Buristan
03-01-2007, 04:51
A response to the recent trolling on all the Iraq threads.
A Change In Course?
On November 8, 2006, the engineer of the Iraq War, and creator of the pro-war slogan “stay the course”, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld resigned. All day, political pundits proclaimed that the exit of the “SecDef” will usher in a change in strategy that will allow for United States troops to leave Iraq, claiming that this exit would be soon, and would leave Iraq as a somewhat stable state, a nation with a hope for the future. This exit will only occur, however, if a series of drastic reforms are taken, not only in the military strategy in Iraq, but in U.S. foreign policy for the region.
Throughout Iraq, sectarian violence runs rampant. The Shiite majority and the Sunni minority fight a constant tit-for-tat battle in the volatile neighborhoods of the urban centers of Iraq. Though the bloodbath rages relentlessly, the American soldiers stand on the sidelines, in the outskirts of the major cities, far away from the fighting. This sectarian violence will never come to an end without a greater military presence inside the centers of resistance. Rather than the large military strongholds on the outskirts of the larges cities of Iraq, the coalition forces need to decentralize into smaller, more compact bases within the most explosive city boroughs; acting as a police force, by regularly patrolling these hotbeds. The American casualties would inevitably go up thanks to the greater visibility of the troops, nevertheless, the sectarian violence tearing the Iraqi people apart would decline, allowing the United States a greater chance of leaving Iraq in the near future. Although U.S. troops are not the police force of the country, they will have to step into the role until the Iraqi government can clean their own police forces of the very insurgents that they are supposed to be fighting.
In the early days of the war, the strength of the Iraqi police forces were viewed as the benchmark for when our troops could exit the country, however, the milestones have came and gone, but in Iraq we remain. The Iraqi security forces are at best crooked. According to and article for the Washington Post by writer Amit R. Paley “…seventy percent of the Iraqi police force has been infiltrated by militias, primarily the Mahdi Army.” This corruption is unacceptable. While Sunni blood runs red in the streets of Baghdad, the Shiite cops supposedly preventing such monstrosities stand by allowing the slaughterers to continue on with their morbid business; while some honorable officers openly join in the butchery. Such horrors must end. If we ever want our young men to come home, we must crack down upon this corruption, perhaps by scrapping the current security force and starting from the ground up if necessary. Though a gloomy prescription, it is vital for any hope of a stable, peaceful Iraq.
The Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia, run by the radical Islamist Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, strikes fear into the hearts of all Sunnis and moderate Shiites throughout Iraq. The militia’s influence becomes greater by the day, its ranks larger by the day, and its soldiers smarter by the day. On al-Sadr, President Bush sticks to his Texas sheriff “no negotiations with terrorists” catchphrase. This policy is irresponsible. If we ever want to piece together any variety of stable nation in Iraq, al-Sadr must play a part. We need to swallow our pride and negotiate. Al-Sadr is a charismatic leader who some Iraqis see as their version of Ataturk, the answer to the Western encroachments on Iraqi liberty. His followers are violent, and fiercely loyal; thus we must concede to some of his demands--for the sake of Iraq--damned be our pride. Before we can obtain concessions from al-Sadr however, we must negotiate him out of his supplies and training, by coming to the table with Iran.
Of all the nations in the world, none support extremist Islam to the extent of Iran and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For years, the Iranians stood against the United States, waging a virtual cold war against us. Since the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981, the States have cut off almost all negotiations with the Theocracy, the nation that not only holds the keys to a victorious ending in Iraq, but also stands on the brink of nuclear capability. The current U.S administration has refused time and time again to cut a deal with the Islamic Republic, however, such an approach to Iran is no longer an option. We must come to the table, without conditions, and come to an agreement on Iranian involvement in the new Iraq and Iran’s nuclear future. We must concede to them on some matters, such as allowing them to possess peaceful, civilian nuclear power, though we cannot allow ourselves the liberty of leniency on matters such as nuclear weaponry. If anywhere holds key to a U.S. success in Iraq, it rests on a bargaining table in Tehran.
This is merely a list of suggestions. Take it with a grain of salt. All of these may be enacted, and Iraq may still be the “catch-22” it is as I write, none of these may be taken, and it may turn into a somewhat stable nation. But if we want to have any hope of changing the current way of the country, something’s gotta change.
Feel free to comment on your reactions, but please keep the debate civilized, like the current debate on the US and UK real heros thread.
A Change In Course?
On November 8, 2006, the engineer of the Iraq War, and creator of the pro-war slogan “stay the course”, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld resigned. All day, political pundits proclaimed that the exit of the “SecDef” will usher in a change in strategy that will allow for United States troops to leave Iraq, claiming that this exit would be soon, and would leave Iraq as a somewhat stable state, a nation with a hope for the future. This exit will only occur, however, if a series of drastic reforms are taken, not only in the military strategy in Iraq, but in U.S. foreign policy for the region.
Throughout Iraq, sectarian violence runs rampant. The Shiite majority and the Sunni minority fight a constant tit-for-tat battle in the volatile neighborhoods of the urban centers of Iraq. Though the bloodbath rages relentlessly, the American soldiers stand on the sidelines, in the outskirts of the major cities, far away from the fighting. This sectarian violence will never come to an end without a greater military presence inside the centers of resistance. Rather than the large military strongholds on the outskirts of the larges cities of Iraq, the coalition forces need to decentralize into smaller, more compact bases within the most explosive city boroughs; acting as a police force, by regularly patrolling these hotbeds. The American casualties would inevitably go up thanks to the greater visibility of the troops, nevertheless, the sectarian violence tearing the Iraqi people apart would decline, allowing the United States a greater chance of leaving Iraq in the near future. Although U.S. troops are not the police force of the country, they will have to step into the role until the Iraqi government can clean their own police forces of the very insurgents that they are supposed to be fighting.
In the early days of the war, the strength of the Iraqi police forces were viewed as the benchmark for when our troops could exit the country, however, the milestones have came and gone, but in Iraq we remain. The Iraqi security forces are at best crooked. According to and article for the Washington Post by writer Amit R. Paley “…seventy percent of the Iraqi police force has been infiltrated by militias, primarily the Mahdi Army.” This corruption is unacceptable. While Sunni blood runs red in the streets of Baghdad, the Shiite cops supposedly preventing such monstrosities stand by allowing the slaughterers to continue on with their morbid business; while some honorable officers openly join in the butchery. Such horrors must end. If we ever want our young men to come home, we must crack down upon this corruption, perhaps by scrapping the current security force and starting from the ground up if necessary. Though a gloomy prescription, it is vital for any hope of a stable, peaceful Iraq.
The Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia, run by the radical Islamist Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, strikes fear into the hearts of all Sunnis and moderate Shiites throughout Iraq. The militia’s influence becomes greater by the day, its ranks larger by the day, and its soldiers smarter by the day. On al-Sadr, President Bush sticks to his Texas sheriff “no negotiations with terrorists” catchphrase. This policy is irresponsible. If we ever want to piece together any variety of stable nation in Iraq, al-Sadr must play a part. We need to swallow our pride and negotiate. Al-Sadr is a charismatic leader who some Iraqis see as their version of Ataturk, the answer to the Western encroachments on Iraqi liberty. His followers are violent, and fiercely loyal; thus we must concede to some of his demands--for the sake of Iraq--damned be our pride. Before we can obtain concessions from al-Sadr however, we must negotiate him out of his supplies and training, by coming to the table with Iran.
Of all the nations in the world, none support extremist Islam to the extent of Iran and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For years, the Iranians stood against the United States, waging a virtual cold war against us. Since the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981, the States have cut off almost all negotiations with the Theocracy, the nation that not only holds the keys to a victorious ending in Iraq, but also stands on the brink of nuclear capability. The current U.S administration has refused time and time again to cut a deal with the Islamic Republic, however, such an approach to Iran is no longer an option. We must come to the table, without conditions, and come to an agreement on Iranian involvement in the new Iraq and Iran’s nuclear future. We must concede to them on some matters, such as allowing them to possess peaceful, civilian nuclear power, though we cannot allow ourselves the liberty of leniency on matters such as nuclear weaponry. If anywhere holds key to a U.S. success in Iraq, it rests on a bargaining table in Tehran.
This is merely a list of suggestions. Take it with a grain of salt. All of these may be enacted, and Iraq may still be the “catch-22” it is as I write, none of these may be taken, and it may turn into a somewhat stable nation. But if we want to have any hope of changing the current way of the country, something’s gotta change.
Feel free to comment on your reactions, but please keep the debate civilized, like the current debate on the US and UK real heros thread.