NationStates Jolt Archive

You need new friends.my friends are fine, I dont want new friends, I want a reasonable PoliceD and I want a reasonable Justice system.

my friends are fine, I dont want new friends, I want a reasonable PoliceD and I want a reasonable Justice system.

Says the guy who admits he can't keep his tallywhacker in his cordoroys(sp?).

Says the guy who admits he can't keep his tallywhacker in his cordoroys(sp?).Levi's ;)

http://levi.imageg.net/graphics/product_images/pLEVI1-3922379r150.jpg

Yep.

That's incredibly stupid. Moral principles do not stand alone, as absolute rules: they are justified in reference to something. We can cite that ultimate standard to non-arbitrarily decide between conflicting moral principles.

You recognize that phrases are more than just the individual words. That phrase includes accepting consequences.

Perhaps it includes accepting the necessary consequences for my actions--if I cause someone harm, because I accept that I am responsible I accept that I am at fault for those consequences. But certainly it does not include submitting to (not necessarily the same as "accepting") consequences that I might expect, but that are the product of other wills. I might expect that someone will respond to my behavior in a certain way. It does not follow that I must submit to that behavior.

Would it be accepting responsiblity to say, I'm at fault for the car accident while lying or cheating to make someone else pay for it.

No. If I accept responsibility, I must accept the implications of that responsibility: if I have caused someone harm, part of accepting responsibility is to acknowledge my responsibility for that harm and make the amends morality requires for it.

Now, do explain how that is relevant in any way to the point. Why does it mean that I must submit to punishment? I fully acknowledge my responsibility for my action, and I fully accept my responsibility, too, for the direct consequences of my action. None of that implies that I am morally required to submit to punishment.

I'm not sure you know what your argument is.

You are exceptionally intellectually dishonest and incredibly close-minded. I don't think you can be sure of anything regarding my argument. You have not given it the consideration necessary to bother understanding it.

Then why did you bring it up?

No, it was you who brought up the issue of harm, in referencing killing a police officer tasked with enforcing the law. I merely pointed out that your argument was a slippery slope, because my argument in no way necessitates principles allowing for harm, let alone killing. I did not say that fleeing from enforcement is morally required to harm no one; I merely sought to point out the irrelevance of your point to what I was arguing.

But you stuck with it, so I clarified my own analysis of the situation.

So since you said this isn't your arbitrary morality,

Wait, who said anything about my morality being arbitrary? I said moral decision-making (like any kind of decision-making) is subject to human arbitrariness (which is not the same thing as saying that it is arbitrary, merely that it can sometimes be); we are imperfect creatures who are subject to bias. The whole point of the rule of law is to come up with procedures that allow us to minimize this arbitrariness--not, as you seem to believe, by eliminating moral decision-making (we can't, if we want our actions to ever be justified at all), but by ensuring we have standards of fairness built into the system that minimize bias.

Thus, in ordinary circumstances, I obey the law in recognition of my own imperfection: my decision as to what particular laws and policies are right is subject to my particular circumstance and bias, and thus I recognize the value of the political system's procedures in abstracting from them. But when a law is in and of itself illegitimate, when it does not abide by those procedures of fairness that get me to trust it is more than someone's arbitrary whim, such an obligation disappears--especially in a matter as morally clear-cut as slavery.

then what decides legitmacy?

Deciding what is legitimate and deciding what is right are very different kinds of decisions. The judgment of legitimacy is considerably less subject to bias, because I am simply applying certain standards to the procedure, not concerning myself with the empirical and moral complexities the law itself may involve.

In a reasonably democratic political system with the rule of law, most laws--at least ones that apply domestically--will be legitimate. Fairly easy judgment, certainly compared to a thorough consideration of the complexities of each particular piece of legislation.

Remember that you started this argument when you climbed way up on that high horse to start lecturing NA.

While the norms of rational discussion do seem beyond your understanding, I was not "lecturing" him, I was questioning something he said... about a topic that is vaguely relevant to this one, but certainly not the same.

Looks like after how many pages, you're still just talking about your completely arbitrary claims.

Your lack of understanding does not indicate arbitrariness. It is an indication either of your own close-mindedness or of your own stupidity.

You've utterly failed to recognize the arbitrariness of your claims.

Wait, are you arguing that all moral views are arbitrary? That changes things somewhat. It means, for instance, that your entire argument is pointless, because it necessarily concerns a moral question: what a person should do once he or she has broken the law. If morality is necessarily arbitrary, then your attempt to support your view and question the support for mine is necessarily pointless: an arbitrary position has no support, and a necessarily arbitrary sphere of judgment cannot have any support.

If you are not arguing that all morality is arbitrary, then it is (past) time to actually start responding to my moral arguments, instead of dismissing them as arbitrary whim.

Why? Apparently, they are subject to your whim based on whether a law is "legitimate" or not.

Is all judgment a matter of whim? If not, why do you insist that a judgment of legitimacy is? If so, how can you believe in rational argumentation at all? (Then again, perhaps you do not. It would not surprise me.)

Amusing. At the same time, for you to be right, we'd have to accept that people who are originally non-racist could not be convinced to be racist.

No, we wouldn't. People can believe the right things for bad reasons, and when challenged effectively, come to believe the wrong things for better ones. The fact that people can be brought to believe wrong things in no way implies that moral argumentation cannot concern objective criteria like rationality.

The grain of truth in what you say is that people can be brought to believe wrong things for wrong reasons, too, since, again, we are imperfect creatures. But my point still holds, because plenty of racists have abandoned their positions precisely because they have recognized their irrationality.

Do you really think it is always futile to argue rationally with a racist?

But, then, hey, you wouldn't want me to just be subject to your whim, now would you?

No, I wouldn't. And I would never appoint myself dictator, even if I had the power to do so.

But you continue to miss the point.

A "given" is when you argue something as true without actually demonstrating it true. You know what you just did above? Where you said you "could" prove it, but you don't have to.

I think you need to review reading comprehension.

What I actually said was:

"Actually, yes. But I don't need to. Intersubjectivity is as good as objectivity here"

I didn't need to prove it not because I thought I was entitled to presuppose it, but because I didn't need it for my argument. Something else sufficed.

That argues it's a given.

No, it doesn't.

You don't have access to the internet?

You don't have access to a mind capable of understanding what other people say? Why the fuck are you spending time on NS, then? To frustrate others?

Are we now going to say that if it's popular it's right? That's totally arbitrary.

Yes, it is. Good thing I never said that, then.

Is that really the only standard you can think of upon which to challenge the basis of racism? That's rather sad. I can think of plenty of others... for instance, actually examining whether the arguments they make are consistent with reason and the empirical evidence.

The same line that made it okay for abolitionists to change the world in the past, defends racists for attempting to do the same.

Any attempt to do what is right, in principle, "defends" anyone who actually is right, whoever they happen to be. When I say that I should do what is right, that is the first premise not only of moral arguments most people would accept as good ones ("I should help those in need") but also of moral arguments with reprehensible conclusions ("I should slaughter innocent people en masse.")

The difference between the KKK and (say) Doctors Without Borders is not that first premise, not the assumption that we should actually concern ourselves with morality (as you absurdly maintain), but the rest of the argument.

I'm pretty sure I've demonstrated just how ludicrous it was for you to lecture NA with a very spurious understanding of what he said, of what he'd shown,

No, I understood exactly what he said and what he'd shown, at least once he clarified his meaning of "legitimacy." I made a point about the limitations of the method.

and amusingly, while making arbitrary claims as if they were universal.

Something can be non-universal without being arbitrary. Something can be arbitrary while being universal.

That's incredibly stupid. Moral principles do not stand alone, as absolute rules: they are justified in reference to something. We can cite that ultimate standard to non-arbitrarily decide between conflicting moral principles.



Perhaps it includes accepting the necessary consequences for my actions--if I cause someone harm, because I accept that I am responsible I accept that I am at fault for those consequences. But certainly it does not include submitting to (not necessarily the same as "accepting") consequences that I might expect, but that are the product of other wills. I might expect that someone will respond to my behavior in a certain way. It does not follow that I must submit to that behavior.



No. If I accept responsibility, I must accept the implications of that responsibility: if I have caused someone harm, part of accepting responsibility is to acknowledge my responsibility for that harm and make the amends morality requires for it.

Now, do explain how that is relevant in any way to the point. Why does it mean that I must submit to punishment? I fully acknowledge my responsibility for my action, and I fully accept my responsibility, too, for the direct consequences of my action. None of that implies that I am morally required to submit to punishment.



You are exceptionally intellectually dishonest and incredibly close-minded. I don't think you can be sure of anything regarding my argument. You have not given it the consideration necessary to bother understanding it.



No, it was you who brought up the issue of harm, in referencing killing a police officer tasked with enforcing the law. I merely pointed out that your argument was a slippery slope, because my argument in no way necessitates principles allowing for harm, let alone killing. I did not say that fleeing from enforcement is morally required to harm no one; I merely sought to point out the irrelevance of your point to what I was arguing.

But you stuck with it, so I clarified my own analysis of the situation.



Wait, who said anything about my morality being arbitrary? I said moral decision-making (like any kind of decision-making) is subject to human arbitrariness; we are imperfect creatures who are subject to bias. The whole point of the rule of law is to come up with procedures that allow us to minimize this arbitrariness--not, as you seem to believe, by eliminating moral decision-making (we can't, if we want our actions to ever be justified at all), but by ensuring we have standards of fairness built into the system that minimize bias.

Thus, in ordinary circumstances, I obey the law in recognition of my own imperfection: my decision as to what particular laws and policies are right is subject to my particular circumstance and bias, and thus I recognize the value of the political system's procedures in abstracting from them. But when a law is in and of itself illegitimate, when it does not abide by those procedures of fairness that get me to trust it is more than someone's arbitrary whim, such an obligation disappears--especially in a matter as morally clear-cut as slavery.



Deciding what is legitimate and deciding what is right are very different kinds of decisions. The judgment of legitimacy is considerably less subject to bias, because I am simply applying certain standards to the procedure, not concerning myself with the empirical and moral complexities the law itself may involve.

In a reasonably democratic political system with the rule of law, most laws--at least ones that apply domestically--will be legitimate. Fairly easy judgment, certainly compared to a thorough consideration of the complexities of each particular piece of legislation.



While the norms of rational discussion do seem beyond your understanding, I was not "lecturing" him, I was questioning something he said... about a topic that is vaguely relevant to this one, but certainly not the same.



Your lack of understanding does not indicate arbitrariness. It is an indication either of your own close-mindedness or of your own stupidity.



Wait, are you arguing that all moral views are arbitrary? That changes things somewhat. It means, for instance, that your entire argument is pointless, because it necessarily concerns a moral question: what a person should do once he or she has broken the law. If morality is necessarily arbitrary, then your attempt to support your view and question the support for mine is necessarily pointless: an arbitrary position has no support, and a necessarily arbitrary sphere of judgment cannot have any support.

If you are not arguing that all morality is arbitrary, then it is (past) time to actually start responding to my moral arguments, instead of dismissing them as arbitrary whim.



Is all judgment a matter of whim? If not, why do you insist that a judgment of legitimacy is? If so, how can you believe in rational argumentation at all? (Then again, perhaps you do not. It would not surprise me.)



No, we wouldn't. People can believe the right things for bad reasons, and when challenged effectively, come to believe the wrong things for better ones. The fact that people can be brought to believe wrong things in no way implies that moral argumentation cannot concern objective criteria like rationality.

The grain of truth in what you say is that people can be brought to believe wrong things for wrong reasons, too, since, again, we are imperfect creatures. But my point still holds, because plenty of racists have abandoned their positions precisely because they have recognized their irrationality.

Do you really think it is always futile to argue rationally with a racist?



No, I wouldn't. And I would never appoint myself dictator, even if I had the power to do so.

But you continue to miss the point.



I think you need to review reading comprehension.

What I actually said was:

"Actually, yes. But I don't need to. Intersubjectivity is as good as objectivity here"

I didn't need to prove it not because I thought I was entitled to presuppose it, but because I didn't need it for my argument. Something else sufficed.



No, it doesn't.



You don't have access to a mind capable of understanding what other people say? Why the fuck are you spending time on NS, then? To frustrate others?



Yes, it is. Good thing I never said that, then.

Is that really the only standard you can think of upon which to challenge the basis of racism? That's rather sad. I can think of plenty of others... for instance, actually examining whether the arguments they make are consistent with reason and the empirical evidence.



Any attempt to do what is right, in principle, "defends" anyone who actually is right, whoever they happen to be. When I say that I should do what is right, that is the first premise not only of moral arguments most people would accept as good ones ("I should help those in need") but also of moral arguments with reprehensible conclusions ("I should slaughter innocent people en masse.")

The difference between the KKK and (say) Doctors Without Borders is not that first premise, not the assumption that we should actually concern ourselves with morality (as you absurdly maintain), but the rest of the argument.



No, I understood exactly what he said and what he'd shown, at least once he clarified his meaning of "legitimacy." I made a point about the limitations of the method.



Something can be non-universal without being arbitrary. Something can be arbitrary while being universal.

This has become nonsensical and really impossible for anyone to follow.

Fact: You claimed that it's okay to violate the law if it's "illegitimate".

Fact: you appealed to popularity to demonstrate legitimacy

Fact: you mentioned a popular law that you claimed wasn't legitimate, thus contradicting yourself.

Fact: You can't use law to demonstrate legitimacy since you complained when NA did so.

Fact: You claimed this isn't about what you believe to be morally correct.

So now, you don't have popularity, universalism, your personal beliefs. What's left? Some arbitrary way of valuing morality? Anything you describe can be shown to be just something you picked. These are facts. There is no getting around that you've destroyed every hole you can hide in. Amusing, since at the start of this discussion you were claiming the legitimacy of laws is obvious and that we must stand against them when they aren't legitimate. Now's a great time to retract said claim.

Levi's ;)

http://levi.imageg.net/graphics/product_images/pLEVI1-3922379r150.jpg

I take you never intend to get married.

"But Honey, I was only being reasonable to the woman." :p

This has become nonsensical and really impossible for anyone to follow.

It's rather presumptuous to assume that your own incapacities are shared by others.

Fact: You claimed that it's okay to violate the law if it's "illegitimate".

That's right.

Fact: you appealed to popularity to demonstrate legitimacy

No, I didn't.

Fact: you mentioned a popular law that you claimed wasn't legitimate, thus contradicting yourself.

See, if you actually believed in rational argumentation, instead of assuming that the problem must lie with my argument you might have considered momentarily whether, instead, your own interpretation might be flawed--as it was.

Fact: You can't use law to demonstrate legitimacy since you complained when NA did so.

That's right. Good thing I didn't do so.

Fact: You claimed this isn't about what you believe to be morally correct.

You're equivocating. My point was that the question is not whether I think the law is morally correct. The question is whether the law is legitimate.

Obviously, at some level in defining legitimacy I must make moral judgments. That's a necessary part of considering what people should do, which, after all, is what this argument is about. But there are different kinds of moral judgments. Because everyone's moral judgment is biased and therefore somewhat arbitrary, we are not entitled to violate the law simply because we believe it is wrong. We must meet a higher standard.

the people of norilsk16 find that extremely amusing

It's rather presumptuous to assume that your own incapacities are shared by others.

Actually, that I stop the broken quotes was requested by others, some in this thread. Who's being presumtuous?

That's right.



No, I didn't.



See, if you actually believed in rational argumentation, instead of assuming that the problem must lie with my argument you might have considered momentarily whether, instead, your own interpretation might be flawed--as it was.



That's right. Good thing I didn't do so.



You're equivocating. My point was that the question is not whether I think the law is morally correct. The question is whether the law is legitimate.

Obviously, at some level in defining legitimacy I must make moral judgments. That's a necessary part of considering what people should do, which, after all, is what this argument is about. But there are different kinds of moral judgments. Because everyone's moral judgment is biased and therefore somewhat arbitrary, we are not entitled to violate the law simply because we believe it is wrong. We must meet a higher standard.

Yay, I get to play the quote game. This is gonna be fun. I love when people are afraid to simply admit that they're wrong (in this doing so while lecturing another poster, while refusing to admit they are doing so from a position that is only supported by their whim), so they keep twisting what they're saying. Give me a moment. The search is only allowed every three minutes. I'm sure you're gonna enjoy this as much as I will.

Actually, that I stop the broken quotes was requested by others, some in this thread.

And that has, what, exactly, to do with labeling the argument "nonsensical" and "impossible to follow"?

Give me a moment. The search is only allowed every three minutes.

Try the "Find" feature.

And that has, what, exactly, to do with labeling the argument "nonsensical" and "impossible to follow"?



Try the "Find" feature.

I was referring to the breaking up of the quotes. Sorry if that was unclear.

Let me ask you this.

Did you claim that legitimacy of a law is based on whether it was arrived at by a democratic process?

Did you claim that legitimacy of a law is based on whether it was arrived at by a democratic process?

In part, yes. But this standard, even ignoring the fact that I also included the rule of law/equality under law in that consideration, is still not one of "popularity." For one, real democracy requires universal (or near-universal) suffrage. The capability of minorities to exercise political power is a necessary component, even if it is really popular among the majority to keep it from them.

In part, yes. But this standard, even ignoring the fact that I also included the rule of law/equality under law in that consideration, is still not one of "popularity." For one, real democracy requires universal (or near-universal) suffrage. The capability of minorities to exercise political power is a necessary component, even if it is really popular among the majority to keep it from them.

Universal suffrage is another bias you're bringing to the table. That you don't acknowledge it doesn't change it.

And even if you have universal suffrage, you still have tyranny by majority, an appeal to popularity for what is right. Something you claimed you didn't say. There are many things you can deny minorities without denying them a vote.