Deep Kimchi
08-09-2006, 14:02
I mean, did Sandy Berger want to kill Osama, or did he not give a crap, as the upcoming "entertainment" movie from Disney implies?
Sandy's letter to complain about the movie:
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2006/images/09/07/berger.iger.pdf
"There is nothing in the 9/11 Commission Report (the purported basis of your film) to support this portrayal and the fabrication of this scene (of such apparent magnitude) cannot be justified under any reasonable definition of dramatic license. In no instance did President Clinton or I ever fail to support a request from the CIA or US military to authorize an operation against bin Laden or al Qaeda."
Really? Never fail to support or authorize an operation against Bin Laden OR al Qaeda?
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
On May 29, “Jeff ” informed “Mike” that he had just met with Tenet, Pavitt, and the chief of the Directorate’s Near Eastern Division.The decision was made not to go ahead with the operation.“Mike” cabled the field that he had been directed to “stand down on the operation for the time being.”He had been told, he wrote, that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties—“collateral damage”—was too high.They were concerned about the tribals’ safety, and had worried that “the purpose and nature of the operation would be subject to unavoidable misinterpretation and misrepresentation—and probably recriminations—in the event that Bin Ladin, despite our best intentions and efforts, did not survive.”29
Impressions vary as to who actually decided not to proceed with the operation. Clarke told us that the CSG saw the plan as flawed.He was said to have described it to a colleague on the NSC staff as “half-assed” and predicted that the principals would not approve it. “Jeff ” thought the decision had been made at the cabinet level. Pavitt thought that it was Berger’s doing, though perhaps on Tenet’s advice. Tenet told us that given the recommendation of his chief operations officers, he alone had decided to “turn off ” the operation. He had simply informed Berger, who had not pushed back. Berger’s recollection was similar. He said the plan was never presented to the White House for a decision.
Well, sounds like Tenet probably made the decision, but Berger, who knew, didn't seem to care. And Pavitt thought the idea to not attack was from Berger.
"The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah.The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.” This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was “probably a direct result of the Iraq–Al Qida agreement.” Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the “exact formula used by Iraq.” This language about al Qaeda’s “understanding” with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998"
So, there WAS an agreement between al Qaeda and the government of Iraq, and Berger was informed of this.
And this:
"On December 4, as news came in about the discoveries in Jordan, National
Security Council (NSC) Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke
wrote Berger,“If George’s [Tenet’s] story about a planned series of UBL attacks
at the Millennium is true, we will need to make some decisions NOW.” He
told us he held several conversations with President Clinton during the crisis.
He suggested threatening reprisals against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the
event of any attacks on U.S. interests, anywhere, by Bin Ladin. He further
proposed to Berger that a strike be made during the last week of 1999 against
al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan—a proposal not adopted.11"
Wow. So Berger got more proposals to strike at al Qaeda.
Wonder what he thought we should do about that:
"11. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). In the margin next to Clarke’s suggestion to attack al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote “no.”"
I guess he DID refuse to support attacks on al Qaeda.
Wow. I guess we know now why Sandy was in the National Archives, stuffing potentially incriminating documents into his pants and forgetting where he left them later.
Sandy's letter to complain about the movie:
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2006/images/09/07/berger.iger.pdf
"There is nothing in the 9/11 Commission Report (the purported basis of your film) to support this portrayal and the fabrication of this scene (of such apparent magnitude) cannot be justified under any reasonable definition of dramatic license. In no instance did President Clinton or I ever fail to support a request from the CIA or US military to authorize an operation against bin Laden or al Qaeda."
Really? Never fail to support or authorize an operation against Bin Laden OR al Qaeda?
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
On May 29, “Jeff ” informed “Mike” that he had just met with Tenet, Pavitt, and the chief of the Directorate’s Near Eastern Division.The decision was made not to go ahead with the operation.“Mike” cabled the field that he had been directed to “stand down on the operation for the time being.”He had been told, he wrote, that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties—“collateral damage”—was too high.They were concerned about the tribals’ safety, and had worried that “the purpose and nature of the operation would be subject to unavoidable misinterpretation and misrepresentation—and probably recriminations—in the event that Bin Ladin, despite our best intentions and efforts, did not survive.”29
Impressions vary as to who actually decided not to proceed with the operation. Clarke told us that the CSG saw the plan as flawed.He was said to have described it to a colleague on the NSC staff as “half-assed” and predicted that the principals would not approve it. “Jeff ” thought the decision had been made at the cabinet level. Pavitt thought that it was Berger’s doing, though perhaps on Tenet’s advice. Tenet told us that given the recommendation of his chief operations officers, he alone had decided to “turn off ” the operation. He had simply informed Berger, who had not pushed back. Berger’s recollection was similar. He said the plan was never presented to the White House for a decision.
Well, sounds like Tenet probably made the decision, but Berger, who knew, didn't seem to care. And Pavitt thought the idea to not attack was from Berger.
"The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah.The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.” This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was “probably a direct result of the Iraq–Al Qida agreement.” Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the “exact formula used by Iraq.” This language about al Qaeda’s “understanding” with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998"
So, there WAS an agreement between al Qaeda and the government of Iraq, and Berger was informed of this.
And this:
"On December 4, as news came in about the discoveries in Jordan, National
Security Council (NSC) Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke
wrote Berger,“If George’s [Tenet’s] story about a planned series of UBL attacks
at the Millennium is true, we will need to make some decisions NOW.” He
told us he held several conversations with President Clinton during the crisis.
He suggested threatening reprisals against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the
event of any attacks on U.S. interests, anywhere, by Bin Ladin. He further
proposed to Berger that a strike be made during the last week of 1999 against
al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan—a proposal not adopted.11"
Wow. So Berger got more proposals to strike at al Qaeda.
Wonder what he thought we should do about that:
"11. NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Dec. 4, 1999; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). In the margin next to Clarke’s suggestion to attack al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote “no.”"
I guess he DID refuse to support attacks on al Qaeda.
Wow. I guess we know now why Sandy was in the National Archives, stuffing potentially incriminating documents into his pants and forgetting where he left them later.