NationStates Jolt Archive

Yep. That's right. I guess Bush is not smoking hard enough (remember "we're gonna smoke them out".."dead or alive"..).

Islamic Emirate of Waziristan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Emirate_of_Waziristan) is the latest entry into the comity of nations in the world, following the Pakistani govt's agreement to withdraw their forces from occupied Waziristan and handing over power to the taliban rulers.

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,20500788,00.html
Taliban opens office at Pakistani bus stop
Bruce Loudon, South Asia correspondent
30sep06

IN a new embarrassment for peripatetic Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, Taliban officials have opened an office in the capital of Pakistan's North Waziristan region, where Osama bin Laden is believed to have his headquarters.

The office, in Miramshah's main bus station, is said to be operating with the complicity of Pakistani authorities.

And Taliban office workers have organised a pamphlet drop calling on locals to contact them on all matters relating to law and order.

Yesterday's disclosure of the office's opening came as General Musharraf had talks in London with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and angrily rejected new charges of complicity between the principal Pakistani intelligence organisation, the Inter-Services Intelligence, and the Taliban and al-Qa'ida.

It also followed a frosty encounter between him and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, brokered by US President George W. Bush at the White House.

After their meeting, the three presidents appeared at a press conference and, while Mr Bush shook hands with each of his guests, General Musharraf and Mr Karzai did not even exchange glances, let alone shake hands.

On Thursday night, South Asia was alive with accounts of what was described as "an extremely frosty" encounter in Washington, during which Mr Karzai hammered home his conviction that Islamabad was not doing enough to deal with Taliban and al-Qa'ida activity within its territory, while General Musharraf declared it was doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it.

The Pakistani President insists that beyond whingeing about his country, all that neighbouring Afghanistan is doing is providing out-of-date information to Islamabad about the alleged location of Taliban and al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. Mr Karzai has countered by accusing Pakistan of "training a snake that can also bite the trainer".

He insists that Pakistan's tolerance of pro-Taliban militants is contributing massively to Afghanistan's instability and the increasingly difficult challenge being confronted by NATO-led forces in his country -- including those from Australia -- battling the Taliban forces.

He has said that co-operating with terrorists is like "trying to train a snake against somebody else. You cannot train a snake. It will come and bite you".

Leading Pakistani newspaper Dawn said the Taliban office in Miramshah, headquarters of the North Waziristan Agency, was there for "curbing crimes and antisocial activities" in the area.

The newspaper said announcements were made and pamphlets distributed in the town asking residents to co-operate with the Taliban in keeping peace in the agency, where bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri are believed to have their operational base.

Apart from the public emergence of an organisation that is doing battle with -- and killing -- NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan, Dawn also reported that Pakistani military authorities have returned AK-47 assault rifles, books and other materials belonging to a seminary owned by Afghan jihadi commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Officials said security forces had raided the seminary a few months ago and seized arms and equipment as part of a crackdown on militants.

But under Pakistan's controversial September 5 peace accord between the Government and the Taliban, it was agreed that the Government and militants would return weapons and other equipment taken during army action.

So the jihadi commander has got his guns and his books back, thanks to the Pakistani army.

More articles pointing to Musharraf's perfidy and the failure of US-NATO strategy in Afghanistan (this is, if we assume they had one in the first place:rolleyes: )

This one is from The Friday Times - a subscription only paper in Pak.

Taliban emerge victorious in North Waziristan

Iqbal Khattak
Despite the Sept 5 accord and the opening of the area, not many are optimistic about the future

MIRANSHAH, NORTH WAZIRISTAN – Inside the air-conditioned office of the political agent for North Waziristan, pro-Taliban clerics were meeting Dr Fakhre Alam. Outside his office, a tribal elder was holding a file in his right hand and waiting for his turn to seek, through the political agent, the government’s approval for upgrading a girl’s primary school to the middle level.

‘Pehlawan’ Malik Mir Kazim has been pressing the government to upgrade the school in his Razmak town now for two years. His efforts have been in vain.

“What has happened [the rise of Taliban] in North Waziristan is all because of lack of education,” the 45-year-old elder told TFT. Now that the government has reached an agreement with the Taliban, Kazim says there is no chance that the school would be upgraded.

His reading of the accord is simple: “The Taliban have emerged victorious from the accord. Whatever demands they put on the table were met [by the government],” he replied to the question. “This is the general perception among the people here.”

Asked to comment on President Musharraf’s claims in the US that the peace accord was “against” the Taliban, he said: “If that were true the Taliban would not be moving around openly without any fear of the government.”

Three months ago, it was hard to imagine the picture Miranshah was presenting on September 22, exactly 17 days after the controversial accord, which Musharraf claims has been signed with the anti-Taliban tribal elders.

A visit by TFT to the area threw up interesting observations. Markets were open, streets were full of people and many longhaired people known as the “Taliban” were patrolling the bazaar in 4x4 SSR jeeps and on foot, brandishing Kalashnikov rifles and other weapons. Vehicles were leaving from the general bus stand in all directions and trailers were bringing different commodity items into the bazaar and carrying exports goods to Afghanistan through the Ghulam Khan check-post.

There are few signs of government presence, however. All check-posts have been vacated and paramilitary jawans are almost gone except at one or two places. The military is back to the barracks. TFT only saw two tribal policemen at one place near the Dattakhel bus stand.

The militants are clearly triumphant and enjoying the freedom of movement the accord has afforded them. As one 22-year-old militant Bismillah Khan put it: “It is great to move around without fear of encountering the troops.”

Former FATA security chief Brig. (Retd) Mehmood Shah said the accord gave the Taliban complete freedom of movement and the “chances of presence [sic] of high value targets” must have grown following the government’s lifting of travel restrictions on militants.

The Taliban look fresh, their hair well-oiled. “They were mostly battle-fatigued and dust-covered when they were fighting the troops and moving constantly from one place to another,” Rasool Khan, a chemist near the agency headquarters hospital, told TFT.

But glimpses of destruction underlined the severity of operations the security forces had carried out blowing up seminaries where the presence of the militants was suspected and public property, including completely damaged pick-ups and a private medical complex.

“What you are seeing today [open markets, government offices, schools, colleges and people on the streets] was closed three months back. Miranshah was giving the look of a deserted city,” the pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Muhammad Alam told TFT after emerging from the meeting with Dr Khan.

Having suffered huge economic losses, the business community has begun to regroup to recoup. “My hotel was hit twice by army shelling when they controlled the Miranshah bazaar. I don’t know why,” hotel owner Mian Khadim told TFT angrily while showing marks of artillery shrapnel on the building.

Wholesale trader Turab Khan stayed at home for six months when his shop was closed because his tribe was sheltering suspected militants and the government was punishing everyone from the tribe under the territorial responsibility clause of the Frontier Crimes Regulation. “We have suffered huge losses,” he said amidst hope the government might compensate the “innocent” people who were caught in the crossfire between the security forces and the militants during months of destruction and killings.

A man whose two pick-up trucks were hit from a Cobra helicopter gunship literally dragged TFT to a place where the completely destroyed vehicles were still parked. “Look, only innocent people were targeted and wanted militants had complete freedom. If my vehicles were hit due to my link with militants why is the administration not arresting me now,” Ishaq said.

There was much collateral damage and it also angered the people. NWFP Governor Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai acknowledged recently that the operations were driving the people away from the government and forcing them to join the Taliban ranks. The accord should have brought hope to Waziristan and in some ways the area has become lively again. But pessimism and fear of an uncertain future still linger and the feeling of uncertainty among most people TFT talked to is palpable.

No one is sure the accord would last for long. That scepticism cuts across the government-people divide. Clerics are the only optimists who believe the accord has ushered in a new era for Waziristan. “Pessimism is haram in Islam,” Maulana Muhammad Alam told TFT outside the political agent’s office. “There is more uncertainty now than before,” a government official told TFT, adding: “We are looking into an uncertain future. We don’t know how the Waziristan wicket will behave.”

Inside the huge military base with communication antennas covering much space on rooftops, army jawans are not convinced that the fighting is over when asked about the accord and whether it would help restore peace. “I am not sure,” said one. Other soldiers TFT spoke with shared his uncertainty.

A break in the fighting, however, has provided the soldiers some moments of rest and the chance to oil their weapons. A glimpse at the base pointed to ongoing military activities. Two Cobra gunships and as many transport helicopters are permanently stationed on the base to respond to any “emergency call” from the GHQ or across the border. A liberal tribal elder, after meeting with senior army officers in a highly secure zone of Miranshah, said: “I wonder how those who called the army kafir [infidel] yesterday are shaking hands with soldiers today.”

Interestingly, while one set of people talks about the accord, either praising it or condemning it, another set of people has decided to remain quiet. They would not say whether it is good or bad. These are also people who seem to have almost become apathetic to what is going on around them.

Maulana Muhammad Alam dispelled the general impression that the accord held no future as far as peace in North Waziristan was concerned and that its violations by the pro-Taliban militants would continue. “We have no business to do with Afghanistan,” the cleric, who was part of 45-member grand Jirga that negotiated the accord, said. “We are part of Pakistan and will go wherever we are required to help Pakistan.”

No government official was ready to shed light on the situation and a nervous-looking Assistant Political Officer Iqbal Hussain Khattak excused himself when asked to comment on the situation. As for anti-terrorism experts, they are agreed that the accord would only be successful if the political administration “regains the lost ground” by asserting its authority in the same manner as it was doing before the military’s arrival.

Can it do that? That’s a question to which not many are prepared to give an affirmative answer.


More to follow.

This is from The Friday Times too. Sorry no linky. Will try to get one later. This one's about how the talibs are all over Quetta, the largest city and capital of Balochistan, the largest Pakistani province.

Looking for the Taliban: check Quetta



Malik Siraj Akbar
While it is difficult to say who is or is not a Talib, one thing is clear: Quetta and other areas are swarming with people who are rabidly anti-US.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly accused Pakistan of being a source of shelter and support for the revived Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. But in an interview with Newsweek on October 2, Karzai took his accusations one step further by saying that Mullah Omar was in Quetta “for sure” and that President Pervez Musharraf knew this. In fact, according to Karzai, Afghanistan had given Musharraf the GPS numbers of Omar’s house as well as the telephone number.

There are constant reports coming in of Taliban operating from northern Balochistan in the areas of Chaman and Spinboldak; there is much talk also about Taliban presence in Quetta. During Musharraf’s recently concluded trip to the United States, these reports again came up and the Afghan president constantly argued that the Taliban were regrouping in Quetta, which was now the ‘Taliban headquarter’. For his part, Musharraf termed these allegations “most ridiculous”.

So what’s really going on?

When TFT contacted government officials to get an answer to this question, no one was willing to speak about the ‘sensitive issue’. Chief Minister Jam Mohammad Yousaf’s press secretary promised an appointment with the CM but later said it was not possible due to the CM’s busy schedule in the week. Balochistan Governor, Owais Ahmed Ghani’s military secretary too was reluctant to commit. The Home Minister was out of station and the inspector general of police was not willing to talk to the media.

All one has to go by are official statements, the most recent being that given by Governor Ghani and CM Jam Yousaf, at a high-level meeting in Quetta. They declared the allegations of Taliban re-grouping in Quetta as ludicrous and also announced that security on the Pak-Afghan border would be tightened by deploying more Frontier Corps (FC) personnel.

“No one, including the Taliban, will be allowed to use Balochistan’s territory for terrorist activities,” CM Jam Yousaf said at the meeting, adding that the Balochistan government had been taking “stern action” against suspect Taliban in the past and would continue to do so in the future. “Pakistan is actively engaged in the ‘war on terrorism’ and has contributed much more to this war than any other county in the world. No Taliban or Al Qaeda members are present in Quetta and the government had been hunting all suspected terrorists,” he concluded.

Ironically, despite official claims that there are no Taliban in Quetta, the government also says it has arrested a large number of Taliban operatives from the area.:rolleyes: “Where these Taliban supporters come from and how long they’ve been here remains anybody’s guess,” said an observer. “With the [Musharraf] regime engaged on several other internal and external fronts, it has failed to effectively curb the rapidly regrouping Taliban.”

Observers also feel it is the government’s failure to implement madrassah reforms and settle the political crisis in the province that has paved the way for a Taliban comeback. “There can be no positive results until the government starts monitoring religious schools where the minds of the young are filled with ideas of hate and militancy,” says one observer.

The Taliban enjoy the overwhelming moral support of some sections of the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal, the second largest partner in the Balochistan government. “The MMA has been a vocal opponent of government raids against the suspected Taliban,” said an observer.

Maulana Noor Mohammad, provincial chief of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), has been one of the biggest opponents of operations against suspected Taliban in Quetta. When the government arrested around 200 Taliban suspects in July this year, he organised a large public rally in Quetta to condemn these raids against those he called, “our Muslim brothers”. “The government is only pleasing its western masters,” Noor said.

In fact, critics of Musharraf’s Taliban policy say that the biggest problem with it is that Musharraf is careful not to crack down too heavily on powerful Islamist radicals – a mix of clerics, army generals and spies – who have retained their Taliban links. “There seems to be a twin-track policy, even if it sometimes moves in opposite directions,” one western official says. “This means that officials turn a blind eye to Taliban in centres such as Quetta.”

This year, law enforcement agencies in Quetta conducted what they claim to be several successful raids against the suspected Taliban at religious schools and private hospitals. Such raids take place about once a month. Earlier in July this year, Quetta police rounded up about 100 Afghan nationals who they said were all Taliban operatives. The arrested persons also included a Taliban commander, Hamdullah. Following the tip-off provided by Hamdullah, the police conducted another raid the same week and arrested a hundred Taliban suspects from a madrassah.

“Who can say with any amount of certainty that the arrested men were actually Taliban,” points one observer.

On August 15, the police rounded up around 29 Taliban suspects following a successful raid on a private hospital in Quetta. The suspected Taliban were reportedly under-treatment in Quetta when the police nabbed them. Then, on September 14, Quetta police claimed to have arrested another 14 Taliban in a similar raid on another private hospital.

While the US-led hunt for the Taliban continues relentlessly in Afghanistan, sources say finding the insurgents is a far easier task in neighbouring Pakistan: you just stroll down to the shops in Quetta where you find posters of Osama bin Laden brandishing a Kalashnikov and cassettes with recordings of speeches and poems calling young men to join the jihad or mourning martyrs. Gory covers match the themes – crossed swords dripping with infidel blood, battlewagons loaded with black-turbaned fighters, and beatific images of bearded militants now detained in Guantánamo Bay.

According to a British newspaper, the men sitting cross-legged behind the counter call themselves staunch Taliban supporters. “We will not go home until there is an Islamic government in Afghanistan,” says shop owner, Muhammad Gul. Others go much further: “I am a mujahid and I will fight to the end of my life,” says Yar Muhammad, a 22-year-old Talib who says he has just completed guerrilla operations in Afghanistan.

Later, in the car, he describes the insurgent’s life of training to fire rockets and planting roadside bombs; conducting night-time attacks against Americans and then escaping under the nose of three armies. “We change our clothes and take off the turban to disguise ourselves. Some Taliban even shave,” he says.

Sources say many like Muhammad have now come to Quetta’s religious seminaries from where they will go back to the battle. “The terrain [in Balochistan] is very favourable to the insurgents,” says Shoukat Haider Changezi, director general of the Levies, a rural police force. “The state would need a phenomenal amount of resources to be effective.”

Pak-Afghan relations have, at this point, hit an all-time low. There is now talk of holding jirgas with tribal elders to empower them and move them away from supporting the Taliban. With all else having failed, it is difficult to say how far this plan will go to stabilise the region and help cut down on insurgent raids.

This one talks about how brazenly talibs cross over the border and attack Afghan security + coalition and slip back in casually.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/03/opinion/main2058543.shtml
The Problem With Pakistan

You could hear the tension over the radios.

As the Afghan border guards helplessly listened to the crackle of gunfire and the sharp, frantic voices of there brethren under attack at another distant post, American troops made a call to their base for air support.

After four bloody hours of fighting, the rebels loaded onto a truck and drove a few hundred yards over the unmarked border into the safety and sanctuary of Pakistan. In the end, two Afghan allies lay dead with two more badly wounded and an assault force of up to 100 Taliban-affiliated fighters slipped away to refit, rearm, and plan for more attacks unmolested in the lawless western border region of Pakistan.

That was back in April of 2004, near a remote border checkpoint east of the Afghan city of Khost. This volatile area — which was a primary transit point for anti-Soviet mujihadeen fighters in the mid-1980s — flanks one of the most contentious enclaves in the region. The so-called tribal areas of North and South Waziristan, just over the mountainous border with Pakistan, have been the launching points for violent attacks against U.S. and Afghan forces for years, but have remained largely "no-go" zones for American — and Pakistani — forces.

In that eastern frontier of Afghanistan, the bad guys come over the border, past seemingly oblivious Pakistani guards, ambush American forces and other Afghan or coalition troops, then run back over the border into the sanctuary of the tribal areas. Rumors of bin Laden and his chiefs' taking shelter there are commonplace, but few details have emerged from this Pashtun enclave closed to outsiders — until now.

In the Frontline season premier airing this evening on PBS, award-winning documentary producer and journalist Martin Smith delivers an unprecedented view of a terrorist breeding ground that has apparently replaced Taliban-run Afghanistan. "Return of the Taliban" is a frightening look into the medieval madness and violence of the tribal areas — where disloyal elders are beheaded in the public square and thieves are hanged in the streets with money stuffed in their gaping mouths for all to see — should serve as a wakeup call to anyone who thinks America's enemies are in retreat.

Ask any military commander in Afghanistan where he thinks the threats are coming from and he'll tell you they're from the tribal areas of Pakistan. Though the Pakistani government issues vociferous denials that it harbors al Qaeda on its soil — with Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf recently declaring that al Qaeda's leadership is hiding in Afghanistan (which has more than 20,000 U.S. troops) not in Pakistan's tribal areas (which now has zero Pakistani troops on patrol) — the Frontline documentary provides strong evidence that powerful terrorist leaders such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Nek Mohammed have been allowed to thrive in the tribal areas.

Incorporating vividly unsettling video footage and in-depth interviews with key players in the region, Smith paints a grim picture of a situation that seems to be slipping further from America's grasp.

"Arresting him might be something we will have to do," says one Pakistani official interviewed in the Frontline documentary of Haqqani. "But I'm not sure whether we know where he is, or whether we are capable at this time."

On at least one occasion in 2004, however, an American surveillance drone observed Haqqani enter a mosque in the tribal area, deliver a sermon, walk out with his entourage, and load into vehicles for the trip back to his compound. Despite the intelligence, U.S. forces were unable to secure permission to fire a precision missile or enter Pakistan to pursue the insurgent commander.

The combination of strong ties with Pakistan's intelligence service, the political risk of an aggressive counter-terror campaign, and a sympathetic population help the growing Taliban and al Qaeda movement to thrive in the tribal areas, the Frontline program shows.

Though it is a remarkably balanced portrayal of the situation over the Pakistan border, "Return of the Taliban" does lob a few cheap political shots.

"But by now the administration was preoccupied with Iraq. The hunt for al Qaeda was left to Pakistan," the Frontline narrator says. Never mind that Pakistan has forbidden U.S. troops from entering its territory and protested loudly when a missile strike from an unmanned drone killed more than a dozen civilians along with four al Qaeda operatives in early 2006.

"We have a clear agreement that whatever happens on our side of the border, it is Pakistan's responsibility and our forces' responsibility," Musharraf tells Smith. "Nobody comes across the border. . . . Any action without our knowledge and without our clearance and approval and without our dictation is not acceptable to Pakistan."

The hunt for al Qaeda was left to Pakistan because Pakistan wanted it that way.

The question the Frontline episode leaves unanswered, however, is what America can or should do about a situation that seems to grow more dangerous by the day. If al Qaeda and the Taliban are safely regrouping in the border regions of Pakistan, doesn't this pose a threat to the United States? Musharraf recently concluded an agreement with elders in Waziristan who promised they would not harbor terrorists and would curtail cross-border incursions in exchange for a total exodus of Pakistani troops. America's top general in the region, Gen. John Abiziad has said he's skeptical such an agreement is realistic. But as the Frontline documentary shows, it may be all America can hope for in the near term.

"He's the only ally you have in the region who is capable of delivering on his promises. You have no other ally," Pakistan's ambassador to the U.N., Munir Akram, tells Smith of Musharraf. "You pressurize Pakistan, you destabilize Pakistan, the most counterproductive thing you do is to press Pakistan more."

As frustrating as it may be for Americans to watch a terrorist sanctuary take root just a few miles from U.S. and Afghan forces, "Return of the Taliban" shows Akram may well be right.


Here's the link to the show "Return of the Taliban", a seven segment show.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/view/

Is their office refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden?

Is their office refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden?

I dunno. You wanna try asking them?:p

This is the former US ambassador to AFG's view

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115999791218582926.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
Pakistan's Border Problem
By ROBERT P. FINN
October 5, 2006

For all Islamabad's claims of reform, today's Pakistan is not so different from 19th century Pakistan under the British Raj. Now, as then, Islamabad's influence ends where the tribal border areas begin. This absence of central government authority creates a vacuum which militants are quick to fill, with the Taliban and al Qaeda increasingly using the tribal areas as a base for cross-border attacks to destabilize Afghanistan.

That hasn't stopped Islamabad from pulling out of the border areas. The latest instance came on Sept. 5, when Pakistani authorities signed an agreement handing over day-to-day administration of the mountainous frontier region of North Waziristan to a local tribal council, or jirga, consisting of 45 tribal elders, religious clerics and local parliamentarians. Islamabad also agreed to return weapons seized from tribal militants and to release 2,500 pro-Taliban prisoners.

In return, the tribal leaders pledged to stop the area from being used as a base for cross-border raids. But no sooner had the agreement been signed than it was undermined by another attack in the neighboring Afghan province of Paktia. On Sept. 10, a suicide bomber suspected by authorities to come from North Waziristan killed the provincial governor. Two days later, another bomber killed five and wounded dozens more attending the governor's funeral.

Few believe the Sept. 5 agreement will stop further such attacks. If anything, it may encourage them -- judging from the experience of a similar accord signed with tribal leaders in neighboring South Waziristan in February 2005. They too promised to end cross-border attacks. But 18 months later, such incursions continue and the Taliban has taken advantage of Islamabad's withdrawal to operate more openly in the province.

The problem is that locals see the border as more a thoroughfare than an international boundary. In Kabul, for instance, it's common to hear people say of the Pakistan tribal areas: "When they come there from Islamabad, they are foreigners; when we come from Afghanistan, we are not." The situation is compounded by the religious fundamentalism which thrives on the Pakistani side of the border. The province of Baluchistan, which also borders Afghanistan, is governed by militant Muslim parties. Its capital, Quetta, has become another center for open Taliban activity over the past year. Nearby North-West Frontier Province, also governed by religious parties, is renowned as another training ground for fundamentalist fighters.

Longstanding resentment over Islamabad's rule, dating back to Pakistan's formation, makes it difficult to stamp out militant activities. In Baluchistan where local tribes have long resented what they perceive as Punjabi domination and economic exploitation, a Sept. 21 tribal jirga appealed to the International Court of Justice to rule that that Islamabad had violated the agreements that brought the province into Pakistan in 1947. That followed an Aug. 27 military strike killing the separatist Baluch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, which aroused widespread outrage in the frontier province.

Pakistan's military, long infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists, is of little help. Its Inter-Services Intelligence organization was notorious for its close ties with the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan. The laissez-faire attitude that the military adopts in the tribal areas, which mirrors the way the British ruled these regions, only makes the situation worse.

That makes it impossible to believe Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's claims that the Taliban have been put out of action in the border areas. Instead, they are growing ever stronger, as shown by the growing violence in neighboring Afghanistan, which has now reached its highest level since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

While the recent deployment of 2,000 additional NATO troops in southeastern Afghanistan will help, we must expect the violence to worsen still further -- especially in light of Pakistan's abdication of its responsibilities in the border areas. What's particularly troubling is that, instead of recognizing this, and looking at increasing troop numbers still further, some American leaders are trying to paint a rosy picture of these dubious developments.

When I was in Kabul in 2002-03, many Afghans told me that they very much wanted the U.S. to succeed in crushing the Taliban and al Qaeda. But they warned that, if it did not, they would look for another solution. The danger now is that, unless America shows it will do what it takes to win this war, an increasing number of Afghans will begin to search for that alternative.

Mr. Finn, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2002-03, teaches about Central Asia and Afghanistan in the Liechtenstein Institute of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

I don't see how this state's independence would help the Taliban. The only reason Islamist groups are safe in Pakistan is because of the cordial US-Pakistani relations, by abandoning that cover I don't see any reason, either tactical or diplomatic, why Waziristan would not be carpet bombed.

We simply can't take the time to fight the terrorists that attacked us, their conspirators and enablers. We're too busy fighting the ones that didn't. :D

We simply can't take the time to fight the terrorists that attacked us, their conspirators and enablers. We're too busy fighting the ones that didn't. :D

Ain't that the sad truth....

This is from B.Raman, the former chief of Indian intelligence and additional Secretary.

http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1981.html
OPERATION ENDURING TALIBAN - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 135


by B. Raman

As the US-led war against international terrorism completes five years on October 6, 2006, with no end yet in sight, it is uncomfortably apparent that Operation Enduring Freedom has turned into Operation Enduring Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. After having re-established its presence, despite the repeated attacks of the NATO forces led by the UK, in the Pashtun majority areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan adjoining Pakistan's Pashtun majority areas, the Neo Taliban is inexorably creeping its way up northwards to Kabul. The sporadic acts of suicide terrorism in Kabul and the anti-US and anti-Hamid Karzai demonstrations witnessed earlier this year in Kabul following a traffic accident show that since the beginning of this year the internal security situation in Afghanistan except in the Tajik and Uzbeck areas has been steadily deteriorating. Neither the induction of the NATO forces nor the raising of a multi-ethnic Afghan Army nor Police has been able to stop the inexorable rise of the Neo Taliban.

3. The figures of the large number of fatal casualties ( about 2,500), which the NATO forces have claimed to have inflicted on the Neo Taliban during the last two months or so have been questioned by the Neo Taliban. It admits that about 2,500 persons have been killed by the NATO forces, but asserts that only about 20 per cent of them are its cadres. According to it, the remaining fatalities were of innocent civilians killed due to the indiscriminate use of air strikes and the heavy artillery by the NATO forces.

4. The NATO forces, while denying the Neo Taliban figures of civilian casualties, do admit that civilian casualties have taken place, but in much smaller number. They attribute this to the Neo Taliban's practice of taking shelter in the midst of civilian population when chased by the NATO forces.

5. The Neo Taliban is qualitatively different from the pre--October 7, 2001 Taliban. The Taliban of the past was a ragtag militia of students recruited from the Deobandi madrasas of Pakistan. It was a force with considerable religious fervour, but with very little professional fighting capability. It dispersed and vanished into the villages on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at the first sign of confrontation with the US-led forces. Even the religious fervour of its cadres was not strong enough to induce them to take to suicide terrorism.

6. The Neo Taliban is an increasingly professional fighting force of well-trained, well-equipped, well-motivated and well-led cadres with a capability for conventional as well as unconventional operations against the NATO forces and the Afghan Security forces. Its conventional capability, remarkably acquired over a short period of three years, is demonstrated by its knowledge of military craft and tactics and its ability to use them effectively against the NATO forces.

7. It is also demonstrated by its ability to operate in section, platoon and company strengths and to stand up and fight instead of vanishing at the first sign of contact with the NATO forces. Its unconventional capability is reflected in its increasing resort to acts of suicide terrorism. According to one estimate, there have been nearly 90 acts of suicide terrorism this year. There was more Arab than Pashtun involvement in suicide terrorism last year. There has been more Pashtun than Arab involvement this year.

8. The suicide attacks have killed more Afghans than members of the NATO forces. One would have normally thought that Afghan anger over the indiscriminate killing of the Afghans by these Neo Taliban suicide strikes would have turned public opinion against it and come in the way of its recruitment to its conventional as well as unconventional fighting units. It has not.

9. Whereas religious fervour was the main driving force of the Taliban, a mix of religious and nationalist fervour is the driving force of the Neo Taliban. The Neo Taliban and its cadres view their conflict with the NATO forces not only as a jihad against the infidels, the crusaders and their Afghan surrogates, but also as a war of national liberation against foreign occupiers of Muslim territory. The religious fervour fuels the acts of suicide terrorism and the nationalist fervour fuels the conventional battles. The fight is viewed as a jihad to liberate the Muslim soul as well as territory.

10. Urban terrorism and rural insurgency are the two faces of the Neo Taliban's tactics. The increasing resort to rural insurgency by the Neo Taliban provides an opportunity to the NATO forces to make use of air and artillery strikes to inflict hopefully debilitating casualties on it. The inability of the NATO forces to prevent civilian casualties is playing into the hands of the Neo Taliban. Civilians angered by the NATO tactics are in the forefront of the new recruits for it.

11. There are questions to which correct answers could be found only in the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army and in the headquarters of its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). How many of the Pashtuns in the Neo Taliban are Pakistani nationals and how many are Afghans? How many of the Afghan Pashtuns have been recruited in the Afghan villages and how many in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistani territory? One knows their source of funding (the ISI and narcotics), but where from are they getting their modern arms and ammunition?

12. And the most important of all: where are they being trained and by whom? One can acquire unconventional suicide terrorism capabilities by watching the TV and browsing the Internet and in the training camps of Al Qaeda and its associates, but one cannot acquire conventional set-piece battle capabilities from the TV and the Internet. They could be acquired only in training camps manned by experienced conventional instructors. Neither the Al Qaeda nor the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan nor the Pakistani jihadi organisations can impart such a capability to the Neo Taliban in their training camps in the Waziristan area of Pakistan, adjoining the Afghan border.

13. Everyone, who has his eyes and ears open --- President Hamid Karzai and his officials, Western and Pakistani media, non-governmental analysts----could see that the roots of the Neo Taliban are in Pakistan---in the Pashtun majority districts of Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Until the roots are eliminated, the Neo Taliban cannot be defeated.

14. The US intelligence agencies, security forces and political leadership are aware of this. The other NATO countries are equally aware of this. Dealing with the roots means writing off Gen. Pervez Musharraf. They do not as yet have the courage to write him off. With Musharraf, things are bad. Without him, they could be worse. So they think. Between the bad and the worse, they prefer to put up with the bad now, hoping they could prevent the worse. They are unlikely to.

15. The US' bleeding preoccupation in Iraq has made Musharraf a more confident man---just as it has made President Ahmadinejad of Iran a more confident person. Both have concluded---each independently of the other--- that Iraq has set the limits to the US power. What the US did to Saddam Hussain in 2003, it cannot do to them. Their conclusion is reflected in Ahmadinejad's increasing defiance of the US on the nuclear issue and in Musharraf's increasing insensitivity to the US concerns over his inaction against the Neo Taliban.

16. The US finds itself with no cards against Ahmadinejad. He is popular at home and has no enemies. It still has cards against Musharraf if it decides to act against him. Musharraf has enemies within----in the political parties, in the circle of retired military officers and in the general population. By helping them as the next year's elections in Pakistan approach, it can undermine him and pave the way for the return of the political parties opposed to him. The Government of the political parties may be less competent, but will be more sincere in its co-operation in the war against terrorism.

17. Of late, Musharraf has been projecting the Neo Taliban as more a resistance movement than a terrorist organisation and saying that it can be tackled only politically and not militarily. He wants the Neo Taliban to have its share of power in Kabul, if not the whole of power. His ill-concealed efforts to have the Taliban, in its new version, re-ensconced in power in Kabul have to be countered if one has to prevent Afghanistan from sliding back to the pre 9/11 days. That could be done only through a regime change in Islamabad---politically through the elections and not militarily. The US has to start working for it now.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com)

NATO brass in AFG joins the chorus....to no avail...

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/06/wafghan06.xml
Nato's top brass accuse Pakistan over Taliban aid

By Ahmed Rashid in Kabul
(Filed: 06/10/2006)

Commanders from five Nato countries whose troops have just fought the bloodiest battle with the Taliban in five years, are demanding their governments get tough with Pakistan over the support and sanctuary its security services provide to the Taliban.

Nato's report on Operation Medusa, an intense battle that lasted from September 4-17 in the Panjwai district, demonstrates the extent of the Taliban's military capability and states clearly that Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI) is involved in supplying it.

Commanders from Britain, the US, Denmark, Canada and Holland are frustrated that even after Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf met George W Bush and Tony Blair last week, Western leaders are declining to call Mr Musharraf's bluff.

"It is time for an 'either you are with us or against us' delivered bluntly to Musharraf at the highest political level," said one Nato commander.

After the September 11 attacks in 2001 America gave Mr Musharraf a similar ultimatum to co-operate against the Taliban, who were then harbouring Osama bin Laden.

"Our boys in southern Afghanistan are hurting because of what is coming out of Quetta," he added.

The Taliban use the southern province of Balochistan to co-ordinate their insurgency and to recuperate after military action.

The cushion Pakistan is providing the Taliban is undermining the operation in Afghanistan, where 31,000 Nato troops are now based. The Canadians were most involved in Operation Medusa, two weeks of heavy fighting in a lush vineyard region, defeating 1,500 well entrenched Taliban, who had planned to attack Kandahar city, the capital of the south.

Nato officials now say they killed 1,100 Taliban fighters, not the 500 originally claimed. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements in pick-up trucks who crossed over from Quetta – waved on by Pakistani border guards – were destroyed by Nato air and artillery strikes.

Nato captured 160 Taliban, many of them Pakistanis who described in detail the ISI's support to the Taliban.

Nato is now mapping the entire Taliban support structure in Balochistan, from ISI- run training camps near Quetta to huge ammunition dumps, arrival points for Taliban's new weapons and meeting places of the shura, or leadership council, in Quetta, which is headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the group's leader since its creation a dozen years ago.

Nato and Afghan officers say two training camps for the Taliban are located just outside Quetta, while the group is using hundreds of madrassas where the fighters are housed and fired up ideologically before being sent to the front.

Many madrassas now being listed are run by the Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam, a political party that governs Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province. The party helped spawn the Taliban in 1994.

"Taliban decision-making and its logistics are all inside Pakistan," said the Afghan defense minister, General Rahim Wardak.

A post-battle intelligence report compiled by Nato and Afghan forces involved in Operation Medusa demonstrates the logistical capability of the Taliban.

During the battle the Taliban fired an estimated 400,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades and 1,000 mortar shells, which slowly arrived in Panjwai from Quetta over the spring months. Ammunition dumps unearthed after the battle showed that the Taliban had stocked over one million rounds in Panjwai.

In Panjwai the Taliban had also established a training camp to teach guerrillas how to penetrate Kandahar, a separate camp to train suicide bombers and a full surgical field hospital. Nato estimated the cost of Taliban ammunition stocks at around £2.6 million. "The Taliban could not have done this on their own without the ISI," said a senior Nato officer.

Gen Musharraf this week admitted that "retired" ISI officers might be involved in aiding the Taliban, the closest he has come to admitting the agency's role.