NationStates Jolt Archive

Be like a rock against which the waves of the sea break unceasingly. It stands unmoved, and the feverish waters around it are stilled. "I am unfortunate because this has happened to me."

No indeed, but I am fortunate because I endure what has happened without grief, neither shaken by the present nor afraid of the future. Something of this sort could happen to any man, but not every man can endure it without grieving.

Why, then, is this more unfortunate than that is fortunate? Would you call anything a misfortune which is not compatible with man's nature, or call incompatible with the nature of man that which is not contrary to his nature's purpose.

You have learned to know that purpose. What has happened can then in no way prevent you from being just, great hearted, chaste, wise, steadfast, truthful, self respecting, and free...or prevent you from possessing those other qualities in the presence of which man's nature finds its own fulfillment.

Remember in the future, when something happens which tends to make you grieve, to cling to this doctrine: this is no misfortune, but to endure it nobly is good fortune.

All the atheists, agnostics, and liberals should take a page from Marcus Aurelius.

All the atheists, agnostics, and liberals should take a page from Marcus Aurelius.

and since nothing he said had anything to do with god, christianity, or conservative philosophies, I'm really not sure why atheists, agnostics and liberals should put forth any more effort than christians, gnostics, buddhists, muslims, astrophysicists, dentists and dog walkers.

You DO also know that adding quotes without personal elaboration and commentary is frowned upon here, right?

Fail.

Great.

Let's start worshipping the gods of Rome.

Who wants to join me in a Baccanalian orgy!

*pulls out the wine. And the water*

I was referring specifically to the "Problem of Evil" that Atheists like to bring up so very often. I'm not sure that it would really be a problem for the Stoics.

I was referring specifically to the "Problem of Evil" that Atheists like to bring up so very often. I'm not sure that it would really be a problem for the Stoics.

atheists have no problem with the concept of evil. People are dicks. That's really the only reason needed.

It's the believers who are always desperately trying to reconcile their incompatable beliefs of a kind and just god with the presence of evil.

Great.

Let's start worshipping the gods of Rome.

Who wants to join me in a Baccanalian orgy!

*pulls out the wine. And the water*

Hail Jupiter!

atheists have no problem with the concept of evil. People are dicks. That's really the only reason needed.

It's the believers who are always desperately trying to reconcile their incompatable beliefs of a kind and just god with the presence of evil.

Yeah, last time I checked atheists weren't going "There are no gods, so why is there evil?" The answer there is patently obvious.

The fact that there are no gods has no bearing on the presence of evil in the world.

It's generally quite the opposite. The theist going "My god loves me, why do bad things happen to me?"

All the atheists, agnostics, and liberals should take a page from Marcus Aurelius.

wouldnt that piss off the librarian?

Unless of course he's refering to the though experiment often employed to the effect of "if god is a loving, benevolent, and all powerful deity, why doesn't he eliminate all suffering, pain, and evil in the world?" In which case, he's going to need to come up with a far better rebuttal than the equivalent of "sticks and stones will break my bones but words will never hurt me!"

I was referring specifically to the "Problem of Evil" that Atheists like to bring up so very often. I'm not sure that it would really be a problem for the Stoics.

There aren't too many problems for stoics in general. That's the nice part.

There aren't too many problems for stoics in general. That's the nice part.

Yes. :p

Unless of course he's refering to the though experiment often employed to the effect of "if god is a loving, benevolent, and all powerful deity, why doesn't he eliminate all suffering, pain, and evil in the world?" In which case, he's going to need to come up with a far better rebuttal than the equivalent of "sticks and stones will break my bones but words will never hurt me!"

Not to mention that the gods of Rome were neither benevolent nor all powerful.

Off-topic: Still haven't seen you poking around on the PNP site. It looks like another game might be going up near the end of the month, or at least beginning to be put together. A d20 Spycraft game, if you're familiar with the system at all.

Off-topic: Still haven't seen you poking around on the PNP site. It looks like another game might be going up near the end of the month, or at least beginning to be put together. A d20 Spycraft game, if you're familiar with the system at all.

I honestly have been swamped, but end of the month sounds good. I'm not familiar with the system, I'll look it up.

All the atheists, agnostics, and liberals should take a page from Marcus Aurelius.

I think everybody can take a page from it. It's a good humanist quote that encourages people to stand up and be a man. Or a woman. Or intersexed.

However.

It's an ideal to strive for, not a statement of fact. In real life the waves are often big enough to bowl people over whether they are stout-hearted or not. Evil happens. And were there a god, it has caused that evil. This fact is usually dodged and run around by theist apologetics, because it's inconsistent with the idea of a god having all three omnis: omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

*pulls out the wine. And the water*

*turns the water into wine*

You pagans have no idea what "festivity" even means.

I think everybody can take a page from it. It's a good humanist quote that encourages people to stand up and be a man. Or a woman. Or intersexed.

However.

It's an ideal to strive for, not a statement of fact. In real life the waves are often big enough to bowl people over whether they are stout-hearted or not. Evil happens. And were there a god, it has caused that evil. This fact is usually dodged and run around by theist apologetics, because it's inconsistent with the idea of a god having all three omnis: omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

i dont think it IS an ideal to strive for.

sure its a good thing to be an adult about the vagaries of fate but its not a good idea to deny human emotion. sometimes there is good reason to grieve, good reason to be pissed at the way things are.

those emotions make us human and spur us on to change the world around us. a stoic acceptance of fate might make it easier to endure but it doesnt make the world a better place.

I honestly have been swamped, but end of the month sounds good. I'm not familiar with the system, I'll look it up.

No worries. With finals coming up we've grinded to a halt.

It's basically a modern d20 game with 0 magic and a spy motif. A nice, fun, frequently action-filled system. And they get rid of a lot of things that I hated about D&D 3.0 and 3.5 (mainly Attacks of Opportunity).

i dont think it IS an ideal to strive for.

sure its a good thing to be an adult about the vagaries of fate but its not a good idea to deny human emotion. sometimes there is good reason to grieve, good reason to be pissed at the way things are.

those emotions make us human and spur us on to change the world around us. a stoic acceptance of fate might make it easier to endure but it doesnt make the world a better place.

Even Epictetus did good works. Stoicism doesn't imply any lack of goals or ideals. The stoic ideal only states (to simplify) that you have the power of interpretation over externals, and suggests that you ought to make the best of them.

I was referring specifically to the "Problem of Evil" that Atheists like to bring up so very often. I'm not sure that it would really be a problem for the Stoics.

Stoics ignore logic?

Stoics ignore logic?

What do you know about logic?

STOP MAKING A MOCKERY OF MY FIELD OF STUDY, DARN IT! :mad:

Even Epictetus did good works. Stoicism doesn't imply any lack of goals or ideals. The stoic ideal only states (to simplify) that you have the power of interpretation over externals, and suggests that you ought to make the best of them.

im only going by what the quote says. i cannot recommend a life of supressing emotion. there are things worth grieving over.

im only going by what the quote says. i cannot recommend a life of supressing emotion. there are things worth grieving over.

On a hippy would think that. :)

im only going by what the quote says. i cannot recommend a life of supressing emotion. there are things worth grieving over.

A lifetime of habits and upbringing might tell you that; however, the mind is amazingly plastic. A few differences in the way you were raised and conditioned might change your opinion entirely. ;)

A lifetime of habits and upbringing might tell you that; however, the mind is amazingly plastic. A few differences in the way you were raised and conditioned might change your opinion entirely. ;)

very true

but i am who i am. experience tells me that i am right. (within my limited understanding of the point of the quote)

im only going by what the quote says. i cannot recommend a life of supressing emotion. there are things worth grieving over.

The ancient Stoics are often misunderstood because the terms they used pertained to different concepts in the past than they do today. The word stoic has come to mean unemotional or indifferent to pain, because Stoic ethics taught freedom from passion by following reason. But the Stoics did not seek to extinguish emotions, only to avoid emotional troubles by developing clear judgment and inner calm through diligent practice of logic, reflection, and concentration.

Here, it may not be the most reliable source ever, but meh. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoicism#The_doctrine_of_.22things_indifferent.22)

What do you know about logic?

STOP MAKING A MOCKERY OF MY FIELD OF STUDY, DARN IT! :mad:

I know that the problem of evil is not a problem with dealing with bad things, but the problem that an omnipotent, benevolent God and the existence of evil can be shown in many ways to violate the rule of non-contradiction.

The Problem of Evil is a logical problem, not a behavioral one.

I know that the problem of evil is not a problem with dealing with bad things, but the problem that an omnipotent, benevolent God and the existence of evil can be shown in many ways to violate the rule of non-contradiction.

Not deductively. Unless you are a philosopher, or a logician, then I suggest that you cease talking about the above. :mad:

Not deductively. Unless you are a philosopher, or a logician, then I suggest that you cease talking about the above. :mad:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil#Formalized_arguments

Not deductively. Unless you are a philosopher, or a logician, then I suggest that you cease talking about the above. :mad:

Oh, also, this quote is an http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority

Not deductively. Unless you are a philosopher, or a logician, then I suggest that you cease talking about the above. :mad:

Yes it does.

But all this is beside the point as you have addressed the Problem of Evil as a logical problem and therefore concede that Marcus Aurelius's quote is not relevant to it.

Moving on....

Are you for real?

Oh, also, this quote is an http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority


A) I'm not saying that there is no alleged "problem of evil." I'm sure there is. None of he arguments involved, however, are deductively sound. Granted, some of them are more probable than others, but none of them are demonstrative in the strict sense. So, to say that there are logical problems is just wrong.

B) That said, if I am commiting an Ad Verecundiam, then name the unauthoritative authority to whom I am appealing, and explain why the authority in question is not authoritative.

But all this is beside the point as you have addressed the Problem of Evil as a logical problem and therefore concede that Marcus Aurelius's quote is not relevant to it.

The reason I brought up the quote is because I doubt that any of the "evil" which is commonly brought up actually is evil in the sense that we mean it is. See the underlined portion of Aurelius' quote.

Are you for real?

Huh?

The reason I brought up the quote is because I doubt that any of the "evil" which is commonly brought up actually is evil in the sense that we mean it is.

Right. Genocide, for instance, is perfectly okay. The important thing is that you strive to endure it.

Right. Genocide, for instance, is perfectly okay. The important thing is that you strive to endure it.

Does being murdered change the fact that the person being murdered either was a good person or not a good person prior to the point that he was murdered?

The reason I brought up the quote is because I doubt that any of the "evil" which is commonly brought up actually is evil in the sense that we mean it is. See the underlined portion of Aurelius' quote.

He acknowledges that events will occur that make people grieve. He acknowledges that people suffer. A benevolent omnipotent God would not allow this, whether the individual suffered with grace or not.

Huh?

You post a quote by Marcus Aurelius as advice, then you get laughably defensive with mad faces to boot.

Moving on....

Are you for real?

Gens Romae is for real, yes.

Does being murdered change the fact that the person being murdered either was a good person or not a good person prior to the point that he was murdered?

You do realize that the Problem of Evil has little to do with "moral" evil proper?

If everyone is a good person yet suffers horrifically, the problem is still not solved.

Gens Romae is for real, yes.

For real about what? I'm confused. :confused:

A) I'm not saying that there is no alleged "problem of evil." I'm sure there is. None of he arguments involved, however, are deductively sound. Granted, some of them are more probable than others, but none of them are demonstrative in the strict sense. So, to say that there are logical problems is just wrong.

They are sound, you may just question the premises.

For real about what? I'm confused.

I thought you may have been another poster having a lark.

For real about what? I'm confused. :confused:

Your opinions and posting style. They smell strongly of troll to those wise in the ways of the wild intertron.

But I have no evidence that suggests you are not sincere in your views. In fact, you seem zealously sincere.

They are sound, you may just question the premises.

By definition, if an argument is deductively sound, then the premises cannot be questioned. Why are you commenting on a logical thing if you don't know logic?

Why are you commenting on a logical thing if you don't know logic?

Why are you quibbling with his terminology instead of advancing a real argument?

By definition, if an argument is deductively sound, then the premises cannot be questioned. Why are you commenting on a logical thing if you don't know logic?

Valid, sound, whatever.

You have still not given any reason to question the premises or the validity of the conclusion.

By definition, if an argument is deductively sound, then the premises cannot be questioned.

I tend to be swayed by arguments that are seductively sound. But..to each his own.

A) I'm not saying that there is no alleged "problem of evil." I'm sure there is. None of he arguments involved, however, are deductively sound. Granted, some of them are more probable than others, but none of them are demonstrative in the strict sense. So, to say that there are logical problems is just wrong.
Well, I may not be a "philosopher" like you, but the part right underneath where it says "Logical problem of evil" looks like it could be easily formulated into whatever your standards require.

B) That said, if I am commiting an Ad Verecundiam, then name the unauthoritative authority to whom I am appealing, and explain why the authority in question is not authoritative.
I'm sorry - I don't speak Latin. You implied that one must be a philosopher or logician to be able to understand or impart logical truth or something, but logical truth and its discernabilitiy is not dependant on credentials.

By definition, if an argument is deductively sound, then the premises cannot be questioned. Why are you commenting on a logical thing if you don't know logic?
I'm thinking you probably took a class or two, but don't really have a feel for the topic, so you just quibble with terminology and definitions. What we're calling a "sound" or "logical" argument is one where the conclusions logically follow, given the premises. The argument from evil can be formulated so as to meet this criteria. If you disagree, please tell us why.

Lemme ask you something...take the following two arguments. Which is the better? Is one necessarily better than the other? Is either one necessarily a bad argument?

A) All men are male. Bob is a man. Bob therefore is male.

B) There exists a country in which 99.9 percent of the population allow their hair to grow uncontrollably. Therefore, professional barbers don't exist in that country.

Lemme ask you something...take the following two arguments. Which is the better? Is one necessarily better than the other? Is either one necessarily a bad argument?

A) All men are male. Bob is a man. Bob therefore is man.

B) There exists a country in which 99.9 percent of the population allow their hair to grow uncontrollably. Therefore, professional barbers don't exist in that country.

Deduction and induction are different animals and are better or worse depending on how they are utilized.

EDIT: Perhaps you should show why this is relevant though.

Lemme ask you something...take the following two arguments. Which is the better? Is one necessarily better than the other? Is either one necessarily a bad argument?

A) All men are male. Bob is a man. Bob therefore is man.

B) There exists a country in which 99.9 percent of the population allow their hair to grow uncontrollably. Therefore, professional barbers don't exist in that country.
I'm interested discussing the problem of evil, not playing games with a wannabe Socrates. If you don't wish to engage in the discussion, then why did you start the thread?

I'm interested discussing the problem of evil, not playing games with a wannabe Socrates. If you don't wish to engage in the discussion, then why did you start the thread?

I'm gonna get around to it...rest you assured. I'm just curious as to your answer. I promise that immediately after you answer it, I'll address the problem at hand to all of your satisfaction.

I'm gonna get around to it...rest you assured. I'm just curious as to your answer. I promise that immediately after you answer it, I'll address the problem at hand to all of your satisfaction.

actually I think that if you create a topic, then you shouldn't try to change the subject to another. Either stick with your original topic, or let it die. Your pathetic attempts to play philosopher not withstanding.

actually I think that if you create a topic, then you shouldn't try to change the subject to another. Either stick with your original topic, or let it die. Your pathetic attempts to play philosopher not withstanding.

I do want to see where he is going with this.

At any rate, the first argument is better than the second. The conclusion clearly follows from the premises. If the premises are true, it is impossible that the conclusion be false.

The second argument is a good one, and it is definately persuasive. Generally speaking, if only 1/10 of a percent of a given population is in need of a barber, then it is unlikely that there will be barbers. They'd probably cut their own hair...insofar as barbers probably wouldn't be likely to make enough money to live.

Granted, this doesn't mean that there are necessarily no barbers. That 1/10 of a percent of the given population might all be concentrated in a given area, at which point being a barber might be a very lucrative thing, in that area.

The problem with the second is that our knowledge of the location is limited. It isn't improbable to conclude a given conclusion, namely that there are no barbers, but given that our knowledge is limited, our conclusion is far from certain.

What does this have to do with the problem of evil? There are presupposed implicit premises which aren't very good.

The argument:

God is all Good.
God is capable of creating the best possible world.
There exists evil in the world.
Therefore, this is not the best possible world.
God was capable of a good which he did not create.
This contradicts the first premise.

This seems deductive, but in truth, there are shaky implicit premises here, namely that there exists some possible world in which evil does not exist such that the possible world is better than this one.

Surely, to affirm this premise is beyond our finite minds. No?

Lemme ask you something...take the following two arguments. Which is the better? Is one necessarily better than the other? Is either one necessarily a bad argument?

A) All men are male. Bob is a man. Bob therefore is man.

B) There exists a country in which 99.9 percent of the population allow their hair to grow uncontrollably. Therefore, professional barbers don't exist in that country.

For part A), it seems a bit redundant. Did you mean to say: "All men are male. Bob is a man. Therefore Bob is male." ?

No big deal, just asking.

I've noticed that first year physics majors often go about remarking about the net force on things, six months later they are quite vocal on how various things are conserved, a few years later, they will expound at length on quanta.

You wouldn't happen to be an undergraduate philo student, would you?

What does this have to do with the problem of evil? There are presupposed implicit premises which aren't very good.

The argument:

God is all Good.
God is capable of creating the best possible world.
There exists evil in the world.
Therefore, this is not the best possible world.
God was capable of a good which he did not create.
This contradicts the first premise.

This seems deductive, but in truth, there are shaky implicit premises here, namely that there exists some possible world in which evil does not exist such that the possible world is better than this one.

Surely, to affirm this premise is beyond our finite minds. No?

Not at all, mainly, because you leave out a very important part of the thought experiment. God, supposedly, is not only omnibenevolent, but omnipotent as well. The existance of evil does not disprove an all good god, and nobody ever claimed it did. Therefore I suspect you're either being intellectually dishonest, or just plain foolish.

Rather, the argument has gone, that the existance of evil disproves a good that is both all good, and all powerful. In a system of an all powerful, omnipotent god, a better world must be possible, because if god is omnipotent, anything is possible. That's what omnipotent means, after all.

It's entirely possible, and nobody claimed it to be otherwise, that god is all good, and would create a better world, but just is impotent and powerless to do so (a rather ineffectual god that). It is also entirely possible that god is entirely capable of creating a better world, but he's a right fucking bastard and doesn't want to.

However an omnibenevolent, omnipotent god is logically impossible, because an all good god would not allow evil if it was his power to stop it, and an omnipotent god could stop it.

Misrepresenting your opponents arguments is a poor way to debate. Shame on you.

For part A), it seems a bit redundant. Did you mean to say: "All men are male. Bob is a man. Therefore Bob is male." ?

No big deal, just asking.

That's what I meant.

You wouldn't happen to be an undergraduate philo student, would you?

I'm nearing the end of my third semester. :D

Not at all, mainly, because you leave out a very important part of the thought experiment. God, supposedly, is not only omnibenevolent, but omnipotent as well.

I thought it was implicit in the reasoning I gave when I said (more or less) "There exists some possible world such that the world is better than this one which God could have created and did not"?

In a system of an all powerful, omnipotent god, a better world must be possible, because if god is omnipotent, anything is possible. That's what omnipotent means, after all.

Which does not involve a contradiction.

In regards to your argument:
God gave Man Free Will
If Man did not have to live with the consequences of his decisions, there is no Free Will
All evils that plague the world are the results of Man's decisions
Man blames God for all his mistakes, exonerating himself
Find an evil that doesn't exist as a result of our actions, and I'll rethink this

Surely, to affirm this premise is beyond our finite minds. No?
No. If you're gonna be starting talk about logic, proof or otherwise attempt to lend any sort of weight to your argument beyond "I feel so", then you cannot start questioning your own or our ability to perceive and comprehend truth.

Otherwise you'd be saying "Our rational mind is imperfect and can not show us the truth. I will now use our rational mind to show you the truth."

And all that quite aside from the unimaginable sadness that resigning in one's own inability represents. You can fill that void with a concept of an omnipotent power or anything else, but it's not going away.

And I think that's what god represents to people: it's a way of filling a void they have created for themselves. I honestly don't believe that there are Christians in the world who would, if god were to become a physical being and demand our submission in person, crawl on their knees before this being and do whatever it demands. The idea of a super-powerful superior being is reassuring - as long as you never have to face it.

Which does not involve a contradiction.

Of course it does. If god is all powerful than a better world must be possible. If god is all good, he would create, if possible, a better world. If god is both all good and all powerful then a better world would be possible, and he would make it.

That's a pretty fucking obvious contradiction. You make a poor student of logic.

No. If you're gonna be starting talk about logic, proof or otherwise attempt to lend any sort of weight to your argument beyond "I feel so", then you cannot start questioning your own or our ability to perceive and comprehend truth.

Possibility by definition is infinite, and our capacity to understand by definition is finite. It seems to intuitively follow that it's unlikely that we can affirm the premise "There exists a possible world such that there exists no evil in that world and that world is better than this one."

At any rate, the first argument is better than the second.

Well you are judging the two against each other using the standards of deduction, so obviously deduction would appear "better", but that is neither here nor there.

What does this have to do with the problem of evil? There are presupposed implicit premises which aren't very good.

The argument:

God is all Good.
God is capable of creating the best possible world.
There exists evil in the world.
Therefore, this is not the best possible world.
God was capable of a good which he did not create.
This contradicts the first premise.

This seems deductive, but in truth, there are shaky implicit premises here, namely that there exists some possible world in which evil does not exist such that the possible world is better than this one.

Surely, to affirm this premise is beyond our finite minds. No?

Do you deny the literal translation of the bible where direct intervention from God resulted in suffering?

Also, yes, it is logically possible that people capable of evil could be made to freely choose good. Gratuitously evil people exist and we can fathom their non-existence.

Of course it does. If god is all powerful than a better world must be possible. If god is all good, he would create, if possible, a better world. If god is both all good and all powerful then a better world would be possible, and he would make it.

That's a pretty fucking obvious contradiction. You make a poor student of logic.

You misunderstand me. Omnipotent means "Able to do all things which does not involve a contradiction."

Also, yes, it is logically possible that people capable of evil could be made to freely choose good. Gratuitously evil people exist and we can fathom their non-existence.

Do you not see the intrinsic contradiction in that statement?

That's a pretty fucking obvious contradiction. You make a poor student of logic.
I think he's saying we're not capable of perceiving the world properly. This world is in fact the best possible, because the evil within it is "good evil" as it were, for it has some sort of good purpose.

So when we're calling for a better world, we're being stupid because we're not capable of distinguishing real good from real evil.

Which is a pretty cruel for God to do, or rather for him to say.

It seems to intuitively follow that it's unlikely that we can affirm the premise "There exists a possible world such that there exists no evil in that world and that world is better than this one."

We don't have to conceive of such a world, as long as you believe that god is omnipotent you must accept that it is possible. By definition, nothing can be impossible for an omnipotent entity. If you believe in an omnipotent god, you must believe that such a world is possible, otherwise, there is the contradiction, because for an omnipotent entity, nothing is impossible.

Again, you fail at logic.

I think he's saying we're not capable of perceiving the world properly. This world is in fact the best possible, because the evil within it is "good evil" as it were, for it has some sort of good purpose.


except, again, this doesn't work. Because, for an omnipotent god, nothing is impossible, so a better world MUST be possible. Even if we can't see that this world is really much much better than we think, and even if we can't perceive the "perfection" of it, if god is omnipotent, a better world must be possible because, for an omnipotent god, literally anything and everything is possible.

It is simple logic. Simple premise, god is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, from this the following conditions flow:

IF god is omnibenevolent THAN this is the most perfect world there can be

IF this is the most perfect world there can be THAN there can be not be a more perfect world

IF there can not be a more perfect world THAN god can not create a more perfect world

IF god can not create a more perfect world THAN there is something god can not do

IF there is something god can not do THAN god has limitations

IF god has limitations THAN god can not be omnipotent

conclusion:

IF god is omnibenevolent THAN god can not be omnipotent

The situation runs in reverse as well:

IF god is omnipotent THAN god can do anything

IF god can do anything THAN anything is possible

IF anything is possible THAN this can not be the best possible world

IF this can not be the best possible world THAN god did not create for us the best possible world

IF god did not create for us the best possible world THAN god is not omnibenevolent

Conclusion:

IF god is omnipotent THAN god can not be omnibenevolent

You misunderstand me. Omnipotent means "Able to do all things which does not involve a contradiction."

You must be a fan of classical philosophy if you believe God is bound by Aristotelian logic. Which is the supreme being?

We don't have to conceive of such a world, as long as you believe that god is omnipotent you must accept that it is possible. By definition, nothing can be impossible for an omnipotent entity. If you believe in an omnipotent god, you must believe that such a world is possible, otherwise, there is the contradiction, because for an omnipotent entity, nothing is impossible.

Nothing can be impossible for an omnipotent entity which does not involve a contradiction. I think you are confused on that point. As a universal optimist, I fail to see why it's necessarily the case that such a greater world is possible, which is to say, I fail to see why it's not the case that it's necessarily the case that this world is not the best possible world. Do you not admit the possibility that asserting a "better" possible world would entail asserting a world which is in fact impossible, which is to say, involves a contradiction?

This seems deductive, but in truth, there are shaky implicit premises here, namely that there exists some possible world in which evil does not exist such that the possible world is better than this one.

Surely, to affirm this premise is beyond our finite minds. No?I don't think so. All we have to do is determine that it is possible for this hypothetical god to have created a less evil world than this one. Myself, I can imagine hundreds of such worlds every day before breakfast. As for a god that is truly omnipotent in his or her creative powers, such a god necessarily could make such a world possible by virtue of their omnipotence. After all, is not our conception of logic merely a limited product of our own limited minds in a universe which may be bounded in conceptual dimensions we cannot even fathom?

If a god can't create a universe without evil, then that is something if hasn't the power to do, which makes it not omnipotent.

You misunderstand me. Omnipotent means "Able to do all things which does not involve a contradiction."
That's only within the context of our universe, which possesses our particular logical structure as a property. Omnipotence in creative powers must be defined more broadly, because an extrauniversal mind is not limited by the traits of our universe.

And even if it were, it's easy to conceive of a world less evil, but still governed by our universe-rules. Anybody can do it. Try it!

God is all Good.
God is capable of creating the best possible world.
There exists evil in the world.
Therefore, this is not the best possible world.
God was capable of a good which he did not create.
This contradicts the first premise.

*coughs* "strawman!" *clears throat*

Possibility by definition is infinite, and our capacity to understand by definition is finite.
Why? What sort of definitions are you using here?

Understanding is the process of acquiring knowledge/information through the use of our cognitive ability. Wouldn't you agree?

We could reasonably say that not everything we understand is actually meaningful, eg we could claim to understand Star Trek's warp drive, which is itself just a fiction dreamt up by someone and may never exist because it contradicts the understanding we have (or could have) of other things. So in this manner all our understanding of individual things also must be threaded together into a grand whole understanding of the universe.

But I don't see how you could conclude that the reverse is true, ie that there is anything meaningful which we can't understand, as in gain knowledge about its nature and existence through thought.

It seems to intuitively follow that it's unlikely that we can affirm the premise "There exists a possible world such that there exists no evil in that world and that world is better than this one."
We might want to leave intuition out of it.

In regards to your argument:
God gave Man Free Will
If Man did not have to live with the consequences of his decisions, there is no Free Will
All evils that plague the world are the results of Man's decisions
Man blames God for all his mistakes, exonerating himself
Find an evil that doesn't exist as a result of our actions, and I'll rethink this

I am reiterating mainly due to the time I typed this took so long, well, look at the responses since, and these are points I feel need to be considered

Do you not see the intrinsic contradiction in that statement?

No, persons could be made that satisfied all requirements for free will, but still always chose the good behavior.

Another way of thinking about it is that if there is a creator god, then evil (or anything for that matter) didn't exist prior to creation, meaning evil was created by the god. To assert that it is impossible to create good without creating evil implies that god already pre-exists in some kind of substrate with good-evil relationship properties that was not created by god, and dominates and restrains the god.

Why? What sort of definitions are you using here?

Count one by one all of the numbers that exist from the farthest reaches of negative infinity to the farthest reaches of positive infinity. In fact, why don't you state the very first number from the farthest reaches of negative infinity? When you can do that, I'll concede that it's possible for a finite mind to comprehend infinity.

We might want to leave intuition out of it.

Or not.

This seems deductive, but in truth, there are shaky implicit premises here, namely that there exists some possible world in which evil does not exist such that the possible world is better than this one.

Surely, to affirm this premise is beyond our finite minds. No?

That's right... no.

For an obvious case, a world in which the Holocaust did not happen would be better than this one, all else being equal, and an omnipotent deity could create such a world.

A few random thoughts:

God exists.
God is perfect.
Nothing that exists is perfect.
Therefore, God is Nothing.


Aethists rarely, if ever bring up the 'problem' of evil because, by definition, evil is a religious problem. ppl do horrid crappy things all the time, but it's not 'evil' because they, like all things, have no soul. It's just horrid crappy stuff.

Also, Marcus Aurelius: Being like a rock against which the waves of the sea break unceasingly, standing unmoved, while the feverish waters around it are stilled just doesn't work. Given time, those waves are gonna destroy you and your wee rock. Heck if you're really unlucky there's gonna be an undersea quake and you and your wee rock are going to swept away in a bloody great tsunami.

Anyone get the feeling we're dealing with someone fresh out of Bibleschool and seeking to impress by using big words and the phrase, 'logical deduction' lots?

No, persons could be made that satisfied all requirements for free will, but still always chose the good behavior.

How?

I'm sorry, but I just cant stand to see something bolded, CAPITALIZED and THEN gramatically incorrect, let alone repeated so many times.

If..., then...

more/less... than...
ThanQ. It was bugging the hell out of me as well.

Nothing can be impossible for an omnipotent entity which does not involve a contradiction.


Omnipotence (literally, "all power") is power with no limits i.e. unlimited power

It would appear your definition is incorrect.

I think you are confused on that point.

The failure to create a logically consistant argument on your part does not equate to confusion on my part.

Do you not admit the possibility that asserting a "better" possible world would entail asserting a world which is in fact impossible, which is to say, involves a contradiction?

involving a contradiction, in what? In god? You assert qualities of god as true, then attempt to prove those qualities by making up your own definitions?

You say that there are things god can not do (namely, contradict itself), however, by definition, for an omnipotent entity, there is nothing it can not do. An omnipotent being, by definition, can not be contradictory. Either a being is all powerful, or it is not. If there is a limit as to what it can do, it is not omnipotent.

You're basically trying to say that god can do anything, except when he can't. And since you already admitted that there are things god can not do, you have already admitted the fallacy.

Congratulations, you just defeated your own point.

That's right... no.

For an obvious case, a world in which the Holocaust did not happen would be better than this one, all else being equal, and an omnipotent deity could create such a world.

Yet, the only world in which the Holocaust did not happen worth mentioning here would have been such a one in which the Holocaust could not have happened, yes? Would that really have been a better world?

That's right... no.

For an obvious case, a world in which the Holocaust did not happen would be better than this one, all else being equal, and an omnipotent deity could create such a world.

So he doesn't need to answer, we cannot predict with certainty that any logically possible world without the holocaust would be better, therefore the argument is inductive.

Of course one must assume that God is subject to logic, which kind of blows several holes in the defense.

In regards to your argument:
God gave Man Free Will
If Man did not have to live with the consequences of his decisions, there is no Free Will
All evils that plague the world are the results of Man's decisions
Man blames God for all his mistakes, exonerating himself
Find an evil that doesn't exist as a result of our actions, and I'll rethink this
First of all, there's plenty of evil that isn't the result of human action, like natural disasters and many diseases.

The concept of free will is not only demonstrably false, but not a consistently defined concept. That is, if our actions are determined by exterior or genetic cause, then determinism is true. If not, then they are random as measured by naturalistic means. If free will is supposed to be a combination of the two, then it simply describes determinism with a randomizer thrown in.

Yet, the only world in which the Holocaust did not happen worth mentioning here would have been such a one in which the Holocaust could not have happened, yes?

That's awful phrasing, but now that I understand your sentence, yes.

Would that really have been a better world?

A world in which millions cannot be slaughtered ruthlessly and unjustifiably? Yes, absolutely.

Similarly, if a human being had the opportunity to prevent the Holocaust from happening, assuming no necessary evil means (and God is omnipotent so He wouldn't need them), that human being should have done so... right?

It would appear your definition is incorrect.

Screw the dictionary. (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm#3)

While you are at it, see Anselm (3.2) (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm/#ConDivAtt)

Furthermore, St. Bonaventure says that God knows all possibles insofar as all that is possible are reflections of His own Being. If God creates anything He knows it first in Himself. For God to create a contradiction is to say that there exists some contradiction in God, which is clearly wrong.

When you can do that, I'll concede that it's possible for a finite mind to comprehend infinity.
I can't do it because the process of counting clashes with the concept of infinity, not because I can't comprehend that there is infinity.

In fact, that I'm not sitting here counting demonstrates my ability to comprehend infinity, because it demonstrates that I know that it is futile. The fact that humans are capable to have mathematical models and equations that involve infinity in some way, shape or form demonstrates our ability to understand its properties.

Infinity is an abstract concept. We can't touch it or interact with it in a meaningful way. But we are capable of abstract thought and can know all there is to know about it - just as we would be capable of knowing all there is to know about anything else.

Or not.
I just think that, considering that we're talking about abstract things, the exclusion of abstract thought doesn't seem particularly useful.

Maybe we're just misunderstand each other: why do you say that we're talking about infinity? And why do you say that understanding is "by definition" finite? You may have to go step by step here.

Really why is God forbidden from contradiction?

I'll repost:

You must be a fan of classical philosophy if you believe God is bound by Aristotelian logic. Which is the supreme being?

A world in which millions cannot be slaughtered ruthlessly and unjustifiably? Yes, absolutely.

So the better world consists in the absense of a Good which God has given us (St. Augustine shows in "On Free Will" that Free Will is a Good given to us by God)?

Surely you can see the intrinsic contradiction in that statement?

First of all, there's plenty of evil that isn't the result of human action, like natural disasters and many diseases.

The concept of free will is not only demonstrably false, but not a consistently defined concept. That is, if our actions are determined by exterior or genetic cause, then determinism is true. If not, then they are random as measured by naturalistic means. If free will is supposed to be a combination of the two, then it simply describes determinism with a randomizer thrown in.
So, your argument boils down to, "We're all insects, let's act like it?"

First of all, there's plenty of evil that isn't the result of human action, like natural disasters and many diseases.

Are those rightly called evils? This is the exact reason I gave the Marcus Aurelius quote.

So the better world consists in the absense of a Good which God has given us (St. Augustine shows in "On Free Will" that Free Will is a Good given to us by God)?

Don't make up things I didn't say.

You know as well as I do that the Holocaust could have been stopped without taking away anyone's free will. "Will" in and of itself doesn't cause mass slaughter.

Screw the dictionary. (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm#3)

While you are at it, see Anselm (3.2) (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm/#ConDivAtt)

Whoops, circular argument. Can't use something to prove itself. Once again you fail at logic.

Furthermore, St. Bonaventure says that God knows all possibles insofar as all that is possible are reflections of His own Being. If God creates anything He knows it first in Himself. For God to create a contradiction is to say that there exists some contradiction in God, which is clearly wrong.

Your right, a contradiction in god is clearly wrong, and since such a contradiction is clearly irreparable, god can not exist in that fashion.

Thank you for admitting your entire belief system is wrong. You may proceed to now be a more productive member of society by ridding yourself of such silly superstition.

So the better world consists in the absense of a Good which God has given us (St. Augustine shows in "On Free Will" that Free Will is a Good given to us by God)?

Surely you can see the intrinsic contradiction in that statement?

God need not work with universal free will or universal slavery. One individual acting under divine guidance could have saved the good of free will for millions.

Are those rightly called evils? This is the exact reason I gave the Marcus Aurelius quote.

They are if there is conscious intent behind them.

Are those rightly called evils? This is the exact reason I gave the Marcus Aurelius quote.

You're equivocating, again. It's getting boring.

The question is: why would a benevolent, omnipotent God tolerate mass death and horrific suffering as a result of (say) a tsunami?

The tsunami obviously isn't "evil" (though it is perhaps "an evil" under a certain definition of that word), but that's completely beside the point.

Don't make up things I didn't say.

You know as well as I do that the Holocaust could have been stopped without taking away anyone's free will. "Will" in and of itself doesn't cause mass slaughter.

Yet you've freely admitted that the only world worth mentioning such that the Holocaust did not happen was such a world in which the Holocaust could not have happened, which is to say, such that men were incapable of killing people unjustly, insofar as the holocaust was the direct result of the (wrongful) excercise of the free will.

You admitted this point. Therefore, such a world (such that men were incapable of killing people, which is to say, that they didn't have the free will to do so) is better, and this better world consists in the absense of some good which God gave us.

So the better world consists in the absense of a Good which God has given us (St. Augustine shows in "On Free Will" that Free Will is a Good given to us by God)?

Surely you can see the intrinsic contradiction in that statement?

circular argument again. Claim that god gave us free will, then use the "good" qualities of free will to assume a good god. However, in order to use free will to prove a good god, it first presumes that a good god gave us that free will.

I thought you studied logic. you're not very good at it.

Whoops, circular argument. Can't use something to prove itself. Once again you fail at logic.

You half-wit, read the articles in question. Your claim is that omnipotence is incompatible with the statement that a being cannot do that, or cannot be involved in, contradictions. The links in question show quite well how there is no contradiction involved. Learn some damn philosophy, crap-for-brains.

The tsunami obviously isn't "evil" (though it is perhaps "an evil" under a certain definition of that word), but that's completely beside the point.

No bullet has ever been evil, but many shooters have been.

Yet you've freely admitted that the only world worth mentioning such that the Holocaust did not happen was such a world in which the Holocaust could not have happened, which is to say, such that men were incapable of killing people unjustly, insofar as the holocaust was the direct result of the (wrongful) excercise of the free will.


The holocaust occured because hitler occured. No hitler, no holocaust. An event LIKE the holocaust may have occured had hitler not been born, but the holocaust would not have.

Certainly god could have arranged for hitler to never have existed without intruding on free will. Make a particular sperm more lazy than normal on that faithful eve, perhaps.

circular argument again. Claim that god gave us free will, then use the "good" qualities of free will to assume a good god. However, in order to use free will to prove a good god, it first presumes that a good god gave us that free will.

I referenced another work.

I referenced another work.

Yes, you referenced another work. Another work that makes the logical fallacy that I mentioned. I would hope that as a student of logic you wouldn't rely on works that contain such obvious logical errors.

Oh well, I suppose your commitment to logic and reason is second to your commitment myth, superstition and fairy tale.

A very poor logic student indeed.

The holocaust occured because hitler occured. No hitler, no holocaust. An event LIKE the holocaust may have occured had hitler not been born, but the holocaust would not have.

Certainly god could have arranged for hitler to never have existed without intruding on free will. Make a particular sperm more lazy than normal on that faithful eve, perhaps.

Or hit him with a fucking hurricane. There is no evil in that.

Yet you've freely admitted that the only world worth mentioning such that the Holocaust did not happen was such a world in which the Holocaust could not have happened, which is to say, such that men were incapable of killing people unjustly,

That's right.

insofar as the holocaust was the direct result of the (wrongful) excercise of the free will.

I didn't say anything about free will. You did.

(such that men were incapable of killing people, which is to say, that they didn't have the free will to do so)

*tries to fly*

*fails*

But I thought God gave me free will!

:rolleyes:

Yes, you referenced another work. Another work that makes the logical fallacy that I mentioned. I would hope that as a student of logic you wouldn't rely on works that contain such obvious logical errors.

Oh well, I suppose your commitment to logic and reason is second to your commitment myth, superstition and fairy tale.

A very poor logic student indeed.

Feel free to prove that the fallacy in question is commited in the said work. Unless you can, then I strongly suggest retracting your statements.

So, your argument boils down to, "We're all insects, let's act like it?"
No, but if you want you can quote me as saying we're all rational, let's act like it and stop with this religion nonsense.
Are those rightly called evils? This is the exact reason I gave the Marcus Aurelius quote.
They cause death, evil, and suffering, whether Marcus Aurelius would agree or not. If there is such a thing as an evil consequence, then natural disasters are evil. If not, then you must absolve me if I punch knock you down and break your nose to make the point, for it is morally the same as God doing it to you through his creation of the hurricane.

You half-wit, read the articles in question. Your claim is that omnipotence is incompatible with the statement that a being cannot do that, or cannot be involved in, contradictions. The links in question show quite well how there is no contradiction involved. Learn some damn philosophy, crap-for-brains.

awww, I thought anger was a sin too? I have read those articles, and sorry, I refuse to give validity to any argument that, instead of attempting to reconcile the flaws in their own arguments, attempts to change definitions mid stream all the while pretending to not do so. It's the linguistic equivalent of slight of hand. It makes for poor illusion and even poorer arguments, and if this is the kind of philosophical discourse you admire and adhere to, it is no wonder you fail so miserably at it.

Or hit him with a fucking hurricane. There is no evil in that.
I'm starting to lol hard. You're jumping up and down, interjecting and stating the obvious and no one's listening. :D

Feel free to prove that the fallacy in question is commited in the said work. Unless you can, then I strongly suggest retracting your statements.

I already pointed it out. It presumes a specific cause of a condition then uses the existance of the condition to prove the cause. Just as pointless as me pointing out that only a giant, all powerful rabbit deity would make grass so delicious to regular rabbits, and since rabbits like grass, an all powerful rabbit diety must exist.

It's a very specific fallacy, known as "begging the question". And, as I said, if this is the type of poor, nonsensical philosophy you follow, it's no wonder you suck at it so horribly.

I already pointed it out. It presumes a specific cause of a condition then uses the existance of the condition to prove the cause. Just as pointless as me pointing out that only a giant, all powerful rabbit deity would make grass so delicious to regular rabbits, and since rabbits like grass, an all powerful rabbit diety must exist.

I've read the work in question, and I fail to see how the specific fallacy is instantiated. Feel free to point out the specific verses in which the fallacy occurs. Otherwise, feel free to shut up. :)

They cause death, evil, and suffering, whether Marcus Aurelius would agree or not. If there is such a thing as an evil consequence, then natural disasters are evil. If not, then you must absolve me if I punch knock you down and break your nose to make the point, for it is morally the same as God doing it to you through his creation of the hurricane.

ahh, I see your point. God is responsible for creating natural disasters, natural disasters cause harm, and therefore are just as evil as me beatting you to death, as long as we accept the proposition that "natural" disasters are the act of some being.

I've read the work in question, and I fail to see how the specific fallacy is instantiated.

Small wonder. As I said, if you can't see the glaring problems with that particular piece, it's no wonder you are so thoroughly incompetant in the fields of philosophy and logic.

The holocaust occured because hitler occured. No hitler, no holocaust. An event LIKE the holocaust may have occured had hitler not been born, but the holocaust would not have.

Certainly god could have arranged for hitler to never have existed without intruding on free will. Make a particular sperm more lazy than normal on that faithful eve, perhaps.

This only works if you say that it's necessarily the case that, once Hitler was created, that he commit the holocaust. Clearly, if I believe in free will, this premise falls apart.

I'm starting to lol hard. You're jumping up and down, interjecting and stating the obvious and no one's listening. :D

I was wondering if anyone else could read my posts.

This only works if you say that it's necessarily the case that, once Hitler was created, that he commit the holocaust. Clearly, if I believe in free will, this premise falls apart.

yes, it does, and again, it's no wonder you believe in something so erronious.

and by the way, despite your insistance on "having read the work" I find it very hard to believe, considering you didn't know that the title of Augustine's work is not "On Free Will" but rather "On Grace and Free Will". I don't see why I should be trying ot disbute your position, when you can't even be bothered to get your source right.

Yes, it's all good and well to endure hardships like a good Ivan-type zek in the gulag.

But what does that have to do with "liberals" or "atheists" or "agnostics?"

See, GR, you seem to be arguing very much - about argument. And not at all about your own argument, which seems to be based on the premise that liberals and atheists are whiny limp-wrists. (Presumably, unlike Christians and conservatives?)

I condense that down to "LOL LIBERALS SUCK." For all the philosophical claptrap that's plugging the hole that is this thread, the OP seems to be little more than stereotypical and tiresome left-versus-right bullshit.

yes, it does

Nuff said.

This only works if you say that it's necessarily the case that, once Hitler was created, that he commit the holocaust. Clearly, if I believe in free will, this premise falls apart.

Never mind the inconsistencies concerning an omniscient, omnipotent supreme being that cannot determine the future actions of such a pathetically inept being as a human, but wouldn't the the world have been better if God could predict and prevent these human caused catastrophes?

I mean a third of the population of Europe was wiped out by something without free will a few hundred years ago, and that is all well and good, but why didn't God put in a little alarm system that went off when John Wayne Gacy started putting on clown costumes?

But what does that have to do with "liberals" or "atheists" or "agnostics?"

Don't ask.

and by the way, despite your insistance on "having read the work" I find it very hard to believe, considering you didn't know that the title of Augustine's work is not "On Free Will" but rather "On Grace and Free Will". I don't see why I should be trying ot disbute your position, when you can't even be bothered to get your source right.

Dude, it's De Libertate Arbitrii. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustine_of_Hippo#Books)

Nuff said.

exactly, it falls apart, if you believe in some silly fallacy like "free will" and other such nonsense.

Again, thank you for admitting your religious outlook is fundamentally incompatable with observable reality. Now that you have shed these silly fairy tales and superstition, you can begin being a productive member of society.

That's like the third time you've admitted that your philosophies are fundamentally inconsistant with observable reality. I have to wonder how you can continue to maintain them, and sitll refer to yourself ever so amusingly, as someone who studies logic.

Vittos the City Slacker is the winner of this thread.

ahh, I see your point. God is responsible for creating natural disasters, natural disasters cause harm, and therefore are just as evil as me beatting you to death, as long as we accept the proposition that "natural" disasters are the act of some being.If the proposed god exists, then for all moral purposes they are.
This only works if you say that it's necessarily the case that, once Hitler was created, that he commit the holocaust. Clearly, if I believe in free will, this premise falls apart.
What is free will anyway? If God is omniscient, then he or she would necessarily know that Hitler would cause the holocaust prior to the creation of the universe.

exactly, it falls apart, if you believe in some silly fallacy like "free will" and other such nonsense.

Prove that free will is a fallacy, or that it is contrary to "observable reality." The same bull that you are spewing has been pushed as early as Democritus and the Atomists; I see no reason why it ought to be any more compelling now than it was then, which is to say, not very.

Dude, it's De Libertate Arbitrii. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustine_of_Hippo#Books)

you know what's funny about your link? It doesn't contain that title at all. Know what it does contain?

His book is entitled "On Free Choice of the Will" not "On Free Will", likewise his letter is entitled "On Grace and Free Will".

Here is the book, entitled, as you see "On Free Choice of the Will". (http://www.amazon.com/Choice-Saint-Bishop-Hippo-Augustine/dp/0872201880)

Here is the letter, "On Grace and Free Will (http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm)"

There is no book or letter by Augustine refered to as "On Free Will". Since you haven't made it clear which you are refering to, I presumed you refered to his letter, not his book. Either way, you cited improperly, so I'm unsure why I should be bothered.

Don't ask.

Why not? Seems like a rather relevant question. It would seem to in fact determine whether this is just trolling, or if the OP actually has something meaningful to say.

What is free will anyway?

The intermediate good by which a rational being is empowered to choose the higher good neither by chance nor by causality, but rather by deliberation, and by which our actions are given moral weight.

If God is omniscient, then he or she would necessarily know that Hitler would cause the holocaust prior to the creation of the universe.

Yet, if he would have prevented Hitler from existing, could he have known that Hitler would cause the holocaust, since clearly, if Hitler had not existed, he could not have caused the holocaust...and so how could God have known that he would if he could not have?

Yet, if he would have prevented Hitler from existing, could he have known that Hitler would cause the holocaust, since clearly, if Hitler had not existed, he could not have caused the holocaust...and so how could God have known that he would if he could not have?

Of course god could have known. Are you really saying that god is incapable of understanding a simple if/then conditional? I thought god was supposed to be all knowing, did god really not know the holocaust was going to happen until it did?

What a pathetic diety, can't even see the future...

Prove that free will is a fallacy, or that it is contrary to "observable reality." The same bull that you are spewing has been pushed as early as Democritus and the Atomists; I see no reason why it ought to be any more compelling now than it was then, which is to say, not very.

This is your expert philosophical opinion. It reminds me of Lews Black routine. "George Bush now says he believes in global warming, and as a result, I'm not sure anymore." Based on your philosophical incompetance, I'm inclined to believe in anything you don't, based purely that on my observation, anything you disagree with is far more likely to be correct.

Oh well, it's simple. When faced with the option of going left, or going right, how do you choose which?

Of course god could have known. Are you really saying that god is incapable of understanding a simple if/then conditional? I thought god was supposed to be all knowing, did god really not know the holocaust was going to happen until it did?

What a pathetic diety, can't even see the future...

At any rate, I fail to see why it's necessarily the case that Hitler not live than Hitler live. Granted, Hitler did commit great wrongdoing...but I'm not completely certain what is entailed in saying that it is better that Hitler did not exist.

If Hitler existed, then God created him. Given the choice of two courses of actions, is it possible for God to choose the lesser good?

If Hitler existed, then God created him. Given the choice of two courses of actions, is it possible for God to choose the lesser good?

Circular argument again. You can't presume that god created something to then use that something to prove a quality of god. There are four possibilities. 1) God is constrained by making the most good choices, and god made the most good choice in creating hitler 2) god is not constrained by making the most good choices, and god made the most good choice by creating hitler; 3) god is not constrained by making the most good choices, and god did not make the most good choice by creating hitler; 4) god did not create hitler.

You have yet to prove any of those. You have instead stated that god created hitler, stated that god can only make the most good choice, and then, based on that, presumed that hitler must be the most good choice. You started with a presumption and ended with a presumption.

Once again, you fail. You fail badly.

The intermediate good by which a rational being is empowered to choose the higher good neither by chance nor by causality, but rather by deliberation, and by which our actions are given moral weight.Thank you. You deserve a cookie because I can never get people to define free will.

Now then.

How is deliberation different from causation? It involves the input of circumstances and suppositions of morality, and produces an answer that is a rational product of those (or more realistically, a rational product of those in the context of a chemically-determined emotional state).

So the cause is those inputs, and the effect is the decision, which is determined by the input.

Is this not so?

Yet, if he would have prevented Hitler from existing, could he have known that Hitler would cause the holocaust, since clearly, if Hitler had not existed, he could not have caused the holocaust...and so how could God have known that he would if he could not have?
If God is omniscient, then he would easily comprehend what could happen if he chose to create Hitler or not. If this kills free will, then I apologize, but we're assuming an omniscient god here. If god is not omniscient, then the problem of evil argument isn't applicable.

Vittos the City Slacker is the winner of this thread.

Slacker? :)

Slacker? :)
oops

So GR you still haven't answered my post. Are you ignoring it for a specific reason?

Slacker? :)

There are lots of cities he *would* sack, but he can't be bothered to do it right now...

Circular argument again. You can't presume that god created something to then use that something to prove a quality of god.

Once again, fail.

I was unaware that God's having created something, or the quality of God's being good and choosing the good, was being contested. Read the thread: You wont' find either of the two having come into question.

At any rate, these are two premises of the Christian faith. All things created are created by the Divine Word.

All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made.

God by definition is The Good. This is the very definition of God which is supposed to set up this alleged "Problem of Evil."

Thus, God is Good, and God creates every human person. These things are not up for debate. These things are implicit in the definition of God.

You say that there could have been a possible world in which Hitler did not exist which would have been better. Yet, God created Hitler, and was able either to create him or not to create him. God by definition is incapable of choosing the lesser good, and therefore we must concede that the best possible world is the one in which God created Hitler.

atheists have no problem with the concept of evil. People are dicks. That's really the only reason needed.

It's the believers who are always desperately trying to reconcile their incompatable beliefs of a kind and just god with the presence of evil.

No, it's those who believe in a kind and just and omnipotent god.

Those of us who don't believe in a god that is omnipotent have no trouble at all reconciling our beliefs with the presence of evil.

How is deliberation different from causation?

I eat because I am pushed to it by hunger: causality.

I eat because I recognize the rational necessity of eating (for survival, for happiness, for some end I will): deliberation.

Edit: Your greater point is not necessarily invalid, but the distinction is a worthy one, and one essential to a good conception of what constitutes "free will."

Thank you. You deserve a cookie because I can never get people to define free will.

Now then.

How is deliberation different from causation? It involves the input of circumstances and suppositions of morality, and produces an answer that is a rational product of those (or more realistically, a rational product of those in the context of a chemically-determined emotional state).

I wrote a philosophy paper on this very subject. I'll post it in a different thread.

I was unaware that God's having created something, or the quality of God's being good and choosing the good, was being contested.

Then you really are pathetic. The qualities, and existance of god, has been the entire point of many pages of this thread. That certain qualities ascribed ot god are mutually exclusive.

Read the thread: You wont' find either of the two having come into question.

YOU were the one who broungt up the "problem of evil", on the very first page. The problem of evil directly involves whether god is good or not. The quality of god being good has been part of the main discussion of this entire thread.

At any rate, these are two premises of the Christian faith. All things created are created by the Divine Word.

God by definition is The Good. This is the very definition of God which is supposed to set up this alleged "Problem of Evil."

Thus, God is Good, and God creates every human person. These things are not up for debate. These things are implicit in the definition of God.

God isn't up for debate? YOU are the one who brought up atheists. YOU are the one who brought up the problem of evil, which is, in itself, a thought experiment discussing whether god as described exists. The entire thread has been nothing BUT a debate on the nature of god.

A debate YOU began, by bringing up a thought experiment that is designed to do just that, question the form and existance of god.

God by definition is incapable of choosing the lesser good, and therefore we must concede that the best possible world is the one in which God created Hitler.

YOU must concede, but that's because, as pointed out, you suck at logic.

I eat because I am pushed to it by hunger: causality.

I eat because I recognize the rational necessity of eating (for survival, for happiness, for some end I will): deliberation.

Problem: your recognition that eating is a rational necessity based on your experiences, and education. Ergo, the result of your deliberation is caused by certain factors.

Posted. (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=544666)

God by definition is incapable of choosing the lesser good, and therefore we must concede that the best possible world is the one in which God created Hitler.So if it were possible for this God to have created a better world without Hitler, which it is, then that would be proof that there is no god. We are assess possible worlds to determine if God could exist according to a certain falsifiable test. If you assume God in order to narrow down the search, then you have defeated the purpose, the falsifiability: blatant circular logic.

I eat because I recognize the rational necessity of eating (for survival, for happiness, for some end I will): deliberation.Then was not your eating ultimately caused by the facts and your abilities to recognize and compute them? Why is deliberation exempt from the label of causality when it bears the same hallmarks?

So if it were possible for this God to have created a better world without Hitler, which it is, then that would be proof that there is no god. We are assess possible worlds to determine if God could exist according to a certain falsifiable test. If you assume God in order to narrow down the search, then you have defeated the purpose, the falsifiability: blatant circular logic.

Not really. The "problem of evil" presupposes God, at least for the sake of reductio. If God isn't assumed at least for the sake of reductio, then the "problem of evil" isn't a problem at all. More importantly, "the problem of evil" is supposed to show incompatibility of God with the current state of things.

I agree that assuming that God is the way He is does in fact greatly narrow down the search, and ultimately turns the tide to my favor. That isn't a logical problem, however, since the initial point of the thought experiment was to show incompatibility, which it doesn't.

Problem: your recognition that eating is a rational necessity based on your experiences, and education. Ergo, the result of your deliberation is caused by certain factors.

That, however, has nothing to do with freedom of the will, just with the limitations of human knowledge.

Then was not your eating ultimately caused by the facts and your abilities to recognize and compute them?

Yes.

Why is deliberation exempt from the label of causality when it bears the same hallmarks?

Because it has to do with recognition, not with compulsion. It's the difference between doing something because you are driven to it by inclination (think an addict for an extreme example) and doing something because you recognize you should do it (moral duties, or prudent acts that you don't enjoy.)

In a certain technical sense, a good case could be made that this is still "causality"--that is why I noted in my edit that your general point was not necessarily invalid--but it is a very different kind of causality.

Not really. The "problem of evil" presupposes God, at least for the sake of reductio. If God isn't assumed at least for the sake of reductio, then the "problem of evil" isn't a problem at all. More importantly, "the problem of evil" is supposed to show incompatibility of God with the current state of things.

The "problem of evil" does not in any way presume the existance of god. All that is required that it presumes that people define god in a certain way, then goes about to counter those definitions. It does not need to presume that there is a god at all, it merely needs to presume that some people believe there to be a god. Very different things. The problem of evil deals with countering the perception of god. God need not exist for the problem to function, merely the perception of god needs to exist. And yes, it does presume that people do believe in god. That's it.

And, since you admit that the "problem of evil" does, fundamentally, deal with the question of the qualities of god, and since YOu raised the problem of evil to begin with, I am highly curious why you state that the qualities of god have not been in question in this thread.

You were the one who raised the question in the bloody first place.

Not really. The "problem of evil" presupposes God, at least for the sake of reductio. If God isn't assumed at least for the sake of reductio, then the "problem of evil" isn't a problem at all. More importantly, "the problem of evil" is supposed to show incompatibility of God with the current state of things.

I agree that assuming that God is the way He is does in fact greatly narrow down the search, and ultimately turns the tide to my favor. That isn't a logical problem, however, since the initial point of the thought experiment was to show incompatibility, which it doesn't.
Whoa whoa whoa. Back to logic, man. God is a PREMISE in the problem of evil argument. The argument goes God is yadadada, therefore if there is a God, we are living in the best possible world. If we aren't living in the best possible world that a hypothetical God could have created, then there is no God. If you say in response to this "We are living in the best possible world because God could not have made it any other way and God exists." then that means nothing because we haven't demonstrated that God exists, therefore your argument that we are living in the best possible world holds no water. It's circular logic. If you are unable to even hypothesize about the non-existence of God, then you are truly brainwashed.

Whoa whoa whoa. Back to logic, man. God is a PREMISE in the problem of evil argument. The argument goes God is yadadada, therefore if there is a God, we are living in the best possible world. If we aren't living in the best possible world that a hypothetical God could have created, then there is no God. If you say in response to this "We are living in the best possible world because God could not have made it any other way and God exists." then that means nothing because we haven't demonstrated that God exists, therefore your argument that we are living in the best possible world holds no water. It's circular logic. If you are unable to even hypothesize about the non-existence of God, then you are truly brainwashed.

The premise is flawed. How does the existence of a god directly lead to us living in the best possible world?

Unless of course, by capitalizing it as "God," you mean only the Abrahamic deity, a very narrow interpretation of the idea of the existence of god, and one I personally do not subscribe to.

:confused:

I'm guessing that Ancient Philosophy is one of the courses you don't have to pass for the Theology degree.

I don't think Gens R answered: which course was the paper in the other thread (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?p=13266912) for? And did it get a mark?

Great.

Let's start worshipping the gods of Rome.

Who wants to join me in a Baccanalian orgy!

*pulls out the wine. And the water*

Me!

except, again, this doesn't work. Because, for an omnipotent god, nothing is impossible, so a better world MUST be possible. Even if we can't see that this world is really much much better than we think, and even if we can't perceive the "perfection" of it, if god is omnipotent, a better world must be possible because, for an omnipotent god, literally anything and everything is possible.

It is simple logic. Simple premise, god is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, from this the following conditions flow:

IF god is omnibenevolent THAN this is the most perfect world there can be

IF this is the most perfect world there can be THAN there can be not be a more perfect world

IF there can not be a more perfect world THAN god can not create a more perfect world

IF god can not create a more perfect world THAN there is something god can not do

IF there is something god can not do THAN god has limitations

IF god has limitations THAN god can not be omnipotent

conclusion:

IF god is omnibenevolent THAN god can not be omnipotent

The situation runs in reverse as well:

IF god is omnipotent THAN god can do anything

IF god can do anything THAN anything is possible

IF anything is possible THAN this can not be the best possible world

IF this can not be the best possible world THAN god did not create for us the best possible world

IF god did not create for us the best possible world THAN god is not omnibenevolent

Conclusion:

IF god is omnipotent THAN god can not be omnibenevolent

Are you sure you don't mean THEN? IIRC it's generally If/Then, not If/Than. :D

Possibility by definition is infinite, and our capacity to understand by definition is finite. It seems to intuitively follow that it's unlikely that we can affirm the premise "There exists a possible world such that there exists no evil in that world and that world is better than this one."

and later:

Furthermore, St. Bonaventure says that God knows all possibles insofar as all that is possible are reflections of His own Being. If God creates anything He knows it first in Himself. For God to create a contradiction is to say that there exists some contradiction in God, which is clearly wrong.

I notice anyone else's commentary on possibilities and God you constrain as unlikely to be affirmable, but your own are clutched vehemently.

You've even commented several times on this being the best of all possible worlds, yet if the opposing premise is outside what is reasonable to assert, your own is equally so.

You say that there could have been a possible world in which Hitler did not exist which would have been better. Yet, God created Hitler, and was able either to create him or not to create him. God by definition is incapable of choosing the lesser good, and therefore we must concede that the best possible world is the one in which God created Hitler.

Again, you stated earlier that our ability to understand possibilities is finite, and it is unlikely we can affirm on this subject, yet you do so freely.

Anyway, all we have to concede here is that your God, rather than being perfectly Good and totally powerful (even within your constrained omnipotence that cannot withstand paradox), is just "trying the best he can", it would seem.

So, your God may be incapable of making anything better (a sad confession for a "perfect" being), but what about us?

For example, suppose I have free will, and I can choose to do something kind for someone today, or something cruel. The character of the world, in a small but not negligable way, will be affected.

If I choose kindness, the world will be a bit better (impossible as that may seem to you), and if I choose cruelty, it will be worse (despite your God's efforts to make it the best).

Your logic is failing again, Gens Romae. If we live in the best of all possible worlds, nothing we do can make it better, or worse. I hope your daily actions reflect something better than that.

No, it's those who believe in a kind and just and omnipotent god.

Those of us who don't believe in a god that is omnipotent have no trouble at all reconciling our beliefs with the presence of evil.

I don't subscribe to any particular God myself, but I would agree that removing the premise of omnipotence does open the range of possible "entities".

I wouldn't really call them Gods if they aren't omnipotent, just because of the connotation of "God", "Godlike" or "Act of God", but I think I see your point.

Gens Romae, though, seems to be talking about the Biblical God, of which are made several claims to omnipotence, without any admission of being restrained by contradiction.

I don't subscribe to any particular God myself, but I would agree that removing the premise of omnipotence does open the range of possible "entities".

I wouldn't really call them Gods if they aren't omnipotent, just because of the connotation of "God", "Godlike" or "Act of God", but I think I see your point.

Gens Romae, though, seems to be talking about the Biblical God, of which are made several claims to omnipotence, without any admission of being restrained by contradiction.

I'd wager that's more an artifact of theology of the past 2000 years than any real definitional issue. Inasmuch as God is held to be distinct from gods.

I'd wager that's more an artifact of theology of the past 2000 years than any real definitional issue. Inasmuch as God is held to be distinct from gods.

Sounds reasonable. I suppose the old Greek gods weren't really omnipotent, being afflicted with lameness, and in constant intrigue with one another.

Still, I feel bad for those Gods who have to ever hold the thought "I wish I could do that". Seems like it would sting a bit.

This only works if you say that it's necessarily the case that, once Hitler was created, that he commit the holocaust. Clearly, if I believe in free will, this premise falls apart.

But you've already claimed we live in the best of all possible worlds. If Hitler hadn't committed the Holocaust, it might have been better, which you claim is impossible. So, by your reasoning, Hitler would have had to do it (again, I think that's false, but its your premise).

You've contradicted yourself again, Gens Romae.

If we live in the best of all possible worlds, nothing can make it better. If nothing can make it better, we can make no choice that makes it better. Further, for it to be the "best" of all possible worlds, it therefore can't be worse, and we couldn't make any choice to make it worse.

Do you see how your "best of all possible worlds" premise logically implodes with your "free will" premise?

How about this: Before Hitler was born, God could see the future and see the Holocaust happening. If Hitler had chosen to become a BMW salesman and foregone the Holocaust, he would prove God wrong. So, do we need to even further constrain your God's abilities? He can be surprised now?

didnt voltaire mock the whole "this is the best of all possible worlds" theory in candide?

didnt voltaire mock the whole "this is the best of all possible worlds" theory in candide?

Yes. It basically showed the folly of the rose-tinted worldview.

Yes. It basically showed the folly of the rose-tinted worldview.

And more importantly, the folly of friendly fire on horny monkeys.

Yes. It basically showed the folly of the rose-tinted worldview.

if this is the best of all possible worlds i guess we should be eternally grateful for not living in the unremitting horror of the other possibilities

if this is the best of all possible worlds i guess we should be eternally grateful for not living in the unremitting horror of the other possibilities

Well, the problem there is that "Best" is a fairly poorly defined word. It's one avenue of critique for the Ontological Argument in fact, pointing Anselm's lack of an actual definition for "best."

One wonders then, given Gens is Catholic and feels this is the best of all possible worlds, if the worse worlds are worlds where every country on earth has legal abortion, comprehensive sex education, gay marriage, and the myriad other no-nos for the average social conservative.

Well, the problem there is that "Best" is a fairly poorly defined word. It's one avenue of critique for the Ontological Argument in fact, pointing Anselm's lack of an actual definition for "best."

One wonders then, given Gens is Catholic and feels this is the best of all possible worlds, if the worse worlds are worlds where every country on earth has legal abortion, comprehensive sex education, gay marriage, and the myriad other no-nos for the average social conservative.

Indeed. Of course, him being Catholic, I wonder if he thinks the world would be better with fewer abortions?

And if the world would be better with fewer abortions, and we live in the best of all possible worlds, wouldn't fewer abortions then be impossible by his logic?

Let's e-mail this to the Pope and see what he thinks:

I. We live in the best of all possible worlds. (Gen Romae's premise)

II. Therefore, If this world is the best possible, then it cannot be made better.

III. The world would be better with fewer abortions (Pope's premise).

IV. Thus, we cannot have fewer abortions.

hmm...seems GR and the Pope need a game of rock-paper-scissors...

One of the aspects of the world today is human's will to improve and change. If we live in the best possible world it could be that it is the best because of our ability to change and develope it as we change and develope.

One of the aspects of the world today is human's will to improve and change. If we live in the best possible world it could be that it is the best because of our ability to change and develope it as we change and develope.

and we desire to change it because we do NOT have the stoic resolve to endure whatever life throws at us. or so it seems to me.

but are we flouting the will of god by improviing on his "perfect" world?

and we desire to change it because we do NOT have the stoic resolve to endure whatever life throws at us. or so it seems to me.

but are we flouting the will of god by improviing on his "perfect" world?

I'm not a believer personally, but if we accept that idea that God created the world to be perfect (which I don't really buy) then it would be reasonable to assume that we are intended to be constantly improving it in our own eyes, and that striving for improvement is part of our perfection.

One of the aspects of the world today is human's will to improve and change. If we live in the best possible world it could be that it is the best because of our ability to change and develope it as we change and develope.

But if we have free will, we can also choose to make it worse.

So, at minimum, there is a range of possible worlds, and the outcome is partly dependent on us. If there is a range of possible worlds, then to say we live in the best of all possible worlds implies everyone made the best of all possible choices. That seems a bit thin.

Also, not all humans have the will to improve and chance, but I agree that some do, and I agree that this is a good aspect.

But in the end, there are multiple possible outcomes (if you believe in free will), and since there are multiple possible outcomes, to assume that we live in the best possible outcome would require that we all made the best possible decisions.

It would only take one instance of a person making less than the best possible choice to mean that we aren't in the best of all possible worlds. Seems like an easy example to find.

I'm not a believer personally, but if we accept that idea that God created the world to be perfect (which I don't really buy) then it would be reasonable to assume that we are intended to be constantly improving it in our own eyes, and that striving for improvement is part of our perfection.

Are we talking about some kind of asymptotic approach, a constant movement towards a perfection that is never quite reached?

Problem is, if we are constantly improving, the world at any given time isn't the best of all possible worlds.

Even if its the best for that moment, if even one person doesn't strive to improve, we didn't even hit the marginal increase.

Are we talking about some kind of asymptotic approach, a constant movement towards a perfection that is never quite reached?

Problem is, if we are constantly improving, the world at any given time isn't the best of all possible worlds.

Even if its the best for that moment, if even one person doesn't strive to improve, we didn't even hit the marginal increase.

I agree with you if we take the view that working for improvement has no value. If it does have value however then the asymptote argument suggests that the greatest total value comes from being as close to the value of the asymptote as possible while working for further improvement.

In other words, if you're asked to choose between a world with no free will right along the asymptote, or a world with free will right below the asymptote, you might be better off in the second case, if you value the ability to strive for improvement more than the loss in "perfection" (though it's silly to think of that as on a measurable scale).

I think it comes down, really, to a question of what we really mean by "best possible." If we measure it in terms of total happiness of people, or other such gauges we might argue that people are happier in a slightly imperfect world that they can work to perfect than they would be in a perfect world. This same basic argument structure can be applied to most if not all other potential measures of the "best" world.

*turns the water into wine*

You pagans have no idea what "festivity" even means.

Oh yeah?? How many Christian holidays are celebrated naked? :D

But if we have free will, we can also choose to make it worse.

So, at minimum, there is a range of possible worlds, and the outcome is partly dependent on us. If there is a range of possible worlds, then to say we live in the best of all possible worlds implies everyone made the best of all possible choices. That seems a bit thin.

Also, not all humans have the will to improve and chance, but I agree that some do, and I agree that this is a good aspect.

But in the end, there are multiple possible outcomes (if you believe in free will), and since there are multiple possible outcomes, to assume that we live in the best possible outcome would require that we all made the best possible decisions.

It would only take one instance of a person making less than the best possible choice to mean that we aren't in the best of all possible worlds. Seems like an easy example to find.

Consider this: In a world completely without free will all actions would be governed by simple cause and effect. The state of the world would be the result of deterministic events in the past, though the idea of the past would be largely irrelevant because the universe could be viewed as static since future states are exclusively the result of the application of rules to the present state. In this case the perfect world is whichever instant along the continuum which maximizes whatever criteria you use to compare two candidate states. This entire case negates the idea that our striving to improve the world proves we are not at the best possible state for two reasons. First because our strivings are merely the result of the interactions of our atoms following the rules of the universe, and second because without the ability to understand and map the entire course of the universe (which I think you'll find is impossible due to the fact that a map cannot contain the territory it depicts) it is impossible to say with certainty if we are in fact at the global maximum in whatever criteria is being used to judge the universe.

If on the other hand we imagine ourselves to have free will the entire argument changes. Rather than looking for the global maximum of a predetermined graph we cannot compare the present with future potentials, though we strive to create greater values in the future it is inherently unknowable on any large scale for the same reason it's impossible to precisely map the entire universe in order to predict the future. In this case you could argue very reasonably that the simple fact that humans exist with free will and work to improve the world means that it is the best possible world: not because it has the greatest total happiness or any other measure, but because it has the greatest potential in the long run. I'm not so sure this is a valid argument, but it makes some sense I think.

In this case you could argue very reasonably that the simple fact that humans exist with free will and work to improve the world means that it is the best possible world: not because it has the greatest total happiness or any other measure, but because it has the greatest potential in the long run.

Not if we compare such a world with another world where "humans exist with free will and work to improve the world"... and have been more successful.

Not if we compare such a world with another world where "humans exist with free will and work to improve the world"... and have been more successful.

If that's even possible. Also there's probably an ideal level of success such that the potential for future gains is greater than having those gains now, while any greater potentially would be worse than having what we have now. That's poorly worded but the concept is actually pretty simple I think. If the total value is equal to the sum of two equations, one for current happiness and the other for potential for improvement, each has a global maximum at opposite extremes, but the maximum sum comes somewhere between those extremes, even if you weight current happiness greater than potential.

I agree with you if we take the view that working for improvement has no value. If it does have value however then the asymptote argument suggests that the greatest total value comes from being as close to the value of the asymptote as possible while working for further improvement.

In other words, if you're asked to choose between a world with no free will right along the asymptote, or a world with free will right below the asymptote, you might be better off in the second case, if you value the ability to strive for improvement more than the loss in "perfection" (though it's silly to think of that as on a measurable scale).

I think it comes down, really, to a question of what we really mean by "best possible." If we measure it in terms of total happiness of people, or other such gauges we might argue that people are happier in a slightly imperfect world that they can work to perfect than they would be in a perfect world. This same basic argument structure can be applied to most if not all other potential measures of the "best" world.

Well, I never said working for improvement has no value. I'm just pointing out that as long as even one person isn't putting out the maximum possible work (with the requisite perfect choices, naturally unlikely), the we haven't really reached "the best of all possible worlds".

A perfect world would mean there is no way to make it better, so if it would be better to have imperfection that people could be challenged by, then that world isn't really "perfect". If people are better of with imperfection, then it is better than perfection, which is impossible a priori.

Whatever is gained by being imperfect and working towards perfection would be lost if you ever succeeded at reaching perfection, and then perfection wouldn't be perfection.

Consider this: In a world completely without free will all actions would be governed by simple cause and effect. The state of the world would be the result of deterministic events in the past, though the idea of the past would be largely irrelevant because the universe could be viewed as static since future states are exclusively the result of the application of rules to the present state. In this case the perfect world is whichever instant along the continuum which maximizes whatever criteria you use to compare two candidate states. This entire case negates the idea that our striving to improve the world proves we are not at the best possible state for two reasons. First because our strivings are merely the result of the interactions of our atoms following the rules of the universe, and second because without the ability to understand and map the entire course of the universe (which I think you'll find is impossible due to the fact that a map cannot contain the territory it depicts) it is impossible to say with certainty if we are in fact at the global maximum in whatever criteria is being used to judge the universe.

If on the other hand we imagine ourselves to have free will the entire argument changes. Rather than looking for the global maximum of a predetermined graph we cannot compare the present with future potentials, though we strive to create greater values in the future it is inherently unknowable on any large scale for the same reason it's impossible to precisely map the entire universe in order to predict the future. In this case you could argue very reasonably that the simple fact that humans exist with free will and work to improve the world means that it is the best possible world: not because it has the greatest total happiness or any other measure, but because it has the greatest potential in the long run. I'm not so sure this is a valid argument, but it makes some sense I think.

Yeah, I'm not sure its a valid argument either, but it might comfort people as an idea. A "best of all possible worlds" would need to be constantly satisfying all conceivable potentials, at all times, or else its not really "best".

Also, bear in mind that not all humans work to improve the world. If they did, with perfect dedication and effectiveiness within their abilities, I might be more on board with what you're saying.

Unfortunately, some people aren't working to make things better, and whatever potential they had is subtracted from the "best of all possible worlds".

A nice idea, though. Maybe over time we'll all be more like that.

Also there's probably an ideal level of success such that the potential for future gains is greater than having those gains now, while any greater potentially would be worse than having what we have now.

Of course, but that doesn't really change my point, which is really about environment: some circumstances for the playing out of human free will are much more conducive to goods than others.