NationStates Jolt Archive

Been doing some basic epistemology and ontology stuff at uni. Honestly, I think it is a waste of time, but I thought I'd see if the forum could make it interesting.

So what are ya', ****?

Here are some bastardised and most probably completely incorrect descriptions of the basic schools of thought.

A Positivist (foundationalist)
There is an objective world which we can find out about through observations, experience etc.

An Interpretist (anti-foundationalist)
There is no real world that we can correctly observe. There are no objective truths in politics, rather interpretations that people use to interpret events, elections, etc.

A Realist (mixture)
Like positivists, believe the real world does exist and we can explain politics by making observations, however there are some unobservable structures also.

I personally tend towards positivism, since I see experience and observation as eventually enabling us to achieve near-total understanding of our world, including those things conventionally seen as paranormal or supernatural.

I'm a realist who leans positivist at times.

I personally tend towards positivism, since I see experience and observation as eventually enabling us to achieve near-total understanding of our world, including those things conventionally seen as paranormal or supernatural.

Speaking of learning...how's finals week treating you?

I guess I'm a realist, there are some objective truths but they can all be lumped into the scientific field. Thinks like poltics, morality etc are human ideas and so wholey subjective.

I’m a realist, both in general epistemology, and when dealing with perception.

I laugh in the face of sense data and qualia!

Bwa-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha!

I have a bit of an odd view. To those of you who know me, this may seem like an obvious truth. But anyway...

I do think that there is an objective world, and that it is impossible for us to perceive it with full accuracy. On the other hand, I also hold that a person can, by removing many of the conceptual blinders they have, gain a significantly less limited perception of the objective world.

I also think the objective/subjective distinction is a false one, and that there are merely degrees to which one holds a limited objective perspective.

Furthermore, that our interpretations that we add to our perceptions of objective reality are merely frameworks we apply to it as a means of functioning within it, and we often start to confuse our interpretations with our perceptions, leading us to either believe our interpretations are objectively true or to believe that our perceptions are inherently subjective/distinct from reality.

I have a bit of an odd view. To those of you who know me, this may seem like an obvious truth. But anyway...

I do think that there is an objective world, and that it is impossible for us to perceive it with full accuracy. On the other hand, I also hold that a person can, by removing many of the conceptual blinders they have, gain a significantly less limited perception of the objective world.

I also think the objective/subjective distinction is a false one, and that there are merely degrees to which one holds a limited objective perspective.

Furthermore, that our interpretations that we add to our perceptions of objective reality are merely frameworks we apply to it as a means of functioning within it, and we often start to confuse our interpretations with our perceptions, leading us to either believe our interpretations are objectively true or to believe that our perceptions are inherently subjective/distinct from reality.



Ummm interesting, soooooo all is objective, and subjectivity is no more than a lack of understanding?

Ummm interesting, soooooo all is objective, and subjectivity is no more than a lack of understanding?

Yes. It's my view that people call things subjective because they do not make the distinction between their perceptions and their interpretations.

I suspect this is due to most folks eventually becoming so attached to their interpretations that they filter all their perceptions through the interpretations they have of the objective world. The two become so thoroughly connected in the minds of such people that they cannot imagine perception without those interpretations.

Yes. It's my view that people call things subjective because they do not make the distinction between their perceptions and their interpretations.

I suspect this is due to most folks eventually becoming so attached to their interpretations that they filter all their perceptions through the interpretations they have of the objective world. The two become so thoroughly connected in the minds of such people that they cannot imagine perception without those interpretations.

I must admit I have not thought of it like that before, it is an intregiuing idea.

Heh lets test it!

So lets take something that I belive is wholey subjective, morality.

An objective moral statement would be 'it is always wrong to steal'

There can of course be subjective interpertaions that suggest, sometimes it is right to steal. If perhaps you are stariving and have no other recourse but to steal food.

Is this then an example of an objective morality, or a subjective morality?
One that lacks understanding, or one that changes from person to person and condition to condition?

I must admit I have not thought of it like that before, it is an intregiuing idea.

Heh lets test it!

So lets take something that I belive is wholey subjective, morality.

An objective moral statement would be 'it is always wrong to steal'

There can of course be subjective interpertaions that suggest, sometimes it is right to steal. If perhaps you are stariving and have no other recourse but to steal food.

Is this then an example of an objective morality, or a subjective morality?
One that lacks understanding, or one that changes from person to person and condition to condition?

I would suggest that the statement "it is always wrong to steal" is a perfect example of a limited objective view, that it is objectively true in a limited sense that the act of theft has the quality of wrongness.

I would suggest that the statement "it is always wrong to steal" is a perfect example of a limited objective view, that it is objectively true in a limited sense that the act of theft has the quality of wrongness.

Okay so you are saying that stealing is objectivly true sometimes?

Okay so you are saying that stealing is objectivly true sometimes?

Yes, and that there are features of our objective reality (human territorial tendencies) that make it so.

Yes, and that there are features of our objective reality (human territorial tendencies) that make it so.

Sooo isn't then that just another way of saying any qeustion on the morality of stealing is relative to conditions, and so is subjective?

Heh or am I missing a subtle differance here?

Sooo isn't then that just another way of saying any qeustion on the morality of stealing is relative to conditions, and so is subjective?

Heh or am I missing a subtle differance here?

You're actually missing what you're saying, I think. When you speak of morality being relative to "conditions", you're suggesting that it is relative to objective features of our reality. And if morals are relative to objective features of our reality, we can hardly term them subjective.

For example, if the objective condition is that the moral actor who is stealing food is doing so because he is starving, then the rightness of the act is due to the fact that he is objectively starving and needs food.

Whereas, if the objective condition is that the moral actor is a wealthy art dealer who steals a painting from a museum, then the wrongness of the act is due to the fact that he objectively does not have an equivalent survival need for that painting.

Speaking of learning...how's finals week treating you?

I posted that 15 mins before my German 201 final from the lab in Hagerty...it was a long ass test, but not too difficult. A lot of writing, though. Econ was yesterday and I've got math and CSE this afternoon; after that, I'm done with exams. All in all, my exams are easier than last quarter's.

I only got 4 hours of sleep last night, but that was due to gaming rather than studying.

Anybody else want to contend with my argument that the fact that morals are relative to objective features of reality makes them objective?

I was kinda hoping someone would poke holes in it...

You're actually missing what you're saying, I think. When you speak of morality being relative to "conditions", you're suggesting that it is relative to objective features of our reality. And if morals are relative to objective features of our reality, we can hardly term them subjective.

For example, if the objective condition is that the moral actor who is stealing food is doing so because he is starving, then the rightness of the act is due to the fact that he is objectively starving and needs food.

Whereas, if the objective condition is that the moral actor is a wealthy art dealer who steals a painting from a museum, then the wrongness of the act is due to the fact that he objectively does not have an equivalent survival need for that painting.

I understand all of that, but isn't that just another way of saying 'relative to the condition' Okay the condition may well be objective, in that the starving man really is starving, but the morality of the situation is relative to the condition, and since what we are discussing is morality, not the condition, we have to say it is subjective.

Let me brake it down inot two types of truth for you.

The what, and the why.

I'll agree that the what is always objective.

What is theifs condition? We can objectivly show that he is starving.

The why, is mostly always subjective.

Why did the theif steal the bread. He can say say that he is starving, but unless we have a way to read his mind, we don't know for sure, if the jury find him guilty, they have subjectivly decided to not belive his plea.

Anybody else want to contend with my argument that the fact that morals are relative to objective features of reality makes them objective?

I was kinda hoping someone would poke holes in it...

I've learned not to argue with you. You tend to win.

Edit: Epistemology is also one of the few branches of philosophy I don't particularly care about. I used to be an Idealist, but I've since given up that school of thought.

I understand all of that, but isn't that just another way of saying 'relative to the condition' Okay the condition may well be objective, in that the starving man really is starving, but the morality of the situation is relative to the condition, and since what we are discussing is morality, not the condition, we have to say it is subjective.

Let me brake it down inot two types of truth for you.

The what, and the why.

I'll agree that the what is always objective.

What is theifs condition? We can objectivly show that he is starving.

The why, is mostly always subjective.

First, I'm curious as to why you see the intent of the moral actor as a morally relevant detail, but I'll grant that it is right from the start.

If we assume that intent is relevant, then how do we get to intent being subjective? Isn't the person's intent simply a complex series of chemical reactions in their brain, an objective part of reality?

Why did the theif steal the bread. He can say say that he is starving, but unless we have a way to read his mind, we don't know for sure, if the jury find him guilty, they have subjectivly decided to not belive his plea.

This is just pointing out that it is sometimes difficult to discern objective reality, which I have no problem admitting, and my view deals with nicely.

I've learned not to argue with you. You tend to win.

Uh, I do? And here I thought I just tended to be a smart-ass. ;)

Edit: Epistemology is also one of the few branches of philosophy I don't particularly care about. I used to be an Idealist, but I've since given up that school of thought.

Ah, Idealism. I really like that school of thought. There's a sort of beauty to it.

I'm a polygamist. I believe there's a real world, and it needs to be overpopulated with mini-me's.

Realist. Not only does objective truth exists, but it exists about things that can neither be observed nor experienced, yet nevertheless are crucial to our understanding and interpretation of the world. And we have no guarantee that our perception accurately represents objects as they actually are.

Is this thread making anybody else feel really stupid?

You're actually missing what you're saying, I think. When you speak of morality being relative to "conditions", you're suggesting that it is relative to objective features of our reality. And if morals are relative to objective features of our reality, we can hardly term them subjective.

"Relative to conditions" implies that they lack the character of absolute rules ("never under any circumstances do x.")

It is a seperate question from whether or not morality is objective, subjective, or in some sense relative to culture.

"Relative to conditions" implies that they lack the character of absolute rules ("never under any circumstances do x.")

It is a seperate question from whether or not morality is objective, subjective, or in some sense relative to culture.

Yes. People often seem to confuse the objective/subjective and absolute/relative distinctions too. Probably because most of the time folks combine the objective with the absolute and the subjective with the relative.

Perhaps that's why my objective relativistic view on morality strikes so many as being odd.

Ah, Idealism. I really like that school of thought. There's a sort of beauty to it.

It is. There's an elegance to it, but unfortunately if one can consider all beings to be minds experiencing an ultimately illusory world around them, one can consider himself to be the sole existing being, and all others merely illusion. It's why I eventually changed my mind about it.

Of the listed positions, I find realism to be the most suitable. Rationalism has its attractive elements as well. Epistemological/methodological dualism I suppose?

It is. There's an elegance to it, but unfortunately if one can consider all beings to be minds experiencing an ultimately illusory world around them, one can consider himself to be the sole existing being, and all others merely illusion. It's why I eventually changed my mind about it.
Wait - no one said the world of ideas is illusory. If you go by Berkeley's formulation of subjective idealism, ideas function in accord with a set of laws (much like the laws of nature), and there is an ultimate prime mover, a mind above all others that impresses ideas upon lesser minds. Solipsism would be the extreme in which one believes only their mind exists, and nothing else.

Not the version I once ascribed to. No one ever said there was a singular form of Idealism.
Hence I did mention Berkeley's. ;) As far as I know idealism is an ontological philosophy though, not so much an epistemological one. With Berkeley's variant, he still saw empiricism as a good means of learning about the world. He just didn't like the atheism and materialism he believed it would lead to.

Wait - no one said the world of ideas is illusory. If you go by Berkeley's formulation of subjective idealism, ideas function in accord with a set of laws (much like the laws of nature), and there is an ultimate prime mover, a mind above all others that impresses ideas upon lesser minds. Solipsism would be the extreme in which one believes only their mind exists, and nothing else.

Not the version I once ascribed to. No one ever said there was a singular form of Idealism.

Edit: the main assertion of Idealism is that everything we experience is of a mental nature or that we can only have immediate knowledge of the contents of our mind. Therefore only minds and objects of minds exist, and everything else is effectively a perceptive illusion.

An Interpretist (anti-foundationalist)
There is no real world that we can correctly observe. There are no objective truths in politics, rather interpretations that people use to interpret events, elections, etc.
Is this the epistemological movement that goes by the so-called name of "hermeunetics"? If I recall a criticism of this view it's that it contradicts itself. If there are no objective truths and everything is subjective interpretation, what of meaning does this statement refer to? Either it is an assertion of the sort it rejects, or it is entirely meaningless, contingent and contains no real, immutable truth.

contextualism (as applied to archaeology/anthropology) - there are no universal laws of human society/behaviour, all data must be interpreted with reference to the social context of the observed and the observer. requires a recognition that what may be a 'true' interpretation of the data from one society cannot therefore be said to be true for another society even if the same material/ethnographic/textual etc. evidence is found. also requires that the observer acknowledge any cultural bias that may influence their interpretation of the data. in archaeology this manifests as a skepticism of ethnographic comparisons and a desire to understand individual societies and how they relate to their surroundings/other societies rather than understanding how individual societies compare to other individual societies as this is considered pointless. stands largely in opposition to a positivist epistemology as it also holds that an outsider can never fully appreciate the workings of a culture/society of which they have no (or little) lived experience.

what of meaning does this statement refer to?

Nothing at all.

The truths it excludes are said to be meaningless, and therefore the statement that excludes them need not deal with anything of meaning. It is only meaningful statements, statements that deal with reality itself, that need meet the condition.

HotRodia, your view on morality there looks interesting, so I'll give it my thoughts:

An act, and the circumstances surrounding it are indeed objective. I merely see the "conditions" as finer details of the whole of the act being judged.

Where the subjectivity can be argued to come in is in the judging itself, not the acts or the details being judged. Going by your example, someone stealing something, from where does it follow that it is good/bad to steal, to begin with? Some form of valuing, where certain positive and negative values have been assigned to different things.

Think of those values as coefficients that make one part of a calculation, that which is judged forming the other. The former may vary, the latter not (EDIT: from the perspective of an act being judged. from the perspective of a given moral value set, the opposite would be the case); were multiple judgings of the same situation according to the same data to be made, those parts of the calculation would remain the same. The other, though, depends on the values the judger go by, and can not only differ between different judgers, but also between the same judger at different times. They are volatile.

HotRodia, your view on morality there looks interesting, so I'll give it my thoughts:

An act, and the circumstances surrounding it are indeed objective. I merely see the "conditions" as finer details of the whole of the act being judged.

Where the subjectivity can be argued to come in is in the judging itself, not the acts or the details being judged. Going by your example, someone stealing something, from where does it follow that it is good/bad to steal, to begin with? Some form of valuing, where certain positive and negative values have been assigned to different things.

Is it not objective truth that people have those values? I dare say it's patently obvious where the values come from. They come from objectively real mental states of the moral actor(s).

Unless you're coming from a non-materialist/idealist sort of perspective, but that's a whole 'nother set of problems.

Think of those values as coefficients that make one part of a calculation, that which is judged forming the other. The former may vary, the latter not (EDIT: from the perspective of an act being judged. from the perspective of a given moral value set, the opposite would be the case); were multiple judgings of the same situation according to the same data to be made, those parts of the calculation would remain the same. The other, though, depends on the values the judger go by, and can not only differ between different judgers, but also between the same judger at different times. They are volatile.

That sort of attack might work on an objective absolutist, but not so on an objective relativist.

Remember that my view accounts for this by saying that moral actors are, to varying degrees, limited in their grasp of objectivity. Some moral actors are more objectively correct (about both the larger reality and the specific circumstances of a local reality) than others, which leads to the disparity in moral judgment.

A Positivist (foundationalist)
There is an objective world which we can find out about through observations, experience etc.

An Interpretist (anti-foundationalist)
There is no real world that we can correctly observe. There are no objective truths in politics, rather interpretations that people use to interpret events, elections, etc.

A Realist (mixture)
Like positivists, believe the real world does exist and we can explain politics by making observations, however there are some unobservable structures also.
I'm a sceptic. None of these things are knowable.

I'm a polygamist. I believe there's a real world, and it needs to be overpopulated with mini-me's.

lol

Trilby63;12423522']Is this thread making anybody else feel really stupid?

Mission accomplished.

I'm a sceptic. None of these things are knowable.

Oh, how convenient!

This list is incomplete. There is no option for rationalism. Thus, I cannot participate.

Edit: On second thought, I guess I could choose realism as being part of apriorism.

This list is incomplete. There is no option for rationalism. Thus, I cannot participate.

Option 4: Other/I don't know what you mean/You are fat/Myrth is fat

It would pretty much have to be "missionary," wouldn't it?

Oh, how convenient!
I would prefer to hold only those opinions I have reason to believe are true. None of these qualify.

It would pretty much have to be "missionary," wouldn't it?

Really? You don't go for doggystyle or anything?

I would prefer to hold only those opinions I have reason to believe are true. None of these qualify.

What would you say is truly knowable?

Really? You don't go for doggystyle or anything?

Well, not epistemologically, no. That's more theological ;)

I have a bit of an odd view. To those of you who know me, this may seem like an obvious truth. But anyway...

I do think that there is an objective world, and that it is impossible for us to perceive it with full accuracy. On the other hand, I also hold that a person can, by removing many of the conceptual blinders they have, gain a significantly less limited perception of the objective world.

I also think the objective/subjective distinction is a false one, and that there are merely degrees to which one holds a limited objective perspective.

Furthermore, that our interpretations that we add to our perceptions of objective reality are merely frameworks we apply to it as a means of functioning within it, and we often start to confuse our interpretations with our perceptions, leading us to either believe our interpretations are objectively true or to believe that our perceptions are inherently subjective/distinct from reality.

How do we make the distinction between perception and interpretation?

Is it not objective truth that people have those values? I dare say it's patently obvious where the values come from. They come from objectively real mental states of the moral actor(s).So it is. The existence and nature of the morality is thus objective. The values are not neccessarily meaningful, though, that depending on an objective truth - that of the existence of absolute meaning - that lies beyond our ability to determine, atleast as of now. But that's another question, I know.

That sort of attack might work on an objective absolutist, but not so on an objective relativist.I'm not too surprised. Interesting to see where this is going. I'm not opposed to your view - I'm trying to validate it with the feedback of your clarifications. I suspect it's basically a different implementation of what mine amounts to. If that's the case, I'll probably soon have the dots connected.

Remember that my view accounts for this by saying that moral actors are, to varying degrees, limited in their grasp of objectivity. Some moral actors are more objectively correct (about both the larger reality and the specific circumstances of a local reality) than others, which leads to the disparity in moral judgment.There are two factors here - grasp of that which is judged, and the way it is measured. The way it is measured cannot be tuned to any absolute standard, as one cannot be objectively determined to be true. What remains - going strictly relatively - would mean the values would correspond to goals and desires and apply strictly within their scope.

For example: you desire a person to be healthy. The person is in need of and steals food, and you don't see it as being wrong, it being in accordance with your goal.

Or: a person is irrelevant to your goals. The person is in need of and steals food. The stealing of the food is also irrelevant to your goals. Moral judgement is irrelevant.

Or: you want to get rid of a person. The person dies, and the death of the person does not go against any of your goals. The death of the person is good.

Provided there is no absolute standard, such goals and desires could be pretty much anything without being any more or less correct. (and as it, if otherwise, cannot be determined, there is no way of measuring objective correctness of such - you can merely judge them by how well they in turn fit yours)

Realist here.

Is there any room for a presuppositional theist in this discussion?

The three choices are limiting. Morality presupposes a standard. If the standard is experientially or empirically based then there can be no absolute standard. Logically, morality would be a house built on sand. There is no empirical justification for any statements about how things "should" be that would correlate to reality in a binding way. So logical positivism is bankrupt in its ability to establish morality. Realism degenerates also into skepticism for much the same reason. Our estimation of objectivity is flawed due to problems of perception. Only a system of absolute standards or ideas will produce a consistent morality. Outside of that we have only consensus which is not philosophically speaking and adequate foundation for such a standard. The key question that needs to be asked when evaluating such a position (because the posts have comingled epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics) is "how do we decide to decide?" You must first identify your presuppositions. What are your invoilable standards that are at the foundation of your worldview? Then ask, why those? Eventually you reach a basic ideological presuppositon. Only then can you answer the question.

Only a system of absolute standards or ideas will produce a consistent morality.
Such as Kant's a priori moral theory?

Yes,

Not the standard I ascribe to but that would be an example.

It's really ashame that I took my epistimology class at a time when I wasn't terribly interested in philosophy...

Anyways, I'd say I'm a realist when it comes to the world, but morals and valuation are always tricky. I don't think that actions have the inherent properties of 'rightness' or 'wrongness' - this is contextually dependant. I'm a relativist in this way. I think that my view may mesh well with HotRodia's, actually ;p. Or maybe not, I wasn't paying that much attention =(.

I suppose that is a common view, but does not a persons ethical standards influence the way they view their relationship to said reality. In fact, wouldn't your metaphysics (realism) strongly influence your ethical standards. Even if you do not recognize those linkages I would say that they do. Of course, as humans we are not all that consistent.

this is contextually dependant.

"Contextually dependent" on what?

Such as Kant's a priori moral theory?

By what standard can someone choose betwee mutually contradictory but internally self consistent a priori theories?

Yes,

Not the standard I ascribe to but that would be an example.
What do you ascribe to then?

Then ask, why those?

If what you say is true, isn't that question unanswerable?

You can have no reasons, because you can know nothing but your presuppositions and their implications.

"Contextually dependent" on what?

I mean that I'll judge the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of an action by the reason for which it's being done.

i.e. the example of the starving thief stealing the loaf of bread.

I'm not really in a philosophical mood right now, you'll have to excuse me if I'm making little to no sense ;/.

By looking at their justifications.

Same question then.

I mean that I'll judge the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of an action by the reason for which it's being done.

Then while morality is not an inherent quality of actions, it may still be an inherent quality of intent?

By what standard can someone choose betwee mutually contradictory but internally self consistent a priori theories?

By looking at their justifications.

Well... which one makes sense, and which one doesn't?

So what you like better? Hardly a rigorous standard.

If what you say is true, isn't that question unanswerable?

You can have no reasons, because you can know nothing but your presuppositions and their implications.

Not so if your presupposition is that there is an absolute standard of some kind. From that point it is a matter of evaluating motivation, action, etc. against that standard. For example: Kant's categorical imperitive. Take the concept or standard "dishonesty is wrong". Then there can be no justification for dishonesty ever...it is always wrong under any circumstance. The key is one of trying to consistently live up to the standard. Your very definitions of what is right or wrong are deduced from the axiomatic standards and can be applied to all sorts of ideas and actions.

Same question then.

Well... which one makes sense, and which one doesn't?

Not so if your presupposition is that there is an absolute standard of some kind.

But why that one, and not another?

If they are truly the foundation of your worldview, then from where could you supply a reason to reject any one of them?

Your very definitions of what is right or wrong are deduced from the axiomatic standards and can be applied to all sorts of ideas and actions.

And at what point does this allow us to escape skepticism and say, "This table exists"?

The only way to demonstrate that a presuppositons are invalid is to demonstrate that they lead to necessarilly contradictory conclusions. I may hold to presuppositon A & B. If you can demonstrate that they are contradictory (logically, not in my application or understanding) then they both cannot be valid. Of course, one may not care about all of that but reasoning with such a person is hopeless anyway.

As far as tables go, this is the same thing. A person who holds to a logical positivist approach cannot with certaintly also claim that the table does not shrink when we walk away from it. After all, nobody has ever experienced a table that does not. So that person has to reconcile both views based upon their empirical presupposions. If they cannot, they either have to discard the presupposition or admit that they cannot with certainty know that the table does not shrink.

I don't believe that that's what I said.

Its what it boils down to. Take the Creatism vs. Evolution debate. Person A is a christian and picks creationism because that makes sense. Person B is an atheist and picks evolution because that's what makes sense.

So what you like better?

I don't believe that that's what I said.

Then while morality is not an inherent quality of actions, it may still be an inherent quality of intent?

No, not even. You can pretty much boil this down to me being a moral relativist in the sense that I think that everyone has their own definitions of 'right' and 'wrong', their own boundaries that they will not cross. This is why philosophical moral relativists aren't all maniacal, selfish, amoral bastards (usually... lol). I suppose in some peoples' minds the starving theif may not be justified in stealing the bread.

Maybe 'morality' isn't the right term to use here - an act and its intent are both subject to being able to be judged. Everyone uses their own, uniquely developed scales of morality to decide on the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of the act. Now this doesn't make the act or its intent either inherently right or wrong, it just tells us that the act has the capacity for being judged on one or another scale of morality.

Hope that makes a little more sense, Daily Show is on ;p.

The only way to demonstrate that a presuppositons are invalid is to demonstrate that they lead to necessarilly contradictory conclusions.

Unless one of my presuppositions is "Logical contradictions exist."

Do you think that there's an objectively true set of presuppositions?

Its what it boils down to. Take the Creatism vs. Evolution debate. Person A is a christian and picks creationism because that makes sense. Person B is an atheist and picks evolution because that's what makes sense.

I don't believe Creation v. Evolution is a matter of a priori theory.

And just because people disagree over what makes sense doesn't mean that there is not one objective truth about what makes sense. People disagree over the shape of the Earth, too - does that mean that the shape of the Earth is not demonstrable?

I don't believe Creation v. Evolution is a matter of a priori theory.

And just because people disagree over what makes sense doesn't mean that there is not one objective truth about what makes sense. People disagree over the shape of the Earth, too - does that mean that the shape of the Earth is not demonstrable?

It was an ananlogy. If reasonable people can differ on what makes sense then what makes sense is not a good standard to apply to prove the objective truth of beliefs.

Trilby63;12423522']Is this thread making anybody else feel really stupid?
No, my kernel-thread was posted for that reason!

It was an ananlogy. If reasonable people can differ on what makes sense then what makes sense is not a good standard to apply to prove the objective truth of beliefs.
No one said this will prove their objective truth. People will disagree, as Soheran said. Zegelekase made mention of a consistent morality, not an objectively true one.

If reasonable people can differ on what makes sense then what makes sense is not a good standard to apply to prove the objective truth of beliefs.

That doesn't follow. Reasonable people disagree over all sorts of things. It doesn't follow that the truth about all of those things is fundamentally subjective.

Reasonable people, for instance, disagree over empirical facts. Does that mean that empirical facts cannot be used to shore up a position?

No one said this will prove their objective truth. People will disagree, as Soheran said. Zegelekase made mention of a consistent morality, not an objectively true one.

And so I asked by what standard do you choose from different a priori systems.

That doesn't follow. Reasonable people disagree over all sorts of things. It doesn't follow that the truth about all of those things is fundamentally subjective.

Reasonable people, for instance, disagree over empirical facts. Does that mean that empirical facts cannot be used to shore up a position?

You seem to be under the impression that I disagree with the above. I dont. However you did say that what makes sense is the standard to judge between the justifications of different a priori theories. As both of us agree people can disagree with what makes sense then that isn't a good standard to judge the truth of different justifications.

I am interpretionist. Well, I think we can not reach truth in hard science, but only approach it. In moral and 'soft issues' our children's children will laugh about our explanations anyways ...

However you did say that what makes sense is the standard to judge between the justifications of different a priori theories.

Indeed, that is what I said.

As both of us agree people can disagree with what makes sense then that isn't a good standard to judge the truth of different justifications.

Just because "people can disagree" about something doesn't mean that it isn't a good standard.

Peoplle disagree about empirical facts, about what follows logically from certain premises, and lots of other things all the time. That doesn't mean that empirical evidence and logic don't provide objective truth, or that they can't, properly used, be utilized to decide between different positions. The same thing applies to "what makes sense."

Sometimes people disagree because the tool doesn't provide objective truth, yes, but other times people disagree because PEOPLE, not the tool, are fallible.

Just because "people can disagree" about something doesn't mean that it isn't a good standard.

Peoplle disagree about empirical facts, about what follows logically from certain premises, and lots of other things all the time. That doesn't mean that empirical evidence and logic don't provide objective truth, or that they can't, properly used, be utilized to decide between different positions. The same thing applies to "what makes sense."

Sometimes people disagree because the tool doesn't provide objective truth, yes, but other times people disagree because PEOPLE, not the tool, are fallible.

My point is that logic, empirical evidence, and any other tool to help explain the world are limited. They rest on some system on self-consistent axioms, but none of these axioms can be proven.

Been doing some basic epistemology and ontology stuff at uni. Honestly, I think it is a waste of time, but I thought I'd see if the forum could make it interesting.

So what are ya', ****?

Here are some bastardised and most probably completely incorrect descriptions of the basic schools of thought.

A Positivist (foundationalist)
There is an objective world which we can find out about through observations, experience etc.

An Interpretist (anti-foundationalist)
There is no real world that we can correctly observe. There are no objective truths in politics, rather interpretations that people use to interpret events, elections, etc.

A Realist (mixture)
Like positivists, believe the real world does exist and we can explain politics by making observations, however there are some unobservable structures also.

Realist with a streak of pragmatism.

Epistemology is also one of the few branches of philosophy I don't particularly care about.

Same here.

Realist, I think. :confused:

A Positivist (foundationalist)
There is an objective world which we can find out about through observations, experience etc.

An Interpretist (anti-foundationalist)
There is no real world that we can correctly observe. There are no objective truths in politics, rather interpretations that people use to interpret events, elections, etc.

A Realist (mixture)
Like positivists, believe the real world does exist and we can explain politics by making observations, however there are some unobservable structures also.

Depends on what you mean by "objective," "world," "find out," "experience," "real," and "exist."

Trilby63;12423522']Is this thread making anybody else feel really stupid?

*psst* You're probably the smart one.

Depends on what you mean by "objective," "world," "find out," "experience," "real," and "exist."

Not to mention "the".

A sort of positivist, with heavy Kantian and Galileian influences, and a bit of Aristoteles. Plus, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The behaviour of the universe as a phainomenon can be described with a somewhat reduced set of physical laws, expressed in mathematical form. (Galilei).
Anyway, quantum mechanics is about observables and probability densities, not "real" objects, by "real" meaning as an apple. (ultrasimplified). Hence, observables are real (and they are described by real numbers and self-adjoint operators) but particles aren't - they're just distributions, mathematical expressions, hence noumena, not phainomena.
Noumena are objects of thought only. Use the aristotelian "cave": the objects projecting shadows are the particles, our idea about the objects is the probability density, the shadows are the observables. Yet, there is no "universal" idea, because there is no (need for) an universal mind.

Ok, stop, my head is aching.

A sort of positivist, with heavy Kantian and Galileian influences, and a bit of Aristoteles. Plus, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The behaviour of the universe as a phainomenon can be described with a somewhat reduced set of physical laws, expressed in mathematical form. (Galilei).
Anyway, quantum mechanics is about observables and probability densities, not "real" objects, by "real" meaning as an apple. (ultrasimplified). Hence, observables are real (and they are described by real numbers and self-adjoint operators) but particles aren't - they're just distributions, mathematical expressions, hence noumena, not phainomena.
Noumena are objects of thought only. Use the aristotelian "cave": the objects projecting shadows are the particles, our idea about the objects is the probability density, the shadows are the observables. Yet, there is no "universal" idea, because there is no (need for) an universal mind.

http://i18.photobucket.com/albums/b106/funkytano/File0411.jpg

there is a real world out there somewhere. whether it bears the slightest resemblence to anything we immagine it to is anybody's guess.

it is the source of what we experience, but not of how we experience it.

we can observe that it prevents the attempt of nothing. rather that is to say, prevents no attempt at anything. and equaly not the collapse of anything either.

we can feel certain things to be real, and perhapse some of them are as well.
inert objects certain seem to be.

and if i see something moving in my direction i'm going to get out of the way of it and worry about what it might or might not have been later rather then reamaining in its path to debate its nature.

i also seem/feel to have observed, that whatever else may or may not exist, it does very much seem to be up to ourselves, to avoid screwing everything up for each other.

and i really think it's this last that is what matters.
and is worth more then anything we might otherwise immagine ourselves to gain at its expense.

=^^=
.../\...

First, I'm curious as to why you see the intent of the moral actor as a morally relevant detail, but I'll grant that it is right from the start.

If the intent had no bearing onthe matter then we could say for sure wheter stealing or not was immoral, and so it would certinaly be objective. But if I steal because I am hungry, or if I steal for greed, there is a differance.

We can't really just say all stealing is immoral we have to look at the circumstances, and it is that very fact that makes morality subjective.



If we assume that intent is relevant, then how do we get to intent being subjective? Isn't the person's intent simply a complex series of chemical reactions in their brain, an objective part of reality?

Yes for sure the biology is certianly objective, what is subjective though is what the mind does with the data.

We can have a piece of data, and show it to say a 1000 people, and more or less garentee that what these people make out of the data will not all the same. The physical brain is objective, the phsyche of our species is subjective.

How do we make the distinction between perception and interpretation?

Pretty simply. Any interpretation will have a concept or multiple concepts attached to it. Perception, by itself, will not.

So it is. The existence and nature of the morality is thus objective. The values are not neccessarily meaningful, though, that depending on an objective truth - that of the existence of absolute meaning - that lies beyond our ability to determine, atleast as of now. But that's another question, I know.

I'm not too surprised. Interesting to see where this is going. I'm not opposed to your view - I'm trying to validate it with the feedback of your clarifications. I suspect it's basically a different implementation of what mine amounts to. If that's the case, I'll probably soon have the dots connected.

There are two factors here - grasp of that which is judged, and the way it is measured. The way it is measured cannot be tuned to any absolute standard, as one cannot be objectively determined to be true. What remains - going strictly relatively - would mean the values would correspond to goals and desires and apply strictly within their scope.

For example: you desire a person to be healthy. The person is in need of and steals food, and you don't see it as being wrong, it being in accordance with your goal.

Or: a person is irrelevant to your goals. The person is in need of and steals food. The stealing of the food is also irrelevant to your goals. Moral judgement is irrelevant.

Or: you want to get rid of a person. The person dies, and the death of the person does not go against any of your goals. The death of the person is good.

Provided there is no absolute standard, such goals and desires could be pretty much anything without being any more or less correct. (and as it, if otherwise, cannot be determined, there is no way of measuring objective correctness of such - you can merely judge them by how well they in turn fit yours)

Very good. All objective, and all quite relative.

If the intent had no bearing onthe matter then we could say for sure wheter stealing or not was immoral, and so it would certinaly be objective. But if I steal because I am hungry, or if I steal for greed, there is a differance.

We can't really just say all stealing is immoral we have to look at the circumstances, and it is that very fact that makes morality subjective.

No, that would make morality relative. You'd need to go much farther to make it subjective.

Yes for sure the biology is certianly objective, what is subjective though is what the mind does with the data.

We can have a piece of data, and show it to say a 1000 people, and more or less garentee that what these people make out of the data will not all the same. The physical brain is objective, the phsyche of our species is subjective.

So you believe that there is more to the mind than the brain?

Pretty simply. Any interpretation will have a concept or multiple concepts attached to it. Perception, by itself, will not.

I understand your definition of the two, rather I am asking how can we know what thoughts fit each definition?

How can we percieve the qualities that make an interpretation an interpretation and not mere perception or vice versa?

On another tangent, is it even possible for us to process a sensation without applying preexisting conceptions. If a great portion (if not all, the battle is still being waged) of our knowledge is retained experiences, how can we take any perception and process it into truth without relying on concepts?


EDIT: In the end, it is hard for me to reject the idea that there is an objective reality with all participants operating from their own subjective viewpoints of this reality (even if I don't think I would accept any proof of this), and I would like to believe that repeated confirmation of perception can establish knowledge approaching truth, but I remain an interpretationist in believing that there is no way that one can process a perception without applying preexisting (and likely wrong) concepts to the perception.

Positivist.
There is nothing in the universe that a being of sufficient intelligence could not understand.

What would you say is truly knowable?
Uncertainty is knowable.

The conclusions drawn by sound axiomatic systems are knowable.

Not to mention "the".

That one I'm comfortable with.

No, that would make morality relative. You'd need to go much farther to make it subjective.

Okay I can agree with that.


So you believe that there is more to the mind than the brain?

Ohhh yes certianly. I am a religious man, but lets leave that aside and concentrate for a while on the properties of self, or the I if you like.

That I am differant from you is no great shock we are all afterall quite uniqe, my personality will be differant to yours, no matter what thoughts and feelings we hold in common. This is of course all down to brain, or more importantly the unique chemial/electrical happenings within the brain, I'm sure that we can agree on this?


It has been shown that via drugs, or accident that a chanege in personality can occour, again because of the chemical and neurological happenings in the brain. It has also been shown that we can effect such a change for ourselves in accordance with our will.

I would ask then, from where does this will, or intent come?

bum

bum

Hehh quite apt for your 666th post!

I understand your definition of the two, rather I am asking how can we know what thoughts fit each definition?

How can we percieve the qualities that make an interpretation an interpretation and not mere perception or vice versa?

You would have to perceive them directly, without conceptual matrices being applied. Essentially, what it requires is the temporary abandonment of concepts during one's experience of one's own thoughts or anything else one wishes to perceive more clearly.

On another tangent, is it even possible for us to process a sensation without applying preexisting conceptions. If a great portion (if not all, the battle is still being waged) of our knowledge is retained experiences, how can we take any perception and process it into truth without relying on concepts?

I'd say that you're correct in that concepts are required to process our perceptions. Like you, I'm simply resigned to that fact. But I don't think the initial perception has to be shaped by them. I would suggest that your assumption that processing is required for truth is a seriously questionable and problematic one.

Ohhh yes certianly. I am a religious man, but lets leave that aside and concentrate for a while on the properties of self, or the I if you like.

Fair enough. I'm a very religious man myself, so I doubt bringing religion into our discussion would present much of a problem, but as you wish.

That I am differant from you is no great shock we are all afterall quite uniqe, my personality will be differant to yours, no matter what thoughts and feelings we hold in common. This is of course all down to brain, or more importantly the unique chemial/electrical happenings within the brain, I'm sure that we can agree on this?

Quite right.

It has been shown that via drugs, or accident that a chanege in personality can occour, again because of the chemical and neurological happenings in the brain. It has also been shown that we can effect such a change for ourselves in accordance with our will.

I would ask then, from where does this will, or intent come?

The question of where it comes from would probably lead us back to religion, so I'll just describe what it is. This will or intent you mention (and other apparently non-physical properties of the mind) is the relational mechanism between the body and the complex brain we have. Much like gravity is the relational mechanism between massive bodies, the will (I prefer to call it consciousness) is the relational mechanism between body and brain. Like gravity, we cannot physically see the will, cannot touch it, cannot measure it with our tools. But we know that it is there because we can see its effects and use it for our ends.

That one I'm comfortable with.

That makes one of us.

Only a system of absolute standards or ideas will produce a consistent morality.

No way.
You can found a consistent moral (not necessarily ethical) system on utility and empathy.

A sketch:

I want to survive. (this isn't an absolute: it's my decision)
In order for me to survive, my similars are needed. (this isn't an absolute: it's utility, hence relative)
They also want to survive. (this is empathy: I guess that my similars share my needs and hopes)
Hence, we have to form a society. (this is experience, hence not absolute)
Anything that is furthers the ends of this society is allowed. Anything that prevents the society from reaching the common goal of survival isn't allowed.

Here, you have a sketch of a moral code based on utility and empathy, instead than absolutes.

It has been shown that via drugs, or accident that a chanege in personality can occour, again because of the chemical and neurological happenings in the brain. It has also been shown that we can effect such a change for ourselves in accordance with our will.

I would ask then, from where does this will, or intent come?
From the brain. There is absolutely no contradiction in the fact that what occurs in the brain can change how the brain functions. Changes in the brain can change our personality, and our personality can lead us to induce changes in our brain.

This is no different than how our consciousness can lead us to want to change any other part of our body, and we can manifest our will through both direct, conscious actions and less direct or even unconscious activities.

I am endlessly confused by the way so many people view the brain as not a part of the body, or the mind as something other than the body. Your brain is part of your body. Your consciousness is a product of your brain, which is part of your body. There is no need for dualism here.

I am endlessly confused by the way so many people view the brain as not a part of the body, or the mind as something other than the body. Your brain is part of your body. Your consciousness is a product of your brain, which is part of your body. There is no need for dualism here.

I don't get confused by that so much. I think it has to do with the dualism of the Greeks and Christians influencing Western culture.

What I tend to be more confused by is that some folks can't seem to believe that consciousness can be more than the brain while still being very much a part of our material universe. Maybe it's the trend towards physicalism influencing scientific believers, but I'm not sure yet.

From the brain. There is absolutely no contradiction in the fact that what occurs in the brain can change how the brain functions. Changes in the brain can change our personality, and our personality can lead us to induce changes in our brain.

This is no different than how our consciousness can lead us to want to change any other part of our body, and we can manifest our will through both direct, conscious actions and less direct or even unconscious activities.

I am endlessly confused by the way so many people view the brain as not a part of the body, or the mind as something other than the body. Your brain is part of your body. Your consciousness is a product of your brain, which is part of your body. There is no need for dualism here.

Hey Bottle,

Naaaa what I mean is from where does the intent to change personality come from.

I agree that personality is due to the chemical/electircal happenings in the brain. If though I decide one day to give up smoking and by my will do this.

In a real way I have brought about a chemical change in my brain, what though is resposible for bith the want to change, and the will to do it.

Is it really one set of chemicals in some way communicating with another?

The key thing is 'in accordance with my will'

I want to survive. (this isn't an absolute: it's my decision)

It's the underlying foundation of your moral system. How is it not an absolute?

Anything that is furthers the ends of this society is allowed. Anything that prevents the society from reaching the common goal of survival isn't allowed.

Provided the underlying foundation is adhered to. Ayn Rand tried to circumvent the is/ought gap using this reasoning (that survival is universally valued, therefore any moral system should be centred around this). It's a good attempt, but it's no different to any other moral system - they are all based on an absolute that is their foundation.

That makes one of us.

:D

Always.

You would have to perceive them directly, without conceptual matrices being applied. Essentially, what it requires is the temporary abandonment of concepts during one's experience of one's own thoughts or anything else one wishes to perceive more clearly.

I'd say that you're correct in that concepts are required to process our perceptions. Like you, I'm simply resigned to that fact. But I don't think the initial perception has to be shaped by them. I would suggest that your assumption that processing is required for truth is a seriously questionable and problematic one.

Initial perceptions may give us truth in a sense, but they do not give us any utilizable truth. In other words, we may have exact raw data, but raw data must be understood for it to be truth we can use.

This process of understanding, unless you can show that there is some a priori system that describes the true nature of reality, is entirely subjective and dependent upon prior (mis)conceptions.

I haven't studied this field in depth yet, but from those descriptions, I would say I am a realist. I believe that the things that we observe are real, at least real for all practical purposes. But there may be concepts and things that cannot be observed by humans, that really exist, as well.

Thinks like poltics, morality etc are human ideas and so wholey subjective.

Wrong.

You would do well to familiarize yourself with the writings of the eminent 20th-century Russian-American philosopher Ayn Rand.

Wrong.

You would do well to familiarize yourself with the writings of the eminent 20th-century Russian-American philosopher Ayn Rand.
Rand was certainly an intelligent woman. What I wonder is why her followers never seem to be able to offer her arguments to those they preach to, something she'd most definitely have done.To do otherwise is to discredit her.

Rand was certainly an intelligent woman. What I wonder is why her followers never seem to be able to offer her arguments to those they preach to, something she'd most definitely have done.To do otherwise is to discredit her.

Certainly.

I just use that line to decide whether or not it's worth my time to do so.

Most people who see that will respond with "OMG AYN RAND WAS A FASCIST! AYN RAND WAS HITLER! AYN RAND WAS AN IDIOT! HER IDEAS ARE SO LAUGHABLE!" Those people clearly cannot be reasoned with, so I don't waste my time.

But those who actually bother to post a counter-argument are worthwhile.

I like to filter out the idiots right away, so I waste as little time as possible.

Most people who see that will respond with "OMG AYN RAND WAS A FASCIST! AYN RAND WAS HITLER! AYN RAND WAS AN IDIOT! HER IDEAS ARE SO LAUGHABLE!" Those people clearly cannot be reasoned with, so I don't waste my time.
Fair enough. Individuals who can't muster much more than an ad hominem attack against her are indeed not worthwhile responding to.

Atlas Shrugged contained more truth than not.

My criticism would be simply that Rand's characters are all a little one dimensional.

Atlas Shrugged contained more truth than not.

My criticism would be simply that Rand's characters are all a little one dimensional.

Ridiculously so.

It is little more than a fantasy book with Rand idolizing mythical "super-rational" beings.

Ridiculously so.

It is little more than a fantasy book with Rand idolizing mythical "super-rational" beings.
Rand had always believed fiction ought to be over the top and supersede the boundaries of mundane life. It's one of the aspects of her work I enjoyed most.

Ridiculously so.

It is little more than a fantasy book with Rand idolizing mythical "super-rational" beings.

Well, to be fair, it was a fantasy/sci-fi book.

Some bits do ring very true however. The deification of intellectual sniping over actual results for example. And for that, I can forgive it a lot.

The fountainhead was a better read though.

Well, to be fair, it was a fantasy/sci-fi book.

Some bits do ring very true however. The deification of intellectual sniping over actual results for example. And for that, I can forgive it a lot.

The fountainhead was a better read though.

The only Rand book I ever read was Anthem.

The only Rand book I ever read was Anthem.

I think the Glass Bead Game says more about the twentieth century than Atlas Shrugged. Despite that, a lot of the conclusions are similar I think.

Rand was certainly an intelligent woman.

Yes, and most of those who subscribe to the religion she founded are intelligent too.

Unfortunately, this says very little about the coherence of their positions - especially since, like her, most of her followers are egotistical and close-minded as well.

Unfortunately, this says very little about the coherence of their positions - especially since, like her, most of her followers are egotistical and close-minded as well.

Case in point, Alan Greenscam.

Mind you no-one has a coherent position, so it's a bit of a moot point.

Mind you no-one has a coherent position, so it's a bit of a moot point.

No one's positions, added together, form a fully coherent whole, no.

But not only are some positions more coherent than others nevertheless, but specific positions on specific questions can indeed be coherent.

Damn it.

I was just getting into this thread and three posts later in devolves into a discussion about a woman who, along with her philosophy, I care nothing about.

Damn it.

I was just getting into this thread and three posts later in devolves into a discussion about a woman who, along with her philosophy, I care nothing about.

Yeah, let's get back on track:

If it is okay to steal a loaf of bread if you're starving, is it okay to steal jam to go on it?

If it is okay to steal a loaf of bread if you're starving, is it okay to steal jam to go on it?

Depends on the circumstances.

The pressing need of your survival has already been satisfied, so probably not.

Damn it.

I was just getting into this thread and three posts later in devolves into a discussion about a woman who, along with her philosophy, I care nothing about.

I would think most women would prefer the procedure to having the baby push through, unassisted. Does that make me a positivist?

Depends on the circumstances.

The pressing need of your survival has already been satisfied, so probably not.

Bart: Uh, say, are you guys crooks?
Tony: Bart, um, is it wrong to steal a loaf of bread to feed your starving family?
Bart: No.
Tony: Well, suppose you got a large starving family. Is it wrong to steal a truckload of bread to feed them?
Bart: Uh uh.
Tony: And, what if your family don't like bread? They like... cigarettes?
Bart: I guess that's okay.
Tony: Now, what if instead of giving them away, you sold them at a price that was practically giving them away. Would that be a crime, Bart?
Bart: Hell, no!

Might makes Right as an epistemological argument.

It's what it boils down to, each time.

Might makes Right as an epistemological argument.

It's what it boils down to, each time.

How do you know?