over my judgment of desert: whatever I think of his worthiness as a person, I have no right to impose that conception upon him.

Of course, I do have the right to my own life. This is the contradiction and the disharmony: justice requires that I render each their due. But because his freedom is in conflict with mine, to render him his due is to deny me mine. As such, in defense of my right, I am entitled to defend myself--to render myself my due at his expense, because it is not possible to render both of us our due, and it is his actions, not mine, that violated the conditions of justice in the first place. (Of course, the moment I no longer seek a restoration of those conditions of justice, the moment I say "I will continue even if he stops, because he deserves it", I am no better than him.)

Justification. Not justice.

However, war is always wrong because it aggresses against the innocent in order to perpetuate itself (through taxation, regulation, conscription, rationing, etc.)

This is not "aggression" as long as it occurs through legitimate public authority, through a government founded on public freedom. In such a case, it calls upon individuals only to obey the laws they themselves have made.

and often harms innocents through collateral damage

Can't self-defense do the same?

or even deliberate targetting.

This is always wrong, but is not a necessary feature of war.

Agreed.

Good.

Here we break. Sometimes it is impossible to render everyone their due. In such a case, we are excused from our failure to do so: we may act unjustly with justification.

I do not think we can ever be permitted to act unjustly. While we may not be able to render each their due 100% of the time, I do not think that that means we are acting unjustly or are allowed to. For instance, if I see a murderer attacking someone and attempt to fend them off, but fail in doing so, not everyone has been rendered their due as the murder victim would attest, but I have not acted unjustly despite my failure to protect him; rather, I have acted justly in attempting to defend the rights of another person.

No. One person, the person who acts in self-defense, is rendered his due. The attacker is not rendered his due. Force is used against him, even though he did not consent.

The attacker consented the moment he began attacking his victim. This is because, as someone who has initiated force, he cannot justify an objection to retaliation as that would be a contradiction. This is the time-honored theory of estoppel, in which one is 'estopped' from complaining against just punishment. Hence, his punishment is his due as an aggressor.

The use of force is justified, but it is not just. We have denied to him the freedom that is his by right. Just relations would not involve violence at all: the freedom of each would harmonize with the freedom of the other, without one imposing on the other as occurs in a violent confrontation. Self-defense is thus a departure from the ideal, which is why we must never accept it as an acceptable permanent condition: we must always attempt to move beyond it, to seek peace.

We have not denied him his freedom, because he is estopped from objection to his punishment; it is his due as an aggressor. While a world in which there are criminals is not a world in which each is rendered their due, i.e. not a peaceful world, the act of self-defense brings it closer to the ideal of peace, which is when one has been rendered their due, and as such is just.

What does that mean practically? That the moment the attacker is willing to make peace--to stop attacking the victim in such a way that the victim can be convinced it will endure--the victim must accept. (Even if the victim thinks he deserves worse. It is not the victim's place to impose punishment upon him.)

No. The aggressor is estopped from objecting to his punishment, even if he changes his mind mid-attack and delivers a lovely speech about peace and his regret. As one who has engaged in force, he cannot justify a prohibition of the use of force against him without contradiction, and as such cannot engage in argumentation in his support.

Unjust means can be justified, but only if their end is their own negation: only if they are consistent with seeking justice (even as we may sometimes not be able to achieve it.)

The ends do not justify the means; if I use an innocent person as a shield while I am in a gunbattle with a mass-murderer, I have already failed to do justice because I am violating the rights of the innocent person in question, even if killing the mass-murderer would save many other lives. This is because I do not own the person that I am using as protection, and to act like I do own him is an inherently unjust and unjustifiable act.

This definition does not accord with your last. Something is "unjust" not if it is "logically deficient", but if it does not give everyone his or her due.

Injustice is always logically deficient, as it cannot be argumentatively shown to be valid. Not everything that is logically deficient is unjust (for instance, if I say the world is flat, seeing as how such a proposition can be proven through argumentative means to be false), but everything that is unjust is logically deficient.

The real question is whether I can rationally show that something can be right even if it does not give everyone his or her due. I say I can--assuming such justice is impossible.

One cannot act to not render each their due. Hence why it is wrong to use the innocent person as a shield; you do not own him, and using him in such a fashion is to not render him his due. If you die in your gunfight because you did not use the innocent person as a shield, you have not failed to render the due of the future victims, as you are not taking away their lives; rather, the criminal, as the direct cause, is. (Just the same as the mother of the killer has not failed to render each their due, as, though she is an indirect cause, it is her child that is the killer and has failed to render each their due as the direct cause.) The injustice is in the killer's acts, not that of the person trying to stop him.

I'm not saying the conclusion is right; I think it's wrong. I'm just trying to illustrate the distinction.

As morally valid propositions, just propositions are the only justifiable propositions (i.e. the only ones capable of convincing people through argumentative means.) Unjust things, being morally invalid, cannot.

But it's not. Say I'm attacked, and in self-defense I kill my attacker. Have I rendered him his due? No--he did not consent to his death, and he rightfully has the freedom to make that choice. I may judge that he "deserved" it, but I don't have the authority to kill him over my judgment of desert: whatever I think of his worthiness as a person, I have no right to impose that conception upon him.

Again, estoppel indicates that the attacker cannot object to a use of force against him, and as such he cannot say he is not being rendered his due. It may be unfortunate, yes, but it is not unjust.

Of course, I do have the right to my own life. This is the contradiction and the disharmony: justice requires that I render each their due. But because his freedom is in conflict with mine, to render him his due is to deny me mine. As such, in defense of my right, I am entitled to defend myself--to render myself my due at his expense, because it is not possible to render both of us our due, and it is his actions, not mine, that violated the conditions of justice in the first place. (Of course, the moment I no longer seek a restoration of those conditions of justice, the moment I say "I will continue even if he stops, because he deserves it", I am no better than him.)

His freedom is not in conflict with yours; he does not have a right to your body, and as such you may use force against him justly in your defense since he is estopped from objection. If you choose to punish him even after he has surrendered, he cannot object seeing as how he used force against you and thus you are entitled to retribution.

Justification. Not justice.

Injustice is unjustifiable.

This is not "aggression" as long as it occurs through legitimate public authority, through a government founded on public freedom. In such a case, it calls upon individuals only to obey the laws they themselves have made.

Governments are not founded on public freedom; they are founded on the idea of a territorial monopoly on jurisdiction. If I say "Conscription is evil, and this war is wrong," and the government later conscripts me and forces me to fight in an unjust war, have I really 'consented' to laws 'I' made? Being that I always maintain control over my body in the fact that I object to these acts perpetrated against me, the public cannot claim that they have the right to conscript me and use me as they wish.

Can't self-defense do the same?

Yes, but there is a far greater potential with the government. It would be nonsensical for me to use a cluster bomb, nerve gas, or nuclear weapon to defend myself, not to mention extremely expensive, and my mere possession of these items as a private citizen would almost certainly result in my ostracism before my acquisition and definitely some serious repercussions from the innocent citizens I kill. Whereas the government has thousands of these weapons, and has used them in the past against countless innocents.

This is always wrong, but is not a necessary feature of war.

But the incentive as a state IS to do this monstrous act, seeing as how the citizens of a nation in popular governments are the backbone of popular governments and their governments ebb and flow on the basis of their popularity. Hence, total war to brutalize a nation to force them- and thus their leaders- into submission has been an accepted tactic of modern warfare since Napoleon, whereas a private citizen's indiscriminate killing of innocents would almost certainly bring him severe repercussions.

Yes, it was.

Secession may have been about slavery. The war itself was not. It was fought to "save the Union" (a euphemism for "destroy federalism and consolidate power in Washington, D.C.").

This is the time-honored theory of estoppel, in which one is 'estopped' from complaining against just punishment. Hence, his punishment is his due as an aggressor. Oh my lord, you really do think you understand the law. I thought your inane babbling in the thread on fraud was a fluke. Estoppel is not nearly as simple as you have 'explained' it. Throwing misused legal terms into your argument does not make you a scholar dear. If you want to create your OWN definition for the term estoppel, please make that clear. Mangling a legal principle and then presenting it as fact is extremely annoying for those of us who know you're full of it.

Estoppel is legal and equitable principle of contract law, not some sort of 'time honoured' bar to complaining about having the shit beat out of you if you initiated the violence.

i do get it. a man who would go to war to keep his slaves is not a man who would accept less than half price for them.

You do know that only about 6% of Southerners owned slaves, right? Most Southern men did not "go to war to keep their slaves."

The attacker consented the moment he began attacking his victim. This is because, as someone who has initiated force, he cannot justify an objection to retaliation as that would be a contradiction.

First, no. There's no necessary contradiction involved at all. He may think his victim deserves it, and he does not. He may have some other basis for the distinction. We can't assume that his actions are so arbitrary.

Second, it doesn't matter even if his beliefs are contradictory. That only proves that he is wrong. But whether or not he is wrong is not in dispute--we have already agreed that he is. The mere fact that he is wrong does not give us the right to impose our will upon him. He is entitled to freedom.

We have not denied him his freedom, because he is estopped from objection to his punishment; it is his due as an aggressor.

No. His due as a person is freedom. He is a free individual, and we may not deny him freedom even if we think he deserves what we impose upon him. We may attempt to convince him, but the moment we force it upon him we treat him merely as an object: a thing we can deal with as we see fit, not a free being that can only be bound by his own freedom.

While a world in which there are criminals is not a world in which each is rendered their due, i.e. not a peaceful world, the act of self-defense brings it closer to the ideal of peace, which is when one has been rendered their due, and as such is just.

But it does so through the means of violence. It does so through denying someone his just due as a person: freedom.

No. The aggressor is estopped from objecting to his punishment, even if he changes his mind mid-attack and delivers a lovely speech about peace and his regret. As one who has engaged in force, he cannot justify a prohibition of the use of force against him without contradiction, and as such cannot engage in argumentation in his support.

Again, it does not matter if you think he was wrong. To impose your will upon him is not to make it right.

Think of it this way: right is for his actions to be determined by reason. His acts of aggression contradict reason. But to impose upon him is to worsen the irrationality, not to repair it. It is to say that "right" is to be determined by power: not by his rational (even if flawed) mind, but by our force.

It does not matter if he cannot refuse without contradiction. All that matters is that he does refuse. That is his right as a free being. And part of being free is being free to be wrong. (Not, of course, that he is wrong to refuse. He is wrong to aggress. But he is perfectly right to oppose his punishment. Contradictions, after all, can be wrong on either side of things.)

The ends do not justify the means; if I use an innocent person as a shield while I am in a gunbattle with a mass-murderer, I have already failed to do justice because I am violating the rights of the innocent person in question, even if killing the mass-murderer would save many other lives.

That's right. But in this case, justice already exists between me and the innocent person: my freedom and hers harmonize. By imposing on her, I destroy justice. That cannot be justified.

I am talking, instead, of dealing unjustly in a situation where justice has already been destroyed, because there is no other choice.

The injustice is in the killer's acts, not that of the person trying to stop him.

But that is not the same rationale at all. I am not responsible for the actions of others. But I am responsible for my own actions, and it is my actions, not anyone else's, that threaten the person attacking me when I act in self-defense.

His freedom is not in conflict with yours; he does not have a right to your body,

But he has a right to his. This is precisely the contradiction: the circumstance has developed where it is mine or his.

Justice demands "both." But justice is impossible.

If you choose to punish him even after he has surrendered, he cannot object seeing as how he used force against you and thus you are entitled to retribution.

His violation of my rights does not give me the right to violate his. "Two wrongs do not make a right."

His violation of my rights proves that he is wrong, that he is a bad person. But it does not permit me to deny him his freedom. His freedom is inalienable. From the fact that he is wrong, from the fact that his will has contradicted itself (assuming it has, which it may not have), it does not follow that I can impose my will on him.

Governments are not founded on public freedom;

If we live under one that is not, we have a duty to overthrow it, violently if necessary. We have a duty to respect the freedom of all, and that is only possible under conditions of public freedom.

they are founded on the idea of a territorial monopoly on jurisdiction.

That is a necessary, though not sufficient, part of public freedom. ;)

Vigilantism asserts that justice is to be determined by power, and is inconsistent with both right and freedom.

If I say "Conscription is evil, and this war is wrong," and the government later conscripts me and forces me to fight in an unjust war, have I really 'consented' to laws 'I' made?

Yes, since as a citizen you are a part of the public. You participated (or had the right to participate) in the decision: your freedom was a part of it even if you opposed it.

To form such a public is the only way we can recognize everyone's freedom in a world where freedom qua individual necessarily conflicts: we must be able to speak with unanimity despite having competing wills. We can only do so through democracy, through a system that incorporates everyone's freedom yet nevertheless can come to a unified choice.

Perhaps you refuse to participate in the public will. But that implies two things. First, you have violated your obligations to others: when you break the law, you impose your will upon them. You deny them the right to choose what kind of society to live in. Second, you have vacated all (at least most) of your rights against them: having refused to harmonize your freedom with theirs, you have entered into a state of injustice with respect to them, and they are free (justifiably, but not justly) to treat you the same way.

Being that I always maintain control over my body in the fact that I object to these acts perpetrated against me, the public cannot claim that they have the right to conscript me and use me as they wish.

Well, conscription is a special case, in that I think a case could be made for a "natural" right to one's physical person, one that is not subject to the public will. Come back to me in, say, a month on that.

But do they have a right to tax you? Yes.

It would be nonsensical for me to use a cluster bomb, nerve gas, or nuclear weapon to defend myself, not to mention extremely expensive, and my mere possession of these items as a private citizen would almost certainly result in my ostracism before my acquisition and definitely some serious repercussions from the innocent citizens I kill.

Surely. But if it is legitimate (within limits) in self-defense, why isn't it legitimate (within limits) in war?

But the incentive as a state IS to do this monstrous act, seeing as how the citizens of a nation in popular governments are the backbone of popular governments and their governments ebb and flow on the basis of their popularity.

What does that have to do with anything?

Hence, total war to brutalize a nation to force them- and thus their leaders- into submission has been an accepted tactic of modern warfare since Napoleon,

Certainly a reason to seek justice among nations and perpetual peace, but sometimes, again, this is impossible.

whereas a private citizen's indiscriminate killing of innocents would almost certainly bring him severe repercussions.

Still, any such conflict will be carried out in terms of power, not in terms of right.

-snip-

If estoppel is just the idea that one cannot contradict one's own act, then I don't see why you are getting so upset at me. It is perfectly useful in a dialogical setting to determine legal punishment.

First, no. There's no necessary contradiction involved at all. He may think his victim deserves it, and he does not. He may have some other basis for the distinction. We can't assume that his actions are so arbitrary.

If he says that the victim deserves it and he does not, then he has particularized his claim, and seeing as how argumentation implies that one's propositions must be acceptable to everyone and not just oneself we can rule out that objection. If he has initiated force, he cannot argue against the use of force against him as well, whether aggressive or not.

Second, it doesn't matter even if his beliefs are contradictory. That only proves that he is wrong. But whether or not he is wrong is not in dispute--we have already agreed that he is. The mere fact that he is wrong does not give us the right to impose our will upon him. He is entitled to freedom.

Actually, in so far as he has aggressed, we can say that the victim has a right to aggress against her attacker, seeing as how she can say that she has a right to retribution/reparation and the aggressor cannot evade just punishment (even if he says no one has a right to retaliatory force, he cannot argue that no one has a right to use force and thus cannot object if we initiate force against him.)

No. His due as a person is freedom. He is a free individual, and we may not deny him freedom even if we think he deserves what we impose upon him. We may attempt to convince him, but the moment we force it upon him we treat him merely as an object: a thing we can deal with as we see fit, not a free being that can only be bound by his own freedom.

The idea that he cannot object to his punishment recognizes his status as a rational being, in that he must accept the consequences of the actions he chose. He chose to have this inflicted upon him.

But it does so through the means of violence. It does so through denying someone his just due as a person: freedom.

His just due is to be punished in accordance with his status as an aggressor, just as it is the due of a non-aggressor to have their freedom that should not be aggressed upon. Would you deny the latter their right to their freedom so that the aggressor will not have the punishment that he consented to?

Again, it does not matter if you think he was wrong. To impose your will upon him is not to make it right.

It is, actually, because he cannot object to retribution as an aggressor and he must repay the person(s) he has hurt.

Think of it this way: right is for his actions to be determined by reason. His acts of aggression contradict reason. But to impose upon him is to worsen the irrationality, not to repair it. It is to say that "right" is to be determined by power: not by his rational (even if flawed) mind, but by our force.

No, the criminal agreed to his punishment, he cannot object to it because he would be in a contradiction concerning the initiation of force. As such, it is alright to use force against him for retribution. Right is not determined by power, but by the ability to exchange logical proposition, and seeing as how he cannot give a logical proposition in his defense it is alright to use retribution.

It does not matter if he cannot refuse without contradiction. All that matters is that he does refuse. That is his right as a free being. And part of being free is being free to be wrong. (Not, of course, that he is wrong to refuse. He is wrong to aggress. But he is perfectly right to oppose his punishment. Contradictions, after all, can be wrong on either side of things.)

But he is not truly arguing, because he is contradicting himself when he says this and is not pursuing the truth. Seeing as how he cannot give a reason why we cannot punish him, but his victim can say that it is good to use retaliatory force but not aggressive force without contradiction and thus can show retaliatory force to be just through argumentative power, we cannot stand in the way of his retribution.

That's right. But in this case, justice already exists between me and the innocent person: my freedom and hers harmonize. By imposing on her, I destroy justice. That cannot be justified.

There is no question of harmonizing; it is the fact that the person in question has rights to her person, which we cannot aggress against. Whereas, the person I am in a gunbattle with has shown that he accepts the use of force and thus I am just in stopping him with violence if necessary.

I am talking, instead, of dealing unjustly in a situation where justice has already been destroyed, because there is no other choice.

Like what? Acting unjustly in a situation where justice has already been destroyed would just exacerbate the destruction of peace; for instance, if someone slapped me for no reason, justice has been destroyed, but if I shoot him in retribution I am going beyond self-defense to aggression and thus destroying justice. Whereas, if I, say, just demand an apology, I am not acting unjustly but just moving back towards peace.

But that is not the same rationale at all. I am not responsible for the actions of others. But I am responsible for my own actions, and it is my actions, not anyone else's, that threaten the person attacking me when I act in self-defense.

I was referring to the whole idea of injustice making justice, which would permit the use of an innocent as a shield so long as I save more people. I am simply saying that it is not alright for us to act unjustly, ever, because it is not justifiable. While there may be ill-effects to not stopping the killer, it is he that is in the wrong for killing innocent people since he is doing something that is not argumentatively justifiable, whereas I am doing something argumentatively justifiable when I try to stop him without using an innocent as a shield, since doing the latter is a violation of the rights of the person in question and thus unjustifiable (and unjust.)

But he has a right to his. This is precisely the contradiction: the circumstance has developed where it is mine or his.

He does not have a right to prevent force being used against him, seeing as how he would be in a logical contradiction were he to make a proposition denying this. The right to your body is yours, not the killer trying to destroy it, and since he has accepted the idea of initiating force against you you have a right to stop him with retaliatory force to stop him.

Justice demands "both." But justice is impossible.

This does not mean we should act against justice; we could not justify that.

His violation of my rights does not give me the right to violate his. "Two wrongs do not make a right."

Except your use of force is not a wrong; it is the just protection of what is yours. It is a correction of his evil act, and you are not violating his rights; he cannot make an objection to the idea of retaliatory force.

His violation of my rights proves that he is wrong, that he is a bad person. But it does not permit me to deny him his freedom. His freedom is inalienable. From the fact that he is wrong, from the fact that his will has contradicted itself (assuming it has, which it may not have), it does not follow that I can impose my will on him.

That would be true, if he can make a logical objection to the use of force against him. But he cannot. Thus I see no reason why we cannot use retributive force.

If we live under one that is not, we have a duty to overthrow it, violently if necessary. We have a duty to respect the freedom of all, and that is only possible under conditions of public freedom.

Yes, but that is obvious if we say that one has a right to stop oppression in self-defense, and that the statists do not have a right to oppress us. But if we muddy it with the idea that they should have the freedom to do whatever they want, including taking away our rights (which is contradictory, seeing as how that would mean we can take away their rights too), then who can say that we can stop their oppression?

That is a necessary, though not sufficient, part of public freedom. ;)

The power to legislate away people's rights is the antithesis, not the foundation, of freedom.

Vigilantism asserts that justice is to be determined by power, and is inconsistent with both right and freedom.

Not so. Vigilantism would say that there are rights and wrongs beyond what the government decides for us and may revoke. It is the idea of self-defense over statist power, to render each our due through reason rather than arbitrary decree.

Yes, since as a citizen you are a part of the public. You participated (or had the right to participate) in the decision: your freedom was a part of it even if you opposed it.

What if I thought that the 'right' to participate in this public decision is morally wrong as it takes away the rights of those who are innocent of any wrongdoing? You could not force me to obey your decisions, as you never had my consent in the first place.

To form such a public is the only way we can recognize everyone's freedom in a world where freedom qua individual necessarily conflicts: we must be able to speak with unanimity despite having competing wills. We can only do so through democracy, through a system that incorporates everyone's freedom yet nevertheless can come to a unified choice.

Who says that freedom 'necessarily' conflicts? If our definition of what our rights, which we need in order to determine what each's due is and avoid conflict, necessarily conflicts, then we need a new definition for rights seeing as how our current definition is inherently flawed. Democracy, in which law is arbitrarily legislated, cannot fix the problem either as it is based upon the idea that whatever the majority says is correct, and seeing as how the majority can always contradict itself this means that it inherently is prone to disputes and is thus not an acceptable system of justice.

Perhaps you refuse to participate in the public will. But that implies two things. First, you have violated your obligations to others: when you break the law, you impose your will upon them. You deny them the right to choose what kind of society to live in. Second, you have vacated all (at least most) of your rights against them: having refused to harmonize your freedom with theirs, you have entered into a state of injustice with respect to them, and they are free (justifiably, but not justly) to treat you the same way.

But who says that I ever consented to their imposing the law upon me in the first place? And who says they have a 'right' to choose what kind of society they live in? This would imply that they have a right to demand that other people live according to what they want, which would imply the ownership of some by others, a non-universal concept and hence an invalid one since it is not universally applicable to all those capable of argumentation, and as such is an arbitrary rule and prone to dispute which contradicts the entire idea of rights.

I am not in a state of injustice by defying them, because their laws are inherently unjust. Their acts of aggression against me for following what are invalid rules would merely compound their injustice.

Well, conscription is a special case, in that I think a case could be made for a "natural" right to one's physical person, one that is not subject to the public will. Come back to me in, say, a month on that.

But couldn't they just say they want a society in which no one has a right to one's physical person, seeing as how they have a 'right' to the kind of society they want? In fact, they have already conscripted you by way of having the power to make you obey laws that assume their ownership over you.

But do they have a right to tax you? Yes.

No, because they have no coherent way to determine what is theirs (the taxes) and what is yours (the untaxed remainder.) Arbitrary decrees always mean that there is dispute, as they can contradict one another, and a system which is poisoned by disputability is not an acceptable method of adjudicating rights.

Surely. But if it is legitimate (within limits) in self-defense, why isn't it legitimate (within limits) in war?

Because war is dependent upon a decree-system of rights (hence why they decide to take your property, conscript you, regulate you, etc. arbitrarily), which is flawed, whereas (just) self-defense is based upon a system that is not based upon a system of decrees.

What does that have to do with anything?

It highlights the inherently different nature of war versus self-defense, much like the difference between driving on the road versus driving through the local playground. First of all, there is the obvious difference that you are
not trespassing in the former whereas you are in the latter. Second, there is a higher chance that you will hit an innocent bystander as a result of your disregard for human life in the latter case than when you are driving where you are actually supposed to drive.

Certainly a reason to seek justice among nations and perpetual peace, but sometimes, again, this is impossible.

I certainly hope you aren't justifying total war. Total war always entails the idea that one thinks one has a right to harm innocent people, which is never just and is logically unjustifiable due to the person's logical capability of objection, which indicates that he is his owner and not the total warrior.

Still, any such conflict will be carried out in terms of power, not in terms of right.

Unfortunately, the dispute will be resolved through power. But there is nothing unjust about the person's self-defense, as he attempts to maintain his just belongings against unjust invaders.

If estoppel is just the idea that one cannot contradict one's own act, then I don't see why you are getting so upset at me. It is perfectly useful in a dialogical setting to determine legal punishment. It isn't, that's the problem. You are oversimplifying a concept to the point that it no longer has any meaning. If you want to talk about the idea that one cannot contradict one's own act, don't use a term that doesn't in fact mean that. Very simple. You can call a fish a bird, but it's still not going to fly. You keep speaking about 'legal punishment'. Well, since your context is legal, don't mangle legal terms.

It isn't, that's the problem. You are oversimplifying a concept to the point that it no longer has any meaning. If you want to talk about the idea that one cannot contradict one's own act, don't use a term that doesn't in fact mean that. Very simple. You can call a fish a bird, but it's still not going to fly. You keep speaking about 'legal punishment'. Well, since your context is legal, don't mangle legal terms.

I don't see how I have oversimplified the concept, seeing as how, in Lord Coke's words, "... a man’s own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth," and I have simply argued that one can use this idea for just retribution in a just legal system.

I don't see how I have oversimplified the concept, seeing as how, in Lord Coke's words, "... a man’s own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth," and I have simply argued that one can use this idea for just retribution in a just legal system.

How nice. You can look up legal quotes.

How about this one..."Estoppel is a shield, not a sword." - Lord Denning. See? Equally pointless in and of itself.

Estoppel is an element of contract law. It is not, as you earlier stated, a time honoured principle you can suddenly mould into some form of 'just retribution'. It isn't about retribution at all. It is called into play when someone has done or said something to induce an expectation in another person, and that person has reasonably relied on the expectation and would suffer detriment if that expectation were false. Three important elements. If you want to use it to back yourself up in the scenario where someone, having initiated violence, cannot complain about getting the shit kicked out of them after, then you need to make out those elements. THAT would be an argument, not your bald statement that 'estoppel is x because I say it is'.

So make the argument. I would be amused to see you try.