NationStates Jolt Archive

This is my second poll to test now the ethical view of morality on NSG.

Morality is nonreligious.

well believe it or not, i do believe there is an absolute morality. i just happen to believe it has absolutely nothing to do with idology, belief, or what anyone goes to bed with, where, when or how often, but rather everything to do with the avoidance of causing suffering, and not a damd thing else.

and not because some belief or anythying else says so, but because it is in the objectively observable best intrests of every living organism, including sentient human ones.

god(s) don't punish us. they/it, simply don't stop us from screwing ourselves. that remains up to us, to avoid doing by not messing everything up for each other.

=^^=
.../\...

Morality is...


...a concept commonly abused by narcissists who insist that their completely subjective and arbitrary preferences should be treated as universal law. Synonyms include "truth," "objective principles," "first principles of the Universe," etc.

EDIT: As to what morality is when not abused...I don't know.

Morality is subjective. Subjectivity is neither objectivity nor relativity, so I picked "neither" in the poll.

I believe there may be an evolved objective moral framework -- a result of the social nature of human life -- that culture, politics, religious belief or lack of, parental and environmental factors, etc., build upon to create a 'half-subjective' morality.

Although personal experience obviously does shape our morality, there seems to me at least some objective moral core principals inherent in all humans; even if these objective moral core principals are nothing more than evolved instinctual drives formed to cope with living in tight-knit social groups.

So morality, I believe, is neither totally relative, nor absolute.

Morality is either absoule and objective or it doesn't exist as meaningful concept. If it does exist it doesn't seem possible to prove what is the one true moral doctrine.

Morality is what you make of it. I would call it relative because it seems to only be the result of instilled information combined with a righteous feeling that you are correct, and rarely anything beyond that.

something no one can agree on.

How could morality possibly be absolute when it's hard to find even 2 people that are in agreement on just a few moral issues?

Humans lack the authority and the capacity to adequately judge what is morally right, and what is morally wrong.

I think there is an abolute goal (happiness) and a set of moral principles that arises from it, it's just that it is so incredibly basic and that there are so many ways to reach it that simply acknowledging that moral goal doesn't get you very far.

Something being relative doesn't necessitate meaninglessness (height is a relative concept that is universally understood and meaningful), nor an impaired ability for humans to judge what is morally right or wrong (just not OBJECTIVELY right or wrong - we have intuitions about this all the time though). There is also nothing illogical in someone or a group of people holding the suffering of others as a moral good (at least in some circumstances), deluded or not.

I don't understand how anyone can view morality as anything other than relative. Some of it is cultural, some of it is biological, but none of it is innate in the universe itself outside of humanity.

Morality is a social construct.

No more true or sacred than anything else devised by men.

Morality is a social construct.

No more true or sacred than anything else devised by men.

As was noted in a recent thread, scientists have identified forms of morality in apes.

I really don't know so I chose neither.

Perhaps there's a black and white position on all things moral but it's the vast area of grey in between that makes life so interesting.

The only true good for humanity I can see is the perpetuation of variety and that means people making all sorts of decisions on all sorts of questions.

Sure there's decisions that are morally better or worse depending on the constructs of our particular society and time but the consequences of those decisions can rarely be determined and are never the same.

So I'd say neither relative nor absolute but constantly shifting between the two on any given subject.

So I'd say neither relative nor absolute but constantly shifting between the two on any given subject.

Exactly.

Perhaps there's a black and white position on all things moral but it's the vast area of grey in between that makes life so interesting.

nuance has nothing to do with absoluteness or lack thereof

This is my second poll to test now the ethical view of morality on NSG.

define your terms

One cannot be moral without being Christian.

One cannot be moral without being Christian.

:rolleyes:

Can't it be both?

One cannot be moral without being Christian.

I like you. You're silly. :)

One cannot be moral without being Christian.

One cannot follow the Evangelical Christian code of morality without being one, but one can most certainly be moral whether one is an Evangelical Christian or not. Your absolutist claim is unsubstantiated, and unverifiable.

Morality is the justification of ones actions.

One cannot be moral without being Christian.

Cool! Shall we follow Jim Baker and Jimmy Swaggert's examples!

Cool! Shall we follow Jim Baker and Jimmy Swaggert's examples!

And Ted Hagert, and Pat Robertson, and Fred Phelps, and...

I think morality is not something humans should concern themselves with :p

This is my second poll to test now the ethical view of morality on NSG.

oh God its a test :eek:

I think there is an abolute goal (happiness)

what makes you say that?

For every situation, there is a right and a wrong. However, it is impossible to say that a certain action is right in every situation or wrong in every situation, usually. For example, in the situation I am currently in, it would be wrong of me to shoot my neighbor in the head. But, if my neighbor were coming at me with a flamethrower and shouting death threats? While still not good, shooting him would probably be justified.

what makes you say that?
Because the alternative (unhappiness is moral, happiness is immoral) is too silly to contemplate.

Morality is subjective. Subjectivity is neither objectivity nor relativity, so I picked "neither" in the poll.

How do you figure that?

Because the alternative (unhappiness is moral, happiness is immoral) is too silly to contemplate.

I think it is a biological goal, but is that the same as absolute?

something no one can agree on.

Agre-hey, you *almost* got me there. *wags finger*

This is my second poll to test now the ethical view of morality on NSG.

Morality has to be a absolute, its based on our genetic makeup which is absolute.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/20/science/20moral.html?ex=1332043200&en=84f902cc81da9173&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss

I think it is a biological goal, but is that the same as absolute?
In as much as we are biological beings living in the real world, yes.

Morality has to be a absolute, its based on our genetic makeup which is absolute.

Again, since when?

Morality has to be a absolute, its based on our genetic makeup which is absolute.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/20/science/20moral.html?ex=1332043200&en=84f902cc81da9173&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss

Our genetic makeup is anything but absolute.

Our genetic makeup is anything but absolute.

So you saying that our DNA is relative and that the base pairs randomly change every second? :rolleyes:

Again, since when?

Since man evolved from monkeys. Read the smegging link.

Since man evolved from monkeys. Read the smegging link.

I know it is genetic, I'm asking since when was our genetic code absolute? What if some aliens came over with another genetic code, and they had a completely different morality, what then? Are the aliens just wrong?

This is my second poll to test now the ethical view of morality on NSG.

"Ethical view of morality"

Ehwhat?

I am not sure how to poach this issue.

So you saying that our DNA is relative and that the base pairs randomly change every second? :rolleyes:

No. I'm saying that it varies between person and person, and often varies within a person's lifetime.

Since man evolved from monkeys. Read the smegging link.

Humans never evolved from monkeys. Monkeys are distant, distant, distant cousins.

"Ethical view of morality"

Ehwhat?

I am not sure how to poach this issue.

I personally think that morality is unethical.

I personally think that morality is unethical.

Morally I believe that ethics cannot be compromised by religion.

Because the alternative (unhappiness is moral, happiness is immoral) is too silly to contemplate.

False dichotomy.

The possibility exists that the determining standard for "right" is neither what makes us happy nor what makes us unhappy.

Indeed, as a purely rational matter it is quite clear that we cannot move from "it makes me happy" (or "it makes me unhappy") to "it is right"--an "ought" does not follow from an "is."

Morality is defined by logical reason and values.

Because the alternative (unhappiness is moral, happiness is immoral) is too silly to contemplate.

There are more alternatives than that, such as happiness has no thing to do with morality and happiness is one value among many in the true moral system.

Would you engineer yourself to be happy no matter what happend? Fictional example: Smilers (http://www.orionsarm.com/clades/Smilers.html)

Would you engineer yourself to be happy no matter what happend? Fictional example: Smilers (http://www.orionsarm.com/clades/Smilers.html)
I don't think that would work. It'd get boring, because happiness is an expression of achievement. Without some level of unhappiness endured on the way to happiness, we wouldn't know what it is.

If it was possible however, I'm not sure there is something wrong with it.

The possibility exists that the determining standard for "right" is neither what makes us happy nor what makes us unhappy.
You go ahead and find it. I'll wait.

Indeed, as a purely rational matter it is quite clear that we cannot move from "it makes me happy" (or "it makes me unhappy") to "it is right"--an "ought" does not follow from an "is."
I'll just quote Ayn Rand here, because she's the one who gave me the idea of happiness as a goal:
"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

In short, you can tell me that I ought to be unhappy all you want, but you'll be talking into the wind. If I damn my existence, it won't last very long.

You go ahead and find it. I'll wait.


I'll just quote Ayn Rand here, because she's the one who gave me the idea of happiness as a goal:
"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."

In short, you can tell me that I ought to be unhappy all you want, but you'll be talking into the wind. If I damn my existence, it won't last very long.

Basically an Ayn Rand fundamentalist. Even down the "It doesn't matter what you say, I can't engage with the possibility I'm wrong" and the bible-like quotations. How terrifying.

I don't think that would work. It'd get boring, because happiness is an expression of achievement. Without some level of unhappiness endured on the way to happiness, we wouldn't know what it is.

Meh. Happiness and boredome are emotions. Emotions spring forth from electrochemical impulses in the brain. Do some rewiring and change the chemical mix and get rid ofunhappiness and boredom. Its at least theoretically possible.

If it was possible however, I'm not sure there is something wrong with it.

If happiness is the absolute standard of morality and the operation to become a smiler is available not getting it done is immoral.

You go ahead and find it. I'll wait.

The burden of proof is on you.

You're the one who asserted the existence of an absolute morality based on the pursuit of happiness.

"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values

Maybe: living entities (well, sapient entities) value things.

That has no bearing whatsoever on which values are right and which ones are wrong.

and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life.

Because Ayn Rand says so? Sorry, that doesn't fly.

Clearly, this is not a necessary truth, because plenty of people have sacrificed their lives out of a sense of obligation to something higher than themselves... so she must somehow justify the valuation of one's own life and happiness over everything else.

She cannot just state "this is how it is." Unless she wants to be regarded as a pseudo-philosopher who is "convincing" only through sophistry and appeals to base emotion, not reason.

Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality.

No. Thus, at most, the existence of value judgments is a matter of the facts of reality.

Their validation is an entirely different matter.

In short, you can tell me that I ought to be unhappy all you want

Why are you still holding by this transparent false dichotomy?

Morality is a structure that's designed around the concept of providing our societies with a sense for social order and harmony. It's near universal that a society is going to develop a moral structure, but how that moral structure will be formed and the results of that moral structure are not universal. The classic divergence is what we see with the difference between wester guilt-based morality, and eastern shame-based morality.

Basically an Ayn Rand fundamentalist. Even down the "It doesn't matter what you say, I can't engage with the possibility I'm wrong" and the bible-like quotations. How terrifying.
Huh? I added a bit of additional authority to a point I was making, and a point I had in fact made previously in another thread.

My point about happiness being the ultimate value for a human being is related to life on earth, as I stated. It may not necessarily imply some supernatural "ought", but it does state an "is". Talking about the is-ought problem here implies two things: firstly, that there needs to be some reason to suspect that the "ought" matters if it clashes with the "is", secondly that there needs to be some reason to suspect the two are different.

Is that, or is that not the case? And if it is, attacking the fact that I used an Ayn Rand quote to support an Ayn Rand argument will advance your position how?

Meh. Happiness and boredome are emotions. Emotions spring forth from electrochemical impulses in the brain. Do some rewiring and change the chemical mix and get rid ofunhappiness and boredom. Its at least theoretically possible.
But how would you judge? People get used to chemicals in their brains, without some standard against which to judge happiness, you can't declare that you are in fact happy, can you?

If happiness is the absolute standard of morality and the operation to become a smiler is available not getting it done is immoral.
It would be. Though I maintain that happiness without something to be happy about isn't possible.

some words of sense


Basically Ayn Rand is ignored by philosophers because she's so obviously wrong and limited that she isn't worthy of discussion. I reckon Neu Leonstein holds onto them because he's disillusioned with the world he lives in and this is how he deals with that.

It may not necessarily imply some supernatural "ought"

Then it tells us nothing about valid and invalid reasons for action. It is purely causal: people will tend to do x because x makes them happy.

That's totally useless when it comes to deciding upon a course of action, to considering the reasons to do one action or another. It tells us what we are likely to do: not what we ought to do.

Talking about the is-ought problem here implies two things: firstly, that there needs to be some reason to suspect that the "ought" matters if it clashes with the "is",

Um, the "ought" matters by definition: it is the standard for action.

The "is" only matters in application, when it comes to decision-making. That's not a matter of metaphysical doctrine, it's a matter of reason. "Is" does not imply "ought." The fact that a given action will make me happy is not in and of itself proof that I ought to do it. It just doesn't follow.

secondly that there needs to be some reason to suspect the two are different.

They are, logically. "It makes me happy to hoard my wealth for myself" and "It is morally permissible for me to hoard my wealth for myself" do not mean the same thing, nor does either follow from the other.

You need another "ought" principle to make that jump: "I ought to do what makes me happy." And justifying that one tends to be conveniently left out.

But how would you judge? People get used to chemicals in their brains, without some standard against which to judge happiness, you can't declare that you are in fact happy, can you?.

Happiness is a subjective feeling. If this subjective feeling can be active at all points in time I don't see a need for a standard of judgemnet, at least in the subjective sense. People will know of unhappiness is the sense that they know objectively what causes the subjective feeling of unhappiness but they will have never subjectively felt it.


It would be. Though I maintain that happiness without something to be happy about isn't possible.

Why is that? Are you saying that happiness is not due to electrochemica impulses in the brain?

You're the one who asserted the existence of an absolute morality based on the pursuit of happiness.
I stated that there is an abolute "is". I have no reason to suspect that there is an "ought" which differs from it. You tell me there is, and that it matters.

Because Ayn Rand says so? Sorry, that doesn't fly.
No, because life is a pre-condition for valuation. Even if you sacrifice yourself, you are doing it because a) you are alive, and therefore capable of making a value judgement and b) you are alive, and therefore have something to sacrifice.

The act of sacrificing your life presupposes your life. If you don't have a life, you don't have anything to sacrifice.

Furthermore, I would suggest that life and mere survival is not one and the same thing. A life without the capacity for happiness generally leads to suicide.

Clearly, this is not a necessary truth, because plenty of people have sacrificed their lives out of a sense of obligation to something higher than themselves... so she must somehow justify the valuation of one's own life and happiness over everything else.
Or, they sacrificed themselves because it made them happier than the alternative. In which case their happiness was their motivaton (whatever it may have stemmed from) and the "it is" has not been violated.

Life can be looked at both as a precondition for and a result of happiness. If you feel that your future does not offer you the chance to be happy, you may well choose to cash in on some brief (but probably intense) happiness now and then cease to exist.

No. Thus, at most, the existence of value judgments is a matter of the facts of reality.

Their validation is an entirely different matter.
Except that your value judgements have material effects which can be right (in the sense that they lead you to more happiness or freedom to experience it) or wrong (if they don't). You can in fact rank actions made according to value judgements by their material outcomes.

We do it all the time with other judgements, but we make a difference when it comes to moral values. We hold the decision of whether or not to hurt someone to be different to the decision of whether or not to plant a seed in order to grow food. I'm not entirely sure why.

Why are you still holding by this transparent false dichotomy?
Because I don't see it. I can be happy or I can be not happy. I don't see an in-between.

If you're saying that the "is" of me wanting to be happy is not the "ought", then you are saying that there is something other than my happiness which is the "ought", so how are you not saying that I ought to not be happy?

Since man evolved from monkeys. Read the smegging link.

A common mistake.

Apes! ;)

I stated that there is an abolute "is". I have no reason to suspect that there is an "ought" which differs from it. You tell me there is, and that it matters.

You still don't get it. You can't make considered decisions if you have no "ought." It matters necessarily, because "ought" principles are simply the standards of decision-making. What you're doing isn't maintaining an "absolute is" at all, but rather arguing that the "is" of "we want to do what makes us happy" somehow justifies the "ought" of "we ought to do what makes us happy."

You could perhaps claim that I cannot rationally derive an "ought" that contradicts your "I ought to do what makes me happy", but even if you justified that claim you would be left not with the absolute standard you've advanced, but merely with meta-ethical subjectivism.

No, because life is a pre-condition for valuation. Even if you sacrifice yourself, you are doing it because a) you are alive, and therefore capable of making a value judgement and b) you are alive, and therefore have something to sacrifice.

The act of sacrificing your life presupposes your life. If you don't have a life, you don't have anything to sacrifice.

Yeah, so? What does this prove? It tells us nothing about right action at all.

Furthermore, I would suggest that life and mere survival is not one and the same thing. A life without the capacity for happiness generally leads to suicide.

Again, so what?

Life can be looked at both as a precondition for and a result of happiness. If you feel that your future does not offer you the chance to be happy, you may well choose to cash in on some brief (but probably intense) happiness now and then cease to exist.

Maybe. But then, there is no reason to assume that that was their motive... because as stubbornly as you want to deny it, there are still two separate questions here: "does it make me happy?" and "is it right?"

Except that your value judgements have material effects which can be right (in the sense that they lead you to more happiness or freedom to experience it) or wrong (if they don't). You can in fact rank actions made according to value judgements by their material outcomes.

Only if we assume a certain standard of valuation: in this case, elevating "more happiness or freedom to experience it" over everything else.

If my standard is different--say, maximizing the happiness of everyone--I will rank those "material outcomes" very differently.

That's why "is" statements only matter in application. First principles, the standard of valuation, are independent of them.

We do it all the time with other judgements, but we make a difference when it comes to moral values. We hold the decision of whether or not to hurt someone to be different to the decision of whether or not to plant a seed in order to grow food.

Actually, our decision-making standard is exactly the same... it is merely the material circumstances that are different.

Generally, whether or not we plant a seed to grow food has minimal consequences on others (or, at least, that's how we perceive it): thus, we rank the alternatives based on their utility to us.

But, as you point out, when it comes to something where the consequences do substantially affect others, we consider their interests as well.

Because I don't see it. I can be happy or I can be not happy. I don't see an in-between.

You can be right. That is not an "in-between", but it is not necessarily connected to other of the two.

If you're saying that the "is" of me wanting to be happy is not the "ought",

All I've argued so far is that there is no necessary connection arising from the simple fact of the "is."

It may nevertheless be true, but you have not demonstrated it to be so.

then you are saying that there is something other than my happiness which is the "ought",

Which may be the "ought."

I do, of course, maintain that there is in fact such an "ought"... but that is beside the point.

so how are you not saying that I ought to not be happy?

Because just because "I ought to seek happiness" is false doesn't mean that "I ought to seek unhappiness" is true.

The determining principle of morality could be neither... with happiness and unhappiness incidental to what is right.

You still don't get it. You can't make considered decisions if you have no "ought." It matters necessarily, because "ought" principles are simply the standards of decision-making. What you're doing isn't maintaining an "absolute is" at all, but rather arguing that the "is" of "we want to do what makes us happy" somehow justifies the "ought" of "we ought to do what makes us happy."
I have another idea:

A moral code is a pattern of standards that are meant to guide our behaviour, ie give us help in choosing between alternatives.

So moral action presupposes choice, correct? If I don't have a choice, there is no moral aspect to the behaviour. That's why a lion eating a zebra isn't evil. Or: if I can't be good, then I'm not being evil* and vice versa.

So can a living, sentient entity consistently choose something that does not make it happy? We said that a life without happiness is most likely gonna lead to suicide.

So if we were to say that it is wrong to eat zebras, then a good lion is a dead lion. So a lion (and without life there is no choice and therefore no good or evil) doesn't really have a choice about good or evil, so we can't really say that it eating zebras is evil, so we have contradicted ourselves.

In short: if moral behaviour presupposes choice, and following some moral code does in fact lead to the negation of choice, then it is impossible to be consistently moral, and any moral code that contradicts the requirements for choice (ie life) is self-contradictory and therefore wrong.

*The assumption here is that there is no "in-between", which may again be an objectivist idea: in a compromise between good and evil, good only loses and evil only wins.

So can a living, sentient entity consistently choose something that does not make it happy? We said that a life without happiness is most likely gonna lead to suicide.

While perhaps you are right that it is "likely", as long as it is not necessary it means nothing in terms of obligation: no one ever said that right action was easy.

Furthermore, at best you could only arrive from this at the notion that we are obligated to seek just enough happiness to avoid suicide--and, indeed, some moral philosophers have argued something like this, that we have an obligation to seek our own happiness (though not exclusively) so that our misery does not interfere with fulfilling our moral obligations. But that is quite different from setting forth the maximization of happiness as the determining principle of morality: it is merely an application of a different moral principle with a far more limited conclusion.

So if we were to say that it is wrong to eat zebras, then a good lion is a dead lion. So a lion (and without life there is no choice and therefore no good or evil) doesn't really have a choice about good or evil, so we can't really say that it eating zebras is evil, so we have contradicted ourselves.

That's disingenuous. The lion does have a choice, while it is alive. It can choose to eat the zebra or not.

After the lion dies, no, the lion has no choice: it is meaningless to speak of the morality of a dead lion. But as long as the lion is alive, the moral obligation would remain. The fact that it is suicidal is irrelevant.

How do you figure that?If morality is absolute, this means that there is some moral code that can be objectively proven. If morality is relative, this means that all moral codes are acceptable. Since neither is the case, morality is subjective.

I have another idea:

A moral code is a pattern of standards that are meant to guide our behaviour, ie give us help in choosing between alternatives.

So moral action presupposes choice, correct? Moral values can be one of the things that presupposes choice. There are other potential values, as well.

I have a choice of something to eat. My choice is between chocolate and brussels sprouts. I choose to eat chocolate.
Was my choice a moral one, or based upon some other value?

If morality is absolute, this means that there is some moral code that can be objectively proven. If morality is relative, this means that all moral codes are acceptable. Since neither is the case, morality is subjective.

It can't just be subjective. Morals are not formed merely from a personal basis - there are shared morals understood by a majority of people. Added to that, if we take evidence of the more intelligent animals having what we'd anthropomorphically call moral traits as well, then we can posit evolutionary advantages to having those morals as opposed to simple subjectivity.

So they're as objective as they are subjective.

I don't know.

It's in fact both.
Recent studies have shown that human beings (as well as apes and even monkeys) have a natural sense of morality. Fairness, if you like. It's a concept that comes in rather handy for any social animal, as it enables them to cooperate. Without fairness, cooperation would be pointless.
However, culture can modify this inate sense of fairness and justice. Most strikingly in the case of religions. Religious dogma can overrride inate morality, replacing it with values that are put in place by the assumed deity.

Dawkins (I know he's much-hated, but bear with me) quotes and experiment that was done with a group of several hundred Israeli children. They were presented with the story of Joshua and the battle of Jericho, and the ensueing genocide.
When asked if Joshua acted correctly by killing every living thing in the city once it had fallen, as commanded by god, the kids almost unilaterally replied with yes. The few who had objections mostly thought the Joshua should have kept the animals to feed the starving Israelites.
The study then did the same test with another group of children, using much the same story, only placing it in ancient China this time, calling Joshua "General Li".
This time around 75% of the children replied that General Li acted wrongly, and that it was immoral to kill men, women, children and animal once they had surrendered.

So, yes, every normal human being has an absolute sense of right and wrong, but culture and religion can change it, thereby making morality relative.

The universe is without morality. Morality does not exist.

<shhhhnip>
I’d agree almost entirely.

The case for evolved morality, clouded by cultural and other factors, seems quite strong IMO.

I'd say morality is subjective. That's a bit different than saying it is "relative," though, because you technically could argue that the only absolutes are the ones created by the individual, and therefore subjective morality could be quite absolute.

I hate philosophy.

It's in fact both.
Recent studies have shown that human beings (as well as apes and even monkeys) have a natural sense of morality. Fairness, if you like. It's a concept that comes in rather handy for any social animal, as it enables them to cooperate. Without fairness, cooperation would be pointless.
However, culture can modify this inate sense of fairness and justice. Most strikingly in the case of religions. Religious dogma can overrride inate morality, replacing it with values that are put in place by the assumed deity.

Dawkins (I know he's much-hated, but bear with me) quotes and experiment that was done with a group of several hundred Israeli children. They were presented with the story of Joshua and the battle of Jericho, and the ensueing genocide.
When asked if Joshua acted correctly by killing every living thing in the city once it had fallen, as commanded by god, the kids almost unilaterally replied with yes. The few who had objections mostly thought the Joshua should have kept the animals to feed the starving Israelites.
The study then did the same test with another group of children, using much the same story, only placing it in ancient China this time, calling Joshua "General Li".
This time around 75% of the children replied that General Li acted wrongly, and that it was immoral to kill men, women, children and animal once they had surrendered.

So, yes, every normal human being has an absolute sense of right and wrong, but culture and religion can change it, thereby making morality relative.

Huh, I'd never heard of that experiment, but that's really cool. Props to whoever came up with it.

But, yea, I'd say there is an absolute morality in the sense that there is a shared set of normative values that, as the above poster's argument seems to imply, all human beings possess. If that base level ethic is a result of evolution or the nature of the universe or whatever is irrelevant; it exists. However, it is a very small base and anything beyond that is entirely up for debate. Hell, even the specifics of the base are up for debate so it behooves humanity to accept and analyze many methods of such in order to find the most acceptable one (and this is where the subjective nature of morality really comes in) but, seeing as that is a very daunting task and different extended frameworks may suit one person more than another due to anything from childhood upbringing to analytic ability, it is important that a wide array of frameworks are not only tolerated, but encouraged, within the bounds of the base set shared by all (and again, even then, we run into a stick situation of how exhaustive that base really is).

So, yea, it's a big question. But a fun one.

Humans lack the authority and the capacity to adequately judge what is morally right, and what is morally wrong.

Apparently you have not read anything by Ayn Rand, the eminent Russian-American philosopher.

Unfortunately, neither have I...

Basically Ayn Rand is ignored by philosophers because she's so obviously wrong and limited that she isn't worthy of discussion. I reckon Neu Leonstein holds onto them because he's disillusioned with the world he lives in and this is how he deals with that.

Since when? I study philosophy, and I understand Ayn Rand as being a well respected philosopher. To say that any philosopher is "obviously wrong" is fundamentally flawed anyway, so I can't hold you to be an authority on the ins and outs of philosophy.

If morality is absolute, this means that there is some moral code that can be objectively proven. If morality is relative, this means that all moral codes are acceptable. Since neither is the case, morality is subjective.


No it doesn't.

Since when? I study philosophy, and I understand Ayn Rand as being a well respected philosopher. To say that any philosopher is "obviously wrong" is fundamentally flawed anyway, so I can't hold you to be an authority on the ins and outs of philosophy.

I've never heard of Ayn Rand being respected in academic philosophy. Then again, Nietzsche wasn't either, for a long while. But Ayn Rand is definitely not on the same level as Nietzsche. From what I've read of her, her metaphysic is the only thing I find appealing. Her social theories are either simply unfeasible or ignorant of various dilemmas that arise because of human nature.

This might just be because my university has a poor philosophy program that is less critical and analytic and more regurgitation of historic philosophical documents, though.

No it doesn’t.
How so?

Moral relativity allows no standpoint to criticise morality. Thus, any moral code would be as good as any other.

I've never heard of Ayn Rand being respected in academic philosophy. Then again, Nietzsche wasn't either, for a long while. But Ayn Rand is definitely not on the same level as Nietzsche. From what I've read of her, her metaphysic is the only thing I find appealing. Her social theories are either simply unfeasible or ignorant of various dilemmas that arise because of human nature.


Well, most people who support her support her general principles and try not to support specifically everything she said.

How so?

Moral relativity allows no standpoint to criticise morality. Thus, any moral code would be as good as any other.

Relativity is the same as subjectivity, its just saying that there is no such thing as absolute morality and it is simply subjective to different people or cultures. Unless you believe in some form of metaphysics, this is pretty much a fact. It doesn't mean that you can't criticize other ethical codes for being irrational or based on flawed science or whatever, it just says that there is no absolute right or wrong transcendent of all cultures and people.

Relativity is the same as subjectivity, its just saying that there is no such thing as absolute morality and it is simply subjective to different people or cultures. Unless you believe in some form of metaphysics, this is pretty much a fact.
Not at all.

The idea that morality is an evolved social construct, for example.

It doesn’t mean that you can’t criticize other ethical codes for being irrational or based on flawed science or whatever, it just says that there is no absolute right or wrong transcendent of all cultures and people.
But we can’t criticise these unscientific views from a moral standpoint, if we accept moral relativity. You’re adding a clause to moral acceptability; namely that morality should be based on correct facts. If morality is based soley on culture, etc., then your moral judgement that ethical codes can’t be based on unscientific facts seems at a loss.

We could construct arguments against these ethical codes, but unless they were devoid of all moral judgement, something which I think would be impossible, they would be moot.

Not at all.

The idea that morality is an evolved social construct, for example.


That just means that it is relative the evolved species.


But we can’t criticise these unscientific views from a moral standpoint

Yes we can, we can do what we want. All it means is that what we say is meaningless analytically and synthetically, but may have value to people anyway.


You’re adding a clause to moral acceptability; namely that morality should be based on correct facts.

That was just one example, hence why I put an "or whatever" in the sentence.


If morality is based soley on culture, etc.

Not based, but subject to.


then your moral judgement that ethical codes can’t be based on unscientific facts seems at a loss.


But I never said that.


We could construct arguments against these ethical codes, but unless they were devoid of all moral judgement, something which I think would be impossible, they would be moot.

That's your opinion. Some others may disagree with that. The thing is, if you accept morality is subjective, you'll come to the same conclusion anyway, because it is the same thing.

Anyway, this still doesn't mean that all moral codes are acceptable. It rejects the idea of acceptableness (if that's a word).

That just means that it is relative [to] the evolved species.
An interesting point.

Let me ponder...

Yes we can, we can do what we want. All it means is that what we say is meaningless analytically and synthetically, but may have value to people anyway.
Yes you’re free to do what you want, but if you wish to hold the view that morality is subject to culture and other factors, then you can’t turn around and criticise other moral beliefs.

If you do, you’re denying relative morality; you’re saying there is an objective moral standard that we can hold moral beliefs up to.

That was just one example, hence why I put an “or whatever” in the sentence.
Ad I attacked the example for its flawed reasoning. I can’t think of any example where we can criticise moral beliefs and hold dear moral relativity.

Not based, but subject to.
Unless I’m mistaken, the two are the same.

But I never said that.
You said, “It doesn’t mean that you can’t criticize other ethical codes for being irrational or based on flawed science or whatever”.

I believe my point still stands.

That’s your opinion. Some others may disagree with that. The thing is, if you accept morality is subjective, you’ll come to the same conclusion anyway, because it is the same thing.
Of course it’s my opinion, but it’s not a moral opinion; just as saying that 2+2=/=5 isn’t a moral opinion.

Yes you’re free to do what you want, but if you wish to hold the view that morality is subject to culture and other factors, then you can’t turn around and criticise other moral beliefs.


Again, you can, just not on a moral basis. You can't say that imperative A is morally wrong and imperative B is morally right imperically of course, but you can say that policy x, for instance, will lead to more happiness while policy y will lead to lots of poor people. Thus concluding that policy x satisfies our self intrerests.


If you do, you’re denying relative morality; you’re saying there is an objective moral standard that we can hold moral beliefs up to.


See above.


Ad I attacked the example for its flawed reasoning. I can’t think of any example where we can criticise moral beliefs and hold dear moral relativity.


I think that killing humans is a bad thing to do, I also think morality is relative. Where is the flaw?


You said, “It doesn’t mean that you can’t criticize other ethical codes for being irrational or based on flawed science or whatever”.


I didn't say morality can't be based on unscientific fact, I just said that you can call a moral imperative unscientific. This is criticizing it, but it's not proving it false.


Of course it’s my opinion, but it’s not a moral opinion; just as saying that 2+2=/=5 isn’t a moral opinion.

I'm confused. I don't remember saying it was a moral opinion.

Again, you can, just not on a moral basis. You can’t say that imperative A is morally wrong and imperative B is morally right imperically of course, but you can say that policy x, for instance, will lead to more happiness while policy y will lead to lots of poor people. Thus concluding that policy x satisfies our self intrerests.
As long as your ‘self interests’ are always maximising happiness, which would not be the case in a completely morally relative system.

I think that killing humans is a bad thing to do, I also think morality is relative. Where is the flaw?
There is only a flaw if you think killing humans is objectively wrong, and that morality is completely relative. You can’t have both.

However, if you don’t hold these views, if you believe that killing humans is a moral belief relative to you and you alone, then there is no flaw.

I’m confused. I don’t remember saying it was a moral opinion.
I’m not claiming you did, I stated it because you seemed to be arguing that because it was my opinion, it was relative and of no consequence.

If you weren’t, I apologise for talking nonsense..

As long as your ‘self interests’ are always maximising happiness, which would not be the case in a completely morally relative system.


If it so happened that another cultures self interest was not, ultimately, being happy, then we could say that their culture and our culture is incompatible, thus their moral code is against our self interests in our culture.


There is only a flaw if you think killing humans is objectively wrong, and that morality is completely relative. You can’t have both.


Well, I don't think there is an objective morality of course, but neither does JB.


However, if you don’t hold these views, if you believe that killing humans is a moral belief relative to you and you alone, then there is no flaw.


You can believe that it is relative to your culture as well, or if you want a real stretch, relative to our biological self interests.


If you weren’t, I apologise for talking nonsense..

Np

If it so happened that another cultures self interest was not, ultimately, being happy, then we could say that their culture and our culture is incompatible, thus their moral code is against our self interests in our culture.
Yes, but my point was that if you believe moral relativism to be true, then you couldn’t criticise the ‘non-being-happy’ culture.

Well, I don’t think there is an objective morality of course, but neither does JB.
In that case, you can’t also rationally hold that killing human beings is objectively wrong.

You can believe that it is relative to your culture as well, or if you want a real stretch, relative to our biological self interests.
Quite.

Yes, but my point was that if you believe moral relativism to be true, then you couldn’t criticise the ‘non-being-happy’ culture.


My point is, you can and I just did in the text you quoted. You just can't say they are intrinsically morally wrong.


In that case, you can’t also rationally hold that killing human beings is objectively wrong.


Ya I no.

My point is, you can and I just did in the text you quoted. You just can’t say they are intrinsically morally wrong.
All you did in the text I quoted was to state that different moral belief systems can be incompatible; you didn’t criticise anything. You could say that a certain culture’s morality was ‘bad’ from your point of view, but the idea of ‘bad’ is meaningless, because your conception of ‘bad’ and their conception of ‘bad’ is different.

If you were to criticise something, you’d have to establish a shared moral standpoint to criticise from, thus rejecting complete moral relativity.

Arguing that all morality is relative is implicitly arguing that there is no objective moral standpoint.

I study philosophy, and I understand Ayn Rand as being a well respected philosopher.

really? you must run in some strange philosophical circles. her arguments are just so...bad.

All you did in the text I quoted was to state that different moral belief systems can be incompatible; you didn’t criticise anything. You could say that a certain culture’s morality was ‘bad’ from your point of view, but the idea of ‘bad’ is meaningless, because your conception of ‘bad’ and their conception of ‘bad’ is different.

If you were to criticise something, you’d have to establish a shared moral standpoint to criticise from, thus rejecting complete moral relativity.


Ahhhhh we are going around in circles. I've given other examples, if you don't call calling something incompatible a criticism, then what about calling it unscientific. That doesn't say it is intrinsically wrong, but calling it unscientific is still a criticism none the less. I don't understand whats so difficult about that.


Arguing that all morality is relative is implicitly arguing that there is no objective moral standpoint.

I never said there was. You seem to be assuming that the only way you can criticize a moral imperative is to call it immoral, but this just isn't the case.

really? you must run in some strange philosophical circles. her arguments are just so...bad.

Well, so are most philosophers. :p

Well, so are most philosophers. :p

at least most people go wrong in interesting ways. rand just goes wrong because she doesn't grasp the basic issues.

at least most people go wrong in interesting ways. rand just goes wrong because she doesn't grasp the basic issues.

Well I disagree, but I can't be bothered go into this, so lets just agree to disagree.

well believe it or not, i do believe there is an absolute morality. i just happen to believe it has absolutely nothing to do with idology, belief, or what anyone goes to bed with, where, when or how often, but rather everything to do with the avoidance of causing suffering, and not a damd thing else.

and not because some belief or anythying else says so, but because it is in the objectively observable best intrests of every living organism, including sentient human ones.

god(s) don't punish us. they/it, simply don't stop us from screwing ourselves. that remains up to us, to avoid doing by not messing everything up for each other.

=^^=
.../\...Sort of my take. Except the god part. No such critters.

While perhaps you are right that it is "likely", as long as it is not necessary it means nothing in terms of obligation: no one ever said that right action was easy.
Sometimes sooner, sometimes later, but are you actually going to say that someone who lives but with no capacity for happiness whatsoever (not physical, not emotional, not due to some devotion to some cause) is not going to kill himself?

But that is quite different from setting forth the maximization of happiness as the determining principle of morality: it is merely an application of a different moral principle with a far more limited conclusion.
I'm not sure the difference is all you make it out to be. We determined that happiness is in fact a good. I'm not sure that happiness is something that you can modulate in stages and determine some cut-off point. Either you're happy, or you're not. If earning $100 million and buying a Ferrari is what makes you happy, being told that you simply cannot do that (in fact, in a communist world - that you can't earn any wealth and drive any nice car) is going to make you miserable.

What is your goal in life? Would you actually consider knowing, for certain, that someone will stop you somewhere short from reaching it a good enough thing?

After the lion dies, no, the lion has no choice: it is meaningless to speak of the morality of a dead lion. But as long as the lion is alive, the moral obligation would remain. The fact that it is suicidal is irrelevant.
Except that if it follows its moral obligation, it will soon no longer have the capacity for moral behaviour. What good is a moral code that works for one choice and then you have no more opportunity to follow it?

If it were moral to commit suicide, we could do it precisely once, and that's it. We could do nothing more good in the world, the overall level of good possible would be quite severely limited.

By being good, I deprive myself of the chance of being good again. But being good in the future is also a good thing, right? So by depriving myself of that capacity, I'm really being bad. So being bad is the same as being good. As I said, it's self-contradictory.

I have a choice of something to eat. My choice is between chocolate and brussels sprouts. I choose to eat chocolate.
Was my choice a moral one, or based upon some other value?
The beauty of taking your happiness as your ultimate value is that we don't have to make a distinction. Every choice is a moral one.

If chocolate makes you happy, and you hated the alternative (and we ignore the long-term health consequences on your happiness for a moment), then eating chocolate is the moral choice, not eating chocolate (that is, willingly and knowingly hurting yourself) is immoral.

Sometimes sooner, sometimes later, but are you actually going to say that someone who lives but with no capacity for happiness whatsoever (not physical, not emotional, not due to some devotion to some cause) is not going to kill himself?

Not necessarily. And that is all we need.

I'm not sure the difference is all you make it out to be. We determined that happiness is in fact a good.

No, we didn't. We determined that sometimes it is useful for doing what is right. Not that it should supersede everything else.

I'm not sure that happiness is something that you can modulate in stages and determine some cut-off point. Either you're happy, or you're not.

Bullshit. Like with almost everything, there are matters of degree.

There is misery so intense that it is extremely difficult to act morally... but that does not even remotely encompass everything but "Do whatever you want."

If earning $100 million and buying a Ferrari is what makes you happy, being told that you simply cannot do that (in fact, in a communist world - that you can't earn any wealth and drive any nice car) is going to make you miserable.

Maybe if I'm really, really materialistic... to the point of absurdity. Not in ordinary circumstances. Forgoing the Ferrari and giving at least a large portion of the $100 million to others is not likely to kill me.

What is your goal in life? Would you actually consider knowing, for certain, that someone will stop you somewhere short from reaching it a good enough thing?

Actually, I've known for a long time that there is something of a disconnect between my moral obligations and what I really want to do with my life... and yet nevertheless I know that if I do the right thing and go with the latter, I'm not likely to kill myself.

If nothing else, because doing so would be wrong.

Except that if it follows its moral obligation, it will soon no longer have the capacity for moral behaviour. What good is a moral code that works for one choice and then you have no more opportunity to follow it?

If having "more opportunity to follow it" involves wrong action, outweighing the good that would be caused by doing so, then clearly that would not be the right thing to do.

If it were moral to commit suicide, we could do it precisely once, and that's it. We could do nothing more good in the world, the overall level of good possible would be quite severely limited.

If we assume without basis that suicide or self-sacrifice broadly is never the right thing to do, we limit the good in the world by failing to consider possibilities that may be more morally compelling than others.

By being good, I deprive myself of the chance of being good again. But being good in the future is also a good thing, right? So by depriving myself of that capacity, I'm really being bad. So being bad is the same as being good. As I said, it's self-contradictory.

Nonsense. Conflict is not contradiction.

There are, as you say, two principles at work here. Keeping to the lion/zebra case, the first is "Do not take innocent life." The second is "Preserve your capacity for moral action."

In this particular case, the principles conflict... so we must decide which is stronger. Generally we do so by referring back to the founding principle (if there is one), the basis upon which we adopt both principles.

For instance, if we are utilitarians, we might ask, "Does the lion's killing of the zebra, thereby preserving its capacity for maximizing everyone's happiness, outweigh the loss of happiness on the part of the zebra?" I hardly see how either possible answer here results in a contradiction.

The beauty of taking your happiness as your ultimate value is that we don't have to make a distinction. Every choice is a moral one.

Every choice is already a moral one. That's what morality means: it's the right standard for decision-making.

It's just that the moral considerations in different choices are often different.

If chocolate makes you happy, and you hated the alternative (and we ignore the long-term health consequences on your happiness for a moment), then eating chocolate is the moral choice, not eating chocolate (that is, willingly and knowingly hurting yourself) is immoral.

That does not sound like morality to me. It sounds like irrationality and servility to whim--going, without justification, with what we want to do without even considering what we really ought to do.

I'm not sure that happiness is something that you can modulate in stages and determine some cut-off point. Either you're happy, or you're not.

Baffling. If I find $50 on the sidewalk, I'm happy. If I find out Rihanna wants to sleep with me, I'm delighted.

If earning $100 million and buying a Ferrari is what makes you happy, being told that you simply cannot do that (in fact, in a communist world - that you can't earn any wealth and drive any nice car) is going to make you miserable.

This is what I really don't understand. You can't do this. You won't do this. Why does legislation make the difference? And the idea that not being able to earn $100million is somehow worse than not being able to get medical treatment is ridiculous
[/B]


The beauty of taking your happiness as your ultimate value is that we don't have to make a distinction. Every choice is a moral one.

If chocolate makes you happy, and you hated the alternative (and we ignore the long-term health consequences on your happiness for a moment), then eating chocolate is the moral choice, not eating chocolate (that is, willingly and knowingly hurting yourself) is immoral.

I think we can see that the "beauty" of taking happiness as your ultimate value is that in turns greed, selfishness and envy from sins to virtues. And isn't it a horrible irony how wimpy, weak and pathetic that is?




.

I’ve given other examples, if you don’t call calling something incompatible a criticism, then what about calling it unscientific. That doesn’t say it is intrinsically wrong, but calling it unscientific is still a criticism none the less.
You seem to be making a number of points here.

Firstly, no, I don’t think calling something incompatible is necessarily a criticism. Chalk and cheese are incompatible, but that’s neither a criticism of cheese nor chalk; it’s simply an observation that the two are incompatible.

Secondly, your talk about something being ‘intrinsically wrong’. I take it by this you mean ‘objectively wrong’.

If you are criticising a moral system because it is unscientific, then you are criticising outside of the moral sphere. Something may or may not be unscientific; this is factual. But to label the ‘unscientificness’ of the thing as a ‘bad’ is a moral judgement. If we argue that morality is relative, then whether or not ‘unscientificness’ is a bad trait is also relative. (I imagine the vast majority of people would say ‘unscientificness’ is a bad trait, but the point still stands.)

So yes, I agree that we are able to label a moral system as ‘unscientific’, and from our point of view that would be a bad thing; but that is our relative moral judgement, relative to ourselves and our moral system. We are criticising from within our own moral system, and thus can’t extend that criticism to another moral system.

If we do, we are implying that ‘unscientificness’ is intrinsically or objectively wrong, and therefore rejecting the idea of relative morality.

You seem to be assuming that the only way you can criticize a moral imperative is to call it immoral, but this just isn’t the case.
Criticism itself is a moral judgement; if morality is relative, then one can’t use moral judgements to attack moral systems.

Actually, I've known for a long time that there is something of a disconnect between my moral obligations and what I really want to do with my life... and yet nevertheless I know that if I do the right thing and go with the latter, I'm not likely to kill myself.

If nothing else, because doing so would be wrong.
And you don't mind that? You're happy to sacrifice reality, that is you and your life, for something that we have no idea about and apparently can't establish?

You know, a big part of my turning away from socialism was about that disconnect, and me realising that I am the enemy of the system I support. A morality that declares me evil (or worthy of punishment without having the guts to admit that it sees me as evil) is not something that I can go with indefinitely.

So how do you do it?

This is what I really don't understand. You can't do this. You won't do this. Why does legislation make the difference?
I can and I will. Last year several people earned more than a billion dollars, in just those twelve months, in takeover deals and hedge fund management. I'm hoping to get into currency trading - if you do a big deal in that, they are worth in the billions, and if I get just a 5% commission or something, that's serious money.

The legislation affects me because if I have a paycheck of ten million coming in, and someone steals half of that to give to people who couldn't be bothered paying attention in school, that does make a difference, believe it or not.

And the idea that not being able to earn $100million is somehow worse than not being able to get medical treatment is ridiculous.
I don't care about medical treatment, because I have already reached the goal of being able to get it. I've moved on. I'm not gonna sit here and presume that one goal is worthy of being achieved and another isn't. That's up to the person in question.

If someone wants to send one's kids to university, then that is not a need. If it doesn't happen, one won't suddenly die. But tell a guy he can't do it (especially if it is because someone else had something that was declared a "need"), and it does make a difference. And watching your kids rot away in menial jobs because you weren't allowed to use your earnings on giving them a good chance - you tell me how many parents are gonna tolerate that until something breaks.

Look, we can't tell what a need is. There's a huge grey area where needs and wants are indistinguishable.

And even if we could, then our standard of value, our reason for rewarding people is the inability to fulfill a need. It is, to but it bluntly, incompetence. Sometimes it's not their fault, sometimes it is - but the fact remains that our standard of value is the inability to overcome the most primitive facts of physical existence. The worse you are at surviving, the more help you will get. The better you are, the more will be taken from you.

There's lots of ways of arguing for socialism, or communism, or mutualism or whatever. But keep "need" out of it, because what you don't want is a society based on need.

And you don't mind that?

Of course I mind!

But this makes no difference. My obligation doesn't change.

You're happy to sacrifice reality, that is you and your life,

I have just been arguing that it makes no difference whether or not it makes me "happy."

For a parallel: it might make me really happy to believe, say, that I am inevitably destined for eternal bliss. But the fact that it makes me happy is not a justification: "what makes me happy" is not a reason to believe something is true, because "what makes me happy" has nothing to do with "what is true."

As with truth, so with right.

for something that we have no idea about and apparently can't establish?

I grant neither.

You know, a big part of my turning away from socialism was about that disconnect, and me realising that I am the enemy of the system I support. A morality that declares me evil (or worthy of punishment without having the guts to admit that it sees me as evil) is not something that I can go with indefinitely.

So how do you do it?

If the moral arguments hold, the fact that I don't want to live up to it makes no difference whatsoever to my moral obligation.

Of course, it helps to also seek what happiness I can in the course of fulfilling moral obligations... and it also helps to realize that a large part of this disconnect has to do with living in a fundamentally unjust and unequal society.

If there were justice, right action and desired action would be far closer.

If there were justice, right action and desired action would be far closer.
So basically, because I think we are a lot closer than you are to a "just" system, I believe that right action and desired action are a lot closer too.

Weird, but it might just make sense.

By the way, running the risk of countering everything I've said:
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8881470
The neurology of morality is being explored

Of course, that's merely an "is", so who gives a shit, right? ;)

Of course, that's merely an "is", so who gives a shit, right? ;)

Actually... yes. How human psychology functions does not tell us how we ought to act.

Indeed, the fact that human psychology makes distinctions between actions that, rationally, do not seem to differ at all only emphasizes this point.

So basically, because I think we are a lot closer than you are to a "just" system, I believe that right action and desired action are a lot closer too.

Weird, but it might just make sense.

By the way, running the risk of countering everything I've said:
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8881470


Of course, that's merely an "is", so who gives a shit, right? ;)

It's interesting how often the scientific community agrees with me - I stated earlier that morality is a constantly shifting function between relative and absolute and I'd say that shifting is between the emotional 'want' and the physical 'can'.

That 'can' is not absolute per se - I want to give the beggar $1 but I only have $2 left - it's not that I can't, it's that the sum is higher than I emotionally allow 'can', but that can constantly shift given many criteria, down to one's mood at the time.

Leaving aside any debate about the moral correctness of giving to beggars here, there does seem to be absolutes in morality in terms of helping others, or not harming others - either out of an evolved communal sense or a protective 'be nice to others so they're nice to me' - that has constraints in terms of 'I need to survive'.

Well I disagree, but I can't be bothered go into this, so lets just agree to disagree.
Why not disagree to agree, if it's all the same?

I can and I will. Last year several people earned more than a billion dollars, in just those twelve months, in takeover deals and hedge fund management. I'm hoping to get into currency trading - if you do a big deal in that, they are worth in the billions, and if I get just a 5% commission or something, that's serious money.

A lot of people want to earn that kind of money. A handful of people do. Most of the people who do come from rich families. What makes you special?

The legislation affects me because if I have a paycheck of ten million coming in, and someone steals half of that to give to people who couldn't be bothered paying attention in school, that does make a difference, believe it or not.

You still get five million. That's an incredible amount of money

I don't care about medical treatment, because I have already reached the goal of being able to get it. I've moved on. I'm not gonna sit here and presume that one goal is worthy of being achieved and another isn't. That's up to the person in question.

If someone wants to send one's kids to university, then that is not a need. If it doesn't happen, one won't suddenly die. But tell a guy he can't do it (especially if it is because someone else had something that was declared a "need"), and it does make a difference. And watching your kids rot away in menial jobs because you weren't allowed to use your earnings on giving them a good chance - you tell me how many parents are gonna tolerate that until something breaks.

I just don't see the difference between the parent who can't send their children to university and the parent who can't send their children to university. The legislation/ lack of funds distinction doesn't seem like an important one. More to the point, I can't tell the difference between one kid who gets to go and one kid who doesn't get to go except that one of them gets to go to the right university, gets the right job and gets they paycheck they "deserve" for having making the good decision to come out of the rich vagina. Then they send their kids to university and the status quo is mantained and they get to feel like the only reason why the poor kid who didn't go to university is still poor is because he didn't work as hard as they did.

Look, we can't tell what a need is. There's a huge grey area where needs and wants are indistinguishable.

I don't think it's that hard to tell that the ability to get medical care comes before the ability to own eight cars

And even if we could, then our standard of value, our reason for rewarding people is the inability to fulfill a need. It is, to but it bluntly, incompetence. Sometimes it's not their fault, sometimes it is - but the fact remains that our standard of value is the inability to overcome the most primitive facts of physical existence. The worse you are at surviving, the more help you will get. The better you are, the more will be taken from you.

By the same logic, we should do without a police force and when a bunch of armed men come and start bashing down your door with a view to robbing you, I'm sure you'll understand when no one comes to help you as it is clearly your incompetence to blame for this.

There's lots of ways of arguing for socialism, or communism, or mutualism or whatever. But keep "need" out of it, because what you don't want is a society based on need.

.

It can't just be subjective. Morals are not formed merely from a personal basis - there are shared morals understood by a majority of people. Added to that, if we take evidence of the more intelligent animals having what we'd anthropomorphically call moral traits as well, then we can posit evolutionary advantages to having those morals as opposed to simple subjectivity.

So they're as objective as they are subjective.That the majority of people share an opinion doesn't make it objectively true.

No it doesn't.Yes, it does.

From the "moral relativism" wiki (emphasis mine):

In philosophy, moral relativism is the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect objective and/or universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social, cultural, historical or personal circumstances. Moral relativists hold that no universal standard exists by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth; it is the opposite of moral absolutism. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or in the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.

The beauty of taking your happiness as your ultimate value is that we don't have to make a distinction. Every choice is a moral one.Raping and killing women made Ted Bundy happy. Was doing so morally right?

That the majority of people share an opinion doesn't make it objectively true.

Hopefully I can encompass my point in a way that is clear rather than muddled and therefore not subject to nitpicking but open to actual debate.

I'm going to posit stealing as a moral absolute, and by stealing I mean taking without permission.

First, for a moral to be objective, it has to exist without an observer - the tree falling in the forest makes a sound when no one's there because it is an absolute, it's objective - so I need to show that stealing is an objective within those terms.

I also have to posit a universe with material 'things' within it, because without that universe, and I mean the one we currently find ourselves in, there's literally nothing to talk about.

Within those terms, I think I can show that stealing, whether it's energy at the most basic level, to possessions at the most physical, to feelings - pride, respect etc - is always detrimental to the original owner and therefore morally wrong.

Murder is stealing life - there may be nuances and this leads to a caveat - stealing from something that creates is the ultimate moral, as opposed to stealing from something that destroys, which is acceptable.

I hope these parameters are clear.

EDIT: Having said that, I have to go in a matter of minutes, the thief of time and all that but I'll return in my morning.

Hopefully I can encompass my point in a way that is clear rather than muddled and therefore not subject to nitpicking but open to actual debate.

I'm going to posit stealing as a moral absolute, and by stealing I mean taking without permission.

First, for a moral to be objective, it has to exist without an observer - the tree falling in the forest makes a sound when no one's there because it is an absolute, it's objective - so I need to show that stealing is an objective within those terms.

I also have to posit a universe with material 'things' within it, because without that universe, and I mean the one we currently find ourselves in, there's literally nothing to talk about.

Within those terms, I think I can show that stealing, whether it's energy at the most basic level, to possessions at the most physical, to feelings - pride, respect etc - is always detrimental to the original owner and therefore morally wrong.

Murder is stealing life - there may be nuances and this leads to a caveat - stealing from something that creates is the ultimate moral, as opposed to stealing from something that destroys, which is acceptable.

I hope these parameters are clear.

EDIT: Having said that, I have to go in a matter of minutes, the thief of time and all that but I'll return in my morning.

It seems churlish to suggest that all morality is derived relativistically and equally so to say that all is derived from objective moral standards.

There do appear to be some objective moral landscapes common through out humanity, and the killing of one human by another seems to be an example.

Now I know that there is evidence of headhunting tribes, and cannibalistic tribes etc... and while it is very easy to want to point to these declare 'look, look, these people have a totally different moral outlook than us'. But when you get down to the nitty gritty of the situation you learn that these types of behavior are reserved for the enemy of such a tribe.

In other words, these are acts pertaining to war, and as we know when it comes to war, people can perform the most outrageous immoral acts in defense of the homeland.

Mostly morality is subjective, but I really can't see how some of the major inner city buildings of the moral landscape, cannot have been built on anything other than the strongest of foundations.

*snip*

I agree to some extent, (which is my cowardly way of not being drawn into absolute statements) as I don't see anything that 'takes' that is either not essential to survival or a result of symbiosis, i.e. giving back in return and therefore implying a certain permission.

This might be from a form of survival - to take unwarranted probably entails defense, if not attack against you in return.

Yet I can advance it as a universal moral given my parameters and therefore an example of morality being objective - and all I'm saying is that morality shifts between the two extremes constantly under the pressure of circumstance.

Just because necessity means you'll break the universal law doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

If you are criticising a moral system because it is unscientific, then you are criticising outside of the moral sphere. Something may or may not be unscientific; this is factual. But to label the ‘unscientificness’ of the thing as a ‘bad’ is a moral judgement.

We need not go further then unscientific, that is a criticism in itself, equating that to making the imperative bad is a separate criticism which I agree is a moral judgement.


If we argue that morality is relative, then whether or not ‘unscientificness’ is a bad trait is also relative. (I imagine the vast majority of people would say ‘unscientificness’ is a bad trait, but the point still stands.)


Of course.


So yes, I agree that we are able to label a moral system as ‘unscientific’, and from our point of view that would be a bad thing; but that is our relative moral judgement, relative to ourselves and our moral system. We are criticising from within our own moral system, and thus can’t extend that criticism to another moral system.


Facts are facts, but I don't see what is so bad about this, you are still able to criticise other cultures, as long as you accept that it is ultimately relative (which is my point).


Criticism itself is a moral judgement; if morality is relative, then one can’t use moral judgements to attack moral systems.

I don't think so. If someone presented a formula to me, and I said that the maths was flawed, where does ethics fit into that?

Yes, it does.

From the "moral relativism" wiki (emphasis mine):

In philosophy, moral relativism is the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect objective and/or universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social, cultural, historical or personal circumstances. Moral relativists hold that no universal standard exists by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth; it is the opposite of moral absolutism. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or in the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.


Firstly, quoting from wiki on philosophy or ethics usually = phail, but I'll let you off. Secondly, doesn't the "often" show you that it is not completely nessecerry. Besides this, it is saying that your criticisms are only meaningful to people who hold the same scientific and cultural standards of analysing ethics (which is true), this doesn't mean you can't still criticise other ethical codes. Furthermore, saying that morals are relative or morals are subjective is exactly the same thing, just replace the words: morals are subject to the person, culture or situation etc... = morals are relative to the person, culture or situation etc...

A lot of people want to earn that kind of money. A handful of people do. Most of the people who do come from rich families. What makes you special?
I would like to see a source that the guys who now manage hedge funds and private equity firms come from rich families.

Anyways, what makes me special? I'm me, that's what. I don't need to know anything else, I don't need to give a shit what everyone else can and can't do. Either I can or I can't.

I'm confident in my ability, that's all either of us needs to know. I know it's not popular in our "civilisation" to say it, because it's more morally acceptable to be eaten by self-doubt and feel an obligation because "that could have been me", but to be honest, I don't care.

You still get five million. That's an incredible amount of money.
Sure is. But it's only half of what my work was worth. If my goal is to have $100 million, and I could do work worth that in 40 years, then 50% taxes means that it will take me 80. I don't know about you, but I rather like life, and wouldn't want to know I'm pissing half of it in the wind.

I just don't see the difference between the parent who can't send their children to university and the parent who can't send their children to university.
You're going off at a tangent because you don't want to answer my point. To that dad who wants to give his kids a chance in life, it doesn't matter what the neighbour does with his time. He cares about his kids.

You go to his house and tell him to forget about them and worry about some addict's kid on the other side of the country instead, you'll probably get a punch to the head.

So tell me: is sending your kids to university a need or a want for this guy? And if it's the latter, would you be happy to explain to him why years and years of his life have been declared fruitless, and the rest of his existence miserable?

The legislation/ lack of funds distinction doesn't seem like an important one.
It's the most important one of all. If someone just lacks the funds, that means he can work a little more, maybe attend an evening class and learn some new skills, maybe get a deal with a bank manager or someone else who can loan him the money. The options are there, it depends on the willingness and skill of taking them.

Legislation puts a stop to it. There is no opportunity to go around it - worse: it's not me who decides, it's not my inability to do something that decides, it's someone else. Rather than being unhappy with myself, I end up hating the addict's kid. You create a situation where liking oneself and considering one's own happiness a good thing must come together with a hatred for everyone who has less than you, because the two are diametrically opposed.

More to the point, I can't tell the difference between one kid who gets to go and one kid who doesn't get to go except that one of them gets to go to the right university, gets the right job and gets they paycheck they "deserve" for having making the good decision to come out of the rich vagina.
My parents aren't rich. Were your parents rich? Who else here goes to university without rich parents?

I'm sorry, but you're building a strawman. Even poor people can work and save towards some goal, especially if that goal is their childrens' future. I picked the university example because I thought you'd understand my point about needs and wants better that way.

Then they send their kids to university and the status quo is mantained and they get to feel like the only reason why the poor kid who didn't go to university is still poor is because he didn't work as hard as they did.
Except that those rich kids know perfectly well that they didn't work hard, unless if they actually are earning a lot of money, in which case they are obviously doing a job equivalent to their earnings.

But besides all that, there are scholarships, loans and part-time jobs available to go to uni even without rich parents. As I said, I wasn't making a point about universities, I was making a point about needs and wants being the same.

I don't think it's that hard to tell that the ability to get medical care comes before the ability to own eight cars.
Maybe. Maybe not. There may well be people who are happy to own 8 cars and wouldn't part with them for the world, but don't care that they keep having chest pains and refuse to see a doctor about it. They apparently value their cars above their health (as, by the way, do a lot of other drivers simply due to how they drive).

Are you the all-knowing guy who can tell what the guy should be doing, against his own will? If not you, then who? And what makes that person so special?

By the same logic, we should do without a police force and when a bunch of armed men come and start bashing down your door with a view to robbing you, I'm sure you'll understand when no one comes to help you as it is clearly your incompetence to blame for this.
I'm not sure I would consider violence by some against others physical reality, unless you want to give up all that gunk about humans being social animals who inherently want to be part of a community rather than be all competitive.

Raping and killing women made Ted Bundy happy. Was doing so morally right?
First of all, he was mentally disturbed, which sorta puts him out of reach for any morality. He can't make moral decisions because he is only led by the maniacal whims of his body. He'd be an outside intrusion into any moral society, regardless of what that would look like.

The question is: can a sane person get happiness out of killing people? I don't think so.

And the second question is: can a sane person get happiness out of hurting others and taking their property? That depends on the person, I guess. One's property represents the time and effort one invested in creating it - stealing something means it becomes meaningless in that respect. Nonetheless, if there was a robber out there who wanted to steal stuff and didn't care that it isn't his, I would say that any system based on my idea would require a provision in order to work, and that is that everyone has the right to seek happiness unimpeded. Just like no one can get undeserved goodies, no one can get undeserved violence inflicted on them or their property.

Morality is neither.

Things that don't exist can't exhibit characteristics.
As was noted in a recent thread, scientists have identified forms of morality in apes.
Of course they haven't. They've documented behaviour that they're calling morality, but that's largely supposition given that they can't commnicate with the apes.

Also, I have to add that Neu Leonstein is doing a great job of illustrating the one point Ayn Rand got completely wrong. Her philosophical basis was nonsensical.

Also, I have to add that Neu Leonstein is doing a great job of illustrating the one point Ayn Rand got completely wrong. Her philosophical basis was nonsensical.

Cany you elaborate?

Firstly, quoting from wiki on philosophy or ethics usually = phail, but I'll let you off. Secondly, doesn't the "often" show you that it is not completely nessecerry. Besides this, it is saying that your criticisms are only meaningful to people who hold the same scientific and cultural standards of analysing ethics (which is true), this doesn't mean you can't still criticise other ethical codes. Furthermore, saying that morals are relative or morals are subjective is exactly the same thing, just replace the words: morals are subject to the person, culture or situation etc... = morals are relative to the person, culture or situation etc...But morals aren't subject to the person, culture, or situation. At best, they are subject to the person.
The killing of homosexuals is morally wrong regardless of which culture does it.

First of all, he was mentally disturbed, which sorta puts him out of reach for any morality. He can't make moral decisions because he is only led by the maniacal whims of his body. He'd be an outside intrusion into any moral society, regardless of what that would look like.

The question is: can a sane person get happiness out of killing people? I don't think so.

And the second question is: can a sane person get happiness out of hurting others and taking their property? That depends on the person, I guess. One's property represents the time and effort one invested in creating it - stealing something means it becomes meaningless in that respect. Nonetheless, if there was a robber out there who wanted to steal stuff and didn't care that it isn't his, I would say that any system based on my idea would require a provision in order to work, and that is that everyone has the right to seek happiness unimpeded. Just like no one can get undeserved goodies, no one can get undeserved violence inflicted on them or their property.If there is a need to put a provision into your system of morality, then for the basis of that provision you must have some moral reason outside of your system of morality.
Why is killing people morally wrong? After all, it's what makes some people happy.

Cany you elaborate?
Nonsensical was entirely the wrong word. Baseless, though.

Rand's assertions that selfishness had some sort of objective moral basis is a completely foundationaless claim. Rand offered no real evidence of objective morality; she simply asserted it was true and left it at that.

All moral realists have the same problem. They assert that moral truths exist, but they can offer no verifiable evidence of it. Rand compounds that by insisting that her claims are objectively true, when objectivity requires possible verification (otherwise, how do you know its objectively true?).

Rand's assertions that selfishness had some sort of objective moral basis is a completely foundationaless claim. Rand offered no real evidence of objective morality; she simply asserted it was true and left it at that.


Funny story: my partner and I have rabid disagreements regarding Objectivism. I think there are a lot of interesting ideas and valid points regarding the value and justifications for selfishness, but I completely reject the notion of objective morality (of any kind). Meanwhile, my partner loathes 99% of Rand's points about selfishness, but agrees with her on the subject of objective morality.

So, while we both reject Randian Objectivism, we manage to spend hours arguing over it.

Funny story: my partner and I have rabid disagreements regarding Objectivism. I think there are a lot of interesting ideas and valid points regarding the value and justifications for selfishness, but I completely reject the notion of objective morality (of any kind). Meanwhile, my partner loathes 99% of Rand's points about selfishness, but agrees with her on the subject of objective morality.

So, while we both reject Randian Objectivism, we manage to spend hours arguing over it.


That's, I think, why objectivism is so popular. Most people seem to believe, deep down, in some sort of objecive standard of right and wrong, so that is easy for people to swallow. The selfishness bit is harder, but Rand does a much better job of justifying that part. The part she does badly people automatically believe, but the part people actually need to be convinced about she's good at convincing people.

For those of us who notice how badly she handles the morality angle, the while system falls apart (but that doesn't mean her ideas about selfishness are any less good).

Morality is neither.

Things that don't exist can't exhibit characteristics.


A center of gravity doesn't exhibit characteristics?

I'm thinking Dr. Newton might have something to say about that. . .


Rand's assertions that selfishness had some sort of objective moral basis is a completely foundationaless claim. Rand offered no real evidence of objective morality; she simply asserted it was true and left it at that.

All moral realists have the same problem. They assert that moral truths exist, but they can offer no verifiable evidence of it. Rand compounds that by insisting that her claims are objectively true, when objectivity requires possible verification (otherwise, how do you know its objectively true?).

Actually it was the prior assertion that got to me: the unjustified claim that the term "society" or "social" is in effect an empty set word in that only describes aggregate individual actions and preferences. All I had to do was ask myself: Wait, this is a book about capitalism? Doesn't capitalism by her own admission exhibit traits fundamentally dissimilar to and emergent from the actions and preferences of any individual?

At which point the book would have gone in the woodchipper if 1) I'd had a woodchipper, and 2) the book wasn't on loan from the library.

But on the main topic, if you really think all moral realists offer mere untestable assertions on their basis for morality, then I would strongly recommend you reread your Aristotle or Kant if you hadn't already. Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics is nothing but an extended dissertation on the empirical verification of happiness being the goal of all human action.

I would also question your notion of "empirical verifiability". Some statements seem to be true without need for empirical verification, or would you go and visually inspect every square in existence to verify that the interior angles of those squares add up to 360 degrees? I for one take the mental reasoning required to mathematically prove it enough, and if I can do it with a sqaure, why can't I do it with another abstract concept with tangible particulars in the world, like moral actions?

A center of gravity doesn't exhibit characteristics?

I'm thinking Dr. Newton might have something to say about that. . .
Just because a centre of gravity isn't a "thing" doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
Actually it was the prior assertion that got to me: the unjustified claim that the term "society" or "social" is in effect an empty set word in that only describes aggregate individual actions and preferences. All I had to do was ask myself: Wait, this is a book about capitalism? Doesn't capitalism by her own admission exhibit traits fundamentally dissimilar to and emergent from the actions and preferences of any individual?
I don't have a problem with that part. Much like a centre of gravity, society isn't a thing.

I need to look to see if she does claim that capitalism exhibits traits dissimilar from those of any individual. I'd probably disagree with her.
But on the main topic, if you really think all moral realists offer mere untestable assertions on their basis for morality, then I would strongly recommend you reread your Aristotle or Kant if you hadn't already. Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics is nothing but an extended dissertation on the empirical verification of happiness being the goal of all human action.
I can't stand Kant. I'm endlessly annoyed that so much of modern social science is based on him.

As for Aristotle, I happen to have a copy of the Nicomachean Ethics on my shelf (a relic from my Philosophy degree). If I recall correctly, I spent most of my time reading it complaining about his definition of happiness. That aside, I don't see how empirical verification that all human action strives for happiness has anything at all to do with moral realism.

Whether people do behave a certain way is by no means evidence that they ought.
I would also question your notion of "empirical verifiability". Some statements seem to be true without need for empirical verification, or would you go and visually inspect every square in existence to verify that the interior angles of those squares add up to 360 degrees? I for one take the mental reasoning required to mathematically prove it enough, and if I can do it with a sqaure, why can't I do it with another abstract concept with tangible particulars in the world, like moral actions?
Empirical verifiability is not equivalent to empirically verified. Furthermore, methematical proofs are true with certainty.

Moral truths aren't like that. They're not empirically verifiable, and they're not proven with certainty (I suspect because they cannot be, but I can't prove that). So why does anyone believe that they exist or even that they are known to anyone (including oneself)?

I once studied under a Moral Perfectionist (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_perfectionism) by the name of Thomas Hurka, and because I questioned any person's ability to perceive moral truths, he once told me I was "something less than human". I really didn't like him.

Facts are facts, but I don’t see what is so bad about this, you are still able to criticise other cultures, as long as you accept that it is ultimately relative (which is my point).
So what would your morally relative criticism amount to? It seems it would be nothing more than a statement that your morality is different to someone else’s morality; not a criticism.

You can only criticise a moral judgement of an individual if you believe the individual and yourself share the same moral ground. Otherwise you’re just highlighting the fact your moralities differ.

I don’t think so. If someone presented a formula to me, and I said that the maths was flawed, where does ethics fit into that?
It wouldn’t in any way. But we’re not talking about mathematical equations, we’re talking about morality.

We can criticise flawed mathematics because mathematics is objective (ignoring some wacky theories in the philosophy of maths). If mathematics was relative, if the answers to mathematical questions were culturally dependent — as I believe you are claiming morality is — then it would be meaningless to say that one culture’s mathematical answers were ‘wrong’ when compared to your culture’s. There would be no objectively correct mathematical answers to evaluate each culture’s answers against. All you could do would be to point out that the mathematical answers were different.

The same if we believe morality is completely relative to culture.

If mathematics was relative, if the answers to mathematical questions were culturally dependent — as I believe you are claiming morality is — then it would be meaningless to say that one culture’s mathematical answers were ‘wrong’ when compared to your culture’s. There would be no objectively correct mathematical answers to evaluate each culture’s answers against. All you could do would be to point out that the mathematical answers were different.

Not at all. A moral relativist denies the existence of an absolute standard of right and wrong. He or she does not deny the existence of standards of right or wrong. A moral relativist can say "this morality is wrong" as long as he or she means that it is wrong by his or her standard, rather than absolutely.

Not at all. A moral relativist denies the existence of an absolute standard of right and wrong. He or she does not deny the existence of standards of right or wrong. A moral relativist can say “this morality is wrong” as long as he or she means that it is wrong by his or her standard, rather than absolutely.
Which is just my point.

However, further than this, to the moral relativist the statement ‘wrong by my standard’, at the best, means nothing more than ‘different to my standard’, and thus is a comparison, rather than a criticism. At the worst, it is a completely meaningless statement.

We cannot on the one hand argue that morality is relative to culture, and on the other hand attempt to criticise another culture’s morality from our culturally relative moral standpoint.

Which is worrying for cultural moral relativists, as intuitively most of us feel we should be able to criticise a culture’s moral standpoints; and that the criticism must be meaningful to said culture.

Of course, we could accept the cultural moral relativist’s thesis, and be forced to give up cross-cultural criticism. But I feel this would be giving up something important.

I believe many relativists feels the same, deep down.

However, further than this, to the moral relativist the statement ‘wrong by my standard’, at the best, means nothing more than ‘different to my standard’, and thus is a comparison, rather than a criticism.

Nonsense.

My friend loves football. I loathe it. Our tastes are different. But I'm not going to stop him from playing football as much as he wants.

If I thought playing football was wrong, was, say, morally equivalent to murder, then I would actively seek to top him. And that has nothing to do with my stance on moral relativism or moral absolutism.

Which is worrying for cultural moral relativists, as intuitively most of us feel we should be able to criticise a culture’s moral standpoints; and that the criticism must be meaningful to said culture.

There is no clear, intuitive reason why my understanding of the morality of homosexuality should be meaningful to a Christian fundamentalist. We operate on radically different moral frameworks.

I do happen to accept the existence of an absolute moral standard... but I hardly think that such a thing is somehow apparent or obvious, and the severe weakness of most of the arguments for such a standard seem to support that conclusion.

Of course, we could accept the cultural moral relativist’s thesis, and be forced to give up cross-cultural criticism. But I feel this would be giving up something important.

Truth does not have to be convenient.

My friend loves football. I loathe it. Our tastes are different. But I’m not going to stop him from playing football as much as he wants.
You’re backing up my argument here.

A like or dislike for football is relative to the individual, just as the moral relativist argues morality is. It would be meaningless to try and say that football is objectively disliked, for whether football is disliked or not is up to the individual’s relative stance. Similarly, the moral relativist would be a fool to say that a moral stance can be objectively wrong, as according to his own argument, whether a moral stance is right or wrong depends on individual relative morality (or cultural relative morality, for the cultural relativist).

If I thought playing football was wrong, was, say, morally equivalent to murder, then I would actively seek to top him. And that has nothing to do with my stance on moral relativism or moral absolutism.
You may well try to stop him, but if you maintain that morality is relative, then you can’t argue that it’s objectively wrong, just that you personally find it is wrong, from your relative moral standpoint.

There is no clear, intuitive reason why my understanding of the morality of homosexuality should be meaningful to a Christian fundamentalist. We operate on radically different moral frameworks.
I don’t think so.

I believe that you share the same evolved moral framework, indeed we all do, but that cultural, religious, political views shape our individual morality; the fundamentalist mostly his religion, and you mostly your politics (I assume).

The views that cloud our moral framework may be radically different to other’s morality — to the point where no compromise can be found at all — but these are merely differences in categorisation, differences in the fine points and definitions of what follows on from the evolved objective moral framework. It is these definitions that we can argue for and against.

I do happen to accept the existence of an absolute moral standard... but I hardly think that such a thing is somehow apparent or obvious, and the severe weakness of most of the arguments for such a standard seem to support that conclusion.
I agree; I believe there is an evolved objective moral framework, but I don’t think that it’s apparent what that framework is. Donald E. Brown’s work on human universals — some of which appear to be very basic moral judgements that all humans share, moral judgements that are almost necessary in a social animal — is perhaps a step in the right direction.

Truth does not have to be convenient.
Indeed. But just as we shouldn’t enshrine our intuitions, we shouldn’t instantly dismiss them.

A like or dislike for football is relative to the individual, just as the moral relativist argues morality is. It would be meaningless to try and say that football is objectively disliked, for whether football is disliked or not is up to the individual’s relative stance. Similarly, the moral relativist would be a fool to say that a moral stance can be objectively wrong, as according to his own argument, whether a moral stance is right or wrong depends on individual relative morality (or cultural relative morality, for the cultural relativist).

Clearly. But I have never disputed that. My point was simply that judgments of "wrong" and judgments of "difference" are not the same even on the relative level.

I don’t think so.

I believe that you share the same evolved moral framework, indeed we all do, but that cultural, religious, political views shape our individual morality; the fundamentalist mostly his religion, and you mostly your politics (I assume).

No, my politics are shaped by my ethics, not the other way around. But regardless, if "cultural, religious, political views shape our individual morality", the fact that we share some moral intuitions because of evolution hardly seems to make a difference.

I tell the Christian fundamentalist, "Your genetic nature provides you with feelings of compassion toward the gays you oppress." Why should he care? Why should he (or anyone) accept that evolution is the determining principle of morality?

"Universal" is not the same as "objective." Even if all of us had exactly the same moral views, dictated by evolution, they would still not be objective, only perfectly intersubjective: we would all share the same subjective moral intuitions, so it would be easy to discuss the justification for each other's behavior, but we could still make no claim to anything being objectively right or wrong simply because our genes made us feel certain ways about certain things. (If a person is born, thanks to a genetic mutation, without a sense of compassion, would morality suddenly cease to be objective because the universality was breached?)

The views that cloud our moral framework may be radically different to other’s morality — to the point where no compromise can be found at all — but these are merely differences in categorisation, differences in the fine points and definitions of what follows on from the evolved objective moral framework.

It would be difficult at best to convincingly argue that all human moral positions are based on our evolutionary moral framework... and even if you could, it still would not give us moral objectivity.

Clearly. But I have never disputed that. My point was simply that judgments of “wrong” and judgments of “difference” are not the same even on the relative level.
I agree totally.

No, my politics are shaped by my ethics, not the other way around. But regardless, if “cultural, religious, political views shape our individual morality”, the fact that we share some moral intuitions because of evolution hardly seems to make a difference.
Not a massive difference, no. But I still think the point is worth making and that it’s worth noticing that moral judgements can only differ so far.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it’s a rebuke of complete cultural or moral relativism.

I tell the Christian fundamentalist, “Your genetic nature provides you with feelings of compassion toward the gays you oppress.” Why should he care? Why should he (or anyone) accept that evolution is the determining principle of morality?
Firstly, I don’t think his genetic nature provides him with feelings of compassion toward homosexuals. Secondly, I’m not arguing that evolution is the determining principle of morality, merely that it marks out the playing field, so to speak.

“Universal” is not the same as “objective.” Even if all of us had exactly the same moral views, dictated by evolution, they would still not be objective, only perfectly intersubjective
A fair point, I am being anthropocentric here and misusing the term ‘objective’. I’m certainly not arguing for some Platonic moral ‘form’ or Randian objective moral principle. A better restatement if my thesis would be: humans posses a universal moral framework. (And remember I’m not arguing that evolution totally determines morality.)

we would all share the same subjective moral intuitions, so it would be easy to discuss the justification for each other’s behavior, but we could still make no claim to anything being objectively right or wrong simply because our genes made us feel certain ways about certain things.
No we couldn’t. But my argument is not to make a case for an objective moral principle; I want to argue against complete moral and cultural relativism, say that there is an underlying universal human moral framework, and maintain that this framework limits the range of humanity’s moral stances.

If a person is born, thanks to a genetic mutation, without a sense of compassion, would morality suddenly cease to be objective because the universality was breached?
I’d say that these people — psychopaths and sociopaths would fall under this category — have ‘faulty’ (for want of a better term) minds/brains that prevent the evolved moral framework from kicking in. But I don’t think this defeats the case for a universal moral framework; the psychopath merely can’t access said framework.

It would be difficult at best to convincingly argue that all human moral positions are based on our evolutionary moral framework... and even if you could, it still would not give us moral objectivity.
Once again, I am very far away from arguing that all human moral positions are based on our evolutionary moral framework. I believe experience and ‘prejudice’ (politics, religion, peer pressure, etc.) have a massive role to play.

Secondly, I’m not arguing that evolution is the determining principle of morality, merely that it marks out the playing field, so to speak.

How does it do so?

How does it do so?
Because humans, I believe, have evolved a moral framework, including (and on this point I admit I go on intuition and observation) a number of moral principles conducive to any social animals.

For example, Tony Soprano and I may differ widely on when it is morally correct to kill another individual, but I think we would agree that there are some situations in which killing is wrong. Indiscriminate killing of one’s species isn’t conducive to the survival of said species, and a morality has evolved to cope with this and the other pressures of being a social creature. It is Tony Soprano's and my upbringing, experience, politics, etc., that create the difference in moral stance.

I don’t claim to know what exactly these universal moral principles are, but I believe they exist (prohibition on some forms of killing, rape and incest are examples that seem likely from anthropological evidence), and I believe that humans are unable — apart from the mentally disabled psychopath or sociopath — to get outside the boundaries that the moral framework lays down.

How does it do so?

imagining an argument, i think i'd say something along these lines:

whatever it is that we ought do, it must be possible for us to survive as a species while doing it (even if occasionally it requires individual sacrifice). the range of possible moral oughts are therefore circumscribed by various empirical facts, particularly evolutionary ones which mark out the range of things we can do and not drive ourselves to extinction.

i'm not sure it works, but it looks like a start.

For example, Tony Soprano and I may differ widely on when it is morally correct to kill another individual, but I think we would agree that there are some situations in which killing is wrong.

Why do you think this agreement is based on evolution?

"Our genetic nature discourages us from killing other humans" does not lead to "We ought to not kill humans."

Why do you think this agreement is based on evolution?

“Our genetic nature discourages us from killing other humans” does not lead to “We ought to not kill humans.”
I believe FS has presented a good case above.

It is not that “our genetic nature discourages us from killing (certain) other humans” leads to “we ought to not kill (certain) humans”, but “killing humans will lead to humans dying out” leading to “we ought to not kill (certain) humans”.

The crux is the social aspect. If humans were solitary, non-social animals, I don’t think such a moral framework would evolve. A large impetus for forming this argument, or more accurately adapting this argument from a number of sources, is my unhappiness about the perceived psychological and moral separation of humans and non-human animals; a throwback to Aristotle's day.

whatever it is that we ought do, it must be possible for us to survive as a species while doing it (even if occasionally it requires individual sacrifice).

Why?

Yes, there is the material fact that if we are all dead, there is no one left to act morally. But I see no reason to assume that there can never be a compelling moral reason that supersedes that one.

but “killing humans will lead to humans dying out” leading to “we ought to not kill (certain) humans”.

This does not follow logically either. It assumes that we have an obligation to prevent the human species from dying out.

A large impetus for forming this argument, or more accurately adapting this argument from a number of sources, is my unhappiness about the perceived psychological and moral separation of humans and non-human animals; a throwback to Aristotle's day.

Moral reasoning requires sapience; unless we are capable of considering and judging different courses of action, it is meaningless to speak of the right standard for such consideration and judgment.

This does not follow logically either. It assumes that we have an obligation to prevent the human species from dying out.
And that’s why I’m claiming that this is an evolved moral framework, evolved to help the human species survive; not some abstract argument for morality created after we have evolved to our current state.

Moral reasoning requires sapience; unless we are capable of considering and judging different courses of action, it is meaningless to speak of the right standard for such consideration and judgment.
And?

I believe higher primates apart from humans exhibit sapience, as do other ‘higher order’ animals. But this is a moot argument; what I’m confused about is the ‘magical spark’ that people seem to suggest humans have over non-human animals. As if all animals act off of nothing but instinct up until we brilliant humans who inexplicably have some non-instinctual, non-evolved, reasoned morality. This is a very popular view, and one that seems to mistakenly place humans outside of nature.

Where does this appear from? If one wants to get away from the idea of humans as a god or gods’ favoured creations, then one must recognise our place in nature. I believe this includes morality.

Just because a centre of gravity isn't a "thing" doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

Well that's a start, but it might help to elaborate on what the deuce the above statement actually means. How is "thingness" and the predicate of "existence" not rather intimately tied together?

Edit: To whit, I could possibly see something that doesn't exist nevertheless be considered a thing. A unicorn is a thing that does not exist. Nevertheless, I'm going to deny that anything that exists isn't also a thing. Maybe my study of philosophy is flawed, but my metaphysics doesn't allow me to understand an extant non-thing.

I don't have a problem with that part. Much like a centre of gravity, society isn't a thing.

The questions compound. If there is a distinction between thingness and existence, a distinction I'm not personally sold on, then what's the advantage of calling society "non-being"? So long as it exists, what's the upshot?

Secondly, how exactly is society not a thing? Pardon my daftness here, but I would assert that one of the primary conditions of a thing being a thing is that it produces effects above and beyond what the sum composite of its constituent elements on their own create. Jumbling 10 protons, 10 electrons, and some odd number of neutrons in a dish does not produce a molecule of water, and you cannot explain the characteristics of water like "You can drown in it" by referencing its composite makeup. By the same token, jumbling 300 million people in a 2.5 million square mile area doesn't make "America", and you can't explain American foreign policy or American culture by describing the individual-level behavior of 300 million residents. America, or more particularly American society, is therefore a thing in itself with independent status.


I need to look to see if she does claim that capitalism exhibits traits dissimilar from those of any individual. I'd probably disagree with her.


Really? That's one of the few sensible points she ever made: you can't explain macro-level justice through micro-level injustice or, perhaps better put, ajust selfish action.


I can't stand Kant. I'm endlessly annoyed that so much of modern social science is based on him.

As for Aristotle, I happen to have a copy of the Nicomachean Ethics on my shelf (a relic from my Philosophy degree). If I recall correctly, I spent most of my time reading it complaining about his definition of happiness. That aside, I don't see how empirical verification that all human action strives for happiness has anything at all to do with moral realism.

Whether people do behave a certain way is by no means evidence that they ought.


Okay, so you can't stand Kant. Can you tell me why his reasoned argument that the only purely good thing is a good intent is bad reasoning, or not?

Further, I'm at a loss to follow the applicability of the naturalistic fallacy to Aristotle. First, Book I is very much a descriptive account about the fact that all people pursue that which they think will make them happy or has an intrinsically noble character (although that's more Book III). The naturalistic fallacy applies in circumstances where is and ought are confused--Aristotle isn't making the case that we ought to pursue happiness, only that we do. Further, the contrary statement, that we for any reason ought not pursue happiness is as utterly baffling to me as it was to Aristotle, especially as he uses happiness, as a fullness of a God-like life.


Empirical verifiability is not equivalent to empirically verified. Furthermore, methematical proofs are true with certainty.

Moral truths aren't like that. They're not empirically verifiable, and they're not proven with certainty (I suspect because they cannot be, but I can't prove that). So why does anyone believe that they exist or even that they are known to anyone (including oneself)?


You're right in a mean sense; verifiability implies the ability to confirm, where verified signifies that it has been confirmed at a prior time. The significance of this eludes. Moreover, I am equally unsure why Moral truths and geometric truths are dissimilar, or perhaps to better put it, why you allow reasoning in the province of geometry, but demand Humean empiricism for your moral proofs. Aside from purely ad hoc considerations, that is.

As for certainty, I can easily get a mathematical theorem wrong:

X + 2/3Y = X - 300Y where Y does not = 0. That's an impossible equation as written, but we know it's wrong because it doesn't conform with any algebraic principles we know. I fail to understand how it's impossible that an immoral action can't be viewed in the same way; as a violation of absolute moral principles as the above equation violated algebraic principles.

And that’s why I’m claiming that this is an evolved moral framework, evolved to help the human species survive; not some abstract argument for morality created after we have evolved to our current state.

Yes, human beings have negative and positive feelings regarding behaviors as a result of evolution. But this tells us nothing whatsoever about what we ought to do.

For that, you need an "abstract argument." Sorry.

As if all animals act off of nothing but instinct up until we brilliant humans who inexplicably have some non-instinctual, non-evolved, reasoned morality.

Human beings are rational creatures: we recognize the rational necessity of making decisions based on reasons, not instinctual whim.

I make no statement as to the rationality or lack of such of other creatures.

The naturalistic fallacy applies in circumstances where is and ought are confused--Aristotle isn't making the case that we ought to pursue happiness, only that we do. Further, the contrary statement, that we for any reason ought not pursue happiness is as utterly baffling to me as it was to Aristotle, especially as he uses happiness, as a fullness of a God-like life.
Right eyebrow going up...

Morality is a shared yet relative construct. That a specific code of morality loses the fullest extent of its sense outside of the society in which it develops in no way reduces its merits within this society.

For that, you need an “abstract argument.”
Yes, I agree.

But the fact that we construct moral arguments and theories doesn’t destroy the possibility of an evolved moral ‘compass’. I’m not arguing that moral philosophy is useless, far from it. I’m just arguing that no moral theory can go ‘outside’ the moral framework.

Sorry.
For your patronising tone, or for the fact you keep mischaracterising my argument? :p

But the fact that we construct moral arguments and theories doesn’t destroy the possibility of an evolved moral ‘compass’. I’m not arguing that moral philosophy is useless, far from it. I’m just arguing that no moral theory can go ‘outside’ the moral framework.

I understand your argument. You have yet failed to support it.

Look, yes, seeing other people in pain arouses feelings of compassion in me, and I understand that this is a product of evolution. But I feel to see how it leads to morality--even to a moral framework. Just because I feel compassion for others doesn't mean that I have an obligation to help them... indeed, I could conceivably have an obligation to harm them severely despite that feeling.

For your patronising tone,

Sorry about that... for real this time.

or for the fact you keep mischaracterising my argument?

I don't think I have.

Look, yes, seeing other people in pain arouses feelings of compassion in me, and I understand that this is a product of evolution. But I feel to see how it leads to morality—even to a moral framework. Just because I feel compassion for others doesn’t mean that I have an obligation to help them... indeed, I could conceivably have an obligation to harm them severely despite that feeling.
I’m not arguing that evolution has produced a woolly feeling of ‘compassion’, I’m arguing it has produced more definite moral drives or inherent moral propositions in ourselves; inherent moral propositions that no moral theory ignores. Although moral theories differ wildly, they never contradict the very basic moral stances that have arisen out of the fact that humans are a very social animal.

So, for example, I think it’s not a too controversial thing to say that almost every known religion has some tenant that is a version of the Golden Rule. Now, I’m not saying that the Golden Rule is somehow an inherent moral proposition (though I could entertain the possibility), but it goes a little way to highlight my position: moral theories cannot break certain inherent moral positions/the moral framework in humans.

I do recognise certain flaws in the argument — especially the tricky question of what exactly these inherent moral positions I keep whittering on about actually are (even though as I said above Brown’s human universals may shed some light on this) — but I am yet to be totally convinced otherwise.

And this is why I appreciate discussing this with yourself and others. Argument and discussion can show whether I’m talking nonsense. :p


Sorry about that... for real this time.
Quite all right.

I don’t think I have.
Perhaps not. I, too, may have been getting a little hot under the collar.

moral theories cannot break certain inherent moral positions/the moral framework in humans.

But why not? What's the force of these "inherent moral positions"? If I deny it, what argument can you give me to sway me?

What does it even mean for something to be an "inherent moral position"? Does it mean that we intuitively feel that it is right? But feelings and intuitions are not a very good basis for any kind of truth... and certainly, if we can find a better basis, you could hardly insist that we keep to that evolutionary moral framework.

Why can we not be culturally, or socially, or intellectually swayed beyond that "moral framework"? After all, other basic human instincts can be repressed... some people are celibate, for one example.

<snip>
Yeah, I sorta see your point.

All I could really say in my defence is that from my observations of moral practices/beliefs and discussions in moral philosophy, I have an intuition that there is some common thread running throughout; something everybody is hinting at.

It ties in with my belief that there is no such thing as ‘evil’. I think when most people talk about evil, they are talking about the absence of ‘good’. I think this is a sensible definition of ‘evil’, and I also think that for an act or theory to be truly evil under this definition, there can not only be no good consequences, but no good intentions either.

Now, I posit that even the most morally reprehensibly person, or even the moral theory or practice that is most racist, sexist, genocidal etc., will never contain no good intentions. These good intentions may only be for a very small clique of people, or for a specific race, gender, etc., and they may lead to the most reprehensible acts, but they are still good intentions.

Even if we look at tyrants like Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, etc., they still had (warped) ‘good’ intentions; intentions to better the human race for example. Even if those intentions were disgustingly wrong, I seriously doubt if any of the above were, in their eyes, trying to only achieve ‘bad’.

And thus there is no true ‘evil’. There is good and bad, but not evil. We all differ on what ‘good’ and ‘bad’ constitute, but I think we are all trying, in general, to do ‘good’ and not ‘bad’. Or at least, not to do bad. It’s just a matter of definition.

And I think it’s possible that morality is much the same; a matter of definition (though you do put up some hard challenges to that notion).

But look at me: abandoning discussion about one controversial moral theory only to discuss another. Forgive me.

I’m afraid I must go to bed.

I have an intuition that there is some common thread running throughout; something everybody is hinting at.

I agree--at least, something a substantial number of people are hinting at.

I merely submit that it is a product not of evolution, at least not directly so, but of reason. Of course, we are also lucky enough to have evolutionary natures that don't contrast so radically with moral reason... that, indeed, in a just world might coincide rather closely with it.

Now, I posit that even the most morally reprehensibly person, or even the moral theory or practice that is most racist, sexist, genocidal etc., will never contain no good intentions. These good intentions may only be for a very small clique of people, or for a specific race, gender, etc., and they may lead to the most reprehensible acts, but they are still good intentions.

I disagree. I think there are truly amoral people--people who do not bother with justifying their actions to themselves, discarding all morality as illusory.

But I think you are right that there is something quite natural, quite universal about moral justification--and it connects directly with our status as rational beings. Just as we seek reasons for our beliefs (instead of just accepting them on whim), we seek reasons for our actions (instead of just acting as we please.)

And thus there is no true ‘evil’.

What about failures of will?

Perhaps I recognize that I ought to help a needy person, but I really want to do something else instead... so I let myself ignore my obligation. Doesn't this sort of thing happen all the time?

Why?

Yes, there is the material fact that if we are all dead, there is no one left to act morally. But I see no reason to assume that there can never be a compelling moral reason that supersedes that one.

i don't know, it just seems to me that a morality that requires the extinction of moral agents is inherently problematic. i would take morality to necessarily involve the governing of interactions between moral agents (and between moral agents and the universe). i guess it's possible that morality could require the destruction of morality, but it just strikes me as odd to even call such a thing morality.

(of course, it could easily require the extinction of some moral agents, provided there are other species of moral agents around)

i guess it's possible that morality could require the destruction of morality, but it just strikes me as odd to even call such a thing morality.

Say that for some reason the continued survival of the human species meant the destruction of all other life on the planet. Is it really so inconceivable that morality would require destroying ourselves in that circumstance? Especially if it were done through simply halting births, instead of mass murder... which might militate against our evolutionary instinct, but seems a good more palpable morally than slaughtering everybody, or being responsible for the eradication of all other species.

(I am assuming for the sake of argument that members of no other animal species could reasonably be termed moral agents.)

This is my second poll to test now the ethical view of morality on NSG.

I find it hilarious that there are still people out there that think morality is objective. Hell, time time is relative, and that affects everything, not just human action.

Say that for some reason the continued survival of the human species meant the destruction of all other life on the planet. Is it really so inconceivable that morality would require destroying ourselves in that circumstance?

nope. premise surrendered.