NationStates Jolt Archive

What are morals exactley? I always get them confused with ethics.

THIS THREAD IS MINE! I think?

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?

EDIT: thanks for the time warp, Jolt.

well yes of course it exists

have I travelled back in time to the...well actually its more or less been universally accepted since ye olde olde times?

Do you believe in moral relativism?
I do, yes. I also believe that the fact that many other people hold this same view is in itself a form of proof that morality is not absolute.

I also believe that the fact that many other people hold this same view is in itself a form of proof that morality is not absolute.

How, exactly?

I think that some things are universal (murdering innocents, rape etc.) but most are not.

T'would be very useful if there was a basic explanation of wtf moral relitivism is. And no, I can't go and find out myself. Don't be absurd. Why the hell should I have to do any work when I'm not the OP?

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?

I believe that morals, to some degree, are relative to things like culture, individual mental development, and personal preference. I'm also of the opinion that morals are quite objective, which means I reject the much stronger claim that true moral relativists make.

T'would be very useful if there was a basic explanation of wtf moral relitivism is. And no, I can't go and find out myself. Don't be absurd. Why the hell should I have to do any work when I'm not the OP?

totally how I feel. I have yet to vote on this poll becuase I don't know wtf its about.

I think that some things are universal (murdering innocents, rape etc.) but most are not.

actually your examples are rather false surely? I seem to remember raping and pillaging being rather acceptable back in the day

and the fact that they are not now proves something? (well okay we do get the odd nutcase)

T'would be very useful if there was a basic explanation of wtf moral relitivism is. And no, I can't go and find out myself. Don't be absurd. Why the hell should I have to do any work when I'm not the OP?

Its that different people can hold different morals basically

How, exactly?
Because if I am right in believing that morality is situationally relative, and other people feel the same way (and are therefore also, in my worldview, right to believe as they do) then morality cannot be objective.

It's not a very good argument. In fact, it's not really an argument at all except in the most tenuous of terms. To be brutally frank it's more of an ego thing, and it's not something that I'm particularly proud of, but hey, it's just how I feel about this particular subject,
:)

I do not think moral relativism is justifiable. There are some things that simply cannot be allowed due to cultural differences.

such as?

I do not think moral relativism is justifiable. There are some things that simply cannot be allowed due to cultural differences.

Its that different people can hold different morals basically

Um, no.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism

Because if I am right in believing that morality is situationally relative, and other people feel the same way (and are therefore also, in my worldview, right to believe as they do) then morality cannot be objective.

Wait a second--there are all kinds of problems here.

What does "situationally relative" mean? At least under some potential interpretations of that phrase, morality can be "situationally relative" while remaining objective. We might, for instance, abide by a moral standard that takes circumstances broadly into account--say, some variety of consequentialism--and thus does not contain at least straightforward absolute moral rules, like "never murder." Such a moral standard can nevertheless be objective--we can nevertheless maintain that in some sense it exists beyond our personal attachment to it, that someone who denies it is objectively wrong and believes something that is objectively false.

If we take "situationally relative" to instead refer to the notion that is generally meant by "moral relativism"--the idea that morality is fundamentally a product of culture and/or individual preference, and thus a particular morality cannot be true or right on an absolute or objective level--then of course it is true that if you are "right" that morality is situationally relative, it follows that morality is not objective.

The whole question is whether, in fact, you are right, and your mere belief is not sufficient.

For what it's worth: no and no.

How exactly can one support moral relativism without believing in it, or believe in moral relativism without supporting it? Is it a matter of thinking that "the world would be better if...."?

Edit: As far as "support" goes, if anything I wish morality were more absolute than I think it is. I find moral relativism to be annoying, but it wouldn't be if more of those who held by it were inclined to take intersubjectivity and intellectual honesty seriously, and critically examine and discuss moral positions. As it is, it's too often used as an excuse to evade discussion and justification.

Um, no.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism

well its more or less would you rather me explain it as a massive time consuming block :p

edit: yes I know it was a rather bad one but good enough I suppose

well its more or less would you rather me explain it as a massive time consuming block :p

edit: yes I know it was a rather bad one but good enough I suppose

Good enough? You proposed an explanation of moral relativism that could easily fit in a moral absolutist or moral objectivist or moral pluralist framework.

That's not even remotely accurate, let alone sufficiently accurate.

Wait a second--there are all kinds of problems here
Yes, yes there are.

What does "situationally relative" mean? At least under some potential interpretations of that phrase, morality can be "situationally relative" while remaining objective. We might, for instance, abide by a moral standard that takes circumstances broadly into account--say, some variety of consequentialism--and thus does not contain at least straightforward absolute moral rules, like "never murder." Such a moral standard can nevertheless be objective--we can nevertheless maintain that in some sense it exists beyond our personal attachment to it, that someone who denies it is objectively wrong and believes something that is objectively false.
In this case, I used "situationally relative" to refer to the fact that I see claims of an objective morality to be false because I can conceive of situations where, for example, killing an individual would be the 'right' thing to do. I concede that it's more ethical subjectivity than moral relativity, and it's certainly not the first time that I've merged the two schools of thought in my mind and thus utterly failed to communicate what I was trying to say.

The whole question is whether, in fact, you are right, and your mere belief is not sufficient.
But you see, that's the thing... my mere belief that this is the case is sufficient, for me, hence the whole 'down to ego/not proud of it' disclaimer.

It's not absolutely true, but it's not absolutely false either.

The notion that it is ok to rape a girl if she's dressed "inappropriately" isn't justified no matter what culture you're in.

It used to be ok to rape a girl if she just beleived in a different god.

Edit:0_0

*experiences power of the timewarp for the first time*

such as?The notion that it is ok to rape a girl if she's dressed "inappropriately" isn't justified no matter what culture you're in.

In this case, I used "situationally relative" to refer to the fact that I see claims of an objective morality to be false because I can conceive of situations where, for example, killing an individual would be the 'right' thing to do.

I think you're confusing "objective" with "absolute". You might, for instance say that unjustified (or insert another modifier) killing is objectively wrong. So it would be relative to the circumstances but it would still be an objective principle of morality.

For what it's worth: no and no.

How exactly can one support moral relativism without believing in it, or believe in moral relativism without supporting it? Is it a matter of thinking that "the world would be better if...."?


I voted yes/no becuase, while I beleive in moral relativism, I think debating about where morals come from is kind of pointless and boring.

In this case, I used "situationally relative" to refer to the fact that I see claims of an objective morality to be false because I can conceive of situations where, for example, killing an individual would be the 'right' thing to do.

That has nothing to do with objective/subjective morality.

Someone who argues that utilitarianism is objectively true, for instance, maintains both that morality is objective and that, in certain circumstances, killing an individual is right.

Indeed, she would insist that anyone who disagrees is objectively wrong. ;)

I concede that it's more ethical subjectivity than moral relativity,

No, it's neither. We can perhaps differentiate between "ethical subjectivity" and "moral relativity"--we could talk about whether morality is relative to culture or a product of individual preferences, or whether something worthy of being called ethical truth is nonexistent or merely relative--but such distinctions are not really relevant here.

I think you're confusing "objective" with "absolute".
Yep, that certainly appears to be the case.

I'd like to have believed that I was old enough and wise enough not to enter into a philosophical discussion whilst doing loads of other things at the same time but nooooo, I seem to just keep pinging back into this thread and further muddying the issue. If Soheran hadn't called me on my vagueness I'd probably never have even noticed the mistake, nor how ridiculous my comments were in the proper context of the thread.

I thought of going back and editing my posts but I've decided just to leave them as they are, just to teach myself a lesson :P

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?

EDIT: thanks for the time warp, Jolt.

No, moral relativism is absolutely evil, dehumanising and is against everything we humans are meant to be. Note that are morals are based on our genes which continue to perfect themselves as we speak. Our morals are genetic programs meant to help the human race survive, thus relativism is false because our morals are based on PROVEN SCIENTIFIC FACT! Relativism in any form is a liberal lie out to confuse and brainwash an unsuspecting populace to suit their cause.

I'd like to have believed that I was old enough and wise enough not to enter into a philosophical discussion whilst doing loads of other things at the same time

Don't beat yourself up over it. The confusion between the two senses of "relative" and "absolute" is very common, and for reasons that, I think, have more to do with culture than intellectual flabbiness.

Our morals are genetic programs meant to help the human race survive, thus relativism is false because our morals are based on PROVEN SCIENTIFIC FACT!

Is/ought.

No, moral relativism is absolutely evil, dehumanising and is against everything we humans are meant to be. Note that are morals are based on our genes which continue to perfect themselves as we speak. Our morals are genetic programs meant to help the human race survive, thus relativism is false because our morals are based on PROVEN SCIENTIFIC FACT! Relativism in any form is a liberal lie out to confuse and brainwash an unsuspecting populace to suit their cause.

Relativistic physics is a liberal lie out to confuse and brainwash an unsuspecting populace to suit their cause?

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?

EDIT: thanks for the time warp, Jolt.

It exists, no doubt. Moral values have shifted one way or another throughout human history. They rarely have been completely inverted, and at most times were more or less what they are now, but the exceptions made could vary drastically. Also, the sphere of morality in the West has expanded to include more and more of humanity, until right now it's expanding to include animals as well as the environment.

Support it... well, to some extend. Morals are very closely linked to cultural identity and as such form the basis of our perception of ourselves.
On the other hand, I cannot morally support causing damage or hurt to others, no matter what moral apologies is offered.

To the OP: ‘no’, and ‘no’.

I think, at the very least, that there seems to objective moral judgement; we all seem to talk and act (at least) as if there are correct answers to moral questions, which implies that there are objective moral facts. Although morality seems to shift wildly through ages, a rallying call for moral relativists, I believe we can see that it doesn't stray over certain boundaries; that the extent that morality 'shifts' is limited.

We all seem to recognise that morality is not relative in regard to agents: if two people commit the same action, and both agents were in the same circumstances, we all agree (I think) that the two were either both right or both wrong. A moral problems faced by one person is a moral problem faced by us all.

Finally, I completely reject cultural relativism, the idea that morality is solely based on culture. The social sciences have been sorely weakened by their reliance on cultural relativism for the past century. It is a poor, and potentially dangerous, dogma.

Finally, I completely reject cultural relativism, the idea that morality is solely based on culture. The social sciences have been sorely weakened by their reliance on cultural relativism for the past century. It is a poor, and potentially dangerous, dogma.

Potentially? I already see dangerous consequences.

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?
Yes and "lol wut" are my respective responses there. The reason I think moral relativism holds is as a natural consequence of the position that objective morality does not. What difference does it make whether I like it or not?

Potentially? I already see dangerous consequences.
Quite.

Folks just don’t see where their conclusions logically take them.

It does sometimes annoy me, but there is no absolute morality without fate or without an objective form of Good.

If the world is not determined by any form of intelligence, and we are either completely free, or randomly determined from the big bang, then there is no prescribed right or wrong action to take for each situation. To say so would have no basis in reality whatsoever.

If there is no right or wrong action to take for each situation, then the only other option is that there is an objective form of Good or absolute law which we can refer to and make decisions ourselves on which is and which isn't the right thing to do for any situation. Likewise, without some sort of paranormal source, there is absolutely no scientific or logical reason to believe such an objective good or law exists.

Morality can be shared biologically amongst species, or even amongst all life, but this does not make it absolute, this just makes it relative to our own biological structure. It is very difficult to say that morality is not also relative to culture, when there is so much proof that it is, and can be demonstrated easily by looking at different tribal customs across the world. Clearly, morality is also subject to our own preferences, in which we base our reasoning. This is where I think we should put most of our emphasis on with ethics: reasoning. Since we all seem to share the same basic preferences, we should apply reason to best cater to our preferences, which in turn will make us happier. This, in my opinion is the best approach to take.

Not really.
It implies it, it certainly doesn’t prove it.

But we all talk and act in a way that implies moral relativism is wrong, from disciplining our children or chastising our friends, all the way to how we treat criminals.

To the OP: ‘no’, and ‘no’.

I think, at the very least, that there seems to objective moral judgement; we all seem to talk and act (at least) as if there are correct answers to moral questions, which implies that there are objective moral facts.

Not really.


Although morality seems to shift wildly through ages, a rallying call for moral relativists, I believe we can see that it doesn't stray over certain boundaries

Some would disagree.

It implies it, it certainly doesn’t prove it.

But we all talk and act in a way that implies moral relativism is wrong, from disciplining our children or chastising our friends, all the way to how we treat criminals.

I think people seem to think that if you believe morals are relative, it means you believe there is no reason to act virtuously and civil etc... This is false, there are plenty of reasons to act kindly and respectfully, there is just no objective imperative commanding us to act this way, nor is there a predetermined way of how exactly you should act kind or whatever.

I think, at the very least, that there seems to objective moral judgement; we all seem to talk and act (at least) as if there are correct answers to moral questions, which implies that there are objective moral facts. Although morality seems to shift wildly through ages, a rallying call for moral relativists, I believe we can see that it doesn't stray over certain boundaries; that the extent that morality 'shifts' is limited.

We all seem to recognise that morality is not relative in regard to agents: if two people commit the same action, and both agents were in the same circumstances, we all agree (I think) that the two were either both right or both wrong. A moral problems faced by one person is a moral problem faced by us all.


I think this is where you're a bit too narrow. Just look at the history of Western civilisation : For the most part of it, it was perfectly ok to own slaves. For a long, long long time nobody thought twice about it. It was condoned by religion, cemented in tradition, and considered necessary both to hold up the economy and as a natural state of things.

If anybody told you today he/she owned a slave, you would consider this to be immoral to the extreme.

It was also considered the norm that a husband owned his wife, that women were mentally deficient compared to men, and therefore could not be treated the same or granted the same rights.

Would you today say that women should not have full rights, such as the right to own property or to vote?

It used to be considered moral to burn witches.
It used to be considered moral to kill cats.
It used to be considered moral to beat children.

In the same line, it used to be considered immoral for a white person to marry a black/Asian/Native American/Jewish person.
It used to be immoral to be homosexual.
It used to be immoral to be atheist.
It used to be immoral to eat meat on certain days of the week.

Morals do change. As I said, they rarely turn into the exact opposites, but they do drift along certain lines, change who they include or exclude, change their exceptions.

Morals do change.

What is considered to be moral does change. Just like what is considered to be true in every respect changes. It does not follow that morality, or truth in general, is relative.

We can see this especially when we consider that there were moral tendencies within even "old" morality that tended against the once-tolerated moral wrongs. Plenty of thinkers throughout history have opposed slavery, for instance, and universal moral notions like any of the multitude of variations on the Golden Rule provide a strong basis for opposing sexism and homophobia.

The problem, then, was not so much that "old" morality was wrong as that it was incomplete: amoral cultural forces were strong enough to limit its sovereignty. Over time, our culture has developed morally as well as otherwise, and we have managed to put some of those prejudices to rest... and insofar as we have done so, we have arrived at an objectively better conception of morality.

Morality is subjective, not relative.

Um, no.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativismI dislike the way this article conflates the terms 'relative' and 'subjective'. 'Relativity' implies, to me, an 'anything goes' mentality. If this is not what is meant by 'relativity', then there needs to be a word for an anything goes mentality, since there are some people who believe that.

'Relativity' implies, to me, an 'anything goes' mentality.

Unfortunately, many opponents of moral relativism routinely conflate the two, but there's a difference.

Moral relativists need merely insist that all moralities are equally truthful, not that they are equally good. The distinction here mirrors the positive/normative distinction: moral relativism is positive in that it discusses "meta-ethics", the positive character and not the normative content of ethical judgments. A moral relativist can certainly maintain that acts are wrong--but only relatively wrong.

If this is not what is meant by 'relativity', then there needs to be a word for an anything goes mentality, since there are some people who believe that.

Amorality?

I think this is where you’re a bit too narrow. Just look at the history of Western civilisation : For the most part of it, it was perfectly ok to own slaves. For a long, long long time nobody thought twice about it. It was condoned by religion, cemented in tradition, and considered necessary both to hold up the economy and as a natural state of things.
Why was this possible? Because it was generally thought that those who were slaves were not fully human, more like the ‘lesser animals’, or at least less morally worthy.

We’ve always had, I think, an attitude that goes something along the lines of:

"It is immoral to treat a fully rational sentient being in ways x, y, z, etc."

What changes is the definition of ‘fully rational sentient being’. I’d submit that for a long while, slaves were not considered such. Much the same has happened to children and nonhuman animals.

Take a look at the debate over abortion; both sides aren’t arguing over whether taking an innocent life is wrong, but over the definition of ‘innocent life’.

On top of this, I’m certainly not arguing that morals can’t be shaped or influenced by environmental factors, including culture. I’m arguing that they aren’t determined.

Unfortunately, many opponents of moral relativism routinely conflate the two, but there's a difference.

Moral relativists need merely insist that all moralities are equally truthful, not that they are equally good. The distinction here mirrors the positive/normative distinction: moral relativism is positive in that it discusses "meta-ethics", the positive character and not the normative content of ethical judgments. A moral relativist can certainly maintain that acts are wrong--but only relatively wrong.Ah, perhaps that's the problem; I've never seen moral relativism explained this way. This is what I could call moral subjectivity.

Amorality?Well, not exactly. It's not so much that there is no moral code, but that all moral codes are equal, according to the type of person I'm talking about.

Why was this possible? Because it was generally thought that those who were slaves were not fully human, more like the ‘lesser animals’, or at least less morally worthy.

We’ve always had, I think, an attitude that goes something along the lines of:

"It is immoral to treat a fully rational sentient being in ways x, y, z, etc."

What changes is the definition of ‘fully rational sentient being’. I’d submit that for a long while, slaves were not considered such. Much the same has happened to children and nonhuman animals.

Take a look at the debate over abortion; both sides aren’t arguing over whether taking an innocent life is wrong, but over the definition of ‘innocent life’.

On top of this, I’m certainly not arguing that morals can’t be shaped or influenced by environmental factors, including culture. I’m arguing that they aren’t determined.

Yes, morality is expanding that way. These days, we move towards including animals into our sphere of morality.
And yet, we also change our moral perception on behaviour of individuals, not only their general humanity. As I said, homosexuality was considered immoral, divorce was immoral, it's a long list.

The general Golden Rule doesn't really change, but we always make exceptions to that rule, and those do change.

Everybody who voted that they believe in moral relativism is a liar.

Everybody who voted that they believe in moral relativism is a liar.

I voted for moral relativism...

I am lying....

Ah, perhaps that's the problem; I've never seen moral relativism explained this way. This is what I could call moral subjectivity.

Well, cultural relativists could maintain that morality is relative to culture, and not to the subjectivity of the individual.

But, then, cultural relativism has never made much philosophical sense.

Well, not exactly. It's not so much that there is no moral code, but that all moral codes are equal, according to the type of person I'm talking about.

Could you elaborate on this position? I'm not sure what you mean by it.

A normative equality of moral theories seems to imply that all actions are equally moral, that is to say, that we cannot distinguish between actions on a moral basis. That sounds like amorality to me.

Everybody who voted that they believe in moral relativism is a liar.
I didn't vote, but I still think morality is based on the comparison of our own actions with that of another institution's declaration of what is right or wrong. Granted, that institution may well be our own instinct, but it is still a comparison with some defined system.

Does that make me a liar? :(

If there were a culture that accepted in some circumstances incest, corpse consumption, pedophilia, cannibalism , slavery, rape, and frontal lobotomies in various combinations and circumstances in order to regulate society, resource consumption, genetic reinforcement, useful desensitization to reality, etc, I think we would all agree that was wrong. Now you can say that this kind of society doesn't exist, therefore it shouldn't be considered, but firstly, the fact it doesn't exist IS an absolute, and secondly, there are/have been cultures and societies where each of these enjoyed various degrees of acceptance. Were they all right? If I placed you in those cultures and you were victimized by them, would that be all right? How many people voted that rape was wrong in all circumstances also voted for moral relativity? Because those two positions are incompatible.

If there were a culture that accepted in some circumstances incest, corpse consumption, pedophilia, cannibalism , slavery, rape, and frontal lobotomies in various combinations and circumstances in order to regulate society, resource consumption, genetic reinforcement, useful desensitization to reality, etc, I think we would all agree that was wrong.

Even if we all agreed that it was wrong, could we prove it to them?

Were they all right? If I placed you in those cultures and you were victimized by them, would that be all right?

Moral relativists need not say that they are "all right." They need merely say that there is no absolute basis for denying that they are.

Moral relativists need not say that they are "all right." They need merely say that there is no absolute basis for denying that they are.But if you say that there is anything that is wrong in all circumstances, isn't that an absolute in and of itself, or doesn't that imply a transcendent, fundamentally humanitarian basis for morality?

But if you say that there is anything that is wrong in all circumstances, isn't that an absolute in and of itself,

"Absolute" within a moral framework that may be relative.

Within that moral framework, no countervailing reason is strong enough to justify the action in question: in that sense, it is absolutely wrong. But the moral framework itself may be founded on a relative basis, like culture--one that someone of a different culture has no compelling reason to recognize.

or doesn't that imply a transcendent, fundamentally humanitarian basis for morality?

No, for the reasons given above.

How many people voted that rape was wrong in all circumstances also voted for moral relativity? Because those two positions are incompatible.

Way to go for completely failing at understanding the question of the OP.
If you go back and read it again, you will see that he in fact asked two thing : Do you believe in moral relativism? and Do you supprot moral relativism?

By acknowledging that there were and are cultures that agree with incest, paedophilia, cannibalism, rape, etc. you've shown that you are, in fact, very well aware that morals are relative and bound to culture.
You simply don't agree with the morals of cultures that practice incest, paedophilia, cannibalism, rape, etc. In fact, your own culture promoted some of the above until not so very long ago, but has changed its framework to what you now consider an absolute truth.
It would be interesting to see what people in 100 years will think of our moral values today. I think they'd be just as outraged at them as we are at some of the values of the 19th century.

"Absolute" within a moral framework that may be relative.You can't call a moral imperative relative if you extend it over all circumstances

Within that moral framework, no countervailing reason is strong enough to justify the action in question: in that sense, it is absolutely wrong. But the moral framework itself may be founded on a relative basis, like culture--one that someone of a different culture has no compelling reason to recognize.But I there are plenty of cultures with relative moral frameworks that have a place for the horrid things I mentioned with no culturally internal reasons for saying that they are wrong. (I can mention a few if you like.) Yet many of those voting that they are moral relativists have demonstrated by voting that rape is always wrong (on a different thread) that they hold absolute beliefs that underlie their purported moral relativism, and I believe that we all hold absolute beliefs by our virtue of being human and animals of culture ourselves. Therefore, while moral relativism may or may not be "right" (I would say that it's not), anybody who believes that it is is lying, or they have somehow used intellectual gymnastics to undermine their cultural orientation and moral foundation, which I think is impossible given human psychology.

Way to go for completely failing at understanding the question of the OP.
If you go back and read it again, you will see that he in fact asked two thing : Do you believe in moral relativism? and Do you supprot moral relativism?I'm addressing the first question.

By acknowledging that there were and are cultures that agree with incest, paedophilia, cannibalism, rape, etc. you've shown that you are, in fact, very well aware that morals are relative and bound to culture.False. I believe these cultures are immoral or contain immoral elements.
You simply don't agree with the morals of cultures that practice incest, paedophilia, cannibalism, rape, etc. In fact, your own culture promoted some of the above until not so very long ago, but has changed its framework to what you now consider an absolute truth.In a sense, although my morals (what I consider to be an approximation of the absolute) differ a bit from the morals of the culture in which I reside.
It would be interesting to see what people in 100 years will think of our moral values today. I think they'd be just as outraged at them as we are at some of the values of the 19th century.This is probably true.

You can't call a moral imperative relative if you extend it over all circumstances

You're equivocating. There are two different senses of "relative", and correspondingly two different senses of "absolute."

A moral imperative that "you extend over all circumstances" is absolute in one sense (no countervailing reason), but not necessarily in the other (universally commanding recognition).

A person can state perfectly consistently that rape is always wrong relative to her cultural or individual morality.

But I there are plenty of cultures with relative moral frameworks that have a place for the horrid things I mentioned with no culturally internal reasons for saying that they are wrong.

Now you're sounding like a moral relativist. ;)

Yet many of those voting that they are moral relativists have demonstrated by voting that rape is always wrong (on a different thread) that they hold absolute beliefs that underlie their purported moral relativism,

They have demonstrated nothing of the sort.

and I believe that we all hold absolute beliefs by our virtue of being human and animals of culture ourselves.

Such beliefs are not "absolute"--they are relative to our culture and species. They do not command the obedience of all rational beings. An alien species with a radically different culture would have no reason, on this line of justifying morality, to regard rape as wrong.

I see no reason to suspect that as a species we are compelled to assume that particular moral beliefs are "absolute" in the relevant sense.

or they have somehow used intellectual gymnastics to undermine their cultural orientation and moral foundation, which I think is impossible given human psychology.

You have a very dismal view of human rationality and free will--one that in the final analysis, I think, undermines the case for absolute morality that it intends to support.

I'm addressing the first question.

So, you don't believe that morals are relative to the culture that holds them, while knowing full well that there are cultures that hold moral values that are different from your own?
You either love a good paradox or you need to re-think that.


False. I believe these cultures are immoral or contain immoral elements.

So you don't support moral relativism, but believe that the set of morals you hold is the only correct one.

By acknowledging that there were and are cultures that agree with incest, paedophilia, cannibalism, rape, etc. you've shown that you are, in fact, very well aware that morals are relative and bound to culture.

Moral beliefs. Not moral truth.

Everyone agrees that moral beliefs are different, and vary depending on culture (though the extent of this variation is disputed.)

The moral relativist takes the additional step of declaring that none of those moral beliefs are absolutely true or false.

Moral beliefs. Not moral truth.

Everyone agrees that moral beliefs are different, and vary depending on culture (though the extent of this variation is disputed.)

The moral relativist takes the additional step of declaring that none of those moral beliefs are absolutely true or false.

Considering that they are evolving and changing constantly, I have problems with considering any set of morals to be absolute in any sense.
As I said, people in 100 years will probably be appaled by what we consider moral today, while holding a set of moral beliefs that would seem very odd to us.

That said, I do believe that there is a basis of morality that is universal throughout human history, that has never changed significantly nor been thrown overboard completely, the much-quoted Golden Rule. I think it forms the basis of human cooperation and in extension human culture.
What does differ is what exceptions we make from that rule, who we extend the rule to, and what areas we apply it to.

You're equivocating. There are two different senses of "relative", and correspondingly two different senses of "absolute."

A moral imperative that "you extend over all circumstances" is absolute in one sense (no countervailing reason), but not necessarily in the other (universally commanding recognition).The question about whether all morals are universally recognized is a question of fact, and I don't think that's what the debate is over in this thread. Rather, we're asking whether there's such a thing as a moral "ought" that is culturally independent. If you say yes, as the anti-rapists do, then you are not a moral relativist in the sense I think the thread is asking.

A person can state perfectly consistently that rape is always wrong relative to her cultural or individual morality.Yes, but when moral relativism was argued by some participants in the rape thread, that argument was rejected. The sense was that the vast majority believed that rape was always always always wrong.

Such beliefs are not "absolute"--they are relative to our culture and species. They do not command the obedience of all rational beings. An alien species with a radically different culture would have no reason, on this line of justifying morality, to regard rape as wrong.

I see no reason to suspect that as a species we are compelled to assume that particular moral beliefs are "absolute" in the relevant sense.Perhaps, but do you truly believe that? If you were raped and tortured would you still be able to make the same argument? I doubt it. When push comes to shove, none of us are moral relativists. I realize I'm making the "no atheists in the trenches" argument, but I think it's valid in this instance.

You have a very dismal view of human rationality and free will--one that in the final analysis, I think, undermines the case for absolute morality that it intends to support.Perhaps, but I'm not making a case for absolute morality right this second, and I wouldn't base it on strong free will or human decision-rationality, concepts that are at odds with each other and demonstrably false.

So, you don't believe that morals are relative to the culture that holds them, while knowing full well that there are cultures that hold moral values that are different from your own?
You either love a good paradox or you need to re-think that.What Soheran said.

So you don't support moral relativism, but believe that the set of morals you hold is the only correct one.Or closer to correct than others.

Or closer to correct than others.

Which leads directly to the question : Why do you think you're correct and not the others?

You have a very dismal view of human rationality and free will--one that in the final analysis, I think, undermines the case for absolute morality that it intends to support.
Indeed it does. Any attempt to suggest that morality has a physiological basis is instantly rendered a morally relativistic position by the fact that it accommodates the possibility of someone so composed as to lack any moral sense at all.

Indeed it does. Any attempt to suggest that morality has a physiological basis is instantly rendered a morally relativistic position by the fact that it accommodates the possibility of someone so composed as to lack any moral sense at all.

I think they're called sociopaths, aren't they?

The question about whether all morals are universally recognized is a question of fact,

I said "command", not "actually receive."

Statements of absolute truth command universal recognition: what is true for one is true for all. People may disagree as to what is absolutely true, but some are objectively wrong (if they fail to recognize it) and others are objectively right (if they do recognize it.)

Statements of relative truth, on the other hand, do not command universal recognition. There is no reason that someone who is not a member of a culture should recognize a truth relative to that culture. If she does not do so, she is in no sense "wrong" in the sense of "incorrect."

Rather, we're asking whether there's such a thing as a moral "ought" that is culturally independent.

That's exactly right.

If you say yes, as the anti-rapists do,

No, they don't. They can just as easily say that "rape is always wrong according to my culturally dependent notion of moral ought."

Yes, but when moral relativism was argued by some participants in the rape thread, that argument was rejected. The sense was that the vast majority believed that rape was always always always wrong.

Yes, but you can think rape is "always always always wrong" without thinking that you can somehow prove this to every rational person, or that this view of morality is somehow possessed of objective truth.

Perhaps, but do you truly believe that? If you were raped and tortured would you still be able to make the same argument? I doubt it. When push comes to shove, none of us are moral relativists.

Okay, first, you're assuming I'm a moral relativist. I'm not. I just deny that culture and human nature in any sense provide us with an absolute moral framework.

Second, I see no reason whatsoever that suffering from the immoral deeds of others would make someone less inclined to moral relativism. If anything, recognizing that some people are capable of such evil would make them more inclined to be moral relativists, not less.

Perhaps you think that moral relativism proscribes judgment. It does not. It merely insists that we can only judge on the basis of our own relative moral beliefs--we have no absolute standard.

I realize I'm making the "no atheists in the trenches" argument, but I think it's valid in this instance.

It's only valid if you're trying to prove that belief in moral absolutism is human. It's not valid if you're trying to prove that belief in moral absolutism is right.

Perhaps, but I'm not making a case for absolute morality right this second, and I wouldn't base it on strong free will or human decision-rationality, concepts that are at odds with each other and demonstrably false.

They are neither at odds with each other (indeed, in a sense they require each other) nor demonstrably false.

At times, we are not rational, but "rationality" in this case merely implies the capacity to understand reason, not necessarily that we always act on it.

Indeed it does. Any attempt to suggest that morality has a physiological basis is instantly rendered a morally relativistic position by the fact that it accommodates the possibility of someone so composed as to lack any moral sense at all.

True, but that is not what I was thinking of.

Rather, my line of thought was that if we are necessarily bound by "cultural orientation" and biological instinct, it is clear we cannot recognize absolute morality, because we can never overcome the relativity of our moral basis to reach an absolute standard.

If there were a culture that accepted in some circumstances incest, corpse consumption, pedophilia, cannibalism , slavery, rape, and frontal lobotomies in various combinations and circumstances in order to regulate society, resource consumption, genetic reinforcement, useful desensitization to reality, etc, I think we would all agree that was wrong.
I would agree that I think it would be wrong, as long as we understand that when I say something to be wrong means I consider it being to the detriment of the wider community. However, there is no absolute authority on the matter, and I'm quite happy to accept the possibility that someone who disagrees with us may well be capable of backing up their claims.

How many people voted that rape was wrong in all circumstances also voted for moral relativity? Because those two positions are incompatible.
Not necessarily. Me thinking something to be wrong without exemption is not the same as saying that I might be in a state where there is some verifiable correctness to my thinking. That's the difference between moral objectivism and relativism.

Morals - what is right - of *any* given situation depends on the viewpoint.

There is no absolute right or wrong, only varying viewpoints on the matter.

Well, cultural relativists could maintain that morality is relative to culture, and not to the subjectivity of the individual.

But, then, cultural relativism has never made much philosophical sense.

Could you elaborate on this position? I'm not sure what you mean by it.

A normative equality of moral theories seems to imply that all actions are equally moral, that is to say, that we cannot distinguish between actions on a moral basis. That sounds like amorality to me.Certainly. The aforementioned 'cultural relativism' can be one example of what I'm talking about. How often, when discussing the treatment of women in, say, Arab countries, is it said that we should not "impose" our "Western" values on other cultures? This implies that all forms of cultural moral relativity are equally valid.

How often, when discussing the treatment of women in, say, Arab countries, is it said that we should not "impose" our "Western" values on other cultures?

That position can be advocated by a moral absolutist or by a moral relativist. It is a moral position--"It is wrong to impose values on others"--and cannot be compatible with the position that "anything goes." If "anything goes", then why not impose our values?

Cultural relativism can be an argument for this position, but I think it is a rather bad one.

That position can be advocated by a moral absolutist or by a moral relativist. It is a moral position--"It is wrong to impose values on others"--I suppose one could believe absolutely that it is more wrong to impose values than it is for women to be stoned to death...I didn't consider that possibility.

and cannot be compatible with the position that "anything goes." If "anything goes", then why not impose our values?

Cultural relativism can be an argument for this position, but I think it is a rather bad one.Because if 'anything goes', then we have no justification for imposing our values.

I suppose one could believe absolutely that it is more wrong to impose values than it is for women to be stoned to death...I didn't consider that possibility.

Why is it any more difficult to believe it relatively? It's equally absurd both ways.

Because if 'anything goes', then we have no justification for imposing our values.

But we need no justification, because anything goes.

Which leads directly to the question : Why do you think you're correct and not the others?Reason.

edit: If my morals are based on a logical extrapolation from something universal, I have no reason to believe that the logic would produce a different or relative morality for different cultures other than in superficial ways

Reason.

What reason? You'll have to be more specific... Afterall, you're arguing that there is an imperitive, a moral "Absolute", some objective criteria which defines the moral imperative.

Why is it any more difficult to believe it relatively? It's equally absurd both ways.Yes, it is equally absurd.

But we need no justification, because anything goes.Which would then be "us" imposing "our" values upon "them", which would mean either that "our" values are better, or that "we" did something that was morally wrong.

Reason.

edit: If my morals are based on a logical extrapolation from something universal, I have no reason to believe that the logic would produce a different or relative morality for different cultures other than in superficial waysAhem. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem)

(This is the second time today I've had to post this link :))

Which would then be "us" imposing "our" values upon "them", which would mean either that "our" values are better,

Why would it? I think you're assuming a need for a moral justification that, in the presupposed system of "anything goes", doesn't exist.

If I need no justification, what difference does it make whether my values are "better" or not? I impose them for whatever reason; it need not be "they are better."

or that "we" did something that was morally wrong.

If "anything goes", nothing is wrong.

Ahem. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem)

The fact that "ought" does not follow from "is" is precisely the basis for absolute morality.

If "ought" is not determined by "is", then "rightness" must not be a product of a particular circumstance, but must instead stand on its own. The legitimacy of moral principles must be contained within themselves, and not in their convenience, and they must apply irrespective of "is"--that is, universally.

At the very least, in an "anything goes" system, something that would interfere with "anything goes" would be wrong.

Well, that depends on whether we mean "anything goes" in the "absence of external constraints" sense or "anything goes" in the "absence of moral constraints" sense.

I think you've been using it in the first sense, and me in the second... which is why we have been disagreeing. :)

Which would mean the universal truth is an "is".

Only on the question-begging assumption that all truth is "is."

Why can't we have a universal "ought" truth?

Why would it? I think you're assuming a need for a moral justification that, in the presupposed system of "anything goes", doesn't exist.

If I need no justification, what difference does it make whether my values are "better" or not? I impose them for whatever reason; it need not be "they are better."

If "anything goes", nothing is wrong.At the very least, in an "anything goes" system, something that would interfere with "anything goes" would be wrong.

The fact that "ought" does not follow from "is" is precisely the basis for absolute morality.

If "ought" is not determined by "is", then "rightness" must not be a product of a particular circumstance, but must instead stand on its own. The legitimacy of moral principles must be contained within themselves, and not in their convenience, and they must apply irrespective of "is"--that is, universally.Which would mean the universal truth is an "is".

Well, that depends on whether we mean "anything goes" in the "absence of external constraints" sense or "anything goes" in the "absence of moral constraints" sense.

I think you've been using it in the first sense, and me in the second... which is why we have been disagreeing. :)Yes, I think that's the problem.
When I meant "anything goes" I meant that "anything goes" is the moral system that was espoused by the individual. You meant something else.
It's good that you have a knack for discerning frame of reference differences like this. :)

Only on the question-begging assumption that all truth is "is."

Why can't we have a universal "ought" truth?Based upon what?

The Commonwealth of Wealthycommons takes the stand that 'moral relativism' is the definition of claiming family relationships (relativism) only to people who are jolly good sorts of upright morality. Since everybody would be inclined to make such a claim, but we all jolly well know it isn't actually true, the Commonwealth, which is based on sensible government, declines to believe in 'moral relativism' and certainly will not seek to apply it as a principle of government.:headbang:

Based upon what?

The is-ought problem.

If "ought" cannot be founded on "is", then the rightness of something has to be contained within itself: it has to be right on its own, regardless of particular "is" circumstances.

As such, we must accept it as right universally--for all people. I cannot say "This rule applies to you, but not to me."

The is-ought problem.

If "ought" cannot be founded on "is", then the rightness of something has to be contained within itself: it has to be right on its own, regardless of particular "is" circumstances.

As such, we must accept it as right universally--for all people. I cannot say "This rule applies to you, but not to me."Certainly, you could have a moral belief that you feel holds true universally.
I thought you meant "why couldn't everyone have the same moral belief that holds true universally?" So I wondered what they would be basing it on.
I suppose theoretically everyone could share the same moral belief just because, but I can't see this actually happening without a reason.

I suppose theoretically everyone could share the same moral belief just because, but I can't see this actually happening without a reason.

You misunderstand me.

I am arguing that this "reason" is precisely the necessity of universality: we are all obligated to recognize a basic sort of moral equality, that what we legitimate for ourselves we must legitimate for others, and what we demand of others we must demand of ourselves.

We do so on the recognition of (essentially) the difference between "is" and "ought": in making a decision, we are bound to assert its legitimacy independent of any particular circumstance.

Morality is subjective, not relative.

I dislike the way this article conflates the terms 'relative' and 'subjective'. 'Relativity' implies, to me, an 'anything goes' mentality. If this is not what is meant by 'relativity', then there needs to be a word for an anything goes mentality, since there are some people who believe that.

Construct a neologism, if it bothers you so much. As Soheran mentioned, people routinely conflate the two. I find it pretty annoying, personally, and I've said so on several occasions to RL friends. But it's not like I can stop it by myself.

I am arguing that this "reason" is precisely the necessity of universality: we are all obligated to recognize a basic sort of moral equality, that what we legitimate for ourselves we must legitimate for others, and what we demand of others we must demand of ourselves.Why?
If I'm unafraid of the consequences in not recognizing moral equality, either because I'm a sociopath or simply believe I'm above retribution, why should I care that I expect more from others than from myself?

We do so on the recognition of (essentially) the difference between "is" and "ought": in making a decision, we are bound to assert its legitimacy independent of any particular circumstance.I understand this part, this makes sense to me.

Construct a neologism, if it bothers you so much. As Soheran mentioned, people routinely conflate the two. I find it pretty annoying, personally, and I've said so on several occasions to RL friends. But it's not like I can stop it by myself.Hm.

How does moral malapropism sound?

Hm.

How does moral malapropism sound?

Pretentious and humorous, mostly. :)

But more seriously, an "anything goes" mentality isn't really morality in the first place. So perhaps describing it as a moral theory would be the wrong approach.

If I'm unafraid of the consequences in not recognizing moral equality,

It cannot have anything to do with "consequences", as you have recognized.

Rather, moral equality is based on the independence of rightness. Rightness being independent of any empirical proposition, I cannot differentiate between empirically different applications of the same rule. If I did, I would be saying, in effect, that empirical circumstance dictates what is right--but I must deny that, because I must recognize that "what is right" cannot depend on circumstance. (The content of "what is right" may differentiate between circumstances, but its basis must be independent.)

You can look at it from a slightly different angle. In making a decision, I must recognize that no circumstance of my decision-making can legitimately determine "the right answer" to my decision-making process: "is" does not imply "ought." As such, in making a decision I can only act on a basis whose legitimacy I would accept for decision-making as such: decision-making abstracted from "what is." It follows that I must accept such a basis for all decision-making, because the only possible differences between one instance and the next are matters of "is", which I have already rejected.

Which means, of course, that I must accept it for all people.

It cannot have anything to do with "consequences", as you have recognized.

Rather, moral equality is based on the independence of rightness. Rightness being independent of any empirical proposition, I cannot differentiate between empirically different applications of the same rule. If I did, I would be saying, in effect, that empirical circumstance dictates what is right--but I must deny that, because I must recognize that "what is right" cannot depend on circumstance. (The content of "what is right" may differentiate between circumstances, but its basis must be independent.)

You can look at it from a slightly different angle. In making a decision, I must recognize that no circumstance of my decision-making can legitimately determine "the right answer" to my decision-making process: "is" does not imply "ought." As such, in making a decision I can only act on a basis whose legitimacy I would accept for decision-making as such: decision-making abstracted from "what is." It follows that I must accept such a basis for all decision-making, because the only possible differences between one instance and the next are matters of "is", which I have already rejected.

Which means, of course, that I must accept it for all people.Certainly, but this rightness is a quality of morality itself, not the universal truth that morality is based upon.

Certainly, but this rightness is a quality of morality itself, not the universal truth that morality is based upon.

What do you mean?

What do you mean?You pointed out that a moral proposition has to apply to everyone, but that's part of the definition of morality. If someone came up with a proposition that didn't apply to everyone, their proposition would not be moral.
As such, in order to establish whether or not something is moral, merely that it applies to everyone is insufficient.

You pointed out that a moral proposition has to apply to everyone, but that's part of the definition of morality.

It's an intrinsic feature, but my argument (or, rather, the argument I am repeating in slightly modified form) is not simply tautology.

I have begun not from an idea of universality, but simply from the idea of "right": that is to say, rules of action. My point is not that morality is morality, but that considerations of rightness must necessarily be universal. If my argument works, I have refuted even the sociopath: even if she cares nothing for anyone else, she is still obligated to restrain her behavior as long as she would not accept the same treatment for herself.

If someone came up with a proposition that didn't apply to everyone, their proposition would not be moral.

But the whole argument of subjective morality is that we can make no statement about what morality "must" look like: we can never state that anyone is objectively wrong.

Now we can; we can state that anyone who acts on bases she would not accept for others is acting in an objectively immoral way. That militates against, among other things, selfishness.

As such, in order to establish whether or not something is moral, merely that it applies to everyone is insufficient.

No, not all the answers are resolvable on an absolute level.

It's an intrinsic feature, but my argument (or, rather, the argument I am repeating in slightly modified form) is not simply tautology.

I have begun not from an idea of universality, but simply from the idea of "right": that is to say, rules of action. My point is not that morality is morality, but that considerations of rightness must necessarily be universal. If my argument works, I have refuted even the sociopath: even if she cares nothing for anyone else, she is still obligated to restrain her behavior as long as she would not accept the same treatment for herself.Agreed.

But the whole argument of subjective morality is that we can make no statement about what morality "must" look like: we can never state that anyone is objectively wrong.Here is where we disagree. If we can make no statement about what morality must look like, then there is no way of distinguishing morality from amorality.

Here is where we disagree. If we can make no statement about what morality must look like, then there is no way of distinguishing morality from amorality.

Well, we can make one statement: morality deals with what we ought to do. A moral theory is a theory of how we ought to act. An amoral person, by contrast, is one who makes no consideration of how we ought to act.

Meta-ethical subjectivism can go that far, and, I think, can even go so far as to say that the amoral person (because she fails to recognize what it means for something to be right) is wrong. But it cannot go farther. It must leave the realm of "ought" completely open on the absolute level, or else we have objective moral principles.

Well, we can make one statement: morality deals with what we ought to do. A moral theory is a theory of how we ought to act. An amoral person, by contrast, is one who makes no consideration of how we ought to act.

Meta-ethical subjectivism can go that far, and, I think, can even go so far as to say that the amoral person (because she fails to recognize what it means for something to be right) is wrong. But it cannot go farther. It must leave the realm of "ought" completely open on the absolute level, or else we have objective moral principles.So then someone who makes a consideration of how we ought to act that is based upon arbitrary whim is being moral?

So then someone who makes a consideration of how we ought to act that is based upon arbitrary whim is being moral?

On the objective level, making decisions based on "arbitrary whim" is not really any different from making decisions based on compassion and love. Rationally speaking, they are the same--just a different sort of arbitrary basis.

On the subjective level, things are somewhat different. We are not likely to be very convinced by someone who asserts moral propositions on the basis of "I feel like it." Furthermore, he is not likely to convince himself. But if he does, on no basis can we say that he is objectively "wrong"--at least prior to recognizing that if his moral positions are a product of arbitrary whim, he is unlikely to be able to accept them for all people.

On the objective level, making decisions based on "arbitrary whim" is not really any different from making decisions based on compassion and love. Rationally speaking, they are the same--just a different sort of arbitrary basis.

On the subjective level, things are somewhat different. We are not likely to be very convinced by someone who asserts moral propositions on the basis of "I feel like it." Furthermore, he is not likely to convince himself. But if he does, on no basis can we say that he is objectively "wrong"--at least prior to recognizing that if his moral positions are a product of arbitrary whim, he is unlikely to be able to accept them for all people.That's interesting. I don't think your definition goes far enough, but yet I can't argue with it either.

That's interesting. I don't think your definition goes far enough, but yet I can't argue with it either.

A person commits murder. When challenged, she says that her action was right. We argue with her.

If meta-ethical subjectivism is correct, we must explain this discussion in terms of intersubjectivity: we will only be able to have a productive discussion with her if our subjective moral intuitions are similar, if they intersect. If, on the other hand, she shares none of our moral intuitions, even if she and we are perfectly rational and honest there is no reason to believe that we will convince her (or that she will convince us.) We have no common ground. At most, we can declare her a monster--not "wrong" in the same sense that someone who denies 1 + 1 = 2 is wrong.

If, instead, we believe that rationally she is bound to recognize some moral principle, then even if we have no common ground whatsoever it is possible for us to rationally convince her. But then we have departed from intersubjectivity--we can show that she is wrong not by appealing to her own subjective standard, but by appealing to an independent standard that she is bound to make her own.

A person commits murder. When challenged, she says that her action was right. We argue with her.

If meta-ethical subjectivism is correct, we must explain this discussion in terms of intersubjectivity: we will only be able to have a productive discussion with her if our subjective moral intuitions are similar, if they intersect. If, on the other hand, she shares none of our moral intuitions, even if she and we are perfectly rational and honest there is no reason to believe that we will convince her (or that she will convince us.) We have no common ground. At most, we can declare her a monster--not "wrong" in the same sense that someone who denies 1 + 1 = 2 is wrong.

If, instead, we believe that rationally she is bound to recognize some moral principle, then even if we have no common ground whatsoever it is possible for us to rationally convince her. But then we have departed from intersubjectivity--we can show that she is wrong not by appealing to her own subjective standard, but by appealing to an independent standard that she is bound to make her own.I can agree with this, I was disagreeing with your idea of subjectivity. I would say that the definition of morality requires universality - if a proposition doesn't apply to everyone, it can't be moral. However, due to the nature of the word 'subjective', I suppose that this could be ignored.

I would say that the definition of morality requires universality - if a proposition doesn't apply to everyone, it can't be moral.

Are people objectively required, then, to only act on moral propositions?

Are people objectively required, then, to only act on moral propositions?No, but if something doesn't apply to everyone, then it isn't a moral proposition.

Reason.

edit: If my morals are based on a logical extrapolation from something universal, I have no reason to believe that the logic would produce a different or relative morality for different cultures other than in superficial ways

Care to name a single universal thing in human relationships?

No

Then our disagreement as to what is implied by the argument that morality is subjective is purely semantic.

My point still holds: if I am right and universalization is a binding requirement, then that argument cannot hold.

Then our disagreement as to what is implied by the argument that morality is subjective is purely semantic.

My point still holds: if I am right and universalization is a binding requirement, then that argument cannot hold.Yes, I can agree with this.

Ultimately, I believe that even if morality isn't objective, it is necessary for us to act as though it is.

It implies it, it certainly doesn’t prove it.

But we all talk and act in a way that implies moral relativism is wrong, from disciplining our children or chastising our friends, all the way to how we treat criminals.

That's because people have preferences. Having a moral code does not mean one believes that moral code is objective, universal truth.

Quite.

Folks just don’t see where their conclusions logically take them.

Yeah, OK. I'll bite. Just what "dangerous" place do you believe my conclusions take me?

That’s because people have preferences. Having a moral code does not mean one believes that moral code is objective, universal truth.
Obviously, and I’d like to point out that (at the moment) I’m only claiming that moral judgement seems objective, i.e. that in the things we say and do, we display a belief that moral judgement applies to everyone; that we are concerned about getting the answers to moral questions right, which seems to imply that there are correct answers to moral questions; that, as Michael Smith says, we feel that “absent some relevant differences in their circumstances, what counts as an adequate response to one person’s case must count as an adequate response in another’s”.

I’m not currently going onto argue towards any metaphysical position on moral facts. I don’t hold a cohesive opinion as of yet of such an issue.

Yeah, OK. I’ll bite. Just what “dangerous” place do you believe my conclusions take me?
Well, if you take moral relativism seriously, if you feel that morals are merely preferences or dispositions, then you have very little scope for moral condemnation. All you’re saying by, for example, ‘killing innocents is wrong’ is ‘I dislike killing innocents’.

Thus, if I kill a child in cold blood, all you can say is that you dislike what I did, and I can retort that I liked what I did. You can’t attempt to try me or punish me without some recognition that morality isn’t totally relative; you’d have to argue that what is a wrong action in your eyes is also a wrong action when I commit it.

Moreover, practices in the past, such as genocide, slavery, etc., can only be said to be, in your opinion, dislikeable. They aren’t ‘wrong’ actions because that would presume a relaxation of relativism.

Any moral judgement becomes moot.

that we are concerned about getting the answers to moral questions right, which seems to imply that there are correct answers to moral questions;

Only that there are correct answers to moral questions for us. That is to say, this only shows that we think there is a standard. It does not tell us whether this standard is subjective or objective, absolute or culturally or individually relative.

Thus, if I kill a child in cold blood, all you can say is that you dislike what I did, and I can retort that I liked what I did.

You're assuming into a simplistic conception of morality that some subjectivists have bought into, but as a whole, they need not accept.

The subjectivist argument need not be that morality is the same as "liking" or "not liking"--indeed, any such attempt would probably be very weak. There is nothing inconsistent in my saying that I really like eating chicken, but I think it is wrong. The argument instead can assert not an equivalence, but merely a parallel character: our moral judgments are like our tastes in that they are subjective (and in grasping this subjectivity we can think about our tastes as an example), but they are not the same in that they are a different kind of judgment.

We can (subjectively) like things that we find (subjectively) to be wrong.

You can’t attempt to try me or punish me without some recognition that morality isn’t totally relative; you’d have to argue that what is a wrong action in your eyes is also a wrong action when I commit it.

No, he wouldn't.

Here your example of "like" works fine, in analyzing the kind of subjectivity we're talking about. I don't like the killing of children; I don't like it when I do it and I don't like it when you do it. This is "subjective" in that it is me who doesn't like it, not some objective "liking", but it still applies both to me and to you: I don't like it in your case any more than I like it in mine.

The same can be true of subjective morality: we can apply it universally without believing that it derives from some standard that is "universal" in the sense of "absolute."

Only that there are correct answers to moral questions for us.
I don’t believe it does.

It seems very odd to say something is ‘right’, yet only mean by it ‘right for me’. And as I’ve noted, our entire legal system, the way we chastise our friends and our children, etc., seems to show that our conception of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ goes further than ‘right for me’ or ‘wrong for me’. The vast majority of people, I’d wager, agree that if you or I, under the same circumstances/motivations, each murder our respective brother, it would be fair and just to give us the same punishment; to say that both of us have done a wrong act.

The way we use moral language doesn’t, I realise, conclude the argument. But it’s an interesting, and important point to note.

The subjectivist argument...
Woah there, cowboy!

Are we talking moral subjectivity or moral relativity? Because I wouldn’t argue (totally) against the idea that morality is subjective, or at least I wouldn’t argue against the idea that one’s moral views are subject to the whims of passion, environmental factors, etc.

However, I would argue against the idea that morality is simply relative to each individual. There’s an obvious big difference between the two, and before we perhaps get into a pointless argument ignoring the difference (and as much of the rest of your post deals with subjectivity, not relativity) could I take the liberty of asking you to rephrase your position so that we’re on the same page?

I believe moral relativism is a particularly euphemistic way of saying, "If it benefits me and hurts you I will fuck you over without hesitation."

I believe moral relativism is a particularly slimy way of saying, "If it benefits me and hurts you I will fuck you over."

Thats strange since that seemingly has nothing to do with moral relativism what so ever. Unless you are saying that it is used (poorly) as an excuse to justify such an action?

Thats strange since that seemingly has nothing to do with moral relativism what so ever. Unless you are saying that it is used (poorly) as an excuse to justify such an action?

Yes, in my experience, it usually is used in precisely that context.

I believe moral relativism is a particularly slimy way of saying, “If it benefits me and hurts you I will fuck you over without hesitation.”
It certainly allows for a similar sort of view, but I’m sure many well-meaning people think it’s a positive doctrine to adopt. Simon Blackburn called it something along the lines of the “fresher’s curse”, alluding to the number of philosophy undergrads who are shocked that anyone wouldn’t hold relativism to be true.

It seems very odd to say something is ‘right’, yet only mean by it ‘right for me’. And as I’ve noted, our entire legal system, the way we chastise our friends and our children, etc., seems to show that our conception of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ goes further than ‘right for me’ or ‘wrong for me’. The vast majority of people, I’d wager, agree that if you or I, under the same circumstances/motivations, each murder our respective brother, it would be fair and just to give us the same punishment; to say that both of us have done a wrong act.

Yes, but you're still confusing two different things. This was my major point in the rest of my post, and why I don't think your distinction between "subjective" and "relative" holds much relevance.

Again: take your earlier example of liking or not liking child murder. I can say, perfectly consistently, that I don't like child murder when anyone does it while at the same time asserting that there is no absolute standard behind my dislike--it is a matter relative to the individual, to my personal likes and dislikes.

I don't ever like child murder--I dislike it for everyone, not just for me--but I don't assert that in that dislike I am participating in an absolute standard of "like" and "dislike."

Are we talking moral subjectivity or moral relativity? Because I wouldn’t argue (totally) against the idea that morality is subjective, or at least I wouldn’t argue against the idea that one’s moral views are subject to the whims of passion, environmental factors, etc.

Yes, of course.

The question is whether we have an independent standard beyond those things. If we do, "my morals" and "your morals" may be influenced by subjective factors (just as our beliefs as to matters of objective scientific truth might be), but they still can be judged by an objective (absolute) standard.

The subjectivist argument is that there is no such standard: morality's grounding is subjective, a matter of subjective attitudes in the same sense that a person's like or dislike for an apple is.

There’s an obvious big difference between the two

There are ways you can draw a distinction (though certainly the two are not exclusive), but an argument that morality is absolute denies both: it asserts that there is an independent standard that is beyond our subjective feelings and that is not relative to culture or to the individual.

Again: take your earlier example of liking or not liking child murder. I can say, perfectly consistently, that I don’t like child murder when anyone does it while at the same time asserting that there is no absolute standard behind my dislike—it is a matter relative to the individual, to my personal likes and dislikes.
OK, I see what you mean, and I indeed was a bit vague in my definitions.

But that still doesn’t clear up the problem of being unable to condemn someone for an act beyond ‘I dislike what you are doing’.

The question is whether we have an independent standard beyond those things. If we do, “my morals” and “your morals” may be influenced by subjective factors (just as our beliefs as to matters of objective scientific truth might be), but they still can be judged by an objective (absolute) standard.
Sure, though the relativist would deny this (as you note).

There are ways you can draw a distinction (though certainly the two are not exclusive), but an argument that morality is absolute denies both: it asserts that there is an independent standard that is beyond our subjective feelings and that is not relative to culture or to the individual.
Yes, which puts me in a pickle.

I don’t agree that (or at least, I intensely dislike, and find unworkable, the conclusions that follow from) either ‘there is no standard that is beyond our subjective feelings’ or ‘morality is relative to culture or to the individual’, which puts me in the absolutist camp, it seems.

Though I haven’t worked out my stance on a number of important issues, including the metaphysical status of moral facts.

But then, that’s why I’m enjoying metaethics so much this term. :p

OK, I see what you mean, and I indeed was a bit vague in my definitions.

But that still doesn’t clear up the problem of being unable to condemn someone for an act beyond ‘I dislike what you are doing’.

No, the solution for that is different: the subjectivist/relativist/non-cognitivist/whatever must argue that judgments of "wrong" are not equivalent to judgments of taste, but rather are simply parallel in their subjective character.

In contemplating attractive people, I feel subjective pleasure; in contemplating solidarity and mutual aid, I feel subjective rightness.

I don’t agree that (or at least, I intensely dislike, and find unworkable, the conclusions that follow from) either ‘there is no standard that is beyond our subjective feelings’ or ‘morality is relative to culture or to the individual’, which puts me in the absolutist camp, it seems.

Me, too... though actually, for me the realization of the problematic nature of relativist conclusions and the acceptance of a positive argument for an absolute moral standard very nearly coincided.

That was quite convenient. Had it happened differently, there would have been many more sleepless nights and mental frustrations.

Care to name a single universal thing in human relationships?
The human.

Care to name a single universal thing in human relationships?

Breaking one's word or violating the terms of an oath is a universally immoral action. No culture on Earth has been found that condones it or sees it as an acceptable course of action.

Obviously, and I’d like to point out that (at the moment) I’m only claiming that moral judgement seems objective, i.e. that in the things we say and do, we display a belief that moral judgement applies to everyone; that we are concerned about getting the answers to moral questions right, which seems to imply that there are correct answers to moral questions

But since everyone has different "correct answers" why would that show there are objectively correct answers, and not that people simply have convictions and think their way is the best way?

Well, if you take moral relativism seriously, if you feel that morals are merely preferences or dispositions, then you have very little scope for moral condemnation. All you’re saying by, for example, ‘killing innocents is wrong’ is ‘I dislike killing innocents’.

Indeed. Of course, whether you say it one way - 'it is objectively wrong' - or another - 'I believe it to be wrong' - it's the same general message.

To my point of view, people who say it the first way ARE saying it the latter way, they just don't always know it. ;) So the strengths of moral condemnations are based less on the verbage and philosophical position and more on whether the condemner convinces me.

Thus, if I kill a child in cold blood, all you can say is that you dislike what I did, and I can retort that I liked what I did.

True. It comes down to enforcement and/or persuasion. Most people don't need to be persuaded that what you did in this situation would be wrong, and most societies would use legal punishment against you. But logically speaking here, just because something is believed by many, and just because it is backed with the threat of force, doesn't mean it is true.

You can’t attempt to try me or punish me without some recognition that morality isn’t totally relative; you’d have to argue that what is a wrong action in your eyes is also a wrong action when I commit it.

The latter doesn't amount to the former. I may personally believe X is wrong, so obviously unless I'm being inconsistent I will tend to believe X is wrong when you commit it as when I do. That only means I'm being egotistical about my beliefs because I tend to believe I'm right and because I like for the world to adapt to my beliefs and positions and needs and wants. Which is what everyone does, is it not?

Moreover, practices in the past, such as genocide, slavery, etc., can only be said to be, in your opinion, dislikeable. They aren’t ‘wrong’ actions because that would presume a relaxation of relativism.

Well, if you were to say, "I really dislike slavery," and I were to say, "Slavery is wrong," in what way is what you said less relevant? You'll still fight against it, the Civil War will still happen, and most people will still tend to agree with you. The people who like slavery and/or believe it 'right' will also be doing the same general things, only on the opposite side.

Seems to me that neither position inherently leads to more "dangerous" situations than the other. There is no logical reason for me to dislike - move against - condemn - be angered and shocked by - slavery, any less. (Or more).

Any moral judgement becomes moot.

Moral judgements are often moot. Plenty of people I judge to be wrong, foul, stupid, etc etc. Do they care? Does the world? No and no. It only matters when enough people get together, and start making laws, or Commandments. Enforcement is what makes moral judgements meaningful (though not necessarily correct!).

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?

Yes and yes.

But since everyone has different “correct answers” why would that show there are objectively correct answers, and not that people simply have convictions and think their way is the best way?
It doesn’t, as I’ve said before, prove that there are objectively correct answers, but individual’s words and actions go beyond the position of relativism. Beyond this, all of our social institutions are set up to be non-relativist (surely the judge in his/her ruling is saying ‘action X is wrong’, not ‘I personally dislike action X’), and if we (well, you :p) maintain that relativism is correct, then we’ve got to seriously re-think our legal and education system for a start.

Indeed. Of course, whether you say it one way–‘it is objectively wrong’–or another–‘I believe it to be wrong’–it’s the same general message.
It’s distinctively not.

So the strengths of moral condemnations are based less on the verbage and philosophical position and more on whether the condemner convinces me.
So the condemner convinces you. What next? You want to impose an arbitrary punishment based upon your own personal likes and dislikes?

True. It comes down to enforcement and/or persuasion. Most people don’t need to be persuaded that what you did in this situation would be wrong, and most societies would use legal punishment against you. But logically speaking here, just because something is believed by many, and just because it is backed with the threat of force, doesn’t mean it is true.
Yes... but we’re again back at the tricky position of seeing punishment as merely an enforcement of whims and desires, albeit the whims and desires of a majority.

I may personally believe X is wrong, so obviously unless I’m being inconsistent I will tend to believe X is wrong when you commit it as when I do.
Sure, but your condemnation carries no moral weight.

That only means I’m being egotistical about my beliefs because I tend to believe I’m right and because I like for the world to adapt to my beliefs and positions and needs and wants. Which is what everyone does, is it not?
Arguably not, but lets leave that for another thread.

Well, if you were to say, “I really dislike slavery,” and I were to say, “Slavery is wrong,” in what way is what you said less relevant?
I could not, legitimately, condemn or punish on the account I hold. If I were to do so, I would merely be enforcing my own personal desires, or the desires of a group of people, onto others.

From my point-of-view, it would be as illegitimate as forcing you to only listen to Tchaikovsky and Kate Bush, because that’s what I desire and like.

You’ll still fight against it, the Civil War will still happen, and most people will still tend to agree with you.
But that struggle, the Civil War et al, is completely illegitimate. Those who believed slavery is right, and wished to do so are, on the relativist’s account, perfectly within their right to do so.

Seems to me that neither position inherently leads to more “dangerous” situations than the other.
That’s only based on the assumption, I believe, that the majority of people, and the force of the state, agree with your likes and dislikes. To take a more up-to-date example, (arguably) the majority of people and the force of the state in the US is against gay rights. You’re effectively saying that that’s a fine situation; there’s no moral argument to be had there.

Personally, tyranny of the majority is not a fun way to deal with moral arguments.

There is no logical reason for me to dislike–move against–condemn–be angered and shocked by–slavery, any less. (Or more).
And you’re OK with that? Rather than try and prevent me from enslaving people, you’re fine with standing back and letting me get on with my own preferences?

It seems to me that the logical conclusion of your position would be to support the release of all prisoners; they are, according to the relativist, merely ‘prisoners of conscience’.

Moral judgements are often moot. Plenty of people I judge to be wrong, foul, stupid, etc etc. Do they care? Does the world? No and no.
I take a less defeatist attitude.

It only matters when enough people get together, and start making laws, or Commandments. Enforcement is what makes moral judgements meaningful (though not necessarily correct!).
That just seems such a bizarre position to hold, supportive of tyranny of the majority or authority in general.

The human.

Nothing universal about humans, sorry. They keep changing all the time.

Breaking one's word or violating the terms of an oath is a universally immoral action. No culture on Earth has been found that condones it or sees it as an acceptable course of action.

You'll find that most cultures did. Not necessarily between equals, but words given or oaths sworn to members of other cultures usually weren't worth much. And that was, at times, regarded as perfectly acceptable.

Nothing universal about humans, sorry.
Here’s (http://condor.depaul.edu/~mfiddler/hyphen/humunivers.htm) over two hundred things which are universal, at least to human society.

Yes, and yes.

I believe moral relativism is a particularly euphemistic way of saying, "If it benefits me and hurts you I will fuck you over without hesitation."
I don't think that's got anything to do with moral relativism, since I'm just as likely to hear it from moral objectivists. It's just that moral objectivists tend to claim that fucking over another person is Objectively Right, while the relativist doesn't.

I think what you are describing is the behavior of jerks. Some jerks are moral relativists, some are moral objectivists. Jerks tend to fit their philosophy to their jerkishness.

As Cabra West stated in another thread, "we were moral long before we invented god".
The existence of God has arguably even more problems for moral objectivity, via the Euthyphro Dilemma (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma).

Generally I’m less flexible about ethics than about morals.
What’s the difference between the two?

To me, they’re synonyms.

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?



As Cabra West stated in another thread, "we were moral long before we invented god". Hence, no absolute source for morals (and ethics). Since every (thinking) human has ideas of his own, yes, morals are relative.

Do I support moral relativism... it depends. I try to have a flexible approach to the moral relativism issue. I call it "metarelativism".
Generally I'm less flexible about ethics than about morals.

As Cabra West stated in another thread, "we were moral long before we invented god". Hence, no absolute source for morals (and ethics).

God would not provide us with an absolute source for morals even if He existed, and He does not.

It does not follow that there is no source. He is not the only possibility.

Since every (thinking) human has ideas of his own, yes, morals are relative.

I have my own ideas about economics. My brother has different ideas, also his own. Does it follow that there is only "relative" truth to, say, the question of whether or not the minimum wage causes unemployment?

What matters is not "ownership" of the ideas, but the standard under which we accept them.

I have my own ideas about economics. My brother has different ideas, also his own. Does it follow that there is only "relative" truth to, say, the question of whether or not the minimum wage causes unemployment?

What matters is not "ownership" of the ideas, but the standard under which we accept them.
Is there an objectively right answer to the question, "Which flavor of ice cream tastes best?"

Think of it this way: what is Utopia? Is there one right answer, one image of Utopia that MUST be correct? I don't think so, and thus it seems perfectly sensible to me that there would also not be any one right answer when it comes to morality. Each individual has a different ideal, so it is totally reasonable for us each to take different paths toward our ideals.

It does not follow that there is no source. He is not the only possibility.
Since we don't have a logical-mathematical moral/ethical system (yet), the only possibility for an ultimate non-relative moral source is the ultimate irrational, id est god.


I have my own ideas about economics. My brother has different ideas, also his own. Does it follow that there is only "relative" truth to, say, the question of whether or not the minimum wage causes unemployment?

This doesn't belong to the field of "moral" or of "ethics". It belongs to social economics, which is (partly) a science.

What matters is not "ownership" of the ideas, but the standard under which we accept them.
Then you're discussing logics. Not morals.

Is there an objectively right answer to the question, “Which flavor of ice cream tastes best?”
No, but then the sciences and (as I and others argue) morality aren’t in the same league as likes and dislikes

and if we (well, you :p) maintain that relativism is correct, then we’ve got to seriously re-think our legal and education system for a start.

That's right.

For starters, we begin to have problems with the idea of "desert": if there is no objective standard for accessing moral truth, how can we hold someone at fault for not abiding by it?

Education-wise, it seems to change how we should approach instilling ethics: if all the standards are relative, we must ensure that the relative standard they get is the right one. The security of freedom--that in a free society, free expression will lead to truth prevailing--is no longer sufficient, because there is no "truth."

Without ideals that we as a society are collectively bound to accept, we are left with the worst kind of pluralism: a proliferation of incompatible moral beliefs that ceaselessly conflict with one another, resulting in, at best, a tenuous compromise instead of genuine consensus. Without an objective moral standard, the only solution here is indoctrination: binding people to the relevant ideals externally, rather than appealing to an internal standard (like rationality) that truly respects their autonomy.

Since we don't have a logical-mathematical moral/ethical system (yet)

I don't know--there are plenty of arguments out there. There is no reason to discount the possibility, in any case.

This doesn't belong to the field of "moral" or of "ethics".

Obviously not. The point of the analogy is that people can think for themselves without truth becoming relative.

Is there an objectively right answer to the question, "Which flavor of ice cream tastes best?"

Obviously not. Not everything is objective.

Think of it this way: what is Utopia? Is there one right answer, one image of Utopia that MUST be correct?

No, but I'm sure both of us can think of wrong answers.

I think a lot of questions aren't truly moral ones but really have only to do with what you are taught and what others think of you - that's the relative stuff that can change with time and culture. It's ridiculous to really say that one's stay on earth has been bad because I haven't worn a hijab.

It's not so ridiculous to say that my stay on earth has been bad if I killed a bunch of people, or if I ended up being dead weight to be lifted by everyone else. Those are objective things that have objective consequences, regardless of the observer.

As for the question of how to arrive at this whittled-down, objective* code of morality I tend to go with the idea that it needs to have as its goal one's happiness (life being in most cases a precondition of that) but also the consistency of being valid if repeated indefinitely or if alone.

Of course, that doesn't take into account the is-ought "problem", but to be honest, that seems to me just a ridiculous notion to start with. We are, our reason is a method that requires inputs that are and the consequences of following a moral code are. But none of these can tell us anything about the content of the moral code? Then what can?

*Objective in the sense that any human should follow it. As other beings have different requirements for surviving and living, it makes sense that their moral code would be different. Though most animals aren't actually capable of making reasoned decisions involving good or evil, so they don't really have moral codes to answer moral questions.

I don't know--there are plenty of arguments out there. There is no reason to discount the possibility, in any case.

Of course. Anyway, at the current state there isn't yet - proof is that we're undecided about it.

Obviously not. The point of the analogy is that people can think for themselves without truth becoming relative.
It depends on the logical methods you're using, anyway.

Simple questions (not really):

Do you believe in moral relativism?
Do you support moral relativism?

EDIT: thanks for the time warp, Jolt.

Yes all morlaity is relative.

What is there to support or not? Thats like asking do you support that red is red.

What is there to support or not? Thats like asking do you support that red is red.
As Soheran and I have been discussing (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=13440809&postcount=132), the institutions of the societies we live in, along with a huge amount of our actions and words, don’t support the relativist’s thesis.

As Soheran and I have been discussing (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=13440809&postcount=132), the institutions of the societies we live in, along with a huge amount of our actions and words, don’t support the relativist’s thesis.

Well now, it would seem that is certianly the case when we talk of ethical systems, but morality being that it is a whole personal thing would be differant.

If a socialpath feels no guilt in the killing of another human, that is his morality in play. According to his moral system it is not immorral to kill. According to the socity that he lives in it may well be that his actions are considered un-ethical.

All moral systems are personal ones, and so wholey relative.

As Soheran and I have been discussing (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=13440809&postcount=132), the institutions of the societies we live in, along with a huge amount of our actions and words, don’t support the relativist’s thesis.

Because when a state has decided that it wishes to enforce laws, it must mean that those laws are the only correct ones in the grand scheme of the universe ?

Because when a state has decided that it wishes to enforce laws, it must mean that those laws are the only correct ones in the grand scheme of the universe ?
I never implied that.

But a state punishing individuals, or condemning the actions of other states, implies that they believe, at the very least, that moral judgement is not relative; that we can legitimately criticise others for wrong actions.

Either that, or they support the rather tyrannical notion that the state can legitimately punish people for actions the government merely dislikes, equatable to punishing you for liking a flavour of ice cream I dislike.

I never implied that.

But a state punishing individuals, or condemning the actions of other states, implies that they believe, at the very least, that moral judgement is not relative; that we can legitimately criticise others for wrong actions.

It does no such thing when condemning individuals. It merely means that "the state" believes certain systems work better than others and that people should be forced into that system. It might benefit from making the population think their system is the only right one, but that is all.

When commenting on the way other states are run however the state is indeed making moral judgments.

Either that, or they support the rather tyrannical notion that the state can legitimately punish people for actions the government merely dislikes, equatable to punishing you for liking a flavour of ice cream I dislike.

What you describe is basicly how nations work, yes. No one ever said reality was nice.
Then again, that implies a moral judgment ;)

It does no such thing when condemning individuals.
It does from a metaethical point-of-view.

What you describe is basicly how nations work, yes. No one ever said reality was nice.
No, and neither is the reality of the relativist’s position coherent.

Heh.

Yes it is.

No it isn't.

Ohh yes it is!

No, no you're wrong, it isn't!

YES IT IS!

NO IT ISN'T!

Of course, that doesn't take into account the is-ought "problem", but to be honest, that seems to me just a ridiculous notion to start with. We are, our reason is a method that requires inputs that are and the consequences of following a moral code are. But none of these can tell us anything about the content of the moral code? Then what can?Does this mean that the only moral actions are the ones that lead to moral outcomes?

I think it's obvious that people have different morals in different cultures. On the other hand I don't think this means that certain cultures can't be wrong. You can't say for instance that female genital mutilation is right because it's part of my culture and someone can't criticize it because, if they did, they would only be saying what is right in their culture.
People can debate about ethics and test their systems on consistency, universability, the amount of intrinsic good being created etc. I think the ethical system that scores highest on these criteria would be best (although there might be others, I only thought about it for a small time).

It doesn’t, as I’ve said before, prove that there are objectively correct answers, but individual’s words and actions go beyond the position of relativism.

Most people's words and actions go beyond any philosophical position. For example, you didn't say it "proved" it, but that it "implied" that dangerous end logically. Well, people's words and actions go beyond logic, too.

It might be logical, if I believe in God, to hurry up and die so I can go to Heaven and live for eternity with harps and shit. So why aren't all theists who believe in an afterlife rushing off to go get it? Wouldn't they prefer to be in a place of eternal life and every conceivable pleasure? But, people have survival instincts. Similarly, people have preferences. These things tend to get in the way of achieving some sort of philosophical-based, logical conclusion.

Beyond this, all of our social institutions are set up to be non-relativist (surely the judge in his/her ruling is saying ‘action X is wrong’, not ‘I personally dislike action X’)

What he is in effect saying is, "I believe it's wrong, and I happen to be the one chosen in this system to enforce legal rights and wrongs, so nyah." Judges make different rulings based solely on their own beliefs all the time.

But perhaps the system is set up to be non-relativist. So what? It was set up by devout Christians who believed in absolute morality anyway. It might have been set up to further theistic interests too, that doesn't mean that's the way it really is.

, and if we (well, you :p) maintain that relativism is correct, then we’ve got to seriously re-think our legal and education system for a start.

The system works well enough for the most people. Of course there are aspects we can change, room for improvement, but that's not because of moral relativism.

Moral relativism doesn't mean one can't prefer, and support, a single moral idea. It just means that one recognizes that moral ideas are a social and subjective thing.

It’s distinctively not.

As far as practicality is concerned, it isn't. Of course there's a philosophical difference, but it's not meaningful as far as I can see.

So the condemner convinces you. What next? You want to impose an arbitrary punishment based upon your own personal likes and dislikes?

Well... yes? Isn't that what justice is? Like some people think dragging a black man from behind a pickup truck is justice. I don't, most people don't, but this is all about punishments based on personal likes... multiplied by a majority and endorsed by society and state.

Arbitrary, hopefully not, but often it is as far as punishments go. Look how many different methods we have of execution.

Yes... but we’re again back at the tricky position of seeing punishment as merely an enforcement of whims and desires, albeit the whims and desires of a majority.

Well, "whims" to address the problems caused by crime, "desires" (for many people) to rehabilitate criminals by using punishment as a learning tool as well. It generally doesn't tend to be just whimsical, but of course it does depend on a majority. Not simply because of democracy, but because any social group tends to from its rules from what most people think or feel.

I'm not sure what's tricky about the position.

Sure, but your condemnation carries no moral weight.

That's why when condemning, I leave out the "I believe" part. ;)

I tend to assume that morals, ideas, preferences, are implied as subjective, relative things by default. If someone disagrees, it usually doesn't matter though - until they start saying WHY they think X is wrong, and it turns out they believe it's wrong because Xenu says so. That's when their objective morality paradigm becomes an issue of disagreement.

I could not, legitimately, condemn or punish on the account I hold. If I were to do so, I would merely be enforcing my own personal desires, or the desires of a group of people, onto others.

"Merely." But you would be! You are! It happens all the time, what's wrong with it? Recognize it, embrace it, don't pretend to be above it. When the US invaded Germany we were enforcing our desires on the Germans. They didn't want to be invaded. But we felt that it was necessary for a number of reasons.

So it's not just about "whims" or "personal desires," it's about thoughts and positions and arguments.

But that struggle, the Civil War et al, is completely illegitimate. Those who believed slavery is right, and wished to do so are, on the relativist’s account, perfectly within their right to do so.

They are within their right to believe slavery is right, I am within my right to believe it is wrong. How does this illegitimatize the civil war? Do you really think there has to be some sort of universal, One True Belief in order for such things to be legitimate?

That’s only based on the assumption, I believe, that the majority of people, and the force of the state, agree with your likes and dislikes. To take a more up-to-date example, (arguably) the majority of people and the force of the state in the US is against gay rights. You’re effectively saying that that’s a fine situation; there’s no moral argument to be had there.

Of course there are moral arguments to be had. You're trying to say that moral relativism = support of or complacence with any and all morals. That isn't the way it is. It's also not tyranny of the majority because again, just because something is believed by a majority doesn't make it true - and if I happen to be in a minority, I am still gonna argue for *my* position! I.E I will argue for gay rights. I just won't argue that the basis of gay rights is "Because it's right" anymore than I would argue something is immoral "cuz it's just wrong."

Personally, tyranny of the majority is not a fun way to deal with moral arguments.

Hmm, but that tends to be how it's solved. I wish it wasn't like that myself. But you ever find yourself with a group of people, a classroom for example, and you do something uncool, perhaps immoral, wrong, or strange? The moral argument is not dealt with rationally and with debating, it's dealt with by a swift tyrannical response from the majority.

And you’re OK with that? Rather than try and prevent me from enslaving people, you’re fine with standing back and letting me get on with my own preferences?

That's not what I said. I said "There is no logical reason for me to dislike–move against–condemn–be angered and shocked by–slavery, any less. (Or more)." My position does not "logically" imply anything.

I might believe X is wrong, that doesn't mean it is logical for me to do any and all things to stop X. More to the point, it isn't reasonable (or generally, legal). Some people think gay marriage is wrong; if they go out and kill two gay people at their wedding, is that a logical course of action? Perhaps it is, but simply having the position doesn't mean someone will do that action.

Similarly, just because I have a position (morals are relative; personal opposition to slavery) doesn't mean I have to sit back and let you enslave people. Nor does it mean I will necessarily charge out and kill you. For example, you might be some slave owner in a third-world country. Let's face it - I will never be able to do anything about you, so it's not logical to conclude that I will. Logic isn't guiding people's actions, it's all about preferences. I prefer not to see slavery in my own country: Civil War.

It seems to me that the logical conclusion of your position would be to support the release of all prisoners; they are, according to the relativist, merely ‘prisoners of conscience’.

They are a threat to me and people I like. Why would it be logical for me to release them prematurely?

That just seems such a bizarre position to hold, supportive of tyranny of the majority or authority in general.

I just recognize that's how things tend to work; doesn't mean I prefer it that way. Personally, I would rather there is a tyranny of Me, and everything I like and say goes. :p

I never implied that.

But a state punishing individuals, or condemning the actions of other states, implies that they believe, at the very least, that moral judgement is not relative; that we can legitimately criticise others for wrong actions.


No it doesn't. As I have already said, there are plenty of reasons to condemn people, for utilitarian reasons for instance, or for pragmatic reasons. None of which implies that morals are absolute.

Most people's words and actions go beyond any philosophical position. For example, you didn't say it "proved" it, but that it "implied" that dangerous end logically. Well, people's words and actions go beyond logic, too.
Sure, but there's a large school of philosophical thought, of which I'm quite sympathetic too, that argues we should examine what people mean, or are trying to say, in everyday speech.

Most folks, though moral relativism is quite a popular view, don't speak or act as if they hold moral relativism to be true. Moreover, the institutions in our societies do the same. Either they should change their actions and the way these institutions are run, or examine if they truly believe in relativism.

It might be logical, if I believe in God, to hurry up and die so I can go to Heaven and live for eternity with harps and shit. So why aren't all theists who believe in an afterlife rushing off to go get it?
Because, in general, suicide is prohibited by religion.

What he is in effect saying is, "I believe it's wrong, and I happen to be the one chosen in this system to enforce legal rights and wrongs, so nyah." Judges make different rulings based solely on their own beliefs all the time.
As I have problems with common law, as well as with relativism, I obviously have problems with that.

Of course there are aspects we can change, room for improvement, but that's not because of moral relativism.
Well, you put yourself in a rather irrational position.

Moral relativism doesn't mean one can't prefer, and support, a single moral idea. It just means that one recognizes that moral ideas are a social and subjective thing
And that one should recognise that it's completely illegitimate to condemn others.

As far as practicality is concerned, it isn't. Of course there's a philosophical difference, but it's not meaningful as far as I can see.
Then I'd recommend you get your 'eyesight' tested. :p

If we live a philosophically meaningless life, I'd say we live a poor life indeed.

Well... yes? Isn't that what justice is? Like some people think dragging a black man from behind a pickup truck is justice.
It most certainly isn't.

Happily, I can condemn such action. Relativists can legitimately merely express their dislike, then shrug their shoulders and move on.

Well, "whims" to address the problems caused by crime, "desires" (for many people) to rehabilitate criminals by using punishment as a learning tool as well.
'Rehabilitate'? You mean, as a relativist, 'enforce your opinions illegitimately onto someone who was merely following their legitimate desires'.

I'm not sure what's tricky about the position.
It lacks any moral legitimacy; it's completely arbitrary and thus tyrannical.

That's fairly tricky.

They are within their right to believe slavery is right, I am within my right to believe it is wrong. How does this illegitimatize the civil war? Do you really think there has to be some sort of universal, One True Belief in order for such things to be legitimate?
I think we need a standpoint before we can say something is wrong. If you believe people are perfectly within their rights to think slavery is right, and thus perfectly within their rights to own slaves, then you should be morally opposed to an action like the US Civil War which, in a roundabout way, stripped people of those rights.

Unless you hold no coherent moral position, as you seem to do.

You're trying to say that moral relativism = support of or complacence with any and all morals.
Yes, of course it is. You may not agree with someone else's moral code but, if you're a coherent relativist, you won't interfere with said code and the actions that follow from it.

Any interference is merely imposing your beliefs on others simply because they're your beliefs; a tyrannical measure.

I just won't argue that the basis of gay rights is "Because it's right" anymore than I would argue something is immoral "cuz it's just wrong."
How utterly bizarre...

Similarly, just because I have a position (morals are relative; personal opposition to slavery) doesn't mean I have to sit back and let you enslave people.
If you do so, then your acting completely illegitimately.

They are a threat to me and people I like. Why would it be logical for me to release them prematurely?
Because the whole legal system is set up to punish people for wrong actions. If you believe there can never be wrong actions, merely actions one likes or dislikes, then there's no legitimate argument for locking up people for expressing their likes and dislikes.

If you're acting out of pure prudence, then I don't see any difference morally between locking up people because they might kill you, and locking people up because they might get in front of you in the queue for the shops.

Personally, I would rather there is a tyranny of Me, and everything I like and say goes. :p
Then I would condemn you utterly, if you're serious.

No it doesn't. As I have already said, there are plenty of reasons to condemn people, for utilitarian reasons for instance, or for pragmatic reasons.
None of these give any reason to label someone as 'wrong' or 'bad', which the legal system does.

Sure, but there's a large school of philosophical thought, of which I'm quite sympathetic too, that argues we should examine what people mean, or are trying to say, in everyday speech.

Most folks, though moral relativism is quite a popular view, don't speak or act as if they hold moral relativism to be true. Moreover, the institutions in our societies do the same. Either they should change their actions and the way these institutions are run, or examine if they truly believe in relativism.

In what way do you think a moral relativist should act? Say "I believe" before every opinion just to make sure it's not forgotten? The end result is the same.

Because, in general, suicide is prohibited by religion.

Indeed, but I rather suspect that religions prohibit suicide specifically for that reason. They realized that the prospect of an afterlife sounded too good... they needed an extra commandment to justify a survival instinct they would not be able to overwhelm.

As I have problems with common law, as well as with relativism, I obviously have problems with that.

Well, OK. But the point is that it's how it happens. Not just judges, but anyone. We aren't working with some objective facts about morality because there aren't any. Even if 90% of us can agree on moral issues enough to make legal systems or religions work, that's still just essentially a social contract.

Well, you put yourself in a rather irrational position.

Oh?

And that one should recognise that it's completely illegitimate to condemn others.

Why is it illegitimate?

Then I'd recommend you get your 'eyesight' tested. :p

If we live a philosophically meaningless life, I'd say we live a poor life indeed.

Yes yes, the unexamined life. Believing in moral relativism doesn't amount to philosophical meaninglessness though. I find more meaning, actually, in trying to wade through the muck and mire of everyone's crazy-assed views and sort it out, than in simplifying it all to Right vs Wrong and That Is That.

It most certainly isn't.

Happily, I can condemn such action. Relativists can legitimately merely express their dislike, then shrug their shoulders and move on.

I can condemn it too. Dragging people behind their trucks is wrong, it's harmful to society, it's perverse, psychologically unhealthful, and of course an unreasonable harm against the victim. See? I just condemned it.

'Rehabilitate'? You mean, as a relativist, 'enforce your opinions illegitimately onto someone who was merely following their legitimate desires'.

It lacks any moral legitimacy; it's completely arbitrary and thus tyrannical.

That's fairly tricky.


"Illegitimately" how? What is your standard for legitimacy? Is it, "condemning by appeal to objective morality is legitimate," because that would be circular reasoning.

As for arbitrariness - no, I don't agree. No more arbitrary than anything you can come up with.

I think we need a standpoint before we can say something is wrong. If you believe people are perfectly within their rights to think slavery is right

Yes! People are within their rights to think WHATEVER THEY WANT. But...

, and thus perfectly within their rights to own slaves

Just because I believe that people can think what they want doesn't mean I think they can DO whatever they want.

, then you should be morally opposed to an action like the US Civil War which, in a roundabout way, stripped people of those rights.

...and in fact, it didn't strip anyone of the right to think slavery is OK. The right to own slaves, yes. But that's a right I'm comfortable taking away.

Unless you hold no coherent moral position, as you seem to do.

I think my moral position is extremely coherent. *I* might not be coherent as far as communicating it effectively to others, especially since you seem to think my position necessitates things it does not.

Yes, of course it is. You may not agree with someone else's moral code but, if you're a coherent relativist, you won't interfere with said code and the actions that follow from it.

Where are you getting this standard for "coherent relativist?" It's like your complaints about being "legitimate."

I just don't understand why you think that moral relativism implies any code of behavior whatsoever. It isn't a code of behavior any more than atheism is.

Any interference is merely imposing your beliefs on others simply because they're your beliefs; a tyrannical measure.

Would it be any less tyrannical to impose my beliefs on others because my beliefs are the True Word of the Lord God (tm)?


How utterly bizarre...

It's not bizarre. "Gay marriage is wrong /right because it's wrong/right" is circular reasoning and I try to avoid that.

If you do so, then your acting completely illegitimately.

I think I'll wait for you to explain this before planting a palm on my face in frustration. :p

Because the whole legal system is set up to punish people for wrong actions. If you believe there can never be wrong actions, merely actions one likes or dislikes, then there's no legitimate argument for locking up people for expressing their likes and dislikes.

If you're acting out of pure prudence, then I don't see any difference morally between locking up people because they might kill you, and locking people up because they might get in front of you in the queue for the shops.

Your mistake is in thinking the legal system is indeed to punish people for "wrongness" in some general, philosophical sense. It's to keep people in line so they do not harm society. Punishment so they do not do it again. What is the inherent difference between locking someone up because they are murderers or because they got in front of me at the shop? None, really. The differences are all on a non-philosophical level.

Then I would condemn you utterly, if you're serious.

I'm somewhat facetious, but I think most people - including yourself - would prefer a world more to their liking, more to their moral and personal preferences, and would try to make such a world happen. Is that not so?

i believe in the avoidance of causing suffering as the basis of any REAL morality.

i don't quite see how or what that would be "relative" to.

but it certainly doesn't encompass putting any idiology or economics or even belief, ahead of it.

=^^=
.../\...

Well yes, obviously. To not do so would be extremely difficult.

Simply put, I believe that most, if not all morality is a social construction and that morals are highly relative (given the lack of an absolute moral code). However, I don't think this view is beneficial to society.

I believe that there are some aspects of morality that are universal, but it is how people interpret and apply those aspects that is relative. We might all agree that, to use my previous example, breaking one's word is wrong, but we're probably all going to disagree to what extent that moral rule applies and what exactly to what it is applicable.

That's generally true; murder is certainly wrong in all cultures, but how wrong it is and what constitutes an act of murder is what is relative.

Well yes, obviously. To not do so would be extremely difficult.

What's "obvious" about moral relativism?

That people have different moral points of view? Sure, but nobody disputes this.

That deciding between these points of view with an independent, "objective" standard is always impossible? That's hardly obvious.

We might all agree that, to use my previous example, breaking one's word is wrong, but we're probably all going to disagree to what extent that moral rule applies and what exactly to what it is applicable.

The fact that certain moral beliefs are more or less universal among humans does not mean that we have escaped relativism. Morality might be relative to the genetic makeup of a species.

The fact that moral beliefs, beyond the very simple ones, are matters of great disagreement does not mean that there are no objectively right answers. There are plenty of questions over which people disagree extensively that nevertheless have objectively right answers and objectively wrong ones.

As Soheran and I have been discussing (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=13440809&postcount=132), the institutions of the societies we live in, along with a huge amount of our actions and words, don’t support the relativist’s thesis.

No... This entire discussion you and the other objectivists have been attacking moral plurality position under the guise that that is the position of moral relativism... You have been engaging in a multi-page strawman argument....

Before I get stuck in GT I thought I’d clear up a point: I haven’t fully realised my position on a number of issues connected with moral realism/objectivism. I heartily disagree with moral relativism, and dislike intensely the consequences it entails, and this puts me in the moral realist/obectivist camp.

Your patience is appreciated. :)

In what way do you think a moral relativist should act? Say “I believe” before every opinion just to make sure it’s not forgotten? The end result is the same.
I don’t think it is at all.

If you hold moral relativism to be true, then you should wish that the legal and educational systems, to give two examples, should reflect this. Moreover, you should be very careful with the language you are using when talkinga bout other’s actions, otherwise you get into the tricky position you’ve found yourself in of classing others’ actions as ‘wrong’ (as you do below), when you simultaneously hold that there is no independent moral standpoint from which to class people’s actions as ‘wrong’ or ‘right’.

(Actually, I don’t believe the relativist’s position is a very persuasive one, once we get down to it, so I suppose I’d actually advise the moral relativist to re-examine their metaethical beliefs.)

Indeed, but I rather suspect that religions prohibit suicide specifically for that reason. They realized that the prospect of an afterlife sounded too good... they needed an extra commandment to justify a survival instinct they would not be able to overwhelm.
Perhaps, it’s an interesting argument.

Though as an atheist, I don’t see why I should waste my time defending arguments whose basic premises I don’t agree with, so I’ll move on.

Well, OK. But the point is that it’s how it happens. Not just judges, but anyone. We aren’t working with some objective facts about morality because there aren’t any.
Begging the question.

Oh?
As I said above, being a moral relativist, you should surely support a legal system that reflects such relativism. Do you not feel any injustice in a system of law and punishment which assumes (wrongly in your opinion) that there is an objective morality?

Why is it illegitimate?
I should have thought that was obvious: one can hardly condemn others, in the sense of ’x is objectively wrong’, while simultaneously holding that morality is relative. The only way out of this is that claiming by condemning others, one is actually saying “I, personally, dislike x”, hardly a correct use of the term ‘condemn’.

Yes yes, the unexamined life. Believing in moral relativism doesn’t amount to philosophical meaninglessness though.
No, and I wasn’t trying to say that. I was more responding to your comment that philosophical differences were “meaningless”.

I find more meaning, actually, in trying to wade through the muck and mire of everyone’s crazy-assed views and sort it out
So do I, I just also don’t believe that the very existence of everyone’s crazy-assed views necessitates moral relativism.

I can condemn it too. Dragging people behind their trucks is wrong, it’s harmful to society, it’s perverse, psychologically unhealthful, and of course an unreasonable harm against the victim.
The highlighted words are inconsistent with your stance as a relativist. Moreover, action x may be ‘harmful to society’, ‘psychologically unhealthy’ or may bring ‘harm against the victim’, but condemning such views as ‘wrong’ places you firmly in the moral realist/objectivist camp.

“Illegitimately” how? What is your standard for legitimacy?
Coherence.

One can’t hold both that moral relativism is true and that it is possible to condemn others (in the strong sense discussed above). Thus condemning of others is illegitimate while you maintain relativism.

Yes! People are within their rights to think WHATEVER THEY WANT. But... Just because I believe that people can think what they want doesn’t mean I think they can DO whatever they want.
How? The only way you can claim people can’t do what they want, while holding moral relativism to be true, is by the completely illegitimate “don’t do it because I said so”. You can’t have it both ways; can’t have moral relativism and still have legitimacy when condemning others.

...and in fact, it didn’t strip anyone of the right to think slavery is OK. The right to own slaves, yes. But that’s a right I’m comfortable taking away.
As long as you accept that you have no moral legitimacy in doing so. You are as morally good/bad (in fact, neutral) as the slave-owner.

Where are you getting this standard for “coherent relativist?” It’s like your complaints about being “legitimate.”
Show me how the relativist can condemn others (again, in the strong sense, which you seem to want to do), and I’ll call you coherent.

Would it be any less tyrannical to impose my beliefs on others because my beliefs are the True Word of the Lord God (tm)?
Nope, but moral realism/objectivism certainly doesn’t entail any religious doctrine, and it’s debatable as to whether the believer who follows a religious moral code can claim to be truly objective (see the Euthyphro Dilemma).

It’s not bizarre. “Gay marriage is wrong /right because it’s wrong/right” is circular reasoning and I try to avoid that.
As we all should, but the above is not what the moral realist claims. It depends on which realist you talk to of course, but two common examples are ‘action x is wrong because of divine rules’ or ‘action x is wrong because of reason’.

Remember, the moral realist is arguing that moral beliefs are like scientific propositions, they are either true or false, as opposed to the moral relativists position that moral beliefs are more like likes and dislikes; analogous with likes and dislikes of art, food, etc.

I think I’ll wait for you to explain this before planting a palm on my face in frustration. :p
:D

See above.

Your mistake is in thinking the legal system is indeed to punish people for “wrongness” in some general, philosophical sense. It’s to keep people in line so they do not harm society. Punishment so they do not do it again.
That’s only one theory of jurisprudence; I subscribe to another.

What is the inherent difference between locking someone up because they are murderers or because they got in front of me at the shop?
Murder is wrong, happening to be in front of you in a queue at the shops isn’t, it’s morally neutral.

Similarly, punishing someone for murder is, if not necessarily correct (depending on your thoughts about punishment), at least justifiable. Punishing someone for simply being in front of you in a queue is hardly justifiable, and completely arbitrary.

I’m somewhat facetious, but I think most people–including yourself–would prefer a world more to their liking, more to their moral and personal preferences, and would try to make such a world happen. Is that not so?
Very probably.

I just disagree that this shows any proof of moral relativism (if that’s what you’re claiming) or that any of these desires are necessarily correct, or that we should let these desires be fulfilled.


No... This entire discussion you and the other objectivists have been attacking moral plurality position under the guise that that is the position of moral relativism... You have been engaging in a multi-page strawman argument....
I don’t see how we have.

Both the moral pluralist and the moral relativist have problems when condemning other’s actions as ‘wrong’. Unless you can show how moral relativism avoids this pitfall, I don’t see any strawmen.

I don’t see how we have.

Both the moral pluralist and the moral relativist have problems when condemning other’s actions as ‘wrong’. Unless you can show how moral relativism avoids this pitfall, I don’t see any strawmen.

A moral relativist would not have a problem with opposing the actions of others that he/she views as wrong... There's no need to avoid this invented "pitfall" of yours, because the pitfall does not actually exist... What is there about moral relativist philosophy which is incompatible with moral contests within society? Answer: Nothing... Discussing a belief in sources morality within society has absolutely nothing to do with how social units will react in the face of contests between opposing views in society.

If it'll make my relatives more moral. Hell yes I'll support it!

I don't understand how anyone can think morality is anything other than relative. Some of it has a biological basis, some of it has a cultural basis, but none of it is innately present in the universe as some kind of literal force or substance that exists outside of people's heads. That's not to say that morality is meaningless or non-existent, of course - anymore than me noting that there is no such thing as a language atom would make me unable to talk or type ;)

but condemning such views as ‘wrong’ places you firmly in the moral realist/objectivist camp.

I think you're begging the question.

You assume that standards of "right" and "wrong" must be objective, but that only makes sense if you presuppose that morality itself must be objective--if you deny moral relativism.

The relativist can get out of the dilemma by arguing that "right" and "wrong" are legitimate concepts, but only relatively; I can call your action "wrong" by my standard of morality just as I can call what you eat "disgusting" by my standard of taste.

We must, however, recognize the limits of this analogy: it does not follow that relative standards of right and wrong are as arbitrary as relative likes and dislikes. They may have no independent foundation, but they are moral claims all the same. The relativist has denied any independent standard. Without any such independent standard, a judgment of arbitrariness can only be made with respect to a relative moral standard... which means that relative moral standards can never be arbitrary with respect to themselves.

So the relativist ends up in an interesting place. Because moral relativism is fundamentally a positive claim (hence "meta-ethical") rather than a normative one, she can reasonably get away with saying that her moral beliefs are perfectly justified, and that some of them can be legitimately imposed upon others. But she is faced with the fact of moral disagreement, and her position requires her to acknowledge that these differences may be fundamentally irreconcilable. She cannot trust "the marketplace of ideas" to bring about a collective appreciation for right, because she denies that the important "objective" factors that triumph in such a marketplace--like reason--can in fact lead us to the right moral conclusions.

How can it be guaranteed that the relatively right ideas will triumph? Only by manipulation of the factors to which morality is supposed to be relative--the cultural influences people receive, for instance. And an excellent excuse for repression is crafted.

The problems do not stop there. A concern for stability, for peace, might lead us to similar conclusions, because we can no longer necessarily expect people to have a similar enough moral basis to get along in society.

Relativists are often accused of taking tolerance and pluralism too far. I maintain the opposite. One major reason I do not like relativist conclusions, true or not, is that, carried out to their full conclusions, they seem to make a rather strong case against tolerance and pluralism.

A very strong assertion of intersubjectivity would avoid much of the practical force for these problems, at least as long as we confine the issue to interaction among the human species... but then, I tend to think that cultural factors play a strong enough role in human thought that relative "common ground" like our shared biology is not enough for us to reach a genuine moral consensus.

A moral relativist would not have a problem with opposing the actions of others that he/she views as wrong...
I’m not saying s/he does, I’m saying s/he has no legitimacy in labelling those actions as anything more than ‘what I consider to be wrong/what I dislike’.

What is there about moral relativist philosophy which is incompatible with moral contests within society? Answer: Nothing...
Again correct, and again I’m not arguing that moral relativism denies the existence of moral arguments (indeed, by the very nature of relativism, this would be a ridiculous position to hold).

Discussing a belief in sources morality within society has absolutely nothing to do with how social units will react in the face of contests between opposing views in society.
I’m sorry, I don’t understand the above sentence.

‘Sources’?

none of it is innately present in the universe as some kind of literal force or substance that exists outside of people's heads.

Few people believe it does anymore. That's why "absolute", if not for its ambiguity, would really be a better word than "objective."

The point is that the standard is independent: it doesn't matter which particular subjective feelings or cultural influences you have in your head, you're still ultimately bound, when thinking about justifying your actions, to recognize certain principles.

Discussing a belief in sources morality within society has absolutely nothing to do with how social units will react in the face of contests between opposing views in society.

Nonsense. If you really believe in a moral framework, you're going to want a society that abides by that moral framework, and you're likely to think that a society that egregiously violates it is not a decent society.

A moral absolutist, in contemplating what to do about these things, has strong reasons to restrain herself: the procedures of a free, pluralistic society tend towards conclusions that will have universal appeal, as an objective ideal of right must. If her particular belief fails, she can reasonably say, "Well, I guess I was wrong", or at least that she can't have enough surety in her rightness that she is justified in dominating society.

A moral relativist is faced with a very different problem. He has no reason to accept that a free, pluralistic society will tend towards the sort of "right" he prefers, because he doesn't think there's any independent standard that will convince others of it. He thus has no reason to accept the judgment of such a society if it turns against his belief system. He has strong reasons, if he fears such a consequence, to turn against his society--to work with others of similar beliefs and impose their will, because he cannot trust those with different influences to ultimately come to similar conclusions.

but none of it is innately present in the universe as some kind of literal force or substance that exists outside of people's heads. Neither does logic.

I’m not saying s/he does, I’m saying s/he has no legitimacy in labelling those actions as anything more than ‘what I consider to be wrong/what I dislike’.


And what more is needed from a personal standpoint past stating a personal viewpoint in opposition to the actions of another or others? Should I be able to speak a word which would make someone immediately die, or cease to exist?

Does this mean that the only moral actions are the ones that lead to moral outcomes?
People can make mistakes, of course.

I would say that we can look at these aforementioned criteria involving things like life, success, happiness and choice and then can decide whether or not an action could rightly have been leading to a moral outcome according to the information available to the agent at that point. If the agent thought that he was doing a good thing ("good" being the objective part, "thought" the subjective one), then the action may not have been successful in hindsight, but the agent wasn't evil either. On the other hand, if there was no realistic chance of the outcome being a good one, the agent was being evil and would be deserving of some sort of punishment.

Which, by the way, would make supplying information and educating good people a good deed in itself. I think that's a nice touch.

And what more is needed from a personal standpoint past stating a personal viewpoint in opposition to the actions of another or others?
The ability to condemn others and their actions as ‘wrong’, ‘right’ or ‘morally neutral’, as opposed to merely expressing preferences.

People can make mistakes, of course.

I would say that we can look at these aforementioned criteria involving things like life, success, happiness and choice and then can decide whether or not an action could rightly have been leading to a moral outcome according to the information available to the agent at that point. If the agent thought that he was doing a good thing ("good" being the objective part, "thought" the subjective one), then the action may not have been successful in hindsight, but the agent wasn't evil either. On the other hand, if there was no realistic chance of the outcome being a good one, the agent was being evil and would be deserving of some sort of punishment.

Which, by the way, would make supplying information and educating good people a good deed in itself. I think that's a nice touch.Ah, I thought you'd have to introduce subjective criteria in there. ("thought") Good enough.

For what it's worth: no and no.

How exactly can one support moral relativism without believing in it, or believe in moral relativism without supporting it? Is it a matter of thinking that "the world would be better if...."?


Perhaps one believes that there is no moral truth period, but understands that humans can only behave as if there were an absolute moral truth or prefers that humans behave as if there were an absolute moral truth.

No, moral relativism is absolutely evil, dehumanising and is against everything we humans are meant to be. Note that are morals are based on our genes which continue to perfect themselves as we speak. Our morals are genetic programs meant to help the human race survive, thus relativism is false because our morals are based on PROVEN SCIENTIFIC FACT! Relativism in any form is a liberal lie out to confuse and brainwash an unsuspecting populace to suit their cause.

That is not morality.

Potentially? I already see dangerous consequences.

How does that compare to the millenniums dominated by moral absolutism?

A person can state perfectly consistently that rape is always wrong relative to her cultural or individual morality.

But don't qualifiers negate any absolute statement? No absolute statement can include an "except".

But don't qualifiers negate any absolute statement?

Depends on what's "absolute" about it.

In this case, it's the range of the prohibition in application, which is not qualified: rape is always wrong.

What is qualified is the standard under which this judgment is made, which is not asserted to be absolute.

The ability to condemn others and their actions as ‘wrong’, ‘right’ or ‘morally neutral’, as opposed to merely expressing preferences.

Oh, well I do not think a single individual should be able to condemn the actions of others in that context... I only think a social group can do that within the context of the group... In such a context I think a judge (operating as an agent of the social organization) can pronounce a "condemnation" (judgement), but it is the sense of the judge speaking on behalf of the society... Or social groups in conflict can do so upon one another, but such in the nature of society in conflict...

Are you honestly arguing that individuals should be able to pronounce judgement outside of any operation as an agent of a socio-political group?

Are you honestly arguing that individuals should be able to pronounce judgement outside of any operation as an agent of a socio-political group?
Yes, because I want to say things such as “slavery is wrong” or “genocide is wrong” in regards to people(s) outside of my socio-political groupings.

Option #6 for me.

Yes, because I want to say things such as “slavery is wrong” or “genocide is wrong” in regards to people(s) outside of my socio-political groupings.

You can, but that is not really any "condemnation" it holds no actual force or power, anymore than saying "I think slavery is wrong" or "I think genocide is wrong"... You simply seem to have a need for your view to be considered objective fact in a contest... Of course, the other side may be just as likely to consider their view objective fact as well...

Option #6 for me.
Moral relativism is the metaethical idea that morality is based on one’s culture/society, and thus that there are no such things as moral ‘facts’; moral statements (such as ‘action x is wrong’) are much like expressions of one’s taste of art, music, food, etc.

This is opposed to moral objectivism (also known as moral absolutism), which is the idea that there is some objective or absolute moral standpoint, that actions can be deemed ‘wrong’ across cultures. This entails that there are real moral facts, that moral statements are much like scientific facts (so the statement ‘action x is wrong’ is either a true or false statement) and thus the position is perhaps better called ‘moral realism’.

Moral realism is a very popular view, probably the dominant notion in popular Western society at the moment. For the past 50 years or so, it’s been extremely influential in the humanities, especially in regards to anthropology, sociology and politics. If you study any of the above subjects in a Western university/college, I think it’d be fair to say that the vast majority of the course material will take it as given that moral relativism is correct.

However it’s always had its opponents in Western philosophy, and there’s never really been one dominant metaethical view in philosophy.


You can, but that is not really any "condemnation" it holds no actual force or power, anymore than saying "I think slavery is wrong" or "I think genocide is wrong"... You simply seem to have a need for your view to be considered objective fact in a contest... Of course, the other side may be just as likely to consider their view objective fact as well...
This entire post begs the question.

You're simply saying "moral objectivism is wrong because moral relativism is right".

I do, yes. I also believe that the fact that many other people hold this same view is in itself a form of proof that morality is not absolute.

That proves nothing more than that opinions are relative.

Merely because you belief one way does not make that belief unassailable. I believe the world is flat, and because other have in the past (and perhaps some do, even today) that is proof that the world is indeed flat.

What about people who believe in moral absolutism? Because many peopole believe in moral absolutism, then that must also be true, therefore we have together created a paradox and all existence has ceased.

That or your opinion, and the opinions of like-minded individuals do not constitute proof.

This entire post begs the question.

You're simply saying "moral objectivism is wrong because moral relativism is right".

LOL... You could say that... Since a relativist needs to do no more than prove that human society makes moral determinations to provide proof of their assertions; it's not up to me to prove there is no "moral absolute" it's up to the moral objectivist to prove a moral absolute... I have yet to meet anyone to actually prove a moral absolute exists... And I'm just as likely never to meet one who will anymore than I will meet someone who will objectively prove God exists...

i belive that morality is not situational. i can understand some arguments like you don't want to hurt some one so you tella little lie but it is still a lie

i belive that morality is not situational. i can understand some arguments like you don't want to hurt some one so you tella little lie but it is still a lie

You don't believe morality is situational? So, if one person shoots another, it is wrong, even if that person shot the other when they were trying to kill others? So, regardless, the person who acted out of self-defense and in the defense of others should be held to the same standard any other "murderer"?

LOL... You could say that...
I did. And it’s true.

Since a relativist needs to do no more than prove that human society makes moral determinations to provide proof of their assertions
You need to do far more than that.

Two scientists may make two different assertions. Does this mean that all scientific statements are relative? Of course not. The same goes for moral relativism; merely pointing out that people have different opinions on morality doesn’t go anywhere in proving morality is relative.

I have yet to meet anyone to actually prove a moral absolute exists...
May I introduce Mr. Immanuel Kant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#Nature_of_the_concept).

Now, I’m not saying Kant proves empirically that that moral objectivism is ‘true’, but then it’d be hard to prove empirically that numbers were true too; it’s the wrong sort of question.

However, Kant puts forward a damn good argument.

I did. And it’s true.


You need to do far more than that.

Well, I'm pretty sure that in your mind, I need to disprove all of Kant's appeals to unknowable unviewable secret laws which supposedly guide the human will in its moral determinations... Of course, I think Kant should prove those exist in the first place.

I need to disprove all of Kant's appeals to unknowable

"Unknowable"? What are you talking about?

unviewable

Show me the laws of logic.

secret

Not at all... indeed, Kant's principles, as he notes, are not that far from common-sense moral principles. There is nothing "secret" about them.

laws which supposedly guide the human will in its moral determinations...

"Guide"? No. Bind.

Of course, I think Kant should prove those exist in the first place.

Right. That's what he attempts to do.

May I introduce Mr. Immanuel Kant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#Nature_of_the_concept).

I don't really get Kant, it seems quite counterintuitive. for instance "don't steal" seems to make perfect sense as a rule, no? But I don't think it seems immoral to anyone for a mother to steal food for her starving children. The same can be said about for instance "don't lie" and a person lying against the gestapo about the jews in his attic.
This has probably been said before but I really don't know enough about philosophy to know what kantians their answer would be. Maybe the principle of double effect or something similar, but I don't know if the PODE is compatible with kantian ethics and tbh I don't think it's a good principle.
So are kantian ethics really so counterintuitive? Or did I make a stupid mistake about his ethics?

I did. And it’s true.


You need to do far more than that.

Two scientists may make two different assertions. Does this mean that all scientific statements are relative? Of course not. The same goes for moral relativism; merely pointing out that people have different opinions on morality doesn’t go anywhere in proving morality is relative.


May I introduce Mr. Immanuel Kant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#Nature_of_the_concept).

Now, I’m not saying Kant proves empirically that that moral objectivism is ‘true’, but then it’d be hard to prove empirically that numbers were true too; it’s the wrong sort of question.

However, Kant puts forward a damn good argument.

So what are some of the unwritten moral laws that govern all humans?

So what are some of the unwritten moral laws that govern all humans?

Allow me:

Murder is wrong! Well, okay, so there are a crapton of different definitions of murder, but still!

Lying is wrong! Well, okay, so a whole lot of people don't agree with that, but still!

Hurting babies is wrong! Okay, so lots of people think that you have to hurt babies in order to be a good parent, but still!

Um, stealing is wrong? I mean except for the cultures in which stealing is viewed as an honorable act, and except for the cultures that don't count it as "stealing" as long as you steal from somebody weaker, and except from the cultures that claim it's wrong but very clearly reward it, and...


All this chatter about whether or not morality is relative, and I've still yet to see anybody present a single moral notion that is universal.

All this chatter about whether or not morality is relative, and I've still yet to see anybody present a single moral notion that is universal.



Bwhahahah I wonder why........

All this chatter about whether or not morality is relative, and I've still yet to see anybody present a single moral notion that is universal.

Isn't the golden rule almost universal? Besides, simple rules like "don't murder" never work

Isn't the golden rule almost universal?

Hell no. Half the people on this forum don't even believe in it. :D

Well, I’m pretty sure that in your mind...
Don’t assume what I think; it doesn’t do you much good.

I highlighted Kant to show you that there’s plenty of good philosophical arguments for moral objectivism, and plenty of respected philosophers who argue for such a position. Thomas Nagel, Christine Korsgaard and David Brink are three others.

Murder is wrong! Well, okay, so there are a crapton of different definitions of murder...Lying is wrong! Well, okay, so a whole lot of people don’t agree with that.

Hell no. Half the people on this forum don't even believe in it
As has been shown many times before, difference in opinion doesn’t necessitate relativism. You and I can differ on what the answer to ‘1+1’ is, but that doesn’t show that mathematics is relative.

All this chatter about whether or not morality is relative, and I’ve still yet to see anybody present a single moral notion that is universal.
According to Kant and others, you’ve just presented two yourself.

Moreover, I've yet to see anybody follow up on their belief that morality is relative. You yourself vehemently declare many things to be wrong in threads; and these statements go far beyond 'I dislike x, but I understand that you may like x and that each position is equally valid'.

This has probably been said before but I really don't know enough about philosophy to know what kantians their answer would be. Maybe the principle of double effect or something similar, but I don't know if the PODE is compatible with kantian ethics and tbh I don't think it's a good principle.
So are kantian ethics really so counterintuitive? Or did I make a stupid mistake about his ethics?
The thing about Kantian ethics which acts as a kind of get-out clause in your criticism is that although the categorical imperative deals with what you think should be universal law, this law can itself be conditional. Allow me to demonstrate with a hypothetical statement of law:

In any circumstance where a person is materially comfortable, stealing is wrong. In any circumstance where a person can acquire that which is needed to continue to live through personal endeavour, stealing as a means of bypassing effort is wrong. If a person is incapable of earning that which is necessary through any other of their own devices, stealing is acceptable.

The above is a conditional but absolute statement of morality. Kant would say that this law is "right" as long as we can construct a rational system whereby the universal application of this law works to the greater benefit.

i belive that morality is not situational. i can understand some arguments like you don't want to hurt some one so you tella little lie but it is still a lie
Yes, it is still a lie. The question is whether the existence of white lies mean that lying is not always morally wrong. That is, if there exist some lies which are right to tell, can lying always be said to be a bad thing?

Yes, it is still a lie. The question is whether the existence of white lies mean that lying is not always morally wrong. That is, if there exist some lies which are right to tell, can lying always be said to be a bad thing?

But what if the moral law does not involve lies? What if it's as simple as the harm principle, by which a lie would be good if it prevented harm, and bad if it caused harm. Therefore you can lie to the Nazis about the Jews in your attic, but you can't lie to commit fraud and screw someone out of their money.

As has been shown many times before, difference in opinion doesn’t necessitate relativism. You and I can differ on what the answer to ‘1+1’ is, but that doesn’t show that mathematics is relative.

And we can differ on whether chocolate tastes better than vanilla, too.

If you claim the preference for vanilla is universal, all I have to do is show one person who doesn't prefer vanilla. If you claim morality is universal, all I have to do is find one person who doesn't share in your supposedly-universal morality.

This is, of course, slightly but critically different from claiming that morality is "objective." One could claim that "objective" morality is anything at all. You could claim that every single human on Earth is wrong, and that the "real" moral answer is out there somewhere waiting to be discovered. Far as I'm concerned, that's no different than any other superstitious claim. :D

According to Kant and others, you’ve just presented two yourself.

Again, I've yet to see this established.

Yes, I know what Kant claimed. Still doesn't answer my challenge.


Moreover, I've yet to see anybody follow up on their belief that morality is relative.

If you've ever spoken with me or interacted with me on "moral issues" threads, then yes you have. :D


You yourself vehemently declare many things to be wrong in threads; and these statements go far beyond 'I dislike x, but I understand that you may like x and that each position is equally valid'.
Sure. So? Of course I believe certain things are wrong. That does not remotely equate to me claiming that they are objectively morally wrong. I don't believe there is any such thing, after all.

And we can differ on whether chocolate tastes better than vanilla, too.
Of course, but as as a moral realist, I think moral statements are statements of facts, rather than statements of taste.

If you claim the preference for vanilla is universal, all I have to do is show one person who doesn’t prefer vanilla.
No. You have to show me that statements about foods are non-truth functioning. And I would agree with you that they are.

If you claim morality is universal, all I have to do is find one person who doesn’t share in your supposedly-universal morality.
Again, no. You’d have to show me that statements about morality are non-truth functioning. However, this time I would disagree with you. I believe they are truth-functioning.

This is, of course, slightly but critically different from claiming that morality is “objective.” One could claim that “objective” morality is anything at all.
One could, but that’s not what I’m doing.

Yes, I know what Kant claimed. Still doesn’t answer my challenge.
If you know what Kant claimed, you’d know he claimed that the objectivity of morality, due to its derivation from reason, could not be proven empirically.

Much like how its impossible to prove logic empirically.

If you’ve ever spoken with me or interacted with me on “moral issues” threads, then yes you have.
Whenever a metaethical debate is brought up, sure; you have consistently argued for relativism. But on other threads, especially surrounding gay rights, abortion, etc., you and many other posters who claim to be moral relativists have often made statements that suggest an absolutist position.

Sure. So? Of course I believe certain things are wrong. That does not remotely equate to me claiming that they are objectively morally wrong.
Just so I’m totally clear on your position, what does the first ‘wrong’ stand for?

But what if the moral law does not involve lies? What if it's as simple as the harm principle, by which a lie would be good if it prevented harm, and bad if it caused harm. Therefore you can lie to the Nazis about the Jews in your attic, but you can't lie to commit fraud and screw someone out of their money.
There's something nice about consequentialist theories, I agree. The difficulty is in calculating what course of action will cause the least amount of harm. If we knew exactly what actions would have what effect then the decision-making process would be trivial; it's the introduction of uncertainty into the problem that means that principles such as "Lying is okay only when..." or "Stealing is not okay unless..." come into consideration.

I don’t think it is at all.

If you hold moral relativism to be true, then you should wish that the legal and educational systems, to give two examples, should reflect this

Um. No. Why? I don't see where you're getting this "should" from. There are plenty of things I hold true but do not think needs to be a fundamental part of legal and educational systems.

. Moreover, you should be very careful with the language you are using when talkinga bout other’s actions, otherwise you get into the tricky position you’ve found yourself in of classing others’ actions as ‘wrong’ (as you do below), when you simultaneously hold that there is no independent moral standpoint from which to class people’s actions as ‘wrong’ or ‘right’.

I don't need an independent moral standpoint to classify anything as wrong, or right. Similarly with stupid, or beautiful, or charming, or silly, or any other adjective based on subjective appraisal.

And really, you DO demand moral relativists say "I think" before every single thing? That's ridiculous. Thinking is implied; personal opinion is implied. You tell me abortion is wrong? You are really telling me you think and believe abortion is wrong. No one, not me, is assuming you are ACTUALLY telling me a UNIVERSAL, OBJECTIVE TRUTH. Opinion needs no warning label.


Perhaps, it’s an interesting argument.

Though as an atheist, I don’t see why I should waste my time defending arguments whose basic premises I don’t agree with, so I’ll move on.


As an atheist, don't you want atheism to be a foundational part of the law, and of educational systems? As a moral absolutist, you surely must believe that there is no God at all and people who believe there is are ignorant, possibly insane, possibly dangerous.... is it not "logical" (by your logic of "shoulds" as applied to "moral relativists should X and Y and Z") for you to make it your life's goal to eradicate religion by any means possible? Otherwise, do you not simply pay lip service to your supposedly universal morals?

;)

Begging the question.

My friend, you have been doing this all along.


As I said above, being a moral relativist, you should surely support a legal system that reflects such relativism. Do you not feel any injustice in a system of law and punishment which assumes (wrongly in your opinion) that there is an objective morality?

You have yet to prove that the system assumes any such thing whatsoever. But, to answer anyway, no. Just because someone believes their opinion is universal doesn't invalidate their opinion or make them unjust. And frankly, this entire subject is of sufficient unimportance in the scheme of things that it's not worth some sort of lame-ass Moral Relativism Crusade, any more than as with atheism.


I should have thought that was obvious: one can hardly condemn others, in the sense of ’x is objectively wrong’

I don't say "X is objectively wrong," so there is no illegitimacy.

Even if I did:

If I said, "Dude, that's just wrong," is that some telling sign of my hidden belief in an objective, universal morality? If you were to stub your toe and say, "Jesus fucking christ," would that be a hidden indication of your true belief in the existence of God? No, and no. Nor would you saying that suddenly mean you were an "illegitimate atheist" or somehow not-really-an-atheist-after-all.

, while simultaneously holding that morality is relative. The only way out of this is that claiming by condemning others, one is actually saying “I, personally, dislike x”, hardly a correct use of the term ‘condemn’.

Of course it's a correct use of the term. To condemn is "To declare to be reprehensible, wrong, or evil usually after weighing evidence and without reservation."

You'll note it isn't defined as "To declare to be universally and objectively reprehensible, universally and objectively wrong, or universally and objectively evil." Again you seem to be attaching these supposed requisites for being a moral relativist and then pointing out the lack of said requisites in an attempt to show that moral relativists do not actually exist, or are all closet-case absolutists, or are simply "illegitimate" in your view.

No, and I wasn’t trying to say that. I was more responding to your comment that philosophical differences were “meaningless”.

In practical terms, they often are. How many people in your life, on this subject, do you know are either "moral relativists" or "moral absolutists?" Because I know many people, and I don't know anyone's position on this subject. It's never come up, it's never been important. I can *guess* that the theists, the ones who do believe, are going to be moral absolutists. But I don't know, because the entire topic is of sufficient unimportance in the real world.

So do I, I just also don’t believe that the very existence of everyone’s crazy-assed views necessitates moral relativism.

It doesn't, but then how do you decide what is the Absolute Morality? Science doesn't speak on the matter. Religions give you plenty of choices to pick from. And every moral absolutist who is convinced his or her opinion is the Fucking Universal Truth, Period, will of course offer their views too.

The highlighted words are inconsistent with your stance as a relativist.

Only according to your strawman definition.

Moreover, action x may be ‘harmful to society’, ‘psychologically unhealthy’ or may bring ‘harm against the victim’, but condemning such views as ‘wrong’ places you firmly in the moral realist/objectivist camp.

Only according to your strawman definition. Look, just because I am a moral relativist doesn't mean I can't use the concept of moral wrongness - that's a nonsensical proposition you're clinging to.

Coherence.

One can’t hold both that moral relativism is true and that it is possible to condemn others (in the strong sense discussed above).

Yes, you can. I've done so. Now your only argument is that I'm not "really" a moral relativist (by your own loaded definition). That's starting to get as annoying as when Christians argue that I really DO believe in God and just don't know it yet.

How? The only way you can claim people can’t do what they want, while holding moral relativism to be true, is by the completely illegitimate “don’t do it because I said so”.

What's "illegitimate" about that? You telling me that if Joe Bob tells you the Gods Have Spoken, Fish Must No Longer Be Cooked On Wednesdays, he is being "legitimate?" Do you think he is really telling you anything other than "I don't want fish to be cooked on wednesdays?" Do you think he is ACTUALLY speaking the word of The Gods, just because he says so?

You can’t have it both ways; can’t have moral relativism and still have legitimacy when condemning others.

You keep saying this, but it's a false dichotomy.

As long as you accept that you have no moral legitimacy in doing so.

I think you're going to have to accept that your argument has no legitimacy.

You are as morally good/bad (in fact, neutral) as the slave-owner.

Morally neutral... in the strict objective sense, because there is no strict objective Morality. Yes. Duh. Kind of like how there is no "beauty" in a strict objective sense. That doesn't mean I refuse to, or HAVE to refuse to use the word "beautiful" or think of things as looking pretty.

The subjective sense is just as, and I would say infinitely more important. Whether God actually DOES forbid abortion? Unimportant, since he's not around to say so or do anything about it. Whether believers in God forbid abortion? Important.

Show me how the relativist can condemn others (again, in the strong sense, which you seem to want to do), and I’ll call you coherent.

Very well. I condemn your argument as being unreasonable. Now you show me how this makes me not a Real Moral Relativist and how Moral Relativists Don't Really Exist and how If They Do They Should Speak Like Lunatics.

Nope, but moral realism/objectivism certainly doesn’t entail any religious doctrine

Mmm. Kind of like how moral relativism doesn't entail a doctrine of apathy towards slavery.


As we all should, but the above is not what the moral realist claims. It depends on which realist you talk to of course, but two common examples are ‘action x is wrong because of divine rules’ or ‘action x is wrong because of reason’.

The first IS an example of circular reasoning. "Divine rules" of course, also get to define what is wrong in the first place, and they also assert and confirm their own "divinity."

Remember, the moral realist is arguing that moral beliefs are like scientific propositions, they are either true or false, as opposed to the moral relativists position that moral beliefs are more like likes and dislikes; analogous with likes and dislikes of art, food, etc.

Oh, I know. I also know that there is no actual science to back up the "true/false" thing - it is all, entirely, dependent on what assumptions people choose to agree with. You cannot scientifically prove that your moral position is true.


That’s only one theory of jurisprudence; I subscribe to another.

Clearly, but just because you might choose to believe something doesn't mean that the people who set up, or maintain and operate, the legal system believe that same way. I would guess that there are moral relativists and absolutists abound in the legal system, with nods to each, rather than (as you claim) an absolutists' playground.

Murder is wrong, happening to be in front of you in a queue at the shops isn’t, it’s morally neutral.

I said what is INHERENTLY different about the two. Your opinion that murder is wrong is not an inherent aspect of the scenario.

Similarly, punishing someone for murder is, if not necessarily correct (depending on your thoughts about punishment), at least justifiable. Punishing someone for simply being in front of you in a queue is hardly justifiable, and completely arbitrary.

Ah, but "justifiable" then becomes the key word here: What you can get away with. What people will accept. What people are persuaded to believe.

Very probably.

I just disagree that this shows any proof of moral relativism (if that’s what you’re claiming) or that any of these desires are necessarily correct, or that we should let these desires be fulfilled.

It simply argues against your contention that, because I might say "X is wrong!" and the basis for this is (recognized to be) my own likes and dislikes, that I am not being morally relativist in doing so. Because people do hold their own opinions higher than others - certainly higher than contradicting or hostile views - this still doesn't indicate that they believe in moral absolutism.

Allow me:

Murder is wrong! Well, okay, so there are a crapton of different definitions of murder, but still!

Lying is wrong! Well, okay, so a whole lot of people don't agree with that, but still!

Hurting babies is wrong! Okay, so lots of people think that you have to hurt babies in order to be a good parent, but still!

Um, stealing is wrong? I mean except for the cultures in which stealing is viewed as an honorable act, and except for the cultures that don't count it as "stealing" as long as you steal from somebody weaker, and except from the cultures that claim it's wrong but very clearly reward it, and...


All this chatter about whether or not morality is relative, and I've still yet to see anybody present a single moral notion that is universal.

Which is exactly my point, the entire philosophical ground of Kantian morality is based on the premise that the human will is BOUND by Kant's "logic" and "reason"; which as you have highlighted appears to in no way match a real picture of the workings, the operations, of the human will... And those who hold to Kant's absolutism merely hold their point based on a religious conviction that they do not like the sound of the alternative... That is, that humans may operate illogically and without reason, and have been historically shown to do just that, and not merely as individuals, but as entire societies... The Kantian is just like the theist, who has replaced "logic and reason" for the former deity who sets the laws of human morality.

Do you support moral relativism?


I would support moral relativism only in certain circumstances.

We've read a great deal of rather confusingly arranged discussion around the point of Moral Relativism, but much has strayed well from the core issue as writers attempt to debate through the semantics of the name given by Jay to this subject. "Moral Relativism". There are several problems, but the main one appears to be that some people confuse the words "morals" and "ethics". While our scholarly philosophers may not agree, I would suggest the old definition "morals are absolutes and ethics are changeable" still provides a useful rule of thumb.

Questions have been asked about the 'absolute' nature of morals when what one person feels is moral, appears immoral to another. This I think is the first clue to our problems in these debates, that different groups of people may be thought to have different moral standards. On that basis, the process of human philosophy breaks down and some other standard must be sought to obtain a moral standard.

This is why people need faith in something outside of ourselves, to enable us to teach and celebrate moral standards that we do not set or change from what has been given to us. Several great religions resound with such moral laws which in Christianity are called the Ten Commandments, and the extra commandment given by Jesus Christ. Jews have the same basic ten, and you will find their echo in Islam and Zorastra, and most aspects of them in almost any system of faith. Even faithful Evolutionists, proclaiming themselves to be atheists, agnostics, rationalists, and humanists, claim human authorship of a similar set of ethics!

So, the argument seems to be that there are no absolute morals because not everybody holds to them. But who makes the judgement of what are absolute morals? Not the people, because they are the subjects of morality. Not the rulers, because under morality they are subejcts too. Not the religious leaders, not the philosophers, not the cultists. No human can judge with a standard of absolute morals. The only judge of absolute morality is the one who enunciated the morals in the first place. He who set the standard is the only one suited to judge the performance of each individual. Our role in this is to apply the morals to our own thinking and actions.

You may laugh and say you don't agree with a super-human judgement of absolute morality. That doesn't matter. It's not relevant. As the sign outside a local church says: "Whether you believe in life after death or not.... you're right!"

Of course, but as as a moral realist, I think moral statements are statements of facts, rather than statements of taste.

"Moral realist"? Hey, I'm one of those, too! Which is why I don't believe morality is objective.


No. You have to show me that statements about foods are non-truth functioning. And I would agree with you that they are.

"Non-truth functioning"? Of course not! But "truthless performancing," sure! Or possibly "proto-reality grounded"!


If you know what Kant claimed, you’d know he claimed that the objectivity of morality, due to its derivation from reason, could not be proven empirically.

Which is a great argument for ignoring pretty much everything that follows after.

Saying, "Not only do I have no evidence for my claims, but it's impossible for there to be evidence for my claims" is not really a strong argument.


Much like how its impossible to prove logic empirically.

Logic is basically just semantic rules. Morality--quite obviously--is not.

It's like the difference between the words we use to describe flavors and our evaluations of the flavor of a particular dish. The words we use are simply defined. Certain sounds have certain meanings. "Delicious" is a defined term. You can't "prove" that delicious means delicious.

If you want to play around with semantics we could dig up Wittgenstein's corpse for you to hash things out with. I certainly have no interest in going down that road.


Whenever a metaethical debate is brought up, sure; you have consistently argued for relativism. But on other threads, especially surrounding gay rights, abortion, etc., you and many other posters who claim to be moral relativists have often made statements that suggest an absolutist position.

Nope. You may have (incorrectly) assumed that my statement of my personal moral beliefs equates to an assumption of objective morality, but that's really not my fault.


Just so I’m totally clear on your position, what does the first ‘wrong’ stand for?
Just what it sounds like.

Um. No. Why?... There are plenty of things I hold true but do not think needs to be a fundamental part of legal and educational systems.
Sure, but I would think that if you believed morals were relative to culture or individuals, then wouldn't you want to argue for a legal system based on the metaethical standpoint of relativism?

There's a big difference, jurisprudentially, between a legal system that regards absolutism to be the case, and a legal system that holds relativism to be the case.

You tell me abortion is wrong? You are really telling me you think and believe abortion is wrong.
You're begging the question.

When I say 'action x is morally wrong', I'm saying that action x is absolutely wrong, not merely that I personally dislike action x. As there's obviously a difference of opinion, I'd think it wise for us to each clearly define our positions.

No one, not me, is assuming you are ACTUALLY telling me a UNIVERSAL, OBJECTIVE TRUTH.
Then you're assumption is very much mistaken.

As an atheist, don't you want atheism to be a foundational part of the law, and of educational systems?
I want a clear separation between church and state, to ensure that one's religion or lack of wasn't imposed on anyone. But one's theological standpoint and one's metaethical standpoint are not analogous; I believe we can have plurality of religious belief and non-belief in a society without it being detrimental. Indeed I believe that it's good for society to be tolerant of religion or a lack of.

However, I believe moral relativism is detrimental to society in the way it treats others, and in the lack of ability to condemn actions outside of one's socio-political grouping. Thus I would argue against moral relativism being instilled in society's institutions.

As a moral absolutist, you surely must believe that there is no God at all and people who believe there is are ignorant, possibly insane, possibly dangerous.... is it not "logical" (by your logic of "shoulds" as applied to "moral relativists should X and Y and Z") for you to make it your life's goal to eradicate religion by any means possible? Otherwise, do you not simply pay lip service to your supposedly universal morals?
I think they are mistaken, but not necessarily ignorant insane or dangerous, but to reiterate: I don't think one's metaethical standpoint and one's theological standpoint are analogous. I believe it may be possible to derive an absolute moral code through reason; I don't think it would be possible to derive the complete proof of the non-existence of any supreme being through either reason or empirical study (the theist always has the supernatural get-out clause).

Thus, although I would argue vehemently for an (agnostic) atheist standpoint, I don't think its enforcement across the board is a good thing.

My friend, you have been doing this all along.
Care to show this?

I don't say "X is objectively wrong," so there is no illegitimacy.
As long as you would in no way wish your beliefs about morality to be enforced.

Of course it's a correct use of the term. To condemn is "To declare to be reprehensible, wrong, or evil usually after weighing evidence and without reservation."

You'll note it isn't defined as "To declare to be universally and objectively reprehensible, universally and objectively wrong, or universally and objectively evil."
I think that's what the terms 'wrong', 'reprehensible' and (especially) 'evil' entail, even more so when one is suggesting that we act upon these terms to prohibit certain actions.

How many people in your life, on this subject, do you know are either "moral relativists" or "moral absolutists?"
Th vast majority of people. Those I don't know, I can surely ask a few questions and they will tell me some answers that will show their position.

Most people in today's Western society are moral relativists. Just take a look at this thread; many find it a rather strange idea that one wouldn't be a moral relativist. One doesn't need an in-depth philosophical education to be able to believe whether or not we can apply morals across the board, or if they are individual to one's self or one's society.

But I don't know, because the entire topic is of sufficient unimportance in the real world.
Nonsense. It affects a huge amount of government policy, especially in relation to foreign policy and current issues of multiculturalism, immigration, humanitarian intervention, etc.

It doesn't, but then how do you decide what is the Absolute Morality?
Reason. Perhaps by using the categorical imperative (though I think this unlikely), perhaps using the 'veil of perception', perhaps another way.

Look, just because I am a moral relativist doesn't mean I can't use the concept of moral wrongness - that's a nonsensical proposition you're clinging to.
I'm not saying you can't. I'm saying you can't legitimately act prohibitively/legislate on such beliefs of moral wrongness if you hold relativism to be true, just as you can't act prohibitively/legislate on beliefs of art, literature, taste, etc.

What's "illegitimate" about that?
Because it's as illegitimate as declaring 'no-one must eat chocolate ice-cream because I dislike chocolate ice-cream'.

It's completely unfair to suggest everyone has their own morality and that there is no one absolute morality, then go onto demand that everyone bend their will to follow your morality.

Kind of like how there is no "beauty" in a strict objective sense. That doesn't mean I refuse to, or HAVE to refuse to use the word "beautiful" or think of things as looking pretty.
I wouldn't argue that you have to, because I don't believe beauty is objective. Statements about beauty are not either true or false; they are not truth-functional. However, I believe moral statements are truth-functional.

Very well. I condemn your argument as being unreasonable.
Unless you're arguing that my argument is morally unreasonable, your condemnation has no bearing on this debate.

However, if (for some bizarre reason) you were to say that it was morally condemnable, and that you'd wish tto prohibit me from making such an argument, I'd rightly point out that you were either arguing from an absolutist standpoint, or that you were incoherent in your metaethical views and practices.

"Divine rules" of course, also get to define what is wrong in the first place, and they also assert and confirm their own "divinity."
I'd quite agree with you.

You cannot scientifically prove that your moral position is true.
Of course not; science has nothing to do with it.

I said what is INHERENTLY different about the two.
What I believe is inherently wrong is that we can condemn the murder but not condemn the fact that I'm in front of you in the queue.

You're not seriously arguing that there is no inherent difference between a pre-planned murder and the chance happening of getting in front of someone in a queue, are you?


Which is exactly my point, the entire philosophical ground of Kantian morality is based on the premise that the human will is BOUND by Kant's "logic" and "reason"
Not at all.

Kant doesn't argue that we are 'slaves' to reason, that we always do what reason dictates.


There are several problems, but the main one appears to be that some people confuse the words "morals" and "ethics". While our scholarly philosophers may not agree, I would suggest the old definition "morals are absolutes and ethics are changeable" still provides a useful rule of thumb.
That statement makes no sense whatsoever.

If you're going to object to the idea of ethics and morals as synonyms, then at least give some definition of the difference between the two.


"Moral realist"? Hey, I'm one of those, too! Which is why I don't believe morality is objective.
You believe moral facts are real, that moral statements are either true of false? Because that's what a moral realist does.

"Non-truth functioning"?
'Non-truth functioning/non-truth functional' simply means that a statement cannot be said to be either true or false.

So, we can say that a statement about art or taste in food is 'non-truth functional', because we can't say that it is either 'true' or 'false'. The moral anti-realist (of which the relativist is one) argues that moral statements are the same.

Obviously, the moral realist objects to this.

Which is a great argument for ignoring pretty much everything that follows after.
It's simply an acknowledgement that empirical science has no hold on moral debate, in the same way that empirical science has no hold on logical debate. It can neither 'prove' morality or logic. It doesn't mean the two don't 'exist' in some way.

"Not only do I have no evidence for my claims, but it's impossible for there to be evidence for my claims" is not really a strong argument.
Not 'no evidence', but 'impossible to show empirically', just as many things are.

I claim that I love my parents. I cannot prove this empirically. This does not show that my love is non-existent.

Saying, "Not only do I have no evidence for my claims, but it's impossible for there to be evidence for my claims" is not really a strong argument.

On this point, Kant is actually pretty convincing.

No empirical truth is ever a binding reason for us to do something. "Is" does not imply "ought." Ethical justification thus necessarily excludes empirical considerations of "is." Empirical evidence can thus prove nothing of ethics.

It does not, of course, follow that we can prove nothing about ethics.

You imply that Kant somehow came to this conclusion because it was convenient for him, but in fact if empirical evidence could prove ethics, his conclusions would be some of the best: they tend to square pretty closely with many intuitive moral notions found more or less universally.

That is, that humans may operate illogically and without reason,

Of course they can. You're ignoring the nature of "obligation." Nobody says that everyone fulfills their obligations, always. There will always be people who fail to consider what they are obligated to do, or come to the wrong conclusions about what they are obligated to do, or fail to do what they are obligated to do even while recognizing it. That's part of the difference between "is" and "ought."

The point is, if we are willing to investigate the nature of our obligations, in what do they consist? And that analysis is definitely a matter of reason.

and have been historically shown to do just that, and not merely as individuals, but as entire societies...

So what?

While our scholarly philosophers may not agree, I would suggest the old definition "morals are absolutes and ethics are changeable" still provides a useful rule of thumb.

Interestingly enough, when I hear a distinction along these lines, usually it is the other way around: morality is relative and ethics are absolute.

Regardless, I tend to think that people who try to draw this line are in effect trying to have their cake and eat it too: they seek to avoid having to deal with the problems of choosing a position, so they try to choose both.

The exception is when it is drawn to differentiate between a "morality" that is supposed to be intrinsically religious and an "ethics" that is supposed to be intrinsically secular... but to me this seems more a sign of a culture where morality and religion are unfortunately intertwined than an actual substantive distinction rooted in the meanings of the words.

Questions have been asked about the 'absolute' nature of morals when what one person feels is moral, appears immoral to another. This I think is the first clue to our problems in these debates, that different groups of people may be thought to have different moral standards. On that basis, the process of human philosophy breaks down and some other standard must be sought to obtain a moral standard.

That's absurd. Different people may have different moral beliefs, but different people have different beliefs about empirical truths, too. Does that mean that science breaks down when trying to resolve these conflicts?

This is why people need faith in something outside of ourselves, to enable us to teach and celebrate moral standards that we do not set or change from what has been given to us.

And this solves the problem how, exactly?

Jews have the same basic ten

...but they do not assign to them the supreme importance the Christians do.

Even faithful Evolutionists, proclaiming themselves to be atheists, agnostics, rationalists, and humanists, claim human authorship of a similar set of ethics!

Um... "similar" in some ways, not in others.

But who makes the judgement of what are absolute morals?

It is not a "who" question. An independent standard of ethics can never be a matter of "who." "Who" is always irrelevant--the mere fact that someone believes that something is right or wrong does not mean that it actually is.

You may laugh and say you don't agree with a super-human judgement of absolute morality. That doesn't matter. It's not relevant.

Yes, it is. You have to give us an actual reason to agree. You have to explain why God's will should matter to us morally. Otherwise, it is no less arbitrary than listening to anyone else mindlessly.

As the sign outside a local church says: "Whether you believe in life after death or not.... you're right!"

Divine punishment does not determine morality, just as the repression of dissent by tyrannical governments does not prove the dissenters wrong.

I voted "no/yes" because moral relativism is the normal, natural state of things, so there's nothing to "believe" in. I also support it, because, hey, I'm a natural knid of guy ;)

I said:
"Questions have been asked about the 'absolute' nature of morals when what one person feels is moral, appears immoral to another. This I think is the first clue to our problems in these debates, that different groups of people may be thought to have different moral standards. On that basis, the process of human philosophy breaks down and some other standard must be sought to obtain a moral standard."

In response, Soheran said:
"That's absurd. Different people may have different moral beliefs, but different people have different beliefs about empirical truths, too. Does that mean that science breaks down when trying to resolve these conflicts?"

No, it doesn't, because where faith requires belief, empirical truth only requires witness of facts.

I said:
"Even faithful Evolutionists, proclaiming themselves to be atheists, agnostics, rationalists, and humanists, claim human authorship of a similar set of ethics!"

In response, Soheran said:
"Um... "similar" in some ways, not in others."

That's what 'similar' means: alike, not neccesarily identical.

I said:
"But who makes the judgement of what are absolute morals?"

In response, Soheran said:
"It is not a "who" question. An independent standard of ethics can never be a matter of "who." "Who" is always irrelevant--the mere fact that someone believes that something is right or wrong does not mean that it actually is."

If you find it easier, "Who or What...." You forget my text in that passage was concerning the setter of standards, not those who are subject to them.

Your other questions either answer themselves or are answered in the original text.

No, it doesn't, because where faith requires belief

When did I say anything about "faith"?

You're the one assuming that faith has something to do with morality, not me.

That's what 'similar' means: alike, not neccesarily identical.

Right.

Religious and secular views on the ethics of, say, helping the poor tend to be (broadly) similar.

Religious and secular views on sexual morality tend to be radically different.

Thus: "similar in some ways, not in others."

If you find it easier, "Who or What...."

But then your reasoning becomes pointless.

Once you make it a matter of "what", we no longer have the difficulty of those subject to moral standards setting them. The determining feature is the "what": those subject to morality reference it.

You forget my text in that passage was concerning the setter of standards

Um, how exactly did I forget this?

Your other questions either answer themselves or are answered in the original text.

Nonsense. You have yet to show how God, even if he existed, could "set" moral standards in any way that would be morally relevant to us.

When did I say anything about "faith"?

You're the one assuming that faith has something to do with morality, not me.

All ethical statements require faith in some objective fact. There is no knowledge without some assumption that avoids a circular argument, so I say faith has a rather key place in arguments of morality.

i still believe in the immorality of knowingly causing avoidable suffering. in that alone being the litmus test of morality in any sense of the word. and still don't see THAT as being "relative" to anything.

it is good, as virtually all beliefs do, all that i've ever studied or heard anything about anyway, to encourage everyone to want to avoid causing suffering.

it is very very VERY NOT good, to encourage anyone, as far too often western monotheistic organized beliefs do, intentionally or not, to deceive themselves as to the mechanism(s) by which they do so!

=^^=
.../\...

How does that compare to the millenniums dominated by moral absolutism?

That is an excellent question, one I'd have to write a journal article to respond to properly. But the short version is...

Moral absolutism has a tendency to lead to oppressive conditions for those who are not within the moral norms of societies. Moral relativism has a tendency to lead to the deconstruction of the moral norms of societies so that everyone can oppress and be oppressed.

That's not all, of course. Moral relativism has positive benefits, in that it tends to alleviate the oppression of those who are not within the absolute moral norms. It can lead to a certain humility regarding one's own morality.

Whether or not that's an acceptable trade for the discipline and social coherence often produced by moral absolutism is something we're going to have to decide.

As usual, I'd like to have the valuable things about both.

There is no knowledge without some assumption that avoids a circular argument

Then science is put into question just as much as morality, and the distinction Wealthycommons drew is still untenable.

Moral absolutism has a tendency to lead to oppressive conditions for those who are not within the moral norms of societies.

That's a problem with the morality deemed to be absolute, not with the idea of moral absolutism itself.

That's a problem with the morality deemed to be absolute, not with the idea of moral absolutism itself.

Hence the use of the word "tendency". While it's true that we can often revise moral propositions to be applicable such that those who are not within the moral norms of society are not oppressed, there is a strong tendency for people who become accustomed to thinking in absolutes to apply moral rules without attempting to make those revisions. Moral absolutism does not necessitate such behavior, but it's so frequently a byproduct of it in practice that it's important to consider.

there is a strong tendency for people who become accustomed to thinking in absolutes to apply moral rules without attempting to make those revisions.

Why?

There might be a tendency of that sort in people who are fanatical, or people who do not think carefully, or people who do not have the honesty to admit the necessary uncertainty that accompanies judgment, or people who mindlessly accept what they are told.

But while those traits may sometimes lead to a belief in moral absolutism, I see nothing to suggest that moral absolutism leads to any of those traits.

Why?

There might be a tendency of that sort in people who are fanatical, or people who do not think carefully, or people who do not have the honesty to admit the necessary uncertainty that accompanies judgment, or people who mindlessly accept what they are told.

And there you have just described 90% of human beings.

But while those traits may sometimes lead to a belief in moral absolutism, I see nothing to suggest that moral absolutism leads to any of those traits.

There's no causal connection. You're correct on that. But there's also no causal connection between capitalism and greed. Or between communism and oppression. The problem is that as a species, we have a hard time having the one without the other because of our individual and cultural flaws. Those systems are not going to work given where we are at. We have to overcome those flaws before those ideologies can be implemented in a healthy way.

The problem is that as a species, we have a hard time having the one without the other because of our individual and cultural flaws.

I can think of plenty of individual and cultural flaws that can lead to the abuse of morality as such.

My question is why you think moral systems deemed to be absolute are particularly susceptible to those flaws.

I can think of plenty of individual and cultural flaws that can lead to the abuse of morality as such.

My question is why you think moral systems deemed to be absolute are particularly susceptible to those flaws.

I'm not sure why you think that I think absolute moral systems are particularly susceptible to those flaws. I think lots of systems are susceptible. It's not as if moral absolutism is something I consider exceptional in that regard.

I'm not sure why you think that I think absolute moral systems are particularly susceptible to those flaws.

"Moral absolutism has a tendency to lead to oppressive conditions for those who are not within the moral norms of societies."

I mean, technically you could have not have meant this in an exclusive sense, but from the context I interpreted you--I think correctly--as drawing a contrast with moral relativism.

I want to know what the basis for that contrast is.

"Moral absolutism has a tendency to lead to oppressive conditions for those who are not within the moral norms of societies."

I mean, technically you could have not have meant this in an exclusive sense, but from the context I interpreted you--I think correctly--as drawing a contrast with moral relativism.

I want to know what the basis for that contrast is.

Ah. I thought you were referring to the individual and cultural flaws in general as applied to absolutism rather than absolutism as contrasted with relativism specifically. That clears it up nicely.

I do think that moral absolutism has that tendency more strongly than some other approaches to morality, yes. I believe that this is in part due to the fact that those who are already inclined to a fanatical view find absolutism very appealing because it fits with their intuition that the world is clear and simple case of good vs. evil. Others find it appealing because it provides a structure for living which doesn't require rigorous thought. Others can find it appealing because they need to feel secure in an uncertain world, and the (apparent) certainty of some of those absolutist moral systems provides them with that security. In essence, moral absolutism is an approach that often appeals to the kinds of people who--whether out of insecurity, fanaticism, or thoughtlessness--are willing to oppress others.

Moral relativism isn't often going to have that same appeal to fanatics, and it doesn't really provide enough structure for the insecure and/or thoughtless.

I believe that this is in part due to the fact that those who are already inclined to a fanatical view find absolutism very appealing because it fits with their intuition that the world is clear and simple case of good vs. evil.

Right, but this is a case of correlation, not causation.

Fanaticism leads to moral absolutism. Fanaticism also leads to oppression. It does not follow that moral absolutism leads to oppression.

Others find it appealing because it provides a structure for living which doesn't require rigorous thought.

How so?

Others can find it appealing because they need to feel secure in an uncertain world, and the (apparent) certainty of some of those absolutist moral systems provides them with that security.

But "certainty" has nothing particularly to do with either moral absolutism or moral relativism. A relativist theory can assume its own certainty, with respect to the conditions to which it applies--indeed, "vulgar" relativism does exactly that, refusing to consider or engage in moral argument because "it's all just a matter of opinion."

and it doesn't really provide enough structure for the insecure and/or thoughtless.

Sure it does. "Go with your gut feeling."

Moral absolutism, if anything, brings that sort of reasoning more into question than moral relativism does.

Right, but this is a case of correlation, not causation.

Fanaticism leads to moral absolutism. Fanaticism also leads to oppression. It does not follow that moral absolutism leads to oppression.

I already mentioned that the link is not causal.

How so?

Most absolutist systems have already been constructed. People can take on the structure they provide without having to think about every proposition or category by itself.

But "certainty" has nothing particularly to do with either moral absolutism or moral relativism. A relativist theory can assume its own certainty, with respect to the conditions to which it applies--indeed, "vulgar" relativism does exactly that, refusing to consider or engage in moral argument because "it's all just a matter of opinion."

Sure. I'm quite aware that relativists can feel that they have certainty. I'm just suggesting that it's a stronger tendency in moral absolutists.

Sure it does. "Go with your gut feeling."

Moral absolutism, if anything, brings that sort of reasoning more into question than moral relativism does.

How so?

I already mentioned that the link is not causal.

Then why is it a problem with moral absolutism?

Most absolutist systems have already been constructed. People can take on the structure they provide without having to think about every proposition or category by itself.

Any pre-existing moral structure can be made relative.

I'm just suggesting that it's a stronger tendency in moral absolutists.

I see no reason why that would be the case.

How so?

Because the moral absolutist must recognize some independent standard. I must question my personal inclination--because the standard is independent of me, I could be wrong.

You see a deaf girl playing on the train tracks. You hear a train coming.
You have two options:

1) Save the girl
2) Don't save the girl

If you save the girl, you have done what most would call "good."

If you do not save the girl, you have not necessarily done evil, but "not good."

Now let's put this into context.

You see a girl playing on the train tracks.

1) You saw her too late--the train hits her.
A) You tried to save her anyway
B) Knowing you couldn't, you didn't try

2)You see her in time.
A) You save her
B) You try to save her, but trip, fall and break your leg, preventing your saving her (aa: you continue to try bb: you give up)
C) You decide to not do anything and watch
D) You are distracted for a moment; while not paying attention, the train hits her
E) You deliberately turn away from the scene

3) You told the girl to play on the train tracks

Is morality subject to time and circumstance, or is it transcendent of both? If you are tied up and forced to watch the train hit the girl, and being unable to save her, have you done evil? Does effort--trying to escape, even though you won't reach her in time--make a difference (alternatively, not trying to escape because you won't save her)? Does your knowledge of being able to save her have any bearing? What if the girl grows up to be the mastermind of another Holocaust?

My take is that deliberate actions to the detriment of another human being are qualitatively "evil." Inability to perform a "good" action, in light of effort put forth, are simply "not good."

The respect for other life is tantamount to good. It is not, in my opinion, relative to individual perspective--one can, to use an adage, most certainly do the wrong thing for the right reasons.

Snip......


My take is that deliberate actions to the detriment of another human being are qualitatively "evil." Inability to perform a "good" action, in light of effort put forth, are simply "not good."

The respect for other life is tantamount to good. It is not, in my opinion, relative to individual perspective--one can, to use an adage, most certainly do the wrong thing for the right reasons.

The key words here are 'my take' Because you say it does it make it objectivly true?

If you get into a fist fight, you are deliberatly trying to harm another human, wether in self defense or otherwise.

Is all violence then to be considered evil?

The respect for other life is tantamount to good. It is not, in my opinion, relative to individual perspective--one can, to use an adage, most certainly do the wrong thing for the right reasons.

So.. mercy killings are always wrong in your eyes ?

The key words here are 'my take' Because you say it does it make it objectivly true?

If you get into a fist fight, you are deliberatly trying to harm another human, wether in self defense or otherwise.

Is all violence then to be considered evil?

Yes. But humans are incapable of doing good at all times, in all places; violence is one expression of evil--is violence not an outward expression of hatred?

So.. mercy killings are always wrong in your eyes ?

Not necessarily. Would letting them suffer be a greater detriment to them than ending their suffering?

Not necessarily. Would letting them suffer be a greater detriment to them than ending their suffering?

That was the implication I intended, yes.
So when you say one needs to respect life, you do not mean the biological attribute ?

That was the implication I intended, yes.
So when you say one needs to respect life, you do not mean the biological attribute ?

The best comparison is that of the Dalai Lama--respect for life and opposition to suffering. The line is a fine one, indeed.

I do not explicitly mean the biological aspect, no.

Of course morality is relative, something is only evil because somebody claims the power to call it so, there will always be a time or place where everything you can think of is considered ok (but not everything you can think of being moral in that same place or time, if you get me) and then there will be a place or time where everything you can think of will be immoral.