NationStates Jolt Archive

This is primarily a continuation of a debate between Similization and myself in another thread regarding the objectivity and accuracy of science, but I welcome the input of others to what will hopefully be a very interesting discussion.

I'm going to assume the general correctness of science in the sense that it is an appropriate method, as a whole, for acquiring meaningful and generally accurate propositions about the physical nature of our world. Partially because that's what I think, and partially because Sim proposed that it would be better to discuss the issue with that assumption.

So let's go ahead and look at more specific aspects of scientific methodology.

First, the Problems with a capital P.

Induction and Causation are often used as central aspects of scientific methodology, and though there have been some successful attempts to avoid using causation as part of scientific explanation, induction is ubiquitous in scientific methodology and so far as I know the old problem of induction has never been dealt with properly despite numerous attempts. Add to that the new and dicier problem of induction regarding grue, and it looks like science may need a new approach based on something other than induction.

Hume, an atheist Scottish philosopher, had some pretty devastating critiques of both causation and induction that are real buggers. His conclusion was that causation and induction are habits of our minds and even though there is nothing to support them empirically, they are a practical necessity for us. For more information on Hume, see here (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/).

So do you, like Hume, take the position that Induction and Causation are simply practical necessities that have no empirical base? Because I happen to be in agreement with him on that, and I'll defend that position in the discussion. If you can empirically ground induction (the general idea that the future will resemble the past in terms of the underlying mechanisms that we observe in reality) and causation (the general idea that there is a necessary connection between some events and other events), then how are you doing so?

If anyone wants to discuss methodological naturalism and mechanism as problematic basic assumptions of science, I'm open to that as well, though my current focus is more the Humean objections.

I'll get to the points about scientific theories and explanations once we've covered the basic problems or run the debate on them into the ground, whichever happens first. Keep in mind that I have limited time to respond to lengthy posts given my RL schedule, so please don't take it personally if it takes me a while to get back to you or if I choose not to respond at all.

If our expectations of cause and effect work, does it really matter if they exist empirically or not? It seems irrelevant that their empirical existence can't be established because they do have practical benefits and effects.

I mean, we can predict the weather or the likelihood of a recession based upon the data, and despite the fact that cause and effect are human constructs, we are capable of foreseeing these events (and others) with a fairly high degree of confidence. I don't think anyone would consider disregarding a weather report or an economic forecast because cause and effect have no empirical basis.

It really seems like an irrelevant argument, actually. I don't see how it would matter, given that we will experience events that have seeming causes and effects regardless of whether they exist or not.

Allow me to start by saying that this sounds like it could be an incredibly interesting discussion. I will most likely take a peripheral position on this one, as I am not incredibly educated in the subjects on the table, though I will attempt some contributions once I read a little more into the matter (google is your friend, and my google-fu largely goes to waste outside of topics like this).

My opening stance, which is a tentative one, would be that Hume is on the ball as regards to induction, as it seems that induction is based on perception of the mechanics, and that perception will change as new information is uncovered, but I may not be in full agreement with his discounting causation. The idea that some events are connected to other events strikes me as common sense. Can this be reasoned empirically, though? Let me google a few things for a little bit and I'll see what I can come up with.

That's just my first impression. It may alter when I've looked at the matter more thoroughly.

btw-did Darwin Days have anything to do with the start of this discussion?

I don't get it. What is the problem with science? If I drop a rock, it falls down. It does not float to the ceiling. The fact that it falls down is empirical evidence. This can be repeated with the same results ad infinitum. What is the problem with creating a law of gravity based on this fact?

I don't get it. What is the problem with science? If I drop a rock, it falls down. It does not float to the ceiling. The fact that it falls down is empirical evidence. This can be repeated with the same results ad infinitum. What is the problem with creating a law of gravity based on this fact?

How do you know that just because the rock has fallen x times in the past that it will fall in the future? You can generate a descriptive structure for the past through empirical evidence but you have no basis, rational basis that is, for extending this into predictive framework that describes the future.

What we do have is a need to be able to at least believe we can predict what will happen in the future from our past experience. This is the conclusion then the scottish atheist drew, and one that I agree with as well. inductive reasoning is not rational, in the strictest sense of the word, but it is essential to our being able to lead our everyday lives. As such we use it, and we come to depend on it. It is no surprise then that we try to extend it into formulating 'laws' that purport to predict the future behaviour of the world around us.

It happens that we are very good at pattern recognition, (something to do with the way our brains work) and as such we tend to see patterns that function reliably. However just because they are functionally efficient does not mean that the rules for generating the pattern are the actual rules of whatever passes for reality. Newtonian mechanics worked reliably for centuries (in fact it is still functionally reliable within a range of scales) but we found that mercury was in the wrong place and as such we had to throw it out and invent a new set of rules that 'accounted for the phenomena' - In this case it was quantum physics and relativity (Incompatible I know) that replaced the old pattern.

The problem is that you do not know that 'this can be repeated ad infinitum'. You only know, and can ever know that every time you tried it it worked (It may surprise you yet)

Well, if you go by Popper, a scientific theory is held to be possible until there is one example that violates its predictions. For instance, general relativity is held as being probable, but not absolutely true, until we perform an experiement that shows it doesn't work.
If you hold that all theories are provisional, then the problem of induction doesn't really come in.

If pure rational science should not be based on experience, then what should it be based on? Is there a methology that is more accurate than trial and error?

Well, if you go by Popper, a scientific theory is held to be possible until there is one example that violates its predictions. For instance, general relativity is held as being probable, but not absolutely true, until we perform an experiement that shows it doesn't work.

If you hold that all theories are provisional, then the problem of induction doesn't really come in.

A couple of quick points:

1. How many scientists or believers in science hold the Law of Gravity as provisionally true? How many would, if confronted with a repeated anti-gravitational phenomenon, say, "Oh shit, the law of gravity is wrong." rather than "Well there must be something here we don't understand yet that is still in keeping with our current understanding of physics."

2. The problem of induction is still very much there. You see, the problem of induction doesn't go away if you replace "certainty" with "probable" or "best guess". You just get a different version of the same circular argument that Hume talked about:

(1) We have been able to generalize from past experiments to future events to get probable predictive claims.
(2) Induction is generalizing from past experiments to future events to get probable predictive claims.
-------------
(C) Therefore induction works. (ie. We can generalize from past experiments to future events to get probable predictive claims.)

A couple of quick points:

1. How many scientists or believers in science hold the Law of Gravity as provisionally true? How many would, if confronted with a repeated anti-gravitational phenomenon, say, "Oh shit, the law of gravity is wrong." rather than "Well there must be something here we don't understand yet that is still in keeping with our current understanding of physics."
Well, there really isn't a "law of gravity" anymore. General relativity is a theory that explains gravitational phenomenon and Newton's idea of gravity is only used for the purposes of approximations, it doesn't even explain the precession of Mercury's perihelion.
At any rate, if an experiment showed that the current theory of general relativity was wrong then it would have to be abandoned or modified to fit with all the previous experimental results as well as the results from the new experiment. A lot of physicists would dream of being able to come up with a theory that's better than GR.
And at any rate, while I may just be an undergraduate student, I hold the current theories to be rather provisional.

2. The problem of induction is still very much there. You see, the problem of induction doesn't go away if you replace "certainty" with "probable" or "best guess". You just get a different version of the same circular argument that Hume talked about:

(1) We have been able to generalize from past experiments to future events to get probable predictive claims.
(2) Induction is generalizing from past experiments to future events to get probable predictive claims.
-------------
(C) Therefore induction works. (ie. We can generalize from past experiments to future events to get probable predictive claims.)
Maybe, I think that saying that since the sun has risen every day in my memory, it's probable that it will rise tomorrow is totally different from saying it will rise tomorrow. It's likely, but not certain.

Do scientists know your mom is the missing link they've been looking for all these years?

I'm sorry. I can't be serious.

C-C-C-COMBO BREAKER!

I looked that up. It still doesn't make any sense.

Do scientists know your mom is the missing link they've been looking for all these years?

C-C-C-COMBO BREAKER!

I looked that up. It still doesn't make any sense.

All I know is you use it when someone posts something unrelated to the content of the posts above it.

I geuss there are problems with science, but I contend that science is still the greatest tool for understanding in all of human history. Certainly better than religion. I await the day when traditional inductive scientific logic is eclipsed by an even greater understanding. Until then, on with science baby.

As mentioned in the other thread, I'm rather ignorant of the subject & know fuck-all about Hume, but.. I have a few thoughts all the same. I've yet read up on him, by the way. I'd appreciate if you'd link to the appropriate bits or past something, so I won't have to cuise through page upon page of his political leanings, travels & opinions on Tandori.I'm going to assume the general correctness of science in the sense that it is an appropriate method, as a whole, for acquiring meaningful and generally accurate propositions about the physical nature of our world. Partially because that's what I think, and partially because Sim proposed that it would be better to discuss the issue with that assumption.What is it we're assuming exactly?

Induction and Causation are often used as central aspects of scientific methodology, and though there have been some successful attempts to avoid using causation as part of scientific explanation, induction is ubiquitous in scientific methodology and so far as I know the old problem of induction has never been dealt with properly despite numerous attempts. Add to that the new and dicier problem of induction regarding grue, and it looks like science may need a new approach based on something other than induction.Being the thoroughly ignorant sod that I am, it's quite possible I'll be making an ass out of myself in a moment. But... Induction? It looks to me we're talking about time. The way I see it, time is a wholly arbitrary measure we've invented, similar to the meters, liters & kelvin. The difference is it isn't readily apparent what we measure with it.

I am of the opinion that universal deterministic causality is nothing more than a hypothesis. It clearly happens a lot, and it's the basis for things like relativity & this thing we call time, but evidence suggests it's not a universal law. Mass-less shit can & do violate deterministic causality all the time, for example. Even things like spatial dimensions do it, by the looks of things (otherwise this place'd arguably be rather blinding right now).

I don't know & don't agree it's an assumption of the methodology itself. In certain circumstances seems to be valid & in others, it doesn't. I'm not gonna claim anyone knows why, but I fail to understand how that's an issue of methodology.

The more basic assumption about causality I consider moot. If it's there, it'll be evident through falsification. If it isn't, it won't be. Whether this means everything can be explained mechanically (because causality is a universal law) or not (because it isn't), will either become apparent or remain a mystery. Either way, I don't see how it's problematic. A limitation, yes, but different tools have different uses. It's not like a hammer'll break 'cos you try to play violin with it, and in this particular case, the violin probably won't either.What we do have is a need to be able to at least believe we can predict what will happen in the future from our past experience. This is the conclusion then the scottish atheist drew, and one that I agree with as well. inductive reasoning is not rational, in the strictest sense of the word, but it is essential to our being able to lead our everyday lives.But is that even apllicable? It looks like a strawman to me. If deterministic causality is a universal law, it'll never be violated & thus any prediction based on it will be correct. If it isn't a universal law, then it'll eventually be falsified & theories altered to accomodate the situation. If causality in itself is wrong, then there'll simply be a limit to what science can explain. Whether that limitation will be evident is a damn good question, but it doesn't change what science can explain.

Like I said, I don't really see the problem.

As mentioned in the other thread, I'm rather ignorant of the subject & know fuck-all about Hume, but.. I have a few thoughts all the same. I've yet read up on him, by the way. I'd appreciate if you'd link to the appropriate bits or past something, so I won't have to cuise through page upon page of his political leanings, travels & opinions on Tandori.What is it we're assuming exactly?

Being the thoroughly ignorant sod that I am, it's quite possible I'll be making an ass out of myself in a moment. But... Induction? It looks to me we're talking about time. The way I see it, time is a wholly arbitrary measure we've invented, similar to the meters, liters & kelvin. The difference is it isn't readily apparent what we measure with it.

I am of the opinion that universal deterministic causality is nothing more than a hypothesis. It clearly happens a lot, and it's the basis for things like relativity & this thing we call time, but evidence suggests it's not a universal law. Mass-less shit can & do violate deterministic causality all the time, for example. Even things like spatial dimensions do it, by the looks of things (otherwise this place'd arguably be rather blinding right now).

I don't know & don't agree it's an assumption of the methodology itself. In certain circumstances seems to be valid & in others, it doesn't. I'm not gonna claim anyone knows why, but I fail to understand how that's an issue of methodology.

The more basic assumption about causality I consider moot. If it's there, it'll be evident through falsification. If it isn't, it won't be. Whether this means everything can be explained mechanically (because causality is a universal law) or not (because it isn't), will either become apparent or remain a mystery. Either way, I don't see how it's problematic. A limitation, yes, but different tools have different uses. It's not like a hammer'll break 'cos you try to play violin with it, and in this particular case, the violin probably won't either.But is that even apllicable? It looks like a strawman to me. If deterministic causality is a universal law, it'll never be violated & thus any prediction based on it will be correct. If it isn't a universal law, then it'll eventually be falsified & theories altered to accomodate the situation. If causality in itself is wrong, then there'll simply be a limit to what science can explain. Whether that limitation will be evident is a damn good question, but it doesn't change what science can explain.

Like I said, I don't really see the problem.

Wow, I don't know whats going on anymore. What are we talking about?

Wow, I don't know whats going on anymore. What are we talking about?I've been wondering the same. But it seemed we're talking deterministic causality/time. My response was based around my opinion that the methodology doesn't make these assumptions at all, but rather seek to falsify them. Whether or not it can be used for the purpose is a different fish of barrels.

So do you, like Hume, take the position that Induction and Causation are simply practical necessities that have no empirical base?
I'm a big fan of Humean empiricism, so I'm with him on that. Induction has no place in reason, and thus no place in science.

Ow! Fire hot. 50% error
Ow! Fire hot. 25% error
Ow! Fire hot. 12.5% error
Ow! Fire hot. 6.25% error
Ow! Fire hot. 3.125% error
Ow! Fire hot. 1.5625% error
Ow! Fire hot. .078125% error
Ow! Fire hot. .390625% error
Ow! Fire hot. .1953125% error
Ow! Fire hot. .09765562% error
Ow! Fire hot. .0488281% error
Ow! Fire hot. .024414% error
Ow! Fire hot. .012207% error
Ow! Fire hot. .0061035% error
Ow! Fire hot. .0030517% error
Ow! Fire hot. .0015258% error
Ow! Fire hot. .0007629% error
etc.............................

Does the % error ever reach 0?
No.
Is this information still useful?
Yes.

If there is no causality, then we cannot have any knowledge of future events. This would mean that there is no reason for us to act one way or another. If there is no causality, why not jump off of a building (since you have no knowledge that you will fall to the ground and die)? I don't see any philosophers doing this out of this conviction.

A couple of quick points:

1. How many scientists or believers in science hold the Law of Gravity as provisionally true?If they understand the foundations of their own knowledge, all of them. In reality, probably not so many. But I think the problem here is a misunderstanding about what "provisionally true" actually means. It does not mean the same thing as "suspect." Rather, it means something more like "possibly untrue." In other words, a good scientist is open to the possibility that the Law of Gravity as we know it might someday turn out to be less useful than some competing theory: How many would, if confronted with a repeated anti-gravitational phenomenon, say, "Oh shit, the law of gravity is wrong." rather than "Well there must be something here we don't understand yet that is still in keeping with our current understanding of physics."That would be there first response, to be sure--indeed, as it should be, since gravity has served science very well thus far, and it makes sense to resist changing it. But what if we cannot find any explanation that comports with our current understanding of physics... and eventually, someone comes along with a radically new idea that explains our old facts and this new fact.

Good scientists should prefer the theory that explains ALL the facts (or at least more of the facts than competing theories), even if it means giving up on long-held ideas.

--Snip--
Good scientists should prefer the theory that explains ALL the facts (or at least more of the facts than competing theories), even if it means giving up on long-held ideas.

Which is what they do. Up until the turn of the 20th century, classical mechanics was held to be the end all in explaining the world around us through physics. Newton's based Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica on observational data that he had formulated into a series of theories that could be used, accurately at the time, to predict things about the physical world.

People accepted classical mechanics because, for their world, it worked. However, as we began to understand more and more about matter and what made up matter, we began to look at the atom. A theory was put forward that the electron of a Hydrogen atom physically orbitted the proton at the nucleus. People, using classical mechanics as shown by Newton, tried to predict what they could about the functioning of the atom, and found that, lo and behold, they were wrong. The fellow who actually did all of the calculations came surprisingly close, but he was still wrong.

Then a man by the name of Schrodinger came along, and he developed a theory that we call quantum mechanics. He applied this theory to the atom, to the electron, etc. and found that, lo and behold, it worked. And not only for the hydrogen atom, but for EVERY atom. And so quantum mechanics was incorporated into "canonical" physics for very small sizes (generally you start to have to worry about quantum effects at the micrometer level and below).

All I know is you use it when someone posts something unrelated to the content of the posts above it.

Eh. It's when people above have all been posting the same thing (comboing), someone posts C-C-C-COMBO BREAKER. What's really fun is when multiple people post the combo breaker, and you now have a combo breaker combo.

So, assuming the combo is "relavent posts", the post that you quoted should be the one that says 'C-C-C-COMBO BREAKER', not yours.

I'm going to re-read after this post but...Did Hume put forward something more effective than induction?

I don't see anything wrong with basing knowledge on previous experience. If we ignore previous tests/data, then what are we suppose to use to analyze and make sense of our enviroment now?

ewww, you got explananda in my explanans

I'm a big fan of Humean empiricism, so I'm with him on that. Induction has no place in reason, and thus no place in science.

Most scientists I work with don't hold induction as rigorous, but I have to admit that I sometimes use the observation of a repetitive or consistent behaviour in nature as a guide to developing hypotheses which can then be attacked more thoroughly.

That is to say, a premise arrived at by induction is certainly by no means proven this way, but could one not argue that something that may eventually be shown true by a more rigorous method (deduction from sound axioms, for example) might first show its potential through satisfying some inductive examination?

EDIT: I'm sorry, it occurs to me that I should make clear that I use the term induction as a reference to "inductive reasoning" to be contrasted with deductive reasoning. "Mathematical induction" (which I sometimes think is poorly named, since it seems more a subset of deductive reasoning) to prove statements in mathematics I have no problem with.

I'm a big fan of Humean empiricism, so I'm with him on that. Induction has no place in reason, and thus no place in science.

is there such a thing as scientific knowledge?

I believe that there is not sufficient cause to doubt causality.

I believe that there is not sufficient cause to doubt causality.Really? Well.. The way I see it, universal causality might exist, but if it does, it's definitly not understood. Universal deterministic causality, on the other hand, is a flawed concept. It has to start somehow, and if it's really deterministic, it can't. That's one of the reasons I'm pretty sure I wouldn't accept the validity of relativity if I understood it.
Fortunately I don't, so I can safely make the personal assumption that it's the most functional theory & get on with my life. Silly as it is, it's necessary for people who don't have unlimited funds, time, opportunity & braincapacity, and I rather doubt I have any of those things.

Really?
Yes really.

Well.. The way I see it, universal causality might exist, but if it does, it's definitly not understood.
That's nice, not really related to my comment, but nice none the less.

Universal deterministic causality, on the other hand, is a flawed concept. It has to start somehow, and if it's really deterministic, it can't.
Universal deterministic causality might indeed be a flawed concept, but the reason you give for it being so prove as much. Nothing you've said eliminates a pre-universe absence of deterministic causality, so it doesnt prove that there cannot have been a start caused by something that wasnt subject to deterministic causality.

That's one of the reasons I'm pretty sure I wouldn't accept the validity of relativity if I understood it.
Fortunately I don't, so I can safely make the personal assumption that it's the most functional theory & get on with my life. Silly as it is, it's necessary for people who don't have unlimited funds, time, opportunity & braincapacity, and I rather doubt I have any of those things.
As interesting as this all is, I dont see why you chose to quote my comment in conjunction with it since nothing you've said addresses or directly responds to the content of my comments.:confused:

Determinism is an assumption that goes way beyond any empirical fact, it is an assumption made for its useful consequences. It guarantees the regularity of nature, which is highly useful to science. It makes the whole scientific endeavour plausible, eminently hopeful, even.

It has become a matter of faith rather than empirical fact to modern science, and advances in quantum mechanics and chaos theory are challenging this article of faith constantly.

If our expectations of cause and effect work, does it really matter if they exist empirically or not? It seems irrelevant that their empirical existence can't be established because they do have practical benefits and effects.

I mean, we can predict the weather or the likelihood of a recession based upon the data, and despite the fact that cause and effect are human constructs, we are capable of foreseeing these events (and others) with a fairly high degree of confidence. I don't think anyone would consider disregarding a weather report or an economic forecast because cause and effect have no empirical basis.

It really seems like an irrelevant argument, actually. I don't see how it would matter, given that we will experience events that have seeming causes and effects regardless of whether they exist or not.

Then you're basically agreeing with Hume that, as a practical matter, we are of course going to use the notion of causality.

But you're using an inductive argument to support the use of causation, so where's your justification of induction?

Well, there really isn't a "law of gravity" anymore. General relativity is a theory that explains gravitational phenomenon and Newton's idea of gravity is only used for the purposes of approximations, it doesn't even explain the precession of Mercury's perihelion.

At any rate, if an experiment showed that the current theory of general relativity was wrong then it would have to be abandoned or modified to fit with all the previous experimental results as well as the results from the new experiment. A lot of physicists would dream of being able to come up with a theory that's better than GR.

I'm aware of that. But let's move the debate to GR since you don't like gravity and it matters little to my point. Let's say someone is just amazingly billiant/lucky and GR is proven wrong.

What would have been done to prove it wrong? How many disproofs of its predictions or "experimental anomalies" would it take to abandon it? 1? 2? 3? 10? 100? 1,000? How much evidence/counterevidence is sufficient to make a theory scientifically valid or invalid? Basically, what I'm asking is how much induction is enough for science.

And at any rate, while I may just be an undergraduate student, I hold the current theories to be rather provisional.

I think that's an excellent decision on your part.

Maybe, I think that saying that since the sun has risen every day in my memory, it's probable that it will rise tomorrow is totally different from saying it will rise tomorrow. It's likely, but not certain.

Sure it's different. A different version of the same old "it's happened a lot before so we can say it'll happen a lot in the future" line.

As mentioned in the other thread, I'm rather ignorant of the subject & know fuck-all about Hume, but.. I have a few thoughts all the same. I've yet read up on him, by the way. I'd appreciate if you'd link to the appropriate bits or past something, so I won't have to cuise through page upon page of his political leanings, travels & opinions on Tandori.What is it we're assuming exactly?

The general correctness of science.

Ok. Induction as Hume described it was a very basic idea, that we can on the basis of past events predict future events.

So let's use the example of a chicken and a farmer to illustrate why it's a problem. Every day for 3 years (over 1,000 days, a good sample size, no?) the farmer comes in the morning and feeds the chicken. So the chicken thinks, after over a thousand days, that when the farmer comes in the morning she's going to be fed. But one morning, the farmer comes and kills the chicken, plucks her, and cooks her.

I am of the opinion that universal deterministic causality is nothing more than a hypothesis. It clearly happens a lot, and it's the basis for things like relativity & this thing we call time, but evidence suggests it's not a universal law. Mass-less shit can & do violate deterministic causality all the time, for example. Even things like spatial dimensions do it, by the looks of things (otherwise this place'd arguably be rather blinding right now).

I don't know & don't agree it's an assumption of the methodology itself. In certain circumstances seems to be valid & in others, it doesn't. I'm not gonna claim anyone knows why, but I fail to understand how that's an issue of methodology.

It's an assumption of the methodology in that, generally, when a scientist is looking for an explanation of a phenomenon, they are looking for one event (or several events) that causes another event. The fact that on occasion scientists have found exceptions to causality hardly suggests to me that it is not a general part of their methodology to look for causes.

The more basic assumption about causality I consider moot. If it's there, it'll be evident through falsification. If it isn't, it won't be. Whether this means everything can be explained mechanically (because causality is a universal law) or not (because it isn't), will either become apparent or remain a mystery.

Interesting. Like with Vetalia's post, this just leads you back to the problem of induction.

Either way, I don't see how it's problematic. A limitation, yes, but different tools have different uses. It's not like a hammer'll break 'cos you try to play violin with it, and in this particular case, the violin probably won't either.

So science is just one tool among many valuable tools?

But is that even apllicable? It looks like a strawman to me. If deterministic causality is a universal law, it'll never be violated & thus any prediction based on it will be correct. If it isn't a universal law, then it'll eventually be falsified & theories altered to accomodate the situation.

How can causality be falsified? If I can't prove a causal connection between two events, isn't it quite possible that there is simply a third thing that's causing both of them that I'm missing?

Let's take a simple example using nature. There's an insect that makes noise in direct proportion to the change in the air pressure around them. You notice repeatedly that storms frequently come in areas and times where the insect makes more noise. The evidence suggests a connection between the insect's noise and storms occurring. Is the insect the cause? Or is there a third variable? Even if you study the air pressure, and it correlates with both the insect's noise and the storms coming, how do you determine that there is a causal relationship between the air pressure and the insect's noise or the storms?

If causality in itself is wrong, then there'll simply be a limit to what science can explain. Whether that limitation will be evident is a damn good question, but it doesn't change what science can explain.

Let's wait until later to hit the explanation issue. That's a big one all on its own.

ewww, you got explananda in my explanans

Sorry, I was trying to make deductive-nomological stew here and got muddled.

If there is no causality, then we cannot have any knowledge of future events. This would mean that there is no reason for us to act one way or another. If there is no causality, why not jump off of a building (since you have no knowledge that you will fall to the ground and die)? I don't see any philosophers doing this out of this conviction.

I don't see any philosophers contesting the idea that causality and induction are useful ideas either.

btw-did Darwin Days have anything to do with the start of this discussion?

Yes. I look forward to reading your thoughts when you're done researching.

What you have brought up, Hotrodia, is indeed a problem facing science and whether what it provides us with can actually be termed as "Knowledge", rather than simply justified beliefs. In turn, I ask, what methodology do you think it ought to be using?

The funny thing with science is how it treats things such as microindeterminism - here it practically lapses into a form of agnosticism, and seems to treat particles as though they were individuals with their own minds, such that if a sudden change were to occur in the desires of these particles oxygen could suddenly become venomous to humans! Sort of similar to saying that what causes the river to flow is the will of the godling inhabiting it... Do scientists seriously believe that particles are completely undetermined? I'd appreciate correction on this matter if I'm wrong.

What you have brought up, Hotrodia, is indeed a problem facing science and whether what it provides us with can actually be termed as "Knowledge", rather than simply justified beliefs. In turn, I ask, what methodology do you think it ought to be using?

The problem with proposing another methodology is that when I have done so, it is lambasted as being non-scientific, non-objective, etc.

Apparently, any great divergence from current scientific methodology is non-scientific. But perhaps this discussion will give adherents of science a sense of its problems and they can come up with ways to at least refine scientific methodology that are more palatable to them.

The funny thing with science is how it treats things such as microindeterminism - here it practically lapses into a form of agnosticism, and seems to treat particles as though they were individuals with their own minds, such that if a sudden change were to occur in the desires of these particles oxygen could suddenly become venomous to humans! Sort of similar to saying that what causes the river to flow is the will of the godling inhabiting it... Do scientists seriously believe that particles are completely undetermined? I'd appreciate correction on this matter if I'm wrong.

As far as I'm aware, there are several controversial interpretations of the data that is often used to support microindeterminism, and I'm unaware of a broad consensus as to what the data means.

If somebody here works with a lot of physicists and reads a lot of the literature of the field, and could tell us what the majority view is, that would be helpful.

The problem with proposing another methodology is that when I have done so, it is lambasted as being non-scientific, non-objective, etc.

Apparently, any great divergence from current scientific methodology is non-scientific. But perhaps this discussion will give adherents of science a sense of its problems and they can come up with ways to at least refine scientific methodology that are more palatable to them.
Go ahead and propose it anyway - I'm familiar with debates on epistemology and method as it comes up a lot in economics, which is my undergrad major, so I'm not overly dismissive of controversial opinions on the matter.

Go ahead and propose it anyway - I'm familiar with debates on epistemology and method as it comes up a lot in economics, which is my undergrad major, so I'm not overly dismissive of controversial opinions on the matter.

Because this thread is assuming the validity of (current) science in general precisely to avoid the issues of proposing another method, we would need another thread. I'm not going to start it, but you are welcome to, and I'll try to make time for it. Epistemology and method are subjects I enjoy as well. And fortunately, I happen to have my epistemology text on hand today. :)

Because this thread is assuming the validity of (current) science in general precisely to avoid the issues of proposing another method, we would need another thread. I'm not going to start it, but you are welcome to, and I'll try to make time for it. Epistemology and method are subjects I enjoy as well. And fortunately, I happen to have my epistemology text on hand today. :)
Perhaps I'll start one later tonight, if someone else doesn't.

Yes. I look forward to reading your thoughts when you're done researching.

I kinda figured. I'll try to keep the deism out of this, though. For proper research, you'd be waiting awhile. I opted for just a basic understanding of the terms being used at the moment.

What would have been done to prove it wrong? How many disproofs of its predictions or "experimental anomalies" would it take to abandon it? 1? 2? 3? 10? 100? 1,000? How much evidence/counterevidence is sufficient to make a theory scientifically valid or invalid? Basically, what I'm asking is how much induction is enough for science.


Just to clarify these questions:

Mathematically speaking, there is no number of tests that can prove or disprove anything. It must be proven in general terms, where the end result looks much akin to x=y+z, where the variables in question stand for whatever values are relevant to the situation, along the lines of Pythagorean Theorum. It would not matter if there were one or one billion different tests that all showed the same result, there's always the chance that the next test will result differently. That is why I agree with Hume's view of induction. It's a great tool for practical application, but should not be used for purist empirical data collection.

Causation: in simplest terms, cause and effect, not to be confused with correlation, a structural, functional, or qualitative, relationship.

That was my mistake earlier, assuming that the one implied the other. I'll get back to causation in a moment.

The funny thing with science is how it treats things such as microindeterminism - here it practically lapses into a form of agnosticism, and seems to treat particles as though they were individuals with their own minds, such that if a sudden change were to occur in the desires of these particles oxygen could suddenly become venomous to humans! Sort of similar to saying that what causes the river to flow is the will of the godling inhabiting it... Do scientists seriously believe that particles are completely undetermined? I'd appreciate correction on this matter if I'm wrong.

I may be remembering incorrectly, but one of the reasons that particles are treated so is that they are incredibly difficult to properly quantify and define. They are so small that the minutest of forces appears to affect them rather dramatically, which makes it difficult to measure them as that would necessitate applying some level of force to them.

This is where problems with causation arise. We attempt to measure the size, speed, or whatever, of, say, an electron. In the process of this, it appears that the electron changes it's pattern of motion. This has been repeated any number of times. Basic causational theory is that our measurement of the electron has applied force to it in some way that has caused it to temporarily effect a change in its behaviour. This is the basic assumption behind the Wave/Particle Theory for electrons. We can tell where it is or how fast it's going, but not both, because measuring the one affects the other.

How do we prove or disprove the cause and effect relationship between our measurements and the itsy-bitsy particles? With the instruments we have now, we don't. We currently lack the capacity to move that theory from one of causation into a declaration of correlation. Again, similar to induction, causation is not prone to empirical proof, especially in the mathematical sense. It works well for a predictive guideline, but cannot be assumed to be universally true.

I wish I had more thoughts to offer at the moment, but I'm still working my way through a few more points to see if they might be relevant.

As per HotRodia's request, here is the thread on epistemology and method in sciences:

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=518896

Propose any alternate methods you have in mind there.