NationStates Jolt Archive

No, people influencing people is by definition what society is, and all that it is. If nobody influenced anybody, then there would be no such thing as society. If nobody influences you, then you are not part of society.
Which is why society isn't a thing. Each and every one of us has the ability to opt out.
That's ridiculous. Manipulation is the fault of the manipulator by the very definition of fault and manipulation. People are responsible for what they are the cause of, and manipulation implies a line of causality from the manipulator to the manipulated. Therefore, the manipulator is responsible, and at fault.
If I convince you of something untrue without ever lying to you about it, have I done something wrong? I say no.

Though countries like Taiwan and South Korea must also be kept in mind. They industrialised without empires and military power, and didn't introduce welfare systems and labour rights until fairly late in the piece.True - but I think the point is that England was first, and the question was why England and not somewhere else.

actually there is. only it isn't an organic or even sentient being. its a little green piece of paper.:eek: Money is Hitler?

If I convince you of something untrue without ever lying to you about it, have I done something wrong? I say no.As with all lies, it depends on the type of lie and the motivation, but if done deliberately and with negative intent then yes, you've done wrong.

As with all lies, it depends on the type of lie and the motivation, but if done deliberately and with negative intent then yes, you've done wrong.
Lies require falsehood. I can mislead without lying.

Lies require falsehood. I can mislead without lying.And intentionally misleading someone is wrong (for most reasons). (Debating the semantics of a lie is counterproductive.)

And intentionally misleading someone is wrong (for most reasons). (Debating the semantics of a lie is counterproductive.)
The wrongness stems from the incorrect inference. Inference is always the fault of the listener.

The wrongness stems from the incorrect inference. Inference is always the fault of the listener.The moral wrongness stems from the intentional misleading.

The wrongness stems from the incorrect inference. Inference is always the fault of the listener.

If you're trying to engineer such an incorrect inference then you are (at least) also to blame.

The moral wrongness stems from the intentional misleading.
If you're trying to engineer such an incorrect inference then you are (at least) also to blame.
Look at traffic law. If there's an car accident, the fault lies with the party who caused the accident by violating traffic law. If you ran the stop sign, then it's your fault. If you failed to signal, it's your fault.

The same applies to reasoning. If I make false statements, all conclusions drawn from those are my responsibility. But if I make true statements, a reasonable person cannot be mislead by them. But, should someone infer baseless conclusions from my true statements, the fault lies with him.

Look at traffic law. If there's an car accident, the fault lies with the party who caused the accident by violating traffic law. If you ran the stop sign, then it's your fault. If you failed to signal, it's your fault.

The same applies to reasoning. If I make false statements, all conclusions drawn from those are my responsibility. But if I make true statements, a reasonable person cannot be mislead by them. But, should someone infer baseless conclusions from my true statements, the fault lies with him.

Traffic law is relatively clear cut where most of language is full of ambiguities. Reasonable people can disagree on the meaning of true statments given language is an imperfect medium meant to transmit information.

Look at traffic law. If there's an car accident, the fault lies with the party who caused the accident by violating traffic law. If you ran the stop sign, then it's your fault. If you failed to signal, it's your fault.


Recently a woman in the UK killed a cyclist who ran a red and was jailed for four years.


The same applies to reasoning. If I make false statements, all conclusions drawn from those are my responsibility. But if I make true statements, a reasonable person cannot be mislead by them. But, should someone infer baseless conclusions from my true statements, the fault lies with him.

That doesn't make any sense. If you are intending to mislead somebody how are their conclusions baseless? Unless you've redefined the word "intend", which doesn't seem so unlikely after what you did to the word "art".

Recently a woman in the UK killed a cyclist who ran a red and was jailed for four years.

I know that in New York State a cyclist is considered to be a pedestrian (for at fault determination) maybe its the same thing in the U.K.

Recently a woman in the UK killed a cyclist who ran a red and was jailed for four years.

Who was texting and speeding at the same time, which would have reduced her awareness of other road users. Apparently the court felt that if she had been aware and under the speed limit she could have taken action.

Who was texting and speeding at the same time, which would have reduced her awareness of other road users. Apparently the court felt that if she had been aware and under the speed limit she could have taken action.

Sure. But in terms of "fault lies with the party who caused the accident by violating traffic law", he was the guy who should be blame. It's just that reasonable people can say that just because he was the one who created the situation by violating the law doesn't mean that the subsequent extraordinary act of negligence wasn't more relevant.

Which is why society isn't a thing. Each and every one of us has the ability to opt out.No, we don't. Few people can survive completely independent of society in the wilderness, or what remains of it, and if suicide is your idea of opting out, your definition of "choice" is nothing but pure coercion.

If I convince you of something untrue without ever lying to you about it, have I done something wrong? I say no.Then you have weak morals, and don't understand what it is about lying that makes it wrong in the first place. If you think the power structure of the society you live in aren't lying to you, then you are a fool.

Lies require falsehood. I can mislead without lying.Such a distinction is a mere superficiality of grammar and the opinions of the cunning linguists employed at the Oxford English Dictionary company.

The wrongness stems from the incorrect inference. Inference is always the fault of the listener.Not when the speaker willfully directs the inference with connotation. And don't pretend like its possible to refrain from inferring. Every rational belief ultimately rests on inference.



Look at traffic law. If there's an car accident, the fault lies with the party who caused the accident by violating traffic law. If you ran the stop sign, then it's your fault. If you failed to signal, it's your fault.So by your reckoning, running over colorblind people at intersections with the lights upsidedown in order to collect insurance money is completely okay even if you kill the other driver?

The same applies to reasoning. If I make false statements, all conclusions drawn from those are my responsibility. But if I make true statements, a reasonable person cannot be mislead by them. But, should someone infer baseless conclusions from my true statements, the fault lies with him.
1)No statement is independently true or false. Veracity is dependent on assigned and agreed upon meaning. Nor is the parsed denotation of a statement the whole of a communication. In most communication and advertising, there usually isn't even a parsible message in which to communicate a "lie".

2)Inference directed by the sender is never baseless, for it is based on the wishes of the sender, and therefore an element of communication. Misleading is such a manipulative influence. It is not baseless, but an element of communication itself, and a form of lie.

Sure. But in terms of "fault lies with the party who caused the accident by violating traffic law", he was the guy who should be blame. It's just that reasonable people can say that just because he was the one who created the situation by violating the law doesn't mean that the subsequent extraordinary act of negligence wasn't more relevant.
They were both violating traffic law. She was speeding. As a result of her speeding (and the cyclist's actions), a cyclist was killed. That seems pretty clear to me.

That doesn't make any sense. If you are intending to mislead somebody how are their conclusions baseless? Unless you've redefined the word "intend", which doesn't seem so unlikely after what you did to the word "art".
They're baseless because they're not based on anything I said. Since my intent isn't knowable to the listener, it can't influence the listener's conclusions.

No, we don't. Few people can survive completely independent of society in the wilderness, or what remains of it, and if suicide is your idea of opting out, your definition of "choice" is nothing but pure coercion.
Independent of society doesn't require you have no contact with society, just that you not interact with it. you might be aware of society and still not take part.
Then you have weak morals, and don't understand what it is about lying that makes it wrong in the first place.
What makes lying wrong is the falsehood. Equivocation isn't lying, because sometimes equivocation is the best answer available. Incomplete truths aren't lying because they're still true (and obviously incomplete).
Such a distinction is a mere superficiality of grammar and the opinions of the cunning linguists employed at the Oxford English Dictionary company.
The OED is easily the best resource we have to tell us what words mean.

Are you claiming that grammar is irrelevant? Rules sense this sentence of the grammar does I make ignore if still?
Not when the speaker willfully directs the inference with connotation. And don't pretend like its possible to refrain from inferring. Every rational belief ultimately rests on inference.
Connotation does not exist. Furthermore, any "belief" that rests on inference cannot be rational. If that requires that no belief is rational, so be it.
So by your reckoning, running over colorblind people at intersections with the lights upsidedown in order to collect insurance money is completely okay even if you kill the other driver?
If the lights are upside-down then they're relaying ambiguous information. That would be a no-fault accident.
1)No statement is independently true or false. Veracity is dependent on assigned and agreed upon meaning.
I'll concede that. This is why definitions are so important.
Nor is the parsed denotation of a statement the whole of a communication.
Yes it is. That's all communication can be, since nothing beyond that is knowable.
In most communication and advertising, there usually isn't even a parsible message in which to communicate a "lie".
Then those messages are meaningless. Advertising does that a lot.
2)Inference directed by the sender is never baseless, for it is based on the wishes of the sender, and therefore an element of communication.
The wishes of the sender are unknowable by the listener.
Misleading is such a manipulative influence. It is not baseless, but an element of communication itself, and a form of lie.
How can it be a lie when it consists of true statements? Define "lie" for me then.

They're baseless because they're not based on anything I said. Since my intent isn't knowable to the listener, it can't influence the listener's conclusions.

Maybe if you hoped they would be misled but had no evidence to believe that they would be. I don't think you understand what the word intent means.

Maybe if you hoped they would be misled but had no evidence to believe that they would be. I don't think you understand what the word intent means.
Since inference is necessarily unpredictable, I can't foresee any specific unfounded conclusion.

Since inference is necessarily unpredictable, I can't foresee any specific unfounded conclusion.

In which case you have no premise.

They're baseless because they're not based on anything I said. Since my intent isn't knowable to the listener, it can't influence the listener's conclusions.

One does not know the other person's actual intent is but one can look at the his signals to makeout what his intent probably is.

What makes lying wrong is the falsehood. Equivocation isn't lying, because sometimes equivocation is the best answer available. Incomplete truths aren't lying because they're still true (and obviously incomplete)

Equivocation is not always the best answer especially when a speaker signals in a way that makes a false interpretation the most likely interpretation of the statement from another's' perspective.

Equivocation is not always the best answer especially when a speaker signals in a way that makes a false interpretation the most likely interpretation of the statement from another's' perspective.
The only predictable interpretation of any remark is the literal one. Once we move beyond that we're in the realm of blind guesses.

In which case you have no premise.
I do appear to have argued effectively that it's not possible to mislead intentionally, at least not mislead to a particular conclusion.

The only predictable interpretation of any remark is the literal one. Once we move beyond that we're in the realm of blind guesses.

Untrue. Otherwise sarcasm could not be used since everyone would think the literal interpretation was correct.

I do appear to have argued effectively that it's not possible to mislead intentionally, at least not mislead to a particular conclusion.

Intentional misleading is what manipulation is. Have you proven that manipulation does not exist?

Independent of society doesn't require you have no contact with society, just that you not interact with it. you might be aware of society and still not take part.I doubt it's possible to have contact with society without interacting with it. If it were, it doesn't really contradict what I said. Either you live completely off the land in the wilderness or you're dependent on society.

What makes lying wrong is the falsehood.A falsehood is a falsehood whether it is stated or not. Saying that what makes lying wrong is the falsehood is like saying what makes swearing wrong is the 4-letter words. You have only referred to the definition of lying, and not any fundamental moral value, unless you simply consider telling the truth itself to be a fundamental value, in which case there's the counterexample the WW2-era German answering the door to find a Nazi housing inspector asking if there are Jews in the basement, which just happens to be full of Jews.

Equivocation isn't lying, because sometimes equivocation is the best answer available. Incomplete truths aren't lying because they're still true (and obviously incomplete).What makes intentional equivocation or omission better or worse than lying?

The OED is easily the best resource we have to tell us what words mean.Outside of actual context, yet, but only because they have catalogued their general usage. They are middlemen, and we are talking about a situation that would generally not make use of a dictionary as a communication facilitator.

Are you claiming that grammar is irrelevant?It is only relevant inasmuch as it facilitates communication.
Rules sense this sentence of the grammar does I make ignore if still?As it so happens, yes. Of course, we are talking about situations where grammar is not "ignored", but perhaps subtely manipulated in conjunction with other elements of communication.

Connotation does not exist. Furthermore, any "belief" that rests on inference cannot be rational. If that requires that no belief is rational, so be it.Connotation doesn't exist??? It would be less mad to claim that words, truth, and falsehood themselves do not exist!

If the lights are upside-down then they're relaying ambiguous information. That would be a no-fault accident.So intentional murder is okay if the law says it's "no fault". At least you're sorta being consistent I spose.

I'll concede that. This is why definitions are so important.

Yes it is. That's all communication can be, since nothing beyond that is knowable.Why would dictionary-defined content be considered "knowable" when your knowledge of it was communicated to you in the first place by more innate "unknowable" forms of communication? There's no such thing as "knowable" communication, if the knowledge must be a priori.

Then those messages are meaningless. Advertising does that a lot.Are music and art meaningless? When people communicate through pantomime are they really being telepathic?

The wishes of the sender are unknowable by the listener.Then how is it that we even know people have wishes? Or are you a solipsist?

How can it be a lie when it consists of true statements? Define "lie" for me then.In the relevant senses I am using it, you could say:

-Something meant to deceive or give a wrong impression.

-to express what is false; convey a false impression.

-something intended or serving to convey a false impression; imposture: His flashy car was a lie that deceived no one.

-To present false information with the intention of deceiving.

-to pretend with intent to deceive

-a statement that deviates from or perverts the trut


P.S. I just had to redo all my friggin quote tags because of the split, which may not have been a good idea, because it relates to the idea of whether people can be manipulated by society, and whether manipulators can be blamed for manipulating. Well, I guess it is pretty far out the tangent though.

Untrue. Otherwise sarcasm could not be used since everyone would think the literal interpretation was correct.
That only applies if tone of voice can't convey denotative meaning, and I don't see why that would be true.

English is a tone language (much like Mandarin).
Intentional misleading is what manipulation is. Have you proven that manipulation does not exist?
It certainly looks like it.

Which is good. If manipulation can't exist, then it can't be immoral.

If I convince you of something untrue without ever lying to you about it, have I done something wrong? I say no.Most definitely yes. It may not be a lie, and you may not be at a severe fault, but spreading an untruth, even unknowingly, isn't a good thing.

If the lie is to protect someone, there is no fault.

That only applies if tone of voice can't convey denotative meaning, and I don't see why that would be true.

English is a tone language (much like Mandarin).

It is impossible to convey sarcasm in a purely visual medium, ie the internet, without a sarcastic emoticon?

I absolutely agree, 100%, no if, ands, or buts. I worship you as the living embodiment of all that is holy.


It certainly looks like it.

Which is good. If manipulation can't exist, then it can't be immoral.

Do you really believe that manipulation does not exist? That people do not try to mislead others and succeed in their attempts?

It is impossible to convey sarcasm in a purely visual medium, ie the internet, without a sarcastic emoticon?

I absolutely agree, 100%, no if, ands, or buts. I worship you as the living embodiment of all that is holy.
Yes.

And thank you.
Do you really believe that manipulation does not exist? That people do not try to mislead others and succeed in their attempts?
Those are two different things. That manipulation doesn't exist doesn't require that people don't try to mislead each other, only that they can't succeed through any fault of their own.

If you try to lead me to a false conclusion, and I draw that false conclusion, you can't credibly claim to have ccaused that. I caused that by drawing the false conclusion.

Yes.

And thank you.

Those are two different things. That manipulation doesn't exist doesn't require that people don't try to mislead each other, only that they can't succeed through any fault of their own.

If you try to lead me to a false conclusion, and I draw that false conclusion, you can't credibly claim to have ccaused that. I caused that by drawing the false conclusion.

This is one of the most illogical and totally incorrect posts I've ever seen.

Commie thread refuses to die. LOL!

Yes.


Sure, that makes a load of sense. I'm in no way being sarcastic right now and therefore in no way undermining your point!

You mean where does the fault 'lay'.
This is a lie.
Or is it. <- Not a question?
!I am going insane
Teh Cake.

Sure, that makes a load of sense. I'm in no way being sarcastic right now and therefore in no way undermining your point!
Correct. You are not.

You might be trying to convey sarcasm, but you cannot help but fail. And other people reading this might think they see sarcasm in your remarks, but this is because they are relevantly similar to you and would also be trying to use sarcasm in your place. As such, their "perception" is actually them projecting their hypothetical behaviour onto you. They can't actually perceive sarcasm in your remarks because your remarks can't contain sarcasm.

Yes.

And thank you.

Your welcome, your Obliviousness.

Those are two different things. That manipulation doesn't exist doesn't require that people don't try to mislead each other, only that they can't succeed through any fault of their own.

If you try to lead me to a false conclusion, and I draw that false conclusion, you can't credibly claim to have ccaused that. I caused that by drawing the false conclusion.

If someone "leads" another to a false conclusion, intentionally, I do not see how it is not that person's fault. Rational people reach conclusions based on the information they are given and if one "loads the dice" by giving information that makes a false conclusion the most probable one given the information available then it can not but be the manipulators fault.

If someone "leads" another to a false conclusion, intentionally, I do not see how it is not that person's fault. Rational people reach conclusions based on the information they are given and if one "loads the dice" by giving information that makes a false conclusion the most probable one given the information available then it can not but be the manipulators fault.
No reasonable person can draw a false conclusion given only true information from which to work. You're referring to the "most probable" conclusion, but if the available information doesn't guarantee that conclusion to be correct, then a reasonable person wouldn't draw it.

You're imaging some sort of quasi-reasonable person who jumps to conclusions (an unreasonable thing to do) but does so only when that conclusion is most likely, thus making their guesses right more often than not.

But they'd still be guesses, and thus still unreasonable.

No reasonable person can draw a false conclusion given only true information from which to work. You're referring to the "most probable" conclusion, but if the available information doesn't guarantee that conclusion to be correct, then a reasonable person wouldn't draw it.

You're imaging some sort of quasi-reasonable person who jumps to conclusions (an unreasonable thing to do) but does so only when that conclusion is most likely, thus making their guesses right more often than not.

But they'd still be guesses, and thus still unreasonable.

I'm imagining a person who draws a conclusion given the information available. This information is altered given how the speaker presents the information.

You're imagining someone who seems to have a mystical ability to tell when he has enough to come to a conclusion and a mystical ability to come to a conclusion devoid of any signs the speaker has used to lead one to a false conclusion.

A most unreasonable notion.

If I convince you of something untrue without ever lying to you about it, have I done something wrong? I say no.

If you convince someone of something that is untrue, you have lied, whether or not you have made an explicit statement that is contrary to the truth.

A lie is a deception. If you say something that is the exact opposite of the truth, but you say it in irony, or sarcastically, you have not lied. If your girlfriend asks you, for the hundredth time, whether you like her in a particular outfit and you respond with a leer and say "no, take it off," she will probably understand that you don't really think it's an ugly outfit.

If you said this because you are tired of telling her how nice her outfit looks and you want to have sex, then this is not a lie, even though it's the opposite of the truth.

If you say it because you think it's an ugly outfit and you don't want her to know that you think that, but you suspect that she'll know if you outright lie to her, then you are lying. It's just a more devious lie than simply saying "no. no, it's nice. Yeah. The way the waste band sinks into your flesh like that. It's like you have a whole extra breast that goes all the way around."

I'm imagining a person who draws a conclusion given the information available.
If the available information does not guarantee the conclusion, drawing it is unreasonable.
You're imagining someone who seems to have a mystical ability to tell when he has enough to come to a conclusion and a mystical ability to come to a conclusion devoid of any signs the speaker has used to lead one to a false conclusion.
Are you saying that you can't tell when you know something for sure? Because I know I can. I can actually prove it, most of the time.

If you convince someone of something that is untrue, you have lied, whether or not you have made an explicit statement that is contrary to the truth.
And I'm asserting that I can't convince you of something that is untrue without making an explicit statement that is contrary to the truth.

If I make a statement that is true, it cannot lead to false conclusions. That's not how logic works.
A lie is a deception.
Truth can't be deceptive. This is my point.

If the available information does not guarantee the conclusion, drawing it is unreasonable.

Are you saying that you can't tell when you know something for sure? Because I know I can. I can actually prove it, most of the time.

Since one lacks perfect information one can not know with 100% certainty if one has enough information to draw the the right conclusion.

Since one lacks perfect information one can not know with 100% certainty if one has enough information to draw the the right conclusion.
What's "the right conclusion". A sound conclusion is one that's guaranteed to be true given the available evidence. A reasonable person draws those conclusions only (an ideally rational person draws ALL of those conclusions).

You can absolutely know with certainty whether you have enough information to draw a given conclusion - this is rudimentary logic.

And I'm asserting that I can't convince you of something that is untrue without making an explicit statement that is contrary to the truth.

If I make a statement that is true, it cannot lead to false conclusions. That's not how logic works.

Truth can't be deceptive. This is my point.

Facts can be deceptive when juxtaposed so as to imply causal links. Like if you point out the medical evidence that people who sleep 6 hours a night live longer than those who sleep 8 hours a night. Many might conclude that more than 6 hours of sleep is harmful to your health. This is false.

They can also be deceptive when partial truths are used as the basis of opinions that would be exposed as ridiculous if the whole truth had been told. Such as when Brit Hume argued that FDR wanted to privatize social security, then played a quote that seemed to support him. But reading the whole speech it becomes clear that FDR was talking about transitioning from the startup system of Social Security into the system we have now. Meaning FDR considered our current system the finished product, but Brit Hume used accurate facts to make people believe the opposite of the truth.

Or when Ann Coulter says that conservatives have the better record on racial justice because it was southern Democrats who most stridently opposed the Civil Rights Act. The opinion she presents is that conservatives have the better track record on civil rights, and it's supported by a fact that is true. But those Democrats weren't liberals, they were Conservatives, thus the fact that she uses to support her case actually disproves it. So she is using a true fact as the basis of a lie.

Or when Bill O'Reilly argued that "Secularists" are trying to stamp out Christmas, and as evidence he presented David Letterman with the case of a school which changed the words to Silent Night. Well, the words were "changed," because it was a song, written by a Christian minister, in a Christmas play that was sung to the tune of Silent Night. Again, he used a true fact (school singing different lyrics to the tune of silent night) to tell a lie (secularists have removed Christmas from a school.)

What's "the right conclusion". A sound conclusion is one that's guaranteed to be true given the available evidence. A reasonable person draws those conclusions only (an ideally rational person draws ALL of those conclusions).

A sound conclusion is what I said is all that one can expect given the evidence. The right conclusion is the one that is actually true.

You can absolutely know with certainty whether you have enough information to draw a given conclusion - this is rudimentary logic.

Illuminate me then. How can one tell that one is not missing information needed to come to the true conclusion?

This is easy. It's the LIARS fault.

[/QUOTE]As with all lies, it depends on the type of lie and the motivation, but if done deliberately and with negative intent then yes, you've done wrong.[/QUOTE]


A lie is a lie. Intention has no bearing. If you don't tell the truth you have lied and lying is wrong.

A lie is a lie. Intention has no bearing. If you don't tell the truth you have lied and lying is wrong.I disagree. Sometimes lying is right, such as in the case of "white lies".
Lying is wrong in most other cases, though.

A lie is a lie. Intention has no bearing. If you don't tell the truth you have lied and lying is wrong.Bullshit. You can lie and speak the truth and you can say something false and still not lie. Intention is everything. Let me explain:

A lie is making a statement on an issue that you are aware (or think) is untrue. Therefore, if you see Uncle Albert being alive and well, and tell someone he is dead, you are lying. This is true even if Uncle Albert was run over by a cement truck after you saw him. You've told a lie, despite it being the truth. Likewise, if you told someone that Uncle Albert is alive and well after seeing him in that state, not knowing that he was just run over by said cement truck, you'd be not lying, despite not telling the truth.

This thread is actually misnamed . The issue was who is at fault when someone makes only true statements but does so in a way to make someone else draw a false conclusion. Take the conversation between person A and person B below:

A: Paul is gay.

B: He's a homosexual?

A He likes other men.

B: How do you know?

A He went to bed with another man the other day.

Person B then goes off with the conclusion that Paul is a homosexual even though Paul is not. Paul is happy, he has many male friends, and he and another man shared a bed in a hotel room to save money when both were strapped for cash. Where does the fault lay for B's mistaken conclusion?

This thread is actually misnamed . The issue was who is at fault when someone makes only true statements but does so in a way to make someone else draw a false conclusion. Take the conversation between person A and person B below:

A: Paul is gay.

B: He's a homosexual?

A He likes other men.

B: How do you know?

A He went to bed with another man the other day.

Person B then goes off with the conclusion that Paul is a homosexual even though Paul is not. Paul is happy, he has many male friends, and he and another man shared a bed in a hotel room to save money when both were strapped for cash. Where does the fault lay for B's mistaken conclusion?In that example A, because A has misled B. He has not lied, but he has misled.

In that example A, because A has misled B. He has not lied, but he has misled.
He has lied. He said Paul was gay.

If you hold that gay != homosexual, then it was B's fault for concluding Paul was a homosexual even though A failed to answer that question.

A sound conclusion is what I said is all that one can expect given the evidence. The right conclusion is the one that is actually true.
Wrong. The right conclusion is the sound conclusion. Drawing a factually correct conclusion based on false or incomplete information is blind luck, and not a repeatable skill.
Illuminate me then. How can one tell that one is not missing information needed to come to the true conclusion?
Sound, not true. And you can tell you're not missing information when the conclusion is logically guaranteed by your other information.

Wrong. The right conclusion is the sound conclusion. Drawing a factually correct conclusion based on false or incomplete information is blind luck, and not a repeatable skill.

Sound, not true. And you can tell you're not missing information when the conclusion is logically guaranteed by your other information.

If someone gives all true information from which the sound conclusion is not the factually true conclusion who is at fault.

He has lied. He said Paul was gay.

If you hold that gay != homosexual, then it was B's fault for concluding Paul was a homosexual even though A failed to answer that question.

Gay also means happy, more or less. Its not the common usage bit it s still there under the definition of gay in the dictionary.

All of A's staments put together as a whole make it pretty obvious that he want's B to believe that Paul is a homosexual. Given the context it wouldn't be unsound for B to believe that Paul is a homosexual. Gay is commonly used as a synonym fot homsexual. Liking a certain gender and bedding a member of one is almost always used for sexual orientation and sex when discussing sexuality.

They're baseless because they're not based on anything I said.If conclusions are not based on anything you said, you cannot claim influence over them. Yet you specifically suggested the scenario in which you intentionally mislead a person. To claim intention, you must admit to a prediction about the effect of your words. You think, "My statements should cause THIS belief or preclude THAT one."

If your statements are intentional in the sense that you seek to instill a particular state of (false) belief in a listener, then you MUST believe that a listener could base such a belief on your statements. If no such belief could be based on your statements, then in what sense are your statements intentional?

Since my intent isn't knowable to the listener, it can't influence the listener's conclusions.But that's precisely the problem, isn't it? You don't WANT your listener to know your intent, because knowing your intent (to mislead or deceive) the listener would acquire an interpretive rule most useful in seeing through your manipulations.

You withhold precisely that information that you know might "influence" the listener to understand the truth rather than your intended deception. You are self-consciously MANIPULATING the truth. It is that act of manipulation, that intended deception, that constitutes the moral wrong in lying... not necessarily the falsehood of any individual statement.

What makes lying wrong is the falsehood.No, it's not.

If a child of four asks me about the shape of the Earth, I will tell him it is "round" or "like a ball." I know that strictly speaking these statements are not true, because the actual shape of the Earth is "oblique spheroid." But my intention is not to mislead the child: rather I know that "like a ball" is a better answer (though not strictly true) because it brings my listener closer to the truth--once she gets this much down, I can offer a better truth.

One could offer a thousand other examples in education: teaching a half-truth or even a falsehood that nevertheless advances understanding or prepares a student for the straight-up truth. (Newtonian mechanics, anyone? False? Maybe... but deceptive? Not really.)

Meanwhile, fictional literature is not wrong because it is untrue--at least so long as it does not seriously attempt to convince its audience that it is true. Few are misled by a science-fiction novel to believe in aliens. There is nothing morally wrong with Dune... though there may be quite a bit wrong with practices among Scientologists, and this would be true even if Dune fans and Scientologists were working with the same text. It is not the text itself (true or false) that describes dishonesty, but rather the use one makes of it.

The moral wrong in lying is not in the falseness of the statement, since it is possible to make false statements that are not morally wrong.

Equivocation isn't lying, because sometimes equivocation is the best answer available.Well, you're close. Ambiguity isn't necessarily lying because sometimes ambiguity is the best answer available. Equivocation, of course, is always deceptive... because equivocation is DEFINED as the misleading use of ambiguity in definition.

You are correct, however, in the moral reasoning: when what you offer is the best answer available, you do not deceive. When you intentionally mislead, however (even with statements true in themselves, as when practicing equivocation), you are guilty of a moral wrong: deception.

Incomplete truths aren't lying because they're still true (and obviously incomplete).Again, it depends on the intention. If you are offering (as you suggest above) the best answer available (because, perhaps, a more complete answer--e.g. quantum theory & relativity--would only confuse your listener), then an incomplete truth is not deceptive. But if you offer a half-truth knowing full well that a better answer could be offered, you may be charged with deception.

Connotation does not exist.Now there's a false statement!

Connotation: defined as subjective colorations in addition to the literal denotative meaning of a word. Do people experience such colorations? Yes. Connotation exists.

Furthermore, any "belief" that rests on inference cannot be rational. If that requires that no belief is rational, so be it.As stupid (and, I think, disingenuous) as these statements are, let's pretend I accept them. The problem then is that they don't get us anywhere: if no belief is rational, then you have no standard upon which to decide if it was (after all) appropriate (or predictable, which is what intention requires) that a person conclude his (false) belief on (true) statements you have made. Accepting arguendo that rational inference is impossible, we can only fall back on a standard of reasonableness. If it were reasonable to draw a conclusion based on your statements and you intentionally provoked that reasonable response, then you are guilty of deception. (If the inference were unreasonable, I would accept that the fault lies essentially with the listener.)

Reasonableness does not depend on strict logical rationality. Rather, as in the law, the question is, "Should a reasonable person be expected to understand the truth of the matter based on what was said?" The question is essentially empirical: what sorts of responses should be expected from the information offered. It does not require that conclusions be "rational." It merely requires that we have some empirical understanding of human responses... and that is precisely what you require to have "intention" in your language at all. You cannot deny reasonable inference without denying the possibility of your own intention as well.

That's all communication can be [denoted meaning], since nothing beyond that is knowable.Only if you deny empirical knowledge of the social/emotional response to language. If connotation exists, which it does, and we can identify patterns in it, then it is empirically knowable. I can have reasonable expectations about the effects of various words, phrases, metaphors. I can (and do) turn my language to take advantage of these effects--either to communicate the sense or tone of my statement more clearly, or to mislead, but I should not pretend that such effects "do not exist."

The wishes of the sender are unknowable by the listener.How ridiculous. Of course I can know the wishes of a communicator: in most cases, when I have good reason to trust her, she can simply tell me. In other cases, I may detect certain signs of deception (nervousness, perhaps)... or I might know a speaker's interest well enough to detect an attempt to manipulate me.

How can it be a lie when it consists of true statements?It may not be. But you're the one stuck on the notion that a statement is only deceptive if it happens to be a lie. The counter-argument is simply this: that the set of lies does not exhaust the set of deceptive statements, and that the moral wrong of a lie consists in the attempt to deceive rather than the tools (true statements, perhaps) of the deception.

Since inference is necessarily unpredictable, I can't foresee any specific unfounded conclusion.In what sense is it "necessarily" unpredictable? Even if is not rationally predictable, certainly it may be empirically predictable: certain words and phrases (tend to) have certain effects.

Even if, intentionally obtuse as you are, you cannot foresee "any specific" unfounded conclusion, if we are to interpret your "intent" to deceive as having any meaning at all then we must at least assume that you mean to predict that your listener will not reach correct or well-founded conclusions. You must admit some ability to predict reactions or you must give up on the possibility of intention. You can't have it both ways.

The only predictable interpretation of any remark is the literal one. Once we move beyond that we're in the realm of blind guesses.You are just willfully blind to reality, aren't you?

I do appear to have argued effectively that it's not possible to mislead intentionally, at least not mislead to a particular conclusion."Argued effectively"?

Only if one accepts the absurd premise that the only predictable response to language is rooted in denotative meaning... which would be a fantastic surprise to social science!

You have only referred to the definition of lying, and not any fundamental moral value, unless you simply consider telling the truth itself to be a fundamental value, in which case there's the counterexample the WW2-era German answering the door to find a Nazi housing inspector asking if there are Jews in the basement, which just happens to be full of Jews.That's not a counter-example, it's a dilemma. As it happens, I maintain that it is wrong to lie to the housing inspector.

Of course, that doesn't mean it's right to just wave him in. The morally correct choice is to tell him the truth while asserting that to get to the Jews he's going to have to go through me: principled opposition rather than falsehood. It's possible that, inspired by my moral courage, the Nazi disobeys orders and simply lets us be. It's also possible (perhaps likely) that he's willing to accept my challenge, in which case I should do my very best to shoot him before he shoots me.

I didn't say my solution was an easy one.

:D

If someone gives all true information from which the sound conclusion is not the factually true conclusion who is at fault.
Since such a scenario is impossible, no one is at fault.

False conclusions cannot follow logically from true statements.
Gay also means happy, more or less. Its not the common usage bit it s still there under the definition of gay in the dictionary.
And as such, the fault is B's.

It certainly looks like it.

Which is good. If manipulation can't exist, then it can't be immoral.I see. You're more interested in absurdities than reasoned debate about moral choices in the real world.

If the lie is to protect someone, there is no fault.I say there is. The fault in my action lies in the character of the action itself rather than in the consequences in which it results.

If the available information does not guarantee the conclusion, drawing it is unreasonable.This must be some novel definition of "unreasonable" with which the rest of us are unfamiliar.

But then, it appears your argument is devolving into a no true Scotsman fallacy. ("No truly reasonable person would be convinced...")

In what sense is it "necessarily" unpredictable? Even if is not rationally predictable, certainly it may be empirically predictable: certain words and phrases (tend to) have certain effects.

Even if, intentionally obtuse as you are, you cannot foresee "any specific" unfounded conclusion, if we are to interpret your "intent" to deceive as having any meaning at all then we must at least assume that you mean to predict that your listener will not reach correct or well-founded conclusions. You must admit some ability to predict reactions or you must give up on the possibility of intention. You can't have it both ways.
I did give up on the possibility of intention. You noticed two posts later.
No, it's not.

If a child of four asks me about the shape of the Earth, I will tell him it is "round" or "like a ball." I know that strictly speaking these statements are not true, because the actual shape of the Earth is "oblique spheroid." But my intention is not to mislead the child: rather I know that "like a ball" is a better answer (though not strictly true) because it brings my listener closer to the truth--once she gets this much down, I can offer a better truth.
"Like a ball" is a true statement. The shape of the earth is similar to the same of a ball. The earth is roughly spherical. Even the oblate spheroid you tried to mention only applies exactly if you ignore topography.
One could offer a thousand other examples in education: teaching a half-truth or even a falsehood that nevertheless advances understanding or prepares a student for the straight-up truth. (Newtonian mechanics, anyone? False? Maybe... but deceptive? Not really.)
A good teacher would point out that Newtonian mechanics is but a fair approximation of reality.

But, you're missing the point. I'm not arguing that all falsehood is deceptive; I'm arguing that all deception is falsehood.

As such, I can skip your section dealing with fiction.
Well, you're close. Ambiguity isn't necessarily lying because sometimes ambiguity is the best answer available. Equivocation, of course, is always deceptive... because equivocation is DEFINED as the misleading use of ambiguity in definition.
And as I've said before, ambiguity cannot be misleading. Only falsehood can mislead.
Again, it depends on the intention. If you are offering (as you suggest above) the best answer available (because, perhaps, a more complete answer--e.g. quantum theory & relativity--would only confuse your listener), then an incomplete truth is not deceptive. But if you offer a half-truth knowing full well that a better answer could be offered, you may be charged with deception.
Intention can't matter, because intention isn't knowable. I can claim to know your intentions all I want, but I'd always be wrong under all possible circumstances. Unless I can read your mind, I cannot know your intentions.
Now there's a false statement!

Connotation: defined as subjective colorations in addition to the literal denotative meaning of a word. Do people experience such colorations? Yes. Connotation exists.
You've just conclusded that something exists purely on the grounds that people perceive it. That's incredibly sloppy reasoning.

if connotation exists, then I should be able to predict exactly how my remarks will be interpreted by any and all listeners, but that's clearly not the case. Any hidden meaning listeners perceive in my remarks are unknowable to me, and any hidden meaning a speaker intends to include are unknowable to the listeners.
As stupid (and, I think, disingenuous) as these statements are, let's pretend I accept them. The problem then is that they don't get us anywhere: if no belief is rational, then you have no standard upon which to decide if it was (after all) appropriate (or predictable, which is what intention requires) that a person conclude his (false) belief on (true) statements you have made. Accepting arguendo that rational inference is impossible, we can only fall back on a standard of reasonableness. If it were reasonable to draw a conclusion based on your statements and you intentionally provoked that reasonable response, then you are guilty of deception. (If the inference were unreasonable, I would accept that the fault lies essentially with the listener.)

Reasonableness does not depend on strict logical rationality. Rather, as in the law, the question is, "Should a reasonable person be expected to understand the truth of the matter based on what was said?" The question is essentially empirical: what sorts of responses should be expected from the information offered. It does not require that conclusions be "rational." It merely requires that we have some empirical understanding of human responses... and that is precisely what you require to have "intention" in your language at all. You cannot deny reasonable inference without denying the possibility of your own intention as well.
I would assert that reasonableness does depend on strict logical rationality. Reasonableness is a subset of rationality, for to be reasonable a conclusion must not only be rational, but it must be demonstrably rational. The conclusion must be able to be reached through reason. Hence reasonable.

Therefore, since a reasonable person is a rational person, a reasonable person should only be expected to understand something if that understanding would be rational under the circumstances.

Having empirical understanding of human responses only tells us what the average human would do, or what humans generally would do, not what any given human would do. And if I'm dealing with a specific human, its behaviour is not predictable. The sample size is too small.
Only if you deny empirical knowledge of the social/emotional response to language.
I deny that those responses are predictable. Since they do not stem from any content within the initial remarks, there's no starting point for applying the empirical data.
If connotation exists, which it does,
It does not.
and we can identify patterns in it, then it is empirically knowable.
Where is this data, by the way? Where would I learn what irrational responses to expect from any given remark I might make?
I can have reasonable expectations about the effects of various words, phrases, metaphors. I can (and do) turn my language to take advantage of these effects--either to communicate the sense or tone of my statement more clearly, or to mislead, but I should not pretend that such effects "do not exist."
As long as you speak truthfully, you cannot be directly responsible for any false conclusions drawn.
How ridiculous. Of course I can know the wishes of a communicator: in most cases, when I have good reason to trust her, she can simply tell me. In other cases, I may detect certain signs of deception (nervousness, perhaps)... or I might know a speaker's interest well enough to detect an attempt to manipulate me.
You might, but you might not. Also, this would only work if the communicator was relevantly similar to people in your prior experience. If you were dealing with an autist who never made eye contact with you, you might conclude that the autist was deceptive, when in fact autists simply don't make eye contact with people under any circumstances.

Failure to make eye contact doesn't contain meaning.

Oh, and trust is irrational.
It may not be. But you're the one stuck on the notion that a statement is only deceptive if it happens to be a lie. The counter-argument is simply this: that the set of lies does not exhaust the set of deceptive statements, and that the moral wrong of a lie consists in the attempt to deceive rather than the tools (true statements, perhaps) of the deception.
But the set of lies does exhause the set of deceptive statements. Since the only reasonable conclusions are rational conclusions, and rational conclusions cannot be false given only true premises, then no set of true premises can mislead a listener to a false conclusion without the listener making an unpredictable error in reasoning.

If I make a statement that is true, it cannot lead to false conclusions. That's not how logic works.That's how deductive reason works. You're the only one mindlessly insistent that reasonable people need not rely on inference and/or that inferential reason relies on no rules (or empirical tendencies) that can be used to manipulate a conclusion.

But we all know what it means to be "reasonable." And we know that reasonable people make reasonable inferences.

But then, "no true Scotsman" for you. :rolleyes:

I see. You're more interested in absurdities than reasoned debate about moral choices in the real world.
The point I'm making here is that it cannot be deceptive to make true statements. If I make a true statement, and you draw a false conclusion, the error lies with you.

What's "the right conclusion". A sound conclusion is one that's guaranteed to be true given the available evidence.Why are you so insistent on a single standard of evidence?

Reasonable people employ different standards depending on the context. In criminal court, a sound conclusion is not one that is "guaranteed" to be true, but rather one which appears to be true "beyond a reasonable doubt." In civil court, a sound conclusion may be based on "the preponderance of the evidence."

Ordinary life tends to require decisions that cannot wait on "guarantees" or 100% certainty. It would be highly unreasonable to wait on such highly unlikely perfection in our evidence. Hence, a reasonable person must make decisions based on the preponderance of the evidence or some similar standard.

100% certainty, while rational, is almost always unreasonable.

That's how deductive reason works. You're the only one mindlessly insistent that reasonable people need not rely on inference and/or that inferential reason relies on no rules (or empirical tendencies) that can be used to manipulate a conclusion.
Inductive reason is unsound. Necessarily.

Even if inferences are predictable, they happen entirely within the mind of the listener, and I cannot influence them directly. Even if I did know that people, generally, tend to draw a given unreasonable conclusion given a certain set of information, my providing that information to people can't be blamed for the subsequent baseless conclusions. The conclusions are baseless, and thus spring solely from the irrational mind that created them.
But we all know what it means to be "reasonable." And we know that reasonable people make reasonable inferences.
Inferences can't be reasonable, because induction isn't reasonable.

Inferences can't be reasonable, because induction isn't reasonable.Why on earth would you want to resurrect that thoroughly beaten philosophical horse? The rest of us got over that one... oh, some two hundred years ago.

Llewdor, your conception of what lying is seems to be critically (and artificially) limited. The only conclusions I can draw here are that: 1) you are just playing a game in this thread to see how far you can go, or 2) you simply don't know how to use the word "lie" properly. Either way, you have some learning to do - whether it's learning how to be reasonably social, or trying to use the word "lying" in a way that is understandable to normal people.

Also, it'd be helpful if you realized that dictionaries are just listings of some ways that words are used, and are by no means exhaustive or even necessarily correct. People write dictionaries about how they use words - dictionaries do not dictate that use, only describe it. Your fascination with a specific definition of lying merely shows that you are unaware of how language works in the real world. If you tried this kind of argument on me in a conversation, I'd call you on it because it is, quite honestly, trash that deserves no response other than correction of the mistake and perhaps a laugh at your expense.

Why are you so insistent on a single standard of evidence?

Reasonable people employ different standards depending on the context. In criminal court, a sound conclusion is not one that is "guaranteed" to be true, but rather one which appears to be true "beyond a reasonable doubt." In civil court, a sound conclusion may be based on "the preponderance of the evidence."
The criminal standard is really quite steep, given that reasonable people cannot disagree.

Were I on a jury, I'm sure we'd acquit a lot of people. But I would also be invulnerable to jury nullification (which should never work on rational jurors).
Ordinary life tends to require decisions that cannot wait on "guarantees" or 100% certainty. It would be highly unreasonable to wait on such highly unlikely perfection in our evidence. Hence, a reasonable person must make decisions based on the preponderance of the evidence or some similar standard.
I never claimed one couldn't make decisions without complete evidence, only that one couldn't draw conclusions. I can act without holding that my action is the correct action.
100% certainty, while rational, is almost always unreasonable.
And this is where you completely ignore the meaning of the word reason.

Why on earth would you want to resurrect that thoroughly beaten philosophical horse? The rest of us got over that one... oh, some two hundred years ago.
It's not thoroughly beaten. Just because something is commonly held to be true doesn't make it true, even when were talking about how people behave.

Llewdor, your conception of what lying is seems to be critically (and artificially) limited. The only conclusions I can draw here are that: 1) you are just playing a game in this thread to see how far you can go, or 2) you simply don't know how to use the word "lie" properly. Either way, you have some learning to do - whether it's learning how to be reasonably social, or trying to use the word "lying" in a way that is understandable to normal people.
The normal people are the problem. They're using the word in a way that doesn't make any sense, placing the burden of ensuring that listeners draw no false conclusions on the speaker, something over which the speaker has no control.

I'm not ignoring how people use the word - I'm correcting them.
Also, it'd be helpful if you realized that dictionaries are just listings of some ways that words are used, and are by no means exhaustive or even necessarily correct.
Have you ever read anything about the creation of the OED? They certainly strove to make their dictionary exhaustive, and did a fine job I would say.
People write dictionaries about how they use words - dictionaries do not dictate that use, only describe it
True. Etymology dictates use.
Your fascination with a specific definition of lying merely shows that you are unaware of how language works in the real world.
I'm aware of how people use language. I'm also aware that they're using it badly.
If you tried this kind of argument on me in a conversation, I'd call you on it because it is, quite honestly, trash that deserves no response other than correction of the mistake and perhaps a laugh at your expense.
But who would be laughing later when you were mislead by true statements, a mistake a rational person could not make?

The criminal standard is really quite steep, given that reasonable people cannot disagree.Clearly there is little point in continuing much further, as you warp the meaning of the word "reasonable" into more twisted confusion with every step.

Of course reasonable people can disagree. I think my buddy and I should go to sleep at 9pm tonight, but I do not think his opinion that we should stay up until 10 is unreasonable.

Were I on a jury, I'm sure we'd acquit a lot of people. But I would also be invulnerable to jury nullification (which should never work on rational jurors).Since a nullifying jury may actually ignore the facts of the case in favor of a statement of value, this does not follow from your arguments about rationality as deductive logic.

I never claimed one couldn't make decisions without complete evidence, only that one couldn't draw conclusions. I can act without holding that my action is the correct action.Well, then let us say that the problem in your deceptiveness is your attempt to manipulate action, setting aside (for purposes of the argument) the question of belief.

And this is where you completely ignore the meaning of the word reason.Am I holding up a rhetorical mirror of some sort? Honestly, you're so far from accepted definitions that you should avoid dictionaries as the possessed protect themselves from bibles.

Am I holding up a rhetorical mirror of some sort? Honestly, you're so far from accepted definitions that you should avoid dictionaries as the possessed protect themselves from bibles.
If reasonableness means what you claim it means, then you need to come up with some argument as to why reasonableness matters. My reasonableness matters because it's rational and cannot make logical errors. What value does reasonableness bring to the table if it's simply a description of the thoughts of an average person, no matter how irrational that person might be?

What value does reasonableness bring to the table if it's simply a description of the thoughts of an average person, no matter how irrational that person might be?*sigh*

When did I ever say anything about the average person?

Ordinarily I would never recommend Wikipedia, but in cases such as this involving (what should be) general knowledge... well, the article under "reasonable person" describing the legal standard is pretty good. Read it, please, so I don't need to waste effort typing an explanation you will undoubtedly ignore. Why? Because you are unreasonable. You are the height of unreason.

You make two fundamental errors: first, you equate "reasonable" with "rational" for no apparent reason; and second, you reduce "rational" to "deductively logical"... and this without even identifying a clear logic. Honestly, do you have any idea how MANY logical systems there are besides what is considered "standard"? One can (easily) make a career simply out of cataloging and analyzing the variations on logical rules.

If you want a clear idea of what reasonable means, consider this: what is a "reasonable assumption"? Logic itself requires reasonable assumptions in order to begin an argument, unless you think that some certain knowledge precedes deduction, in which case you've defeated your own point (again). Reasonable assumptions, as they appear in practical deductive logic, invariably rely on some form of induction. ("Such and such appears usually/always to be the case, so it is reasonable to assume that I may take it for granted.")

The normal people are the problem. They're using the word in a way that doesn't make any sense, placing the burden of ensuring that listeners draw no false conclusions on the speaker, something over which the speaker has no control.

I'm not ignoring how people use the word - I'm correcting them.It is not about ensuring that listeners draw no false conclusions, it is about the speaker intending for the listeners to draw false conclusions, over which the speaker has absolute control.
Indeed, for the speaker to intend a false conclusion to be drawn is morally wrong even if the listener does not draw the false conclusion.

I never claimed one couldn't make decisions without complete evidence, only that one couldn't draw conclusions. I can act without holding that my action is the correct action.How can you act without drawing a conclusion about how you should act?

That's not a counter-example, it's a dilemma. As it happens, I maintain that it is wrong to lie to the housing inspector.

Of course, that doesn't mean it's right to just wave him in. The morally correct choice is to tell him the truth while asserting that to get to the Jews he's going to have to go through me: principled opposition rather than falsehood. It's possible that, inspired by my moral courage, the Nazi disobeys orders and simply lets us be. It's also possible (perhaps likely) that he's willing to accept my challenge, in which case I should do my very best to shoot him before he shoots me.

I didn't say my solution was an easy one.

:D
It's no solution at all, and you're avoiding the point of the dilemma by pretending there might be a way around it. If by telling the truth you invite murder, then you are undermining the principle foundation on which truth rests. Choosing to act in such a way makes you guilty of murder if murder is knowingly committing an act that will result in death, such as pulling the trigger of a gun, pressing a button on a detonator, or telling a Nazi housing inspector that there are Jews downstairs. Of what value is telling the truth in the face of such consequences?

It's no solution at all, and you're avoiding the point of the dilemma by pretending there might be a way around it.No, I'm not. If by telling the truth you invite murder, then you are undermining the principle foundation on which truth rests.Care to tell me what that is? Here I thought it was respect for others as willing ends-in-themselves, but clearly you must have something else in mind.

Choosing to act in such a way makes you guilty of murder if murder is knowingly committing an act that will result in death, such as pulling the trigger of a gun, pressing a button on a detonator, or telling a Nazi housing inspector that there are Jews downstairs.I deny that murder consists in knowingly committing an act that will result in death. Murder consists in actually killing someone.

For many public projects, I can estimate in advance the number of people who will die during construction. I nevertheless vote to build the bridge, and two people die. Have I murdered them?

Of what value is telling the truth in the face of such consequences?Who said I was concerned with consequences? I judge the action, not the consequence. The action is wrong regardless of the consequence, or it is not wrong at all.

No, I'm not.Yes you are. The point is to ask how a person would respond to a choice between lying to a would-be murderer or facilitating murder.

Care to tell me what that is? Here I thought it was respect for others as willing ends-in-themselves, but clearly you must have something else in mind.

1) By telling the truth to the Nazi, you have respected nobody. Most obviously, you disrespect the Jews in your basement. But you also disrespect whatever humanity remains in the Nazi by allowing him to commit an inhuman act. Were I so misguided as a Nazi, and later came to my humane senses, I would consider the liars to have been more "respectful" in the significant sense of the word.

2) Respect for others is a decent thing, but its goodness rests on the fact that their other others who have intrinsic value. Would you value respect for others when the "other" is a stone? It also rests on what respect entails. What constitutes respect can mean many different things depending on the circumstances.

3) The undermining comes into play when your "respect for others" comes at the expense of "others".

I deny that murder consists in knowingly committing an act that will result in death. Murder consists in actually killing someone.There's no difference between the two. You cannot do one without also doing the other. There's no "Oops I pointed the gun in a certain direction and pulled the trigger, resulting in your death, but at least I didn't 'actually kill' you."

For many public projects, I can estimate in advance the number of people who will die during construction. I nevertheless vote to build the bridge, and two people die. Have I murdered them?In a sense, yes. You are responsible for their deaths.

Who said I was concerned with consequences? I judge the action, not the consequence. The action is wrong regardless of the consequence, or it is not wrong at all.It's impossible to judge an action without consideration of consequence. What else has an actor to consider than consequences when making a moral decision? Action is inseparable from consequence. In fact, actions can only be described in a consequential sense. If you judge an action based on its description/definition, you are not avoiding consequentialism; you are being the worst type of consequentialist, one that evaluates only an arbitrarily narrow set of conesquences rather than the totality of them.

Yes you are. The point is to ask how a person would respond to a choice between lying to a would-be murderer or facilitating murder.Umm... and I gave you a response, no?

1) By telling the truth to the Nazi, you have respected nobody.Of course I do. First and foremost, I respect his right to make an important moral choice. I offer him my faith that he is capable of doing the NEXT right thing, no matter how many wrong things he has done before. He can live up to my moral expectations, and my example, or not... if not, he is my enemy and I will oppose him to the death.

Most obviously, you disrespect the Jews in your basement.How can you say that? I'm willing to die to defend them. Of course, I think they should really be there beside me, armed to the teeth. But I won't force them to do so.

But you also disrespect whatever humanity remains in the Nazi by allowing him to commit an inhuman act.But I don't "allow" him to do anything. Did you miss the part where I shoot him in the face?

It's impossible to judge an action without consideration of consequence."Impossible"? Bullshit. I just did it: lying is wrong, no matter the consequence.

What else has an actor to consider than consequences when making a moral decision?The character of an action itself. Actions are either manipulative or not. Actions are either deceitful or not. I can make such judgments quite easily without even knowing the consequences of a given action.

Action is inseparable from consequence.Not at all. I can easily give you a choice (this door or that door?) without revealing to you the consequences. While it is trivially true that every action entails its own consequences, from a practical perspective I may certainly choose to judge actions without regard to consequences. This is a question of value, not a question of metaphysics.

In fact, actions can only be described in a consequential sense. If you judge an action based on its description/definition, you are not avoiding consequentialism; you are being the worst type of consequentialist, one that evaluates only an arbitrarily narrow set of conesquences rather than the totality of them.You're going to have to explain that, because on the face of it this makes no sense whatsoever. I am not evaluating an "arbitrarily narrow" set of consequences: I am not evaluating consequences at all, but rather the character of the action itself. Is it deceptive? Is it manipulative? And so on.

But you also disrespect whatever humanity remains in the Nazi by allowing him to commit an inhuman act. Were I so misguided as a Nazi, and later came to my humane senses, I would consider the liars to have been more "respectful" in the significant sense of the word.He's misguided, certainly, but why do you assume he's not in his right mind?

If I see positive signs of mental imbalance, I might concede that it is better to lie just as it is better to refuse a weapon to an inebriated friend. But I see no reason to believe that the Nazi is out of his mind simply because he intends to do wrong.

The difference between you and I is that I am willing to believe other people understand what they are doing, that they choose right or wrong.

You seem to think they are all children to be manipulated... for their own good, of course.

Umm... and I gave you a response, no?A response that seeks to avoid the dilemma, as we shall see below.

Of course I do. First and foremost, I respect his right to make an important moral choice.Choosing to kill is not a right.

I offer him my faith that he is capable of doing the NEXT right thing, no matter how many wrong things he has done before. He can live up to my moral expectations, and my example, or not...That faith is irrational.

if not, he is my enemy and I will oppose him to the death.We can reasonably assume that he is your enemy and that your death would be in vain if you opposed in.

How can you say that? I'm willing to die to defend them. Of course, I think they should really be there beside me, armed to the teeth. But I won't force them to do so.Your suicidal wishes are irrelevant; you're willing to make a choice that results in their deaths. You respect "not lying" more than their lives, which is less respect than most civilized people would afford them.

But I don't "allow" him to do anything. Did you miss the part where I shoot him in the face?
The point is to ask how a person would respond to a choice between lying to a would-be murderer or facilitating murder.
There's no part where you shoot him in the face. Either you lie and he moves on, or you tell the truth and the Jews go to Auschwitz. If you so much as make a sudden move for your gun, the gun he's aiming at your face will be fired. He may even have an entourage of Nazis. They may even be surrounding the building, and have discovered your secret get-away tunnel, and have anti-aircraft guns for the secret Jew-smuggling blimp you're hiding in your attic.

"Impossible"? Bullshit. I just did it: lying is wrong, no matter the consequence.The act of lying doesn't happen in isolation. There must be certain consequences for it to be lying, including a receiver who interprets the message as being whatever it is that is in fact false.

The character of an action itself. Actions are either manipulative or not. Actions are either deceitful or not. I can make such judgments quite easily without even knowing the consequences of a given action.False. Actions can only be judged to be manipulative or deceitful based on the consequences of their reception. If you say a statement that seems to me obviously false, then I have not been deceived or manipulated. If you said a false statement to a more gullible person, they may be deceived. Whether there is deceipt or manipulation is a matter of consequence.

Not at all. I can easily give you a choice (this door or that door?) without revealing to you the consequences. While it is trivially true that every action entails its own consequences, from a practical perspective I may certainly choose to judge actions without regard to consequences. This is a question of value, not a question of metaphysics.This paragraph doesn't make sense to me. How could the pretend choice "This door or that door" have any value since there are no predictable consequences? What is practical about choosing not to lie to the Nazi when you can be certain of the consequences? What value is there in not lying over life itself?

You're going to have to explain that, because on the face of it this makes no sense whatsoever. I am not evaluating an "arbitrarily narrow" set of consequences: I am not evaluating consequences at all, but rather the character of the action itself. Is it deceptive? Is it manipulative? And so on.These characters - deceipt, manipulation, etc - that you evaluate are consequential in nature. The characters by which you evaluate an action are the arbitrarily narrow consequences of which I speak. Why is deceipt or manipulation normally bad except for the other consequences they tend to accompany?

He's misguided, certainly, but why do you assume he's not in his right mind?

If I see positive signs of mental imbalance, I might concede that it is better to lie just as it is better to refuse a weapon to an inebriated friend. But I see no reason to believe that the Nazi is out of his mind simply because he intends to do wrong.What I mean is that a Nazi is irrational. Murdering Jews is irrational and inhumane. Why is it okay to lie to somebody who's inebriated, but not somebody who's a Nazi? Why do you insist on placing arbitrary abstractions and grammatical rules over the most fundamental of principles: life?

The difference between you and I is that I am willing to believe other people understand what they are doing, that they choose right or wrong.It's irrelevant to me whether the Nazi knows that he is wrong, or at least it's not relevant enough to not lie to him. Of course, that many people do wrong without believing that they do is a matter of fact, and a demonstrable one. If there is a right and wrong, then the fact that some people do opposites in every category of action and consider them to be right means that at least some of them have to be wrong, regardless of what the right moral code is.

You seem to think they are all children to be manipulated... for their own good, of course.That's ridiculous. You take the specific - the case of a Nazi who is undeniably in the wrong, so much that the wrong committed by lying to him would not come close to the wrong committed as a result of not lying to him, and generalize it to mean that I must extend the same power over everybody in every moral situation. Furthermore, you refuse to examine the other half of the decision. Either you lie to the Nazi, or the Jews die. Its a choice between consequences that you insist on judging only on those consequences which involve the words understood by the Nazi, rather than any consequences that might befall the Jews in your basement as a predictable result of your choice. That's a blind, head-in-the-sand approach to morality.

A response that seeks to avoid the dilemma, as we shall see below.Just give this one up, okay? I'm not "avoiding" the dilemma, and I don't know why you insist that I am. I'm just choosing the opposite prong from the one you choose. You prefer "the end justifies the means." I argue for "the means is wrong regardless." That's not avoidance. You haven't explained how it is.

Choosing to kill is not a right.No, it's not. Hence, if he makes that choice I should oppose him. But I do not have the right to manipulate his choices, only to oppose the wrong ones.

That faith is irrational.Isn't all faith?

There is a difference between optimism and hope. I'm not optimistic about the Nazi making the right decision, but I choose to hope that he will. It's a moral choice, not a prediction.

Of course, I only set the scenario in this fashion to emphasize the features of the dilemma as it usually appears. To the extent that I can take myself as already a combatant in a conflict the enemies in which are Nazis, I would feel pretty all right taking him out from the window before he ever gets to the door. Or rigging the door with explosives. Or otherwise destroying my enemy.

But I will not manipulate him.

We can reasonably assume that he is your enemy and that your death would be in vain if you opposed [him].My death is only in vain if we lose the war. And even then, I died for a good cause and I should not be ashamed.

My question remains, why are the Jews hiding? Why are they not fighting? The more of us that resist, the harder it is to oppress us. Some of us will die that would not have (because we might otherwise have been hiding or lying), but we will have stood up for right rather than hiding to save our own skins.

Your suicidal wishes are irrelevant; you're willing to make a choice that results in their deaths.How am I suicidal? Is every martyr suicidal?

I have every desire to live. But I would live only according to my own ethics. I will not do wrong simply to save myself, nor to save others. And again, while I would fight whether they do or not, I would urge them to fight by my side rather than cowering in the basement. If we all fight, we might just take a few Nazis with us. And then surely our deaths will have meant something.

You respect "not lying" more than their lives, which is less respect than most civilized people would afford them.I don't "respect" telling the truth, I respect human dignity in such a way that I would not put myself in the position of manipulating others. I oppose them, if I do oppose them, as equals.

My charges make their own choices. They choose to hide, and they choose to let me answer the door. Being the honest person that I am, I will of course have made them aware of my intentions: they can take the risk of hiding in the home of a person who prefers to fight than lie; they can choose to fight with me, if it comes to that; or they can move on to another house. But they will know in any case that I will not violate my ethics to save them.

There's no part where you shoot him in the face.How do you know? Maybe I have a sniper waiting for a signal. Maybe I take both of us out with the bomb strapped to my chest. Maybe he's so used to being obeyed that he's taken by surprise when a citizen pulls a gun on him.

If you so much as make a sudden move for your gun, the gun he's aiming at your face will be fired. He may even have an entourage of Nazis. They may even be surrounding the building, and have discovered your secret get-away tunnel, and have anti-aircraft guns for the secret Jew-smuggling blimp you're hiding in your attic.All possible. All irrelevant.

The act of lying doesn't happen in isolation. There must be certain consequences for it to be lying, including a receiver who interprets the message as being whatever it is that is in fact false.No. If I lie and you see through my lie, I have still done wrong. I just didn't get away with it.

Same as getting caught stealing... it's not as if I'm innocent of the crime because you catch me in the act.

False. Actions can only be judged to be manipulative or deceitful based on the consequences of their reception. If you say a statement that seems to me obviously false, then I have not been deceived or manipulated.No, you haven't. But the moral choice for me remains, should I attempt deception? My attempt is wrong whether it is successful or not.

By your logic, a murder attempt is only wrong if it is successful. If the intended victim gets away unharmed, I should be able to claim that I didn't do anything wrong... no matter how many bullets I fired. That's absurd. It's the action that makes the wrong, not the consequence.

If you said a false statement to a more gullible person, they may be deceived. Whether there is deceipt or manipulation is a matter of consequence.That's true. But the wrong does not lie in whether there is in fact manipulation, but whether I intended to manipulate.

This paragraph doesn't make sense to me. How could the pretend choice "This door or that door" have any value since there are no predictable consequences?It doesn't. But lying or telling the truth does, even if I have no idea what you're going to do with the information for which you ask. If a car stops and the driver asks me for directions, should I question him about his intentions before answering? What if he is looking for a person he means to kill? By your logic, since a) actions are "inseparable" from their consequences; and b) the rightness of an action depends wholly on the consequence... by offering directions to a murderer I commit the same offense (as you would have it) as I do in revealing fugitives in my home. And regardless of whether I know what he intends to do!!

Clearly I can make a choice without understanding the consequences of that choice. Either you have to admit that I should choose truthfulness over lying when I don't know the consequence, or you have to argue that I am responsible for interrogating the consequences of every fact I might share.

These characters - deceipt, manipulation, etc - that you evaluate are consequential in nature.No, they're not... and precisely because I judge them to be wrong whether or not I am successful in the attempt. If I attempt unsuccessfully to deceive you, I am still in the wrong for trying. This has nothing to do with the consequences of the action, and everything to do with the character of the action itself.

Why is deceipt or manipulation normally bad except for the other consequences they tend to accompany?They are wrong not for their consequences but for the relationship that they establish between human beings: manipulator/manipulated, deceiver/deceived. I could go on: coercer/coerced, master/slave... in the abstract, subject/object, doer/done-to, person/thing.

What I mean is that a Nazi is irrational.Actually, I think the Nazi project was perfectly rational. Perhaps unreasonable (raising a distinction debated already in this thread), but certainly not irrational.

Murdering Jews is irrational and inhumane.It's inhumane, but I fail to see how it's irrational... at least from the perspective of the individual soldier.

Why is it okay to lie to somebody who's inebriated, but not somebody who's a Nazi?Because I can make a reasonable judgment about what my inebriated friend would want if he were in his right mind. But the Nazi may very well believe that he is doing the right thing. Surely there were unrepentant Nazis. There are many bigoted, racist people today... even violently racist. And while I think they are wrong, I think they are misled, I think they should be opposed... I think I can only judge them insane or incompetent through a bizarre form of prejudice favoring my own opinion.

Would you also call slave masters insane? Not in their right mind? Inhumane, yes, but that doesn't mean they'd ever regret it. What about sexist men? Is everyone who does not adhere to liberal values simply not in his right mind?

Why do you insist on placing arbitrary abstractions and grammatical rules over the most fundamental of principles: life?"Life" is not a principle, it's a value.

That's ridiculous. You take the specific - the case of a Nazi who is undeniably in the wrong, so much that the wrong committed by lying to him would not come close to the wrong committed as a result of not lying to him, and generalize it to mean that I must extend the same power over everybody in every moral situation.Well, you must have some principle for deciding when it's right to lie and when it's not. I was under the impression it was, "One may lie when the consequences of lying are better than the consequences of not lying."

Furthermore, you refuse to examine the other half of the decision.What other half? Either I lie, or I don't lie. I've actually offered more "other half" than you have: I've suggested other choices, such as whether to fight or not to fight.

Either you lie to the Nazi, or the Jews die.That consequence seems likely, though I think not as certain as you'd like. You allow for the Nazis being prepared with many weapons, but presume that I am not: you stack the deck, not I.

I don't know what the ultimate consequence will be. It's possible the Nazi, who is programmed to hate Jews, falters in the face of this Aryan German citizen standing in his way as a moral example--it's possible he cannot bring himself to kill me and moves on. It's also possible that my wild attack succeeds well enough to allow time for escape. Of course it's possible, perhaps likely, that we all die... but we die resistors and martyrs to the cause of truth, rather than cowards and manipulators.

Its a choice between consequences that you insist on judging only on those consequences which involve the words understood by the Nazi,But I don't. I judge based on the truthfulness of the words coming out of my mouth. I don't care for a second what he makes of them.

That's a blind, head-in-the-sand approach to morality.No, it's not. I'm perfectly aware of the likely consequences of my actions. I've been perfectly straight-forward about that.

I just don't think they matter.

I'm going to disagree. I think that by refusing to lie, you've allowed the murder of the jews to take place. Let's face it, in Germany at the time you would not have had a crack team of snipers to take out the Nazi soldiers at your door. You tell the truth, you die, so do the Jews, game over.

As far as I am concerned, you picked the greater of two evils.

Do the ends justify the means? Not always, no. But are they completely divorced? No, most certainly not.

As far as I am concerned, you picked the greater of two evils.Only if you judge based on the consequences of my actions, which I do not.

You're right: we probably all die. If their only priority was staying alive (rather than living rightly), they should have picked another place to hide. If none was available... well, hiding with me is better than huddling in the street, I'm sure. They just have to hope no one asks if they're inside, because I would have to tell the truth.

Do the ends justify the means? Not always, no. But are they completely divorced? No, most certainly not.Okay, but "not always" is not a principle upon which to base a decision: when does the end justify the means? How do you know?

If the end always justifies the means, at least you have a coherent consequentialism.

Perhaps you set yourself on "life" as some sort of deciding factor. But what means are acceptable for the purposes of saving lives? The atomic bombs dropped on Japan present a popular dilemma, or perhaps we should just consider a cleaner hypothetical: if murdering one person would save ten, does the end justify murder? What if it would save 100? 1000?

Where do you draw the line? Why?

You prefer "the end justifies the means." I argue for "the means is wrong regardless."That's not an accurate characterization of my position. I don't understand why one would consider means and ends to be morally separate entities. I consider their ramifications together.

No, it's not. Hence, if he makes that choice I should oppose him. But I do not have the right to manipulate his choices, only to oppose the wrong ones.He's a Nazi, he's already made the choice. Your right to manipulate his choices is due to the fact that you have less of a right to bring death to the basement Jews.

Isn't all faith?

There is a difference between optimism and hope. I'm not optimistic about the Nazi making the right decision, but I choose to hope that he will. It's a moral choice, not a prediction.Morality that is not based in reality is meaningless and bankrupt.

Of course, I only set the scenario in this fashion to emphasize the features of the dilemma as it usually appears. To the extent that I can take myself as already a combatant in a conflict the enemies in which are Nazis, I would feel pretty all right taking him out from the window before he ever gets to the door. Or rigging the door with explosives. Or otherwise destroying my enemy.

But I will not manipulate him.How is destroying your enemy NOT manipulating him? If he makes the incorrect choice, you insist that you will manipulate him to a far greater extent than I would. Not to mention that the scenario precludes the possibility of this.

How am I suicidal? Is every martyr suicidal?

I have every desire to live. But I would live only according to my own ethics. I will not do wrong simply to save myself, nor to save others. And again, while I would fight whether they do or not, I would urge them to fight by my side rather than cowering in the basement. If we all fight, we might just take a few Nazis with us. And then surely our deaths will have meant something.All martyrs with foreknowledge of their martyrdom are suicides by definition. By not saving others, you do far more wrong. Your ethics are malformed and your deaths will be meaningless.

I don't "respect" telling the truth, I respect human dignity in such a way that I would not put myself in the position of manipulating others. I oppose them, if I do oppose them, as equals.You are not respecting human dignity by manipulating events to bring about human death. Morally, you are only equal with the Nazis if you choose to be.

How do you know? Maybe I have a sniper waiting for a signal. Maybe I take both of us out with the bomb strapped to my chest. Maybe he's so used to being obeyed that he's taken by surprise when a citizen pulls a gun on him.
The point is to ask how a person would respond to a choice between lying to a would-be murderer or facilitating murder.

But the moral choice for me remains, should I attempt deception? My attempt is wrong whether it is successful or not.But "attempting deception" isn't an action, it's an intent. The act you take to attempt deception will vary, because of the consequentialist nature of the intent.

By your logic, a murder attempt is only wrong if it is successful. If the intended victim gets away unharmed, I should be able to claim that I didn't do anything wrong... no matter how many bullets I fired. That's absurd. It's the action that makes the wrong, not the consequence.By my logic attempted murder is wrong because of the intent to create a negative consequence, not because of a specific action.

That's true. But the wrong does not lie in whether there is in fact manipulation, but whether I intended to manipulate.But the intent is aimed for a consequence. Therefore, the morality of your actions depends on the consequences you aim for. The most moral choice of action is to attempt to bring about the best consequences.

By your logic, since a) actions are "inseparable" from their consequences; and b) the rightness of an action depends wholly on the consequence... by offering directions to a murderer I commit the same offense (as you would have it) as I do in revealing fugitives in my home. And regardless of whether I know what he intends to do!!

Clearly I can make a choice without understanding the consequences of that choice. Either you have to admit that I should choose truthfulness over lying when I don't know the consequence, or you have to argue that I am responsible for interrogating the consequences of every fact I might share.Of course uncertainty is a mitigating factor, but you do have an obligation to reasonably assess the probabilities of the situation. In the case of the Nazi, we can be reasonably certain of the consequences.

No, they're not... and precisely because I judge them to be wrong whether or not I am successful in the attempt. If I attempt unsuccessfully to deceive you, I am still in the wrong for trying. This has nothing to do with the consequences of the action, and everything to do with the character of the action itself.The wrong is in the consequences you are attempting. To attempt deceipt and manipulation is to aim as a specific set of consequences. If that is the "character" of an action, then when assessing the character of your lie, you must take into account the consequences that you know will happen by not lying to the Nazi.

They are wrong not for their consequences but for the relationship that they establish between human beings: manipulator/manipulated, deceiver/deceived. I could go on: coercer/coerced, master/slave... in the abstract, subject/object, doer/done-to, person/thing.You forgot not-dead/dead. You can't judge human interactions in isolation. Thought you may lie to the Nazi once, he is still your master.

Actually, I think the Nazi project was perfectly rational. Perhaps unreasonable (raising a distinction debated already in this thread), but certainly not irrational.You are incorrect.

It's inhumane, but I fail to see how it's irrational... at least from the perspective of the individual soldier.Because you experience, and therefore know the value of your own life. When you take others, it creates an ethical contradiction.

Because I can make a reasonable judgment about what my inebriated friend would want if he were in his right mind. But the Nazi may very well believe that he is doing the right thing. Surely there were unrepentant Nazis. There are many bigoted, racist people today... even violently racist. And while I think they are wrong, I think they are misled, I think they should be opposed... I think I can only judge them insane or incompetent through a bizarre form of prejudice favoring my own opinion.

Would you also call slave masters insane? Not in their right mind? Inhumane, yes, but that doesn't mean they'd ever regret it. What about sexist men? Is everyone who does not adhere to liberal values simply not in his right mind?If your opinion has been formed objectively and rationally, wouldn't it be logical to conclude that you are more morally competent than them?

"Life" is not a principle, it's a value.Semantics.

Well, you must have some principle for deciding when it's right to lie and when it's not. I was under the impression it was, "One may lie when the consequences of lying are better than the consequences of not lying."That's correct, but I do consider the act of deception itself to be part of the negative consequences.

What other half? Either I lie, or I don't lie. I've actually offered more "other half" than you have: I've suggested other choices, such as whether to fight or not to fight.The moral problem of causing the Jews to die. Fighting is irrelevant to the debate.

That consequence seems likely, though I think not as certain as you'd like. You allow for the Nazis being prepared with many weapons, but presume that I am not: you stack the deck, not I.Yes, it's a hypothetical situation.

I don't know what the ultimate consequence will be. It's possible the Nazi, who is programmed to hate Jews, falters in the face of this Aryan German citizen standing in his way as a moral example--it's possible he cannot bring himself to kill me and moves on. It's also possible that my wild attack succeeds well enough to allow time for escape. Of course it's possible, perhaps likely, that we all die... but we die resistors and martyrs to the cause of truth, rather than cowards and manipulators.The situation assumes that we can be reasonably certain of the ultimate consequence.The point is to ask how a person would respond to a choice between lying to a would-be murderer or facilitating murder.

But I don't. I judge based on the truthfulness of the words coming out of my mouth. I don't care for a second what he makes of them.Then it's an even more narrow consequentialist judgment than I thought!

I just don't think they matter.If preserving humans doesn't matter, then why would preserving human dignity?

That's not an accurate characterization of my position. I don't understand why one would consider means and ends to be morally separate entities. I consider their ramifications together."Ramifications"... translated "ends." You are a self-described consequentialist: the end justifies the means. If you intend some other argument, I have yet to see you make it.

He's a Nazi, he's already made the choice. Your right to manipulate his choices is due to the fact that you have less of a right to bring death to the basement Jews.But I'm not bringing death to them, the Nazi is (if he can manage it).

This is a fundamental disagreement between deontological ethics and consequentialism: the latter abstracts from human action so far as to collapse the distinction between "do" and "allow"... here even further, collapsing the distinction between "do" and "fail to prevent."

If we all die in my home, it is because I failed to prevent murder. But I can only use those means ethically available to me, and lying is not one of them.

Morality that is not based in reality is meaningless and bankrupt.I agree wholeheartedly. We differ only in our opinions of what facts about reality are relevant to our moral choices.

How is destroying your enemy NOT manipulating him?To meet him in combat is to treat him as an equal who chooses his own fate: he knows what it means to choose sides in a war.

If he makes the incorrect choice, you insist that you will manipulate him to a far greater extent than I would.I would not manipulate him, I would oppose him. Yet another distinction you want to collapse under the weight of consequence: which one of us is really abstracting from reality here? The one who recognizes consequences but maintains they do not matter, or the one who refuses to recognize distinctions between different varieties of action?

Not to mention that the scenario precludes the possibility of this.Perhaps, perhaps not. I'm not concerned with the consequence of my action, but with the rightness of the action itself. If I die doing right, so be it.

All martyrs with foreknowledge of their martyrdom are suicides by definition.No, not if you actually think about the definition of suicide. A suicide kills herself according to her own will. A martyr is killed by someone else, and against his will: the martyr would live if he could, but he cannot--not without violating his ethics.

By not saving others, you do far more wrong.By not saving others, you mean, my actions result in far worse consequences. Fair enough. But that's not what concerns me.

Your ethics are malformed and your deaths will be meaningless.You're not even advancing arguments anymore, you're just repeating yourself. This results in my repeating myself, because there's little else to do in response. Around and around we go. Boring.

You are not respecting human dignity by manipulating events to bring about human death.You're equivocating on the definition of "manipulation." To manipulate a person in the moral sense we have been considering is not the same as to "manipulate events," which appears in your usage to be synonymous with "act."

Morally, you are only equal with the Nazis if you choose to be.Moral equality is fundamental if I am to claim that all people are bound by the same ethical laws: if I may "choose" to be equal or not with other people, I may always make exceptions for my own case. We cannot speak of ethical obligations if we cannot assume moral equality.

But "attempting deception" isn't an action, it's an intent.No, "intending to deceive" is an intent. Attempting it involves some action.

By my logic attempted murder is wrong because of the intent to create a negative consequence, not because of a specific action.But then why is a lie only a lie if the listener believes it? You're contradicting yourself.

But the intent is aimed for a consequence.True.

Therefore, the morality of your actions depends on the consequences you aim for.Non sequitur.

You cannot conclude from the trivial fact that intents are aimed at consequences that the morality of an action depends on the intended consequence. This is just a revised version of your earlier error in concluding that because "actions have consequences" they must be judged on those consequences.

The most moral choice of action is to attempt to bring about the best consequences.No.

An ethical choice must conform to duty, which is to say that it must have the form of a law: either it is right for everyone, or it is not a law. I may not make exceptions for myself or my own circumstances. I may not make exceptions based on the consequences in this particular case.

The wrong is in the consequences you are attempting.Says you.

To attempt deceipt and manipulation is to aim as a specific set of consequences.Again, this is trivially true.

If that is the "character" of an action,But it's not. The character of the action lies in the relationship it establishes between people, not in the specific consequences I seek. If I seek to help a person by lying to her, that does not change the nature of lying--it only changes the consequence.

You can't judge human interactions in isolation.I'm not judging them in isolation, you are: you judge this interaction by itself (according to its consequences), then that interaction separately. I judge every lie at once.

Thought you may lie to the Nazi once, he is still your master.Actually, he is only my master if he degrades me to the point of lying to him. To the extent that I refuse to be broken, that I refuse to step down from my moral stand, he can never be my master. Even when he kills me.

Because you experience, and therefore know the value of your own life. When you take others, it creates an ethical contradiction.But I'm not taking lives, the Nazi is. You're abstracting from the actual events.

If your opinion has been formed objectively and rationally, wouldn't it be logical to conclude that you are more morally competent than them?Oh, yes. In ideal circumstances, in fact, I'd very much like to sit our Nazi down and try to set him straight. In the scenario under consideration, however, all I can do is a) set a good moral example and hope he will follow; b) oppose him in his attempts to do wrong.

But I wouldn't be very "morally competent" if I did wrong just to prevent him from doing wrong.

Semantics.Actually, this is important. "Life" is certainly a value that one might weigh against other values, but the word by itself does not offer a principle for action of any kind: what sorts of actions may I take to protect this value? Any action? It depends? Depends on what?

I'm looking for an actual principle, a guide for my actions. "Life" is not such a thing.

That's correct, but I do consider the act of deception itself to be part of the negative consequences.How? What weight does "the act of deception" have? If you include it as part of the negative consequences, are you admitting, at least, that there is something wrong in the action itself? On what grounds? (You've rejected all of mine.)

The moral problem of causing the Jews to die.I'm not causing the Jews to die, the Nazi is.

Fighting is irrelevant to the debate.No, it's not. Too often this dilemma is presented as if the choices are a) lie, b) wave the Nazi inside. But there are other options, and they are clearly relevant to the debate about how one should stand on principle.

If preserving humans doesn't matter, then why would preserving human dignity?Human dignity is what makes human lives worth saving.

Preserving human dignity means attaching oneself to ideals, projecting the world that should be against the world that is. Lying to a Nazi to save lives degrades those lives by reducing them merely to breaths and heartbeats.

It's possible that the ideals that make human life worthwhile will fail, because those ideals depend on each of us to stand up for them. And standing up for them is rarely easy in a world that tramples them at every step.

I would rather die a martyr to the ideal than give in to the reality. I would rather die a human than a heartbeat.

To the extent that I can take myself as already a combatant in a conflict the enemies in which are Nazis, I would feel pretty all right taking him out from the window before he ever gets to the door. Or rigging the door with explosives. Or otherwise destroying my enemy.

But I will not manipulate him.

What's the moral distinction here?

I can see it perfectly well outside of the context of war. I cannot manipulate the person who comes to my doorstep--but I cannot kill him either. Not until he actually moves to attack.

But if I am already in a state of war with a group of people, then my respect for free choice consists only in respect for their choice to oppose me. I can kill before they present an immediate threat in deference to the fact that we are in a state of conflict: my real target is not them in particular (if they were to stop opposing my just cause, I would not harm them), but whatever it is that they are defending.

Similarly, it seems to me, I can lie as a weapon in that war. The relation it establishes between us is not "master/slave", but "combatant/combatant": perhaps I have used the means available to me in an unexpected way, but that is the nature of winning wars.

What's the moral distinction here?When I lie, I pretend NOT to be a combatant in the war.

It would be different if I were a captured soldier lying about the position of troops, the condition of supplies, and so on.

But when the enemy soldier comes to my door and I answer pretending to be an ordinary citizen, when in fact I consider myself an enemy soldier, then my deceit is unethical insofar as it presents a false relationship between us.

"Rules of war" are an uncomfortable topic for a Kantian because, really, we want to end all war. Our "rules" should really be disarm and seek peace. Nevertheless, Kant's philosophy gives us a reasonable ground for certain rules within the context of a war, once engaged. Among them:

Combatants have a duty to distinguish themselves from non-combatants.

Hobbes saw the reason for this first, of course, as expressed in his (troubling, for some) dictum that once I surrender and lay down my arms, I may not take up arms again when the conqueror's back is turned. Why? Because if people are generally disposed to do so (a generalization principle!) then conquerors have no reason to trust anyone's vows: they would be wiser to wipe us out than to accept us as subjects. The vow of surrender, in other words, protects the non-combatants.

The principle that combatants should not lie about their status follows from the same generalization: if the enemy cannot tell the difference between combatants and non-combatants, the necessities of war dictate that he might kill indiscriminately (at the very least less discriminatingly) in order to destroy his enemies.

Indeed, Hobbes uses precisely the same logic of generalizability to make nearly as compelling a case against lying as Kant's: the more people lie, the less people are inclined to trust one another, the more unstable the social fabric becomes. (Hobbes is somewhat vulnerable to a "free rider" mindset because he is a consequentialist: any given individual may reason, "But so long as everyone else behaves correctly, my lie does not detract significantly from the social trust. And if no one else behaves correctly, my truthfulness does not improve significantly on the social trust. Therefore, my lie is inconsequential (socially), and the argument fails." Hobbes thought we were smarter than to fall for the allures of the free rider... yet another reason to say he is mis-appropriated by capitalists and neo-cons who call him to their cause.)

But if I am already in a state of war with a group of people, then my respect for free choice consists only in respect for their choice to oppose me.But you deny them that choice by pretending to be a non-combatant.

I can kill before they present an immediate threat in deference to the fact that we are in a state of conflict: my real target is not them in particular (if they were to stop opposing my just cause, I would not harm them), but whatever it is that they are defending.That's exactly right. And the principles I have stated do NOT require that I leap out of my position and identify myself before shooting: such are the perils of war. But if we do have personal, one-on-one interaction, I have a duty to interact with him as a soldier to his enemy, not as a citizen to an officer of his country's military.

*sigh*

When did I ever say anything about the average person?

Ordinarily I would never recommend Wikipedia, but in cases such as this involving (what should be) general knowledge... well, the article under "reasonable person" describing the legal standard is pretty good. Read it, please, so I don't need to waste effort typing an explanation you will undoubtedly ignore. Why? Because you are unreasonable. You are the height of unreason.
That wikipedia article is one of the most vague, self-referential, meaningless pieces of crap I have ever read. It relies heavily on a definition of reasonable that it simply fails to provide. You could use my definition of reasonable and the article would still make sense.
You make two fundamental errors: first, you equate "reasonable" with "rational" for no apparent reason; and second, you reduce "rational" to "deductively logical"... and this without even identifying a clear logic. Honestly, do you have any idea how MANY logical systems there are besides what is considered "standard"? One can (easily) make a career simply out of cataloging and analyzing the variations on logical rules.
First, I equate rationality with reason, which I think makes perfect sense. So unless reasonableness has nothign to do with reason, then reasonableness and rationality are very closely links. Naturally, given the costruction of the word, I think reasonableness has something to do with the ability to reason.

As for logic, I am limiting myself to sound logical systems, becuse unsound logical systems (including all complete logical systems) provide false answers.
If you want a clear idea of what reasonable means, consider this: what is a "reasonable assumption"?
There is no such thing.
Logic itself requires reasonable assumptions in order to begin an argument, unless you think that some certain knowledge precedes deduction, in which case you've defeated your own point (again).
Logic requires assumptions. To suggest those assumptions are reasonable is the height of absurdity. Assumptions can't be reasonable.
Reasonable assumptions, as they appear in practical deductive logic, invariably rely on some form of induction. ("Such and such appears usually/always to be the case, so it is reasonable to assume that I may take it for granted.")
That's not eve close to how assumptions work. You accept assumptions for the purposes of seeing where they lead your reasoning, but you need never hold them to be true, and thus you need never induce the truth within them. Assumptions don't hold truth; they are suppositions.

There is no such thing [as a reasonable assumption].It is statements such as this that make it completely pointless to attempt reasoning with you.

It is not about ensuring that listeners draw no false conclusions, it is about the speaker intending for the listeners to draw false conclusions, over which the speaker has absolute control.
But, since the intent of the speaker isn't knowable to people who are not the speaker, that intent can't have any material effect on the world. But if the speaker's intent makes no material difference, why does it matter?
Indeed, for the speaker to intend a false conclusion to be drawn is morally wrong even if the listener does not draw the false conclusion.
There's no reason to judge it on moral grounds because it makes no difference.
How can you act without drawing a conclusion about how you should act?
Tentatively.

Given that I try never to make normative claims at all, I find your choice of words interesting.

It is statements such as this that make it completely pointless to attempt reasoning with you.
Assumptions lie outside the scope of reason. Asking whether an assumption is reasonable is like asking how honour tastes.

Assumptions lie outside the scope of reason.You do realize that your arbitrary restrictions on the scope of reason actually produce a world that is less sensible and intelligible to human beings, yes?

On your understanding, it is impossible to tell the difference between a "good" assumption and a "bad" one. The rest of us are not nearly so blind.

You do realize that your arbitrary restrictions on the scope of reason actually produce a world that is less sensible and intelligible to human beings, yes?
More sensible, neccessarily, but less intelligible, yes. Most humans aren't sufficiently good at reasoning to behave reasonably.

But through the application of reasonable rules, I can encourage reasonable behaviour. Over time, I can move the margins of human behaviour to reason and away from this random intuition to which you cling.
On your understanding, it is impossible to tell the difference between a "good" assumption and a "bad" one. The rest of us are not nearly so blind.
Not at all. I'm forced to assume, for example, that the physical world exists, and that it exists largely as I perceive it. Otherwise I wouldn't be able to do anything because I couldn't know if my lunch was real.

And given that assumption, other assumptions suddenly become vastly more or less likely to be true, so to save myself some time good assumptions are those assumptions which are more likely to be true, given my other assumptions.

But, since the intent of the speaker isn't knowable to people who are not the speaker, that intent can't have any material effect on the world. But if the speaker's intent makes no material difference, why does it matter? There's no reason to judge it on moral grounds because it makes no difference.It can be knowable, but it doesn't matter - it can make a material difference without being knowable. A successful deception obviously makes a difference, as the person who was deceived altered their behavior in a material way. An unsuccessful deception makes less of a difference, but it does waste the time of the person who the deception was attempted upon.

Tentatively.

Given that I try never to make normative claims at all, I find your choice of words interesting.So then you draw the conclusion that you should act tentatively, and act according to this conclusion.

It can be knowable, but it doesn't matter - it can make a material difference without being knowable. A successful deception obviously makes a difference, as the person who was deceived altered their behavior in a material way. An unsuccessful deception makes less of a difference, but it does waste the time of the person who the deception was attempted upon.
You're missing the point. Whether I intend my remarks to be deceptive can't influence how they're taken by the listener. What my remarks actually are influences that, but my motive behind uttering those remarks does not.

If you draw a false conclusion from my remarks, whether I was deceptive, mistaken, or just imprecise doesn't matter. The relevant bit is that I said something that led you to a false conclusion. What I said matters. Why I said it didn't.

You're missing the point. Whether I intend my remarks to be deceptive can't influence how they're taken by the listener. What my remarks actually are influences that, but my motive behind uttering those remarks does not.

If you draw a false conclusion from my remarks, whether I was deceptive, mistaken, or just imprecise doesn't matter. The relevant bit is that I said something that led you to a false conclusion. What I said matters. Why I said it didn't.That's like saying if Person X kills Person Y, it doesn't matter why Person X did it, or even if Person X did it on purpose.

(And yes, I noticed the "I said something that led you to a false conclusion" :p)

That's like saying if Person X kills Person Y, it doesn't matter why Person X did it, or even if Person X did it on purpose.
I don't see why it should.
(And yes, I noticed the "I said something that led you to a false conclusion" :p)
Well, we're discussing a different point. I accepted the possibility for the sake of argument.

I don't see why it should.Well, there are plenty of reasons, but since this was initially a discussion of morality, with morality, motive matters.
If motive didn't matter, then moral action would be impossible, and only moral outcomes would matter.
(I have a feeling that I may have said something like that to you before. If so, I apologize for not remembering how you responded.)

Well, we're discussing a different point. I accepted the possibility for the sake of argument.Fair enough, I didn't think you actually felt that way. :)

Well, there are plenty of reasons, but since this was initially a discussion of morality, with morality, motive matters.
And this is what I don't get. Since motive, on its own, makes no material difference, how can it possibly matter?

If I kill a bunch of people, but I kill some of them while I'm thinking about pork, that I was thinking about pork didn't matter. That I killed them does.

It's behaviour about which we should care, not motives.
[quoet]If motive didn't matter, then moral action would be impossible, and only moral outcomes would matter.[/quote]
Only outcomes do matter. Asserting that my motives somehow make my actions morally better or worse than they otherwise might have been is lunacy.
(I have a feeling that I may have said something like that to you before. If so, I apologize for not remembering how you responded.)
I think you did, and I probably said something similar, but since I don't remember how you justified the relevance of motives, I said it again.

And this is what I don't get. Since motive, on its own, makes no material difference, how can it possibly matter?Because things other than things that make a material difference matter.

If I kill a bunch of people, but I kill some of them while I'm thinking about pork, that I was thinking about pork didn't matter. That I killed them does.That's not motive. Motive is the reason you acted. If you killed them because you were thinking about pork, then that would be your motive, but not because you happened to be thinking about it while you did it.

It's behaviour about which we should care, not motives.Motive is inseparable from behavior.

Only outcomes do matter. Asserting that my motives somehow make my actions morally better or worse than they otherwise might have been is lunacy.Given that we can't predict the future, there is no way of predicting with certainty what the outcomes of our actions will be.
If we can't predict the outcome, then, by your definition, moral action is impossible. This means morality is left up to chance.

Because things other than things that make a material difference matter.
How? If they make no material difference, why do they matter? I assert that they can't matter without making a material difference because they have no effect. How can things that make no difference at all matter?
Motive is inseparable from behavior.
Except behaviour is observable, and motive is unknowable. Therefore, evalutaing behaviour based on motive is foolishness.
Given that we can't predict the future, there is no way of predicting with certainty what the outcomes of our actions will be.
If we can't predict the outcome, then, by your definition, moral action is impossible.
Yes. Morality is an inherently meaningless concept.

How? If they make no material difference, why do they matter? I assert that they can't matter without making a material difference because they have no effect. How can things that make no difference at all matter?There are effects to consider that aren't material effects.

Except behaviour is observable, and motive is unknowable. Therefore, evalutaing behaviour based on motive is foolishness.Motive isn't entirely unknowable. Though it isn't knowable conclusively, it is knowable enough in some cases to ascertain that an action was performed due to a particular motive.

Yes. Morality is an inherently meaningless concept.Then one needn't be concerned with whether or not an outright lie or fraud is immoral.

Then one needn't be concerned with whether or not an outright lie or fraud is immoral.
But one should be concerned when others are making decisions based on moral concerns.

My goal here in all of these morality discussions is to point out how fuzzy people's thinking is on moral issues. More than any other area of investigation, I find people discussing morality are likely to jump to a conclusion based on how they feel and then try to justify it.

This is how the entire field of moral perfectionism works, and it's silly.

But one should be concerned when others are making decisions based on moral concerns.

My goal here in all of these morality discussions is to point out how fuzzy people's thinking is on moral issues. More than any other area of investigation, I find people discussing morality are likely to jump to a conclusion based on how they feel and then try to justify it.

This is how the entire field of moral perfectionism works, and it's silly.Perhaps so, but this doesn't mean that morality itself is worthless.

Perhaps so, but this doesn't mean that morality itself is worthless.
Can it have worth while it's meaningless?

Can it have worth while it's meaningless?Simply because many people are morally inconsistent does not mean morality is meaningless.