NationStates Jolt Archive

Well, to give an example, one might be someone yelling through a bullhorn on the street, the sound of which enters your house. Is their freedom of speech more important than your peace and quiet?
Ah I see what you mean. No, of course not. Freedom is only valuable so long as it doesn't violate the freedom of others - therefore there are limits to what one can do.

i don't know but i know libertair who are not capitalist

Self-ownership can be a positive right, however for me to agree to this would be inconsistent with my rejection of ownership as a concept. I am willing to agree to much of what self-ownership implies on the basis of use. Perpetual use of one's own body (or of anything) does not imply exclusive use, however, much of what is implied by exclusive use can be protected by perpetual use.
With that said, if a society wishes to grant self-ownership, that's fine, as rights are created by people.

I would like to see how you reject the concept of ownership. I can understand rejecting some forms, bases, and distribution of ownership, but not complete rejection of ownership.

Ah I see what you mean. No, of course not. Freedom is only valuable so long as it doesn't violate the freedom of others - therefore there are limits to what one can do.Naturally. The trick is deciding which freedoms are more important than others.

I would like to see how you reject the concept of ownership. I can understand rejecting some forms, bases, and distribution of ownership, but not complete rejection of ownership.Well, it comes from the natural right/ability of use, including the use of oneself. It is true that people sometimes have to give up their natural abilities when they join together in groups, I don't see why the ability of use should be given up. I think a nice compromise would be to have the right of use, as long as your use doesn't interfere with the use of the person/people who are using something before you.
Since one is the initial user of one's body/self, anyone wishing to use (or end the use of) the body of another has to ensure that their use doesn't interfere.

I doubt that any of the people who make this claim actually believe it. If they really do, they are individuals who have abandoned any serious claim to moral decency. They are individuals, for instance, who think it would be morally acceptable to betray a friend, or to blackmail somebody, or to make a desperate person in need of money your slave, or to guilt somebody into serving you, or to prey on someone's insecurities and fears to get them to serve you, even though it is contrary to their welfare and desire.

None of these involve force. All of them are immoral. And this recognition has nothing to do with a "nanny" attitude and everything to do with believing in a society based on human dignity and mutual respect.
Okay, I was right in the other thread. You ARE a moral realist.
have i ever mentioned how much i love libertarians? i mean, honestly, how many ideologies are there that can so easily get their adherents to give up on even pretending to be decent human beings? even stalinists and fascists try to pretend like its all for some greater good.
Because they have irrationally presupposed that the greater good is relevant.

Okay, I was right in the other thread. You ARE a moral realist.

No, I'm not. I deny that moral positions are objectively true or false; thus, I am very far from a moral realist.

Do you know what the term means?

Because they have irrationally presupposed that the greater good is relevant.

All valuations are "irrational" in that sense.

I doubt that any of the people who make this claim actually believe it. If they really do, they are individuals who have abandoned any serious claim to moral decency. They are individuals, for instance, who think it would be morally acceptable to betray a friend, or to blackmail somebody, or to make a desperate person in need of money your slave, or to guilt somebody into serving you, or to prey on someone's insecurities and fears to get them to serve you, even though it is contrary to their welfare and desire.
I don't see how you can hold this position without being a moral realist.

You're judging whether other people's behaviour could possibly be moral, and you think you're doing that without making claims about the moral rules themselves? I don't think so.

I got tired of reading around page 9 so I may have missed it but, did anybody address the original posts assertion that Libertarians have no right to borrow social contract theory? I expected to see a lot more Locke, Bentham, and Mill here; maybe even a little Demosthenes, but all you guys scrounged up in 9 pages was Mises...BORING

I don't see how you can hold this position without being a moral realist.

You're judging whether other people's behaviour could possibly be moral, and you think you're doing that without making claims about the moral rules themselves? I don't think so.

Moral judgement need not be objective. A normative claim can be made without any assertion that it has the status of objective fact.

Have you ever noted that a particular food tasted bad? That badness was not an objective quality of the food; it was a subjective judgment you made based on your experience of it (someone with different tastes, for instance, might judge it to be the opposite even with the exact same experience of it, with neither of you legitimately laying claim to objective truth.) Does that make your judgment illegitimate? Does it mean that you cannot act based on that judgment?

It's impossible for any society to be of that nature. The very notion of a contract assumes certain rights.
And what would you call those rights?

Certain rights can be inviolable without being inviolable because they are natural.
Such as?

And what would you call those rights?

The right not to be cheated and lied to?

Such as?

I don't think any rights are inviolable.

No one has the RIGHT to not be cheated or lied to. You have every right to call it if someone does though. :cool:

The right not to be cheated and lied to?
I'm not questioning that the notion of two parties to a contract making an agreement presupposes certain rights - although I wouldn't necessarily call the above a right. I was more generally wondering - if this is not a contractarian right defined and agreed upon by us, and it is not a pre-existing and absolute natural right - then what is it?

But you asked an interesting question. I take it that "natural rights" as such are probably made up and have no necessary basis in reality. So I normally call myself a contractarian - the rights we do have are defined by us and the society we live in, through an abstract sort of 'contract', ie a definition of what a human can and can't morally do.

But that presupposes that people have the right to make a decision about their rights and those of others...where does this right come from?

I don't think any rights are inviolable.
in‧vi‧o‧la‧ble  /ɪnˈvaɪələbəl/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[in-vahy-uh-luh-buhl] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation

–adjective 1. prohibiting violation; secure from destruction, violence, infringement, or desecration: an inviolable sanctuary; an inviolable promise.
2. incapable of being violated; incorruptible; unassailable: inviolable secrecy.
No, of course every right can theoretically be violated, and probably will be at some point.
The question is: what makes it wrong for a right to be violated?

I'm not questioning that the notion of two parties to a contract making an agreement presupposes certain rights - although I wouldn't necessarily call the above a right. I was more generally wondering - if this is not a contractarian right defined and agreed upon by us, and it is not a pre-existing and absolute natural right - then what is it?

But you asked an interesting question. I take it that "natural rights" as such are probably made up and have no necessary basis in reality. So I normally call myself a contractarian - the rights we do have are defined by us and the society we live in, through an abstract sort of 'contract', ie a definition of what a human can and can't morally do.

But that presupposes that people have the right to make a decision about their rights and those of others...where does this right come from?

They are "made up" like the natural rights.

No, of course every right can theoretically be violated, and probably will be at some point.
The question is: what makes it wrong for a right to be violated?

I meant "inviolable" in the normative sense - that it cannot be violated justly.

Since I see rights as safeguards of human dignity, to violate them is wrong because human beings simply ought not to be treated in certain ways - we would take it as wrong if harmful things were done to us, and in respect of the dignity of others we must take it as wrong if harmful things are done to them as well.

They are "made up" like the natural rights.
Then how do you propose rights be formulated and justified?

I meant "inviolable" in the normative sense - that it cannot be violated justly.

Since I see rights as safeguards of human dignity, to violate them is wrong because human beings simply ought not to be treated in certain ways - we would take it as wrong if harmful things were done to us, and in respect of the dignity of others we must take it as wrong if harmful things are done to them as well.
This essentially sounds exactly like the Golden Rule.

This essentially sounds exactly like the Golden Rule.

It is very similar.

But I do not stop there, however; I would add that human dignity gives us some protections but not others, that the sphere of legitimate preferences is limited. That is to say, whatever the intensity, my preferences for my own life, for things to which I have a legitimate claim (my life, my liberty) always matter more than my preferences for someone else's life. Theoretically, I could protest as "harm" something outside that sphere, but no one would be required to pay any attention. In this sense I differ from the Golden Rule - it is not quite "treat others as you would like to be treated," more "treat others as you would like to be treated, were you properly respectful of the autonomy of others."

Furthermore, the notion that the welfare of the less well off should not be sacrificed for the sake of the better off, even if it ultimately maximizes happiness or preference satisfaction to do so, makes some sense to me, at least enough to give it some (though not absolute) consideration; we are morally equal beings, and the only justification for alienating this equality is for the benefit of all.

In this sense I differ from the Golden Rule - it is not quite "treat others as you would like to be treated," more "treat others as you would like to be treated, were you properly respectful of the autonomy of others."

This seems logical to me, perhaps an improvement upon the Golden Rule. Mind answering the other question I posed also?

This seems logical to me, perhaps an improvement upon the Golden Rule. Mind answering the other question I posed also?

Sorry. I assumed you realized the answer after you read the second part of my post, but re-reading it, I see that you're right; I don't really answer your question there, either.

Since I don't subscribe to any moral theory postulating natural rights ("natural" broadly defined as intrinsic), I tend to see rights as justified on a vaguely utilitarian basis - whether treating people in a certain way generally tends to significantly increase or decrease the overall welfare of beings worthy of moral consideration, and whether the goods provided by the right could also provided by a differently formulated right, one that did not have as many negative consequences.

For instance, were I to be considering private property rights, I would ask whether the consequences of enshrining them (economic inequality, a loss of basic autonomy for the propertyless, etc.) outweigh the consequences of ignoring them (economic inefficiency, increased vulnerability of the individual to society, potential alienation of labor from product, etc.), and then whether the goods private property rights provide could be better provided under a different system (use rights, collective ownership, etc.)

Since I don't subscribe to any moral theory postulating natural rights ("natural" broadly defined as intrinsic), I tend to see rights as justified on a vaguely utilitarian basis - whether treating people in a certain way generally tends to significantly increase or decrease the overall welfare of beings worthy of moral consideration, and whether the goods provided by the right could also provided by a differently formulated right, one that did not have as many negative consequences.

Again though, isn't such a system of rights "made up"? To be enforced, doesn't it rely on an overall consensus of aims? How does it preclude the notion of a contractarian right system?

But you asked an interesting question. I take it that "natural rights" as such are probably made up and have no necessary basis in reality. So I normally call myself a contractarian - the rights we do have are defined by us and the society we live in, through an abstract sort of 'contract', ie a definition of what a human can and can't morally do.I would agree with this, personally, I believe that all rights come from a contractarian basis. This would mean that property rights can be socially agreed upon via a contract, but it would also mean that the lack of socially agreed upon property rights is not a violation of anybody's rights.

But that presupposes that people have the right to make a decision about their rights and those of others...where does this right come from?Well, people have the ability to make a decision about their rights, and the rights of others, so they will whether or not they have the right to.

I would agree with this, personally, I believe that all rights come from a contractarian basis. This would mean that property rights can be socially agreed upon via a contract, but it would also mean that the lack of socially agreed upon property rights is not a violation of anybody's rights.
This is why I support the notion too - it allows a society to accord rights depending on what it considers its priorities to be.

Well, people have the ability to make a decision about their rights, and the rights of others, so they will whether or not they have the right to.
Logically this seems correct. Now I wonder if Soheran opposes such a notion and considers contractarianism a priori untenable, or does he not?

This is why I support the notion too - it allows a society to accord rights depending on what it considers its priorities to be.Right. So it seems to me that the argument between communists and capitalists should be "should states/societies grant property rights?"

Logically this seems correct. Now I wonder if Soheran opposes such a notion and considers contractarianism a priori untenable, or does he not?I don't think he was saying that it was, he said that contractarianism for the establishment of all rights is untenable, since the notion of trying to get someone to agree to a contract means that you believe they have the right to make a decision and not have it forced upon them. Contractarianism for the establishment of most rights works, though.

Right. So it seems to me that the argument between communists and capitalists should be "should states/societies grant property rights?"
Or maybe we should just let certain societies secede and go ahead with their own conception of rights. That way each community can set itself up as it pleases - the ones that prove most intolerable to live in will eventually be abandoned. A priori argumentation is good and all, but in the end until it is applied no one can be certain how different theoretical ideologies will play out in reality.

I don't think he was saying that it was, he said that contractarianism for the establishment of all rights is untenable, since the notion of trying to get someone to agree to a contract means that you believe they have the right to make a decision and not have it forced upon them. Contractarianism for the establishment of most rights works, though.
Ah, I see - it's just the way he phrased it that gave such an impression. If that is what he meant, then no further argument is really needed.

but it would also mean that the lack of socially agreed upon property rights is not a violation of anybody's rights.

That is no argument against property rights, as they remain on the same level as those rights you would consider drastically more important.

Me, I say property rights are necessary for the maintenance of those rights we hold so dear, and that is why I support them.

Lord Kames, upon whose opinions much of western legal structure is based, stated that the purpose of government was to secure the right of property.

Logically this seems correct. Now I wonder if Soheran opposes such a notion and considers contractarianism a priori untenable, or does he not?

BAAWA posted a Hoppe quote about argumentation presupposing self-ownership. Any society based upon a contractarian system of rights presupposes the right of self-ownership.

Or maybe we should just let certain societies secede and go ahead with their own conception of rights.
Spot on!

And that's why I don't see why anarcho-capitalists and anarcho-communists, -socialists, -syndicalists etc wouldn't get along. They can coexist just fine, the only thing to be worked out is what happens with the property that already exists.

In which case I would tend towards leaving it with its present owners (ie the capitalists), since this property was established with the expectation that one gets to keep it and those were the rights more or less agreed upon or at least understood to be in force.

Lord Kames, upon whose opinions much of western legal structure is based, stated that the purpose of government was to secure the right of property.
Given taxation and eminent domain, governments certainly don't do a good job of it.

That is no argument against property rights, as they remain on the same level as those rights you would consider drastically more important.

Me, I say property rights are necessary for the maintenance of those rights we hold so dear, and that is why I support them.
Likewise.

BAAWA posted a Hoppe quote about argumentation presupposing self-ownership. Any society based upon a contractarian system of rights presupposes the right of self-ownership.
If so, I'd like to see what possible basis Soheran has in mind for rights, if both natural rights and contractarian rights are logically flawed. I think Jello Biafra is right though.

Spot on!

And that's why I don't see why anarcho-capitalists and anarcho-communists, -socialists, -syndicalists etc wouldn't get along. They can coexist just fine, the only thing to be worked out is what happens with the property that already exists.

In which case I would tend towards leaving it with its present owners (ie the capitalists), since this property was established with the expectation that one gets to keep it and those were the rights more or less agreed upon or at least understood to be in force.
I think it depends very much on the community - societies which would retain a capitalist (or similar) system, would maintain existing property rights. Communities that use a collectivist system without property rights would obviously favour different solutions. What is most likely, in my mind, is that such collectivists would find an unoccupied location and form their own city-state there (or whatever), and begin anew.

Again though, isn't such a system of rights "made up"?

Yes and no.

It's "made up" in the sense that its foundations are not rational principles; this is true of all moral systems.

But I would deny that its basis is mere arbitrary preference; it is derived from fairly common (but still subjective, for those who do not understand the difference) moral notions by reason.

To be enforced, doesn't it rely on an overall consensus of aims?

Yes.

How does it preclude the notion of a contractarian right system?

It doesn't logically preclude any such thing.

Yes and no.

It's "made up" in the sense that its foundations are not rational principles; this is true of all moral systems.

But I would deny that its basis is mere arbitrary preference; it is derived from fairly common (but still subjective, for those who do not understand the difference) moral notions by reason.
Essentially they are valuable so long as they are assigned value.

It doesn't logically preclude any such thing.
All right, it's just that the post Neu Leonstein quoted seemed to imply this - I think Jello Biafra cleared up the ambiguity though anyway.

Now I wonder if Soheran opposes such a notion and considers contractarianism a priori untenable, or does he not?

I don't think moral obligations are dependent on someone's acceptance of them, and I don't think it's morally legitimate to make the suppression of at least some rights a condition of entering into society.

I don't think any of the things we consider to be rights - the right to life, the right to free speech, the right to religious freedom, the right to privacy, even the right to property - are contractarian. They are moral obligations independent of any contract.

I do think that we have an obligation to fulfill our promises, to not mislead people or disturb their capability to make reasonable decisions, and in this context I accept a limited, loose notion of a social contract.

But I would deny that its basis is mere arbitrary preference; it is derived from fairly common (but still subjective, for those who do not understand the difference) moral notions by reason.

Non-sequitor, that a value is common is no bearing on whether it is arbitrary. If anything, simply the term "common" has a rather arbitrary definition.

Nevermind the dramatic is-ought jump (which I cannot actually blame you for as I don't know if anyone on NSG has ever rid an argument of that problem).

I don't think moral obligations are dependent on someone's acceptance of them.

Either you believe that people are forced to take on moral obligations be outside forces, or you are a moral realist.

I don't think any of the things we consider to be rights - the right to life, the right to free speech, the right to religious freedom, the right to privacy, even the right to property - are contractarian. They are moral obligations independent of any contract.

Then what is their basis, not moral justification, but practical basis?

I think we can agree that rights are obligations on others towards the right holder, so I have to ask two questions:

1. How are rights practical if they don't utilize the agreement of two parties?

2. How would these two parties manage an agreement without an exchange of interest?

Spot on!

And that's why I don't see why anarcho-capitalists and anarcho-communists, -socialists, -syndicalists etc wouldn't get along. They can coexist just fine, the only thing to be worked out is what happens with the property that already exists.

I can see an anarchist free market, with the full spectrum of private property rights, coexisting beside anarcho-communist and anarcho-syndicalist communities.

I cannot see anything resembling modern capitalism doing so, however.

Non-sequitor, that a value is common is no bearing on whether it is arbitrary. If anything, simply the term "common" has a rather arbitrary definition.

Nevermind the dramatic is-ought jump (which I cannot actually blame you for as I don't know if anyone on NSG has ever rid an argument of that problem).

You misunderstood me, because I was speaking very imprecisely.

It is arbitrary in a logical sense, in an empirical sense. It is not arbitrary, however, in that it was not taken out of nowhere; it is a formulation based on basic moral intuitions.

Perhaps the intuitions are arbitrary - but the formulation is not, in relation to them. It is thus not "made up."

Either you believe that people are forced to take on moral obligations be outside forces, or you are a moral realist.

For someone who has argued that altruism is a natural human instinct, that's a weird position to take.

Then what is their basis, not moral justification, but practical basis

That is a wholly different question.

Rights are enforced by force, by culture, and by human instinct.

I think we can agree that rights are obligations on others towards the right holder, so I have to ask two questions:

1. How are rights practical if they don't utilize the agreement of two parties?

Every society, in order to function, needs to have citizens who believe that the societal framework benefits them.

Free and equal association is thus not only a good thing morally, but also practically.

2. How would these two parties manage an agreement without an exchange of interest?

I don't think most people's respect for other people's dignity rests on an "exchange of interest."

But yes, like I said before, you do need an overall impression among people that the system benefits them.

I don't think any of the things we consider to be rights - the right to life, the right to free speech, the right to religious freedom, the right to privacy, even the right to property - are contractarian. They are moral obligations independent of any contract.
So then, would you go as far as to call these rights natural? Or are you justifying this on some sort of utilitarian basis? Natural rights are a priori inviolable, but those on a utilitarian basis are contingent upon the society accepting the end aim as worthwhile. If the society (any society for that matter) always accepts certain rights as worthwhile, are they not then natural?

I can see an anarchist free market, with the full spectrum of private property rights, coexisting beside anarcho-communist and anarcho-syndicalist communities.

I cannot see anything resembling modern capitalism doing so, however.
I could not see any statist system co-existing with anarchist communities, unless they were committed to recognising their right to existence. Unless the anarchist communities have a means of self-defence (which is possible), they'd be overwhelmed, assuming such a reason exists.

Or are you justifying this on some sort of utilitarian basis?

That. None of those rights are absolute.

I could not see any statist system co-existing with anarchist communities, unless they were committed to recognising their right to existence. Unless the anarchist communities have a means of self-defence (which is possible), they'd be overwhelmed, assuming such a reason exists.

No, in order for genuine anarchism to exist, it would have to be universal. A commitment to self-defense capable of fully dealing with statist violence would involve overcentralization.

But that's not what I was getting at; rather, that capitalism as it exists today has a class structure and a degree of power concentration that is incompatible with a free society.

You misunderstood me, because I was speaking very imprecisely.

It is arbitrary in a logical sense, in an empirical sense. It is not arbitrary, however, in that it was not taken out of nowhere; it is a formulation based on basic moral intuitions.

Perhaps the intuitions are arbitrary - but the formulation is not, in relation to them. It is thus not "made up."

What is the purpose of all of this? Why is that an important definition of "made up"?

For someone who has argued that altruism is a natural human instinct, that's a weird position to take.

No, I was referring to your statement that we are morally obligated whether we accept it or not.

I believe we fully accept (and create) our moral obligations and that is the reason they exist.

Every society, in order to function, needs to have citizens who believe that the societal framework benefits them.

Free and equal association is thus not only a good thing morally, but also practically.

I don't think most people's respect for other people's dignity rests on an "exchange of interest."

But yes, like I said before, you do need an overall impression among people that the system benefits them.

Certainly the exchange of rights is not a one on one (in most cases) interaction, but wouldn't you agree, based on your own statements, that the establishment of rights is contract by proxy?

That. None of those rights are absolute.
All right, I think I see what you are getting at now. You seem to mean that certain rights will always be necessary on a utilitarian basis, whereas others can be negotiated via contractarianism. Hopefully I have interpreted you correctly.

No, in order for genuine anarchism to exist, it would have to be universal. A commitment to self-defense capable of fully dealing with statist violence would involve overcentralization.
A common critique of all forms of anarchism is that they will eventually revert to centralisation, and therefore self-destruct.

But that's not what I was getting at; rather, that capitalism as it exists today has a class structure and a degree of power concentration that is incompatible with a free society.
True, I agree with this. It is enough to prevent anarchism from occuring. I don't mean this as a criticism against it - I am still not convinced anarchism is tenable.

What is the purpose of all of this? Why is that an important definition of "made up"?

It makes morality something more than mere whim. I cannot wake up one day and say, "from now on I'm going to treat everyone else horribly."

No, I was referring to your statement that we are morally obligated whether we accept it or not.

I believe we fully accept (and create) our moral obligations and that is the reason they exist.

What I meant was, I see someone as having certain moral obligations regardless of whether or not they agree to them.

A murderer cannot say, "I never accepted that murder was wrong."

Certainly the exchange of rights is not a one on one (in most cases) interaction, but wouldn't you agree, based on your own statements, that the establishment of rights is contract by proxy?

No. I'm not sure where you're coming from here.

All right, I think I see what you are getting at now. You seem to mean that certain rights will always be necessary on a utilitarian basis, whereas others can be negotiated via contractarianism. Hopefully I have interpreted you correctly.

Yes, but I wouldn't call the ones negotiated via contractarianism "rights." They are contracts whose moral force rests on the immorality of dishonest manipulation.

A common critique of all forms of anarchism is that they will eventually revert to centralisation, and therefore self-destruct.

There is no reason to suppose that that is the case, sort of serious external threats compelling it.

True, I agree with this. It is enough to prevent anarchism from occuring. I don't mean this as a criticism against it - I am still not convinced anarchism is tenable.

That's what revolutions are for.

Yes, but I wouldn't call the ones negotiated via contractarianism "rights." They are contracts whose moral force rests on the immorality of dishonest manipulation.
Fine, I think we are more or less in agreement then.

There is no reason to suppose that that is the case, sort of serious external threats compelling it.
Well the critique usually bases itself upon the assumptions that a) centralisation is more efficient in the long-run b) humans have a natural tendency to centralise. On a certain level I see this as pessimism more than anything else - I'd like to give anarchism a try first, and if indeed it does regress to statism, at least we attempted it.

That's what revolutions are for.
The problem being that almost everyone in the mainstream is statist - be they capitalist, socialist or whatever else they want to call themselves. They all, to a degree, do not desire a major departure from the status quo, whether it leads to market anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism et al. This makes a revolution of any kind difficult.

Well the critique usually bases itself upon the assumptions that a) centralisation is more efficient in the long-run

"Efficient" at what, for whom?

b) humans have a natural tendency to centralise.

The natural human group is, at most, something like two hundred people. The institution of the state has not existed for the vast majority of the span of human existence.

If anything, modern anarchism would be unnaturally over-centralized.

The problem being that almost everyone in the mainstream is statist - be they capitalist, socialist or whatever else they want to call themselves. They all, to a degree, do not desire a major departure from the status quo, whether it leads to market anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism et al. This makes a revolution of any kind difficult.

There is no large anarchist movement, no, but there are sentiments among the population that could be the basis for one (a general dislike of the status quo political parties and politicians, the belief that special interests control the system, etc.)

We will have to wait and see.

"Efficient" at what, for whom?
Efficient at delivering the services it is meant to deliver, for the general public. They argue that (theoretically) anarchism would as such simply revert to statism. These to me seem like untested hypotheses, but for many they are convincing.

The natural human group is, at most, something like two hundred people. The institution of the state has not existed for the vast majority of the span of human existence.

If anything, modern anarchism would be unnaturally over-centralized.
Oh, I agree with this - it's something I often point out to people. The problem is they cannot project themselves into any other form of society than this one. Ergo, anything without statism to them seems a pipe dream. Ever had a chat with Neo Undelia here? That's tantamount to speaking to any given statist.

There is no large anarchist movement, no, but there are sentiments among the population that could be the basis for one (a general dislike of the status quo political parties and politicians, the belief that special interests control the system, etc.)

We will have to wait and see.
I am beginning to think market anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, anarcho-communists etc. should band together to bring about this revolution, and then go their separate ways. Time will tell.

Efficient at delivering the services it is meant to deliver, for the general public.

What the state is most "efficient" at is appeasing societal power centers, because they are best at keeping it accountable.

When it is compelled by democracy to help the public - anti-poverty measures, corporate regulation, etc. - it usually either fails at the task or twists it to appease aforementioned societal power centers.

Public services are good, but they could be provided with far more accountability and efficiency at increasing overall social welfare under an anarchist arrangement of political power.

Oh, I agree with this - it's something I often point out to people. The problem is they cannot project themselves into any other form of society than this one. Ergo, anything without statism to them seems a pipe dream. Ever had a chat with Neo Undelia here? That's tantamount to speaking to any given statist.

Yes, I have had several long arguments with Neo Undelia.

I do not see anarchism suddenly appearing out of nowhere in our present society. It will have to be a gradual process.

I am beginning to think market anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, anarcho-communists etc. should band together to bring about this revolution, and then go their separate ways. Time will tell.

I do not, unless the market anarchists are of the free market socialist/mutualist sort.

It makes morality something more than mere whim.

A common whim is still a whim.

A cultural norm is no less arbitrary than the rationale of a sociopath.

What I meant was, I see someone as having certain moral obligations regardless of whether or not they agree to them.

A murderer cannot say, "I never accepted that murder was wrong."

I understand what you are saying, and that requires you to believe in universal absolute morality, and/or that we are legitimately forced into moral behavior by an external force, depending on where you are coming from. It seems that you are stating the former.

And it seems quite plain that a murderer can believe that murder is right.

No. I'm not sure where you're coming from here.

If members of society must feel they are recieving benefit from society, then you agree that people must feel they are getting something in exchange for being a member of society. Furthermore, it can be assumed that, if they must feel that they get a benefit from society, they must also must give up something to society.

So what you have is a person seeking to derive some benefit from society, while offering something to society. On the other end of the spectrum, another individual gains whatever was given up by the other as benefit, while putting his end into the bargain.

While there is no direct contractual relationship between the two, there is a definite exchange of interests between the two. Therefore we can look upon this as being a contractual exchange via proxy, with proxy being the non-person entities of the state or other societal institutions.

A common whim is still a whim.

A cultural norm is no less arbitrary than the rationale of a sociopath.

Recognition of the worth and dignity of others is not a "whim," because it does not have the superficial character of a whim.

"Common" was an indicator of this, not a logical proof.

I understand what you are saying, and that requires you to believe in universal absolute morality, and/or that we are legitimately forced into moral behavior by an external force, depending on where you are coming from. It seems that you are stating the former.

No, that's a false dichotomy. A moral obligation can be morally binding without being legally binding, and it can be universally morally binding even if it is a subjective thing only accepted by one person.

An individual source does not preclude a universal application.

And it seems quite plain that a murderer can believe that murder is right.

True. But I believe it is wrong, even if the murderer believes that.

If members of society must feel they are recieving benefit from society, then you agree that people must feel they are getting something in exchange for being a member of society. Furthermore, it can be assumed that, if they must feel that they get a benefit from society, they must also must give up something to society.

So what you have is a person seeking to derive some benefit from society, while offering something to society. On the other end of the spectrum, another individual gains whatever was given up by the other as benefit, while putting his end into the bargain.

While there is no direct contractual relationship between the two, there is a definite exchange of interests between the two. Therefore we can look upon this as being a contractual exchange via proxy, with proxy being the non-person entities of the state or other societal institutions.

Sure, I can go with that; in order to have a properly functioning stable society that does not depend on repression, an exchange-like character is required.

Or maybe we should just let certain societies secede and go ahead with their own conception of rights. That way each community can set itself up as it pleases - the ones that prove most intolerable to live in will eventually be abandoned.Yes, that's fine, but for the purposes of debate, I was thinking of the hypothetical situation where we would be part of a community that hasn't decided how it feels about property rights, and neither of us wanted to secede from it. ('We' being either you and I, or whoever is participating in the argument.)

That is no argument against property rights, as they remain on the same level as those rights you would consider drastically more important.It in and of itself wasn't meant to be; it is an argument against the notion that communism inherently violates the rights of people.

BAAWA posted a Hoppe quote about argumentation presupposing self-ownership. Any society based upon a contractarian system of rights presupposes the right of self-ownership.I believe that contractarianism fits with my conception of usage rights.

Spot on!

And that's why I don't see why anarcho-capitalists and anarcho-communists, -socialists, -syndicalists etc wouldn't get along. They can coexist just fine, the only thing to be worked out is what happens with the property that already exists.

In which case I would tend towards leaving it with its present owners (ie the capitalists), since this property was established with the expectation that one gets to keep it and those were the rights more or less agreed upon or at least understood to be in force.I'm not entirely certain of the justification of leaving the property with its present owners. While it is true that the property was established with the expectation of keeping it, it would also be true that the social contract has changed, and therefore the terms would have.

Given taxation and eminent domain, governments certainly don't do a good job of it.Theoretically, taxation is simply the fee that government charges to protect property.

Sure, I can go with that; in order to have a properly functioning stable society that does not depend on repression, an exchange-like character is required.Do you believe that contractarianism is something more than an exchange-like character?

Do you believe that contractarianism is something more than an exchange-like character?

As a moral foundation for rights (or for political obedience), it's a whole lot more.

Have you ever noted that a particular food tasted bad? That badness was not an objective quality of the food; it was a subjective judgment you made based on your experience of it (someone with different tastes, for instance, might judge it to be the opposite even with the exact same experience of it, with neither of you legitimately laying claim to objective truth.) Does that make your judgment illegitimate? Does it mean that you cannot act based on that judgment?
That would have been horribly imprecise of me.

The flavour of the food exists objectively. What's at issue is whether I enjoy that flavour, but that doesn't affect others. As such, the appropriate remark would be that I don't like the taste, not that the taste is bad.

Yes, that's fine, but for the purposes of debate, I was thinking of the hypothetical situation where we would be part of a community that hasn't decided how it feels about property rights, and neither of us wanted to secede from it. ('We' being either you and I, or whoever is participating in the argument.)
Fair enough.

I'm not entirely certain of the justification of leaving the property with its present owners. While it is true that the property was established with the expectation of keeping it, it would also be true that the social contract has changed, and therefore the terms would have.
Depending on what system the given society adopts - market anarchism would most likely allow the majority to retain their existing property. Those whose societies shift to systems which seek to change the status quo would likely seek compensation, then leave for societies in which their right to property is guaranteed.

Theoretically, taxation is simply the fee that government charges to protect property.
Theoretically, and this would be so in a Nightwatchman State (at a basic level). Modern governments obviously tax to fund many of their policies and activities, beyond simple property protection.

Recognition of the worth and dignity of others is not a "whim," because it does not have the superficial character of a whim.

"Common" was an indicator of this, not a logical proof.

You have lost me. How does this recognition not have the "superficial character of a whim" and how is commonality a indicator of this?

No, that's a false dichotomy. A moral obligation can be morally binding without being legally binding, and it can be universally morally binding even if it is a subjective thing only accepted by one person.

This does not mesh with:

"What I meant was, I see someone as having certain moral obligations regardless of whether or not they agree to them."

I certainly agree that moral obligations can exist outside of codified law, but that is besides the point.

I guess you will have to explain what you mean when you say a subjective moral obligation can be "universally morally binding".

True. But I believe it is wrong, even if the murderer believes that.

I understand that, but what makes your belief more substantial (and less whimsical)?

That would have been horribly imprecise of me.

The flavour of the food exists objectively. What's at issue is whether I enjoy that flavour, but that doesn't affect others. As such, the appropriate remark would be that I don't like the taste, not that the taste is bad.

The two statements are equivalent. There is no such thing as an objectively "bad" taste of food.

You have lost me. How does this recognition not have the "superficial character of a whim"

Because it is based in ingrained beliefs and emotions, not in random whimsy.

and how is commonality a indicator of this?

If it were unique to me, it would make more sense to say it is mere arbitrary whim; since it is common, it must have some common root.

This does not mesh with:

"What I meant was, I see someone as having certain moral obligations regardless of whether or not they agree to them."

I certainly agree that moral obligations can exist outside of codified law, but that is besides the point.

I guess you will have to explain what you mean when you say a subjective moral obligation can be "universally morally binding".

I do not mean "binding" in the sense that I can necessarily go up to the person and demonstrate to her that she ought or ought not do something.

What I mean is that my judgment applies to her regardless of whether or not she agrees; my subjective view of moral obligation is that it is universally binding.

I understand that, but what makes your belief more substantial (and less whimsical)?

Nothing, necessarily. A species with different natural instincts from human beings could theoretically have a moral conscience that I found vile that was nevertheless just as substantial as mine.

Indeed, it is likely that even with humans, my formulation is, at best, merely equally substantial to other formulations derived from similar premises. (Most likely, because it is not fully developed and still has flaws, it is less substantial than some.)

The two statements are equivalent. There is no such thing as an objectively "bad" taste of food.
Well, exactly. Much as there's no such thing as an objetively immoral action. And that's the problem. You've made two statements here which directly contradict each other.
I doubt that any of the people who make this claim actually believe it. If they really do, they are individuals who have abandoned any serious claim to moral decency. They are individuals, for instance, who think it would be morally acceptable to betray a friend, or to blackmail somebody, or to make a desperate person in need of money your slave, or to guilt somebody into serving you, or to prey on someone's insecurities and fears to get them to serve you, even though it is contrary to their welfare and desire.

None of these involve force. All of them are immoral.
I deny that moral positions are objectively true or false; thus, I am very far from a moral realist.
In the first passage, you're making normative claims. For those to have any prescriptive force, they need to apply to people. So the moral rules behind them have to exist objectively.

You've asserted that it's not possible to be moral and at the same time condone specific types of behaviour. What are you doing if you're not claiming that those types of behaviour are immoral?

Because it is based in ingrained beliefs and emotions, not in random whimsy.

If it were unique to me, it would make more sense to say it is mere arbitrary whim; since it is common, it must have some common root.

I could build my house on the strongest foundation I could, but if that foundation was secured in a floodplain, the foundation is worthless.

In other words, why are common beliefs and emotions less arbitrary?

(It will probably be hard to convince me, since I argued for about 15 pages on the assumption that beliefs and emotions come about through largely Darwinian forces.)

I do not mean "binding" in the sense that I can necessarily go up to the person and demonstrate to her that she ought or ought not do something.

What I mean is that my judgment applies to her regardless of whether or not she agrees; my subjective view of moral obligation is that it is universally binding.

This really doesn't make sense to me.

Are you saying that you believe that there is a universal morality, but that this belief is subjective?

Nothing, necessarily. A species with different natural instincts from human beings could theoretically have a moral conscience that I found vile that was nevertheless just as substantial as mine.

Indeed, it is likely that even with humans, my formulation is, at best, merely equally substantial to other formulations derived from similar premises. (Most likely, because it is not fully developed and still has flaws, it is less substantial than some.)

I am saying that development has absolutely no bearing upon whether a moral system or code is any more substantial than random behavior.

Your premises are merely culturally and biologically derived impulses to think or act in a certain way. They are only innate to you and are only practical expressions of which past impulses were must successful in garnering imitation.

I will not say for sure that I am right, although it does make sense to me, but I cannot imagine any way that you can establish the rational or absolute validity of these "similar premises" that establish the substance of your beliefs.

I could build my house on the strongest foundation I could, but if that foundation was secured in a floodplain, the foundation is worthless.

In other words, why are common beliefs and emotions less arbitrary?

(It will probably be hard to convince me, since I argued for about 15 pages on the assumption that beliefs and emotions come about through largely Darwinian forces.)

They're not.

This really doesn't make sense to me.

Are you saying that you believe that there is a universal morality, but that this belief is subjective?

"Universal" means two different things in this context.

It can mean "universal" in acceptance - that is to say, with enough time, energy, and intelligence any rational being could be convinced to accept that moral position.

It can also mean "universal" in application - that is to say, everyone is (and all actions are) judged by one standard.

I subscribe to a universal morality in the second sense, not the first.

I am saying that development has absolutely no bearing upon whether a moral system or code is any more substantial than random behavior.

Your premises are merely culturally and biologically derived impulses to think or act in a certain way. They are only innate to you and are only practical expressions of which past impulses were must successful in garnering imitation.

I will not say for sure that I am right, although it does make sense to me, but I cannot imagine any way that you can establish the rational or absolute validity of these "similar premises" that establish the substance of your beliefs.

Of course not. My concern is not for the substance of the premises, but rather for the substance of the conclusions - whether or not they actually coincide with the intuitive moral notions upon which they are necessarily based.

In the first passage, you're making normative claims. For those to have any prescriptive force, they need to apply to people. So the moral rules behind them have to exist objectively.

No, they don't. No more than any other kind of subjective judgment has to have bases that "exist objectively."

Applicability has nothing to do with subjective/objective; if I really hate a certain food, enough that I hate the very concept of anyone eating it, could I not use that as a basis for preventing others from eating it - even though it is merely a subjective judgment?

You've asserted that it's not possible to be moral

Really? Where?

and at the same time condone specific types of behaviour. What are you doing if you're not claiming that those types of behaviour are immoral?

That's exactly what I'm doing.

I just deny that they are objectively immoral.

"Universal" means two different things in this context.

It can mean "universal" in acceptance - that is to say, with enough time, energy, and intelligence any rational being could be convinced to accept that moral position.

It can also mean "universal" in application - that is to say, everyone is (and all actions are) judged by one standard.

I subscribe to a universal morality in the second sense, not the first.

I understand what you are saying now, but I don't really know where to go with it.

Of course not. My concern is not for the substance of the premises, but rather for the substance of the conclusions - whether or not they actually coincide with the intuitive moral notions upon which they are necessarily based.

You were the one establishing your conclusions on "common roots."

You were the one establishing your conclusions on "common roots."

I never established them on "common roots." I used "common roots" as an argument against the notion that they were mere whim.

I never established them on "common roots." I used "common roots" as an argument against the notion that they were mere whim.

Perhaps I was being vague:

whim

NOUN:

1. A sudden or capricious idea; a fancy.
2. Arbitrary thought or impulse: governed by whim.
3. A vertical horse-powered drum used as a hoist in a mine.

I was referring to the second definition of whim only. I understand that a moral's cultural relevance means that you aren't "pulling it out of thin air", but it doesn't make it less arbitrary or significant.

As a moral foundation for rights (or for political obedience), it's a whole lot more.Oh, that makes sense. Personally, I don't support the idea of contractarianism because I believe it's moral, but if I did I can see your point.

Depending on what system the given society adopts - market anarchism would most likely allow the majority to retain their existing property. Those whose societies shift to systems which seek to change the status quo would likely seek compensation, then leave for societies in which their right to property is guaranteed.They can argue that they should be compensated, and if they get it, fine, but I would say that they wouldn't have the right to compensation, in such a situation.

Theoretically, and this would be so in a Nightwatchman State (at a basic level). Modern governments obviously tax to fund many of their policies and activities, beyond simple property protection.Well, if I wanted to, I could argue that those policies and activities are simply a roundabout way of providing protection. With that said, it's extremely unlikely that someone would purchase a private protection policy that did this, so I can see how someone who views government exclusively as providing protection would view anything more as theft.
Personally, I don't view governments in this way, so I don't believe that additional taxation is theft.

I was referring to the second definition of whim only.

And I the first. No wonder we were going nowhere.

And I the first. No wonder we were going nowhere.

Yes, I realized it with that last post, it can be very hard to recognize when you are arguing from different definitions.

As a late entrant to this conversation, I don't know why it matters if there is an external authoritative source to your morality, or why it came up.

Oh, that makes sense. Personally, I don't support the idea of contractarianism because I believe it's moral, but if I did I can see your point.
Out of curiosity, which idea do you support?

Personally, I don't view governments in this way, so I don't believe that additional taxation is theft.
A government can perform any number of functions - and for each of these a different tax will arise. As you said, no one in their right mind would call an agency unilaterally providing that number of services unilaterally as one merely protection - hence the fee will be for something more than protection too. This is all I intended to point out.

whim
NOUN:
1. A sudden or capricious idea; a fancy.
2. Arbitrary thought or impulse: governed by whim.
3. A vertical horse-powered drum used as a hoist in a mine.
I was referring to the second definition of whim only.
And I the first. No wonder we were going nowhere.At least neither of you was using the third. <giggle>


Out of curiosity, which idea do you support?I'm fine with the idea of contractarism, not because I think it's more moral, but simply as a matter of expedience. It is useless, if not impossible, to talk about rights without other people defending them, and therefore it's best to make certain that other people will be willing to defend your rights, and vice versa.

A government can perform any number of functions - and for each of these a different tax will arise. As you said, no one in their right mind would call an agency unilaterally providing that number of services unilaterally as one merely protection - hence the fee will be for something more than protection too. This is all I intended to point out.Fair enough.

I'm fine with the idea of contractarism, not because I think it's more moral, but simply as a matter of expedience. It is useless, if not impossible, to talk about rights without other people defending them, and therefore it's best to make certain that other people will be willing to defend your rights, and vice versa.
Well to be honest I'd be much happier with a natural rights concept, but since this seems inherently flawed, I think contractarianism is the best we have to work with. As you said, it's a matter of expedience.

Well to be honest I'd be much happier with a natural rights concept, but since this seems inherently flawed, I think contractarianism is the best we have to work with. As you said, it's a matter of expedience.I can see natural rights/abilities being the initial basis on which the contract is formed. "What natural ability do you want me to give up, and what will I get in return?"

I can see natural rights/abilities being the initial basis on which the contract is formed. "What natural ability do you want me to give up, and what will I get in return?"
Well, so far I'm more or less in agreement with Soheran - that on a utilitarian basis, certain tradeoffs should not occur, and that these would form so-called rights (e.g. a right to life, right to freedom of speech), whereas others would be negotiable. In order for contracts to be formed the way you mentioned, it'd be necessary for natural rights to exist - natural abilities, on the other hand, do exist, and are, amongst other things, often the bases for such contracts.

Really? Where?
Where you said, "If they really do, they are individuals who have abandoned any serious claim to moral decency." If their moral decency is entirely independent of yours, how can you possibly make this claim?
That's exactly what I'm doing.

I just deny that they are objectively immoral.
Then why should anyone care what your opinion on the issue is? You view of morality would then be necessarily irrelevant to everyone but you.

Well, so far I'm more or less in agreement with Soheran - that on a utilitarian basis, certain tradeoffs should not occur, and that these would form so-called rights (e.g. a right to life, right to freedom of speech), whereas others would be negotiable. In order for contracts to be formed the way you mentioned, it'd be necessary for natural rights to exist - natural abilities, on the other hand, do exist, and are, amongst other things, often the bases for such contracts.I'm not certain why natural rights would have to exist for the contracts to happen the way I said. Otherwise, I'm in agreement with you.

I'm not certain why natural rights would have to exist for the contracts to happen the way I said. Otherwise, I'm in agreement with you.
Based on the way you phrased it. ;) You mentioned exchanging "natural rights" (and abilities).

Where you said, "If they really do, they are individuals who have abandoned any serious claim to moral decency." If their moral decency is entirely independent of yours, how can you possibly make this claim?

My perception of their moral decency is very much dependent on my conception of moral decency.

Then why should anyone care what your opinion on the issue is? You view of morality would then be necessarily irrelevant to everyone but you.

That does not follow. Others can (and do) share my subjective sentiments, just as others can share subjective tastes in art or food. I can use this common ground to argue for my position.

My perception of their moral decency is very much dependent on my conception of moral decency.

That does not follow. Others can (and do) share my subjective sentiments, just as others can share subjective tastes in art or food. I can use this common ground to argue for my position.
The people who already share your sentiments will have already reached the same conclusions as you have, so you don't need to persuade them.

The people who already share your sentiments will have already reached the same conclusions as you have, so you don't need to persuade them.

Nonsense. Moral intuitions are vague and complex enough that quite different moral principles can be derived from the same set.

Based on the way you phrased it. ;) You mentioned exchanging "natural rights" (and abilities).Well, I'm not particularly concerned with whether or not natural rights exist, or if they're simply natural abilities. I see what you mean, though, I didn't mean to imply both rights and abilities, simply one or the other.