NationStates Jolt Archive

Utilitarianism is the system of ethics that argues that, generally, any human action should produce the greatest amount of ‘utility’ for the greatest number of people, or alternatively, that any action should produce the least amount of evil or harm. ‘Utility’ is judged variously by different utilitarian scholars as happiness, pleasure or satisfaction of preferences. Although there are many theories of utilitarianism, most can be summed up by advocating the maximisation of good or the minimisation of evil.

Human rights’ theorists argue that all human beings, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, sex, etc., have universal rights that cannot be breached in any circumstances. Human rights, I imagine, are far more recognisable to Average Joe than utilitarianism, mainly because they have played such an important part in post-WW2 politics; most nations in the world are signed up to some variation of a Bill of Rights, one example being the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights). However, recently human rights have come under fire from more conservative politicians on both sides of The Big Pond for being too unweildy.

Obviously, utilitarians would in some instances argue that human rights should be breached to maximise utility; alternatively, human rights theorists would contend that human rights should never be breached, even if that entails suffering for a proportion of people.

Personally, utilitarianism seems an initially sensible idea that, after some thought, raises some difficult questions (one example being how does one measure utility effectively without knowledge of the future); while universal human rights sit well with the civil libertarian in me.

To illlustrate the difficulty of implementing either theory, consider the following, hypothetical, example. A passenger plane carrying hundreds of people is infected mid-air with a highly deadly contagious disease. If it lands on the ground, the disease will spread among the population of the country rapidly. For argument’s sake, the only way to prevent this from happening is to fire on the plane, killing all inside. What should be done?

The utilitarian would argue that to maximise the good for the most people, the plane should be destroyed. The human rights theorist (if s/he accepted the right to life, as most would) would argue that the passengers on the plane have the right not to be killed.

What would you do?

And what do think is the more desirable theory, utilitarianism or human rights?

Protect the innocent, serve the public trust but to hell with OCP

Human rights’ theorists argue that all human beings, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, sex, etc., have universal rights that cannot be breached in any circumstances.



I'm not sure that is an accurate statement of human rights theory. While there are certain basic rights that everyone is entitled to, that does not mean they cannot be infringed under any circumstances. In other words, the rights are not necessarily absolute. But they should not necessarily be infringed merely because it is expedient to do so, or because a majority desires it.

To take the example you used, in that case, a human rights advocate might very well suggest shooting down the plane, since allowing the people on the plane to excercise a right to life would end up infringing everyone else's right to live.

So utilitarianism and human rights are not necessarily as inconsistent as you suggest. In fact, it might be suggested that many human rights advocates would simply see human rights as extremely desirable goods that should not be taken away.

So utilitarianism and human rights are not necessarily as inconsistent as you suggest. In fact, it might be suggested that many human rights advocates would simply see human rights as extremely desirable goods that should not be taken away.
In that sense, are human rights not merely human guidelines? And if indeed they are, does that not render rights incrediably weak; leading us down a slippery slope where rights can be taken away due to any extenuating circumstances goverments can dream up?

One major problem with utilitarianism is that it is impossible to say what action will give the greatest utility. Because in the strictest sense, it demands evaluation of all possible futures. Perhaps the future will end up better if the disease is let run it's course. In the immediate future many may die, but the survivors may pass on and promulgate a protective gene that'll safe humanity in the far future.
Consequences on the large scale are unforseeable; chaos theory and all that.

Hence why weaker forms of utilitarianism like rule-utilitarianism have been thought of. To explain, the latter says, rather than selecting the action that gives the greatest utility, act according to a general rule which optimizes utility (in comparison to rules pertaining the same situations). This is easier, because you can base it on statistics of events in history. (Although, it's still intractible)
However, in as far as the problem of human-rights vs utilitarianism, it should be clear that you can view adhering to human rights as rule-utilitarianism.

There is however the theoretical issue of why it is moral. Do rights have value for their own sake, or only for their consequences.

Utilitarianism is the system of ethics that argues that, generally, any human action should produce the greatest amount of ‘utility’ for the greatest number of people, or alternatively, that any action should produce the least amount of evil or harm. ‘Utility’ is judged variously by different utilitarian scholars as happiness, pleasure or satisfaction of preferences. Although there are many theories of utilitarianism, most can be summed up by advocating the maximisation of good or the minimisation of evil.

Human rights’ theorists argue that all human beings, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, sex, etc., have universal rights that cannot be breached in any circumstances. Human rights, I imagine, are far more recognisable to Average Joe than utilitarianism, mainly because they have played such an important part in post-WW2 politics; most nations in the world are signed up to some variation of a Bill of Rights, one example being the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights). However, recently human rights have come under fire from more conservative politicians on both sides of The Big Pond for being too unweildy.

Obviously, utilitarians would in some instances argue that human rights should be breached to maximise utility; alternatively, human rights theorists would contend that human rights should never be breached, even if that entails suffering for a proportion of people.

Personally, utilitarianism seems an initially sensible idea that, after some thought, raises some difficult questions (one example being how does one measure utility effectively without knowledge of the future); while universal human rights sit well with the civil libertarian in me.

To illlustrate the difficulty of implementing either theory, consider the following, hypothetical, example. A passenger plane carrying hundreds of people is infected mid-air with a highly deadly contagious disease. If it lands on the ground, the disease will spread among the population of the country rapidly. For argument’s sake, the only way to prevent this from happening is to fire on the plane, killing all inside. What should be done?

The utilitarian would argue that to maximise the good for the most people, the plane should be destroyed. The human rights theorist (if s/he accepted the right to life, as most would) would argue that the passengers on the plane have the right not to be killed.

What would you do?

And what do think is the more desirable theory, utilitarianism or human rights?

I would land the plane in a remote location, quarantine the area and send in volunteer doctors and infectious disease specialists to contain the infected people, sanitize the area and try to cure the disease. Or at least make the infected people as comfortable as possible as scientists attempt to find the original source of the plague and eradicate it.

What can be learned from blowing the plane up? What'll happen the next time someone is infected. How do we know they are even the only ones? KNowledge is power and one can value the lives of those people AND benefit from it as well.

One major problem with utilitarianism is that it is impossible to say what action will give the greatest utility. Because in the strictest sense, it demands evaluation of all possible futures. Perhaps the future will end up better if the disease is let run it’s course. In the immediate future many may die, but the survivors may pass on and promulgate a protective gene that’ll safe humanity in the far future.
Consequences on the large scale are unforseeable; chaos theory and all that.
Mmmm. That’s my main beef with utilitarianism too, and one that I don’t see being solved by any ‘tweaking’ of the theory.

However, in as far as the problem of human-rights vs utilitarianism, it should be clear that you can view adhering to human rights as rule-utilitarianism.
That’s very interesting. I’d be very much in favour of somehow conciling the two views; get the best of both worlds, so to speak.

There is however the theoretical issue of why it is moral. Do rights have value for their own sake, or only for their consequences.
I’d contend that only the consequences are moral. Merely having the concept of the right to life isn’t, in itself, moral. It’s the upholding or enforcement(?) of the right that has moral worth.


I would land the plane in a remote location, quarantine the area and send in volunteer doctors and infectious disease specialists to contain the infected people, sanitize the area and try to cure the disease.
Pretty much exactly my response when I first heard the problem. The lecturer who told it then sort of exploded, saying that there was no other way to deal with the plane.

I went into a strop.

I had qualms about whether to include the problem or not in my original post, but couldn’t think of a decent alternative. Probably should have left it out.

In that sense, are human rights not merely human guidelines? And if indeed they are, does that not render rights incrediably weak; leading us down a slippery slope where rights can be taken away due to any extenuating circumstances goverments can dream up?

Not exactly ... there should be a very high standard of justification for infringement, far above the mere whim of the majority. But no right is absolute ... at the very least, it is always subject to other competing rights.

Pretty much exactly my response when I first heard the problem. The lecturer who told it then sort of exploded, saying that there was no other way to deal with the plane.

I went into a strop.

I had qualms about whether to include the problem or not in my original post, but couldn’t think of a decent alternative. Probably should have left it out.

I suspect that your lecturer was a nincompoop. :p

I’d contend that only the consequences are moral. Merely having the concept of the right to life isn’t, in itself, moral. It’s the upholding or enforcement(?) of the right that has moral worth.The problem with any form of consequence-moralism is of course the unforeseeable consequences. Anything done with the best intentions might still in the end make the world worse.
I think the main three aspects of moral behaviuour are: intention, action and consequence. In my opinion all three play a role in deciding if you're chosen behaviour is 'good'.
If you want to kill me, but accidentally shoot another assassin out to get me, well, I'll be happy with the consequences. But I won't suddenly think you're a nice guy, just because you're an awfull shot.
On the other side, children might make a horrible mess, and horrible breakfast, but parents might still appreciate the effort they went through to give them breakfast in bed.
Then on action; if someone always tells the truth, he might tell the stormtroopers where I'm hiding.
All three aspects in themselves don't make something right. They depend on their context.

Of course there are yet other ways to think abotu ethics. Like virtue ethics (striving for certain moral character traits), deontic logic (duties/right), etc. There isn't really any one moral framework a person falls in; if they claim to fit in a certain framework, you can always find a question that makes them think twice, even when the theory itself gives a clear (and intuitively wrong) answer. (Those people might still adhere to the 'wrong' answer though, because they think the theory is worth it)

The individual must always come first. If not, then atrocities can be defended on the basis of utility.

After all, why shouldn't I have a slave to serve my house? This is one persons unhappiness vs a whole families improved welfare. Why shouldn't we ethnically cleanse a small tribe to pave way for a shopping mall? After all, what are a couple of hundred people compared to the happiness of thousands for decades to come?

What would you do? And what do think is the more desirable theory, utilitarianism or human rights?


Ummmm good question, interesting. Apart from the obviouse land the plane, hangar it, and seal the hangar. Treat the people on the plane, or make them comfatable for death.(heheh there are always more than one or two ways)

And apart from the question, Human rights where did they come from then?
I would plump with the rights of each individual every time.

I personally am a humanist, even though I have my occassional nihilist tendencies. Both philosophies have their merits, yet to me humanism moreso than utilitarianism. To me individuals come first.

Would it not be possible to simply exclude and quarantine these individuals? If not, this would be one of those few cases where firing on the plane would be warranted.

I am not exactly a utilitarian, but yes, I would fire on the plane, and yes, I believe that human rights can be violated when necessary to pursuing the good.

The individual must always come first. If not, then atrocities can be defended on the basis of utility.

Defended, yes. But not justified, being atrocities.

After all, why shouldn't I have a slave to serve my house? This is one persons unhappiness vs a whole families improved welfare.

It isn't a simple question of how many people benefit vs. how many people are harmed. The harm done to a slave is egregious. The benefit done to the family is simply not comparable.

Why shouldn't we ethnically cleanse a small tribe to pave way for a shopping mall? After all, what are a couple of hundred people compared to the happiness of thousands for decades to come?

Same logic as before applies here.

One major problem with utilitarianism is that it is impossible to say what action will give the greatest utility.

Impossible to say for sure, yes. Not impossible to make reasonable assumptions.

And this is not an objection to theory exactly. Even if it is extremely difficult, we could still be morally obligated to maximize utility.

The individual must always come first. If not, then atrocities can be defended on the basis of utility.

After all, why shouldn't I have a slave to serve my house? This is one persons unhappiness vs a whole families improved welfare. Why shouldn't we ethnically cleanse a small tribe to pave way for a shopping mall? After all, what are a couple of hundred people compared to the happiness of thousands for decades to come?Because it might happen to you, and the risk and worry decreases utility.
Because enough people would feel sorry for the victims and feel worse for it, decreasing utility.

Of course it depends on what measure of 'utility' you use. But it's a very malleable guide. If we strongly object to certain phenomena, utility theory will automatically agree.
Actually, that effect is so bad, that utility theory can even be used to argue against (publicly) adhering to utility theory. The trivial consideration is that it's quite possible the world would be better off if nobody was utilitarian. (That's no argument against though, since it's a guess either way)
I can't remember the better argument that came up during my ethics course though (it's been two or three years, and I doubt it's in my notes).

And this is not an objection to theory exactly. Even if it is extremely difficult, we could still be morally obligated to maximize utility.
Morally obligated to protect ourselves you mean? It seems like an extension of the self-interest theory, to a point, even though utilitarianism and it do not see eye to eye usually.

What would you consider an objection to the theory then?

Of course it depends on what measure of 'utility' you use. But it's a very malleable guide. If we strongly object to certain phenomena, utility theory will automatically agree.

Yes. This is my biggest problem with it. It places us at the mercy of preferences. If I prefer to torture a child, simply because I derive pleasure from torturing children, that preference is worthy of moral consideration. The more I prefer to torture the child, the more moral consideration my preference gets. That is a twisted way of judging things. Such a preference is intrinsically wrong, and is unworthy of moral consideration however strong it is.

Similarly, utilitarianism precludes any category of "victimless" acts. After all, while it may not seem to someone watching pornography or engaging in gay sex that she is harming anyone, we are at the mercy of others' preferences; someone on the other side of the world may strongly prefer, for whatever reason, that such acts not be done. In utilitarian terms that person is a victim of the act, and her preference is worthy of moral consideration. The problem, of course, is that while her preference is not as twisted as that of the child torturer mentioned earlier, her preference nevertheless concerns something that is not her business; it isn't a question of whether it does matter to her, but whether it should matter to her, at least to the point where we are supposed to take that preference into account.

Defended, yes. But not justified, being atrocities.There's a nomological problem there. They wouldn't be called atrocities if we didn't find them unjustified in the first place.
But opinions may differ on what does and does not constitute an atrocity.

Impossible to say for sure, yes. Not impossible to make reasonable assumptions.For some definitions of reasonable :p
I agree though, that for almost all problems you encounter, it is quite easy to find a reasonable solution. If you don't take utilitarianism too strict, it comes down to "think about the consequences of your actions", which is a good rule to live by.

And this is not an objection to theory exactly. Even if it is extremely difficult, we could still be morally obligated to maximize utility.I'd say we can only be morally obliged to things that lie within our power. And even if it lies within, there must be some "cost-benefit" trade-off *)
For one you have to find a trade-off between thinking further about the consequences of actions (possibly further optimizing the results), and implementing your action in a timely fashion. And the sooner you do one thing, the sooner you can move on to doing other (good) things.

*) which suffers from a worse problem in the strict case of utilitarianism, because finding the right tradeoff would still involve considering all possible futures. But you're quite right that we can be pragmatic, and go with reasonable assumptions)

Morally obligated to protect ourselves you mean? It seems like an extension of the self-interest theory, to a point, even though utilitarianism and it do not see eye to eye usually.

I don't see why you say so; utilitarianism is the system perhaps most at odds with self-interest, because it does not really include a category of supererogatory acts.

What would you consider an objection to the theory then?

I give one in the post preceding this one. There are others; it may equally maximize utility (because of whatever weird circumstances) for a serial murderer or an innocent child to be sent to prison, but shouldn't we choose the serial murderer anyway, every time?

I don't see why you say so; utilitarianism is the system perhaps most at odds with self-interest, because it does not really include a category of supererogatory acts.
Perhaps. Don't you mean compatible then though?

I give one in the post preceding this one. There are others; it may equally maximize utility (because of whatever weird circumstances) for a serial murderer or an innocent child to be sent to prison, but shouldn't we choose the serial murderer anyway, every time?
Yes, I read them. Essentially what you say is that it is too subject to personal preferences and interpretations, hence potentially creating very warped results.

I choose to maximize human rights for all of humanity, be it through utilitarianism or not.

There's a nomological problem there. They wouldn't be called atrocities if we didn't find them unjustified in the first place.
But opinions may differ on what does and does not constitute an atrocity.

I was being a little facetious.

It really is my opinion, though; we may not like a moral theory that could theoretically be used to justify atrocities, but we must keep in mind that in actual practice it is rather difficult to do so. And in circumstances where it can be done, there is usually something to be said for doing it. After all, what if the aforementioned slave would produce a cure for cancer that would save millions of lives over the next decade? Could we avoid enslaving her, and still be acting morally?

For some definitions of reasonable :p
I agree though, that for almost all problems you encounter, it is quite easy to find a reasonable solution. If you don't take utilitarianism too strict, it comes down to "think about the consequences of your actions", which is a good rule to live by.

I didn't say it was easy, and I wouldn't say it is easy. We may not have problems with such acts as theft and murder (at least in their usual contexts), but when it comes to the issues over which serious disputes can be had - like, say, war - the problem of maximizing utility becomes far harder.

Of course, the difficulty is that in any decent moral system, the problem would be hard. Why should we make certain things unworthy of moral consideration solely because it is inconvenient to consider them? If the Principle of Utility really is the right moral principle in its conception of the good and its insistence that we maximize the good, all the objections to its difficulty are irrelevant.

I don't disagree with anything you said in the rest of your post.

Perhaps. Don't you mean compatible then though?

No, utilitarianism states that we have a moral duty to do everything we can to maximize utility, which grants equal moral consideration to everyone; it is completely incompatible with self-interest.

No, utilitarianism states that we have a moral duty to do everything we can to maximize utility, which grants equal moral consideration to everyone; it is completely incompatible with self-interest.
Which is what I said. What I meant was, wouldn't it be within a collectivity's self-interest to maximise their utility, in this case safety? I wasn't referring to individual self-interest...

Which is what I said. What I meant was, wouldn't it be within a collectivity's self-interest to maximise their utility, in this case safety? I wasn't referring to individual self-interest...

Oh, I see what you're getting at. Yes, it does have room for self-interest in that sense. You are permitted to give yourself moral consideration.

It really is my opinion, though; we may not like a moral theory that could theoretically be used to justify atrocities, but we must keep in mind that in actual practice it is rather difficult to do so. And in circumstances where it can be done, there is usually something to be said for doing it. After all, what if the aforementioned slave would produce a cure for cancer that would save millions of lives over the next decade? Could we avoid enslaving her, and still be acting morally?It's a bit like the reverse side of "if we could travel in time, should we kill Hitler/Stalin when he was still a child" (assuming that would actually prevent the misery he caused, blah, blah).
Do future lives weigh up to current ones? Or; does future utility weigh up to more 'immediate' utility. (I'd say it's pragmatic to use an event-horizon, and give increasingly less weight to possible events further into the future)
My answer to the question at hand is that I would have to give the choice to the 'slave to be' in question; her call. But then, I have an irrational objection to unwilling sacrifices.

If the Principle of Utility really is the right moral principle in its conception of the good and its insistence that we maximize the good, all the objections to its difficulty are irrelevant.I'm a bit ambivalent about it. On the one hand, abstractly, it may work in determining what is good and not. But if it's too difficult to implement, that would mean we can never be truely moral. Which is unfair, because it is asking us to do something that can't be done.
The difficulties of utility theory influence it's own effectivity. If we can't effectively do the maximizing, we can't truely implement the principle. There has to be foremost a practical way of applying the theory. After all our means and capacity is limited, and our decisions are further constrained by time, something utilitarianism doesn't seem to take into account. Sometimes situations call for snap decisions; after-the-fact evaluation might reveal there were better options, but that's not a fair way to judge because it uses time and information not available at the time.