NationStates Jolt Archive

I believe that it is possible to be guilty of murder or accomplice of murder through inaction. For example, if one were walking along and one saw some guy killing a little kid or old lady, and one did nothing about it, I believe that person would have a degree of guilt in the crime. Similarly, if one was walking along and saw a huge metal door with someone locked inside, and had the ability to let the person out or they would starve to death, and they merely walked by, I think they would also be an accomplice in murder.

With that in mind, let's use this following example. Let's say that one was stranded on a bountiful island (emphasis on bountiful). After some time on this island, the person sees a child drowning out in the sea, and is able to swim out and rescue them. However, to do so would mean that they would have to live on the island as well, seeing as there is no way off. The island, since it was brought into productive use by the original person, belongs to him, and is his to use. However, to let the child drown would be an act of murder through inaction, much like the person locked in the room with no way out. Can the original person be obligated to rescue the child, without this meaning that there is some positive right held by the child and thus violating the negative rights of the original person?

I think the following would be a good answer. An inaction by the original person would be a violation of the negative rights of the child, seeing as how the person would effectively be murdering them, as well as the fact that the island is bountiful and able to support the both of them- saving the child would not end up killing them both. However, since the child will be living on the island with no reasonable alternative, he should be expected to give some sort of compensation to the original person, or at least be cooperative.

What do you all have to say?

I believe that Libertarian philosophy would dictate that you are under no obligation to save the person, regardless of how they ended up in their predicament. I would also say that I think it would be unfair to charge someone with the same crime as one they did not try to prevent.

That said, I dont think there is a libertarian out there who would respect someone who chose not to save someone. Part of the libertarian doctrine is that we should always be ready to defend others rights lest there be no one to help us when our rights are threatened. Libertarians generally feel that an abuse ignored is as bad as the abuse itself as it paves the way for more abuses.

As to the island question. I think philosophy is rarely the first thing in ones mind when there is a drowning child ie: I dunno.

Quite simply, it isn't reconciliable with negative rights. It implies an obligation to perform a service for another - rather than merely to avoid harming another.

You say it's "equivalent" to murder, which is of course true, but which is also what people who advocate positive rights have always insisted.

If you want a way out that preserves the spirit of negative rights, you can always say that while small sacrifices of personal convenience for compelling reasons (say, the lives of others) are obligatory, more profound sacrifices (of bodily autonomy, of basic personal freedom, of a large portion of your property, of your very life) are supererogatory. I happen to think that such a position is unacceptably arbitrary, but it has nevertheless been defended by many.

I think it infringes on my rights.

If I see someone getting mugged, I get punished for not helping them? what about my right to decide my own actions for myself?


Watching someone get mugged without helping is a crime?

what about watching someone starve? am I punished for not giving them money? That is a decidedly anti-libertarian policy.

There is a genocide going on in Darfur. I could go there and likely save a life or two, but I am choosing not to. Am I a murderer?

I think it infringes on my rights.

If I see someone getting mugged, I get punished for not helping them? what about my right to decide my own actions for myself?
Within reason. Their right to live, or at least live without serious injuries trumps your right to laziness.

There is a genocide going on in Darfur. I could go there and likely save a life or two, but I am choosing not to. Am I a murderer?

No. You are morally flawed (as we all are), but not to the degree of a murderer.

You are only morally equivalent to a murderer if your inaction is not based on a desire for personal convenience or security, or even on simple apathy, but rather on the conviction that it is a good thing for the people of Darfur to be slaughtered.

Nevertheless, you do have a moral obligation to help the people of Darfur to the best of your ability, short of causing more harm to yourself than aid to them.

Libertarians compose a great many philosophies. My own feeling is that self-defense is both a duty and a right. In addition, it is in one's own interest to defend others as a group can defend itself better than a single person can. Finally, when someone saves your life, you are in their debt. The best way to pay that debt, of course, is to pay it forward.

I believe that it is possible to be guilty of murder or accomplice of murder through inaction. For example, if one were walking along and one saw some guy killing a little kid or old lady, and one did nothing about it, I believe that person would have a degree of guilt in the crime. Similarly, if one was walking along and saw a huge metal door with someone locked inside, and had the ability to let the person out or they would starve to death, and they merely walked by, I think they would also be an accomplice in murder.

With that in mind, let's use this following example. Let's say that one was stranded on a bountiful island (emphasis on bountiful). After some time on this island, the person sees a child drowning out in the sea, and is able to swim out and rescue them. However, to do so would mean that they would have to live on the island as well, seeing as there is no way off. The island, since it was brought into productive use by the original person, belongs to him, and is his to use. However, to let the child drown would be an act of murder through inaction, much like the person locked in the room with no way out. Can the original person be obligated to rescue the child, without this meaning that there is some positive right held by the child and thus violating the negative rights of the original person?

I think the following would be a good answer. An inaction by the original person would be a violation of the negative rights of the child, seeing as how the person would effectively be murdering them, as well as the fact that the island is bountiful and able to support the both of them- saving the child would not end up killing them both. However, since the child will be living on the island with no reasonable alternative, he should be expected to give some sort of compensation to the original person, or at least be cooperative.

What do you all have to say?

the first paragraph of your argument is ludicris..lol...i have zero responsibility for your well being!
i am a good samaritan...but to legislate it is farsical...go give lenin a kiss you commie..lol
j/k
i always help people..to my detriment at times...but to legislate it is nothing more then another layer of gov,which we need less of...and contrary to human nature.
it also helps you decide who are decent people...i wont be friends with someone that would sit by idly and watch someone be beaten..i also would not be friends with someone that thinks the gov can change human nature....
people are inherently decent or they are not...you can debate nature verse nurture..but the fact remains...people are people...and any fucking law you write means nothing..it means only to you.
i would probably die to save a stranger...you even...but to be told too...i think not.

i hate the nanny state....and college seems to indoctrinate everyone they come into contact with..that the gov can solve all...that is false...it keeps them in authority and in control...

i will help you if your being attacked,cause i am nice...but no one should be forced to go against their nature by law..that is fucking stupid.

I believe that it is possible to be guilty of murder or accomplice of murder through inaction. For example, if one were walking along and one saw some guy killing a little kid or old lady, and one did nothing about it, I believe that person would have a degree of guilt in the crime.
That would be impossible. Not-acting is not an action, and just because you see something happen doesn't mean you're involved. That's guilt-by-association/guilt-by-proxy. It's an annihilation of justice to even suggest such a thing.

Thus, your example that you want a comment on really doesn't make any sense.

Within reason. Their right to live, or at least live without serious injuries trumps your right to laziness.
No it doesn't, for then they have a positive right against you, i.e. you are required to do something for them. But positive rights do not exist.

There was a case a couple of years ago, in Nevada, I believe. A guy went in to a public restroom, saw a friend of his raping an eight year old girl, and opted to leave. His friend killed the girl, and there was quite a bit of outrage, but no proscecution. In Nevada, he wasn't required to do anything. I think some states have "failure to render aid" laws. Anybody know?

I think the whole letting a crime happen thing is human nature yes it is generally not a good thing but still its like a happy slapping attack on a bus sure the people there could kick there asses and save the day but it requires someone to come up and actually say “fuck that shit” something which sheep find hard to do…

And libertarianism relies on the individual you can’t force people to be your police and you certainly can’t force them to care accept it or go for a much more authoritarian ideology

And as for the island I would use my head and try to save them without getting in the water. I think that means I would try to do something without putting myself in harms way

Edit: not that I’m libertarian myself…
Edit2: and to make my point having laws against human nature is ridiculous and doomed to failure

Like all previous posters have said this is irreconcilable with negative rights. One can advocate this on the grounds of utilitarianism but doing such is a violation of rights.

That would be impossible. Not-acting is not an action, and just because you see something happen doesn't mean you're involved. That's guilt-by-association/guilt-by-proxy. It's an annihilation of justice to even suggest such a thing.

Thus, your example that you want a comment on really doesn't make any sense.

Not-acting is an action- you choose to do it. If you just walk on by a guy knifing an old lady and don't do anything about it, you are effectively allowing him to do it. I'm not saying that you should go up and fight him- that would be dangerous to your own well-being- but if you can act without endangering yourself, such as calling the police, it should be obligatory or you're allowing someone else's rights to be violated. I'm not suggesting that if you walk on by you might as well have been knifing the old lady yourself, but there is a degree of liability for having decided to do nothing.

My own feeling is that self-defense is both a duty and a right. In addition, it is in one's own interest to defend others as a group can defend itself better than a single person can. Finally, when someone saves your life, you are in their debt. The best way to pay that debt, of course, is to pay it forward.

My thoughts exactly.

If someone is hitchhiking and the temp is below negative 20 celcius you have to pick him/her up. Its the law in Canada. Unless they are weilding a chainsaw or something.

Not-acting is an action- you choose to do it. If you just walk on by a guy knifing an old lady and don't do anything about it, you are effectively allowing him to do it. I'm not saying that you should go up and fight him- that would be dangerous to your own well-being- but if you can act without endangering yourself, such as calling the police, it should be obligatory or you're allowing someone else's rights to be violated. I'm not suggesting that if you walk on by you might as well have been knifing the old lady yourself, but there is a degree of liability for having decided to do nothing.


An "anarcho"-capitalist will never, never, never accept this argument no matter how well reasoned (which it is), or how long you try to convince him or her. Acceptance of this argument would require acceptance in a slightly different situation: watching a poor homeless person starve, but standing there doing nothing, means you've violated starving person's rights (mainly the right to freely engage in any human activity other than dying; commonly refered to as "life"). See where this is going? Even if one insists that the state doesn't need to force assistance, but a moral obligation still exists, the "anarcho"-capitalist will still manage to make the "logical" jump all the way to "OMGZ EVIL SOVIET RUSSIA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" Any obligation of any kind at all to behave like a human being is to be for "slavery," or some such other nonsense conclusion. Obviously, if the little old lady was getting knifed in the first place, she did something wrong, like being old or unable to afford a personal security detatchment. It's all about competition anyway; "survival of the fittest" right?

Of course, this all assumes that the "anarcho"-capitalist will admit that there are likely to still be starving homeless people in the utopia that exists only between his or her ears. I wouldn't hold my breath on that one either.

(edit: and besides, in a "perfect" world, the police either don't exist, or their services must be purchased a la carte, so the situation posited is still promoting "slavery" in that it forces the "anarcho"-capitalist to take action to either spend his own money [!] or directly step in to stop/prevent the violation of rights. Communism, I tells ya.)

There was a case a couple of years ago, in Nevada, I believe. A guy went in to a public restroom, saw a friend of his raping an eight year old girl, and opted to leave. His friend killed the girl, and there was quite a bit of outrage, but no proscecution. In Nevada, he wasn't required to do anything. I think some states have "failure to render aid" laws. Anybody know?

In Michigan, if I remember correctly, you can only be prosecuted for failure to render aid if you are responsible for putting the person in danger in the first place, or if your are somehow legally responsible for the person (ie: teacher, baby sitter, guardian, etc.)

Not-acting is an action
And black is white. I took that out of context, I know, but my point stands. It may be a choice, but it still does not constitute an action. The whole point of negative rights is that noone is legally liable for choosing inaction. Yes, if a person chooses inaction in certain situations (like the ones you described), that person is clearly a douchebag, but not a criminal if you believe that only violations of negative rights constitute criminality.

Not-acting is an action- you choose to do it.
Then there are an infinite number of things that I am not-doing, and by not-doing them, I am acting. Also, when I'm asleep, I'm even further not-doing things. Therefore....


If you just walk on by a guy knifing an old lady and don't do anything about it, you are effectively allowing him to do it.
So what? It might be aesthetically unpleasing, but it has nothing to do with rights or morality. You only have liability if you are the one so violating the person's rights/were negligant in your duties. If not, you have no liability.

Trying to stop someone from stabbing another person might get you stabbed too. So I don't know how this law would make things any better.

An "anarcho"-capitalist will never, never never accept this argument no matter how well reasoned (which it is),
No it isn't. It presumes that we have positive rights. That has yet to be demonstrated. As it is a flagrantly begged question, it's not well-reasoned!


Of course, this all assumes that the "anarcho"-capitalist will admit that there are likely to still be starving homeless people in the utopia that exists only between his or her ears. I wouldn't hold my breath on that one either.
There will be starving and homeless people.

So now that you're a proven liar....


(edit: and besides, in a "perfect" world, the police either don't exist, or their services must be purchased a la carte, so the situation posited is still promoting "slavery" in that it forces the "anarcho"-capitalist to take action to either spend his own money [!] or directly step in to stop/prevent the violation of rights. Communism, I tells ya.)
Only if you like strawmen. Which you clearly do.

Then there are an infinite number of things that I am not-doing, and by not-doing them, I am acting. Also, when I'm asleep, I'm even further not-doing things. Therefore....


The obvious difference being that in the situation described by Greill, one is aware of the crime being committed and yet purposefully chooses to do nothing (and thus is morally responsible for an informed and concious choice), whereas no such awareness or purpose exists during sleep (thus no choice or responsibility).

Trying to posit that Greill is claiming that one is individually guilty of all the evil in the world is a most blatant strawman.

Let us review:


For example, if one were walking along and one saw some guy killing a little kid or old lady...

There will be starving and homeless people.
So now that you're a proven liar....


The fact is that I have run into people who do think as I have described; as such, nothing in particular about my personal honesty has been "proven." However, I am fully capable of recognizing individuals who do not think as described.


Only if you like strawmen. Which you clearly do.

It's not a strawman if it's true (edit: which in my experience is often the case)

It's not a strawman if it's true.
Sigged.

Trying to stop someone from stabbing another person might get you stabbed too. So I don't know how this law would make things any better.

I would assert that not trying to stop the crime would create a situation where in the criminal element feels more and more confident and safe in continuing to commit crime in the future. (edit: obviously, such is a serious problem. Not helped much by our politician's insistance on disarming the population "for their own safety", either.)

Trying to stop someone from stabbing another person might get you stabbed too. So I don't know how this law would make things any better.
His examples weren't quite perfect. The point is, if it would not put you in any danger (like if you were Superman), should you be legally required to give at least a little bit of help.

His examples weren't quite perfect. The point is, if it would not put you in any danger (like if you were Superman), should you be legally required to give at least a little bit of help.

So you would put Superman in jail for not saving one person's life? Nevermind how many other lives he's saved and will save in the future if he is not in jail.

So you would put Superman in jail for not saving one person's life? Nevermind how many other lives he's saved and will save in the future.
Absolutely not.

The real question is, if he did something that would require a jail sentance, how would we keep him locked up. It's possible to execute him with cryptonite, but he wasn't given a death sentance, so no executions. My solution would be to destroy the sun because that's where he draws his power. If he so much as jaywalks...

The obvious difference being that in the situation described by Greill, one is aware of the crime being committed and yet purposefully chooses to do nothing (and thus is morally responsible for an informed and concious choice), whereas no such awareness or purpose exists during sleep (thus no choice or responsibility).
Ah, but they are both cases where I am not-acting. To make a separation requires a valid reason, lest a special plead be committed. And as of now, no valid reason has been proffered.


Trying to posit that Greill is claiming that one is individually guilty of all the evil in the world is a most blatant strawman.
And since no one is doing that....

The fact is that I have run into people who do think as I have described;
The fact is that you made a blanket claim. Now you have to live with it.


It's not a strawman if it's true
And it's not, your extremely limited experience notwithstanding.

Absolutely not.

The real question is, if he did something that would require a jail sentance, how would we keep him locked up. It's possible to execute him with cryptonite, but he wasn't given a death sentance, so no executions. My solution would be to destroy the sun because that's where he draws his power. If he so much as jaywalks...

So if Superman jaywalks we NEED to distroy the sun. But that will hurt the economy! Chanel and Rayban won't be able to give their sunglasses away.

The fact is that you made a blanket claim. Now you have to live with it.


I'll probably lose sleep too. *shrugs*

So if Superman jaywalks we NEED to distroy the sun. But that will hurt the economy! Chanel and Rayban won't be able to give their sunglasses away.
This is a dellema. How do we save the sunglasses industry while simultaneously eliminating Superman's source of power? We could set the southern hemisphere on fire. That way, everyone in the northern hemisphere would need sun glasses. Sure, everyone in the southern hemisphere would die, but who cares about Texas and Alabama.

So if Superman jaywalks we NEED to distroy the sun.

On my tax dollar? Like hell.


Sure, everyone in the southern hemisphere would die, but who cares about Texas and Alabama


I'd guess Texas and Alabama. (edit: it only just now dawning on me that neither Texas nor Alabama are in the southern hemisphere)

Ah, but they are both cases where I am not-acting.


True enough. However, the two cases are not equivalent as the first is the result of a choice, while the second (sleeping) is not. Thus, there is responsibility for the first, but not for the second.



And since no one is doing that....


Right, cause if you don't actually type your conclusion, but rather use "..." like a get out of jail free card,



Therefore....



you can claim whatever you want.

(... ; let's see if it works for me too ;) )

On my tax dollar? Like hell.

We can set up the Destroy the Sun Charity and hold bake sales and sell lottery tickets to finance Superman's punishment for jaywalking.

I believe that it is possible to be guilty of murder or accomplice of murder through inaction. For example, if one were walking along and one saw some guy killing a little kid or old lady, and one did nothing about it, I believe that person would have a degree of guilt in the crime. Similarly, if one was walking along and saw a huge metal door with someone locked inside, and had the ability to let the person out or they would starve to death, and they merely walked by, I think they would also be an accomplice in murder.

With that in mind, let's use this following example. Let's say that one was stranded on a bountiful island (emphasis on bountiful). After some time on this island, the person sees a child drowning out in the sea, and is able to swim out and rescue them. However, to do so would mean that they would have to live on the island as well, seeing as there is no way off. The island, since it was brought into productive use by the original person, belongs to him, and is his to use. However, to let the child drown would be an act of murder through inaction, much like the person locked in the room with no way out. Can the original person be obligated to rescue the child, without this meaning that there is some positive right held by the child and thus violating the negative rights of the original person?

I think the following would be a good answer. An inaction by the original person would be a violation of the negative rights of the child, seeing as how the person would effectively be murdering them, as well as the fact that the island is bountiful and able to support the both of them- saving the child would not end up killing them both. However, since the child will be living on the island with no reasonable alternative, he should be expected to give some sort of compensation to the original person, or at least be cooperative.

What do you all have to say?


It's tough, but it isn't reconcilable with negative rights, and while choosing not to help is an action, it is not an action that harms another, it is simply an action that doesn't help. If you are a hard-line follower of the libertarian creed, then you do not support any obligation placed upon one to help the other.

We can set up the Destroy the Sun Charity and hold bake sales and sell lottery tickets to finance Superman's punishment for jaywalking.
I like the idea of a bake sale. We could advertize it as the bake sale to end all bake sales.

We can set up the Destroy the Sun Charity and hold bake sales and sell lottery tickets to finance Superman's punishment for jaywalking.

But in a bake sale, the goods sold are donated, and those donating recieve none of the proceeds. Again with the communism...

I like the idea of a bake sale. We could advertize it as the bake sale to end all bake sales.

The Ultimate Going Out Of Business Sale. Everyone must go!

True enough. However, the two cases are not equivalent as the first is the result of a choice, while the second (sleeping) is not. Thus, there is responsibility for the first, but not for the second.
Bzzzzzzt. Begged question.



Right, cause if you don't actually type your conclusion,
I assumed you're intelligent enough to know what it is. I assumed incorrectly, it looks like. You just aren't intelligent enough to know what the conclusion is.

But in a bake sale, the goods sold are donated, and those donating recieve none of the proceeds. Again with the communism...
How exactly is that communism?

Trying to stop someone from stabbing another person might get you stabbed too. So I don't know how this law would make things any better.

You should at least get on your cellphone and call the police, not just walk by and pretend you didn't see anything.

It's tough, but it isn't reconcilable with negative rights, and while choosing not to help is an action, it is not an action that harms another, it is simply an action that doesn't help. If you are a hard-line follower of the libertarian creed, then you do not support any obligation placed upon one to help the other.

That is actually one of the best reasons there is to reject the "hard-line" libertarian creed.

A purely negative interpretation of rights and obligation leads to absurdities.

I assumed you're intelligent enough to know what it is. I assumed incorrectly, it looks like. You just aren't intelligent enough to know what the conclusion is.

I've got a dunce cap around here somewhere... *goes looking*

How exactly is that communism?


(it's not.)



<.<




>.>

Bzzzzzzt.

*checks the dryer*

That is actually one of the best reasons there is to reject the "hard-line" libertarian creed.

A purely negative interpretation of rights and obligation leads to absurdities.

It depends on what you consider an absurdity.

Some libertarians (myself included) are rigorously consistent and not afraid to bite a bullet or two.

It depends on what you consider an absurdity.

Some libertarians (myself included) are rigorously consistent and not afraid to bite a bullet or two.
Bullets are yummy...



Try a bullet flavored brownie. It's for a good cause.

Then there are an infinite number of things that I am not-doing, and by not-doing them, I am acting. Also, when I'm asleep, I'm even further not-doing things. Therefore....

Well, yeah, you are acting. You can never not be acting, unless you're dead. Even if you are just sitting in your chair, you are performing the action of sitting in your chair. I'm not suggesting that people go around and hunt for people stabbing old ladies- that would be ludicrous. However, when there is a clear situation in which one can see that an action can be taken to save someone else's life that does not endanger one's own welfare, one knows the consequence (certain death or serious injury) of doing otherwise (which is always an action), and does not do it, you are allowing the violation of another person's rights, and thus somewhat liable.

So what? It might be aesthetically unpleasing, but it has nothing to do with rights or morality. You only have liability if you are the one so violating the person's rights/were negligant in your duties. If not, you have no liability.

But the person IS negligent in their duties to respect other's rights, by acting to do nothing, just as the criminal is not respecting other rights by knifing them. While the actions are not equivalent in their violation, there is still liability for both.

It's tough, but it isn't reconcilable with negative rights, and while choosing not to help is an action, it is not an action that harms another, it is simply an action that doesn't help. If you are a hard-line follower of the libertarian creed, then you do not support any obligation placed upon one to help the other.

But I say it is an action that harms others, in that it allows the violation of another's rights to proceed unhindered. If I accidentally run over someone, and my car pins them, and they ask me to help them, and I decide to walk away and have a smoke instead, wouldn't that be an act that doesn't help either? I'm not doing anything more to them. But in my unwillingness to act to help, I am harming them by keeping them pinned. If there is no obligation upon anyone ever, doesn't that mean that parents could drop their kids off in the middle of nowhere and not be culpable? They're not actually doing anything harmful to them, at least not directly. But they would be culpable, because they are responsible for those children, and are in fact harming them even though they have not done anything directly.

Also, what is the libertarian creed? Is it Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism, or Mises' minarchism? Does it have a gold standard, or monetary policy like Friedman? Is it pro-choice like Ayn Rand, or pro-life like Ron Paul? Isolationist and pacifist like the Old Right, or hawkish like QandO? Does it shy away from being termed "right-wing", even economically, or does it oppose all things leftist ferociously? There are so many different strands of thought to libertarian creed, but perhaps that is libertarianism's strength, the diversity and vibrance of its thought.

Also, what is the libertarian creed? Is it Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism, or Mises' minarchism? Does it have a gold standard, or monetary policy like Friedman? Is it pro-choice like Ayn Rand, or pro-life like Ron Paul? Isolationist and pacifist like the Old Right, or hawkish like QandO? Does it shy away from being termed "right-wing", even economically, or does it oppose all things leftist ferociously? There are so many different strands of thought to libertarian creed, but perhaps that is libertarianism's strength, the diversity and vibrance of its thought.

Ah, the fundamental quandry of all religious movements. Talk about debates that will never be resolved.

It depends on what you consider an absurdity.

Some libertarians (myself included) are rigorously consistent and not afraid to bite a bullet or two.

Really?

Okay. Let me waste the few remaining hours of my weekend on this, and see how far you'll go. :)

So I really hate the women down the street. I don't have a reason for my hatred; she's done nothing to me, in fact she's a quite decent and intelligent woman. But for purely arbitrary reasons, I harbor for her a lot of malice. One day, she's walking beside a river, and I walk up behind her and push her in. Unfortunately, she can't swim, and she drowns and dies.

Murder, right? I violated her negative rights. How despicable.

Now let's change the example slightly. Instead of actually pushing her into the water, I merely watch her walk across slippery stones, knowing (as she does not) that she will almost certainly fall. Once she does, I can save her with very little effort - I'm an excellent swimmer, I have no trouble with a little bit of physical exertion, and since I don't care much for her anyway, I have no fear of failure. But I don't, not out of apathy or laziness or some other such thing, but solely out of malice. I hate her. I want her to die. So I let her fall into the river, and then I watch amusedly as she drowns.

This time, I didn't violate her negative rights. But my motive was exactly the same as in the prior example. So was the result of my action. If you were to prohibit me from not saving her, I'd lose no more than if you prohibited me from murdering her.

Are you honestly going to say that there's a morally relevant difference between the two situations?

Also, what is the libertarian creed? Is it Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism, or Mises' minarchism? Does it have a gold standard, or monetary policy like Friedman? Is it pro-choice like Ayn Rand, or pro-life like Ron Paul? Isolationist and pacifist like the Old Right, or hawkish like QandO? Does it shy away from being termed "right-wing", even economically, or does it oppose all things leftist ferociously? There are so many different strands of thought to libertarian creed, but perhaps that is libertarianism's strength, the diversity and vibrance of its thought.
Well said. The leaders LP of America should read this.

But I say it is an action that harms others, in that it allows the violation of another's rights to proceed unhindered. If I accidentally run over someone, and my car pins them, and they ask me to help them, and I decide to walk away and have a smoke instead, wouldn't that be an act that doesn't help either?


But in that case you are directly responsible for the victim's predicament; thus the moral obligation is obvious. This isn't the same as happening upon a crime that one otherwise has nothing to do with.


If there is no obligation upon anyone ever, doesn't that mean that parents could drop their kids off in the middle of nowhere and not be culpable?


I swear I've seen "libertarians" argue exactly that. The worthlessness of my limited experience notwithstanding, of course.

Try a bullet flavored brownie. It's for a good cause.

They take pictures, too. (http://www.eastman.org/fm/brownie/mE13000037.jpg)

But I say it is an action that harms others, in that it allows the violation of another's rights to proceed unhindered. If I accidentally run over someone, and my car pins them, and they ask me to help them, and I decide to walk away and have a smoke instead, wouldn't that be an act that doesn't help either? I'm not doing anything more to them. But in my unwillingness to act to help, I am harming them by keeping them pinned. If there is no obligation upon anyone ever, doesn't that mean that parents could drop their kids off in the middle of nowhere and not be culpable? They're not actually doing anything harmful to them, at least not directly. But they would be culpable, because they are responsible for those children, and are in fact harming them even though they have not done anything directly.

How can one harm another without any interaction?

Concerning your scenario, however, any further harm that occurs by your lack of help is simply harm caused by your earlier actions, so in that case, your lack of help is actually causing harm.

Also, what is the libertarian creed? Is it Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism, or Mises' minarchism? Does it have a gold standard, or monetary policy like Friedman? Is it pro-choice like Ayn Rand, or pro-life like Ron Paul? Isolationist and pacifist like the Old Right, or hawkish like QandO? Does it shy away from being termed "right-wing", even economically, or does it oppose all things leftist ferociously? There are so many different strands of thought to libertarian creed, but perhaps that is libertarianism's strength, the diversity and vibrance of its thought.

From For a New Liberty, by Murray Rothbard:

THE LIBERTARIAN CREED rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the "nonaggression axiom." "Aggression" is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synony*mous with invasion.

According to this, while it would not be legally wrong to ignore the person in need, it would be morally wrong for another to force the person to help.

There's another problem with the distinction between "negative" and "positive" rights that can lead to absurdity - where do you draw the line?

Do I have to actually shoot somebody to violate her rights? Or does handing her murderer a gun, knowing how it will be used, count? What if I work for an institution that's actively engaged in murder; do I have a moral obligation to resign? If I pay someone to kill someone else, am I a participant in the crime?

If I am, doesn't acknowledging complicity justify (perhaps limited) positive rights (say, restrictions on certain kinds of voluntary transfers)? If I'm not, why on Earth am I not? Are you really going to say that an active murderer is of a different moral character than someone who deliberately and knowingly aids in the murder?

But in that case you are directly responsible for the victim's predicament; thus the moral obligation is obvious. This isn't the same as happening upon a crime that one otherwise has nothing to do with.

But I'd (hopefully) be prosecuted for both running over the person AND failing to render aid, not just hitting the person. Is the action of leaving the person pinned and letting the old lady get knifed really all that different? They're both inactions, and don't directly do anything- but both permit the situations that rob people of their rights to persist, even though there are actions that do not cost everyone their welfare, but rather improve it, and whose consequences have certain effects.

I swear I've seen "libertarians" argue exactly that.

I'm not surprised...

But I'd (hopefully) be prosecuted for both running over the person AND failing to render aid, not just hitting the person.


Yes, but in this very specific case, the second charge of "failing to render aid" is likely to be considered an extention of the first.


Is the action of leaving the person pinned and letting the old lady get knifed really all that different?


To the extent that the injury in the first cause is caused by you, and in the second case by someone else, no, they are not the same. I agree that there is a moral obligation to assist the old lady, I disagree that the illustration of hitting someone with a car demonstrates why.

Yes, but in this very specific case, the second charge of "failing to render aid" is likely to be considered an extention of the first.

But saying that failing to render aid in one case and failing to render aid in another case is completely inconsistent. Neither of them are direct actions or, in and of themselves, cause harm. But both let situations that violate people's rights persist, even when there is a safe and clear alternative and a certain consequence for doing otherwise.

To the extent that the injury in the first cause is caused by you, and in the second case by someone else, no, they are not the same. I agree that there is a moral obligation to assist the old lady, I disagree that the illustration of hitting someone with a car demonstrates why.

How would you phrase it?

This is a good example for highlighting the moral bankruptcy of 'negative rights libertarianism.'

The problem with legislating something like this would be ascertaining the degree of culpability (if any) of the person who walked by - turning it into just another drawn-out, expensive, legal mess.

For example, if I were a seven-foot Maori guy and I walked past someone knifing a little old lady, you bet I'd be wading in there to help Grandma.

The reality, though, is that I am a five-foot tall, non-athletic and heavily pregnant woman, and therefore in as much danger as Grandma were I to intervene. Also, I frankly consider I have more of a duty of care to my baby than to Grandma.

(This is not to say I wouldn't be on the phone to the cops the moment I had slunk round the corner, however.)

Assuming that neither of us has a cell, would I be held to be as culpable as the big guy under the proposed legislation? Would this be decided sometime pre-trial? It opens up a big mess.

I'm a lefty but I don't see why a law expecting all members of society to expose themselves to danger where arbitrarily deemed necessary should be enacted.

But saying that failing to render aid in one case and failing to render aid in another case is completely inconsistent.


Yes, that's true. But that still doesn't make your case. In the first case, hitting someone with a car, the obligation to assist is obvious; you caused someone direct injury, you are responsible to make it right. In the second case, you, as the person who happens by, are not causing direct injury, the assailant with the knife is. Thus, appealing to direct injury doesn't work in this case; you need to find another justification.


How would you phrase it?


I'm not a baboon. I'm not really sure how else to say it. (edit: perhaps another line of inquiry would explore the necessary implications of a society based on non-initiation of force, like libertarians claim to want. Demanding a society based on such values doesn't really mean much if we wait until after the little old lady is dead before rendering justice on the offender. "Yeah, lady, you have a right to not be a victim of aggression. Now, hurry up and die so we can get to punishing your killer." If non-initiation of force is to have any practical meaning, there must be effort made to deter and punish aggression as soon as it happens by a population of individuals who are willing to come to each others defense at a moments notice. The matter of law is irrevelant; the response should be an automatic part of being "libertarian." If people aren't willing to take such a strong stand against aggression, they should not be surprised if the aggressor feels secure in the commission of his crimes.)

Well, yeah, you are acting.
But the non-action of not-acting insofar as not doing what you think I should be doing is not in and of itself an action.

At least not unless you're Hegel. Because then everything's a contradiction.


You can never not be acting, unless you're dead. Even if you are just sitting in your chair, you are performing the action of sitting in your chair. I'm not suggesting that people go around and hunt for people stabbing old ladies- that would be ludicrous. However, when there is a clear situation in which one can see that an action can be taken to save someone else's life that does not endanger one's own welfare, one knows the consequence (certain death or serious injury) of doing otherwise (which is always an action), and does not do it, you are allowing the violation of another person's rights, and thus somewhat liable.
No you're not.



But the person IS negligent in their duties to respect other's rights, by acting to do nothing,
Prove it.



But I say it is an action that harms others, in that it allows the violation of another's rights to proceed unhindered. If I accidentally run over someone, and my car pins them, and they ask me to help them, and I decide to walk away and have a smoke instead, wouldn't that be an act that doesn't help either?
You caused the problem. False analogy.

This is a good example for highlighting the moral bankruptcy of 'negative rights libertarianism.'
And exactly how is it "morally bankrupt"? Remember: you can't just assert that it is. You actually have to demonstrate that just seeing something bad happen entails a duty to correct it.

Tall task. Get to it.

*checks the dryer*
You forgot the fabric softener sheet. And you forgot to clear up the begged question. But that's just normal for you.

I swear I've seen "libertarians" argue exactly that. The worthlessness of my limited experience notwithstanding, of course.
Of course, since you're quite clearly lying your ass off at this point.

Really?

Okay. Let me waste the few remaining hours of my weekend on this, and see how far you'll go. :)

So I really hate the women down the street. I don't have a reason for my hatred; she's done nothing to me, in fact she's a quite decent and intelligent woman. But for purely arbitrary reasons, I harbor for her a lot of malice. One day, she's walking beside a river, and I walk up behind her and push her in. Unfortunately, she can't swim, and she drowns and dies.

Murder, right? I violated her negative rights. How despicable.

Now let's change the example slightly. Instead of actually pushing her into the water, I merely watch her walk across slippery stones, knowing (as she does not) that she will almost certainly fall. Once she does, I can save her with very little effort - I'm an excellent swimmer, I have no trouble with a little bit of physical exertion, and since I don't care much for her anyway, I have no fear of failure. But I don't, not out of apathy or laziness or some other such thing, but solely out of malice. I hate her. I want her to die. So I let her fall into the river, and then I watch amusedly as she drowns.

This time, I didn't violate her negative rights. But my motive was exactly the same as in the prior example. So was the result of my action. If you were to prohibit me from not saving her, I'd lose no more than if you prohibited me from murdering her.

Are you honestly going to say that there's a morally relevant difference between the two situations?
Of course.

In the first situation, you caused the problem. In the second, you didn't, no matter if you liked her or not. Your thoughts didn't cause her to fall--at least not unless you're some sort of Jedi or Sith. And those only exist in movies.

Unless, of course, you believe that the Jedi and Sith are real. At which point I would then have to question your ability to discern reality from fantasy.

The problem with legislating something like this would be ascertaining the degree of culpability (if any) of the person who walked by - turning it into just another drawn-out, expensive, legal mess.

For example, if I were a seven-foot Maori guy and I walked past someone knifing a little old lady, you bet I'd be wading in there to help Grandma.

The reality, though, is that I am a five-foot tall, non-athletic and heavily pregnant woman, and therefore in as much danger as Grandma were I to intervene. Also, I frankly consider I have more of a duty of care to my baby than to Grandma.

(This is not to say I wouldn't be on the phone to the cops the moment I had slunk round the corner, however.)

Assuming that neither of us has a cell, would I be held to be as culpable as the big guy under the proposed legislation? Would this be decided sometime pre-trial? It opens up a big mess.

I'm a lefty but I don't see why a law expecting all members of society to expose themselves to danger where arbitrarily deemed necessary should be enacted.

I understand, but my conditions were as follows to be culpable- one must be able to act to stop the violation without endangering one's own welfare, be certain of the consequences that will happen from inaction, and not act anyway. I never suggested that one would be as culpable as having done it, because you didn't. However, there is a level of liability in having not acted even though it was possible to do so without danger to one's own welfare and knowing the consequences of doing otherwise.

Yes, that's true. But that still doesn't make your case. In the first case, hitting someone with a car, the obligation to assist is obvious; you caused someone direct injury, you are responsible to make it right. In the second case, you, as the person who happens by, are not causing direct injury, the assailant with the knife is. Thus, appealing to direct injury doesn't work in this case; you need to find another justification.

Perhaps, but the example has to be different from the original, since to make the exact same argument again is just repeating oneself. There is still a failure to aid that is ultimately negative to the person, even if it is not a direct action against them. Both are actions that allow them to be harmed, even if, by themselves, they do not actually hurt them. One may be more serious than the other, but they are ultimately very similar, in that neither are initiations of force but both are detrimental to the person's rights.

I'm not a baboon. I'm not really sure how else to say it. (edit: perhaps another line of inquiry would explore the necessary implications of a society based on non-initiation of force, like libertarians claim to want. Demanding a society based on such values doesn't really mean much if we wait until after the little old lady is dead before rendering justice on the offender. "Yeah, lady, you have a right to not be a victim of aggression. Now, hurry up and die so we can get to punishing your killer.")

I'd think rather it's "negative rights only prohibit direct action", but it does make negative rights collapse partially through this.

Of course, since you're quite clearly lying your ass off at this point.

But since I have the benefit of being able to consult someone with the ability to read minds from long distances, my errant ways will no doubt be corrected in no time. :)

One may be more serious than the other, but they are ultimately very similar, in that neither are initiations of force but both are detrimental to the person's rights.


How is hitting someone with a car not an initiation of force? Granted, it might have been an accident, however, an injustice has still been done, even if not explicitly criminal; this injustice still needs rectification. The direct obligation, unlike the "little old lady" situation, is still established.

But since I have the benefit of being able to consult someone with the ability to read minds from long distances, my errant ways will no doubt be corrected in no time. :)
Your statements rank up there with the apologists who try the "I used to be an atheist and tried to disprove the bible, but I found it was 100% accurate." route. So please--don't insult the intelligence of the people here.

How is hitting someone with a car not an initiation of force? Granted, it might have been an accident, however, an injustice has still been done, even if not explicitly criminal; this injustice still needs rectification. The direct obligation, unlike the "little old lady" situation, is still established.

No, not the hitting the person with the car, since that is obviously an initiation of force. The part where he is left to be pinned is not a direct act, since the car is doing the damage, not the person. However, I would say that leaving the person pinned is a crime in and of itself, since it is leaving the person to be harmed, even if not directly.

I'd think rather it's "negative rights only prohibit direct action", but it does make negative rights collapse partially through this.

Note that I expanded my comment:


(edit: perhaps another line of inquiry would explore the necessary implications of a society based on non-initiation of force, like libertarians claim to want. Demanding a society based on such values doesn't really mean much if we wait until after the little old lady is dead before rendering justice on the offender. "Yeah, lady, you have a right to not be a victim of aggression. Now, hurry up and die so we can get to punishing your killer." If non-initiation of force is to have any practical meaning, there must be effort made to deter and punish aggression as soon as it happens by a population of individuals who are willing to come to each others defense at a moments notice. The matter of law is irrevelant; the response should be an automatic part of being "libertarian." If people aren't willing to take such a strong stand against aggression, they should not be surprised if the aggressor feels secure in the commission of his crimes.)


I think there is a tendency for libertarians (note that I also speak from my own thinking early in my intoduction to libertarian politics) to believe that they can completely re-work how society operates, fashoning it according to libertarian political ideals, but in a completely passive or non-aggressive way. But, of course, other opposed elements will do whatever they can to prevent the libertarians from succeeding. This is why I find those who refuse to participate in the political process so amusing; they obviously want to fail.

If the goal is to establish a society based on the non-initiation of force, then those who hold this goal must be willing to defend themselves against such initiations, directly and actively, contrary to the thinking described above. By extention, if they want anyone to take them seriously, they must also be willing to defend others; society as a whole is not going to be willing to reform itself along libertarian lines, if libertarians cannot demonstrate that society can benefit from doing so. At any rate, it seems fantastically inconsistant, even hypocritical, for those claiming allegiance to non-initiation of force to then try to claim a right to stand by and let an act of aggression against a fellow human occur without challenge.

This has nothing to do with "what should the law require" or "what should morality require." It's simply a matter of intellectual consistancy. If I hate aggression, and I want to eliminate aggression, then I must stand against it where ever it is. That means going to the aid of the "little old lady" (in whatever way I can, directly or otherwise) if necessary. (edit: Of course, being a student of foreign policy, I realize now that I am also crafting a defense of interventionist international relations along libertarian lines. A couple of quarters ago, I was reading a justification of interventionism in one of my textbooks, and the author's argument floored me: "appeals to right of sovereignty doesn't work because states don't have rights, only individual human beings do, and it is the duty of individual human beings to defend those rights against those states that violate them." Again, how can a anti-aggression libertarian just stand by and let aggression happen, and not be a hypocrite? I'm not claiming to accept the argument completely, but its certainly interesting to think about.)

Again, I'm not sure how else to say it.

let the kid drown . . . you don't have a beach towel to dry yourself with.

The part where he is left to be pinned is not a direct act, since the car is doing the damage, not the person.


The distinction is specious; the car would not be inflicting injury on the person if not for the direct (even if accidental) action of the driver.

Of course.

In the first situation, you caused the problem. In the second, you didn't, no matter if you liked her or not. Your thoughts didn't cause her to fall--at least not unless you're some sort of Jedi or Sith. And those only exist in movies.

This distinction, while factually accurate, is morally irrelevant.

It is morally irrelevant because the distinction between what we cause or don't cause, between active "killing" and passive "letting die," is useless once we control for context.

It is clear that there is a difference between, to borrow Greill's example in the OP, watching someone drown from your bounteous island and actively dropping them into the ocean. In the first case, your possible reasons are manifold - perhaps you are apathetic, perhaps lazy, or you value your privacy, or you don't want to use what you have for the survival of another. Forcing you to ignore these considerations simply out of compassion for another could be reasonably construed as a violation of your liberty. In the second case, however, you actively desire the person's death - you don't just not care whether she lives or dies, you desire her death, and you are willing to take action for it to happen.

I happen to think that none of the reasons I mentioned in the first case are good reasons for ignoring the death of the drowning person, but certainly they are mitigating factors. The person who is merely apathetic is not morally equivalent to the person who is actively malicious. But once we have removed the issue of motive, there is no good basis for making the decision between what I cause and what I do not cause. Either way, I wanted her to die; either way, I acted on this desire, solely because I wanted her to die. Either way, she in fact died, because of my actions. And either way, I am morally responsible for her death in exactly the same way.

Forcing me to save her, when the only thing restraining me is a desire for her death, is not relevantly different from forcing me not to kill her. The only "liberty" I am being denied is the liberty to seek her death - precisely the same liberty denied by prohibiting murder.

You happen to believe in an incoherent basis for rights, so I doubt you will pay any serious attention to my arguments here, but perhaps someone else will.

Liberty EKB;11908245']let the kid drown . . . you don't have a beach towel to dry yourself with.

Thus the establishment of the moral obligation to "[not] forget to bring a towel!"

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/f/fb/Towelie.jpg/170px-Towelie.jpg

Is there anything that show can't teach us?

Your statements rank up there with the apologists who try the "I used to be an atheist and tried to disprove the bible, but I found it was 100% accurate." route. So please--don't insult the intelligence of the people here.

Glory, Hallelujah, Fire, Brimstone, etc, so on and so forth. *shrugs*

By the way, you're all idiots. :D

But since I have the benefit of being able to consult someone with the ability to read minds from long distances

Oh, I'm not the only one who's noticed this particular talent of BAAWA's?

It's quite impressive... almost on par with, I don't know, people's thoughts causing others to fall into rivers.

Oh, I'm not the only one who's noticed this particular talent of BAAWA's?

I suppose I shouldn't be surprised that a militant atheist (http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/BAAWA) would try to go out of his way to characterize his opponent as deceptive and religious.

According to attribution theory, people attribute those "bad" positions and actions of their aversaries as being the necessary product of their flawed, evil or malicious character, and nothing else. Of course, how is a militant atheist likely to characterize his opponents "flawed," "evil," or "malicious" character? (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=11908267&postcount=80)

I didn't like church that much either, but I'm not seeing theist bogeymen everywhere I look.

*snip*

Katherine Genovese (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kitty_Genovese)

No, not the hitting the person with the car, since that is obviously an initiation of force. The part where he is left to be pinned is not a direct act, since the car is doing the damage, not the person. However, I would say that leaving the person pinned is a crime in and of itself, since it is leaving the person to be harmed, even if not directly.
No, you directly harmed the person by hitting the person with the car.

I suppose I shouldn't be surprised that a militant atheist (http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/BAAWA) would try to go out of his way to characterize his opponent as deceptive and religious.
And this means what?

Oh, you didn't have a point. Poor you.

Oh, I'm not the only one who's noticed this particular talent of BAAWA's?

It's quite impressive... almost on par with, I don't know, people's thoughts causing others to fall into rivers.
You're the one who believes that, dear lady. You said so yourself.

I just love it when people destroy their own personal attacks by having them boomerang right back.

Really?

Okay. Let me waste the few remaining hours of my weekend on this, and see how far you'll go. :)

So I really hate the women down the street. I don't have a reason for my hatred; she's done nothing to me, in fact she's a quite decent and intelligent woman. But for purely arbitrary reasons, I harbor for her a lot of malice. One day, she's walking beside a river, and I walk up behind her and push her in. Unfortunately, she can't swim, and she drowns and dies.

Murder, right? I violated her negative rights. How despicable.

Now let's change the example slightly. Instead of actually pushing her into the water, I merely watch her walk across slippery stones, knowing (as she does not) that she will almost certainly fall. Once she does, I can save her with very little effort - I'm an excellent swimmer, I have no trouble with a little bit of physical exertion, and since I don't care much for her anyway, I have no fear of failure. But I don't, not out of apathy or laziness or some other such thing, but solely out of malice. I hate her. I want her to die. So I let her fall into the river, and then I watch amusedly as she drowns.

This time, I didn't violate her negative rights. But my motive was exactly the same as in the prior example. So was the result of my action. If you were to prohibit me from not saving her, I'd lose no more than if you prohibited me from murdering her.

Are you honestly going to say that there's a morally relevant difference between the two situations?

Of course there is a morally relevant difference. One is an action directly aimed to harm, one is a lack of action to help.

You can get far more absurd to than this scenario, even. Assume that there is some action that you routinely do for your own benefit, say switching on a light switch. Assume also that, through some Rube Goldberg machine, your switching on the light switch is the only thing that can save your worst enemy's life. Knowing this, you forego the lights and remain in the dark.

I guess you could make some argument that a person stopped his own natural, rational behavior for the sole purpose of allowing someone to die, and in a sense was the sole cause of the person's death.

It is very, very tricky when getting into these situations and dealing with the various types of causality.

But central to the natural rights libertarians idealogy, is the idea that any obligation placed on one person to act in another's interest by means of violence is, by its definition, slavery.

But central to the natural rights libertarians idealogy, is the idea that any obligation placed on one person towards another's benefit by means of violence is, by its definition, slavery.

Yup, see, righ' thar. Thars yer problem. :)

Besides that, the above wording seems to indicate that the threat of force as a deterrent or self-defense also qualifies as "slavery." Of course, I have no doubt this wasn't the intended meaning, but it still sounds like that.

The OP is confusing libertarianism with objectivism. Therein lies the problem.

Pushing someone into a river and not jumping in to save someone who fell into the river are wholly different. I do not see how you can say you are equally culpable for that person’s death in both scenarios. That is simply absurd.

Causing someone harm is in no way a legal equivalent to allowing harm to be done.

If you equate those two things, you must give all of your money to the poor, live on the verge of starvation to assist those who are hungry, and support immediate military invasions of every nation accused of violating human rights. Otherwise you are guilty of murdering thousands of people.

While I think you have a moral obligation to assist someone if you are able, this in no way forces a legal obligation upon someone. Legislating moral behavior is a feature of a theocracy. It is equivalent to legislating sexual abstinence, adultery, church attendance, or anything else someone considers a ‘moral imperative’.

Of course there is a morally relevant difference. One is an action directly aimed to harm, one is a lack of action to help.

No, they are both directly aimed to harm; in both cases the reason for the behavior is to cause the woman's death.

The only difference is in the means, and I can see no good reason to consider that distinction to be any more important than one between killing someone with a knife and killing someone with a gun. Certainly not enough of one upon which to base a political philosophy.

But central to the natural rights libertarians idealogy, is the idea that any obligation placed on one person towards another's benefit by means of violence is, by its definition, slavery.

Which is an absurd definition of slavery.

Pushing someone into a river and not jumping in to save someone who fell into the river are wholly different. I do not see how you can say you are equally culpable for that person’s death in both scenarios. That is simply absurd.

Causing someone harm is in no way a legal equivalent to allowing harm to be done.

If you equate those two things, you must give all of your money to the poor, live on the verge of starvation to assist those who are hungry, and support immediate military invasions of every nation accused of violating human rights. Otherwise you are guilty of murdering thousands of people.
The reason for that is because we can see it on the TV news and read about it in newspapers, magazines, and on the internet. We are aware of it, even if we aren't there. Ergo, we are all guilty of murder, etc.

That of course merely demonstrates a problem of thinking about humans as some whole, rather than as individuals. We have no responsibility to the whole; we merely have the obligation to not interfere with the lives of others insofar as they are not interfering with our lives with respect to our (and their) ability to maximize our individual liberty.

There is no real difference between what the OP is positing and "sin of omission". They are both fundamentally flawed concepts.

Pushing someone into a river and not jumping in to save someone who fell into the river are wholly different. I do not see how you can say you are equally culpable for that person’s death in both scenarios. That is simply absurd.

I said you were only in a certain specific context. Do read the post. It isn't that long. (And read the reply to BAAWA, too, if you're still confused.)

Causing someone harm is in no way a legal equivalent to allowing harm to be done.

So?

If you equate those two things, you must give all of your money to the poor, live on the verge of starvation to assist those who are hungry, and support immediate military invasions of every nation accused of violating human rights. Otherwise you are guilty of murdering thousands of people.

You obviously didn't pay any attention to the argument, because there is a clear difference between not saving someone in order to bring about their death and not saving someone because you care about other things more.

While I think you have a moral obligation to assist someone if you are able, this in no way forces a legal obligation upon someone. Legislating moral behavior is a feature of a theocracy.

Legislating norms of behavior is a feature of every society, actually. Either we use a moral standard to determine what kind of behavior to legislate, or we use some either kind of standard. Which standard would you suggest?

It is equivalent to legislating sexual abstinence, adultery, church attendance, or anything else someone considers a ‘moral imperative’.

No, because none of those things are moral imperatives.

No, they are both directly aimed to harm; in both cases the reason for the behavior is to cause the woman's death.
No, the slipping on the rocks in the second case caused the woman's death.

If you do not consider that distinction to be different, then you have a serious problem. For what if the woman slipped on the rocks but you weren't around to even notice? The same outcome (her death) would occur. Now then, YOU must demonstrate that there is some valid difference between you watching and not helping vs. you simply not even being there. The outcomes are the same.

You obviously didn't pay any attention to the argument, because there is a clear difference between not saving someone in order to bring about their death and not saving someone because you care about other things more.
Only the thoughts, but then you'd have the problem of ThoughtCrime. I don't think you want to go there.

No, the slipping on the rocks in the second case caused the woman's death.

No, it caused her to fall into the river.

As well say that walking by the river caused her death, because it gave her assailant the opportunity to push her in.

If you do not consider that distinction to be different, then you have a serious problem. For what if the woman slipped on the rocks but you weren't around to even notice? The same outcome (her death) would occur.

Right, and perhaps if you hadn't pushed her into the river, someone else would have.

So?

Now then, YOU must demonstrate that there is some valid difference between you watching and not helping vs. you simply not even being there. The outcomes are the same.

The obvious valid difference is one of capability. I am easily capable of saving her in one case, and not in the other.

No, it caused her to fall into the river.
And thus her death. Your inaction didn't cause anything.


As well say that walking by the river caused her death, because it gave her assailant the opportunity to push her in.
Only if you don't understand the concept of "cause".


Right, and perhaps if you hadn't pushed her into the river, someone else would have.
Since we've already established that actually causing the problem entails responsibility, you should instead focus on the idea that an action of which you had no part therein should somehow entail that you have a responsibility.


The obvious valid difference is one of capability.
What does capability have to do with it? Remember: you cannot beg the question, which is PRECISELY what you're doing.

Since we've already established that actually causing the problem entails responsibility, you should instead focus on the idea that an action of which you had no part therein should somehow entail that you have a responsibility.

The problem is that you are linking together a lack of direct physical cause with something "of which you had no part."

The two are not equivalent.

What does capability have to do with it?

We do not have moral responsibility for not doing things we are incapable of doing.

The problem is that you are linking together a lack of direct physical cause with something "of which you had no part."
Where's the problem?


We do not have moral responsibility for not doing things we are incapable of doing.
We are capable of sending money to people to help the starving in Africa.
We do not do so.
Therefore, we are morally responsible for the deaths of those starving in Africa.

Yeah, there's a HUGE problem there. Do you know what it is?

Where's the problem?

Because as long as you are easily capable of preventing something from happening, you are playing a role.

We are capable of sending money to people to help the starving in Africa.
We do not do so.
Therefore, we are morally responsible for the deaths of those starving in Africa.

To a degree, yes.

Nevertheless, unless we are holding back our money because we actually seek the death of African children, we are not morally equivalent to murderers.

Because as long as you are easily capable of preventing something from happening, you are playing a role.
The role of?



To a degree, yes.
Please demonstrate it.


Nevertheless, unless we are holding back our money because we actually seek the death of African children, we are not morally equivalent to murderers.
Special pleading.

1.


Causing someone harm is in no way a legal equivalent to allowing harm to be done.

If you equate those two things, you must give all of your money to the poor, live on the verge of starvation to assist those who are hungry, and support immediate military invasions of every nation accused of violating human rights.



Acceptance of this argument would require acceptance in a slightly different situation: watching a poor homeless person starve, but standing there doing nothing, means you've violated starving person's rights (mainly the right to freely engage in any human activity other than dying; commonly refered to as "life"). See where this is going? Even if one insists that the state doesn't need to force assistance, but a moral obligation still exists, [someone] will still manage to make the "logical" jump all the way to "OMGZ EVIL SOVIET RUSSIA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"



2.



Otherwise you are guilty of murdering thousands of people.



Trying to posit that Greill is claiming that one is individually guilty of all the evil in the world is a most blatant strawman.



Granted, so far my prediction/description is only partially correct in that someone eventually asserted the stated positions, yet I so far have no conclusive evidence as to the individual's political or economic outlook. Entropic Creation, how would you describe your political or economic outlook/philosophy/ideal/etc.?

edit: Maybe I do have conclusive evidence, or perhaps the answer to my question isn't hard to guess: http://www.nationstates.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi/page=display_nation/nation=entropic_creation .

But remember, I'm just a liar.

1.

Granted, so far my prediction/description is only partially correct in that someone eventually asserted the stated positions, yet I so far have no conclusive evidence as to the individual's political or economic outlook. Entropic Creation, how would you describe your political or economic outlook/philosophy/ideal/etc.?

edit: Maybe I do have conclusive evidence, or perhaps the answer to my question isn't hard to guess: http://www.nationstates.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi/page=display_nation/nation=entropic_creation .

But remember, I'm just a liar.
You are.

You are.

Totally.

Totally.
Without a doubt.

Yup, see, righ' thar. Thars yer problem. :)

Besides that, the above wording seems to indicate that the threat of force as a deterrent or self-defense also qualifies as "slavery." Of course, I have no doubt this wasn't the intended meaning, but it still sounds like that.

I was at work when typed that out and very quickly realized how poorly it came out.

The threat of force as a matter of self-defense, fulfilling contractual obligations, and compensation for damages, is of course justified in preventing a person from actually enslaving another.

Without a doubt.

Only the most backbiting, bent, bluffing, cheating, corrupt, crafty, crooked, cunning, deceitful, deceiving, deceptive, designing, disreputable, double-crossing, double-dealing, elusive, false, fraudulent, guileful, hoodwinking, knavish, mendacious, misleading, perfidious, roguish, shady, shifty, sinister, slippery, sneaking (and/or sneaky) ...**deep breath***... swindling, traitorous, treacherous, tricky, two-faced, two-timing, unctuous (?), underhanded, unfair, unprincipled, unscrupulous, untrustworthy, villainous, or wily individual would ever try to deny it.

(**doffs hat to http://thesaurus.reference.com**)

Only the most backbiting, bent, bluffing, cheating, corrupt, crafty, crooked, cunning, deceitful, deceiving, deceptive, designing, disreputable, double-crossing, double-dealing, elusive, false, fraudulent, guileful, hoodwinking, knavish, mendacious, misleading, perfidious, roguish, shady, shifty, sinister, slippery, sneaking (and/or sneaky) ...**deep breath***... swindling, traitorous, treacherous, tricky, two-faced, two-timing, unctuous (?), underhanded, unfair, unprincipled, unscrupulous, untrustworthy, villainous, or wily individual would ever try to deny it.

(**doffs hat to http://thesaurus.reference.com**)
Don't you forget it.

Don't you forget it.

forget what?

**looks around**

No, they are both directly aimed to harm; in both cases the reason for the behavior is to cause the woman's death.

Allowing an event to occur does not cause an event to occur.

The only difference is in the means

That and the fact that in one situation the individual is not killing the other.

Which is an absurd definition of slavery.

I don't have to go back to BAAWA's gainsaying, do I?

forget what?

**looks around**
Did you hear the one about the jump rope and the lollipop?

Vittos the City Sacker ---

I'd like your comments on my post here:

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=11908244&postcount=75

No it doesn't, for then they have a positive right against you, i.e. you are required to do something for them. But positive rights do not exist.
Right to live > right to laziness.

It's tough, but it isn't reconcilable with negative rights, and while choosing not to help is an action, it is not an action that harms another, it is simply an action that doesn't help. If you are a hard-line follower of the libertarian creed, then you do not support any obligation placed upon one to help the other.That is actually one of the best reasons there is to reject the "hard-line" libertarian creed.

A purely negative interpretation of rights and obligation leads to absurdities.
What absurdity? That position is internally consistent, thus it cannot be absurd.

No, they are both directly aimed to harm; in both cases the reason for the behavior is to cause the woman's death.

The only difference is in the means, and I can see no good reason to consider that distinction to be any more important than one between killing someone with a knife and killing someone with a gun. Certainly not enough of one upon which to base a political philosophy.
The difference between action and inaction matters, because one of them renders your own presence irrelevant.

If you see to woman fall on the rocks and don't help her, are you more guilty than if you weren't there and didn't see it happen but are happy about it after the fact? In this case, your actions are identical; there's not even a difference in means. Both times you did nothing at all. Do you find these two scenarios morally equivalent?

There is a difference between action and inaction. There is a difference between intent and foresight. But futhermore, I think intent requires action, so what you did when you let her drown not only wasn't an action, it also didn't involve intent. You merely foresaw her likely demise, but you did nothing to hasten it. If you hadn't been there, it still would have happened. The event itself had nothing to do with you.

Right to live > right to laziness.
Right to live != right to force others (via morality) to help you if you get into trouble.

Right to live > right to laziness.



Right to live != right to force others (via morality) to help you if you get into trouble.


No, no, no. You've both got it wrong:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/c/2/c/c2c349a2ed31daccd53c26430b33240d.png
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/E-to-the-i-pi.svg/30px-E-to-the-i-pi.svg.png

and of course:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/5/f/7/5f7109bf1bb9b9bf502b1b1c053ca515.png
http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/4/7/c/47ca9b00b158f19e8eee4e44414b725a.png

but only if:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/b/f/9/bf940cb800bd417033036c2db107ed41.png
http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/e/7/f/e7f112e85ad83cf7f33a456c61922e93.png

...all according to the data presented in this table:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/4b/Warptable.gif/800px-Warptable.gif

So...as one can clearly see, the correct conclusion is:

"I before E, except after C."


Q.E.D.

No, no, no. You've both got it wrong:

[snippage]

So...as one can clearly see, the correct conclusion is:

"I before E, except after C."


Q.E.D.
And when sounded like "ay", as in neighbor and weigh.

You also forgot: http://www.bbspot.com/comics/PC-Weenies/2006/11/2368.php

Note that I expanded my comment:



I think there is a tendency for libertarians (note that I also speak from my own thinking early in my intoduction to libertarian politics) to believe that they can completely re-work how society operates, fashoning it according to libertarian political ideals, but in a completely passive or non-aggressive way. But, of course, other opposed elements will do whatever they can to prevent the libertarians from succeeding. This is why I find those who refuse to participate in the political process so amusing; they obviously want to fail.

If the goal is to establish a society based on the non-initiation of force, then those who hold this goal must be willing to defend themselves against such initiations, directly and actively, contrary to the thinking described above. By extention, if they want anyone to take them seriously, they must also be willing to defend others; society as a whole is not going to be willing to reform itself along libertarian lines, if libertarians cannot demonstrate that society can benefit from doing so. At any rate, it seems fantastically inconsistant, even hypocritical, for those claiming allegiance to non-initiation of force to then try to claim a right to stand by and let an act of aggression against a fellow human occur without challenge.

This has nothing to do with "what should the law require" or "what should morality require." It's simply a matter of intellectual consistancy. If I hate aggression, and I want to eliminate aggression, then I must stand against it where ever it is. That means going to the aid of the "little old lady" (in whatever way I can, directly or otherwise) if necessary. (edit: Of course, being a student of foreign policy, I realize now that I am also crafting a defense of interventionist international relations along libertarian lines. A couple of quarters ago, I was reading a justification of interventionism in one of my textbooks, and the author's argument floored me: "appeals to right of sovereignty doesn't work because states don't have rights, only individual human beings do, and it is the duty of individual human beings to defend those rights against those states that violate them." Again, how can a anti-aggression libertarian just stand by and let aggression happen, and not be a hypocrite? I'm not claiming to accept the argument completely, but its certainly interesting to think about.)

Again, I'm not sure how else to say it.

OK, first I want to make a comment on your amusement at apolitical movements. Many of those who do not take part in the political process recognize the political process as the source of their problems and thereby consider the political solution a doomed solution. Liberal cartelization and the present state of entrenched capitalism is a result of our political process, and many believe that the only methods for bringing about a change to this system are civil ones.

As for the rest of this, it is not a matter of hating aggression itself, it is aggression in the interests of undermining one's self-ownership that is so hated.

Since aggression is only denied when its intent is to undermine the sovereignty of the individual, any law forcing one individual to defend another is denied on the same grounds as any law prohibiting an individual to aggress against another. So while a libertarian may be hypocritical for not stepping up to defend the sovereignty of another individual, it would also be hypocritical for a libertarian to undermine the sovereignty of the would-be helper.

In the end, your position of forced fighting of aggression is inconsistent, in that it fights aggression by instituting more of it.

The same goes for war.

(Private declarations of war is a very interesting moral question though.)

Allowing an event to occur does not cause an event to occur.

Not directly, no, but this does not matter in terms of the moral culpability of the watcher.

The only thing that matters in terms of the watcher's moral culpability is the watcher's actions, and the reasons behind them. The watcher did not save her, solely so that she would die. Quibbling about cause misses the central point that the watcher's act was a deliberate, and quite successful, attempt to harm another.

Anyone who wanted to murder her would have been satisfied with the result.

All you are doing is repeating the negative/positive distinction to me. I'm familiar with the negative/positive distinction. Tell me why, in this case, I should care.

That and the fact that in one situation the individual is not killing the other.

So?

I don't have to go back to BAAWA's gainsaying, do I?

No... you just need to realize that there is an obvious difference of scale between making someone flip a lightswitch when someone else's life is at stake and treating somebody as property.

The difference between action and inaction matters, because one of them renders your own presence irrelevant.

If you see to woman fall on the rocks and don't help her, are you more guilty than if you weren't there and didn't see it happen but are happy about it after the fact? In this case, your actions are identical; there's not even a difference in means. Both times you did nothing at all. Do you find these two scenarios morally equivalent?

I see I didn't explain this very well.

The question is not one of "happiness." Certainly, I can feel happy over someone else's death without being morally guilty of murder. (Indeed, I can save a drowning woman even if I would feel happy over her death.) It is one of motive and intent - not only do I want her to die, not only do I watch her die, but I watch her die because I want her to die.

There is a difference between action and inaction. There is a difference between intent and foresight. But futhermore, I think intent requires action, so what you did when you let her drown not only wasn't an action, it also didn't involve intent.

"Intent requires action"?

So if I fully intend to murder somebody, but I trip and fall and become incapable of doing it, I'm free of moral guilt?

You merely foresaw her likely demise, but you did nothing to hasten it. If you hadn't been there, it still would have happened. The event itself had nothing to do with you.

The events - the woman drowning in a river, and the woman drowning in a river with me watching - are clearly different.

They are different not just in circumstances, but in potential result. The woman's doomed if she drowns when no one's watching. She's not (necessarily) if she drowns when I'm watching her.

The event clearly has something to do with me, because while in the first case, she dies regardless, in the second case, she can be saved, but the conscious decision is made not to save her.

Not directly, no, but this does not matter in terms of the moral culpability of the watcher.

The only thing that matters in terms of the watcher's moral culpability is the watcher's actions, and the reasons behind them. The watcher did not save her, solely so that she would die. Quibbling about cause misses the central point that the watcher's act was a deliberate, and quite successful, attempt to harm another.

Anyone who wanted to murder her would have been satisfied with the result.

All you are doing is repeating the negative/positive distinction to me. I'm familiar with the negative/positive distinction. Tell me why, in this case, I should care.

The obligation to positive action in the benefit of another through force is slavery.

How about you show me how the "action" to not help is sufficient cause to the harm visited on the individual, or since you don't want to "quibble" about cause, you can show me how someone can harm another without causing harm.

So?

The harmful act is killing, the person did not kill, so the person did not visit harm on anyone.

No... you just need to realize that there is an obvious difference of scale between making someone flip a lightswitch when someone else's life is at stake and treating somebody as property.

Slavery is not merely constituted by treating someone as property. Children are often treated as property, for instance, but we would not call them slaves to their parents.

Slavery is about extracting labor and subverting liberty for the benefit of another person through force.

If a slaveowner had legal title to another man, but set that man free to do as he pleased, would you still consider the person a slave? If you do, I would reply that you have a very limited definition of slavery.

The obligation to positive action in the benefit of another through force is slavery.

How about you show me how the "action" to not help is sufficient cause to the harm visited on the individual, or since you don't want to "quibble" about cause, you can show me how someone can harm another without causing harm.

She died. She could have been saved. The fact that she was not saved is the direct result of the person's actions. Is death not a harm?

Slavery is not merely constituted by treating someone as property. Children are often treated as property, for instance, but we would not call them slaves to their parents.

Actually, there is fair reason to do so if parents actually treat them as property and not as human beings.

Most parents, however, do not do so, whatever their legal rights (which are more limited than those over property, too.)

Slavery is about extracting labor and subverting liberty for the benefit of another person through force.

No, that is an ideological definition that has been manipulated to support your conclusion. Its obvious flaw is that there is no room for scale. If I force somebody to toss me a loaf of bread when I'm starving, that is not equivalent to making her work in the fields for my profit every day of her life.

If a slaveowner had legal title to another man, but set that man free to do as he pleased, would you still consider the person a slave?

Of course not, because the person is not being treated as property.

Along the same lines, if the state has the power to make you do things, but only exercises it in highly limited circumstances, how are you a slave?

I see I didn't explain this very well.

The question is not one of "happiness." Certainly, I can feel happy over someone else's death without being morally guilty of murder. (Indeed, I can save a drowning woman even if I would feel happy over her death.) It is one of motive and intent - not only do I want her to die, not only do I watch her die, but I watch her die because I want her to die.
But you didn't cause her to die any more than not sending a starving kid in Africa some food causes them to starve.


"Intent requires action"?

So if I fully intend to murder somebody, but I trip and fall and become incapable of doing it, I'm free of moral guilt?
Yes. You didn't do anything. Otherwise, you have ThoughtCrime/CrimeThink. That's doubleplus ungood.



The events - the woman drowning in a river, and the woman drowning in a river with me watching - are clearly different.

They are different not just in circumstances, but in potential result. The woman's doomed if she drowns when no one's watching. She's not (necessarily) if she drowns when I'm watching her.

The event clearly has something to do with me, because while in the first case, she dies regardless, in the second case, she can be saved, but the conscious decision is made not to save her.
But it has nothing to do with you, since you weren't involved.

I want to know what libertarians think of the work below written by the anarcho-capitalist David Friedman, son of Milton Friedman.

Consider the following example. A madman is about to open fire on a crowd; if he does so numerous innocent people will die. The only way to prevent him is to shoot him with a rifle that is within reach of several members of the crowd. The rifle is on the private property of its legitimate owner. He is a well known misanthrope who has publicly stated on numerous occasions that he is opposed to letting anyone use his rifle without his permission, even if it would save hundreds of lives.

Two questions now arise. The first is whether members of the crowd have a right to take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman. The answer of libertarian rights theory, as I understand it, is no. The owner of the rifle is not responsible for the existence of the madman, and the fact that his rifle is, temporarily, of enormous value to other people does not give them a right to take it.

The second question is whether it is desirable that someone take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman--whether, to put it more personally, I wish that someone do so, or whether I would rather see the members of the crowd stand there and be shot down. The answer to this question seems equally unambiguous. If someone takes the rifle, there is a relatively minor violation of the legitimate rights of its owner; if no one does, there is a major violation of the legitimate rights (not to be killed) of a large number of victims--plus a substantial cost in human life and human pain. If asked which of these outcomes I would prefer to see, the answer is obviously the first.

This result is not, in any strict sense, paradoxical. An outcome may be desirable even though there is no morally legitimate way of achieving it. Indeed, this possibility is implied by the idea (due to Nozick) of viewing libertarian rights as "side constraints" within which we seek to achieve some objective; the constraints would be irrelevant unless there were some circumstances in which we could better achieve the objective by ignoring them.

While not in any strict sense paradoxical, the result is, at least to me, an uncomfortable one. It puts me in the position of saying that I very much hope someone grabs the gun, but that I disapprove of whoever does so.

One solution to this problem is to reject the idea that natural rights are absolute; potential victims have the right to commit a minor rights violation, compensating the owner of the gun afterwards to the best of their ability, in order to prevent a major one. Another is to claim that natural rights are convenient rules of thumb which correctly describe how one should act under most circumstances, but that in sufficiently unusual situations one must abandon the general rules and make decisions in terms of the ultimate objectives which the rules were intended to achieve. A third response is to assert that the situation I have described cannot occur, that there is some natural law guaranteeing that rights violations will always have bad consequences and that committing one rights violation can never decrease the total of rights violations.

All of these positions lead to the same conclusion. Under some circumstances rights violations must be evaluated on their merits, rather than rejected a priori on conventional libertarian natural rights grounds. Those who believe that rights violations are always undesirable will be sure that the result of the evaluation will be to reject the violation, but that does not mean that they can reject arguments to the contrary without first answering them. Any such argument claims to provide a counterexample to their general theorem, and if one such counterexample is true the general theorem must be false.

I have made my point so far in terms of an issue created for the purpose; whether or not to steal rifles in order to shoot madmen is not a burning issue in libertarian (or other) circles. I will now carry the argument a step further by defending one of the particular heresies which, it is widely believed, no libertarian can support--that under some conceivable circumstances a draft would be desirable.

Suppose we are threatened with military conquest by a particularly vicious totalitarian government; if the conquest is successful we shall all lose most of our freedom and many of us will lose our lives. It is claimed that only a draft can protect us. Two replies are possible. The first is that since coercion is always wrong we should reject the draft whatever the consequences. I have tried to show that that answer is not satisfactory--at the most it should lead us to refuse to enforce a draft ourselves while hoping that someone with fewer principles imposes one for us. Temporary slavery is, after all, better than permanent slavery.

The other possible reply is to deny that the draft is necessary. This can be done in many ways. The economist is inclined to argue that collecting taxes in cash and using them to hire soldiers is always more efficient than collecting taxes in labor; the moralist may claim that a society whose members will not voluntarily defend it is not worth defending. I have myself used the first argument many times; I believe that in the circumstances presently facing the U.S. it is correct. But the question I am currently concerned with is not whether under present circumstances, or even under likely circumstances, a draft is desirable. The question is whether under any conceivable circumstances it could be.

The answer is yes. Imagine a situation in which the chance of a soldier being killed is so high that a rational individual who is concerned chiefly with his own welfare will refuse to volunteer even at a very high wage. Imagine further that the percentage of the population required to defeat the enemy is so large that there are simply not enough patriotic, or altruistic, or adventure loving, or unreasonably optimistic recruits available; in order to win the war the army must also include selfish individuals with a realistic view of the costs and benefits to themselves of joining the army. Recruiters and preachers will of course point out to such individuals that "if everyone refuses to fight we will be conquered and you will be worse off than if everyone volunteers to fight." The individual will reply, correctly, that what he does does not determine what everyone else does. If everyone else volunteers, he can stay safely at home; if nobody else volunteers and he does, he will almost certainly be killed and if not killed will be enslaved.

Under such circumstances, an army could be recruited without a draft by paying very high salaries and financing them with taxes so high that anyone who does not volunteer starves to death. The coercion of a tax is then indistinguishable from the coercion of a draft. While a libertarian may still argue that to impose either a draft or a tax is immoral and that he himself would refuse to do so, I find it hard to see how he can deny that, under the circumstances I have hypothesized, he would rather see himself and everyone else temporarily enslaved by his own government than permanently enslaved by someone else's.

The point of this argument is not that we should have a draft. As it happens, I not only believe that under present circumstances a draft is a bad thing, I also believe that if the government has the power to impose a draft it is very much more likely that it will use it when it should not than that the rather unlikely circumstances I have described will occur. That is, however, a practical argument, and one that might depend on the particular circumstances of a particular time and place; it is not an argument of principle that would apply everywhere and everywhen.

Perhaps what these examples show is not that we cannot accept a simple statement of libertarian principle but only that I picked the wrong one. Perhaps we should replace a statement about what one should do ("never initiate coercion") with a statement about what objective one should seek ("do whatever minimizes the total amount of coercion"). Both seizing the rifle and imposing a draft are then, in the particular circumstances I have described, not only consistent with libertarian principle but required by it.

While I cannot speak for other libertarians, I find that this version of libertarianism does not always fit my moral intuition. Suppose the only way I can stop someone from stealing two hundred dollars from me is by stealing your hundred dollar rifle (which you are unwilling to lend or sell me) and using it to defend myself. The result is to reduce the total amount of coercion, at least if we measure amount by value of what is stolen. Yet it seems, at least to me, that stealing the rifle is still wrong.

A second problem with this approach is that it is of no help when we must choose between a small cost in coercion and an enormous cost in something else. Suppose you happen to know that everyone in the world is going to die tomorrow (by some natural catastrophe, say the earth colliding with a large asteroid), unless you prevent it. Further suppose that the only way to prevent it involves stealing a piece of equipment worth a hundred dollars from someone who, in your opinion, rightfully owns it. Your choice is simple: violate libertarian principles by stealing something or let everyone die.

What do you do? You cannot justify stealing as a way of minimizing total coercion. Being killed by an asteroid is not coercion, since it is not done by a person. After the asteroid strikes there will be no more coercion ever again, since there will be no one left to either coerce or be coerced.

Speaking for myself, the answer is that I steal. When I put such questions to other libertarians, one common response is a frantic attempt to reinterpret the problem out of existence. One example might be the reply that, since the person you are stealing from will himself be killed if you do not take the device, he would be in favor of your taking it, so you are not really stealing--you are using the device in the way he would want you to if he knew what you know. Another response might be that you should not steal the equipment because your belief that doing so will save the world may be wrong .

All such evasions are futile. I can always alter the assumptions to force the issue back to its original form. Perhaps the owner of the device agrees that using it is necessary if the world is to be saved, but he is old, tired of living, and not very fond of his fellow humans. Perhaps the situation is so clear that everyone agrees that without your act of theft we shall all die.

She died. She could have been saved. The fact that she was not saved is the direct result of the person's actions. Is death not a harm?

Death is a harm, but the person did not cause the death.

In what form of causation does not saving someone cause someone to die?

Actually, there is fair reason to do so if parents actually treat them as property and not as human beings.

Most parents, however, do not do so, whatever their legal rights (which are more limited than those over property, too.)

The rights of property are socially defined and flexible. The rights to property over a pet are far more strict than those over land, so to set one definition to the rights of property and compare parenthood to that is fallacious.

While property rights in land are far less restrictive than the rights afforded the parent, the rights of the parent and property rights are still analogous.

No, that is an ideological definition that has been manipulated to support your conclusion. Its obvious flaw is that there is no room for scale. If I force somebody to toss me a loaf of bread when I'm starving, that is not equivalent to making her work in the fields for my profit every day of her life.

I wish I knew my logical fallacies because I am sure there are some in this statement. Anyways:

First off, it is you who is denying it scale, not me. I am the one that is saying any situation where one is violently forced into subserviency is made a slave, and that certainly allows for scales. I would guess that it is your general opposition to slavery combined with your contradictory opinion that some should be forced to serve others that causes your misinterpretation.

Second, you show no reason why my definition of slavery could not work, at least not in my terms, since "forc(ing) somebody to toss me a loaf of bread when I'm starving," is well within the bounds of my definition and I am perfectly willing to accept that.

In the end, you just think that slavery is justified.

Of course not, because the person is not being treated as property.

Here's that floating definition of property, again.

Along the same lines, if the state has the power to make you do things, but only exercises it in highly limited circumstances, how are you a slave?

For the same reason I am a slave if they exercised it constantly.

I would like to point out that all government controls on regulations will inherently affect all of our decisions, as they will undoubtedly shift the weights of our judgement.

I want to know what libertarians think of the work below written by the anarcho-capitalist David Friedman, son of Milton Friedman.

First off, I wouldn't want to oppose Friedman in a debate for the fear of looking like an imbecile, but still:

When he speaks of the situation with the madman and the gun, there is not much of a problem in my opinion. Libertarian justice would deal with it very easily, where the thief (who would probably not get caught due to the death or sympathy of the witnesses) would simply pay restitution for the spent shells, plus a minor added on amount to account for social factors.

So, a rational acting person would take on the costs of stealing the gun to protect his life. In the end, restitution is made, and both are back on a level playing field.


In the end, he advocates a sort of utilitarian approach, but shows how easily that position lends itself to absurdities, and kind of leaves the article open.


I tend to come from neither the absolutist natural rights position or the utilitarian position. I am an "emotive" libertarian in that I acknowledge that my thoughts on the issue are solely based in my desires. Some have expressed otherwise, but I consider it to be the best position to take in that those that need to be convinced of libertarian philosophy will largely hold the same cultural values as me, and will therefore be more receptive to the rational arguments I put forward.

When he speaks of the situation with the madman and the gun, there is not much of a problem in my opinion. Libertarian justice would deal with it very easily, where the thief (who would probably not get caught due to the death or sympathy of the witnesses) would simply pay restitution for the spent shells, plus a minor added on amount to account for social factors.
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Some slight problems for this. Firstly you are justifying breaking the law (atleast a law you still hold as valid) this is a contradiction. Secoundly you justify punishing someone who most people would regard as doing the right action.

Some slight problems for this. Firstly you are justifying breaking the law (atleast a law you still hold as valid) this is a contradiction. Secoundly you justify punishing someone who most people would regard as doing the right action.

I am advocating restitution for the violated rights. This does not justify "breaking the law" nor does it bring down a punishment.

I am advocating restitution for the violated rights. This does not justify "breaking the law" nor does it bring down a punishment.

Even though I think we can all agree (including Friedman) that violating someone elses rights in that case is the right thing to do. He explicitly says he would steal and personally so would I.

What I thought was the major criticism is why should Libertarian law punish someone who we all agree is doing the right thing (or atleast something we would all want him to do).

What I thought was the major criticism is why should Libertarian law punish someone who we all agree is doing the right thing (or atleast something we would all want him to do).

Like I said before, there is no punishment (at least not in the way it exists in the present judicial system), only restitution for the violation of another's rights.

We can assume that the situation between the madman and the borrower of the gun has nothing to do with the owner of the gun, so, to him, there is no difference if the gun was borrowed to rob a convenience store. If that were the case, the obvious solution is to have the criminal repay the owner of the gun, and since this case is no different to the owner of the gun, he should be repaid all the same.

Furthermore, there is nothing stopping the man who borrowed the gun from making the case that he was forced to do it by the madman, and thereby passing the obligation of restitution on to him. Also, the borrower of the gun can only found liable if sought by the owner, if the owner felt that the use of the gun was alright (I would guess that would be 99.9% of the time), there would be no issue.

All that a libertarian seeks is that any victim of aggression and coersion be made right by the aggressor, even if there must be a backtracking of violence.

What it boils down to is the situation where one uses force to cause his victim to harm another, there is no good solution to this as its problems are easy to point out:

Suppose one person hijacks a car and then forces the driver to rob a convenience store. We can say that the man being hijacked is justified in defending his own life by doing what the hijacker says, and we can furthermore call the hijacker entirely responsible for the robbery as well, as any victim would have likely done the same.

Now what if this hijacker had ordered the driver to kill another person? Can we say that the individual is justified in killing another to save his own life? Can we say that the first victim does not have some culpability in the death of the second victim?

Suppose one person hijacks a car and then forces the driver to rob a convenience store. We can say that the man being hijacked is justified in defending his own life by doing what the hijacker says, and we can furthermore call the hijacker entirely responsible for the robbery as well, as any victim would have likely done the same.

Now what if this hijacker had ordered the driver to kill another person? Can we say that the individual is justified in killing another to save his own life? Can we say that the first victim does not have some culpability in the death of the second victim?

That sounds quite nice and I think I can agree with that.

But then is a government "forced" to draft people under the threat of greater threat to freedom war (possiby from communism/fascism or even possibly religious terrorism). The line of logic above would seem to allow the government to act in ways to help people even if it violates their rights. Just as the person in question was justified to steal if it advanced long term good. I'm not sure how far you hold your libertarian views but as Friedman said most are agains't such drafts or wars. I also beleive ayn Rand was agains't US involvement in both world wars and Korea.

Death is a harm, but the person did not cause the death.

In what form of causation does not saving someone cause someone to die?

All you are doing is repeating the negative/positive distinction to me. I'm familiar with the negative/positive distinction. Tell me why, in this case, I should care.

I honestly do want an answer to this question.

The rights of property are socially defined and flexible. The rights to property over a pet are far more strict than those over land, so to set one definition to the rights of property and compare parenthood to that is fallacious.

While property rights in land are far less restrictive than the rights afforded the parent, the rights of the parent and property rights are still analogous.

It really doesn't matter, because just because the parents have the right to restrict the freedom of the child doesn't mean that they will exercise this right.

I wish I knew my logical fallacies because I am sure there are some in this statement. Anyways:

First off, it is you who is denying it scale, not me. I am the one that is saying any situation where one is violently forced into subserviency is made a slave, and that certainly allows for scales. I would guess that it is your general opposition to slavery combined with your contradictory opinion that some should be forced to serve others that causes your misinterpretation.

No, it is you. You are adhering by an absolutist definition, and you refuse to make basic distinctions.

Is prohibiting murder slavery? Is that not "violently forc[ing]" me into "subserviency" to whoever I want to murder, by this sort of logic?

Second, you show no reason why my definition of slavery could not work, at least not in my terms, since "forc(ing) somebody to toss me a loaf of bread when I'm starving," is well within the bounds of my definition and I am perfectly willing to accept that.

Of course you are. So? That doesn't make it any better a definition.

It would be much akin to me redefining murder to mean "any kind of deliberate behavior whose known consequence is the death of another" and through that definition calling anybody against a positive right to life and anybody in favor of self-defense a supporter of murder.

In the end, you just think that slavery is justified.

No, I think that VittosSlavery is justified. Just as you think that what Marxists call "exploitation" or "wage-slavery" is justified under capitalism. (Though they, at least, have something of an argument for grouping them together.)

For the same reason I am a slave if they exercised it constantly.

Again, you refuse to consider scale or degree.

I would like to point out that all government controls on regulations will inherently affect all of our decisions, as they will undoubtedly shift the weights of our judgement.

Yes, and exactly the same thing is true of other people's actions in a free market. Do they make me slaves?

I want to know what libertarians think of the work below written by the anarcho-capitalist David Friedman, son of Milton Friedman.

Direct linkage or other reference, please.


All of these positions lead to the same conclusion. Under some circumstances rights violations must be evaluated on their merits, rather than rejected a priori on conventional libertarian natural rights grounds. Those who believe that rights violations are always undesirable will be sure that the result of the evaluation will be to reject the violation, but that does not mean that they can reject arguments to the contrary without first answering them. Any such argument claims to provide a counterexample to their general theorem, and if one such counterexample is true the general theorem must be false.


Wait, you mean the black and white moral prescriptions of a particular political ideology do not necessarily reflect the conditions of reality? Compromises or independent judgements according to the particulars of a situation must be made? Absolute and unbending moral declarations sometimes don't work out as well as we think?

I'll be damned.


Perhaps we should replace a statement about what one should do ("never initiate coercion") with a statement about what objective one should seek ("do whatever minimizes the total amount of coercion"). Both seizing the rifle and imposing a draft are then, in the particular circumstances I have described, not only consistent with libertarian principle but required by it.


The above says much better what I think I was trying to get at in an earlier post. **thumbs up**


Speaking for myself, the answer is that I steal. When I put such questions to other libertarians, one common response is a frantic attempt to reinterpret the problem out of existence.


Yeah, such is a very common "tactic."

"Yeah, but in a real <market/libertarian utopia/whatever>..."

I honestly do want an answer to this question.

What do you think the entire discussion of slavery and forced positive obligations has been?

It really doesn't matter,

You are correct, because slavery isn't merely a matter of property.

No, it is you. You are adhering by an absolutist definition, and you refuse to make basic distinctions.

I am adhering to a definition of slavery that takes in many scales and many situations. You are adhering to a definition of slavery that accounts only for ownership of another person. How is my position absolutist, and how do I not make basic distinctions?

Is prohibiting murder slavery? Is that not "violently forc[ing]" me into "subserviency" to whoever I want to murder, by this sort of logic?

No, murder would be very similar to slavery, as it would be the ultimate undermining of another's self-determination. I would make the distinction between murder and slavery because there is no subserviency involved.

So, prohibiting murder is the violent imposition of rules to protect self-determination, the same as laws that prohibit slavery.

It would be much akin to me redefining murder to mean "any kind of deliberate behavior whose known consequence is the death of another" and through that definition calling anybody against a positive right to life and anybody in favor of self-defense a supporter of murder.

I am not redefining anything. I am taking the common characteristics among situations we would call slavery and formulating a definition for slavery.

No, I think that VittosSlavery is justified. Just as you think that what Marxists call "exploitation" or "wage-slavery" is justified under capitalism. (Though they, at least, have something of an argument for grouping them together.)

Actually, what Marxists call exploitation and wage slavery aren't justified, they just don't exist as Marx believed.

Again, you refuse to consider scale or degree.

No, I am acknowledging that there are degrees of slavery just as there are degrees of theft (they are largely the same thing), but I say that no instance of slavery or theft should be whitewashed without fair restitution.

You would seem to also think that theft is only theft when one has all of their Earthly possessions stolen.

Yes, and exactly the same thing is true of other people's actions in a free market. Do they make me slaves?

If they were violently forcing you to abide by market pressures and forces, yes.

What do you think the entire discussion of slavery and forced positive obligations has been?

You are not making an argument, you are manipulating a definition.

You are correct, because slavery isn't merely a matter of property.

Isn't "merely", perhaps, but certainly without most kinds of property rights over a person (either legally or practically), slavery is impossible.

No, murder would be very similar to slavery, as it would be the ultimate undermining of another's self-determination. I would make the distinction between murder and slavery because there is no subserviency involved.

There is no "subserviency" involved in certain positive obligations, either. Making someone toss a loaf of bread to a starving person hardly makes her "subservient" to the starving person.

So, prohibiting murder is the violent imposition of rules to protect self-determination, the same as laws that prohibit slavery.

Yes... but think of the implications of that kind of statement.

Now I can say that my self-determination is threatened by my lack of food. If I starve to death, I can hardly be free, after all. So I force you to throw me bread.

Just another example of the "violent imposition of rules to protect self-determination."

I am not redefining anything. I am taking the common characteristics among situations we would call slavery and formulating a definition for slavery.

Unless they are defining characteristics as well, that is hardly a good method.

I actually can't think of a single thing commonly called "slavery" that was imposed upon the rich and powerful for the benefit of the poor - probably because slavery also contains with it a denial of equality, a notion of class, that the requirement of basic mutual aid does not meet.

Actually, what Marxists call exploitation and wage slavery aren't justified, they just don't exist as Marx believed.

You are honestly going to tell me that people are never really in positions where they have a choice between starvation, or similarly horrific consequences, or laboring for a capitalist?

No, I am acknowledging that there are degrees of slavery just as there are degrees of theft (they are largely the same thing), but I say that no instance of slavery or theft should be whitewashed without fair restitution.

And what if "fair restitution" is impossible?

Perhaps you are too poor to pay the gun owner for the gun you steal to protect the crowd from those seeking to slaughter its members.

You would seem to also think that theft is only theft when one has all of their Earthly possessions stolen.

No, but theft (unlike slavery) is a very broad term. I have no problem saying that theft is justified in some circumstances.

What you are really trying to do is to make any deprivation of freedom for the benefit of another (the equivalent of theft in broadness, and justifiable in some circumstances) to slavery, which is the extreme deprivation of freedom for the benefit of another (or just the extreme deprivation of freedom; theoretically slavery could be misplaced benevolence as well), and which also contains with it not only the idea of temporary subservience, but of class subservience.

If they were violently forcing you to abide by market pressures and forces, yes.

They are violently forcing me to adhere by property rights.

There is no "subserviency" involved in certain positive obligations, either. Making someone toss a loaf of bread to a starving person hardly makes her "subservient" to the starving person.

How is actively providing for the ends of another against one's own will not subservient?

Yes... but think of the implications of that kind of statement.

Now I can say that my self-determination is threatened by my lack of food. If I starve to death, I can hardly be free, after all. So I force you to throw me bread.

One can die out of their own self-determination, it is not an eraser of consequence.

Unless they are defining characteristics as well, that is hardly a good method.

I actually can't think of a single thing commonly called "slavery" that was imposed upon the rich and powerful for the benefit of the poor - probably because slavery also contains with it a denial of equality, a notion of class, that the requirement of basic mutual aid does not meet.

Name several situations that you would call slavery. We will identify their common factors.

You are honestly going to tell me that people are never really in positions where they have a choice between starvation, or similarly horrific consequences, or laboring for a capitalist?

Marxist exploitation is a systematic extracting of a greater and greater amount of labor from the workforce without paying for it. It rests on the illegitimacy of profits. Since profits are legitimate, Marxist exploitation does not exist.

Now regarding your definition of exploitation as a difference between the bargaining ability of worker and employer, yes, it can exist, but it is rare, unsustained, and largely a matter of consequence to the worker.

And what if "fair restitution" is impossible?

Perhaps you are too poor to pay the gun owner for the gun you steal to protect the crowd from those seeking to slaughter its members.

Assuming that you cannot show that your actions are a necessary effect of the aggression of another, and you cannot repay your debts in cash, you can repay them in labor. Whether through direct labor or garnishments.

No, but theft (unlike slavery) is a very broad term. I have no problem saying that theft is justified in some circumstances.

Why is theft more broad than enslavement? Why could they not be, in a sense, the exact same thing?

What you are really trying to do is to make any deprivation of freedom for the benefit of another (the equivalent of theft in broadness, and justifiable in some circumstances) to slavery, which is the extreme deprivation of freedom for the benefit of another (or just the extreme deprivation of freedom; theoretically slavery could be misplaced benevolence as well), and which also contains with it not only the idea of temporary subservience, but of class subservience.

What i am really trying to do is make the forcing of servitude to another through violence to be slavery.

I am interested though, what would you call a minor instance of forced servitude, since slavery is only extreme, prolonged, and class driven forced servitude?

They are violently forcing me to adhere by property rights.

Ideally, you are forced to respect the product of another's labor as an extension of his/her self, and sticking to your obligation not interfere with him/her. Current law rarely reflects that ideal.

How is actively providing for the ends of another against one's own will not subservient?

How is passively providing for the ends of another against one's own will not subservient? There is a difference in degree (maybe), but hardly in kind.

One can die out of their own self-determination, it is not an eraser of consequence.

Of course, but one is not dying of one's own self-determination if one starves against one's will.

Name several situations that you would call slavery. We will identify their common factors.

I think the pre-1865 subjugation of Blacks in the United States was slavery, as were similar cases directed at Blacks and Native Americans elsewhere in the Americas.

I think a decent argument could be made for the assertion that compulsory education amounts to slavery, though it could be reasonably disputed in a few ways.

I think wage-slavery is a legitimate label for conditions where employment is a necessity and the options are horrific and limited.

Now regarding your definition of exploitation as a difference between the bargaining ability of worker and employer, yes, it can exist, but it is rare, unsustained, and largely a matter of consequence to the worker.

I was actually referring to wage-slavery there, and some Marxists, engaging in exactly the same failure to consider degree that you are, would make the argument that class dependence (the dependence of the proletariat as a whole upon the entire class of owners of the means of production) amounts to wage-slavery simply because it means they must accept the terms of some capitalist somewhere.

Assuming that you cannot show that your actions are a necessary effect of the aggression of another,

They would not be "necessary." You didn't have to defend anybody.

and you cannot repay your debts in cash, you can repay them in labor. Whether through direct labor or garnishments.

And if you don't have the time, or you aren't skilled enough to amass the money without starving yourself in the process?

Why is theft more broad than enslavement? Why could they not be, in a sense, the exact same thing?

Why does blue not mean green?

It is a matter of convention - we do not use "slavery" to refer to every example of coerced activity.

What i am really trying to do is make the forcing of servitude to another through violence to be slavery.

I am interested though, what would you call a minor instance of forced servitude, since slavery is only extreme, prolonged, and class driven forced servitude?

I think "servitude" is still too strong a term.

"Coercion," maybe.

Ideally, you are forced to respect the product of another's labor as an extension of his/her self,

Why does that extend to everything she might exchange it for?

and sticking to your obligation not interfere with him/her.

This is, for the most part, a good idea, but it has its limits.

Current law rarely reflects that ideal.

Agreed. And a change towards it would probably be a good thing, in many respects.

"Intent requires action"?

So if I fully intend to murder somebody, but I trip and fall and become incapable of doing it, I'm free of moral guilt?
Attempted action is all the action for which you can be responsible. You should never be rewarded for your own failure.

Inaction is not action.
The events - the woman drowning in a river, and the woman drowning in a river with me watching - are clearly different.

They are different not just in circumstances, but in potential result. The woman's doomed if she drowns when no one's watching. She's not (necessarily) if she drowns when I'm watching her.

The event clearly has something to do with me, because while in the first case, she dies regardless, in the second case, she can be saved, but the conscious decision is made not to save her.
Assuming such a conscious decision was made. I could let a woman die by being paralysed with indecision.

But ignoring that, if I decline to inferfere, and simply allow the woman to succeed or fail on her own merits, I'm somehow responsible for her failure? Should I then also be lauded for her success? If she swims to safety on her own, should I be rewarded as if I'd saved her? If I choose not to shoot people in the street, should I be seen as a hero for saving them from being shot?

Attempted action is all the action for which you can be responsible. You should never be rewarded for your own failure.

If your failure wasn't your fault, why not?

Assuming such a conscious decision was made. I could let a woman die by being paralysed with indecision.

Right. Only that has nothing to do with the argument I've been advancing.

But ignoring that, if I decline to inferfere, and simply allow the woman to succeed or fail on her own merits, I'm somehow responsible for her failure?

Again, it depends on the motive.

If I don't save her because I know she'll fail and I want her to fail, I am indeed morally culpable for her death.

If I don't save her because I just don't care, I am not.

Should I then also be lauded for her success? If she swims to safety on her own, should I be rewarded as if I'd saved her?

No, because her success is incidental; I failed in my attempt, but I still made the attempt.

If I choose not to shoot people in the street, should I be seen as a hero for saving them from being shot?

No, because it's not much of a sacrifice.

If your failure wasn't your fault, why not?
So if you try to kill me and I stop you, that's somehow a less bad act than if you'd failed on your own?
If I don't save her because I know she'll fail and I want her to fail, I am indeed morally culpable for her death.

If I don't save her because I just don't care, I am not.
I'd have to object to that. That's getting awfully close to thought-police territory.
No, because her success is incidental; I failed in my attempt, but I still made the attempt.

No, because it's not much of a sacrifice.
But this is logically equivalent to my being somehow responsible to the outcome of some event in which I was not involved.

If I don't save her, that's the same as me killing her.

But if I don't kill her, that's not the same as me saving her? Those can't both be true.

So if you try to kill me and I stop you, that's somehow a less bad act than if you'd failed on your own?

What are you talking about?

I'd have to object to that. That's getting awfully close to thought-police territory.

So motive never matters, morally?

If I kill someone because I think she's trying to kill me, but she's really not, I've committed an equivalent crime to killing someone on a whim?

But this is logically equivalent to my being somehow responsible to the outcome of some event in which I was not involved.

If I don't save her, that's the same as me killing her.

That's not what I said. I said if my motive for not saving her is wanting her to die, that's the same as killing her.

But if I don't kill her, that's not the same as me saving her?

It is, assuming that saving her requires no significant sacrifice on your part and, in both cases, the motive for your action is wanting her to live (as opposed to, say, fear of punishment.)

So motive never matters, morally?

If I kill someone because I think she's trying to kill me, but she's really not, I've committed an equivalent crime to killing someone on a whim?


You have, ignorance is no defense under the law.


That's not what I said. I said if my motive for not saving her is wanting her to die, that's the same as killing her.


Why can't be held responcible for actions of others. If someone else or some other force lead to the persons death it is not directly our responcibility. As for if we should act, it would be nice, but we can't force people to do stuff we want just because we think it would be nice.
Other wise from the jist of your argument, you want to punish someone for walking out of their house and not jumping into a river to save someone they don't know/like.


It is, assuming that saving her requires no significant sacrifice on your part and, in both cases, the motive for your action is wanting her to live (as opposed to, say, fear of punishment.)

If I was a good person than I would be inclined to help. But we can't inact law/punishment to punnish "bad" people who have simply done nothing.

You have, ignorance is no defense under the law.

So? I don't care about the law. I'm talking about the moral character of the act.

And while I undoubtedly should have been more careful, an accident happening due to lack of care and a deliberate murder are very different, morally.

Why can't be held responcible for actions of others. If someone else or some other force lead to the persons death it is not directly our responcibility. As for if we should act, it would be nice, but we can't force people to do stuff we want just because we think it would be nice.
Other wise from the jist of your argument, you want to punish someone for walking out of their house and not jumping into a river to save someone they don't know/like.

I think that if all the factors were known, and indeed, the person watched the woman drown solely because he wanted her to die, even though he could have saved her easily, then yes, it would be legitimate to charge him with murder.

I also acknowledge, however, that since we cannot know, it is unjustified to punish such things equally.

If I was a good person than I would be inclined to help. But we can't inact law/punishment to punnish "bad" people who have simply done nothing.

But they have done something. They have watched a woman drown, though they could have saved her, because they wanted her to die.

How is passively providing for the ends of another against one's own will not subservient? There is a difference in degree (maybe), but hardly in kind.

What do you mean by "passively"?

Of course, but one is not dying of one's own self-determination if one starves against one's will.

No one desires the negative consequences of their actions, that is why they are negative consequences. Yet, if death is a consequence of one's actions, then it is a matter of self-determination.

I think the pre-1865 subjugation of Blacks in the United States was slavery, as were similar cases directed at Blacks and Native Americans elsewhere in the Americas.

I think a decent argument could be made for the assertion that compulsory education amounts to slavery, though it could be reasonably disputed in a few ways.

I think wage-slavery is a legitimate label for conditions where employment is a necessity and the options are horrific and limited.

What are the common characteristics of those?

The glaring one is coerced labor, if there are any others, let them be known.

And if you don't have the time, or you aren't skilled enough to amass the money without starving yourself in the process?

You will be forced to pay what you are able to pay, starvation wouldn't be an option as that helps no one. But if you must have wages garnished for the rest of your life and live in poverty because of it, then so be it. If full amount cannot be paid back, then there is nothing that can be done.

Why does blue not mean green?

Because there are definitive characteristics not shared by either.

It is a matter of convention - we do not use "slavery" to refer to every example of coerced activity.

But if we set a moral definition of slavery and it includes every form of coerced activity, we can conclude that conventional use is not appropriate.

I think "servitude" is still too strong a term.

"Coercion," maybe.

Slavery is coercion as well.

Why does that extend to everything she might exchange it for?

Because you cannot respect the fruits of a person's labor if you don't also respect what that person exchanged it for.

What is the difference between withholding all wages for labor, and paying wages but then taking all of the goods those wages purchased?

What do you mean by "passively"?

Not actively; coerced inaction (say, prohibiting murder) instead of coerced action (requiring mutual aid.)

No one desires the negative consequences of their actions, that is why they are negative consequences. Yet, if death is a consequence of one's actions, then it is a matter of self-determination.

No, it isn't - no more than punishment being a consequence of one's actions makes it a matter of self-determination.

But that is beside the point, because nothing in the example necessitated that it be a condition caused by the starving person's own choices.

What are the common characteristics of those?

The glaring one is coerced labor, if there are any others, let them be known.

There are two important ones.

The first is class; unlike obligatory mutual aid, which has a degree of recipricocity to it, here one group is denied freedom at the hands of another in a one-sided manner.

The second is the degree of coerced labor. In all three examples it occupies a large portion of the victim's time, and indeed, in many ways defines their lives.

You will be forced to pay what you are able to pay, starvation wouldn't be an option as that helps no one. But if you must have wages garnished for the rest of your life and live in poverty because of it, then so be it. If full amount cannot be paid back, then there is nothing that can be done.

That wasn't my intended question. Can I take the gun or not, knowing that I probably won't be able to pay it back?

But if we set a moral definition of slavery and it includes every form of coerced activity, we can conclude that conventional use is not appropriate.

True, but then you are engaging in circular logic:

Positive obligations are immoral because they constitute slavery.

Positive obligations constitute slavery because they are immoral.

Slavery is coercion as well.

So?

Because you cannot respect the fruits of a person's labor if you don't also respect what that person exchanged it for.

Why not? I respect her right to her fruits of her labor as an extension of herself, but suddenly she's saying that this alleged extension of herself is going to be sold to someone on the other side of the country, and I'm still supposed to respect it?

Either it's alienable, or it's not.

What is the difference between withholding all wages for labor, and paying wages but then taking all of the goods those wages purchased?

Wages are what is paid for the fruits of labor, not the fruits of labor themselves.

Not actively; coerced inaction (say, prohibiting murder) instead of coerced action (requiring mutual aid.)

Mutual forebearance of action towards others establishes mutual freedoms and responsibilities of the individual.

Would you say that not enslaving another person establishes one's own subserviency? It seems to me quite obvious that it establishes an equality between the two.

No, it isn't - no more than punishment being a consequence of one's actions makes it a matter of self-determination.

If the consequences of one's actions were removed, self-determination would be undermined.

Answers.com (not an authoritative source for this sort of thing, but I couldn't have put the definition any better) defines self-determination as:

Determination of one's own fate or course of action without compulsion; free will.

Now, regardless of the self-determination sacrificed by others for your benefit, if the consequences of your actions are erased in favor of a state's predetermined consequences, then your self-determination is undermined.

But that is beside the point, because nothing in the example necessitated that it be a condition caused by the starving person's own choices.

If it is a result of another's intrusion it is in fact coersion and unjust.

There are two important ones.

The first is class; unlike obligatory mutual aid, which has a degree of recipricocity to it, here one group is denied freedom at the hands of another in a one-sided manner.

First off, in the case of obligatory "mutual aid", we can assume that the scenarios proposed are analogous of an obligation placed upon the priveleged class to support the poor.

Now because of this, while I will agree that, in the extreme situations of mutual defense, class is not an issue. But if this argument shifts over to welfare obligations, you must either not define it as mutual aid or forsake your "classless" definition of "mutual aid". Either way the justification doesn't stick.

Now, considering your statement: I think we can simply toss out the characteristic of "class" altogether. For one reason, I think I can propose an example in which one member enslaves another member of the same class through violent methods.

For another reason, in your statement class is completely superfluous. At the end of the sentence you point out that it is the one-sidedness of the exchange that is unjust (with this I would completely agree). This is not directly a matter of class, but rather reciprocity (which you also mentioned).

So you would be much better served to remove the first clause (an independent clause in every sense) entirely and just state:

Unlike obligatory mutual aid, which has a degree of recipricocity to it, here one group is denied freedom at the hands of another in a one-sided manner

Now my answer to the revision is much shorter than the exposition of the revision itself (I also imagine it will be far less conclusive):

In the case of "obligatory mutual aid", especially in our scenario, the reciprocity is practically impossible, with the reciever of aid being completely unable (I would also imagine that you would not actually support true reciprocity in the situation, as the reciever of help would not be obligated to repay it) to return the favor. So, in a sense, the individual is being forced into a behavior where it is very, very unlikely that he will recieve a benefit from.

The second is the degree of coerced labor. In all three examples it occupies a large portion of the victim's time, and indeed, in many ways defines their lives.

I still don't understand how slavery cannot take in all degrees of coerced labor. If a slave was captured and labored for one day before escaping, is that not still slave labor? If someone was required to spend an hour every weekend maintaining another's weekend under threat of death or imprisonment, would that not also be slave labor?

Even in your scenario, where an employee is a victim of "wage slavery", we can assume that the employee recieves a basic subsistence wage (he would not work if he would still die). His limited options also imply that he does not have a very valuable skill set. From these two assumptions we can deduce that only a portion (the size of the portion is debatable) of his labor hours are being coercively taken.

That wasn't my intended question. Can I take the gun or not, knowing that I probably won't be able to pay it back?

Oh, I see.

My resolution of the issue is a bit sketchy I will admit, but I am assuming that you can do anything you want (within your natural abilities), that is part of being a rational human actor. The morality of the system comes into play in assigning fair restitution to the victim of your actions. If there is no possible way to repay the victim for your actions, then all systems will fail.

True, but then you are engaging in circular logic:

Positive obligations are immoral because they constitute slavery.

Positive obligations constitute slavery because they are immoral.

It is not a matter of circular logic yet, first we have to set a definition for slavery, and then show why all slavery is immoral. As I said before, I feel that you think slavery is sometimes justified, but my goal is to show that it is slavery, and then, if I have to show that all slavery is immoral.

It then becomes:

Violently mandated positive obligations are slavery.

Slavery is immoral.

Therefore, violently mandated positive obligations are immoral.

So?

So I am looking for a viable term that will contrast slavery with minor forms of coerced labor. Sense slavery is also coersion, no contrast is drawn.

Why not? I respect her right to her fruits of her labor as an extension of herself, but suddenly she's saying that this alleged extension of herself is going to be sold to someone on the other side of the country, and I'm still supposed to respect it?

What is gained through exchange of the fruits of her labor is also the fruit of her labor.

Wages are what is paid for the fruits of labor, not the fruits of labor themselves.

What is gained through exchange of the fruits of labor is also the fruit of labor.

Mutual forebearance of action towards others establishes mutual freedoms and responsibilities of the individual.

And exactly the same thing could be said for mutual aid, which is the whole point.

Eventually you have to acknowledge that coercion can be justified in some circumstances, and once you do, I don't see why you should stop at negative rights.

(A philosophy of complete non-coercion would be an interesting one, but in the end, hardly libertarian; it would mandate that an oppressor should not be resisted, but rather tolerated.)

Would you say that not enslaving another person establishes one's own subserviency?

Absolutely not. I am trying to say that your logic leads us to that conclusion, which I reject.

It seems to me quite obvious that it establishes an equality between the two.

To me as well. And it also seems to me quite obvious that an obligation of mutual aid when people are in need establishes an equality.

Inequality springs up in every society and every circumstance, and to actively counteract this through the obligation of mutual aid prevents the subservience that may otherwise develop. Because the obligation is mutual - because everyone is obligated to help anyone else in need - there is no subservience.

If the consequences of one's actions were removed, self-determination would be undermined.

Answers.com (not an authoritative source for this sort of thing, but I couldn't have put the definition any better) defines self-determination as:

Determination of one's own fate or course of action without compulsion; free will.

Now, regardless of the self-determination sacrificed by others for your benefit, if the consequences of your actions are erased in favor of a state's predetermined consequences, then your self-determination is undermined.

There is no "compulsion," however.

Say I must choose between two options - Option 1 and Option 2. Option 1 has consequences A and B; I want A but not B. Option 2 has consequences C and D; I want C but not D. I cannot choose both. The internal goods of each option are irrelevant to me.

My choice between Option 1 and Option 2 is completely free, but my self-determination has still been constrained. I can choose A and B or C and D, but I cannot get all of what I want (A and C), nor can I avoid what I dislike (B and D).

If society takes action to divide these choices, to make four options instead of two, it has increased my self-determination. Now I can pick and choose as I see fit.

To return to your example, the starving person doesn't want to starve, but as you say it is at least very plausible that his circumstances are in part a result of his actions. However, by saving him from starving, and more importantly, by saving all starving people from starving, we are permitting another choice - to undertake those actions and not to starve. If you're the kind of person who wants to starve, you're still free to starve, but the extra consequence that was not willed by the person who performed the actions (and was thus compelled) is removed.

If it is a result of another's intrusion it is in fact coersion and unjust.

And if it is merely a random, natural occurrence, it may not be coercion but it is still unjust, and it certainly limits the self-determination of the starving person.

While you are concerned with non-coercion, I am concerned with genuine self-determination, which includes the capability to meaningfully control one's life, something starvation impedes significantly. Since I don't see what the justification for non-coercion is beyond promoting self-determination, it seems to me that my formulation is the better one.

First off, in the case of obligatory "mutual aid", we can assume that the scenarios proposed are analogous of an obligation placed upon the priveleged class to support the poor.

Now because of this, while I will agree that, in the extreme situations of mutual defense, class is not an issue. But if this argument shifts over to welfare obligations, you must either not define it as mutual aid or forsake your "classless" definition of "mutual aid". Either way the justification doesn't stick.

Well, there is a loose sort of recipricocity regardless. A rich person may not actually receive aid from the poor, but she can imagine herself as a poor person, and realize that were she poor she would be benefiting from aid. Insofar as class distinctions are morally arbitrary, acknowledgment of the moral equality of the poor leads us to this kind of theoretical recipricocity, akin to the Golden Rule - because they are beings equal to you, treat others the way you would like to be treated, were you in their place.

In addition, what mutual aid encompasses is merely an equalizing; I have something superfluous that you need, I give it to you, we are now more equal than before.

None of this is to say that I don't see where you're coming from here; I do, and like I said the last time you brought this up, I think this is one of the reasons that economic equality is a good thing. I merely don't think that the concern is significant enough to remove the obligation.

Now, considering your statement: I think we can simply toss out the characteristic of "class" altogether. For one reason, I think I can propose an example in which one member enslaves another member of the same class through violent methods.

For another reason, in your statement class is completely superfluous. At the end of the sentence you point out that it is the one-sidedness of the exchange that is unjust (with this I would completely agree). This is not directly a matter of class, but rather reciprocity (which you also mentioned).

So you would be much better served to remove the first clause (an independent clause in every sense) entirely and just state:

Agreed. I was using "class" rather loosely there; simply pointing out the denial of recipricocity is more precise.

Now my answer to the revision is much shorter than the exposition of the revision itself (I also imagine it will be far less conclusive):

In the case of "obligatory mutual aid", especially in our scenario, the reciprocity is practically impossible, with the reciever of aid being completely unable (I would also imagine that you would not actually support true reciprocity in the situation, as the reciever of help would not be obligated to repay it) to return the favor. So, in a sense, the individual is being forced into a behavior where it is very, very unlikely that he will recieve a benefit from.

Well, of course he cannot expect a direct benefit from it; otherwise it would amount to extortion. But the point is that he lives in a society where everyone practices mutual aid, not just him, and not just the woman. So while the woman herself may never repay him, he will be repaid by the benefits he gets from living in a society where mutual aid is an obligation, and she will repay the society by practicing mutual aid towards others in her own life. The recipricocity is loose, to ensure equality, but it's there.

I still don't understand how slavery cannot take in all degrees of coerced labor. If a slave was captured and labored for one day before escaping, is that not still slave labor? If someone was required to spend an hour every weekend maintaining another's weekend under threat of death or imprisonment, would that not also be slave labor?

Yes, in the first case, because the fact that the slave escaped is incidental to the character of his status. No, in the second, because it is not a defining characteristic of the person's life; he is coerced, he is not a slave, for whom coercion is the dominant feature.

And that's what I've been trying to get at, but haven't explained very well. Our self-determination is limited all the time; by nature, by the interference of others, by our own mistakes. That doesn't make us slaves. What would make us slaves is for a high degree of coercion to be a dominant feature of our basic daily activities.

It's a vague line, but I hope it's intuitively meaningful, at least.

Even in your scenario, where an employee is a victim of "wage slavery", we can assume that the employee recieves a basic subsistence wage (he would not work if he would still die). His limited options also imply that he does not have a very valuable skill set. From these two assumptions we can deduce that only a portion (the size of the portion is debatable) of his labor hours are being coercively taken.

Sure, but one's place of employment is certainly a very significant portion of a person's life, and its influence extends far beyond the mere quantity of working-hours. The day must be built around it; so must one's place of residence and means of transportation. The goods one buys and the social class in which one exists are determined by the wages. And so on.

Oh, I see.

My resolution of the issue is a bit sketchy I will admit, but I am assuming that you can do anything you want (within your natural abilities), that is part of being a rational human actor. The morality of the system comes into play in assigning fair restitution to the victim of your actions. If there is no possible way to repay the victim for your actions, then all systems will fail.

A good system does not fail; it will always give us a moral course (or courses) of action, at least if we are aware of all the factors and the action is morally significant, as this one clearly is.

In moral terms, when I say "can" I mean "ought." The question here is, knowing both that people will be killed if I do not act and knowing also that I cannot repay the owner, whether or not I should steal the gun. Both systems that have been referenced here give us an answer to this question, though it may or may not be an answer we like.

Most forms of utilitarianism would say "steal the gun." Lives are more important than property rights; most people have a far stronger preference for living than for keeping everything they own.

A strict natural rights libertarian theory would say, "don't steal the gun." In fact, restitution is no way out here, because just as with eminent domain the key issue for the libertarian is not "fair" restitution, which she will be quick to insist is purely subjective, but rather consent.

What I want to know is, which one would you go with? And why?

Honestly, I don't think there is a good way out for you. You must either:

1. Advise taking the gun. But once you have done so you must grant the existence of positive obligations, because you are saying that it is just (at least more just than the alternative) to deprive someone of property for another's benefit.
2. Advise leaving the gun. But then you are saying that I must tolerate severe violations of the right to life for the sake of preventing a minor violation of property rights, which seems rather egregious.

Edit: Alternatively, you could argue that property rights, while important, are not the equivalent of the rights of self-ownership. Stealing the gun is thus acceptable; forcing the owner to make you a gun is not.

So I am looking for a viable term that will contrast slavery with minor forms of coerced labor. Sense slavery is also coersion, no contrast is drawn.

I don't think such a term exists.

What is gained through exchange of the fruits of her labor is also the fruit of her labor.

Perhaps, but she certainly doesn't have the same kind of direct connection to it that something she herself produced might contain.

An example might illustrate this point. Say I buy some wood and painstakingly hand-carve something. I now have a direct connection to it; it has a high degree of subjective value for me. If I build ten, and the state comes to my house and demands the tenth in taxes, I will feel violated; I made it, I intricately carved it, and now you will take it away?

But once we are dealing in wages and not in direct product, the violation hardly seems so egregious. It is just money; the state taking away 10% of my income may be an annoyance, but it is not really a violation. I did, after all, take the job knowing that my income would be taxed. It really is not that different from my employer merely paying me less for my labor, which even a natural rights libertarian would not consider a violation.

What are you talking about?
You suggested your failure should be rewarded if it wasn't your fault. So I presented an example of such a thing.
So motive never matters, morally?
I don't see why it would.

Matters of morality are pretty sketchy at the best of times (I typically deny knowledge of morality). If you're going to assign specific characteristics to morality, I want you to offer some sort of basis for that.
That's not what I said. I said if my motive for not saving her is wanting her to die, that's the same as killing her.
So I'm less guilty if I feel remorse?
It is, assuming that saving her requires no significant sacrifice on your part and, in both cases, the motive for your action is wanting her to live (as opposed to, say, fear of punishment.)
I still fail to see why my motives are relevant.

Plus, this general suggestion that we're beholden to help each other flies in the face of individual freedom. I'm apparently not allowed to remove myself from the group.

And exactly the same thing could be said for mutual aid, which is the whole point.

No, it accomplishes the opposite, it successfully limits the choices of action and denies some consequences of actions. I don't know how you can reconciliate that with freedom and responsibility.

Eventually you have to acknowledge that coercion can be justified in some circumstances, and once you do, I don't see why you should stop at negative rights.

(A philosophy of complete non-coercion would be an interesting one, but in the end, hardly libertarian; it would mandate that an oppressor should not be resisted, but rather tolerated.)

I do believe that very few libertarians are pacifists. I think an important principle of the philosophy is a constant and active protection of one's own rights.

So of course I acknowledge the coercion is justified in some situations, namely in the defense of one's self and one's property, or in the fulfillment of contract to protect another and his property.

Absolutely not. I am trying to say that your logic leads us to that conclusion, which I reject.

Show the deduction that you assume leads to that conclusion, I don't get it.

To me as well. And it also seems to me quite obvious that an obligation of mutual aid when people are in need establishes an equality.

Inequality springs up in every society and every circumstance, and to actively counteract this through the obligation of mutual aid prevents the subservience that may otherwise develop. Because the obligation is mutual - because everyone is obligated to help anyone else in need - there is no subservience.

Except for those who are naturally less needy.

Forced equality is impossible. Equality will only exist with the free acceptance of egalitarian ideals by the individuals that comprise the interactions of society.

There is no "compulsion," however.

Say I must choose between two options - Option 1 and Option 2. Option 1 has consequences A and B; I want A but not B. Option 2 has consequences C and D; I want C but not D. I cannot choose both. The internal goods of each option are irrelevant to me.

My choice between Option 1 and Option 2 is completely free, but my self-determination has still been constrained. I can choose A and B or C and D, but I cannot get all of what I want (A and C), nor can I avoid what I dislike (B and D).

If society takes action to divide these choices, to make four options instead of two, it has increased my self-determination. Now I can pick and choose as I see fit.

I am having trouble linking this analogy to the idea of mutual aid.

However, to address the analogy, self-determination has nothing to do with the number of options, it has everything to do with your ability to pick available options.

Simply because I cannot choose to asexually reproduce myself a billion times and take over the planet, does not imply that I am in any less control over my situation.

Considering the infinite number of comprehendable future paths I could take and the limited number of possible future paths, your definition would make our self-determination infinitely small.

To return to your example, the starving person doesn't want to starve, but as you say it is at least very plausible that his circumstances are in part a result of his actions. However, by saving him from starving, and more importantly, by saving all starving people from starving, we are permitting another choice - to undertake those actions and not to starve. If you're the kind of person who wants to starve, you're still free to starve, but the extra consequence that was not willed by the person who performed the actions (and was thus compelled) is removed.

Here is where we get to the idea of compulsion. You say that there is no compulsion to change how we act in this situation, but now I will offer a scenario to counter that.

Suppose we have an investment (any action will work in this, but since monetary values are easiest to work with, thanks to the wonderful invention of currency, we will stick to financials) that has a possible reward of $10,000bucks, but could cost you your yearly income and your entire life savings of $200,000. Depending on probabilities and your risk aversity, you would most likely not undertake this option.

Now assume that your government forces all individuals who make gains on the year to make sure that no one has a certain income. All of a sudden, while the possible reward is $10,000, your possible losses are much, much lower, with no risk to the life savings you value so much. Therefore, your valuation and decision making processes are shift toward making an action that you would not do.

The compulsion in this issue is the undermining of our natural value judgements. Any time that consequences are whitewashed, the behavior that we would naturally take is also whitewashed.

And if it is merely a random, natural occurrence, it may not be coercion but it is still unjust, and it certainly limits the self-determination of the starving person.

While you are concerned with non-coercion, I am concerned with genuine self-determination, which includes the capability to meaningfully control one's life, something starvation impedes significantly. Since I don't see what the justification for non-coercion is beyond promoting self-determination, it seems to me that my formulation is the better one.

Even if you were operating from a valid definition of self-determination, your consistency is fleeting when one considers the cost of another's self-determination.

Well, there is a loose sort of recipricocity regardless. A rich person may not actually receive aid from the poor, but she can imagine herself as a poor person, and realize that were she poor she would be benefiting from aid. Insofar as class distinctions are morally arbitrary, acknowledgment of the moral equality of the poor leads us to this kind of theoretical recipricocity, akin to the Golden Rule - because they are beings equal to you, treat others the way you would like to be treated, were you in their place.

And once again, this moral equality only implies that someone should be treated as a person deserves, but makes no implication as to what a human deserves.

The individual who does not agree with your ideas on the entitlements of personhood would be hard pressed to see the reciprocity of their obligations.

In addition, what mutual aid encompasses is merely an equalizing; I have something superfluous that you need, I give it to you, we are now more equal than before.

Of course, there will never be a point where all are equal, so there will always be someone in in this society who is entitled to the service of another. If you are obligated to serve another, just as in your percieved wage-slavery, you are not an equal.

Yes, in the first case, because the fact that the slave escaped is incidental to the character of his status. No, in the second, because it is not a defining characteristic of the person's life; he is coerced, he is not a slave, for whom coercion is the dominant feature.

I am guessing that you see it coming, and I was hoping to avoid it, but at what point do you draw the line between simple coerced service and slavery? Is it entirely arbitrary? You have shown no actual difference between the two other than the amount of labor robbed.

And that's what I've been trying to get at, but haven't explained very well. Our self-determination is limited all the time; by nature, by the interference of others, by our own mistakes. That doesn't make us slaves. What would make us slaves is for a high degree of coercion to be a dominant feature of our basic daily activities.

Our own mistakes are critical to our self-determination, if our current selves were no longer a result of our past mistakes, one would be hard pressed to say that we were a prominent factor in our own making.

Nature also is not a valid limitation to our self-determination, because self-determination is a matter of how we make our choices, and with the elimination of nature, we don't make any choices.

Furthermore, if you were to include our mistakes and nature into the realm of restrictions to our self-determination, I would posit that we are indeed slaves at all points in our lives.

Sure, but one's place of employment is certainly a very significant portion of a person's life, and its influence extends far beyond the mere quantity of working-hours. The day must be built around it; so must one's place of residence and means of transportation. The goods one buys and the social class in which one exists are determined by the wages. And so on.

Yes, but the amount of coerced labor is of limited influence upon the person's life.

A good system does not fail; it will always give us a moral course (or courses) of action, at least if we are aware of all the factors and the action is morally significant, as this one clearly is.

In moral terms, when I say "can" I mean "ought." The question here is, knowing both that people will be killed if I do not act and knowing also that I cannot repay the owner, whether or not I should steal the gun. Both systems that have been referenced here give us an answer to this question, though it may or may not be an answer we like.

Most forms of utilitarianism would say "steal the gun." Lives are more important than property rights; most people have a far stronger preference for living than for keeping everything they own.

A strict natural rights libertarian theory would say, "don't steal the gun." In fact, restitution is no way out here, because just as with eminent domain the key issue for the libertarian is not "fair" restitution, which she will be quick to insist is purely subjective, but rather consent.

What I want to know is, which one would you go with? And why?

Honestly, I don't think there is a good way out for you. You must either:

1. Advise taking the gun. But once you have done so you must grant the existence of positive obligations, because you are saying that it is just (at least more just than the alternative) to deprive someone of property for another's benefit.
2. Advise leaving the gun. But then you are saying that I must tolerate severe violations of the right to life for the sake of preventing a minor violation of property rights, which seems rather egregious.

Edit: Alternatively, you could argue that property rights, while important, are not the equivalent of the rights of self-ownership. Stealing the gun is thus acceptable; forcing the owner to make you a gun is not.

You have a moral obligation to not take the gun, for reasons that we are going through right now.

I would point out that utilitarian arguments are just as "egregious" when tested under extreme examples.

I don't think such a term exists.

Because slavery perfectly incapsulates the idea.

Perhaps, but she certainly doesn't have the same kind of direct connection to it that something she herself produced might contain.

An example might illustrate this point. Say I buy some wood and painstakingly hand-carve something. I now have a direct connection to it; it has a high degree of subjective value for me. If I build ten, and the state comes to my house and demands the tenth in taxes, I will feel violated; I made it, I intricately carved it, and now you will take it away?

Any sense of direct connection and increased subjective value is irrelevant to the notion of property as an extension of the self. I value my hands more than my nipples, but that does not mean that my nipples are any less mine. It simply means that I would sooner part with them.

But once we are dealing in wages and not in direct product, the violation hardly seems so egregious. It is just money; the state taking away 10% of my income may be an annoyance, but it is not really a violation. I did, after all, take the job knowing that my income would be taxed. It really is not that different from my employer merely paying me less for my labor, which even a natural rights libertarian would not consider a violation.

You have yet again touched on the beauty of currency.

And the "that" is the reason your last sentence doesn't matter, because "that" difference is contractarian exchange against violent extortion.

Vittos: I wrote out a long reply to you, and was nearly finished when I accidentally closed the window and lost the post.

I don't have the patience to write it out again, sorry. Let me just ask two questions, ones that cover, I think, the most essential point:

However, to address the analogy, self-determination has nothing to do with the number of options, it has everything to do with your ability to pick available options.

What's the difference between an unavailable option and a prohibited available option? Perhaps more importantly, why should we be concerned with the difference?