NationStates Jolt Archive

Why should we care about the potential happiness of non-existent people?

What if I take the opposite view? What if we don't care about their potential happiness, and thus don't breed at all? Would it be OK to completely wipe out humanity by refusing to breed just because we don't care about people in the future? Would that be equally "good" as having a thriving society in the future, where every member is happy? I certainly don't think so.

And why not? People are not so radically different in their assessments of utility that comparisons cannot be made.
It's in the nature of the concept. Make up a new one, if you so please, but utility cannot be compared between people.

It's got to do with free will and all that.

Not in and of itself, no, but considering that they are both of the same species, and they both have similar physical and emotional needs, it's not much of a stretch to say that that is the case.
But it is an assumption. It is a stretch, even if not a very big one. It's not proven, it's not objective.

It's purely you arbitrarily choosing to misuse the concept in that way.

Amartya Sen's capabilities approach, which I also like, is an interesting response to this and other objections.
Well, yes, but it's not utility.

Sen is great as far as development economics is concerned. People are actually without capabilities there, as it were. But despite what people keep insisting...in the Western world there is no one who doesn't get a chance. So I don't think that much of his work applies here.

That may be the case, but they're a threat to truth, justice, the American way, and my stock portfolio.

So are conservatives. Any and all ideologies are a threat to freedom, especially when taken to such an extreme level as the factions here in th eUS take them.

And now lets' listen in as EM, Soheran and MTAE continue their discussion. Now matter how much it makes our brains hurt.

We assume that it is, by definition, non-existence, as that is a state in which neither positive or negative enjoyment is expressed.

Since we cannot measure what enjoyment comes from non-existence, how can we know that existence conveys positive enjoyment?

You're thinking of the group as a single entity, which is patently false. You're argument is not only moronic, but evil. According to you, all the people who fall below the "average" happiness might as well be killed, because that would increase the Holy Average. Hell, everybody except the happiest person in the world might as well kill themselves now, since that would increase the average, right? Your "point" demolishes itself.
Strawman, again. You have not shown why more people will create a happier society in the end. All you have stated is something to the effect of 3x5000 > 10 x 100. Either prove that having more individuals will make each and every individual that much happier, or drop the argument. I can give you an answer though: you're hallucinating. India has in excess of 1 billion individuals. Mostly miserable. Iceland has a mere 300 000. Happier than those in India. By your logic though, India should be inherently happier. Yet it isn't. Why? Because it is fallacious.

how can we know that existence conveys positive enjoyment?

We are the judge of that. Most people like life; for them, it carries positive enjoyment. It is an absolute standard which is completely independent of whatever happiness is derived from nothingness (none or neutral enjoyment, as a matter of fact).

By your logic though, India should be inherently happier. Yet it isn't. Why? Because it is fallacious.

By your logic, the US would be better off if we killed, say, 99% of the least happy citizens. Funnily enough, I don't hear that getting proposed anywhere. Do you know why? Because although they're not super-happy, they still enjoy their life; you cannot take that away in the name of your average. It's fallacious to think that a life has a negative value when it falls below an arbitrary average when it can, in fact, have a positive absolute happiness associated with it.

By your logic, the US would be better off if we killed, say, 99% of the least happy citizens. Funnily enough, I don't hear that getting proposed anywhere. Do you know why? Because although they're not super-happy, they still enjoy their life; you cannot take that away in the name of your average. It's fallacious to think that a life has a negative value when it falls below an arbitrary average when it can, in fact, have a positive absolute happiness associated with it.
Strawman, third one now. Either prove more people equates more happiness for each and every person, or drop the argument.

It's in the nature of the concept. Make up a new one, if you so please, but utility cannot be compared between people.

It's got to do with free will and all that.

What does free will have to do with anything?

But it is an assumption. It is a stretch, even if not a very big one. It's not proven, it's not objective.

It's purely you arbitrarily choosing to misuse the concept in that way.

There is nothing "arbitrary" about it.

I am not an economist. I am not limiting myself to the norms of economic behavior. Like the utilitarians I am more concerned with "utility" as in preference satisfaction or happiness, and human psychology being pretty similar across the species, I see no reason to expect great differences.

What if I take the opposite view? What if we don't care about their potential happiness, and thus don't breed at all? Would it be OK to completely wipe out humanity by refusing to breed just because we don't care about people in the future? Would that be equally "good" as having a thriving society in the future, where every member is happy?

It could be argued that the existence of the species is in itself a good (independent of any utilitarian calculation), but leaving that aside, yes, it would be equally good.

So are conservatives. Any and all ideologies are a threat to freedom, especially when taken to such an extreme level as the factions here in th eUS take them.

Nonsense. Conservatives are teh sheet, because they uh... nevermind.

And now lets' listen in as EM, Soheran and MTAE continue their discussion. Now matter how much it makes our brains hurt.

It's good stuff, actually. (Thanks for sharing, y'all! :D) Sometimes I wonder why they spend their time on NSG for free when they could easily be paid by a random political thinktanks for the stuff they post here. I suspect it's because of the holiday spirit and they're feeling generous.

Strawman, third one now. Either prove more people equates more happiness for each and every person, or drop the argument.

It's not a straw-man, as I am simply extending your logic. According to you, the average happiness would increase if we killed off the saddest 99% of people. Also, I never stated that more people means each person is happier, or even that the average happiness increases. I only said that the total happiness increases; more people experience the joy of life.

It's not a straw-man, as I am simply extending your logic. According to you, the average happiness would increase if we killed off the saddest 99% of people. Also, I never stated that more people means each person is happier, or even that the average happiness increases. I only said that the total happiness increases; more people experience the joy of life.
It is a strawman. Now, for the last time, prove that having a larger population increases each and every person's happiness, or your argument fails. Last chance.

We are the judge of that. Most people like life; for them, it carries positive enjoyment. It is an absolute standard which is completely independent of whatever happiness is derived from nothingness (none or neutral enjoyment, as a matter of fact).

That doesn't answer my question.

If we cannot measure the enjoyment on non-existence, how can we compare it to the enjoyment of existence?

That doesn't answer my question.

If we cannot measure the enjoyment on non-existence, how can we compare it to the enjoyment of existence?
He is arguing in circles, and via the use of strawmen. He has repeatedly failed to provide the positive side of his argument. I am not sure if it's worth the effort.

It's good stuff, actually. (Thanks for sharing, y'all! :D) Sometimes I wonder why they spend their time on NSG for free when they could easily be paid by a random political thinktanks for the stuff they post here. I suspect it's because of the holiday spirit and they're feeling generous.

Soheran's much more intelligent than I; I'm just more stubborn. That makes for a slightly lopsided argument. :)

Speaking of being hired by political think-tanks, though -- I'm really curious as to what Soheran's job is, if not writing brain-bending, philosophical posts on NSG 24/7.

This is my (MeansToAnEnd) other account. Was I banned indefinitely? It said so, but specified no reason. Sorry for posting on another account while banned, but I'd really like to know why I was banned.

It is a strawman. Now, for the last time, prove that having a larger population increases each and every person's happiness, or your argument fails. Last chance.

No, it is a logical conclusion of your argument. You're claiming that average happiness is what we should maximize. Let's say that we have 9 people, with the following happiness coefficients (or whatever you'd like to call them): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. That means we have an average happiness of 5. What is we kill the first two? Well, that increases our average happiness by 1. What if we kill everybody but number nine? Well, then, according to you, the average happiness would be 9 and we'd be better off. Do you deny this outcome is based on your logic? Do you accept this outcome as correct?

As to my point: I never claimed that having a larger population increases each and every person's happiness. I claimed that we should not seek to maximize average happiness, but total happiness. I'd rather have 1,000,000 people who are moderately happy rather than have 1 person who is exceedingly happy. Each person's happiness matters to me, even if they are not extremely happy.

I claimed that we should not seek to maximize average happiness, but total happiness. I'd rather have 1,000,000 people who are moderately happy rather than have 1 person who is exceedingly happy. Each person's happiness matters to me, even if they are not extremely happy.
Then why not clarify this at the beginning? The way you phrased the argument is that a higher population will equate higher happiness. Instead of clarifying this (and my numerical examples gave you plenty of opportunity to), you carried on arguing with no reason. Your point then is no different to mine. They are for all purposes the same.

And another thing, I was making no argument of the sort -- I was demonstrating that a higher population is by no means necessarily a happier one.

Soheran's much more intelligent than I; I'm just more stubborn. That makes for a slightly lopsided argument. :)

Hah, I've had my share of taking the other side in that kind of debate. Not too often on NS - though there've been a few times when arguing with the truly brilliant people here - but lots of times before, on other political forums and off the Internet.

Speaking of being hired by political think-tanks, though -- I'm really curious as to what Soheran's job is, if not writing brain-bending, philosophical posts on NSG 24/7.

Your curiosity shall remain unsated, I fear. ;)

No, it is a logical conclusion of your argument. You're claiming that average happiness is what we should maximize. Let's say that we have 9 people, with the following happiness coefficients (or whatever you'd like to call them): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. That means we have an average happiness of 5. What is we kill the first two? Well, that increases our average happiness by 1. What if we kill everybody but number nine? Well, then, according to you, the average happiness would be 9 and we'd be better off. Do you deny this outcome is based on your logic? Do you accept this outcome as correct?

As to my point: I never claimed that having a larger population increases each and every person's happiness. I claimed that we should not seek to maximize average happiness, but total happiness. I'd rather have 1,000,000 people who are moderately happy rather than have 1 person who is exceedingly happy. Each person's happiness matters to me, even if they are not extremely happy.

This is why utilitarian arguments suck.

If you wish to maximize total happiness or satisfaction, you are stuck with scenarios where 1,000,000 miserable people are better off than 1000 happy people. If you wish to maximize average happiness, you are stuck with situations where five free people and five slaves are better off than ten free people.

Why not just accept the morality of individual self-determination?

If you wish to maximize average happiness, you are stuck with situations where five free people and five slaves are better off than ten free people.

I highly doubt it. The harm to the slaves far exceeds the benefit to the free people.

I highly doubt it. The harm to the slaves far exceeds the benefit to the free people.
Not if the slaves are made to like their slavery.

;)

I highly doubt it. The harm to the slaves far exceeds the benefit to the free people.


It only requires that the slaves become more productive than they would have been as free men, and that the added production is greater than the lost happiness. Do you believe that there are no scenarios where that is possible.

Not if the slaves are made to like their slavery.

This only means that they are ignorant of the harm, not that the harm does not exist.

This is one of the places where I part ways with classical utilitarianism. There are different kinds of happiness, and some kinds are better than others. There is no equivalence between a truly content, clear-minded free person and a drugged slave.

This only means that they are ignorant of the harm, not that the harm does not exist.
I know, I am just bringing up our dear MTAE's argument. :)

This is one of the places where I part ways with classical utilitarianism. There are different kinds of happiness, and some kinds are better than others. There is no equivalence between a truly content, clear-minded free person and a drugged slave.
Agreed.

This only means that they are ignorant of the harm, not that the harm does not exist.

This is one of the places where I part ways with classical utilitarianism. There are different kinds of happiness, and some kinds are better than others. There is no equivalence between a truly content, clear-minded free person and a drugged slave.

Now you run into the problem MTAE has with his "enjoyment of non-existence". How does harm exist when a person is unaware of it?

If you wish to maximize total happiness or satisfaction, you are stuck with scenarios where 1,000,000 miserable people are better off than 1000 happy people.

I try to avoid that by saying that if people are miserable, then they have negative happiness, and each additional miserable person is a bad thing, not a good thing.

It only requires that the slaves become more productive than they would have been as free men, and that the added production is greater than the lost happiness. Do you believe that there are no scenarios where that is possible.

I can think of none - with the possible exception being saving the lives of the free people, and even that is questionable.

It only requires that the slaves become more productive than they would have been as free men, and that the added production is greater than the lost happiness. Do you believe that there are no scenarios where that is possible.

In my view, productivity is simply a means of attaining a positive happiness. I believe that a slave can derive much more benefit from being free than a free man can extract from having another pair of shoes. In other words, the freedom of the slave would be worth more than the value of added goods which he could produce. The only exception would be when the slave actually enjoyed being a slave, and there are no historical examples of this, as far as I know.

In my view, productivity is simply a means of attaining a positive happiness. I believe that a slave can derive much more benefit from being free than a free man can extract from having another pair of shoes. In other words, the freedom of the slave would be worth more than the value of added goods which he could produce. The only exception would be when the slave actually enjoyed being a slave, and there are no historical examples of this, as far as I know.
Indeed.

Hence, I suppose you consider the perfect slave to be one which enjoys its servitude?

I can think of none - with the possible exception being saving the lives of the free people, and even that is questionable.

A lazy genius and nine dunces find themselves marooned on the island. The genius is capable, through his ingenuity, or providing comfortable shelter for the group. However, because of his laziness, he is only willing to provide comfort for himself. The others, who could provide for a meager living on their own, conclude (correctly) that they would be much more happy if they ganged up on the genius and forced him to work for them. The dunces gain a great deal of happiness while the genius is made a slave. Are the dunces justified?

Suppose a community of fifty atheistic families and one christian family existed. Every single one of the atheists abhorred christianity and its adherents. Therefore they would not be satisfied with their situations until the one christian family renounced their religion or left the community. Are the atheists justified?

What does free will have to do with anything?
Well, what people enjoy and how much is an individual thing and is different for everyone, isn't it?

There is nothing "arbitrary" about it.
Sure there is. Unless you can objectively prove it somehow that Bill Gates gets fewer units of utility from a dollar than the Toowong Bag Man (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziggy_the_bagman).

I am not an economist. I am not limiting myself to the norms of economic behavior.
And yet, you use the theory of diminishing marginal utility. Bentham doesn't mention it...econ textbooks do.

Like the utilitarians I am more concerned with "utility" as in preference satisfaction or happiness, and human psychology being pretty similar across the species, I see no reason to expect great differences.
But you are just expecting. It's an assumption, and not one that has to hold true, especially in borderline cases. You pick and choose from different concepts to build something that allows you some ultimate goal, for example to redistribute from some to others.

Now you run into the problem MTAE has with his "enjoyment of non-existence". How does harm exist when a person is unaware of it?

The fact that you do not know what you have lost is no indication that you have lost nothing.

The person would be better off were she free; she might not be consciously aware of this fact, but it is still there. All drugs and conditioning can do is suppress her realization of this; it cannot change it.

In my view, productivity is simply a means of attaining a positive happiness. I believe that a slave can derive much more benefit from being free than a free man can extract from having another pair of shoes. In other words, the freedom of the slave would be worth more than the value of added goods which he could produce.

Since happiness and value is subjective, it is perfectly possible for a man to provide more utility to those he interacts with than he would lose through the interaction.

The only exception would be when the slave actually enjoyed being a slave, and there are no historical examples of this, as far as I know.

The man who wanted to be a slave could never be a slave.

Suppose a community of fifty atheistic families and one christian family existed. Every single one of the atheists abhorred christianity and its adherents. Therefore they would not be satisfied with their situations until the one christian family renounced their religion or left the community. Are the atheists justified?

Why couldn't the Christians just keep it to themselves? I don't buy your either/or scenario.

The man who wanted to be a slave could never be a slave.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/slave

1. a person who is the property of and wholly subject to another; a bond servant.
2. a person entirely under the domination of some influence or person: a slave to a drug.


Couldn't either of these conditions be satisfied, even if the person voluntarily entered servitude?

The fact that you do not know what you have lost is no indication that you have lost nothing.

By objective valuation, but who would argue that happiness is objective?

The person would be better off were she free; she might not be consciously aware of this fact, but it is still there. All drugs and conditioning can do is suppress her realization of this; it cannot change it.

I have a tendency to pile up reworded versions of my statements that don't provide any substantiation. I guess I think they will bludgeon my counterpart into accepting my viewpoint. The only good thing about the tendency is the quick recognition of it in other people.

Why couldn't the Christians just keep it to themselves? I don't buy your either/or scenario.

I don't need to provide a rhyme or reason to every aspect of my scenario, I just have to point out a scenario where I think a utilitarian viewpoint would justify an act that is unjust.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/slave


Couldn't either of these conditions be satisfied, even if the person were voluntarily a slave?

A willing slave is subject to his own will, not the will of another. If his will ever comes in conflict with the will of his "master" then he ceases to become a willing slave.

Well, what people enjoy and how much is an individual thing and is different for everyone, isn't it?

Yes, but the variability is far less within the same society.

Sure there is. Unless you can objectively prove it somehow that Bill Gates gets fewer units of utility from a dollar than the Toowong Bag Man (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziggy_the_bagman).

I cannot objectively prove that Bill Gates or Toowong Bag Man are conscious at all. I can merely look at the evidence.

And yet, you use the theory of diminishing marginal utility. Bentham doesn't mention it...econ textbooks do.

Whether or not Bentham mentions it is irrelevant. It is easy to reach the same conclusion with most conceptions of utility.

Which brings a person more pleasure - being able to eat, or being able to go to the movies?

But you are just expecting. It's an assumption, and not one that has to hold true, especially in borderline cases.

In borderline cases, it doesn't hurt much if I am wrong.

You pick and choose from different concepts to build something that allows you some ultimate goal, for example to redistribute from some to others.

That's a vague enough accusation that I have no way of responding.

A lazy genius and nine dunces find themselves marooned on the island. The genius is capable, through his ingenuity, or providing comfortable shelter for the group. However, because of his laziness, he is only willing to provide comfort for himself. The others, who could provide for a meager living on their own, conclude (correctly) that they would be much more happy if they ganged up on the genius and forced him to work for them. The dunces gain a great deal of happiness while the genius is made a slave. Are the dunces justified?

No. Again, the harm to the genius is probably significantly greater than the happiness given to the dunces. Furthermore, the dunces did not attempt any alternatives.

Suppose a community of fifty atheistic families and one christian family existed. Every single one of the atheists abhorred christianity and its adherents. Therefore they would not be satisfied with their situations until the one christian family renounced their religion or left the community. Are the atheists justified?

No, but I agree that utilitarianism would disagree with me. My standpoint on this issue is more complex; I think that preferences should be weighed not only by intensity, but by legitimacy. A preference I have regarding my life is more morally significant than one that concerns other people's private religious beliefs.

This also gets around such problems as the religious fundamentalists who object to same-sex intercourse in their neighborhood, or the bigots who want to exclude Blacks, and so on.

Yes, but the variability is far less within the same society.
But it still exists, and that's the point.

I cannot objectively prove that Bill Gates or Toowong Bag Man are conscious at all. I can merely look at the evidence.
Such as?

Whether or not Bentham mentions it is irrelevant. It is easy to reach the same conclusion with most conceptions of utility.

Which brings a person more pleasure - being able to eat, or being able to go to the movies?
I don't know, ask the person. But the point is really: What brings more pleasure full stop - me eating, or you going to the movies?

In borderline cases, it doesn't hurt much if I am wrong.
And yet, the free market is a much more reliable tool for people to maximise their utility without any comparisons (and the resulting mistakes) being necessary.

That's a vague enough accusation that I have no way of responding.
I win at teh debating!!1! :p

By objective valuation, but who would argue that happiness is objective?

The emotional state of happiness is objective, however much its causes may not be.

I have a tendency to pile up reworded versions of my statements that don't provide any substantiation. I guess I think they will bludgeon my counterpart into accepting my viewpoint. The only good thing about the tendency is the quick recognition of it in other people.

That is actually not the intention. The idea is to clarify, to attempt a different way of making the point, since the last attempt failed. I was pointing out how "harm" was possible even without knowledge of harm, a point I glossed over in the post before that one.

Denying somebody the opportunity for genuine happiness is still a harm, even if they are not aware that they have lost the opportunity.

But it still exists, and that's the point.

Yes, they do. No cross-personal comparison will ever be perfect. But then again, we cannot be sure that human beings actually make the calculations of utility they are supposed to when buying goods, anyway.

Such as?

The fact that they have similar brain structures to mine, are of the same species, and behave fairly similarly. I do know that I am a conscious being.

I don't know, ask the person. But the point is really: What brings more pleasure full stop - me eating, or you going to the movies?

Almost certainly you eating. Again, we have basic psychological and cultural similarities that keep our desires within the same ranges; I know that I would attain more pleasure from eating than from doing to the movies, so I can reasonably assume that you would attain more pleasure from eating than I would from going to the movies.

And yet, the free market is a much more reliable tool for people to maximise their utility without any comparisons (and the resulting mistakes) being necessary.

The problem is that just as I cannot say that Bill Gates having his money redistributed will be a more utilitarian use of the money, you cannot say with certainty that him keeping it will be; the opportunity for mistakes is shared by both options. At most you can claim that the structure of free market incentives benefits everyone, but then your point has nothing to do with cross-personal comparisons of utility.

The emotional state of happiness is objective, however much its causes may not be.

And it is causes for happiness that we are dealing with. We would be hard pressed to maximize happiness without actually maximizing the causes of happiness.

That is actually not the intention. The idea is to clarify, to attempt a different way of making the point, since the last attempt failed.

I was just poking fun, I didn't actually think that was your reason for it.

I was pointing out how "harm" was possible even without knowledge of harm, a point I glossed over in the post before that one.

Actually, you just made the statement again.

Denying somebody the opportunity for genuine happiness is still a harm, even if they are not aware that they have lost the opportunity.

And "geniune happiness" is somehow better than fake happiness? Since the emotional state of happiness is objective, how are the two differentiated?

And it is causes for happiness that we are dealing with. We would be hard pressed to maximize happiness without actually maximizing the causes of happiness.

True, but even those are somewhat predictable. Human minds are biological, and their emotional states are rooted in natural processes.

Actually, you just made the statement again.

This only means that they are ignorant of the harm, not that the harm does not exist.

This is one of the places where I part ways with classical utilitarianism. There are different kinds of happiness, and some kinds are better than others. There is no equivalence between a truly content, clear-minded free person and a drugged slave.

The person would be better off were she free; she might not be consciously aware of this fact, but it is still there. All drugs and conditioning can do is suppress her realization of this; it cannot change it.

Well, I attempted to explain what I had said before, anyway, but looking at the posts again, I'm not sure I did a very good job.

And "geniune happiness" is somehow better than fake happiness? Since the emotional state of happiness is objective, how are the two differentiated?

Fake happiness is not feeling happy, it is thinking that one's feelings correspond to happiness.

But then again, we cannot be sure that human beings actually make the calculations of utility they are supposed to when buying goods, anyway.
Well, Bruno Frey and his mates are trying to find out.

The fact that they have similar brain structures to mine, are of the same species, and behave fairly similarly. I do know that I am a conscious being.
Well, I meant the evidence for diminishing marginal utility allowing us to make cross-personal comparisons.

Almost certainly you eating. Again, we have basic psychological and cultural similarities that keep our desires within the same ranges; I know that I would attain more pleasure from eating than from doing to the movies, so I can reasonably assume that you would attain more pleasure from eating than I would from going to the movies.
Well, I might be a supermodel movie freak. Or just not be a very excitable person who hates life, such that almost nothing really makes me very happy at all.

The problem is that just as I cannot say that Bill Gates having his money redistributed will be a more utilitarian use of the money, you cannot say with certainty that him keeping it will be; the opportunity for mistakes is shared by both options.
I can however say that he is maximising his personal utility, subject to his personal budget constraint, as is everyone else.
And when there is a scope for both sides to increase their utility by doing so, they will trade with each other. It's a way of maximising utility in society, without needing cross-personal comparisons.

At most you can claim that the structure of free market incentives benefits everyone, but then your point has nothing to do with cross-personal comparisons of utility.
Well, I put forward that cross-personal comparisons of utility are impossible, more or less by definition of the term. The free market is a way of organising things that doesn't need them.

Now you run into the problem MTAE has with his "enjoyment of non-existence". How does harm exist when a person is unaware of it?Ooh I can answer this one. If I kill you, and you don't know that you're dead, have I harmed you?

if the government isnt suppose to tell you what to do. whats the point in having laws?
some chick was shouting her pro-gay marraige views at me. liberals just make me more and more conservative.

if the government isnt suppose to tell you what to do. whats the point in having laws?To tell you what not to do. ;)

Llewdor, why the objection to the theory of diminishing marginal utility? It all ties in to the Subjective Theory of Value.
I just don't see the necessary connection between the two.

We can value things differently, the the doesn't mean that the extent to which I value something should be affected simply by how many of them I have.

I suspect somehow that diminishing marginal utility has been oversimplified to the point that it no longer makes logical sense.

By your logic, the US would be better off if we killed, say, 99% of the least happy citizens. Funnily enough, I don't hear that getting proposed anywhere. Do you know why? Because although they're not super-happy, they still enjoy their life; you cannot take that away in the name of your average. It's fallacious to think that a life has a negative value when it falls below an arbitrary average when it can, in fact, have a positive absolute happiness associated with it.
I don't think that's a strawman. I do think it demonstrates that people aren't actually utilitarians.
A lazy genius and nine dunces find themselves marooned on the island. The genius is capable, through his ingenuity, or providing comfortable shelter for the group. However, because of his laziness, he is only willing to provide comfort for himself. The others, who could provide for a meager living on their own, conclude (correctly) that they would be much more happy if they ganged up on the genius and forced him to work for them. The dunces gain a great deal of happiness while the genius is made a slave. Are the dunces justified?

Suppose a community of fifty atheistic families and one christian family existed. Every single one of the atheists abhorred christianity and its adherents. Therefore they would not be satisfied with their situations until the one christian family renounced their religion or left the community. Are the atheists justified?
I think utilitarianism demands that they are. To deny it is to deny utilitarianism. And you can do that, but I think you need to recognise that's what you're doing.
To tell you what not to do. ;)
Perhaps the most intelligent thing I've heard all day.

To tell you what not to do. ;)

Does that include not "marrying" someone of the same sex as you?

Right. I thought so.

To deny it is to deny utilitarianism.

Or to recognize that degree is just as important as quantity to a utilitarian calculation.

It is not a matter of majority rules.

Well, I meant the evidence for diminishing marginal utility allowing us to make cross-personal comparisons.

It's basically the same.

Well, I might be a supermodel movie freak. Or just not be a very excitable person who hates life, such that almost nothing really makes me very happy at all.

But if I give you (or the state takes from me and gives you) my ten dollar bill, and you're barely making enough money to eat, I can reasonably assume that your use of that money, whatever it is, will bring you as much pleasure as my use of that money for food to survive would.

I can however say that he is maximising his personal utility, subject to his personal budget constraint, as is everyone else.

But this doesn't tell us anything useful in terms of promoting public welfare.

And when there is a scope for both sides to increase their utility by doing so, they will trade with each other. It's a way of maximising utility in society, without needing cross-personal comparisons.

Only you have no way of knowing that it maximizes utility without cross-personal comparisons. Workers aren't paid according to the utility their wages will bring to them; they're paid according to the utility their labor will bring to their employer.

The free market is a way of organising things that doesn't need them.

Yes, but only because the free market is not concerned with maximizing total (or average) utility. If my concern is doing so, that is no way out.

I just don't see the necessary connection between the two.

We can value things differently, the the doesn't mean that the extent to which I value something should be affected simply by how many of them I have.

I suspect somehow that diminishing marginal utility has been oversimplified to the point that it no longer makes logical sense.
It does make sense though. Think of it this way. Say, you have 3 chocolates in a day. All satisfy you. However, you get to the point where either its taste no longer appeals as much to you or it's nauseating. It's marginal utility at this point diminishes.

I don't think that's a strawman. I do think it demonstrates that people aren't actually utilitarians.
It is a strawman because I was arguing nothing of the sort -- I was demonstrating the fallacy of his badly phrased proposition, until he clarified it to give it its intended meaning. But you are correct, I still have my doubts about utilitarianism.


But if I give you (or the state takes from me and gives you) my ten dollar bill, and you're barely making enough money to eat, I can reasonably assume that your use of that money, whatever it is, will bring you as much pleasure as my use of that money for food to survive would.
I think he is speaking of preferences between wants though. A need will of course take precedence over a want, so much is logical.

that doesn't mean that the extent to which I value something should be affected simply by how many of them I have.

Sure it does. That is the law of diminishing utlility, word for word. Let's say you've run a marathon and you're extremely thirsty. You might give a lot of money for a glass of water; you're practically collapsing with exhaustion. You might similarly pay a lot for the second glass, and maybe even the third glass. But by the tenth glass, you'd be more or less satiated, and you wouldn't agree to pay so much. By the hundreth glass, you wouldn't value to water at all; you'd have to be forced to drink it. The same applies to money (although you won't get sick of it). A homeless man is willing to stand on a street all day begging for $25 dollars. Do you think Bill Gates would do that kind of work? No; he has more money, and doesn't value each individual dollar as much.

True, but even those are somewhat predictable. Human minds are biological, and their emotional states are rooted in natural processes.

Happiness and harm are subjective sensations, so loss that affect happiness and harm must also be a subjective sensation. Objective loss that is unknown to the individual can have absolutely no affect on the individual's happiness or sense of harm.

Fake happiness is not feeling happy, it is thinking that one's feelings correspond to happiness.

You have lost me here, if one thinks that one's feelings correspond to happiness and has a sense of happiness because of it, how is that not geniune happiness?

Ooh I can answer this one. If I kill you, and you don't know that you're dead, have I harmed you?

Ok, I will assume that by killing me you mean instantly and painlessly ending my consciousness.

To that I can only reply that I do not know how to measure the harm in transitioning from a state of existence to a state of non-existence. Because of this I would state that there is no harm or that the question is unanswerable.

A willing slave is subject to his own will, not the will of another. If his will ever comes in conflict with the will of his "master" then he ceases to become a willing slave.

If a person owns himself and if ownership is transferable then one can voluntarily give up ownership of one's self to another.

Or to recognize that degree is just as important as quantity to a utilitarian calculation.

It is not a matter of majority rules.
Utilitariansim is about maximising total happiness. It is all about quantity, and the majority may well be able to increase total happiness by subjugating the minority. Utilitarianism requires that you support such things.

It does make sense though. Think of it this way. Say, you have 3 chocolates in a day. All satisfy you. However, you get to the point where either its taste no longer appeals as much to you or it's nauseating. It's marginal utility at this point diminishes.
But that's not strictly having more - that's having more than I can use. If I can stockpile those chocolates, then I'll continue to value them (because I can use them later), but if I can't stockpile them then I'm required to make myself ill to use them, and then they're not useful.

But not simply because I have more. It's because you've exceeded a relevant threshold.

Money doesn't have a relevant threshold. I can always use or stockpile money.

But that's not strictly having more - that's having more than I can use. If I can stockpile those chocolates, then I'll continue to value them (because I can use them later), but if I can't stockpile them then I'm required to make myself ill to use them, and then they're not useful.
No, the theory explains why after having consumed said 3 chocolates you will have no incentive to go and buy a fourth. MTAE's illustration of the concept is good too.

I think you're referring to saving a good for future consumption, which is a different scenario altogether. Diminishing marginal utility has more to do with the consumption of the next immediate good rather than saving for future consumption. When it comes to money I am more inclined to agree with you, except that the sating of needs takes precedence over that of wants, and therefore money employed with the former goal in mind is valued more than that with the latter.

I notice both Vittos and you have objections to utilitarianism; if so, what philosophical bases do you each go with? Natural rights?

I think he is speaking of preferences between wants though. A need will of course take precedence over a want, so much is logical.
Where is the difference though?

Is it just about guaranteeing survival? Or is it about maximising utility, in which case simply getting some tasteless nutrient paste may not be all that great, even if it does prevent death from starvation.

When it comes to money I am more inclined to agree with you, except that the sating of needs takes precedence over that of wants, and therefore money employed with the former goal in mind is valued more than that with the latter.
It's usually applied to money, and given subjective value of the value of the money itself is unknowable.
I notice both Vittos and you have objections to utilitarianism; if so, what philosophical bases do you each go with? Natural rights?
Pure reason (take that, Kant!).

I don't have an ethical position behind my arguments because I don't find any of them particuarly compelling. But I am happy to point out the logical holes where I see them.

Is it just about guaranteeing survival? Or is it about maximising utility, in which case simply getting some tasteless nutrient paste may not be all that great, even if it does prevent death from starvation.
Even when it comes to utility-maximisation, wouldn't a rational consumer opt to ensure their survival over sating wants? Wouldn't that grant any rational individual greater utility? As much as one may be obsessed with films, I do not see how a starving individual could derive greater utility from watching a film.


Pure reason (take that, Kant!).
My favourite. :) FYI, Kant's synthetic a priori is of great importance to Mises and praxeology.

I don't have an ethical position behind my arguments because I don't find any of them particuarly compelling. But I am happy to point out the logical holes where I see them.
I was rather curious as to what you base things such as property rights on.

I notice both Vittos and you have objections to utilitarianism; if so, what philosophical bases do you each go with? Natural rights?

I go with natural rights, but I have no good reason for it.

If a person owns himself and if ownership is transferable then one can voluntarily give up ownership of one's self to another.

That is beside the point.

If the person is a willing slave, then his master's ends are his own ends. Therefore he is still a means to his own ends and cannot be construed as a slave.

Even when it comes to utility-maximisation, wouldn't a rational consumer opt to ensure their survival over sating wants? Wouldn't that grant any rational individual greater utility? As much as one may be obsessed with films, I do not see how a starving individual could derive greater utility from watching a film.
You don't have to see it, you just have to accept that everyone can (not necessarily does) tick in their own special way.

The point is: where do you distinguish needs from wants, and how can you say that the satisfaction of needs is fundamentally different from the satisfaction of wants?

Both give the person in question a certain amount of utility. That amount is individual to a person, every person will invariably gain a different amount of utility from any given action.

So unless you presuppose certain things about people, you can't really make a difference. I might be suicidal, and my the things I need to do to survive aren't nearly as important as listening to emo music.

I might be suicidal, and my the things I need to do to survive aren't nearly as important as listening to emo music.

If you don't satiate your needs prior to splurging on your wants, you will cease to exist; it's that simple. By virtue of the fact that you are living, you must value your needs over your wants.

If a person owns himself and if ownership is transferable then one can voluntarily give up ownership of one's self to another.

incorrect because not even the person "owns" himself. It is more proper to say that the person has autonomy over himself. Now while that person can willingly chose to follow another, it is only until such a point as the person reasserts his own autonomy.

In that sense slavery is "willing" slavery. The definition of slavery is that it is not voluntary, you can not chose to leave.

If you don't satiate your needs prior to splurging on your wants, you will cease to exist; it's that simple. By virtue of the fact that you are living, you must value your needs over your wants.
Assuming that I am indeed trying to continue my life. There are plenty of people who commit suicide, and they obviously value their life not very highly.

Because his arguments are completely devoid of morality. Would our armed service grow if we forcibly impregnated every female prisoner and then took their children to raise as soldiers? Well, duh.

The problem is it utterly ignores morality. Most arguments work if you seek to be utterly inhuman.

I think (I certainly HOPE) that the person you're referring to is just being sarcastic. I am socially conservative, but i DO NOT advocate forcible (by "forcible", I mean against the female's will and without her consent) impregnation of female soldiers for ANY reason.

And I don't mean in the American way.

I notice that on most issues the majority of people on NSG will tend towards the "live and let live" philosophy. Some are committed libertarians or anarchists and will openly say so, others hold different views and are still liberal in social issues because it seems like common sense to them.

So, how come that you have relatively few outright moralists on NSG? Why isn't it a popular view here that there is an absolute set of social morals that everyone needs to adhere to, if necessary by being forced to do so?

And why is society at large apparently not like NSG in that respect?

I personally am socially conservative; I believe there are things people should and should not do, but I believe in "live and let live", so long as the person I'm "letting live" lets ME live also.

Assuming that I am indeed trying to continue my life. There are plenty of people who commit suicide, and they obviously value their life not very highly.

You're right; I misread what Europa was saying. Some consumers (whether rational or irrational) may choose to maximize their wants rather than their needs, as they feel they can derive additional happiness from the former. This occurs rarely, and it most often is borne out of misguided sentiments, but it does happen. There have been many documented places where one person has (nobly and irrationally) sacrificed his/her life so that another may live. A starving individual may opt to give a loaf of bread to another starving man, ensuring that the other man will continue living. Such an action may even be perfectly rational from both an objective and subjective perspective.

I think (I certainly HOPE) that the person you're referring to is just being sarcastic. I am socially conservative, but i DO NOT advocate forcible (by "forcible", I mean against the female's will and without her consent) impregnation of female soldiers for ANY reason.

he has made a thread suggesting that the armed forces could be augmented by impregnating female prisoners (not soldiers) and raising the resultant offspring as soldiers. He didn't at any time say "haha, just kidding' but rather continued to defend that position.

So he either believes it or is a troll.

You don't have to see it, you just have to accept that everyone can (not necessarily does) tick in their own special way.
Which I freely accept - as Soheran mentioned though, there is a human nature that does, for the most part, may influence the way in which we order our preferences. It is safe to assume that someone so starved that their mental faculties no longer operate to their full extent will derive very little satisfaction from a film.

The point is: where do you distinguish needs from wants, and how can you say that the satisfaction of needs is fundamentally different from the satisfaction of wants?
I would classify needs as anything necessary for survival, such as food, drink etc.

Both give the person in question a certain amount of utility. That amount is individual to a person, every person will invariably gain a different amount of utility from any given action.
Agreed.

So unless you presuppose certain things about people, you can't really make a difference. I might be suicidal, and my the things I need to do to survive aren't nearly as important as listening to emo music.
Human nature does not mean everyone is the same; quite the contrary. Indeed, a suicidal person will have different preferences to a non-suicidal individual. However, given that for the most part the human species has a penchant for survival, one can assume that most will prefer sating needs over wants.

You're right; I misread what Europa was saying. Some consumers (whether rational or irrational) may choose to maximize their wants rather than their needs, as they feel they can derive additional happiness from the former.
Would a non-suicidal, non-altruistic rational consumer ever do so though? Would they say, prefer more video games over bread, when they are starving, since the former need supersedes and indeed diminishes any utility provided by the latter want?

This occurs rarely, and it most often is borne out of misguided sentiments, but it does happen. There have been many documented places where one person has (nobly and irrationally) sacrificed his/her life so that another may live. A starving individual may opt to give a loaf of bread to another starving man, ensuring that the other man will continue living. Such an action may even be perfectly rational from both an objective and subjective perspective.
Yes, both altruism and nihilism are cases in which the consumer's preferences deviate greatly from the norm.

Would a non-suicidal, non-altruistic rational consumer ever do so though? Would they say, prefer more video games over bread, when they are starving, since the former need supersedes and indeed diminishes any utility provided by the latter want?

No, since you specified non-suicidal and non-altruistic. However, neither of these qualities are necessarily irrational (I know you didn't say that it was irrational). An altruistic individual can seek to maximize his own pleasure by performing good deeds, as he would be depressed had he not done so. A suicidal individual can similarly choose to end his life in order to minimize pain and thus maximize happiness. However, by definition, a non-suicidal individual must choose needs over wants, so the "non-altruistic" and "rational" stipulations were redundant.

However, by definition, a non-suicidal individual must choose needs over wants, so the "non-altruistic" and "rational" stipulations were redundant.
I inserted "non-altruistic" deliberately, to make reference to your example of a person preferring their death over another's starvation, though yes you could rightly term this as suicide. In any case, you got my point.

i'm a socially liberal guy, with a live and let live attitude.

I believe in the Welfare State and nationalized industry, i dug around and i seem to be classed as an "Anarcho Syndicalist (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarcho-syndicalism)" not that i completely agree but i'm closser to that than i am to Gordon Gecco.

i don't particularly like the idea of guns in the hands of the general public (see america) but Canadas low murder rate and high gun rate is always making me rethink my attitude (usually toward americans :headbang: ) lol.

everyone should basically have the freedom to do what they want without hurting others.
we all are obligated to look out for each other.

we should not trade liberty for security. if you want to be secure move to a police state - if you want to live free do so. Paul Revere had it about right.

I inserted "non-altruistic" deliberately, to make reference to your example of a person preferring their death over another's starvation, though yes you could rightly term this as suicide. In any case, you got my point.

Yeah, I wasn't trying to correct you; what you said was perfectly valid. I was just trying to make a point, but I did it extremely poorly. What I meant was that if you refine your parameters to "non-altruistic, rational" individuals, then there will be some that would value their wants over their basic needs. However, every non-suicidal individual would satiate his needs prior to indulging in his wants. What you said covered absolutely everything, and I was just trying to separate it into two groups of people, since one group may be rational and value wants over needs.

Well, I'm sure most people would agree with me when I say this...

It's good to be liberal! :D

It's good to be liberal! :D

I prefer being rich, hard-working, and responsible, thank you very much. :)

I think he is speaking of preferences between wants though. A need will of course take precedence over a want, so much is logical.

Not really. There is nothing rational about preferring needs to wants (nor anything rational about the opposite.)

Happiness and harm are subjective sensations, so loss that affect happiness and harm must also be a subjective sensation. Objective loss that is unknown to the individual can have absolutely no affect on the individual's happiness or sense of harm.

Well, firstly, with preference utilitarianism utilitarian "harm" has, justifiably, been distanced from "sense of harm." If I have a preference that my sexual partner not cheat behind my back, even if I never learn of it my preference would still be violated by the act, and in that sense I would be harmed.

Secondly, the "loss" here is indeed one of subjective sensation; all that is drugged away is the realization of that loss, the pain associated with it, not the loss itself.

A slave who has once been free might be more pained than one who has been a slave from birth, because she realizes her loss - but does that mean that the slave from birth has lost nothing?

You have lost me here, if one thinks that one's feelings correspond to happiness and has a sense of happiness because of it, how is that not geniune happiness?

The second part (the "sense of happiness") is indeed genuine happiness. What is "fake happiness" is having the first without the second.

Utilitariansim is about maximising total happiness. It is all about quantity, and the majority may well be able to increase total happiness by subjugating the minority. Utilitarianism requires that you support such things.

Yes, but usually when utilitarianism says it should happen there are good reasons that it should happen.

For instance, killing someone to save fifteen.

That is beside the point.

If the person is a willing slave, then his master's ends are his own ends. Therefore he is still a means to his own ends and cannot be construed as a slave.

If a person voluntarily gives up ownership of his self he becomes the property of another. If that person later becomes unwilling to be a slave later he doesn't have a choice. A slave can be unwilling and yet be a slave voluntarily as long as the tranfer of ownership was voluntary.

In that sense slavery is "willing" slavery. The definition of slavery is that it is not voluntary, you can not chose to leave.

Are legally binding contracts slavery if one party wants to opt out but not the rest?

Not really. There is nothing rational about preferring needs to wants (nor anything rational about the opposite.)

Assuming an individual interested in their survival, how is it not rational? If one is so deprived of their needs they can barely enjoy wants, I fail to see in what way they will not prefer need-satisfaction over want-satisfaction.

Assuming an individual interested in their survival, how is it not rational?

Because that individual might be more interested in temporary pleasure.

If one is so deprived of their needs they can barely enjoy wants

Who said that? Perhaps they are deprived of their needs, but can still enjoy wants.

Because that individual might be more interested in temporary pleasure.
Then they haven't got their long-term survival in mind, have they?

Who said that? Perhaps they are deprived of their needs, but can still enjoy wants.
An example to illustrate would be a person so starved that they collapse to the floor (or even less melodramatically, get dizzy). Would they then still be able to enjoy a movie? In such a case I'd think satisfying the need of hunger precedes satisfying the want of watching a movie.

Then they haven't got their long-term survival in mind, have they?

They might. They just might prefer temporary pleasure.

An example to illustrate would be a person so starved that they collapse to the floor (or even simply dizzy). Would they then still be able to enjoy a movie? In such a case I'd think satisfying the need of hunger precedes satisfying the want of watching a movie.

Perhaps they merely wish to sit (or collapse, as the case may be) in the theater?

Perhaps they merely wish to sit (or collapse, as the case may be) in the theater?
Perhaps (though what I meant is actually watching a movie through). The point I am making essentially is that to derive any satisfaction from a want (even temporary) any needs hindering said satisfaction would first have to be alleviated, otherwise the agent could hardly be said to be maximizing utility. In that sense, their need-satisfaction would take precedence. I could scarcely imagine a person operating differently.

Perhaps (though what I meant is actually watching a movie through). The point I am making essentially is that to derive any satisfaction from a want (even temporary) any needs hindering said satisfaction would first have to be alleviated. In that sense, their satisfaction would take precedence. I could scarcely imagine a person operating differently.
The goal would still be watching the movie though. Eating is (so to speak) just part of watching the movie, and watching the movie is what utility is derived from.

A model may absolutely hate the thought of eating, but force herself through it in order to derive utility from doing model-things (like doing cocaine...which may actually be something of an anti-need).

A model may absolutely hate the thought of eating, but force herself through it in order to derive utility from doing model-things (like doing cocaine...which may actually be something of an anti-need).
That is exactly what I am getting at. Alleviating the need may not bring satisfaction, but it may be the prerequisite of deriving satisfaction from something else. In this sense, its alleviation (since satisfaction seems to be leading to confusion) will take precedence.

That is exactly what I am getting at. Alleviating the need may not bring satisfaction, but it may be the prerequisite of deriving satisfaction from something else. In this sense, its alleviation (since satisfaction seems to be leading to confusion) will take precedence.
Let me go back a few posts then, to my original question:

How do you really distinguish a need from a want?

I'm talking about this from the perspective of a government which is utilitarian, ie it seeks to impose policies that maximise aggregate happiness.

If we were to categorically say "needs have precedence over wants" we may not be maximising happiness at all.

So in reality, the distinction becomes irrelevant from a policy perspective. We'd still have to look at every effect individually (or in conjunction with the related effects, as it were), regardless of whether it happened to be a need or a want.

The distinction is meaningless in the practical sense, thus weakening the argument for taking from those who only wish to satisfy wants and giving to those who seek to satisfy needs.
In principle, at least. In practice, in a pure Benthamite utilitarian society it may still be perfectly all right to redistribute if a previous investigation found it to increase aggregate utility.

Which is why I'm not a real fan of Benthamite utilitarianism: if overall people were happier if I were dead, it would be morally good to kill me. Or indeed, if the Nazis were overall happier about the Holocaust than the Jews were unhappy about it, then the Holocaust would be morally good.

Let's just not call social conservatives stupid, alright?

Not all of them, but plenty of them are.

There are plenty of stupid liberals too...

~Satanic Reverend Medved~

Which is why I'm not a real fan of Benthamite utilitarianism: if overall people were happier if I were dead, it would be morally good to kill me.

If you consider the kinds of circumstances where that would be true, the position does not appear so egregious.

Or indeed, if the Nazis were overall happier about the Holocaust than the Jews were unhappy about it, then the Holocaust would be morally good.

This is a real problem, not so much in practice (because the Holocaust and similar acts pretty much always lead to net suffering) but in theory. It goes back to the point I touched on in one of my replies to Vittos - only caring about preference satisfaction fails to consider the justness and legitimacy of preferences themselves. Why should we count bigoted preferences for genocide against Jews or fundamentalist preferences for prohibiting same-sex intercourse the same way we count preferences that seem to be legitimate concerns, like the preference to live, or the preference to be free?

Indeed, without such a distinction, the whole vaunted distinction between acts that harm others and acts that do not falls apart, because "harm" becomes so broad that essentially all acts are susceptible.

There are plenty of stupid liberals too...

A significantly smaller proportion. And there are far more intelligent arguments for liberalism out there than there are for conservatism; Neu Leonstein links to a decent one in his signature.

Does that include not "marrying" someone of the same sex as you?

Right. I thought so.No more so than it would include not marrying someone of the opposite sex as you.

Ok, I will assume that by killing me you mean instantly and painlessly ending my consciousness.

To that I can only reply that I do not know how to measure the harm in transitioning from a state of existence to a state of non-existence. Because of this I would state that there is no harm or that the question is unanswerable.Do you think it could possibly be measured if done to somebody else? If not, wouldn't this mean that killing someone instantly and painlessly isn't harmful?

And I don't mean in the American way.

I notice that on most issues the majority of people on NSG will tend towards the "live and let live" philosophy. Some are committed libertarians or anarchists and will openly say so, others hold different views and are still liberal in social issues because it seems like common sense to them.

So, how come that you have relatively few outright moralists on NSG? Why isn't it a popular view here that there is an absolute set of social morals that everyone needs to adhere to, if necessary by being forced to do so?

And why is society at large apparently not like NSG in that respect?

that's how it is at the moment, and has been for some time. but a forum like this (especially one as busy as this) changes over time with the coming and going of posters. i seem to remember getting very annoyed at the seemingly conservative or religious bias that used to pervade this forum ages back. now i hardly feel the need to debate as most people (other than teh trollz0rs of course) seem to pretty much agree with my views anyhow.
or maybe i'm just getting lazier....

either way, in this place people's most extreme views tend to be drawn out in the process of debate and having to defend their opinions. as such moderates probably tend to either be scared off or be 'radicalised', and social conservatives do tend to get labelled as trolls or are so against the majority of this forum that they too get scared off.
*shrugs*

Let me go back a few posts then, to my original question:

How do you really distinguish a need from a want?
As a third-person observer, you cannot really. It is for the individual in question to make the distinction.

I'm talking about this from the perspective of a government which is utilitarian, ie it seeks to impose policies that maximise aggregate happiness.

And I am talking about it from the perspective of a specific individual; I willingly submit that a government would be hard-pressed to make such a distinction, and then go on to pursue such policies. I think the confusion stems from this fact; that I am referring to a first-person rather than third-person individual.

I think the confusion stems from this fact; that I am referring to a first-person rather than third-person individual.
Fair enough. Though given that Bentham wrote to create a rule for the creation and enforcement of laws rather than on personal morality, I'm thinking that utilitarianism in its basic form is always government-related.

An individual is never going to value his or her own happiness the same as that of some other random who happens to be part of the society, so that person isn't going to be making decisions based on aggregate happiness, ie they're not really utilitarian.

Fair enough. Though given that Bentham wrote to create a rule for the creation and enforcement of laws rather than on personal morality, I'm thinking that utilitarianism in its basic form is always government-related.

An individual is never going to value his or her own happiness the same as that of some other random who happens to be part of the society, so that person isn't going to be making decisions based on aggregate happiness, ie they're not really utilitarian.

I'm not sure it matters whether people are utilitarians or not as long as utility is maximised. Believing in and enforcing natural rights may maximise utility more than a system where a person can be stripped of such "rights". At its most basic utilitarianism is about maximising utilty in what ever way works. Mises was an utilitarian who argued that a natural rights framework maximised utility.

Mises was an utilitarian who argued that a natural rights framework maximised utility.
Hehe, yeah.

I mean, Bentham was right when he said (basically) anyone who isn't a utilitarian, on a basic, personal level at least, is insane.

I'm thinking that Mill, considering the utilitarian he was, is probably a good role model to aim for. He tried very hard to work out a working argument on combining individual rights with the need to maximise aggregate happiness. I suppose he wasn't completely successful, otherwise the world would be a much better place, but he got pretty close.

Fair enough. Though given that Bentham wrote to create a rule for the creation and enforcement of laws rather than on personal morality, I'm thinking that utilitarianism in its basic form is always government-related.
It should be remembered that to order a society a government (at least in the form of state) is not absolutely necessary. In which case I suppose it'd always be related in its basic shape to the means of social ordering, to give it a more general form.

An individual is never going to value his or her own happiness the same as that of some other random who happens to be part of the society, so that person isn't going to be making decisions based on aggregate happiness, ie they're not really utilitarian.
Definitely. Any form of satisfaction-maximization should be ultimately up to the individual to establish, and not some arbitrary political entity. Hence I am all the more inclined to agree with utilitarianism as put forward by Mises or Mill.

Well, firstly, with preference utilitarianism utilitarian "harm" has, justifiably, been distanced from "sense of harm." If I have a preference that my sexual partner not cheat behind my back, even if I never learn of it my preference would still be violated by the act, and in that sense I would be harmed.

So one can be harmed even if their physical and emotional status is completely unchanged?

Let us imagine that I have developed some phobia of a thought-to-be-extinct creature. I am quite happy that the creature is extinct. Somewhere in a dense jungle, against my knowledge, this creature does exist. Am I being harmed by it's existence?

Secondly, the "loss" here is indeed one of subjective sensation; all that is drugged away is the realization of that loss, the pain associated with it, not the loss itself.

But it is typically not loss and gain that utilitarians are concerned with (although those are factors, of course) but natural "goods" such as happiness, pleasure, and preference satisfaction.

I understand why the loss is still there, but I don't understand why it should matter.

A slave who has once been free might be more pained than one who has been a slave from birth, because she realizes her loss - but does that mean that the slave from birth has lost nothing?

One cannot lose something that he or she has never had.

The second part (the "sense of happiness") is indeed genuine happiness. What is "fake happiness" is having the first without the second.

Then why is ignorant bliss any less a "good" than enlightened bliss? Why should we not prefer ignorant bliss to enlightened pergatory?

Do you think it could possibly be measured if done to somebody else? If not, wouldn't this mean that killing someone instantly and painlessly isn't harmful?

Unless one can experience earthly non-existence, whether through direct or second-hand observation (I have not yet heard of any reliable source for this information, nor have I died), then no, I don't see any chance of measurement; I would go so far as to guess any measurement of non-existence is a ridiculous point (I wouldn't write it off entirely, though).

And yes, it would mean that the end of consciousness itself would not be harmful.

And I don't mean in the American way.

I notice that on most issues the majority of people on NSG will tend towards the "live and let live" philosophy. Some are committed libertarians or anarchists and will openly say so, others hold different views and are still liberal in social issues because it seems like common sense to them.

So, how come that you have relatively few outright moralists on NSG? Why isn't it a popular view here that there is an absolute set of social morals that everyone needs to adhere to, if necessary by being forced to do so?

And why is society at large apparently not like NSG in that respect?

There were a lot more of them. We were crawling with them after Dubya got reelected. There were still a few before the mid-terms. It seemed that once the Dems took the legislature, the moralists cleared out because they were afraid that they'd have to be told how all the stuff they said was total crap. Especially how they said, over and over again, "America wants..."

I was rather curious as to what you base things such as property rights on.
Personal preference, really. I can measure the outcomes of various economic systems, and one with private property and a free market tends to produce results I like.

Which is why I'm lousy at making positive arguments. I'm not going to convince anyone of anythng because I know my positions lack objective basis. However, most other people's positions contain logical errors, so I try to point those out. If someone genuinely prefers different outcomes (like Soheran does), then we have no common ground. But many socialists believe socialism produces outcomes it doesn't.

If it matters, measure it.

So one can be harmed even if their physical and emotional status is completely unchanged?

Let us imagine that I have developed some phobia of a thought-to-be-extinct creature. I am quite happy that the creature is extinct. Somewhere in a dense jungle, against my knowledge, this creature does exist. Am I being harmed by it's existence?

Yes.

Or, rather, because you're right that "harm" is an awkward term there, you have an unsatisfied preference that's relevantly unsatisfied.

Edit: Though the proper formulation of your preference, in many cases anyway, may be something closer to "I am quite happy that I am not in situations where I interact with this creature." If it is not, there is probably a reason that your preference is specifically aimed at the mere existence of the creature, regardless of interaction, and the notion of that being a "harm" may be easier to swallow.

But it is typically not loss and gain that utilitarians are concerned with (although those are factors, of course) but natural "goods" such as happiness, pleasure, and preference satisfaction.

I understand why the loss is still there, but I don't understand why it should matter.

Because the loss of opportunity is the loss of opportunity to experience certain kinds of happiness.

The difference between the drugged slave and the enlightened slave is only that the drugged slave does not know that she has been deprived of this opportunity; she is thus not pained by this loss. The fact of her non-pain is separate from the fact of her loss.

One cannot lose something that he or she has never had.

So taxation is not theft if you never receive the money?

Then why is ignorant bliss any less a "good" than enlightened bliss? Why should we not prefer ignorant bliss to enlightened pergatory?

No, I am not comparing ignorant bliss to enlightened bliss.

I am comparing enlightened bliss to unenlightened non-bliss that is thought to be bliss.

Unless one can experience earthly non-existence, whether through direct or second-hand observation (I have not yet heard of any reliable source for this information, nor have I died), then no, I don't see any chance of measurement; I would go so far as to guess any measurement of non-existence is a ridiculous point (I wouldn't write it off entirely, though).

And yes, it would mean that the end of consciousness itself would not be harmful.Are you certain that the harm has to be able to be measured in order to exist? (That's what you seem to be saying here.)

Personal preference, really. I can measure the outcomes of various economic systems, and one with private property and a free market tends to produce results I like.

Which is why I'm lousy at making positive arguments. I'm not going to convince anyone of anythng because I know my positions lack objective basis. However, most other people's positions contain logical errors, so I try to point those out. If someone genuinely prefers different outcomes (like Soheran does), then we have no common ground. But many socialists believe socialism produces outcomes it doesn't.

If it matters, measure it.What outcomes do you like to see from an economic system?

Are you certain that the harm has to be able to be measured in order to exist? (That's what you seem to be saying here.)

I am saying that harm has to be measured to make the question answerable.

I am saying that harm has to be experienced to exist.

Because the loss of opportunity is the loss of opportunity to experience certain kinds of happiness.

Opportunity is only valuable to those who know they have it. Someone who is ignorant of opportunity will gain nothing from it.

The difference between the drugged slave and the enlightened slave is only that the drugged slave does not know that she has been deprived of this opportunity; she is thus not pained by this loss. The fact of her non-pain is separate from the fact of her loss.

And I am asking why the loss is more important than the perception of loss.

So taxation is not theft if you never receive the money?

This is a bad question, it requires a shitload of qualifiers to make it analagous with our discussion.

So I will make a new one that I think follows what you are getting at. Let us say that I am walking through the woods, and one of my footsteps brushes aside a rock that was previously covering a very valuable artifact. Unaware of my inadvertant discovery, I continue on my merry way. Another individual happens to be following some ways back on the trail and he discovers what I had unearthed. He picks it up, has it evaluated, and sells it to a museum for $500,000.

Certainly it is my labor that is integral to the discovery of the artifact, and certainly I had all the opportunity in the world to claim my value, only I was ignorant of the opportunity.

Therefore it is neither unjust for the other man to claim it, nor does it harm me in anyway for him to.

No, I am not comparing ignorant bliss to enlightened bliss.

I am comparing enlightened bliss to unenlightened non-bliss that is thought to be bliss.

But you are defining what can and cannot be bliss so that the individual who is subjectively experiencing bliss is not experiencing your bliss.

What outcomes do you like to see from an economic system?
I like to see opportunities to make a significant impact. If I can't actually affect the world, why am I bothering to live in it?

I like to see the poorest people in society have sufficient wealth to survive in relative comfort. As I've mentioned before, the United States features some of the richest poor people on the planet.

I like to see a society with feedback that encourages rational behaviour. This requires that society contain risks - penalities for bad decisions.

Countries with cold weather have a sort of synergy between the last two points. Being homeless in a place where winter will kill you provides a significant disincentive.

Opportunity is only valuable to those who know they have it. Someone who is ignorant of opportunity will gain nothing from it.

Only in this case someone must actively be made ignorant as well as forcibly be denied the opportunity.

The opportunity for the happiness that freedom permits is also not something that need be known before it can be exploited; it arises naturally from freedom.

And I am asking why the loss is more important than the perception of loss.

Because the loss is irrelevant to the perception. Whether or not the slave knows what the fruits of freedom are, they are still denied to her.

This is a bad question, it requires a shitload of qualifiers to make it analagous with our discussion.

So I will make a new one that I think follows what you are getting at. Let us say that I am walking through the woods, and one of my footsteps brushes aside a rock that was previously covering a very valuable artifact. Unaware of my inadvertant discovery, I continue on my merry way. Another individual happens to be following some ways back on the trail and he discovers what I had unearthed. He picks it up, has it evaluated, and sells it to a museum for $500,000.

Certainly it is my labor that is integral to the discovery of the artifact, and certainly I had all the opportunity in the world to claim my value, only I was ignorant of the opportunity.

Therefore it is neither unjust for the other man to claim it, nor does it harm me in anyway for him to.

It does harm you, if the man steals it from you without your consent. And you cannot give your consent, for you are ignorant of what it is you are consenting to.

But you are defining what can and cannot be bliss so that the individual who is subjectively experiencing bliss is not experiencing your bliss.

No, I deny he is experiencing bliss at all, or at least, if he is, it is only insofar as he is free, that the will of the master does not interfere with his will and his natural desires. And I would argue that if you freed him, he would recognize this.

I am saying that harm has to be measured to make the question answerable.

I am saying that harm has to be experienced to exist.Oh, I see. I suppose I was thinking that you could tell whether or not something was worse than something else just by comparing them without exact measurements, but of course a comparison is a form of measurement, which can't be done in this case.

I like to see opportunities to make a significant impact. If I can't actually affect the world, why am I bothering to live in it?

I like to see the poorest people in society have sufficient wealth to survive in relative comfort. As I've mentioned before, the United States features some of the richest poor people on the planet.

I like to see a society with feedback that encourages rational behaviour. This requires that society contain risks - penalities for bad decisions.

Countries with cold weather have a sort of synergy between the last two points. Being homeless in a place where winter will kill you provides a significant disincentive.This allows for many different types of economies; are there more criteria that lead you to have a +10 economic score on the Political Compass?