NationStates Jolt Archive

I have become rather disillusioned with moral philosophy and all that stuff. No matter how neat or convincing the arguments, in the real world no one seems to care. People don't sit there and decide dilemmas by remembering their extensive study of Kant - they often decide to a large part out of an undefined feeling of right and wrong.

So I found this fascinating:
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8881470
Philosophy and neuroscience

Posing the right question
Mar 22nd 2007
From The Economist print edition

The neurology of morality is being explored
IT IS the hoariest dilemma in undergraduate moral-philosophy classes: how do you pick the lesser of two evils? Often the problem is posed as the runaway-railway-wagon paradox. Given a choice between deliberately pushing someone in front of the wagon, in order to slow it down sufficiently for five people further down the line to escape, and allowing the five to die that the one may live, what should you do? Conversely, given a choice of throwing a set of points so that the wagon will go down a line where it will kill only one person, as opposed to five down the other line, what should you do?

On the face of things, the outcomes are identical in both situations. Either one person dies or five do. But, whereas most people have no difficulty choosing which is better in the second case (to kill one rather than five), the first usually causes paroxysms of guilt. Moral philosophers have spent years discussing this paradox. It has, however, taken a team of neuroscientists, led by Michael Koenigs of the University of Iowa and Liane Young of Harvard University, to come up with at least part of the real answer.

Basic emotions, such as fear, are regulated in part of the brain called the limbic system. These emotions—along with the limbic system—are shared by all mammals. Social emotions such as compassion, shame and guilt, however, are confined to a small number of species, and are most strongly expressed in man. They are associated with a particular part of the prefrontal cortex, an area of the brain that is much bigger in humans than in other mammal species. Dr Koenigs, Ms Young and their colleagues suspected that the seat of the runaway-railway-wagon paradox lies in that specific part of the prefrontal cortex, known as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC).

To test this idea, they looked at six people with damage to the VMPC on both sides of their brains. These people are known from other work to have poor social-emotional responses. The researchers compared the responses of these people to various moral dilemmas with those of a group whose brains were undamaged and a second group with equivalent damage in other parts of the cortex. All three groups were asked questions (including the runaway-railway-wagon paradox) that previous studies have shown fall either side of the divide between the obvious and the squirm-inducing. The researchers' hypothesis was that people with VMPC-damage would come to the utilitarian answer in difficult cases (push the guy in front of the wagon) more often than either of the other two groups. And that, as they describe in this week's Nature, was exactly what happened. In cases where the choice involved personally causing harm, even for good ends, destroying the centre of social emotion also destroyed what is regarded by most people as normal moral judgment.

Pinning down the location of this part of morality does not answer the more fundamental question of why it evolved the way it did. It does, however, assist the process of thinking about that question.

In these cases it seems that the decision on how to act is not a single, rational calculation of the sort that moral philosophers have generally assumed is going on, but a conflict between two processes, with one (the emotional) sometimes able to override the other (the utilitarian, the location of which this study does not address).

That fits with one of the tenets of evolutionary psychology—a field which, as its name suggests, seeks to explain, rather than merely describe, mental processes. This is that minds are composed of modules evolved for given purposes. Dr Koenigs and Ms Young have shown that the VMPC may be the site of a “moral-decision” module, linked to the social emotions, that either regulates or is regulated by an as-yet-unlocated utilitarian module.

This does not answer the question of what this module (what philosophers would call “moral sense”) is actually for. But it does suggest the question should be addressed functionally, rather than in the abstract. Time, perhaps, for philosophers to put away their copies of Kant and pull a dusty tome of Darwin off the bookshelf.

Very interesting indeed.

So how much moral behaviour is biological and genetic? And what does that mean for moral philosophy?

I have become rather disillusioned with moral philosophy and all that stuff. No matter how neat or convincing the arguments, in the real world no one seems to care. People don't sit there and decide dilemmas by remembering their extensive study of Kant - they often decide to a large part out of an undefined feeling of right and wrong.

So I found this fascinating:
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8881470


Very interesting indeed.

So how much moral behaviour is biological and genetic? And what does that mean for moral philosophy?

In the fact that all emotions, logical thought and reasoniong capabilites are all done in the head, then of course all morlity ultimatly stems from a biological place.

This is another branch of the old nature vs nuture argument, and I thought that it was understood that both have a hand in making us who we are.

As to moral philosophy, well that will still be there huh!

"We now have four good Darwinian reasons for individuals to be altruistic, generous or 'moral' towards each other. First, there is the special case of genetic kinship. Second, there is reciprocation: the repayment of favours given, and the giving of favours in 'anticipation' of payback. Following on from this there is, third, the Darwinian benefit of acquiring a reputation of generosity and kindness. And fourth... there is the additional benefit of conspicuous generosity as a way of buying unfakeably authentic advertising...

Could it be that our Good Samaritan urges are misfirings, analogous to the misfiring of a reed warbler's parental instincts when it works itself to the bone for a young cuckoo?"

The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins. Chapter 6, if anyone is interested.

if anyone is interested.

No i'm not interested in that ammature philosiphical plageristic un-original crap.

/rant

No i'm not interested in that ammature philosiphical plageristic un-original crap.

/rant

I'd challenge you to back up your claims, but I don't want to hi-jack the thread.

On topic, I think it'll be a long time before we can separate our natural, built-in morality from what we learn(which is an adaption of said built in morality).

I'd challenge you to back up your claims, but I don't want to hi-jack the thread.

On topic, I think it'll be a long time before we can separate our natural, built-in morality from what we learn(which is an adaption of said built in morality).

Dooo it, thread nap it, do it do it do it!

I'd challenge you to back up your claims, but I don't want to hi-jack the thread.


Well I made a whole thread about it last year.

Well I made a whole thread about it last year.

Perhaps you could link to it and Ifreann could have some light reading for the day.

As to the subject of the OP, I'll respond affirmatively that morality is biological and natural.

So how much moral behaviour is biological and genetic? And what does that mean for moral philosophy?

at least the basic framework that culture builds from

and it means that the conversation continues - firstly because of is/ought and secondly because it is just some more and better data on the nature of our moral intuitions. we still have much to figure out, and it cannot be answered purely empirically.

I think more of our morality is based on biology than we think.

As to the subject of the OP, I'll respond affirmatively that morality is biological and natural.

but do you take that to mean our natural biological inclinations towards violence are moral? if not, why not?

Well, I know that altruism has a biological basis, and reward centers in our brain are triggered when we perform actions that we consider good. I imagine morality reflects a social construct built upon basic biological mores.

but do you take that to mean our natural biological inclinations towards violence are moral? if not, why not?

They certainly have a moral quality, if that's what you mean.

But I suspect you mean moral in the sense of "morally permissable". In that case, I'll suggest that our inclinations to protect our physical territory and belongings are both quite natural and quite moral. Whether protecting them with violence is morally correct in any particular circumstance requires a more mature and developed moral sense to ascertain.

i dont know about that study but i DO know that children have no morality.

a child will steal, lie, even kill without a second thought. you cannot safely leave a 4 year old with a new baby. if it annoys her, she might just toss it down the stairs to shut it up.

But I suspect you mean moral in the sense of "morally permissable". In that case, I'll suggest that our inclinations to protect our physical territory and belongings are both quite natural and quite moral.

what about our more common uses of it - to protect our pride, to take some weaker kid's lunch money, because that woman needs to learn her lesson, because we're drunk, and because we just like hitting things?

what about our more common uses of it - to protect our pride, to take some weaker kid's lunch money, because that woman needs to learn her lesson, because we're drunk, and because we just like hitting things?

As it turns out, I happen to be one of those people who likes hitting things. So I have a punching bag, or when that's not available, good old-fashioned air.

But to address your larger question about morality, our common actions are indicative of our natural moral development. As we mature neurologically and socially (in our natural environs), we also mature in terms of what behaviors we consider acceptable or unacceptable. Some only reach a very limited degree of moral maturity, while other continue to grow over their lifetime or perhaps grow rapidly early on and stick with what moral thought they have.

Well, I know that altruism has a biological basis, and reward centers in our brain are triggered when we perform actions that we consider good.
Any conditioned response operates that way. It isn't "natural" to keep pouring money into slot machines, but the addiction operates through similar biological functions.

I'd say it is about a 60-40 relationship, or even a 30-70 one. While some moral decisions may occur naturally to every single person on earth, they are usually the more simplistic kinds, like whether the act of directly murdering someone is automatically wrong. Probably most of the more complex moral decision depend on upbringing or other factors.

A member of a culture that values individualism more than anything else, say, an ancient african tribal society, may actually choose the option of doing nothing on the first delemma, as they may believe that it is worse to actively kill one person (forcing their will upon them) than, through inaction, kill many. (which they wouldn't see as killing, anyway) This is pretty much the opposite of post-enlightenment, social-contract type European thinking.

I'm not sure it matters. You're still capable of making rational decisions - this moral section of the brain is simply influencing your preferences.

That some people elect not to think through their actions doesn't make that somehow a desirable trait.

Well apparently most if not all morality is biological


Morality in Monkeys - http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/21/healthscience/snmorals.php

i dont know about that study but i DO know that children have no morality.

a child will steal, lie, even kill without a second thought. you cannot safely leave a 4 year old with a new baby. if it annoys her, she might just toss it down the stairs to shut it up.

Morality (if we must call it that, biology-driven morality is an oxymoron), as with all mental functions, "blossoms" later in life.

It is likely that there are mental functions that trigger observations and assimilations of behaviors, and these have likely not reached their peak yet. It could also be that children have not yet formed the rational capabilities to harness their emotional and moral responses.

I have noticed, however, my little cousin (age 2) has developed a protective instinct towards smaller children and attempts to comfort people who she thinks are hurt or sad.

I'm not sure it matters. You're still capable of making rational decisions - this moral section of the brain is simply influencing your preferences.

That some people elect not to think through their actions doesn't make that somehow a desirable trait.

You have it backwards. Preferences are not rational, they are emotional. Preferences are there regardless of reason, and if anything, it is reason that "influences" the preferences.

It seems more likely that reason is just a matter of attempting to order the preferences after the fact, where we act based on the battle of our emotional preferences, and then discern just how the action came about after it has already taken place.

I was under the impression that biology was something that we couldn't act against, at least not without a lot of surgery. However, people have found a way to violate every moral law that has ever been invented. How do we account for that if morality is controlled by biology?

No i'm not interested in that ammature philosiphical plageristic un-original crap.

/rant

It's not plagiarism if you have end notes.

I was under the impression that biology was something that we couldn't act against, at least not without a lot of surgery. However, people have found a way to violate every moral law that has ever been invented. How do we account for that if morality is controlled by biology?

Because biology interacts with the environment. Squirrels won't hibernate if there is enough food to eat throughout the Winter, yet biology tells them to hibernate.

Biology tells us not to have sex with the people we grew up in the same house with. Morality tells us not to have sex with close blood relatives, even if they are complete strangers. Biology does not discriminate against blood relatives as sex partners very strongly (though it does a bit). Culture does not, as a general rule, frown upon marriage between childhood cohabitants.

China, up until the early 20th century, had an institution called Sim Pua, in which a man with no daughters would bring an otherwise unwanted girl into his household and raise her like (but not as) a daughter. Then he would arrange for this girl to marry his son. Then as soon as the old man died, the couple would get divorced because biology was telling them that they had married as brother and sister, even though culture told them that they had been betrothed since childhood.

The early incarnations of the Kibbutz in Israel decided to raise all the kids as one family. No exclusive parent-child relationships. This led to a high rate of incest because fathers and daughters didn't instinctively see each other as relatives.

Any conditioned response operates that way. It isn't "natural" to keep pouring money into slot machines, but the addiction operates through similar biological functions.

The important thing though is that this particular reward center is triggered in response to moral considerations.

If it was me in that Wagon Paradox I would throw myself infront of the wagon to allow all six others to survive.

If by biological you mean genetic.. I most certainly believe it can be passed down. But it isn't gauranteed.

Personally I think morality derives from economics, not biology.

For example: It's the year 50,000 BC and there's this tribe in... the Middle East. 'Kay, so one guy murders another guy. That would be considered bad because it reduces the [potential] working population, meaning one less guy to kill animals for meat.

The same might be said for abstinence, and 'thou shalt not steal'. People die sometimes after sex. One might interpret this as 'sex is bad' - and so arises the concept of abstinence, because again, one less person to feed society. Stealing would have been frowned upon, too - it was not until fairly recently in history that many people dropped their farming tools, sickles, et cetera - stealing someone's food or belongings would mean, again, less food.

Put plain and simple, they're protective measures.

It's survival of the fittest, applied to groups: Murder, rape, et al. were considered bad among tribal peoples because one less man meant one less hunter, and less meat for the tribe - and so, the tribe develops a set of morals.

If it was me in that Wagon Paradox I would throw myself infront of the wagon to allow all six others to survive.

And if it was me, I'd leave...

I was under the impression that biology was something that we couldn't act against, at least not without a lot of surgery. However, people have found a way to violate every moral law that has ever been invented. How do we account for that if morality is controlled by biology?

Because biology wouldn't create a black and white moral code that we have from birth. Even if all possessed the same basic genetic morality from birth, the way that phenotype was expressed would be altered by its interaction with the expression of other genetic tendencies and the environment.

The great majority of morality is likely triggered learning, where a gene causes certain observations to be unconsciously stored and repeated when applicable.

You have it backwards. Preferences are not rational, they are emotional. Preferences are there regardless of reason, and if anything, it is reason that "influences" the preferences.
But the preferences exist prior to the reason. You like pancakes. There's no rational reason why you like pancakes - you just do. You can then apply your preference rationally to your pursuit of pancakes.

The reasoning happens later, but it is heavily influenced by preferences.

But the preferences exist prior to the reason. You like pancakes. There's no rational reason why you like pancakes - you just do. You can then apply your preference rationally to your pursuit of pancakes.

No, you apply the pursuit to the preference. It is insensible to apply a preference after one has begun the pursuit.

If reason plays an active role, then it merely mediates between the preferences and forms and maintains plans to pursue these preferences.