NationStates Jolt Archive

[This, though long, sums up a lot of personal reservations about
libertarianism I have long had.]

Libertarianism is usually defined as the view in political philosophy
that the only legitimate function of a government is to protect its
citizens from force, fraud, theft, and breach of contract, and that it
otherwise ought not to interfere with its citizens dealings with one
another, either to make them more economically equal or to make them
more morally virtuous. Most libertarian theorists emphasize that their
position is not intended to be a complete system of ethics, but merely
a
doctrine about the proper scope of state power: their claim is not that
either egalitarian views about the distribution of wealth or
traditional
attitudes about sexuality, drug use, and the like are necessarily
incorrect, but only that such moral views ought not to guide public
policy. A libertarian society is in their view compatible with any
particular moral or religious outlook one might be committed to, and
this is taken to be one of its great strengths: people of all
persuasions in a pluralistic society can have reason to support a
libertarian polity, precisely because it does not favor any particular
persuasion over another. A libertarian society is, it is claimed,
genuinely neutral between diverse moral and religious worldviews.

It simply isn't true that libertarianism is neutral between various
moral and religious worldviews, notwithstanding that most libertarians
would like to believe (indeed do believe) that it is. The reason, as it
turns out, is that there is no such thing as libertarianism in the
first
place: it would be more accurate to speak in the plural of
libertarianisms, a variety of doctrines each often described as
libertarian, but having no common core, and each of which tends in
either theory or practice to favor some moral worldviews to the
exclusion of others. It also turns out that the illusion that there is
such a thing as libertarianism -- a basic set of beliefs and values
that
all so-called libertarians have in common -- is the source of the
illusion that a libertarian society would be a truly neutral one. When
one gets clear on exactly which version of libertarianism one is
talking
about, it will be seen that what one is talking about is a doctrine
with
substantial moral commitments, commitments which cannot fail to promote
some worldviews and to push others into the margins of social life.

To see that this is so, we need only look at some specific and
paradigmatic examples of libertarian political theories, and there is
no
more appropriate place to start than at the beginning, with the early
classical liberal (as opposed to modern, egalitarian liberal) political
thinkers whom libertarians typically regard as their intellectual
forebears. Take John Locke (1632-1704), who famously argued that the
primary function of a government was to protect the property rights of
its citizens, with the most fundamental property right being that of
self-ownership. That we own ourselves entails, in Lockes view, that we
own our labor and its fruits, and this in turn entails that we can
(with
certain qualifications) come to own whatever previously unowned natural
resources we mix our labor with. Self-ownership thus grounds the right
to private property, and with it the basic rights that determine the
proper scope and functions of state power.

But what grounds the right of self-ownership itself? The answer,
according to Locke, was that it derives from *God*. How? God, being the
creator of everything that exists other than Himself including us is
the
ultimate owner of everything that exists including us. Therefore, when
a
person harms another person by killing him, stealing from him, and so
forth, he in effect violates the rights of God, because he damages what
is God's property. To respect God's rights over us, therefore, we must
recognize our duty not to kill, harm, or steal from each other, which
entails treating each other as having certain rights relative to each
other the rights to life, liberty, and property. And these rights can
usefully be summed up as rights of self-ownership. But ultimately, as
it
turns out, we dont really own ourselves: *God does*. Relative to Him,
we
are merely leasing ourselves, as it were, and are accountable to Him
for
how we use His property. Relative to other human beings, however, we
are
in effect self-owners; we must treat others as if they owned
themselves,
and not use them as if they were our property.

That Lockes version of classical liberalism favors a decidedly
religious
social order should be obvious. Of course, Locke is also famous for
promoting the idea of religious toleration, and would vehemently reject
the suggestion that any particular denomination or its teachings ought
to be promoted by government. But Locke was nevertheless very far in
his
thinking from the interpretation of the doctrine of the separation of
church and state favored by the ACLU. For he also held that toleration
cannot be extended to atheists, precisely because their denial of the
existence of God amounted, in his view, to the denial of the very
foundations of the moral order in general, and the classical liberal
political order in particular. In Locke's estimation, if the suggestion
that liberalism entails a right of toleration of atheism isnt exactly a
self-contradiction, it will do until the real thing comes along; for
the
existence of any rights at all presupposes the falsity of atheism.

Whatever one thinks of their ultimate defensibility, Lockes position
does at least arguably form a coherent and systematic whole; and, more
to the present point, it quite obviously is not, and does not pretend
to
be, consistent with any claim to neutrality between all moral and
religious worldviews.

This commitment to a particular moral view of the world was typical of
the early classical liberals. Adam Smith (1723-1790) favored modern
liberal capitalist society precisely because of what he took to be its
moral advantages: it provided an unprecedented degree of material
well-being for the masses, and it promoted such bourgeois virtues as
sobriety, moderation, and diligence. Moreover, because in Smith's view
capitalist society failed to promote certain other virtues (namely
martial and aristocratic ones), and even tended positively to undermine
some of them (insofar as consumerism and the hyper-specialization
entailed by the division of labor oriented mens minds away from
learning), there was an urgent need for government to foster
institutions outside the market -- a professional military and publicly
financed education, for example -- that would make up for its
deficiencies.

It ought not to be supposed that the moralism of these early classical
liberals was merely an artifact of their having written in a less
secularist age. Indeed, one finds many of the same themes in their
recent successors. F.A. Hayek (1899-1992) was perhaps the foremost
champion of the free society and the market economy in the 20th
century.
He was also firmly committed to the proposition that market society has
certain moral presuppositions that can only be preserved through the
power of social stigma. In his later work especially, he made it clear
that these presuppositions concern the sanctity of property and of the
family, protected by traditional moral rules which restrain our natural
impulses and tell us that you must neither wish to possess any woman
you
see, nor wish to possess any material goods you see.

Among the benefits of religious belief in Hayek's view is its
strengthening [of] respect for marriage, its enforcement of stricter
observance of rules of sexual morality among both married and
unmarried,
and its creation of a socially beneficial taboo against the taking of
another's property. Indeed, though he was personally an agnostic, Hayek
held that the value of religion for shoring up the moral
presuppositions
of a free society cannot be overestimated:

'We owe it partly to mystical and religious beliefs, and, I believe,
particularly to the main monotheistic ones, that beneficial traditions
have been preserved and transmitted If we bear these things in mind, we
can better understand and appreciate those clerics who are said to have
become somewhat sceptical of the validity of some of their teachings
and
who yet continued to teach them because they feared that a loss of
faith
would lead to a decline in morals. No doubt they were right.'

For these reasons, Hayek, though like Locke a great defender of the
classical liberal belief in toleration of diverse moral and religious
points of view, also held that such toleration must have its limits if
a
free society is to maintain itself, as the following passages
illustrate:

'I doubt whether any moral rule could be preserved without the
exclusion
of those who regularly infringe it from decent company or even without
people not allowing their children to mix with those who have bad
manners. It is by the separation of groups and their distinctive
principles of admission to them that sanctions of moral behavior
operate.'

It is not by conceding a right to equal concern and respect to those
who
break the code that civilization is maintained. Nor can we, for the
purpose of maintaining our society, accept all moral beliefs which are
held with equal conviction as morally legitimate, and recognize a right
to blood feud or infanticide or even theft, or any other moral beliefs
contrary to those on which the working of our society rests. For the
science of anthropology, all cultures or morals may be equally good,
but
we maintain our society by treating others as less so:

'Morals must be restraints on complete freedom, they must determine
what
is permissible and what not. [T]he difficulties begin when we ask
whether tolerance requires that we permit in our community the
observance of a wholly different system of morals, even if a person
does
so entirely consistently and conscientiously. I am afraid I rather
doubt
whether we can tolerate a wholly different system of morals within our
community, although it is no concern of ours what moral rules some
other
community obeys internally. I am afraid that there must be limits even
to tolerance.'

It is significant that Hayek's view was as conservative and moralistic
as it was despite its not being, like Locke's view, based on
theological
premises or even on the notion of natural rights. And as might be
expected, contemporary natural rights theories have a tendency to imply
no less conservative a moralism. To be sure, Robert Nozick (1938-2002),
the most influential proponent of natural rights libertarianism in
recent political philosophy, was no conservative, and was also a
proponent of the idea that libertarianism is neutral between moral and
religious worldviews. Indeed, given that his predecessors included
people like Locke, Smith, and Hayek, Nozick might even have the
distinction of being the first major classical liberal or libertarian
theorist to suggest such a thing. The trouble is, Nozick is also
notoriously unclear about where natural rights, and in particular the
right of self-ownership, come from. But surely what we take to be the
source of rights cannot fail to imply, as it does in Locke, a specific
moral view of the world. So if Nozick's position seems to allow for
neutrality between all worldviews, this is arguably precisely because
he
is so vague about the grounds of natural rights.

The history of recent libertarian theorizing about natural rights only
confirms this suspicion, in my view. From the work of Ayn Rand
(1905-1982) onward, such theorizing has been dominated by
Aristotelianism, and in particular by some version or other of the idea
that natural rights are ultimately to be grounded in the sort of
natural
end or purpose that Aristotle held all human beings to have. Now
sometimes libertarian theorists try to cash out the idea of a natural
end in only the thinnest of terms -- in Rand's case, in terms of the
need to survive as a rational being. Notoriously, however, such an
approach fails plausibly to yield a distinctively libertarian
conception
of rights: one might need some sort of rights in order to survive, but
it is hard to see why one would need the extremely strong rights to
liberty and private property (rights strong enough to rule out an
egalitarian redistribution of wealth, say) libertarians want to affirm.
So to make this sort of attempt to justify a libertarian conception of
natural rights work, the libertarian needs to appeal to a much thicker
conception of the natural end or purpose human beings have. In that
case, though, it is very hard to see how anyone committed to this sort
of approach can consistently avoid committing himself also to the very
conservative moral views Aristotelian natural end theories are usually
thought to entail, especially when worked out systematically after the
manner of St. Thomas Aquinas and other natural law theorists.

So far my examples have all been cases where the failure of
libertarianism to be neutral between all the moral and religious
worldviews that exist within a modern pluralistic society involves a
bias in favor of decidedly conservative points of view. Do I mean to
imply, then, that all versions of libertarianism entail moral
conservatism? By no means. Some versions in fact entail exactly the
opposite; and in this very different way, they too fail to be neutral
between moral and religious points of view.

Many libertarian theorists eschew any suggestion that rights are
natural, and with it any appeal to God or human nature as the source of
rights. They take our rights to be in some way artificial historically
contingent conventions, say, or the products of some kind of social
contract. The latter approach is an application to the defense of
libertarianism of a view in moral theory sometimes called
contractarianism, which holds that moral obligations in general and
rights in particular can only be grounded in a kind of implicit
agreement between all the members of society. Contrary to Locke, who
held that our rights, being natural, pre-exist and put absolute
conditions on any contract that can be made between human beings, the
contractarian view is that rights only come into existence after, and
as
a result of, a social contract, and that their content is determined by
the details of the contract. Libertarian contractarians argue that the
details of such a social contract, when rightly understood, will be
seen
to entail libertarianism.

Now since any such contract can only ever be purely hypothetical (the
claim is not that we literally have ever made or could make such an
agreement), the contractarian approach raises all sorts of
philosophical
questions. Moreover, the claim that the details of the contract would
favor libertarianism is by no means uncontroversial. (The
non-libertarian Rawls, after all, also appeals to a kind of social
contract theory.) But since the libertarian social contract theorist
typically denies that there is any robust conception of human nature
which can plausibly determine the content of morality, and typically
characterizes what he regards as a rational party to the social
contract
as refusing to agree to any rule that he does not personally see as in
his self-interest (where his self-interest is typically defined in
terms
of whatever desires or preferences he actually happens to have), it is
easy to see how conservative moral views are going to be ruled out as
indefensible from a contractarian point of view: not all parties to the
social contract will agree to them, and so they cannot be regarded as
morally binding.

Utilitarianism is another moral theory libertarians have sometimes
appealed to in defense of their position. This is, to oversimplify, the
view that what is morally required is whatever promotes the best
consequences, where this is usually understood to entail maximizing the
satisfaction of individual desires or preferences. Here too, whether
either utilitarianism as a general moral philosophy or the strategy of
using it to defend libertarianism in particular is defensible are
matters of great controversy. But just as utilitarianism in general
tends to be radically unconservative (as it is in the work of Peter
Singer, perhaps the best known contemporary utilitarian) so too is it
when applied to a defense of libertarianism. For any view that appeals
merely to what people happen in fact to desire or prefer without
asking,
after the fashion of Aristotelianism or natural law theory, what
desires
or preferences we ought to have given our nature is bound not to sit
well with the conservative moralist's tendency to see certain kinds of
desires and preferences as intrinsically disordered and immoral, so
that
there can be no question of maximizing their satisfaction.

Of course, the expression utilitarian is sometimes used by libertarians
in a much looser way, to refer, not to utilitarianism as a general
moral
philosophy, but merely to a defense of libertarianism which emphasizes
certain practical economic benefits of the free market, such as its
ability to generate wealth and technological innovation. Now by itself,
this sort of economic approach doesn't count as a complete defense of
libertarianism, since many egalitarian liberals and non-libertarian
conservatives would acknowledge these benefits of the market but deny
that such considerations address all their concerns, such as moral
ones.
But there is a tendency among some economics-oriented defenders of
libertarianism to go well beyond this modest appeal to what are
generally recognized to be economic considerations -- a tendency to try
to analyze all human behavior and social institutions in economic
terms,
and thereby to reduce all considerations to purely economic ones. At
its
most extreme, the results are artifacts like Richard Posner's book 'Sex
and Reason', which attempts to account for all human sexual behavior in
terms of perceived costs and benefits.

Now many of those committed to the sorts of unconservative versions of
libertarianism Ive just described would insist that their position
really is neutral between moral worldviews, since they would not
advocate keeping those with conservative sensibilities from living in
accordance with their views or expressing them in public. But this
misses the point. For the versions of libertarianism described in the
last section do not treat conservative views as truly moral views at
all; they treat them instead as mere prejudices: at best matters of
taste, like one's preference for this or that flavor of ice cream, and
at worst rank superstitions that pose a constant danger of leading
those
holding them to try to restrict the freedoms of those practicing
non-traditional lifestyles. Libertarians of the contractarian,
utilitarian, or economistic bent must therefore treat the conservative
the way the egalitarian liberal treats the racist, i.e., as someone who
can be permitted to hold and practice his views, but only provided he
and his views are widely regarded as of the crackpot variety. Just as
the Lockean, Smithian, Hayekian, and Aristotelian versions of
libertarianism entail a social marginalization of those who flout
bourgeois moral standards, so too do these unconservative versions of
libertarianism entail a social marginalization of those who defend
bourgeois moral standards. Neither kind of libertarianism is truly
neutral between moral worldviews.

There are two dramatic consequences of this difference between these
kinds of libertarianism. The first is that a society self-consciously
guided by principles of the Lockean, Smithian, Hayekian, or
Aristotelian
sort will, obviously, be a society of a generally conservative
character, while a society self-consciously guided by principles of a
contractarian, utilitarian, or economistic sort will, equally
obviously,
be a society of a generally anti-conservative character. The point is
not that the former sort of society will explicitly outlaw bohemian
behavior or that the latter will explicitly outlaw conservative
behavior. The point is rather that the former sort of society is bound
to be one in which the bohemian is going to feel out of place, while
the
latter is one in which the conservative is going to feel out of place.
In either case, there will of course be enclaves here and there where
the outsider will find those of like mind. But someone is inevitably
going to get pushed into the cultural catacombs. In no case is a
libertarian society going to be genuinely neutral between all the
points
of view represented within it.

The second dramatic consequence is that there are also bound to be
differences in the public policy recommendations made by the different
versions of libertarianism. Take, for example, the issue of abortion.
Those whose libertarianism is grounded in Lockean, Aristotelian, or
Hayekian thinking are far more likely to take a conservative line on
the
matter. To be sure, there are plenty of pro-choice libertarians
influenced by Hayek. But by far most of these libertarians are
(certainly in my experience anyway) inclined to accept Hayek's economic
views while soft-pedaling or even dismissing the Burkean traditionalist
foundations he gave for his overall social theory. Those who endorse
the
latter, however, are going to be hard-pressed not to be at least
suspicious of the standard moral and legal arguments offered in defense
of abortion. Even more clearly, libertarians of a Lockean or
Aristotelian-natural law bent are going to have strong grounds for
regarding abortion as no less a violation of individual rights than is
the murder of a man, woman, or child: a fetus is no less God's property
than is a child or adult; and on the standard Aristotelian-natural law
view, the fetus is fully human not a potential human being, but rather
a
human being which hasn't yet fulfilled all its potentials and thus has
all the rights that any other human being has.

By contrast, libertarians influenced by contractarianism are very
unlikely to oppose abortion, because fetuses cannot plausibly be
counted
as parties to the social contract that could provide the only grounds
for a prohibition on killing them. Utilitarianism and economism too
would provide no plausible grounds for a prohibition on abortion, since
fetuses would seem to have no preferences or desires which could be
factored into our calculations of how best to maximize the satisfaction
of such preferences or desires.

There are also bound to be differences over the question of same-sex
marriage. From a natural rights perspective, whether Lockean or
Aristotelian, it is hard to see how the demand for a right to same-sex
marriage can be justified. For if there is a natural right to marriage,
then marriage must be a natural institution; and the standard defense
of
marriage as a natural institution appeals to the idea that it is has a
natural function, namely procreation, which entails in turn that it is
inherently heterosexual. Nor can a Hayekian analysis of social
institutions fail to imply anything but skepticism about the case for
same-sex marriage. Hayek's position was that traditional moral rules,
especially when connected to institutions as fundamental as the family
and found nearly universally in human cultures, should be tampered with
only with the most extreme caution. The burden of proof is always on
the
innovator rather than the traditionalist, whether or not the
traditionalist can justify his conservatism to the innovators
satisfaction; and change can be justified only by showing that the rule
the innovator wants to abandon is in outright contradiction to some
other fundamental traditional rule. But that there is any contradiction
in this case is simply implausible, especially when one considers the
traditional natural law understanding of marriage sketched above.

On the other hand, it is easy to see how contractarianism,
utilitarianism, and economism might be thought to justify same-sex
marriage. If the actual desires or preferences of individuals are all
that matter, and some of those individuals desire or prefer to set up a
partnership with someone of the same sex and call it marriage, then
there can be no moral objection to their doing so.

If these different versions of libertarianism differ so radically in
terms of their justifying grounds and implications, why are they
usually
regarded as variations of the same doctrine? And why are they so
commonly held to be neutral between various moral and religious
worldviews if, as I have tried to show, they clearly are not? The
answer
to both questions, I think, is that all these versions of
libertarianism
are often thought, erroneously, to be committed fundamentally to the
value of freedom: they are versions of libertarianism, after all, so
liberty or freedom would seem to be their common core, and this might
seem to include the freedom of every person to follow whatever moral or
religious view he likes. But in fact none of these doctrines takes
liberty or freedom to be fundamental. What is taken to be fundamental
is
rather natural rights, or tradition, or a social contract, or utility,
or efficiency; freedom falls out only as a consequence of the
libertarians more basic commitment to one of these other values, and
the
content of that freedom differs radically depending on precisely which
of these fundamental values he is committed to. For the
Aristotelian-natural law theorist, freedom includes not only freedom
from excessive state power, but also freedom from those moral vices
which prevent the realization of our natural end; for the contractarian
or utilitarian, however, freedom may well include freedom from the very
concepts of moral vice and natural ends. Freedom would also entail for
the latter the right to commit suicide, while for the Lockean, there
can
be no such right, since suicide would itself violate the rights of the
God who created and owns us.

This difference in the understanding of freedom has its parallel in a
difference in what we might call the tone in which various libertarians
assert the right of self-ownership. In the mouth of some libertarians,
what self-ownership is fundamentally about is something like this:
Other
human beings have an intrinsic dignity and moral value, and this
entails
a duty on my part not to use them as means to my own ends; I therefore
have no right to the fruits of another man's labor. In the mouths of
other libertarians, what it means is, at bottom, rather this: I can do
whatever what I want to do, as long as I let everyone else do what they
want to do too; there are no grounds for preventing any of us from
doing, in general, what we want to do. The first view expresses an
attitude of deference, the second an attitude of self-assertion; the
first reflects a commitment to strong moral realism and a rich
conception of human nature, the second a thin conception of human
nature
and a tendency toward moral minimalism or even moral skepticism. And
the
first, I would submit, is more characteristic of libertarians of a
Lockean, Hayekian, or Aristotelian bent, while the latter is more
typical of libertarians influenced by contractarianism, utilitarianism,
or economism.

It is sometimes said that contemporary conservatism is an uneasy
alliance between libertarians and traditionalists, and that this
alliance is destined eventually to collapse due to the inherent
conflict
between the two philosophies. But it can with equal or even greater
plausibility be argued that it is in fact contemporary libertarianism
which comprises an uneasy alliance, an association between incompatible
factions committed to very different conceptions of freedom. **The
trouble with libertarianism is that many of its adherents have for too
long labored under the illusion that things are otherwise, that their
creed is a single unified political philosophy that does not, and need
not, take a stand on the most contentious moral issues dividing
contemporary society.** This has led to confusion both at the level of
theory and at the level of policy. Libertarians need to get clear about
exactly what they believe and why. And when they do, they might find
that their particular version of libertarianism commits them or ought
to
commit them to regard as rivals those they might once have considered
allies.

Edward Feser (edwardfeser@hotmail.com) is the author of On Nozick
(Wadsworth, 2003).

Passion fruit, then?

Chocolate!

No seriously, it is worth discussing but its late for me and it would really help if you format it.

tl;dr, needs reformating, needs some actual comment on it, probably boring.




*does a little dance*

and they wonder why we don't really count them as libertarian at all...

Good piece. Although what exactly its purpose is wasn't entirely clear to me.

A few thoughts:

1) I'm a Contractarian. "Individualist Rationalism" seems to be a good term for it too ;) . I have found it ridiculously difficult to argue with any sort of confidence for the existence of natural rights, or absolute and universal rights to be arrived at through reason, so my long-held belief that there is no such thing is probably affirmed once again. Which helps me define myself even further, which is a good thing.

2) I have always regarded the Austrians as a bunch of moralists, if only of slightly different persuasion. That's why, for all the good points they made at times, I have never really identified with any Austrian. Nonetheless, I pick and choose bits and pieces.

3) Obviously libertarianism or liberalism is in no way a unified political force. That's part of what makes it special - afterall, how could a group of people fighting for freedom to do virtually whatever you want, be centralised? Any attempt to define what exactly it is will only lead to splits and long debates which lead to no answers.

4) I fully agree with the part about conservatism in a non-conservative libertarian society. I have always and probably always will regard conservatism as little better than a brain disease. I don't think it needs to be actively suppressed in any way though. Not only do I think that without a government peddling conservatism (and mainly the idea that it is okay to fiddle about in other people's lives) it will die out in a matter of a generation or two. But even if the majority of people were conservative, that would be fine. Without them destroying society to establish their oppressive fantasy world, they still wouldn't hurt anyone. I favour the idea of then letting people leave for whatever medieval utopia they want.

5) And that's where conservative, moralistic forms of libertarianism fall down completely. For all the respect I have for Hayek and his mates (not too sure where Rand stands in all this) - he was wrong on that.
Contractarianism doesn't need to take freedoms from anyone. If anyone doesn't wanna play, they go and find people who are like them and start their own little society with their own little implicit contract.
Moralists on the other hand must take other people's choice away. They must oppose abortion, they must oppose gay marriage, they must force their views on people. For them, disregarding and respecting such choices is impossible almost by definition. Whether they will do so through legislation or simply through trying to convince people through advertising or other social action is perhaps a matter of debate. I don't consider either any good.

6) The market will sort it out. :D
Or it would if only people had a real choice, and weren't forced to obey moralistic majority decisions all the time.

7) And before you people start talking bad about Posner...the man isn't stupid. He's got a blog together with the (just as brilliant) Gary Becker. A amoralistic libertarian's view on the issues of current politics:
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/

"Religion" was actually the very first word that came to mind which I read elsewhere about how the Austrian School (which includes Hayek) "rejects the use of observation, saying that human actors are too complex to be reduced to their component parts and too self-conscious not to have their behaviour affected by the very act of observation" instead holding that "the only valid economic theory is one that is logically derived from basic principles of human action." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxeology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school ).

The first claim is basically the same one put forward all throughout history by religious types against the scientific method in general: Galileo was wrong because the universe is simply way to complex for stupid humans to understand. Today, it's simply the same argument leveled against the social sciences: human beings are way to complex for stupid humans to understand. And, of course, just as the Church used "God" as a solution to humanity's inability to understand the universe, the modern opponents of the social sciences in turn invent methods for explaining human behavior that are equally arbitrary and subjectivist in nature, clothed in the ephemism of "reason;" "logically derived from basic principles of human action" amounts to absolutely nothing more than "start with baseless assumption, assume it is correct."

Same damn crap all over again. The physical sciences have survived the onslaught, however, so at least they provide hope that the social sciences will do the same.

At any rate, this bit hits the nail on the head:


But in fact none of these doctrines takes
liberty or freedom to be fundamental. What is taken to be fundamental
is rather natural rights, or tradition, or a social contract, or utility,
or efficiency; freedom falls out only as a consequence of the
libertarians more basic commitment to one of these other values, and
the content of that freedom differs radically depending on precisely which
of these fundamental values he is committed to.


I cannot even count how many times I have been frustrated by "libertarians" who declare their allegance to "eliminating all government interference in the economy" only to watch them turn around and engage in all kinds of mental contortion defending corporations, intellectual property, and other measures that could not exist as we know them and thus as defended without the active participation of the state. "Well, yeah, but it does make the economy more efficient, and, um, you don't want to be poor do you?" Or "libertarians" of a left-wing nature who rant about the evils of the state, and then turn around and defend statist welfare or other interventionist methods that could not occur as we know them and thus as defended without the active participation of the state. "Well, yeah, but at least it helps the poor to some extent, and, well, rich people are bad, you don't want to be bad do you?"

So yes, the author is dead on. "Libertarians," of all flavors, including the leftist ones, are for a lot of things. Often, however, I wonder if "liberty" is actually one of them. Sometimes I suspect that, like pretty much all other political parties/ideologies, advocacy of "freedom" really only amounts to advocacy for "whatever is best for me" (review what I wrote above about clothing arbitrary and subjective goals in euphimisms).

Besides my economic psudeo-scialist viewpoint (being able to buy walls that change color based on your internal temperature all over your 64-acre lot is not cool, man. If you can blow $$$ on that, you need more taxes. Sorry.), my views on victimless crimes and freedoms are the same as Libertarians... although I hate criminals (the ones that commit high-level felonies (murder, rape, etc.), not the misdemeanor criminals) and feel they should do labor to pay off their debt to society. (It solves the Welfare problem. They build houses good.)\

So what is that ideology?

But what grounds the right of self-ownership itself?It's nice to see somebody else pointing out that (right) libertarianism simply declared this to be the case without its having basis.

Ok, about the consequences:

It seems that the point of the first portion of the article is that many libertarians believe that while government remains neutral on moral issues, society will pick up the slack and maintain itself. While I can hardly disagree that morality will be perpetuated by society, but I cannot see how that implicates libertarianism. Cultural norms are often reflected and sustained by government policy, and it seems that those norms would decay with the elimination of government policy concerning them.

I also think his argument that a contractarian society would marginalize the conservative is backwards. The marginalization of the conservative results in a contractarian society, not vice versa. It seems ludicrous that the racist became marginalized after we became egalitarian.

Now, as for the differences in policy. I just don't see it. How many modern natural right libertarians actually uphold that the fetus is God's property or a full human? Furthermore, how can a libertarian by modern definition maintain that a person is God's property and justify policy upon that?

Does the idea that marriage is a natural institution and should be protected on the grounds of procreation between man and female actually hold any weight in libertarian circles?

He seems to misrepresent natural right libertarianism by falling back on Aristotelian teleology or Locke's reliance on God. It is rather telling that he completely ignores Nozick's justification for natural rights based on an inherent human dignity while discussing these differences in opinions. I would state that Nozick's justification for natural rights is far more prevalent than archaic teleological notions of fulfilling one's greater purpose.

In the end, I just don't see where these irreconcilable differences between moral and practical libertarians exist.

I don't think libertarianism necessarily requires any sort of moral grounding. There doesn't need to be a moral basis for libertarianism for it to be compelling.

A lot of Objectivists assert otherwise, but they make a gross logical error right at that part of the their philosophy that gives them their name. The world and morality exists objectively. I don't buy it. I certainly couldn't defend the position.

If libertarians eschew moral arguments, I think their positions are strengthened considerably.

It's nice to see somebody else pointing out that (right) libertarianism simply declared this to be the case without its having basis.
Why does it need a basis? Why can't it simply be an assertion upon which libertarianism is based?

It doesn't even need to be a natural right.

Why does it need a basis? Why can't it simply be an assertion upon which libertarianism is based?

It doesn't even need to be a natural right.

Good luck trying to provide any moral basis for a political ideology.

Why does it need a basis? Why can't it simply be an assertion upon which libertarianism is based?


Random assumptions are not a good means of determining truth. If "libertarianism" is simply based on an "assertion" with no greater justification or basis, there is no reason to accept "libertarianism" over any other political ideology. As I touched on in my original post, it is the difference between attempting to determine what actually is, versus simply assuming my own subjective assumptions to be correct.

Ok,

Having read this little analysis I am not really impressed with either his conclusions or how he came to them. He relies heavily on generalizations and the assumption that everyone takes their political philosphy to its limit. This is neither practicable nor true in any real experience.

Let me try to atriculate this...

I dont think the American brand of Libertarianism is similiar to the global view of libertarianism. The reason for this being, the American brand seems to base itself upon the US Constitution. It probably developed this way out of practicality, but makes American libertarians less prone to political division because they have both a contract and a foundation (Both being the consitution) for the rights they claim to have.

Random assumptions are not a good means of determining truth. If "libertarianism" is simply based on an "assertion" with no greater justification or basis, there is no reason to accept "libertarianism" over any other political ideology. As I touched on in my original post, it is the difference between attempting to determine what actually is, versus simply assuming my own subjective assumptions to be correct.

And there is no actual morality, especially as it applies to politics. So we judge based on what we would want for ourselves and operate our government in accordance.

That, to me, implies a sort of collective reciprocal nature to rights. We act collectively to insure our own rights at the expense of allowing everyone their own same set of rights. Hence, I fit into that contractarian section, even though I am not the typical libertarian.

I don't make claims for human dignity, self-ownership, or self-determination on any moral grounds, I claim them because I want them, for me and those I care about.

Let me try to atriculate this...

I dont think the American brand of Libertarianism is similiar to the global view of libertarianism. The reason for this being, the American brand seems to base itself upon the US Constitution. It probably developed this way out of practicality, but makes American libertarians less prone to political division because they have both a contract and a foundation (Both being the consitution) for the rights they claim to have.

We Americans are taught to worship the constitution.

Since the constitution is open to interpretation, just about every political orientation relies on it for justification, certainly including the libertarians.

Why does it need a basis? Why can't it simply be an assertion upon which libertarianism is based?Other people have answered this, but to give examples of how it can be dangerous to base a system on an assertion; it would be the same as basing a system on Jews being inferior or that we should kill and eat capitalists. Certainly, they're welcome to assert their system, but anyone else is welcome to assert a contrary system - any contrary system.

Other people have answered this, but to give examples of how it can be dangerous to base a system on an assertion; it would be the same as basing a system on Jews being inferior or that we should kill and eat capitalists. Certainly, they're welcome to assert their system, but anyone else is welcome to assert a contrary system - any contrary system.

How about looking at it as an incentive. An essential part of what makes our economy work. And private property being essential for exchange of goods.

How about looking at it as an incentive. An essential part of what makes our economy work. And private property being essential for exchange of goods.That could work, except that I don't agree that the way our economy is is the best economy, and I don't think that the exchange of goods between individuals should be necessary.

Random assumptions are not a good means of determining truth. If "libertarianism" is simply based on an "assertion" with no greater justification or basis, there is no reason to accept "libertarianism" over any other political ideology. As I touched on in my original post, it is the difference between attempting to determine what actually is, versus simply assuming my own subjective assumptions to be correct.
How about "Which one produces a society we like?"

Otherwise, those of us who deny the relevance of morality can't ever have political opinions.

That's always been the basis of my arguments for capitalism over socialism: capitalism does a better job of improving the lives of poor people. I don't claim that this has some sort of moral weight, because I can't defend that.

Moral claims are necessarily indefensible.

That could work, except that I don't agree that the way our economy is is the best economy, and I don't think that the exchange of goods between individuals should be necessary.
But you also have yet to explain why it's bad.

And our economy behaves the way it does because of the people in it. Economics is really just a study of behaviour. What do people do with and for things they value? I don't see humanity suddenly becoming less selfish, for example.

Economics is really just a study of behaviour

...within the context of certain rules and institutions, which we know have an immense impact on behavior.

and that is the more useful, at-least-trying-for-scientific, side of economics (the real work here will have to be done by anthropology, really). large sections of it ae devoted to extrapolating from already falsified assumptions, or being entirely prescriptive.

extrapolating from already falsified assumptions
Like what?

Like what?

That children like Santa Clause himself instead of just the presents he gives.:D

PS. It is false; children seem indifferent to a presentless Santa.

I don't really see what assumptions you need. You can see empirically that incentives matter, and once you have that it explains pretty much everything that happens.

Like what?

the continued use of the homo economicus concept, for example

Homo economicus only asserts that people behave in ways they want to behave. You're challenging that?

Certainly, they're welcome to assert their system, but anyone else is welcome to assert a contrary system - any contrary system.

How do you think politics work?

It's nice to see somebody else pointing out that (right) libertarianism simply declared this to be the case without its having basis.
Every single political viewpoint boils down to a normative judgement much as this one at some point. It's impossible to critique one ideology on this basis without critiquing your own ideology.

Homo economicus only asserts that people behave in ways they want to behave.

not in any econ textbook i've ever seen - source?

and i would in fact immediately challenge that idea - because people quite frequently behave in ways directly contrary to the way they want, because people are quite frequently conflicted over what they want, etc.

not in any econ textbook i've ever seen - source?

and i would in fact immediately challenge that idea - because people quite frequently behave in ways directly contrary to the way they want, because people are quite frequently conflicted over what they want, etc.
Your choices reveal your preferences, which is what you want. You may want something more, but you can't get it. But that means nothing.

Unless, of course, you're saying that your choices DO NOT reveal your preferences.

That could work, except that I don't agree that the way our economy is is the best economy, and I don't think that the exchange of goods between individuals should be necessary.
The only other options are individual autarky, small group autarky, or some hypocritical thing which tries to get rid of exchange while realizing that it's necessary.

How do you think politics work?

Every single political viewpoint boils down to a normative judgement much as this one at some point. It's impossible to critique one ideology on this basis without critiquing your own ideology.Yes, but the idea behind the initial judgment is that everyone should agree on it; or at least you and the person you're talking to should agree on it.

The only other options are individual autarky, small group autarky, or some hypocritical thing which tries to get rid of exchange while realizing that it's necessary.Or exchange between groups, or between individuals and groups.

Yes, but the idea behind the initial judgment is that everyone should agree on it; or at least you and the person you're talking to should agree on it.

Well, it's tough enough to get everybody to agree that "violence is bad" as the basic precept of a political system, let along normative judgements on rights and other such things.

Well, it's tough enough to get everybody to agree that "violence is bad" as the basic precept of a political system, let along normative judgements on rights and other such things.Perhaps there's a judgment that's even more basic than that? The Golden Rule might be one.

Good luck trying to provide any moral basis for a political ideology.
Who needs morality? What matters is what works. Property rights generally work, with the right regulation.

Perhaps there's a judgment that's even more basic than that? The Golden Rule might be one.
The Golden Rule is still just a normative judgement. Unless you wish to use human behavior as the basis for morality. Of course, doing that runs immediately contrary to several bits of Marxist dogma.

not in any econ textbook i've ever seen - source?

and i would in fact immediately challenge that idea - because people quite frequently behave in ways directly contrary to the way they want, because people are quite frequently conflicted over what they want, etc.
Homo economius does not require that humans are aware of what's best for them in the long term, or that they perceive the world around them accurately. Only that they try to behave in a way that produces the outcome they prefer (given the alternatives).

I don't even see how this needs to be stated as an assumption; it's a necessary consequence of free will. As long as you think humans have free will, you have to accept that they choose those things they want to choose. I cannot imagine a circumstance under which an agent, when choosing between A and B, prefers B but chooses A.

Perhaps there's a judgment that's even more basic than that? The Golden Rule might be one.
The golden rule only works if all the people in a group have relevantly similar preferences.

I took a job in retail sales once. My training consisted of "treat them as you'd like salesmen to treat you". My preference, as a customer, is to avoid talking to the salesmen at all unless I need something. I'd like them to hang about 12' off my shoulder and wait for me to ask them a question. Most customers, however, really hate that. I was fired after 6 weeks.

The Golden Rule is still just a normative judgement.Yes, but it might be one that you might get everybody to agree on.

Unless you wish to use human behavior as the basis for morality. Of course, doing that runs immediately contrary to several bits of Marxist dogma.Not especially; communism isn't as contrary to human behavior as some people would like to think that it is. Of course, Marxism doesn't represent all of communism, so you might be right, too.

The golden rule only works if all the people in a group have relevantly similar preferences.

I took a job in retail sales once. My training consisted of "treat them as you'd like salesmen to treat you". My preference, as a customer, is to avoid talking to the salesmen at all unless I need something. I'd like them to hang about 12' off my shoulder and wait for me to ask them a question. Most customers, however, really hate that. I was fired after 6 weeks.Ah, I see. Perhaps we could take a specific scenario and apply the Golden Rule to it. For instance, if the issue to legalize rape comes up; there might be people who like the idea, but if rape is legal then that means it is legal for them to be raped, as well. I can't imagine many people wanting to legalize rape in that case.

Yes, but it might be one that you might get everybody to agree on.
Not really. There's plenty of people out there who are perfectly willing to not operate on that rule. Folks like the former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein who feel that they're perfectly happy with doing whatever they want, regardless of other people.

Not especially; communism isn't as contrary to human behavior as some people would like to think that it is. Of course, Marxism doesn't represent all of communism, so you might be right, too.
My claim is that Marxist dogma rejects the concept of human nature, and instead embraces the idea of total malleability, or something close to it. I'm not even going to begin discussing what human nature is, because that can of worms is lethal, and I get off work in fifteen minutes.

Not really. There's plenty of people out there who are perfectly willing to not operate on that rule. Folks like the former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein who feel that they're perfectly happy with doing whatever they want, regardless of other people.Right, but only because they can get away with it. In a system where the rule applied to everyone, they presumably wouldn't do so.

My claim is that Marxist dogma rejects the concept of human nature, and instead embraces the idea of total malleability, or something close to it. I'm not even going to begin discussing what human nature is, because that can of worms is lethal, and I get off work in fifteen minutes.Fair enough. I would disagree with most communists and say that it doesn't matter if human nature is malleable or not because communism isn't incompatible with human nature; however the explanation is lengthy.

The golden rule only works if all the people in a group have relevantly similar preferences.

I took a job in retail sales once. My training consisted of "treat them as you'd like salesmen to treat you". My preference, as a customer, is to avoid talking to the salesmen at all unless I need something. I'd like them to hang about 12' off my shoulder and wait for me to ask them a question. Most customers, however, really hate that. I was fired after 6 weeks.

It's not the Golden Rule that's flawed, it's your framework for fulfilling it. Ultimately, the way anyone wants to be treated is, by definition, according to their preferences; thus, it requires that you attempt to satisfy their preferences, not that you try to satisfy their preferences as if they were you.

It's not the Golden Rule that's flawed, it's your framework for fulfilling it. Ultimately, the way anyone wants to be treated is, by definition, according to their preferences; thus, it requires that you attempt to satisfy their preferences, not that you try to satisfy their preferences as if they were you.
Unless I get to know them really well, their preferences are unknowable to me.

Unless I get to know them really well, their preferences are unknowable to me.

That's why freedom is so essential.

That's why freedom is so essential.
When did we start agreeing?

When did we start agreeing?

Note the kind of freedom I'm talking about, though. It's the freedom to make one's life suit one's preferences - not the narrow, property-based right-libertarian conception.

Or exchange between groups, or between individuals and groups.
Say--aren't groups comprised of individuals?

Note the kind of freedom I'm talking about, though. It's the freedom to make one's life suit one's preferences - not the narrow, property-based right-libertarian conception.
Hitler preferred to have a life where the world was free of Jews.

Note the kind of freedom I'm talking about, though. It's the freedom to make one's life suit one's preferences - not the narrow, property-based right-libertarian conception.
I think one necessarily contains the other.

As long as your preferences don't require other people to behave a particular way, then freedom is freedom.

Say--aren't groups comprised of individuals?
Not only that, but don't they voluntarily associate, each individual deciding on his own?

I think one necessarily contains the other.

I don't. For that matter, I think there are pretty clear circumstances in which they conflict.

What "freedom," in my sense of the word, is open to a starving unemployed worker? Perhaps she can find a job - but certainly not necessarily. Even if she can, it is likely going to involve subjection to circumstances she does not at all prefer.

Yet fixing that problem requires violations of the property-based conception of freedom.

Edit: And even more significantly, according to the property-based conception of freedom the lack of freedom open to the worker is irrelevant. None of his rights, according to that framework, are being violated.

As long as your preferences don't require other people to behave a particular way, then freedom is freedom.

But they always do. Any preference requires others to refrain from disrupting its fulfillment.

Who needs morality? What matters is what works. Property rights generally work, with the right regulation.

Works to achieve what?

What "freedom," in my sense of the word, is open to a starving unemployed worker? Perhaps she can find a job - but certainly not necessarily. Even if she can, it is likely going to involve subjection to circumstances she does not at all prefer.
But you've just conceded that it's not the case that everyone can have evertything they want, because they'll step on each other's toes.

The Homo economicus assertion only requires that the worker choose either to starve or to work the distasteful job, whichever she prefers (assuming those are her options).

Of course, I have family who live in the woods and grow their own food (supplemented with hunting). That's neither starving nor working a distasteful job.

But you've just conceded that it's not the case that everyone can have evertything they want, because they'll step on each other's toes.

Right. We need a framework for adjucating the differences, and one based solely on property rights doesn't account for other violations of freedom.

The Homo economicus assertion only requires that the worker choose either to starve or to work the distasteful job, whichever she prefers (assuming those are her options).

But her overall set of preferences still aren't satisfied. She is essentially being coerced into a situation she hates.

Homo economius does not require that humans are aware of what's best for them in the long term, or that they perceive the world around them accurately. Only that they try to behave in a way that produces the outcome they prefer (given the alternatives).

that's way too psychological for economics of the sort that uses homo economicus as a model. homo economicus is all about rational self-interest and utility maximization.

I cannot imagine a circumstance under which an agent, when choosing between A and B, prefers B but chooses A.

abusive relationships

She is essentially being coerced into a situation she hates.
No, she's choosing one over another she hates even more. By your reasoning all decisions are coerced.

But her overall set of preferences still aren't satisfied.
And you've already pointed out that we can't satisfy everyone's overall set of preferences, so that's an impossible standard. And thus completely irrelevant.

Since some people's preferences are in direct conflict with each other, it's unreasonable to have the satisfaction of anyone's complete set of preferences as a goal, unless you value that person above the others.

You forgot strawberry.

that's way too psychological for economics of the sort that uses homo economicus as a model. homo economicus is all about rational self-interest and utility maximization.
You've constructed a lovely strawman, here. It's a very naïve application of Homo economicus that assumes that the agent has perfect knowledge of the world, or is never influenced by his emotions.

And utility maximisation is a necessary consequence of free will. If I choose A over B, I must have preferred A. It's not possible for me to have preferred B, else I would have chosen B. Perhaps B looks great on the surface, and I'd like to choose B, but it carries with it unwelcome side effects like shame or social ostracism or a risk of disease or it's insufficiently fun.

I can use this reasoning to justify gambling, addiction, wearing a burka, anything you'd like. If I, overall, prefer the consequences of the alternative, I will select that alternative.

abusive relationships
Take this one, for example. If I'm in an abusive relationship, chances are I would prefer I not be in an abusive relationship, all else being equal. But all else isn't equal. If I stay in the relationship, there must be other characteristics of either that relationship or my perceived alternatives which make the relationship the alternative I prefer.

Otherwise, I don't have free will. I can't, if I'm not choosing that which I want to choose.

No, she's choosing one over another she hates even more. By your reasoning all decisions are coerced.

No. Coercion, as far as it is relevant to the coerced's person's decisions, requires a severe disincentive attached to a certain mode of behavior - say, if you do this you'll be shot, or if you don't do this you'll starve.

And you've already pointed out that we can't satisfy everyone's overall set of preferences, so that's an impossible standard. And thus completely irrelevant.

Since some people's preferences are in direct conflict with each other, it's unreasonable to have the satisfaction of anyone's complete set of preferences as a goal, unless you value that person above the others.

All I'm saying is that the non-satisfaction of her preferences is deserving of moral consideration. In a system of freedom focusing solely on property rights, it is not.

All I'm saying is that the non-satisfaction of her preferences is deserving of moral consideration. In a system of freedom focusing solely on property rights, it is not.
I don't care about the moral angle. At all. I just want a society that produces the outcomes I prefer.

No. Coercion, as far as it is relevant to the coerced's person's decisions, requires a severe disincentive attached to a certain mode of behavior - say, if you do this you'll be shot, or if you don't do this you'll starve.
We need a standard, then, as to what constitutes a severe disincentive.

And how realistic is that starvation threat? I see lots of homeless people around, and they don't seem to die on a regular basis. They rely on charity, which is a viable option in most western societies.

I don't care about the moral angle. At all. I just want a society that produces the outcomes I prefer.

Which, depending on how you define the "outcomes" that you prefer, could well involve a moral angle.

We need a standard, then, as to what constitutes a severe disincentive.

Yes, we do.

And how realistic is that starvation threat? I see lots of homeless people around, and they don't seem to die on a regular basis. They rely on charity, which is a viable option in most western societies.

Homelessness is a pretty severe disincentive, too.

Homelessness is a pretty severe disincentive, too.
Not for all people. Some people prefer homelessness.

Do you have any ideas as to what that standard should be? When I raised the issue of actually figuring out where to draw a line you felt was important in the inheritance tax thread, you disappeared.

Right. We need a framework for adjucating the differences, and one based solely on property rights doesn't account for other violations of freedom.
Actually, it accounts for them all. Whatever gives you the idea that it doesn't?

Not for all people. Some people prefer homelessness.

Yes, and some people undoubtedly prefer starvation. They should have that option, but since most of us do neither, a society which attaches such conditions to certain behaviors is coercive.

Do you have any ideas as to what that standard should be?

Standard for coercion? Frankly, no; I don't think it's very important, because my standard for determining the rightness or wrongness of an action does not require a judgment as to whether or not it is "coercive."

The vagueness of the concept is one of many reasons I don't like ethical systems based on non-coercion.

When I raised the issue of actually figuring out where to draw a line you felt was important in the inheritance tax thread, you disappeared.

I disappeared for reasons that had nothing to do with your post, I don't even remember seeing it. Sleep was the main one; that, and getting the chance to read a bit (other than NSG) without staying up as obscenely late as I have been the past few weeks.

I disappeared for reasons that had nothing to do with your post, I don't even remember seeing it. Sleep was the main one; that, and getting the chance to read a bit (other than NSG) without staying up as obscenely late as I have been the past few weeks.
I'll admit I was a bit late to the party on that one.

Actually, it accounts for them all. Whatever gives you the idea that it doesn't?

What on earth gave you the idea that unlimited property rights account for all violations of freedom? What if I own no property? If property rights are supreme, wouldn't that mean I have no rights?

It indeed would. As George Walford rights...

"The private ownership envisages by the anarcho-capitalists would be very different from that which we know. It is hardly going too far to say that while the one is nasty, the other would be nice. In anarcho-capitalism there would be no National Insurance, no Social Security, no National Health Service and not even anything corresponding to the Poor Laws; there would be no public safety-nets at all. It would be a rigorously competitive society: work, beg or die. But as one reads on, learning that each individual would have to buy, personally, all goods and services needed, not only food, clothing and shelter but also education, medicine, sanitation, justice, police, all forms of security and insurance, even permission to use the streets (for these also would be privately owned), as one reads about all this a curious feature emerges: everybody always has enough money to buy all these things.
"There are no public casual wards or hospitals or hospices, but neither is there anybody dying in the streets. There is no public educational system but no uneducated children, no public police service but nobody unable to buy the services of an efficient security firm, no public law but nobody unable to buy the use of a private legal system. Neither is there anybody able to buy much more than anybody else; no person or group possesses
economic power over others.
"No explanation is offered. The anarcho-capitalists simply take it for granted that in their favoured society, although it possesses no machinery for restraining competition (for this
would need to exercise authority over the competitors and it is an anarcho- capitalist society) competition would not be carried to the point where anybody actually suffered from it. While proclaiming their system to be a competitive one, in which private interest rules unchecked, they show it operating as a co-operative one, in which no person or group profits at the cost of another." On Capitalist Anarchists

You've constructed a lovely strawman, here. It's a very naïve application of Homo economicus that assumes that the agent has perfect knowledge of the world, or is never influenced by his emotions.

perfect knowledge wasn't mentioned by me anywhere.

go find me a usage of homo econ that doesn't base itself entirely in rational self-interest. particularly one that's made it's way into an econ text book.

And utility maximisation is a necessary consequence of free will. If I choose A over B, I must have preferred A. It's not possible for me to have preferred B, else I would have chosen B.
...
Take this one, for example. If I'm in an abusive relationship, chances are I would prefer I not be in an abusive relationship, all else being equal. But all else isn't equal. If I stay in the relationship, there must be other characteristics of either that relationship or my perceived alternatives which make the relationship the alternative I prefer.

Otherwise, I don't have free will. I can't, if I'm not choosing that which I want to choose.

or, more realisticly, the human brain isn't as simple or as unified as that. it works at cross purposes, leads us to do things we openly admit are stupid and not what we actually want to do as we do them. the part of the brain that is capable of reflective thinking and making choices is barely on speaking terms with much of the rest of the brain. large parts of our behavior are operating completely below our conscious control. putting us in various social situations can utterly distort our ability to think and choose anything. brain damage of various types can do all sorts of strange things to our thinking and behavior. etc.

What on earth gave you the idea that unlimited property rights account for all violations of freedom?
Violations of liberty, not freedom.


What if I own no property?
But you do: yourself.

Please think before you post.

Standard for coercion? Frankly, no; I don't think it's very important, because my standard for determining the rightness or wrongness of an action does not require a judgment as to whether or not it is "coercive."
So your point about coersion was what, exactly?

Yes, but the idea behind the initial judgment is that everyone should agree on it; or at least you and the person you're talking to should agree on it.

There is no real basis for coming to either of those conclusions.

My main concern is that I agree to the deal.

go find me a usage of homo econ that doesn't base itself entirely in rational self-interest. particularly one that's made it's way into an econ text book.
I don't happen to have an economics textbook handy.

But nothing I've said about Homo economicus has required that it be based in anything other than rational self-interest. Perhaps you're defining self-interest too narrowly.

For example, people give to charity because it makes them happy.

or, more realisticly, the human brain isn't as simple or as unified as that. it works at cross purposes, leads us to do things we openly admit are stupid and not what we actually want to do as we do them[i]. the part of the brain that is capable of reflective thinking and making choices is barely on speaking terms with much of the rest of the brain. large parts of our behavior are operating completely below our conscious control. putting us in various social situations can utterly distort our ability to think and choose anything. brain damage of various types can do all sorts of strange things to our thinking and behavior. etc.
But that's part of our preferences.

I hate dealing with people. I'll put myself at tremendous personal and professional risk to avoid dealing with people. Because I hate dealing with people that much.

Otherwise, I'd just suck it up and deal with them.

Or, put more abstractly, how could you possibly hold an opinion if you didn't know why you held it?

I like rational behaviour. I prefer an economic system that encourages rational behaviour.

So your point about coersion was what, exactly?

Merely that her freedom is being severely constrained.

Merely that her freedom is being severely constrained.
But not her freedom to choose. Just her freedom to have everything she wants, which we've already established is an unrealistic goal.

But not her freedom to choose. Just her freedom to have everything she wants, which we've already established is an unrealistic goal.

Nothing constrains your freedom to choose, except a mind control machine.

The fact that it's impossible for everyone to get everything they want doesn't mean that their capability to make their lives suit their preferences shouldn't be maximized.

Nothing constrains your freedom to choose, except a mind control machine.

The fact that it's impossible for everyone to get everything they want doesn't mean that their capability to make their lives suit their preferences shouldn't be maximized.
Do you have reason to believe it isn't currently? Or wouldn't be under libertarianism?

How about "Which one produces a society we like?"

That's always been the basis of my arguments for capitalism over socialism: capitalism does a better job of improving the lives of poor people.


Why does it matter what "we like" or what "[improves] the lives of poor people?"

I've a feeling there is a moral argument burried down under there somwhere, even if one does not wish to recognize or acknowledge it.

Do you have reason to believe it isn't currently? Or wouldn't be under libertarianism?

Yes. I've already explained how absolute property rights restrict people's freedom.

I've a feeling there is a moral argument burried down under there somwhere, even if one does not wish to recognize or acknowledge it.
It's about rational behaviour. We select that which we want to select.

I'm a global sceptic. I claim to have to knowledge of moral truths.

We select that which we want to select.


Obviously. The question is: Why do we want what we select? If I actually have the ability to choose between alternatives, then I must have some mechanism for drawing a distinction between said alternatives. This mechanism is what constitutes a moral framework. This is all that "morality" is: what I use to determine which is the "right" or "good" choice and which is the "wrong" or "bad" choice. To deny such a mechanism is to deny me the ability to choose between alternatives. Being a believer in free will and the necessary responsibility I bear for my behavior, naturally, I cannot accept such a conclusion.

Obviously. The question is: Why do we want what we select? If I actually have the ability to choose between alternatives, then I must have some mechanism for drawing a distinction between said alternatives. This mechanism is what constitutes a moral framework. This is all that "morality" is: what I use to determine which is the "right" or "good" choice and which is the "wrong" or "bad" choice. To deny such a mechanism is to deny me the ability to choose between alternatives. Being a believer in free will and the necessary responsibility I bear for my behavior, naturally, I cannot accept such a conclusion.
Do you prefer rice pudding with cinnamon, or without?

I prefer mine without. Was that a moral judgement I just made? No, it was based on my preference.

Do you prefer rice pudding with cinnamon, or without?

I prefer mine without. Was that a moral judgement I just made? No, it was based on my preference.

First, false analogy.

Somehow, you've gone from discussing matters that impact an entire society (for example, "socialism" vs. "capitalism:" http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=11484267&postcount=21 ) to discussing matters that effect only the individual (rice pudding). The two situations are, obviously, not comparable. As such, whether or not a decision regarding rice pudding constitutes a "moral judgement" is completely irrevelant to the issue of whether social/political decisions are based in morality. (edit: of course, characterizing a decision over something as incredibly inconcequential and harmless as rice pudding as a moral dillema is silly. Matters of society, economics, and politics, however, are not so inconcequential or harmless, thus the moral dillema in that case is real and serious.)

Second, morality can be and is often based on or influenced by personal preference. This is why homo sapiens sapiens presents many different competing systems of morality. Which system one chooses is indeed dependent on personal preference. But the system of morality is still there and operating.

Yes. I've already explained how absolute property rights restrict people's freedom.
Are you free to hit someone without provocation? Yes. Is that something morally correct? No.

So is limiting freedom necessarily bad? No.

I don't happen to have an economics textbook handy.

But nothing I've said about Homo economicus has required that it be based in anything other than rational self-interest. Perhaps you're defining self-interest too narrowly.

no, i'm defining it as its defined in every book and article i've seen.

But that's part of our preferences.

no, i'm talking about stuff that takes place despite ourselves. if we were better able to control such things (using that new-fangled neocortex thing that allows us such reflectiveness) we would behave much more rationally, at least some of the time.

I hate dealing with people. I'll put myself at tremendous personal and professional risk to avoid dealing with people. Because I hate dealing with people that much.

Otherwise, I'd just suck it up and deal with them.

that is not really at all like what i'm talking about. i'm talking more about the fact that you personally would very probably kill someone if a dude in a lab coat said you "had to", despite the fact that you don't want to kill them, despite the fact that your mind and body would show enormous strain while you did it, despite the fact that you would feel absolutely awful during and after, despite the fact that there is no benefit to you, and despite the fact that the dude in the lab coat has no means to force you to comply or punish you if you don't.

Or, put more abstractly, how could you possibly hold an opinion if you didn't know why you held it?

very easily - it happens all the time. i'd guess that most opinions anyone holds aren't held for readily accesible reasons, let alone good ones.

but that also isn't really what we're talking about. this is more about actions in direct contradiction to what you know is best, to what you think you really want, to what you prefer.

I like rational behaviour. I prefer an economic system that encourages rational behaviour.

so do i. doesn't mean that we should go around pretending such behavior actually is and continuing to use models that incorrectly predict behavior in both the real world and lab experiments

How about "Which one produces a society we like?"Actually, upon reflection, this being the basis for libertarianism is much more intellectually appealing than a basis which is supposedly based upon logic.

Say--aren't groups comprised of individuals?

Not only that, but don't they voluntarily associate, each individual deciding on his own?Certainly. However, with groups, in order for the individuals to come to an agreement, there almost necessarily has to be a compromise. This results in an arrangement which is probably not going to be the same arrangement that an individual would make with another individual.

With that said, I'm not opposed to all trade between individuals; it's just that in my opinion an ideal system should minimize it.

What on earth gave you the idea that unlimited property rights account for all violations of freedom? What if I own no property? If property rights are supreme, wouldn't that mean I have no rights?Close. It would be a better argument to say that differing levels of property mean that there is a different set of rights for everyone in a system based upon property rights.

There is no real basis for coming to either of those conclusions.

My main concern is that I agree to the deal.I suppose that would be working the opposite of what I said, which would also be fine; nonetheless, there is a point of agreement.

Certainly. However, with groups, in order for the individuals to come to an agreement, there almost necessarily has to be a compromise.
No.


Close. It would be a better argument to say that differing levels of property mean that there is a different set of rights for everyone in a system based upon property rights.
Non sequitur.

First, false analogy.

Somehow, you've gone from discussing matters that impact an entire society (for example, "socialism" vs. "capitalism:" http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=11484267&postcount=21 ) to discussing matters that effect only the individual (rice pudding). The two situations are, obviously, not comparable. As such, whether or not a decision regarding rice pudding constitutes a "moral judgement" is completely irrevelant to the issue of whether social/political decisions are based in morality. (edit: of course, characterizing a decision over something as incredibly inconcequential and harmless as rice pudding as a moral dillema is silly. Matters of society, economics, and politics, however, are not so inconcequential or harmless, thus the moral dillema in that case is real and serious.)
But then you're presupposing tha tthe choice between captalism and socialism is a moral one, which is exactly what I'm denying. I don't think the preference between capitalism and socialism necessarily must be moral in cause.

Second, morality can be and is often based on or influenced by personal preference. This is why homo sapiens sapiens presents many different competing systems of morality. Which system one chooses is indeed dependent on personal preference. But the system of morality is still there and operating.
How then is that a system of morality. If it is based on personal preference, doesn't it lack prescriptive force? I'd consider prescriptive force a necessary characteristic of any moral assertion.

Actually, upon reflection, this being the basis for libertarianism is much more intellectually appealing than a basis which is supposedly based upon logic.
Logic is all well and good, but you need to be able to support your base assertions: the starting point from which the reasoning springs. I suggest "that which produces the outcomes we like" as that starting point. Then all we have to do is follow the data and find out which social structure that is.

If it matters, measure it.

no, i'm talking about stuff that takes place despite ourselves.
I can't imagine what such things might be.

that is not really at all like what i'm talking about. i'm talking more about the fact that you personally would very probably kill someone if a dude in a lab coat said you "had to", despite the fact that you don't want to kill them, despite the fact that your mind and body would show enormous strain while you did it, despite the fact that you would feel absolutely awful during and after, despite the fact that there is no benefit to you, and despite the fact that the dude in the lab coat has no means to force you to comply or punish you if you don't.
Why would I do that? That would be stupid.

very easily - it happens all the time. i'd guess that most opinions anyone holds aren't held for readily accesible reasons, let alone good ones.
That's completely irrational behaviour. If people do behave that way (and I'll agree they probably do) I have considerably less concern for their welfare.

A society that encourages rational behaviour - that punishes people for being idiots - can help fix that.

but that also isn't really what we're talking about. this is more about actions in direct contradiction to what you know is best, to what you think you really want, to what you prefer.
How can I not know what I want? This knowledge exists only within my head. I'm uniquely qualified to recover it.

What I think I should want is a different thing.

so do i. doesn't mean that we should go around pretending such behavior actually is and continuing to use models that incorrectly predict behavior in both the real world and lab experiments
Which is why I want to measure their behaviour. Let's find out what they actually do.

Why would I do that? That would be stupid.

indeed it would. but every time they ran the experiment, about 65% of people would 'kill' the person, and essentially everybody would 'severely hurt' the person multiple times before those that did quit actually did.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment

indeed it would. but every time they ran the experiment, about 65% of people would 'kill' the person, and essentially everybody would 'severely hurt' the person multiple times before those that did quit actually did.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment
You did oversimplify that. It wasn't that these individuals were dominated by the labcoats, it was that people saw these labcoats as legitimate sources of authority who knew what they were doing. It was part of a "test" for better teaching techniques and I recognize that I would have probably gone all the way simply because I believe that better teaching techniques are important and because I am not an expert in that field. Rather than an argument against freedom though, this test is more of an argument for more freedom as the Milgram experiment in practice comes from its practice by statists such as the Nazis. The fact that power can be cruelly manipulated is the greatest argument for the decentralization of power which is a concept at the heart of libertarianism.

I don't think the preference between capitalism and socialism necessarily must be moral in cause.


I must have a reason for choosing one over the other (otherwise I may as well be a mindless automaton), and a moral framework is nothing more than that which I utilize for making such a choice.

Rice pudding doesn't count because that particular choice is of such incredibly insignificant concequence that constructing an entire moral framework in order to determine whether I like cinnamon is just an absurd waste of time. In that case, yes, it is simply a matter of personal taste or preference.

However, the choice of economic or political systems has far greater impact, not only on myself but on the rest of society. Thus, out of fear and respect for the liberty and safety of those around me, taking responsibility for my actions as a free individual, I must take the time to seriously construct a framework that will allow me to make the best decision. Even if the laws of the cosmos do not in some objective way require a moral cause, I will still take the time to develop and think about one simply becuase this is very deadly business, and I fear what I am capable of doing. To chalk it all up to personal preference (fashion?) entirely, not even attempting to determine whether one's personal choice is actually the correct or good choice, seems to me analogous to failing to comprehend or appreciate the gravity of the situation. (edit: I do not assume that my free choice is instantly right or good simply because I am a free individual; this appears to be the mistake that the total focus on personal preference commits. We have a responsibility to ensure that our free choice does not impede the equally free choices of other individuals, otherwise the liberty of each is in peril. <--- thus, with only two sentences, I have already constructed a moral framework.)


If it is based on personal preference, doesn't it lack prescriptive force?


Not at all. We may disagree on which moral framework to use, but there are plenty of constructive and peaceful means for resolving this conflict. This discussion, voluntary education, and peaceful persuasion are all examples. The democratic process also provides the norms and institutions that make such possible. And besides that, we will probably find that we agree more than we disagree on many issues (the moral status of such behaviors as murder, robbery, and other things that government ought to prevent people from doing). Yes, disagreement will require compromise, but the end result can still enjoy prescriptive force.

Rather than an argument against freedom

why on earth would i make such an argument?

indeed it would. but every time they ran the experiment, about 65% of people would 'kill' the person, and essentially everybody would 'severely hurt' the person multiple times before those that did quit actually did.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment
The test presupposes that those people would prefer not to kill the participants in the other room under those circumstances. They've been assured that they will face no consequences for the outcome, plus they're being paid. Furthermore, they don't see what's happening in the other room, so they have plausible deniability. All of the basic social safeguards that make us get along have been removed. Who's to say that most people really aren't that evil, in the absence of the stick of authority telling them otherwise?

I don't like your application of the Milgram experiment to this discussion.

But let's ignore that for a moment. Let's suppose I completely agree with those findings. So what? If I prefer rational behaviour, but am aware most people exhibit irrational behaviour, shouldn't I prefer a society that encourages rational behaviour as a sort of social engineering?

why on earth would i make such an argument?
I am just uncertain of your use of the Milgram experiment. It just doesn't seem very natural as you misrepresented it and then made it almost seem that individuals were forced by it. When you first made the argument you made it seem like some random dude in a lab coat was distributing knives and telling people to use them to cause pain.

I must have a reason for choosing one over the other (otherwise I may as well be a mindless automaton), and a moral framework is nothing more than that which I utilize for making such a choice.
Of course you must have a reason. But you've gone further than that, and asserted that your reason must be based on morality, and I don't see how that's necessary.

Rice pudding doesn't count because that particular choice is of such incredibly insignificant concequence that constructing an entire moral framework in order to determine whether I like cinnamon is just an absurd waste of time. In that case, yes, it is simply a matter of personal taste or preference.
And thus demonstrates that not all decisions require moral grounding, thus raising the possibility that the initial choice doesn't not require moral grounding.

However, the choice of economic or political systems has far greater impact, not only on myself but on the rest of society.
And thus you choose that which you prefer for the rest of society. I'm not saying you'll always pick what's best for you, because you might care more about society than that.

Thus, out of fear and respect for the liberty and safety of those around me, taking responsibility for my actions as a free individual, I must take the time to seriously construct a framework that will allow me to make the best decision.
Because that matters to you.

Even if the laws of the cosmos do not in some objective way require a moral cause, I will still take the time to develop and think about one simply becuase this is very deadly business, and I fear what I am capable of doing. To chalk it all up to personal preference (fashion?) entirely, not even attempting to determine whether one's personal choice is actually the correct or good choice, seems to me analogous to failing to comprehend or appreciate the gravity of the situation.
And there you again presuppose the necessity of a moral grounding for your decision.

(edit: I do not assume that my free choice is instantly right or good simply because I am a free individual; this appears to be the mistake that the total focus on personal preference commits. We have a responsibility to ensure that our free choice does not impede the equally free choices of other individuals, otherwise the liberty of each is in peril. <--- thus, with only two sentences, I have already constructed a moral framework.)
But you need not have done so. I could just as easily say that I prefer others not be able to limit my personal freedom, and then conclude the best way to ensure that is to limit anyone's ability to limit anyone's personal freedom. Voila - free society in the absence of moral grounding.

Alternately, if I'm genuinely concerned with the welfare of others, I can make decisions to safeguard them. But it's still all based on personal preference.

Not at all. We may disagree on which moral framework to use, but there are plenty of constructive and peaceful means for resolving this conflict. This discussion, voluntary education, and peaceful persuasion are all examples. The democratic process also provides the norms and institutions that make such possible. And besides that, we will probably find that we agree more than we disagree on many issues (the moral status of such behaviors as murder, robbery, and other things that government ought to prevent people from doing). Yes, disagreement will require compromise, but the end result can still enjoy prescriptive force.
But if your moral code is based on your preferences (rather than something which actually affects me), why do I care what it is? And isn't that, then, a lack of prescriptivity?

I cannot imagine a circumstance under which an agent, when choosing between A and B, prefers B but chooses A.

It's actually rather simple. Every firefighter, police officer, soldier, or private citizen who runs into the fire, into the spray of bullets, or into whatever other dangerous situation despite the biological and instinctual imperative (preference?) for preserving one's own life first. In such situations, such people put what is best for others ahead of what is best for themselves; such people potentially pay the maximum cost for other's gain.

But you've gone further than that, and asserted that your reason must be based on morality, and I don't see how that's necessary.


Morality is nothing more than determining what is "correct," "right," or "good." Why would I make a particular choice if I didn't believe it was "correct," "right," or "good?"


And thus demonstrates that not all decisions require moral grounding, thus raising the possibility that the initial choice doesn't not require moral grounding.


But I don't assert that all decisions require moral grounding. When the result of the choice is completely and totally isolated to the individual so choosing, whether this choice is "correct," or "good" becomes irrevelant. When the result of the choice, however, is necessarily shared among individuals, the moral dilemma is most certainly relevant.


And there you again presuppose the necessity of a moral grounding for your decision.


I wasn't "presupposing" so much I as was attempting to provide a reason for why the necessity for moral framework comes into existance. If the only factor is personal preference, then I can simply claim that it is my personal preference that I be able to execute random individuals for no particular reason. This is my choice, and what right has anyone else to say otherwise? There must be some factor outside of myself that prevents me from behaving as such, some factor that determines that my choice is not good or correct. Otherwise, social interaction amounts to nothing more than survival of the fittest, and any talk of individuals, liberty, rights, or anything else becomes moot.


I could just as easily say that I prefer others not be able to limit my personal freedom, and then conclude the best way to ensure that is to limit anyone's ability to limit anyone's personal freedom.


Emphasis above is mine.

By determining what is the best way to ensure your freedom, you have determined what is the "correct" or "good" choice and course of action, a course of action which must necessarily be enforced on the rest of society beyond each individual's personal preference or choice. And of course, why do you prefer that others not limit your personal freedom? Because you've determined that such limitation is neither "correct" or "good."

Congratulations, you've constructed a moral framework and made a moral decision.


But if your moral code is based on your preferences (rather than something which actually affects me), why do I care what it is?


A moral code is not based entirely on personal preferences; personal preferences are only one of many factors that influence the process of creating a moral framework. It is also entirely possible to construct a moral framework based on objective criteria: the historical record shows objectively that capitalism is far more productive than socialism, thus captialism is the "correct," "good," or "moral" choice; murder prevents an individual from exercising his or her liberty or free will in an ultimate and irreversable way, thus murder is "incorrect," "bad," or "immoral" behavior.

It's actually rather simple. Every firefighter, police officer, soldier, or private citizen who runs into the fire, into the spray of bullets, or into whatever other dangerous situation despite the biological and instinctual imperative (preference?) for preserving one's own life first. In such situations, such people put what is best for others ahead of what is best for themselves; such people potentially pay the maximum cost for other's gain.
What you prefer is demonstrated by your actions, though. Those people prefer to do their jobs/save others at the risk of their own lives.

It's actually rather simple. Every firefighter, police officer, soldier, or private citizen who runs into the fire, into the spray of bullets, or into whatever other dangerous situation despite the biological and instinctual imperative (preference?) for preserving one's own life first. In such situations, such people put what is best for others ahead of what is best for themselves; such people potentially pay the maximum cost for other's gain.

Because they prefer that others not suffer. One's preferences do not have to be selfish.

It is also entirely possible to construct a moral framework based on objective criteria: the historical record shows objectively that capitalism is far more productive than socialism, thus captialism is the "correct," "good," or "moral" choice;

Why, on a purely objective level, is productivity "correct," "good," or "moral"? I would ask the same question, reversed, about denial of free will.

What you prefer is demonstrated by your actions, though.


Not necessarily. As Free Soviets was arguing earlier, any number of physiological conditions or illness may cause me act in ways that, absent such pathological causes, I would not normally prefer to act. Yes, I agree that individuals possess free will (although our current knowledge of the operation of the human brain and mind requires me to characterize my belief as an assumption), however, that free will can be temporarily or even permanently damaged or disabled; our brains ultimately operate according to the objective and deterministic laws of physics and biology, after all.


Those people prefer to do their jobs/save others at the risk of their own lives.

True, however, in this specific case, that preference necessarily requires being willing to pay an extremely high (if not the highest possible) price for no gain to one's self (I don't see how the satisfaction of helping one's fellow man has any meaning if one is dead, for instance). As such, these occupations at least appear to require behavior that is in direct contradiction to the assertion that human beings seek to maximize gain in pursuit of goals at minimal cost. There appear to be plenty of examples where this is not necessarily the case.

Why, on a purely objective level, is productivity "correct," "good," or "moral"? I would ask the same question, reversed, about denial of free will.

I intended the statement only to serve as a possible example; I was not necessarily making a factual statement. Of course, in the course of trying to determine what is an objective fact there will be much controversy and debate.

At any rate, I could argue that productivity is "correct," "good," or "moral" as it enables society to amass the resources necessary for securing sustenance for its individual members to a greater extent. Even the historically "socialist" or "communist" societies recognized this simple fact, even if their specific attempts to enhance productivity were not necessarily successful (not all such attempts within "capitalist" societies are necessarily successful either).

I intended the statement only to serve as a possible example; I was not necessarily making a factual statement. Of course, in the course of trying to determine what is an objective fact there will be much controversy and debate.

I am not challenging the contention that productivity is a good thing. I agree that it's a good thing.

I am challenging the contention that productivity is somehow objectively good so as to make economic systems that maximize it also objectively good.

At any rate, I could argue that productivity is "correct," "good," or "moral" as it enables society to amass the resources necessary for securing sustinence for its individual members to a greater extent.

You're only adding another link to the chain. Why is sustenence an objectively good thing? What if I think that humanity is intrinsically evil and should starve to death, and thus that sustenance for humans is a bad thing? On what basis can you label my point of view objectively false?

Ultimately, it comes down to different moral preferences. Creating a "moral framework based on objective criteria" is impossible without references to subjective moral preferences as well.

Not necessarily. As Free Soviets was arguing earlier, any number of physiological conditions or illness may cause me act in ways that, absent such pathological causes, I would not normally prefer to act.
Those are "extraordinary" cases, and, as such, not worth dealing with, since they are not ceteris paribus. However, in those cases, you still did prefer what you did. Any other statement is schizophrenic.


True, however, in this specific case, that preference necessarily requires being willing to pay an extremely high (if not the highest possible) price for no gain to one's self (I don't see how the satisfaction of helping one's fellow man has any meaning if one is dead, for instance). As such, these occupations at least appear to require behavior that is in direct contradiction to the assertion that human beings seek to maximize gain in pursuit of goals at minimal cost. There appear to be plenty of examples where this is not necessarily the case.
I don't see why humans must act that way all the time.

However, in those cases, you still did prefer what you did. Any other statement is schizophrenic.


This I don't understand. How can I possibly "prefer" a particular action or behavior if said action or behavior is not the result of the operation of my free will, free will being the mechanism that allows me to make a choice and thus express my preferences? (edit: and at any rate, the exceptional cases at least intoduce the possibility that my behavior at any given time is not necessarily the result of a free choice, and is thus not necessarily an expression of my preferences)



I don't see why humans must act that way all the time.


But of course. Neither do I, in either case.

I am challenging the contention that productivity is somehow objectively good so as to make economic systems that maximize it also objectively good.


True, one single factor (productivity) does not necessarily demonstrate that a particular economic system is objectively good entirely. However, it does help provide evidence of that conclusion. Of course, other factors must be taken into consideration as well.


You're only adding another link to the chain. Why is sustenence an objectively good thing?


Because the objective laws of nature, operating outside of the perferences of any individual or group thereof, have made securing my own survival an instinctual imperative. Securing maximum sustenence serves to satisfy that objective imperative.


Creating a "moral framework based on objective criteria" is impossible without references to subjective moral preferences as well.

I don't claim that subjective considerations have no place in the process ("personal preferences are only one of many factors that influence the process of creating a moral framework."). I only claim that they are not sufficient alone.

This I don't understand. How can I possibly "prefer" a particular action or behavior if said action or behavior is not the result of the operation of my free will, free will being the mechanism that allows me to make a choice and thus express my preferences?
Just because you're ill doesn't mean you didn't have free will. Now if you want to try to deal with a minute exception as the standard, that's rather stupid. Also, to say that it introduces the possibility all the time is rather like religious epistemic skepticism--a mental masturbatory dead-end that doesn't get you off.

True, one single factor (productivity) does not necessarily demonstrate that a particular economic system is objectively good entirely. However, it does help provide evidence of that conclusion. Of course, other factors must be taken into consideration as well.

Yes, but that wasn't my point. Even if capitalism maximizes productivity while still equaling or surpassing every other economic system in every respect, that still doesn't prove that it's the best system.

Because the objective laws of nature, operating outside of the perferences of any individual or group thereof, have made securing my own survival an instinctual imperative. Securing maximum sustenence serves to satisfy that objective imperative.

The fact that it is "instinctual" only means that the desire exists objectively, not the moral imperative. That is to say, we may indeed instinctually wish to secure maximum sustenance, but that in itself doesn't mean that we ought to secure maximum sustenance.

If a certain creature "instinctually" desires that all other sentient beings should be annihilated, does that make the annihilation of all other sentient beings a moral imperative?

I don't claim that subjective considerations have no place in the process ("personal preferences are only one of many factors that influence the process of creating a moral framework."). I only claim that they are not sufficient alone.

Every moral framework ultimately depends on subjective considerations. Even if you accept that an ethical system can be established on the basis of rationality - something I happen to reject - it is still based on the subjective preference for choosing rational options over irrational ones.

Just because you're ill doesn't mean you didn't have free will.


It does if the ilness is of such a nature that I am prevented from the ability of making concious choices.


Now if you want to try to deal with a minute exception as the standard, that's rather stupid.


That would be rather stupid, which is why I'm not doing that. What I am doing is simply stating that it is something that needs to be considered, and that occurances of such minute exceptions, while rare, nonetheless provide evidence that a human being is capable of having his free will impared or destroyed.


Also, to say that it introduces the possibility all the time is rather like religious epistemic skepticism--a mental masturbatory dead-end that doesn't get you off.

If anything, acknowledging the possibility is doing nothing more than acknowledging the existance of objective empirical evidence that shows that human illness or injury can often arise suddenly and without warning (see also brain aneurysms, tumors, hormonal irregularities resulting in involuntary and even dangerous behavior, traffic accidents and other blunt force trauma, etc) or even without any knowledge or fault of the affected individual (mental impairment, birth defects, etc). It is even theorized that many cases of criminal, anti-social, or otherwise undesirable behavior results from such medical or genetic conditions that an individual is otherwise unaware of. I agree that even so such an individual is still responsible for their behavior, as they potentially pose dangers that must be dealt with regardless of fault or knowledge, however, it cannot be claimed that such individuals necessarily prefer such behavior when control of that behavior is impared or completely absent.

If anything constitues a "masturbatory dead-end" it is insisting on having the ability to convieniently ignore cases that do not support one's position.

Yes, but that wasn't my point. Even if capitalism maximizes productivity while still equaling or surpassing every other economic system in every respect, that still doesn't prove that it's the best system.


But I'm not necessarily looking for the best system, so much as I am looking for a moral system.


The fact that it is "instinctual" only means that the desire exists objectively, not the moral imperative. That is to say, we may indeed instinctually wish to secure maximum sustenance, but that in itself doesn't mean that we ought to secure maximum sustenance.


I suppose I was assuming that if the process of evolution has produced an instinct that serves to secure the survival of the species, and that the instinct has been successful in doing so, it is probably safe to conclude that one ought to continue to pursue the goal in question.


If a certain creature "instinctually" desires that all other sentient beings should be annihilated, does that make the annihilation of all other sentient beings a moral imperative?


An interesting thought experiment, however, again, taking my understanding of how nature and evolution actually work, I cannot see a real example of any species which actually operates as described. Instead, the observed evidence indicates that while the natural processes necessarily lead to the destruction of individuals, overall the instinctual imperitive present in each species actually results in the establishment of homeostasis and balance, not annihilation.

At any rate, if such a creature did exist, then its moral imperative would obviously be in conflict with that of its target. This, however, does not remove the existance or necessity of moral imperative. Again, conflict does not preclude objective morality, it simply draws in question which morality is in fact the objective one. We can disagree on how many grains of sand rest on a beach; this conflict, however, does not mean that there isn't in fact an exact number of grains, whatever it happens to be.

It does if the ilness is of such a nature that I am prevented from the ability of making concious choices.
Again: an extraordinary case.


That would be rather stupid, which is why I'm not doing that. What I am doing is simply stating that it is something that needs to be considered, and that occurances of such minute exceptions, while rare, nonetheless provide evidence that a human being is capable of having his free will impared or destroyed.
Ummmm....so?


If anything, acknowledging the possibility is doing nothing more than acknowledging the existance of objective empirical evidence that shows that human illness or injury can often arise suddenly and without warning (see also brain aneurysms, tumors, hormonal irregularities resulting in involuntary and even dangerous behavior, traffic accidents and other blunt force trauma, etc) or even without any knowledge or fault of the affected individual (mental impairment, birth defects, etc). It is even theorized that many cases of criminal, anti-social, or otherwise undesirable behavior results from such medical or genetic conditions that an individual is otherwise unaware of. I agree that even so such an individual is still responsible for their behavior, as they potentially pose dangers that must be dealt with regardless of fault or knowledge, however, it cannot be claimed that such individuals necessarily prefer such behavior when control of that behavior is impared or completely absent.
Ummmmm....so?


If anything constitues a "masturbatory dead-end" it is insisting on having the ability to convieniently ignore cases that do not support one's position.
No one's doing that.

Ummmm....so?


Both cases call into question the idea that a human being always in control of their behavior. Both cases provide evidence that it is possible to deprive a human being of his or her free will (either accidently or even on purpose). As such, both cases demonstrate that it is not necessarily true that a human being always prefers the choices that he or she makes.

In fact, another case demonstrating the above is purposeful psychological manipulation, either via propaganda, torture, brainwashing, or even such phenomena as Stockholm's Syndrome.

All of these cases, even if relatively rare, demonstrate that it is possible to cause human beings to do what they would not otherwise prefer to do. Thus the idea that a human being always necessarily chooses their preference is clearly false. Edit: one contrary case is sufficient to disprove such an absolute claim, specifically this claim:


And utility maximisation is a necessary consequence of free will. If I choose A over B, I must[b] have preferred A. It's [b]not possible for me to have preferred B, else I would have chosen B.


Emphasis is mine.

But I'm not necessarily looking for the best system, so much as I am looking for a moral system.

I was using "best" as the superlative of "(morally) good."

I suppose I was assuming that if the process of evolution has produced an instinct that serves to secure the survival of the species, and that the instinct has been successful in doing so, it is probably safe to conclude that one ought to continue to pursue the goal in question.

Yes, you were. Why? Why should we assume that the correct moral imperatives are natural ones? Personally, I am of the opinion that a perfectly moral person is very much unnatural, and should be complimented for it. There are plenty of natural behavioral tendencies in humans that are rather abhorrent - say, our tendencies towards exclusion and irrational tribalism.

That was the point I was making with my example of the creature who instinctually sought the annihilation of all other sentient beings (that there is no reason to suppose that natural behaviors aren't morally abhorrent), but what you said in reply to that was interesting enough that it merits a digression from the point.

At any rate, if such a creature did exist, then its moral imperative would obviously be in conflict with that of its target. This, however, does not remove the existance or necessity of moral imperative. Again, conflict does not preclude objective morality, it simply draws in question which morality is in fact the objective one. We can disagree on how many grains of sand rest on a beach; this conflict, however, does not mean that there isn't in fact an exact number of grains, whatever it happens to be.

Firstly, no, it does not draw the question of "which morality is in fact the objective one." In fact, the basis of their moral imperatives would be the same (at least under your moral framework): "Act according to your instinctual desires."

Secondly, it is true that conflict does not preclude objective morality, but it does raise a question aside from "which morality is the correct one": if, in fact, we disagree so much on what is moral, in what sense can the objective morality be objective? It is true that people have disagreements all the time about objective things, but those disagreements mostly pertain, to the degree that they are objective, to empirical facts - for instance, the question of whether socialism or capitalism is preferable usually comes down to (except on NS) a question as to which is the more productive, which best satisfies the needs of the citizens, which produces more equality, etc.

Morality, at least at its base, cannot be empirical. Coming up with a moral imperative simply from the way things are is an unjustified leap of logic from the way things are to the way things out to be. As such, if we are to call it "objective," it must be objective in the sense the rules of logic are objective - it must be self-evident. If there is such great disagreement about morality, it follows that moral truth cannot be self-evident, and we are left with subjective preferences.

It wasn't that these individuals were dominated by the labcoats, it was that people saw these labcoats as legitimate sources of authority who knew what they were doing.

and the screams of pain and terror or the demands to make it stop didn't get in the way

The fact that power can be cruelly manipulated is the greatest argument for the decentralization of power which is a concept at the heart of libertarianism.

yeah, and?

But let's ignore that for a moment. Let's suppose I completely agree with those findings. So what? If I prefer rational behaviour, but am aware most people exhibit irrational behaviour, shouldn't I prefer a society that encourages rational behaviour as a sort of social engineering?

what does that have to do with the argument we're having?

I was using "best" as the superlative of "(morally) good."


Understood. This is why I attempted to separate the concepts of "best" and "moral." "Best," for instance, could be understood to mean nothing more than "most productive."


Yes, you were. Why? Why should we assume that the correct moral imperatives are natural ones?


I suppose becaue I observe the universe and what it contains and am highly impressed with what nature and its laws have accomplished. Perfection? Of course not. Even so, the functionality that does exist is rather astonishing.


Personally, I am of the opinion that a perfectly moral person is very much unnatural, and should be complimented for it.


Sadly, upon initial inspection, this does appear to be the case.


That there is no reason to suppose that natural behaviors aren't morally abhorrent


I am willing to concede the point that there is no reason to suppose that a natural behaviors is necessarily moral. However, in my attempt to discover an objective basis, I can not, at the moment, think of another valid starting point. Again, I am left with the dilemma, that if "morality" is simply a matter of subjective desire, any number of equally morally abhorrent behavior can be perfectly justified simply because the individual chooses it.


If there is such great disagreement about morality, it follows that moral truth cannot be self-evident, and we are left with subjective preferences.


Disagreement only indicates our ignorance of the self-evident. Before Galileo and Newton, it was "self-evident" that the sun revolved around the earth and we were the center of the universe. Once relieved of our ignorance, however, the genuine "self-evident" truth became obvious.

I am willing to concede the point that there is no reason to suppose that a natural behaviors is necessarily moral. However, in my attempt to discover an objective basis, I can not, at the moment, think of another valid starting point. Again, I am left with the dilemma, that if "morality" is simply a matter of subjective desire, any number of equally morally abhorrent behavior can be perfectly justified simply because the individual chooses it.

The problem is that you're making morality subjective without making justification subjective. Even with subjective morality, I can still judge an action to be unjustified; it is merely subjectively unjustified, that is, it violates what I take to be the proper moral duty. The fact that morality is subjective doesn't mean that I can't apply moral judgment universally; it just means that those judgments aren't objectively true (or false).

Disagreement only indicates our ignorance of the self-evident. Before Galileo and Newton, it was "self-evident" that the sun revolved around the earth and we were the center of the universe. Once relieved of our ignorance, however, the genuine "self-evident" truth became obvious.

You cannot be ignorant of the self-evident by the very nature of self-evidence. Neither the earth's revolution around the sun nor the sun's revolution around the Earth have ever been self-evident; both are contentions that we reject or accept on the basis of empirical evidence.

and the screams of pain and terror or the demands to make it stop didn't get in the way It was an experiment to see if pain affects ones ability to learn, so of course the subjects would have felt pain and like all people they wouldn't like pain. Ultimately the true subjects felt that they had a job to make sure that the experiment goes to completion. If the goal of the experiment includes causing pain then of course the fact that pain is caused shouldn't be a shocker to those participating.

yeah, and?
And what? It was a comment addressing the focus of these experiments in authoritarianism.

Both cases call into question the idea that a human being always in control of their behavior.
So?


Both cases provide evidence that it is possible to deprive a human being of his or her free will (either accidently or even on purpose). As such, both cases demonstrate that it is not necessarily true that a human being always prefers the choices that he or she makes.
We're dealing with ceteris paribus, not some tortured and twisted reasoning to make the exceptions the rules.

The fact that morality is subjective doesn't mean that I can't apply moral judgment universally; it just means that those judgments aren't objectively true (or false).


But it seems that if the judgement is being applied universally, it is in fact being treated as if it was objective in nature. Another individual may draw a subjective conclusion that is different than yours and then attempt to apply it universally. Who should be followed then? This is similar to the argument in favor of a monopoly of the use of force by the state, instead of relying on, as some propose, competition and privitization of the police, courts, and other law enforcement agencies. In such a situation, which law is the one society is supposed to follow, especially where the different choices are in direct conflict?

OK, fine. Suppose for the time being that morality is subjective. It still must necessarily be applied and enforced as if objective, or again we simply revert to whomever can apply the most force to get their way (which is essentially nature's survival of the fittest...even seeking the anihilation of any and all competitors).


You cannot be ignorant of the self-evident by the very nature of self-evidence.


Yeah, I actually regretted the wording of that response almost as soon as it was posted (unfortunately, for a while the forum server(s) appeared to go out to lunch). That point I was attempting was that conflict only demonstrates our ignorance. All we have to do is attempt to find an objective basis in order to resolve said conflict.

We're dealing with ceteris paribus, not some tortured and twisted reasoning to make the exceptions the rules.

Unfortunately, Llewdor's statement regarding his own specific case was being used to justify a generalized statement about all people. While we may be able to assume "all things being equal" in a specific case, this assumption is not safe when applied generally, where it is a simple observable fact that not all things are equal between all people in general. Thus, it seems to me that ceteris paribus is simply being invoked, in this case, to exclude inconvienient cases contrary to one's own position (asserting one's conclusion in a more or less circular fashion). Llewdor appeared to make an absolute claim about how all human beings behave when there is plenty of evidence that not all human beings behave in the way claimed.

Besides, explain to me how anyone is making "the exceptions the rules." I don't claim that no one ever prefers any choice. I simply claim that it is not necessarily true that one always prefers what is chosen.

Unfortunately, Llewdor's statement regarding his own specific case was being used to justify a generalized statement about all people. While we may be able to assume "all things being equal" in a specific case, this assumption is not safe when applied generally, where it is a simple observable fact that not all things are equal between all people in general.
Actually, it precisely IS safe applied generally, for generally a person is not mentally whacked. Unless, of course, you want to make the exception the rule.

But it seems that if the judgement is being applied universally, it is in fact being treated as if it was objective in nature. Another individual may draw a subjective conclusion that is different than yours and then attempt to apply it universally. Who should be followed then?

I should be followed, because I'm right.:)

She will say the same thing, of course. You will have to choose according to your preferences. There is no other basis for making the decision.

This is similar to the argument in favor of a monopoly of the use of force by the state, instead of relying on, as some propose, competition and privitization of the police, courts, and other law enforcement agencies. In such a situation, which law is the one society is supposed to follow, especially where the different choices are in direct conflict?

I think society ought to follow my law.

OK, fine. Suppose for the time being that morality is subjective. It still must necessarily be applied and enforced as if objective, or again we simply revert to whomever can apply the most force to get their way (which is essentially nature's survival of the fittest...even seeking the anihilation of any and all competitors).

Universality is not the same thing as objectivity. I can hold that moral duty is universal - that is, that everyone ought to undertake a certain course of action - without holding that this perspective is somehow objectively true.

Say, for instance, that I, as dictator of the planet, really loathe the idea of people eating apples. As such, I decree that anyone who eats an apple will die. My loathing for apples is subjective, unquestionably, but the nature of the sentiment nevertheless leads to a universal application. I am not merely troubled by me eating applies, I am troubled by anyone eating apples. There is still an "I" in there, though - it is me who is troubled, not some objective moral law.

Yeah, I actually regretted the wording of that response almost as soon as it was posted (unfortunately, for a while the forum server(s) appeared to go out to lunch).

I know the feeling. I usually need to change a few phrases after I post, and with Jolt being the way it is, that can be very annoying.

That point I was attempting was that conflict only demonstrates our ignorance. All we have to do is attempt to find an objective basis in order to resolve said conflict.

But if there were such an "objective basis," we would know it already.

As I've said, morality isn't empirical. It can't be, because then we will run into the is-ought problem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem). The principles of logic we accept also are focused on learning what is - we take things that are and derive from them other things that thus must be. If this shirt is completely black, it cannot be completely white as well.

We need a different framework entirely for "ought" (moral) statements, and if that framework is going to be objective, it will have to be based (like the principles of logic) on self-evident propositions. Since moral propositions are clearly not self-evident - we disagree rather widely about them - I doubt that it is possible to establish an objective system of morality.

Someone might argue that objective morality could conceivably exist, but be beyond the scope of the human mind. If this is the case, however, then I can always ask, "why should I care about what is 'objectively' moral?", and as soon as I can sanely and sincerely ask that question, it is no longer objective - it is dependent on our subjective preference for it over the other options.

Actually, it precisely IS safe applied generally, for generally a person is not mentally whacked.


Of course, this convienient assumption depends on a specific understanding of does or does not constitute "mentally whacked." Again, there is plenty of continuing and far from resolved debate among those who believe, for example, that criminal behavior is freely chosen versus those who believe that criminal behaivor is the result of mental illness. Since even individual personality, temperment, and other psychological traits will vary widely over the general population, even if not considered to be "mentally whacked" in nature, there is plenty of room for doubt.


Unless, of course, you want to make the exception the rule.


Or if one simply wants to counter Llewdor's generalization via a single specific case by pointing out all the other specific cases that cast doubt upon said generalization.

Of course, this convienient assumption depends on a specific understanding of does or does not constitute "mentally whacked."
No, for then you make everyone mentally whacked. And for all your protestations, all you're trying to do is that: claim everyone is mentally whacked. It's amazing just how blind you are to the reality of your statements.

No, for then you make everyone mentally whacked.

As far as I can tell, at most I'm claiming that it is possible that a specific case constitutes mental illness. Now, if a specific case can be examined and shown empirically to not be the result of mental illness, then the conclusion that the choice reflected preference is a safe one. Unfortunately, using the results of only one such specific case (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=11485705&postcount=60) (a case which happens to support the conclusion, by the way...) to generalize about the entire species precludes any such empirical determination (which is exactly why it was so generalized, in order to prevent access to contrary cases). Application of ceteris paribus, in such a situation, amounts to nothing more than "Assuming all the necessary conditions exist in order to make my claim true, ignoring all those cases where they don't exist, my claim is true."

c = 2πr.

No.What groups do you belong to where everyone has the exact same preferences?

Non sequitur.Not at all. The defense of the right to property typically takes the form of it enabling the exercise of other rights; you can't take my computer away because it helps me exercise my freedom of speech; so taking my computer away violates not only my right to property but also my freedom of speech. This makes sense, as rights don't exist without the opportunity to exercise them. Therefore, by this logic, a person with a computer by definition has more freedom of speech (and therefore, more of a right to speech) than a person without one.

Logic is all well and good, but you need to be able to support your base assertions: the starting point from which the reasoning springs. I suggest "that which produces the outcomes we like" as that starting point. Then all we have to do is follow the data and find out which social structure that is.

If it matters, measure it.Oh, I understand, and that's fine. To argue against such a thing, I would have to either say that it isn't what you think it is that leads to the outcome that you like, or that more people dislike the outcome than like it, so your system shouldn't be implemented.

As far as I can tell, at most I'm claiming that it is possible that a specific case constitutes mental illness.
From what I read, you're trying to claim that every case could be mental illness---and that any action which doesn't fit your preconceived notions is a sign thereof.

What groups do you belong to where everyone has the exact same preferences?
Don't have to have the same preferences. But that doesn't mean a compromise has to be reached.


Not at all. The defense of the right to property typically takes the form of it enabling the exercise of other rights; you can't take my computer away because it helps me exercise my freedom of speech; so taking my computer away violates not only my right to property but also my freedom of speech.
Fuck too it does. You still have a larynx, right? You still have hands, right? Hands that can write.

Taking your computer would be a violation of property rights, not of freedom of speech.


This makes sense, as rights don't exist without the opportunity to exercise them.
You and I are on an otherwise deserted island. You want to play chess. I say no. Therefore, by your reasoning, I have violated your rights, since I am preventing you from exercising them by saying no.

Don't have to have the same preferences. But that doesn't mean a compromise has to be reached.In most cases, it does.

Fuck too it does. You still have a larynx, right? You still have hands, right? Hands that can write. I didn't say that I was completely unable to exercise my freedom of speech, I said that someone with a computer would be more able to do so.

Taking your computer would be a violation of property rights, not of freedom of speech.It would be both (in a society with both).

You and I are on an otherwise deserted island. You want to play chess. I say no. Therefore, by your reasoning, I have violated your rights, since I am preventing you from exercising them by saying no.It isn't a given that I would have the right to play chess in such a situation. (I could also play chess my myself.)

In most cases, it does.
It's not necessary.


I didn't say that I was completely unable to exercise my freedom of speech, I said that someone with a computer would be more able to do so.
Then if you didn't have one in the first place, you would need to be given one so that you could be equal.


It would be both (in a society with both).
Wrong.


It isn't a given that I would have the right to play chess in such a situation. (I could also play chess my myself.)
Now you understand the problem of your above statement.

It's not necessary.No, not necessary, just usually necessary.

Then if you didn't have one in the first place, you would need to be given one so that you could be equal.Yes, or at least access to one.



Wrong.Right. So are you saying that chopping somebody's legs off doesn't also violate their freedom of movement, in addition to the harms inflicted upon them?

Now you understand the problem of your above statement.It isn't a given that people would have property rights in a society with property rights? Or just that it isn't a given that rights would be equal for everyone?

Yes, or at least access to one.
No, that's positive rights--which do not exist.


Right. So are you saying that chopping somebody's legs off doesn't also violate their freedom of movement, in addition to the harms inflicted upon them?
I'm saying that if you lock your house, you violate people's freedom of movement.


It isn't a given that people would have property rights in a society with property rights? Or just that it isn't a given that rights would be equal for everyone?
It isn't a given that there are positive rights.

But you do: yourself.

Please think before you post.

1. The concept of self-ownership is the most absurd concept i have ever heard. I AM myself, I don't own myself!

2. Even so, If this concept of self ownership is made a reality, wouldn't that mean I might have to sell myself into slavery to pay a debt? Then i merely become the property of someone else. And if I am owned by someone else, wouldn't that mean that I have no rights or liberties?

3. What about children? Do their parents own them since they are still minors? Could their parents sell their children into slavery if property rights are given unlimited sway?

1. The concept of self-ownership is the most absurd concept i have ever heard. I [B]AM[/I] myself, I don't own myself!
Does one necessarily preclude the other?

2. Even so, If this concept of self ownership is made a reality, wouldn't that mean I might have to sell myself into slavery to pay a debt? Then i merely become the property of someone else. And if I am owned by someone else, wouldn't that mean that I have no rights or liberties?
Yes.

3. What about children? Do their parents own them since they are still minors? Could their parents sell their children into slavery if property rights are given unlimited sway?
I don't see why you'd claim that minors are owned by their parents. Minors own themselves, but as minors lack the power to consent to their own sale.

No, that's positive rights--which do not exist.
"Rights" only exist as a concept. It's one of their failings. They can be anything any redneck with a shotgun and a pair of repeat trespassers wants them to be.

I don't see why you'd claim that minors are owned by their parents. Minors own themselves, but as minors lack the power to consent to their own sale.

So the right to ownership is separate from the right to exchange?

So the right to ownership is separate from the right to exchange?
Not for adults.

Think of the children as being held in trust for their majority.

1. The concept of self-ownership is the most absurd concept i have ever heard.
That's too bad for you.


I AM myself, I don't own myself!
Yes you do.


2. Even so, If this concept of self ownership is made a reality, wouldn't that mean I might have to sell myself into slavery to pay a debt?
No.


3. What about children? Do their parents own them since they are still minors?
They are custodians/guardians.

No.
I think he should be permitted to sell himself into slavery to pay a debt.

I think he should be permitted to sell himself into slavery to pay a debt.
The trouble is: how does one collect on that.

"Rights" only exist as a concept. It's one of their failings. They can be anything any redneck with a shotgun and a pair of repeat trespassers wants them to be.
Logic exists only as a concept as well. Is that an undoing?

The trouble is: how does one collect on that.
I don't understand.

I don't understand.
I dunno, however, for your idea on slavery: do you mean a contract between 2 willing people for a pre-agreed period of servitude and conditions of servitude in exchange for a pre-agreed pay-out?

I dunno, however, for your idea on slavery: do you mean a contract between 2 willing people for a pre-agreed period of servitude and conditions of servitude in exchange for a pre-agreed pay-out?
Yeah, but I don't see why that pre-arranged period can't be permanent, as long as both parties agree.

No, that's positive rights--which do not exist.I'm not saying I accept this, but if I did that would leave you to either argue that people should have more rights and freedoms than others, or agree that property rights is a bogus way to structure society.

I'm saying that if you lock your house, you violate people's freedom of movement.True, however if everybody locks their house, everyone's freedom of movement is restricted equally, thus leaving people with an equal amount of freedom of movement.

It isn't a given that there are positive rights.It isn't a given that there are any rights.

I'm not saying I accept this, but if I did that would leave you to either argue that people should have more rights and freedoms than others, or agree that property rights is a bogus way to structure society.
No, it wouldn't.


True, however if everybody locks their house, everyone's freedom of movement is restricted equally, thus leaving people with an equal amount of freedom of movement.
But their freedom of movement is restricted. That is the main thing. And is it a bad thing?


It isn't a given that there are any rights.
And?

No, it wouldn't.Why wouldn't it?

But their freedom of movement is restricted. That is the main thing. And is it a bad thing?Not in and of itself, no, what is a bad thing is for some people to have more rights than others (aside from people who voluntarily give them up via violating the social contract.)

And?And I'm not sure where you were going with this argument.

Why wouldn't it?
Because neither case is correct. In the first case, you would have me argue that some are more equal than others. In the second case, you would have me deny reality.


Not in and of itself, no, what is a bad thing is for some people to have more rights than others (aside from people who voluntarily give them up via violating the social contract.)
That only happens when you believe in positive rights.


And I'm not sure where you were going with this argument.
S'your argument.

According to Murray Rothbard, the veritable founder of right-wing "anarchism," children are the "property of their parents" and can be sold as such. Don't believe, read the quote below from the Anarchist FAQ.

And it is interesting to note that even Murray Rothbard is not against the selling of humans. He argued that children are the property of their parents. They can (bar actually murdering them by violence) do whatever they please with them, even sell them on a "flourishing free child market." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 102] Combined with a whole hearted support for child labour (after all, the child can leave its parents if it objects to working for them) such a "free child market" could easily become a "child slave market" -- with entrepreneurs making a healthy profit selling infants to other entrepreneurs who could make profits from the toil of "their" children (and such a process did occur in 19th century Britain). Unsurprisingly, Rothbard ignores the possible nasty aspects of such a market in human flesh (such as children being sold to work in factories, homes and brothels). And, of course, such a market could see women "specialising" in producing children for it (the use of child labour during the Industrial Revolution actually made it economically sensible for families to have more children) and, perhaps, gluts and scarcities of babies due to changing market conditions. But this is besides the point.

According to Murray Rothbard, the veritable founder of right-wing "anarchism," children are the "property of their parents" and can be sold as such. Don't believe, read the quote below from the Anarchist FAQ.

First, have you read Robard's Ethics? He takes an ethical standing and applies it to children. I will freely admit that it leads to sticky situations that are morally appalling to us: child neglect, forcing a child to manage its own situation, and I will admit that I don't particularly care for it.

However, that blurb there does not actually address any of Rothbard's arguments and simply relies on stating some of Rothbard's opinions that on the surface (and even below the surface) would offend us.

How does the Anarchist FAQ deal with child/parental rights? How do you think we should deal with child/parental rights.

According to Murray Rothbard, the veritable founder of right-wing "anarchism," children are the "property of their parents" and can be sold as such. Don't believe, read the quote below from the Anarchist FAQ.
How about we read the entire chapter, so we don't have quote-mining from the stupid leftists who don't understand that left-anarchism is self-contradictory:

http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/fourteen.asp

Suppose now that the baby has been born. Then what? First, we may say that the parents—or rather the mother, who is the only certain and visible parent—as the creators of the baby become its owners. A newborn baby cannot be an existent self-owner in any sense. Therefore, either the mother or some other party or parties may be the baby’s owner, but to assert that a third party can claim his “ownership” over the baby would give that person the right to seize the baby by force from its natural or “homesteading” owner, its mother. The mother, then, is the natural and rightful owner of the baby, and any attempt to seize the baby by force is an invasion of her property right.

But surely the mother or parents may not receive the ownership of the child in absolute fee simple, because that would imply the bizarre state of affairs that a fifty-year old adult would be subject to the absolute and unquestioned jurisdiction of his seventy-year-old parent. So the parental property right must be limited in time. But it also must be limited in kind, for it surely would be grotesque for a libertarian who believes in the right of self-ownership to advocate the right of a parent to murder or torture his or her children.

We must therefore state that, even from birth, the parental ownership is not absolute but of a “trustee” or guardianship kind. In short, every baby as soon as it is born and is therefore no longer contained within his mother’s body possesses the right of self-ownership by virtue of being a separate entity and a potential adult. It must therefore be illegal and a violation of the child’s rights for a parent to aggress against his person by mutilating, torturing, murdering him, etc. On the other hand, the very concept of “rights” is a “negative” one, demarcating the areas of a person’s action that no man may properly interfere with. No man can therefore have a “right” to compel someone to do a positive act, for in that case the compulsion violates the right of person or property of the individual being coerced. Thus, we may say that a man has a right to his property (i.e., a right not to have his property invaded), but we cannot say that anyone has a “right” to a “living wage,” for that would mean that someone would be coerced into providing him with such a wage, and that would violate the property rights of the people being coerced. As a corollary this means that, in the free society, no man may be saddled with the legal obligation to do anything for another, since that would invade the former’s rights; the only legal obligation one man has to another is to respect the other man’s rights.

...

But when are we to say that this parental trustee jurisdiction over children shall come to an end? Surely any particular age (21,18, or whatever) can only be completely arbitrary. The clue to the solution of this thorny question lies in the parental property rights in their home. For the child has his full rights of self-ownership when he demonstrates that he has them in nature—in short, when he leaves or “runs away” from home. Regardless of his age, we must grant to every child the absolute right to runaway and to find new foster parents who will voluntarily adopt him, or to try to exist on his own. Parents may try to persuade the runaway child to return, but it is totally impermissible enslavement and an aggression upon his right of self-ownership for them to use force to compel him to return. The absolute right to run away is the child’s ultimate expression of his right of self-ownership, regardless of age.

Now if a parent may own his child (within the framework of non-aggression and runaway-freedom), then he may also transfer that ownership to someone else. He may give the child out for adoption, or he may sell the rights to the child in a voluntary contract. In short, we must face the fact that the purely free society will have a flourishing free market in children. Superficially, this sounds monstrous and inhuman. But closer thought will reveal the superior humanism of such a market. For we must realize that there is a market for children now, but that since the government prohibits sale of children at a price, the parents may now only give their children away to a licensed adoption agency free of charge.[12] This means that we now indeed have a child-market, but that the government enforces a maximum price control of zero, and restricts the market to a few privileged and therefore monopolistic agencies. The result has been a typical market where the price of the commodity is held by government far below the free-market price: an enormous “shortage” of the good. The demand for babies and children is usually far greater than the supply, and hence we see daily tragedies of adults denied the joys of adopting children by prying and tyrannical adoption agencies. In fact, we find a large unsatisfied demand by adults and couples for children, along with a large number of surplus and unwanted babies neglected or maltreated by their parents. Allowing a free market in children would eliminate this imbalance, and would allow for an allocation of babies and children away from parents who dislike or do not care for their children, and toward foster parents who deeply desire such children. Everyone involved: the natural parents, the children, and the foster parents purchasing the children, would be better off in this sort of society.[13]

In the libertarian society, then, the mother would have the absolute right to her own body and therefore to perform an abortion; and would have the trustee-ownership of her children, an ownership limited only by the illegality of aggressing against their persons and by their absolute right to run away or to leave home at any time. Parents would be able to sell their trustee-rights in children to anyone who wished to buy them at any mutually agreed price.

I think it helps to have context, don't you? Or do you feel, like the creationists do, that it's ok to quote-mine?

1. The concept of self-ownership is the most absurd concept i have ever heard. I AM myself, I don't own myself!

Are you saying that you shouldn't have the legal bundle of rights we call ownership?

Remember that ownership and rights are a relationship between people, not a relationship between people and things. So self-ownership implies the way you and others relate, not how you and yourself relates. Others are obliged to you, you are not obliged to yourself.

2. Even so, If this concept of self ownership is made a reality, wouldn't that mean I might have to sell myself into slavery to pay a debt? Then i merely become the property of someone else. And if I am owned by someone else, wouldn't that mean that I have no rights or liberties?

What do you think you do when you work for a living. And don't make the mistake to assume that it is wrong to work for a living by serving other people. If you want to have any sort of living you have to specialize, and to specialize you have to serve other people.

As for whether you have no rights are liberties, you have those rights specified within the contract.

How about we read the entire chapter, so we don't have quote-mining from the stupid leftists who don't understand that left-anarchism is self-contradictory:

http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/fourteen.asp

I think it helps to have context, don't you? Or do you feel, like the creationists do, that it's ok to quote-mine?

Do you think children should be left to fend for their own needs from birth? I see the logic in this, but are you willing to bite the bullet?

Don't bother answering. I will leave it up as a point, but remembering who you are, I don't need any three-word nonanswers.

Because neither case is correct. In the first case, you would have me argue that some are more equal than others. In the second case, you would have me deny reality.In the first case, that is the end result of property rights with varying levels of property between people. The second result is only true if you can demonstrate that reality would be altered without property rights.

That only happens when you believe in positive rights.Demonstrate how rights as I have suggested that they should be would lead to some people having more rights than others.

S'your argument.No, it was your counter argument that we were discussing.

How about we read the entire chapter, so we don't have quote-mining from the stupid leftists who don't understand that left-anarchism is self-contradictory:Except for the fact that it isn't.

The mother, then, is the natural and rightful owner of the baby, and any attempt to seize the baby by force is an invasion of her property right.

But it also must be limited in kind, for it surely would be grotesque for a libertarian who believes in the right of self-ownership to advocate the right of a parent to murder or torture his or her children.So then it's acceptable to tell people what they can and cannot do with their property because the alternative is simply too repugnant to us?

The demand for babies and children is usually far greater than the supply, and hence we see daily tragedies of adults denied the joys of adopting children by prying and tyrannical adoption agencies.False. The demand for white babies and children is usually far greater than the supply. There are plenty of babies and children of other races in adoption agencies right now.

So then it's acceptable to tell people what they can and cannot do with their property because the alternative is simply too repugnant to us?

That is how all laws work. We stick with an ethical basis, which is most likely truly baseless, and then extend it until we can no longer take the consequences of extending it.

Communists won't agree to Harrison Bergeron scenarios and libertarians won't allow you to kill your children, even if it would be proper disposal of one's own property.

That is how all laws work. We stick with an ethical basis, which is most likely truly baseless, and then extend it until we can no longer take the consequences of extending it.

Communists won't agree to Harrison Bergeron scenarios and libertarians won't allow you to kill your children, even if it would be proper disposal of one's own property.I'm not certain how Harrison Bergeron scenarios would be consistent with the aims and ideals of communism.

I'm not certain how Harrison Bergeron scenarios would be consistent with the aims and ideals of communism.

Equal freedom of opportunity within society?

Equal freedom of opportunity within society?

Equality is not the same thing as conformity.

Equal opportunistic freedom within society?This could be accompished by society not valuing people with more intelligence (or better looks, or more strength) than people with less intelligence. That being said, it seems to me that intelligence is mainly the result of upbringing, with the exception of certain things like Down Syndrome.

This could be accompished by society not valuing people with more intelligence (or better looks, or more strength) than people with less intelligence.

Why should society control what people value?

Furthermore, how could more productive people, people who produce better things, not be more valued. In the Harrison Bergeron example, how could attractive people or good dancers not be more appreciated without wiping out the concepts of "attractive" or "good dancing" altogether?

That being said, it seems to me that intelligence is mainly the result of upbringing, with the exception of certain things like Down Syndrome.

I would not agree with that, but am unwilling to argue it. Perhaps you have some support?

Why should society control what people value?People are free to have their own values, but since society is typically the employer, society can decide what it values when it comes to employing people. (In situations of socialism where society isn't the employer, you can insert 'the co-op' where you see 'society'.)

Furthermore, how could more productive people, people who produce better things, not be more valued. In the Harrison Bergeron example, how could attractive people or good dancers not be more appreciated without wiping out the concepts of "attractive" or "good dancing" altogether?As far as individuals liking other individuals more, you would have to also alter personalities so that nobody is friendlier, or more altruistic, etc. than others.

I would not agree with that, but am unwilling to argue it. Perhaps you have some support?That children who have been through Head Start programs tend to score better on standardized tests than children who haven't been. (Yes, I know, it could be a result of problems with the standardized tests.)

Ok,

Having read this little analysis I am not really impressed with either his conclusions or how he came to them. He relies heavily on generalizations and the assumption that everyone takes their political philosphy to its limit. This is neither practicable nor true in any real experience.

Let me try to atriculate this...

I dont think the American brand of Libertarianism is similiar to the global view of libertarianism. The reason for this being, the American brand seems to base itself upon the US Constitution. It probably developed this way out of practicality, but makes American libertarians less prone to political division because they have both a contract and a foundation (Both being the consitution) for the rights they claim to have.


I tend to look at Libertarianism as the Political Correctness Police, and therefore Libertarianism is gay. I don't need someone else to tell me whats good for me and what isn't. I was pissed when I learned about failing grades now being called, "Deffered Success" or Stewardesses (Airline Waitresses in my mind) having to be called "Flight Attendants".

Do you think children should be left to fend for their own needs from birth? I see the logic in this, but are you willing to bite the bullet?
http://www.walterblock.com/publications/block-children.pdf

Hope that will help you.

In the first case, that is the end result of property rights with varying levels of property between people.
No it isn't.


The second result is only true if you can demonstrate that reality would be altered without property rights.
We would be in the state of nature.


Demonstrate how rights as I have suggested that they should be would lead to some people having more rights than others.
With positive rights, some would have title to the property of others based on need. That means they have more rights--they are more equal, as I said-- than others. Of course, if you want to misquote me, feel free. You'll only fuck yourself over.


No, it was your counter argument that we were discussing.
Nope. You're the one with the strawman.


Except for the fact that it isn't.
Except for the fact that it was a quote-mine, as I showed with the quote and link to the chapter in question.

You're as dishonest as Kent Hovind.


So then it's acceptable to tell people what they can and cannot do with their property because the alternative is simply too repugnant to us?
Thus showing your lack of English comprehension skills.


False.
No, it's true.

People are free to have their own values, but since society is typically the employer, society can decide what it values when it comes to employing people. (In situations of socialism where society isn't the employer, you can insert 'the co-op' where you see 'society'.)

There are benefits of society that are not delivered by government, that are inherently inequal (not to say that government is equal in its treatment). Certainly the benefits of accolades and gifts that will some will receive over others.

A very relevant issue:

How do you handle the benefits of parenthood? That is certainly a great source of inequality when it comes to the developing and opportunity of the individual. Do you support the standardized raising of children?

As far as individuals liking other individuals more, you would have to also alter personalities so that nobody is friendlier, or more altruistic, etc. than others.

And those individuals who are better liked will derive greater benefit from society.

"Religion" was actually the very first word that came to mind which I read elsewhere about how the Austrian School (which includes Hayek) "rejects the use of observation, saying that human actors are too complex to be reduced to their component parts and too self-conscious not to have their behaviour affected by the very act of observation" instead holding that "the only valid economic theory is one that is logically derived from basic principles of human action." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxeology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school ).

The first claim is basically the same one put forward all throughout history by religious types against the scientific method in general: Galileo was wrong because the universe is simply way to complex for stupid humans to understand. Today, it's simply the same argument leveled against the social sciences: human beings are way to complex for stupid humans to understand. And, of course, just as the Church used "God" as a solution to humanity's inability to understand the universe, the modern opponents of the social sciences in turn invent methods for explaining human behavior that are equally arbitrary and subjectivist in nature, clothed in the ephemism of "reason;" "logically derived from basic principles of human action" amounts to absolutely nothing more than "start with baseless assumption, assume it is correct."

Same damn crap all over again. The physical sciences have survived the onslaught, however, so at least they provide hope that the social sciences will do the same.


I think the problem the Austrian school tries to solve in economics is a very real one. Almost all of the traditional sciences are highly analytic in nature and have developed analytic methods to solve their problems. Most problems in the social sciences require highly synthetic reasoning. The scientific method is practically impossible to apply to social problems because it is impossible to set up a controlled experiment. An impossible number of factors affect the human psyche. The Austrians have decided that, because the scientific method isn't suitable to solve problems of economics, that they will proceed by constructing a large theoretical model based upon a few simple observations of human nature. Their approach is based upon a highly simplistic "rational being" which doesn't really exist in pure form. It does work quite well in abscence of a more synthetic and comprehensive approach to economics. What we really need is a method that will do to synthetic thinking what the scientific method did to analytic thought.

"Religion" was actually the very first word that came to mind which I read elsewhere about how the Austrian School (which includes Hayek) "rejects the use of observation, saying that human actors are too complex to be reduced to their component parts and too self-conscious not to have their behaviour affected by the very act of observation" instead holding that "the only valid economic theory is one that is logically derived from basic principles of human action." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxeology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_school ).

The first claim is basically the same one put forward all throughout history by religious types against the scientific method in general: Galileo was wrong because the universe is simply way to complex for stupid humans to understand. Today, it's simply the same argument leveled against the social sciences: human beings are way to complex for stupid humans to understand. And, of course, just as the Church used "God" as a solution to humanity's inability to understand the universe, the modern opponents of the social sciences in turn invent methods for explaining human behavior that are equally arbitrary and subjectivist in nature, clothed in the ephemism of "reason;" "logically derived from basic principles of human action" amounts to absolutely nothing more than "start with baseless assumption, assume it is correct."
Well then, I'm sure you can tell me the objective standard by which we measure happiness. Or desire. Or utility. Or value

Oh wait--you can't. There aren't any such beasties.

That's part of why the method of the a posteriori sciences is completely incapable of providing us with the answers for economics. Humans aren't reducable to linear functions and whatnot. We can't describe humans with formulae, nor with processes. It does come down to something actually mentioned in The Matrix Reloaded: choice. Atoms don't have a choice in how they interact; humans do.

And that makes all the difference.

Atoms don't have a choice in how they interact; humans do.

Actually, I believe the interaction of atoms is contingent and subject to observation as well.

And needless to say, this doesn't imply that people have actual choice, only that they are free of inevitability.

Actually, I believe the interaction of atoms is contingent and subject to observation as well.
It's really more of the subatomic particles that do. However, an atom of hydrogen will interact with an atom of oxygen in a certain way, regardless.


And needless to say, this doesn't imply that people have actual choice, only that they are free of inevitability.
They are free of the mechanistic determinism.

No it isn't.If it isn't, then show how it isn't. I've already shown how it is.

We would be in the state of nature.Nope. There have been societies without property rights. You've heard of the Kibbutzim, right?

With positive rights, some would have title to the property of others based on need. That means they have more rights--they are more equal, as I said-- than others. Of course, if you want to misquote me, feel free. You'll only fuck yourself over.With positive rights and no property rights, this wouldn't happen. Of course, if you want to completely ignore the context of the comment, feel free.

Nope. You're the one with the strawman.Thus showing once again that learning the names of logical fallacies doesn't mean anything if you don't know how to properly use them.

Except for the fact that it was a quote-mine, as I showed with the quote and link to the chapter in question.

You're as dishonest as Kent Hovind.Uh, no, I was referring to your incorrect comment that left-anarchism is self-contradictory.

Thus showing your lack of English comprehension skills.Thus showing your inability to understand your own ideology, or at the very least, Milton Friedman's comments.

No, it's true.No, it isn't. There isn't a bigger demand for babies and children of all races than the supply - otherwise, nobody would be spending their childhood in orphanages.

It's really more of the subatomic particles that do. However, an atom of hydrogen will interact with an atom of oxygen in a certain way, regardless.

A person placed in the same situation, under the same forces, will interact with its environment the same way every time as well.

They are free of the mechanistic determinism.

This is for another thread.

There are benefits of society that are not delivered by government, that are inherently inequal (not to say that government is equal in its treatment). Certainly the benefits of accolades and gifts that will some will receive over others.Certainly. This is one reason that Harrison Bergeron scenarios wouldn't be palatable, because you would have to not simply remove the concept of good-looking, but remove people's preferences completely. There are other reasons, too, such as do the people who install the things in our brains to make us dumber also have chips installed in their brains?

A very relevant issue:

How do you handle the benefits of parenthood? That is certainly a great source of inequality when it comes to the developing and opportunity of the individual. Do you support the standardized raising of children?It's hard to say. On one hand, there is a lot of evidence showing that children tend to do better when being raised by their extended families than only by their parents, or by one parent. On the other hand, I'm not certain that society would raise children in the same way that an extended family would.

And those individuals who are better liked will derive greater benefit from society.Certainly. There are plenty of communists who encourage this, as a way of encouraging people to take the jobs that nobody wants.

If it isn't, then show how it isn't. I've already shown how it is.
No, you most certainly have not. You need to demonstrate that it is.


Nope. There have been societies without property rights. You've heard of the Kibbutzim, right?
Yes. They are in a state of nature.


With positive rights and no property rights, this wouldn't happen.
That's self-contradictory. Of course, if you want to completely ignore the law of non-contradiction--feel free.


Thus showing once again that learning the names of logical fallacies doesn't mean anything if you don't know how to properly use them.
Thus showing that you don't know what you're talking about, since I use the fallacies properly.


Oh, no, I was referring to your incorrect comment that left-anarchism is self-contradictory.
Except it is correct.


Thus showing your inability to understand your own ideology,
Thus showing that you like to create strawmen.


or at the very least, Milton Friedman's comments.
Friedman is a Chicagoite. I'm Austrian.


No, it isn't.
Certainly is, m'laddio.


There isn't a bigger demand for babies and children of all races than the supply - otherwise, nobody would be spending their childhood in orphanages.
Non sequitur. You forget the mountains of bureaucratic regulations surrounding all of it.

Also, this applies to organs. There's a huge demand for organs for transplant. Unfortunately, I'm not aware of any nation which has not banned a market for organs. Same thing as with children.

A person placed in the same situation, under the same forces, will interact with its environment the same way every time as well.
Prove it.

No, you most certainly have not. You need to demonstrate that it is.I already did, when I pointed out that computers help to enable freedom of speech, and therefore a person who has a computer has more freedom of speech than a person who doesn't.

Yes. They are in a state of nature.What would you describe the state of nature to be, what you are implying isn't any one that I've heard of.

That's self-contradictory. Of course, if you want to completely ignore the law of non-contradiction--feel free.In what way is it self-contradictory?

Thus showing that you don't know what you're talking about, since I use the fallacies properly.Except when you don't, as in this case.

Except it is correct.How so?

Friedman is a Chicagoite. I'm Austrian.So then it's simply your inability to understand what Friedman said. If Friedman didn't say what I thought he was implying, then what did he say?

Non sequitur. You forget the mountains of bureaucratic regulations surrounding all of it.

Also, this applies to organs. There's a huge demand for organs for transplant. Unfortunately, I'm not aware of any nation which has not banned a market for organs. Same thing as with children.If it was the same as organs, then there would be a mountain of organs just lying around just waiting to be transplanted into people. There aren't, however there are plenty of children waiting to be adopted.

I already did,
No you didn't.


when I pointed out that computers help to enable freedom of speech,
No it doesn't. It's just another medium, not an enabler. Stop confusing ideas.


and therefore a person who has a computer has more freedom of speech than a person who doesn't.
Wrong.


What would you describe the state of nature to be, what you are implying isn't any one that I've heard of.
Probably because you've never read The Leviathan (http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html).


In what way is it self-contradictory?
Positive rights indicate a right to property.


Except when you don't, as in this case.
Except I do, as always.


How so?
All socialist/collectivist/fascist/communist shit requires a government.


So then it's simply your inability to understand what Friedman said.
Nope. It's your inability to grasp that you shouldn't create a strawman.


If it was the same as organs, then there would be a mountain of organs just lying around just waiting to be transplanted into people.
There are; they're simply not harvested due to the bureaucracy.

No it doesn't. It's just another medium, not an enabler. Stop confusing ideas.You can't have the ability without the medium. Stop treating them as if they're not two sides of the same coin.

Probably because you've never read The Leviathan (http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html).Nope, can't say that I have. I'll put it on my list of stuff to read after The Wealth of Nations.

Positive rights indicate a right to property.How so?

All socialist/collectivist/fascist/communist shit requires a government.Except the forms of socialism, collectivism, and communism which don't. (Not going to get into your confusion of fascism with the others.)

Nope. It's your inability to grasp that you shouldn't create a strawman.If I created a strawman, then surely you'd be able to point out what the strawman is and where I was wrong.

There are; they're simply not harvested due to the bureaucracy.No, they're being used by people and not lying around.

You can't have the ability without the medium.
Yes you can.

Nope, can't say that I have. I'll put it on my list of stuff to read after The Wealth of Nations.
Ok, so you haven't read the book where the concept "state of nature" as qua rights originates, yet you dare to act as if you know all about it? WTF?


How so?
Positive rights indicate that someone has the right to be given something, making that thing the property of the person.


Except the forms of socialism, collectivism, and communism which don't.
There aren't any.


(Not going to get into your confusion of fascism with the others.)
I don't.


If I created a strawman, then surely you'd be able to point out what the strawman is and where I was wrong.
Sure. You said I was talking about Friedman. I wasn't.


No, they're being used by people and not lying around.
They're being used by dead people? WTF? How the fuck can a dead person use an organ? Please explain. I'd LOVE to hear your explanation of this. LOVE TO.

Prove it.

He either acts in accordance to pre-determined desires and knowledge and outside impressions or he acts randomly.

In neither situation is there room for actual choice, as there is nothing inside a person that is not contingent upon the laws of nature, and as such he must abide by them.

He either acts in accordance to pre-determined desires and knowledge and outside impressions or he acts randomly.
False dichotomy, especially given that desires and values can change.


In neither situation is there room for actual choice, as there is nothing inside a person that is not contingent upon the laws of nature, and as such he must abide by them.
That's irrelevant.

False dichotomy, especially given that desires and values can change.

How does that matter?

How does that matter?
That you may not necessarily pick the same thing every time or do the same thing every time.

Yes you can. Explain how you can have freedom of movement without having the ability to move.

Ok, so you haven't read the book where the concept "state of nature" as qua rights originates, yet you dare to act as if you know all about it? WTF?It's entirely possible to know of the concept of the "state of nature" without using Hobbes' definition of it; his isn't the only one.

On a related note, does this mean you've read the English translation ofL'Utilité de la célébration du dimanche?

Positive rights indicate that someone has the right to be given something, making that thing the property of the person.Really? So the positive right to go outside and breathe clean air means that I own the air?

There aren't any.Of course there are. Anarcho-communism.

I don't.Sure you did. You listed it in the same sentence as socialism, even though they aren't the same.

Sure. You said I was talking about Friedman. I wasn't.You were talking about Murray Rothbard when I said you were talking about Friedman. That isn't a strawman, that is a mistake. (Showing yet again your improper use of the fallacy "strawman".)
Nonetheless, are you actually going to address my point about Murray Rothbard and the inconsistency of his ideology?


They're being used by dead people? WTF? How the fuck can a dead person use an organ? Please explain. I'd LOVE to hear your explanation of this. LOVE TO.Certainly. There is the whole religious concept of maintaining the sanctity of a corpse. Therefore, the person who wishes to maintain that sanctity is using their organs.

That you may not necessarily pick the same thing every time or do the same thing every time.

Of course over the course of a person's life they can be faced with similar decisions, but the ability to make two different decisions in two similar situations does not mean that someone is actually free to choose.

When stating that one person will make the same decision when given the same input, one must consider desires to be an input. The instant of a decision cannot allow for multiple sets of values.

Explain how you can have freedom of movement without having the ability to move.
Explain how you don't have freedom of speech if you don't have a computer.


It's entirely possible to know of the concept of the "state of nature" without using Hobbes' definition of it; his isn't the only one.
Basically every philosopher uses the definition he gave. So you might want to not spout off on shit that you don't know a damned thing about, especially since you claim that no philosopher uses the term as I do. You've been caught posing.


On a related note, does this mean you've read the English translation of L'Utilité de la célébration du dimanche?
Yes, I know about Proudhon's concept-stealing nonsense with the next little screed he wrote.


Really? So the positive right to go outside and breathe clean air means that I own the air?
That's not a positive right.


Of course there are. Anarcho-communism.
Self-contradictory.


Sure you did.
I didn't.


You listed it in the same sentence as socialism, even though they aren't the same.
That's because fascism is a form of socialism, despite your uninformed idea that it isn't.


You were talking about Murray Rothbard when I said you were talking about Friedman.
Yes.


That isn't a strawman,
It is when you assert that I did.


Nonetheless, are you actually going to address my point about Murray Rothbard and the inconsistency of his ideology?
You have yet to show that he was inconsistent.


Certainly. There is the whole religious concept of maintaining the sanctity of a corpse.
Which is just nonsense.


Therefore, the person who wishes to maintain that sanctity is using their organs.
Prove it. Prove that a dead person is using his or her organs, and you'd better not try to redefine the term "use" as you just did.

Of course over the course of a person's life they can be faced with similar decisions, but the ability to make two different decisions in two similar situations does not mean that someone is actually free to choose.
Doesn't mean the person isn't, either.


When stating that one person will make the same decision when given the same input, one must consider desires to be an input. The instant of a decision cannot allow for multiple sets of values.
Desires aren't constant.

Explain how you don't have freedom of speech if you don't have a computer.I didn't say that a person who didn't have a computer didn't have freedom of speech, I said that a person who has a computer has more freedom of speech than a person who doesn't.

Basically every philosopher uses the definition he gave. So you might want to not spout off on shit that you don't know a damned thing about, especially since you claim that no philosopher uses the term as I do. You've been caught posing.By your statement that basically every philosopher uses the definition he gave, does this mean that you've read every philosopher?
And, I never said that no philosopher used the term as you did, I said that I'd never heard it used in that way. Speaking of lacking English comprehension skills...

Yes, I know about Proudhon's concept-stealing nonsense with the next little screed he wrote.Is that the same as how the right stole the concept of anarchism?

That's not a positive right.When the state has to clean the air after a volcano erupts, it is.

Self-contradictory.You're welcome to show how anarcho-communism requires a state.

I didn't.Yes, you did, by listing it in the same sentence as the others, you essentially said that they were the same thing.

That's because fascism is a form of socialism, despite your uninformed idea that it isn't.Except that fascism isn't a form of socialism, despite your mostly baseless idea that it is. You're welcome to show how it is.

It is when you assert that I did. No, it isn't. How is getting the name of the person making the argument wrong deliberately misrepresenting the argument itself?

You have yet to show that he was inconsistent.I did. Remember this?

The mother, then, is the natural and rightful owner of the baby, and any attempt to seize the baby by force is an invasion of her property right.

But it also must be limited in kind, for it surely would be grotesque for a libertarian who believes in the right of self-ownership to advocate the right of a parent to murder or torture his or her children.These two statements are inconsistent. If they aren't inconsistent, how are they consistent?

Which is just nonsense.I'm not saying that it isn't nonsense, I'm saying that it exists.

Prove it. Prove that a dead person is using his or her organs, and you'd better not try to redefine the term "use" as you just did.You're the one redefining terms here, my usage of the word was perfectly in line with its definition.

I didn't say that a person who didn't have a computer didn't have freedom of speech, I said that a person who has a computer has more freedom of speech than a person who doesn't.
Then prove it.


By your statement that basically every philosopher uses the definition he gave, does this mean that you've read every philosopher?
I said basically. I have never heard of a dissenting opinion. So please--admit that you were just posing.


And, I never said that no philosopher used the term as you did, I said that I'd never heard it used in that way.
Meaning that you don't know what you're talking about.


Is that the same as how the right stole the concept of anarchism?
Nah, it's how the left somehow believes that not having a government implies socialism, which requires a government. Strange creatures, those leftists.


When the state has to clean the air after a volcano erupts, it is.
Nope.


You're welcome to show how anarcho-communism requires a state.
All forms of socialism require a state.


Yes, you did, by listing it in the same sentence as the others, you essentially said that they were the same thing.
Wrong.


Except that fascism isn't a form of socialism,
Except that it is, despite your desperate flailing about to deny reality.

Fascism is socialism with the government allowing some pretense at private ownership of the means of production.


No, it isn't. How is getting the name of the person making the argument wrong deliberately misrepresenting the argument itself?
Because you misrepresented the case.


I did. Remember this?
Yes, and there's no inconsistency.

You have to demonstrate that they are inconsistent. I don't have to do anything.


I'm not saying that it isn't nonsense, I'm saying that it exists.
And I'm saying that it's just nonsense.


You're the one redefining terms here, my usage of the word was perfectly in line with its definition.
Nope. You redefined it. So tell me how a dead person is using his or her organs.

Doesn't mean the person isn't, either.

Exactly why your comment, "desires and values can change," is totally irrelevant.

Decisions are made in an instant and desires, for the duration of that instant, are set and unchangeable

Desires aren't constant.

Decisions are instantaneous and constancy does not apply to the instant. Since change is not possible in the infinitesimal moment with which are decision is formed, decisions based on desires and environment or random decisions is a true dichotomy, and a dichotomy that precludes true choice.

Exactly why your comment, "desires and values can change," is totally irrelevant.
I don't see how.


Decisions are made in an instant and desires, for the duration of that instant, are set and unchangeable
And?


Decisions are instantaneous and constancy does not apply to the instant.
Relevance? None.

Then prove it.If those without the medium and ability to do something don't have the freedom to do something, then by entension those with fewer mediums and abilities to do something have less freedom to do something.

I said basically. I have never heard of a dissenting opinion. So please--admit that you were just posing.You've never heard of a lot of things.

Meaning that you don't know what you're talking about.Meaning that Hobbes doesn't own the concept.

Nah, it's how the left somehow believes that not having a government implies socialism, which requires a government. Strange creatures, those leftists.How does worker ownership of the means of production require a government?

Nope.Yep. Why should the state clean up the air for the rich when the rich can just buy air filters and filter their own air?

All forms of socialism require a state.Prove it.

Except that it is, despite your desperate flailing about to deny reality.

Fascism is socialism with the government allowing some pretense at private ownership of the means of production.Except that socialism has nothing to do with government ownership of the means of production, so why you're bringing it up I have no idea.

Because you misrepresented the case.In what way?

Yes, and there's no inconsistency.

You have to demonstrate that they are inconsistent. I don't have to do anything.How is not being able to tell people what they can do with their property consistent with being able to tell people what they can do with their property?

Nope. You redefined it. So tell me how a dead person is using his or her organs.Nope, I didn't. I've already shown how a dead person is using his or her organs.

If those without the medium and ability to do something don't have the freedom to do something, then by entension those with fewer mediums and abilities to do something have less freedom to do something.[/qote]
False.


[QUOTE=Jello Biafra]You've never heard of a lot of things.
Yeah--I've never heard of "state of nature" in the way you're using it. In fact, I daresay that I wouldn't be able to find a philosophy prof who has.


Meaning that Hobbes doesn't own the concept.
Meaning that you're posing.


How does worker ownership of the means of production require a government?
Because it's not worker ownership of the means of production. That's just the fantasy that the communists try to sell. In reality, the government owns the means of production.


Yep. Why should the state clean up the air for the rich when the rich can just buy air filters and filter their own air?
Wht should the state do anything?


Prove it.
Already have.


Except that socialism has nothing to do with government ownership of the means of production,
Except that it does.


In what way?
By telling me what I believed without referring to what I wrote.


How is not being able to tell people what they can do with their property consistent with being able to tell people what they can do with their property?
Because that's your utter inability to comprehend English.


Nope, I didn't. I've already shown how a dead person is using his or her organs.
No you haven't. Show how a dead person can use his or her organs. Now.

I'll keep asking until you admit that a dead person can't use his or her organs. They aren't functioning in a dead person. They aren't being used.

False.How so?

Yeah--I've never heard of "state of nature" in the way you're using it. In fact, I daresay that I wouldn't be able to find a philosophy prof who has. I've never heard of state of nature in the way you're using it.

Because it's not worker ownership of the means of production. That's just the fantasy that the communists try to sell. In reality, the government owns the means of production.Except that socialism is defined as worker ownership of the means of production; if the government owns the means of production it isn't socialism, by definition.

Wht should the state do anything?And when the state does do something other than defend the people from interference, it is a positive right.

Already have.Nope.

Except that it does.No, by definition, it doesn't. You know what definitions are, right?

By telling me what I believed without referring to what I wrote.You wrote essentially the same thing as you wrote below:

Because that's your utter inability to comprehend English.In what way am I unable to comprehend English?

No you haven't. Show how a dead person can use his or her organs. Now.

I'll keep asking until you admit that a dead person can't use his or her organs. They aren't functioning in a dead person. They aren't being used.You're welcome to keep asking, you won't get a different answer. The organs don't have to be functioning in the way that organs typically function in order to be being used, provided that the person who has died stipulated that they want them that way before death.

How so?
You have to demonstrate that it's true.


I've never heard of state of nature in the way you're using it.
Then I don't know how it is that you've heard of the state of nature, since the way I use it is the classical use. The one that's been used for over 300 years.


Except that socialism is defined as worker ownership of the means of production; if the government owns the means of production it isn't socialism, by definition.
Nope. Socialism is government owning of the means of production, by definition.


And when the state does do something other than defend the people from interference, it is a positive right.
No, it's just wrong.


Nope.
Certainly have, m'laddio.


No, by definition, it doesn't. You know what definitions are, right?
But, by definition, it does. You know what definitions are, right?


You wrote essentially the same thing as you wrote below:

In what way am I unable to comprehend English?
By not understanding what's been written.


You're welcome to keep asking, you won't get a different answer.
Then you concede that a dead person is not using the organs. Thank you.

You have to demonstrate that it's true.Already done, unless you have a counter argument.

Nope. Socialism is government owning of the means of production, by definition.Then you're unaware of what the correct definition is. Now you know.

No, it's just wrong.Then what is a positive right?

Certainly have, m'laddio.Nope, dearie, you haven't. You've heard of the logical fallacy "argument by assertion", right?

By not understanding what's been written.I did understand what was written, I can't help it that Rothbard is a moron.

Then you concede that a dead person is not using the organs. Thank you.Of course they are, if they are using them to maintain the sanctity of their corpse. You're aware that things can have more than one use, right?

Already done, unless you have a counter argument.
You didn't provide an argument.


Then you're unaware of what the correct definition is.
No, I'm aware of it, since I provided it for you.


Then what is a positive right?
You don't know?


Nope, dearie, you haven't.
Yes dearie, I have.


I did understand what was written, I can't help it that Rothbard is a moron.
So you didn't understand what was written. I can't help that.


Of course they are, if they are using
How does a dead person use something? Please stop repeating your assertion.

You're aware that dead people can't use things, right? That death means you're not alive, and only living things can use something, right? You ARE aware of that, correct? Please tell me that you passed grade-school level biology.

You didn't provide an argument.Of course I did.

No, I'm aware of it, since I provided it for you.No, you provided me an incorrect definition that you pulled from somewhere I don't know.

You don't know?Sure I do, I want to make sure we're on the same page.

Yes dearie, I have.Nope, you've simply asserted it. Of course, this is usual for you...but at least it's a break from "Nuh Uh".

So you didn't understand what was written. I can't help that.Strawman.

How does a dead person use something? Please stop repeating your assertion.

You're aware that dead people can't use things, right? That death means you're not alive, and only living things can use something, right? You ARE aware of that, correct? Please tell me that you passed grade-school level biology.By stating, as a living person, that they would like their organs to remain intact. You're not suggesting that because somebody dies, they should have no control over what happens to their property, are you?

Of course I did.
No, you fleshed your premise out some, but didn't provide an argument.


No, you provided me an incorrect definition that you pulled from somewhere I don't know.
No, I provided you a correct definition.


Sure I do, I want to make sure we're on the same page.
Page 5.


Nope, you've simply asserted it. Of course, this is usual for you...but at least it's a break from "Nuh Uh".
Pot. Kettle. Black.


Strawman.
Nope.


By stating, as a living person, that they would like their organs to remain intact.
They're not using them.


You're not suggesting that because somebody dies, they should have no control over what happens to their property, are you?
You're learning, aren't you?

So now I take it that you will have no trouble ever with not having an estate tax.

No, you fleshed your premise out some, but didn't provide an argument.Remember this:?

If those without the medium and ability to do something don't have the freedom to do something, then by entension those with fewer mediums and abilities to do something have less freedom to do something.

No, I provided you a correct definition.Whose correct definition?

Pot. Kettle. Black.Not hardly.

Nope.So then does this mean that Murray Rothbard has no problem with telling people what to do with their property if he finds the use to be "grotesque"? Great, I find many uses of capitalist property to be grotesque.

They're not using them.Nope, but the living person that they once were used them as far as the disposal of their property goes.

You're learning, aren't you?

So now I take it that you will have no trouble ever with not having an estate tax.I didn't say that I agreed with the premise, however I was aware that you did.

Remember this:?

If those without the medium and ability to do something don't have the freedom to do something, then by entension those with fewer mediums and abilities to do something have less freedom to do something.
Yes. That's fleshing out your premise, not providing evidence.


Whose correct definition?
The real one.


So then does this mean that Murray Rothbard has no problem with telling people what to do with their property if he finds the use to be "grotesque"?
It means that you didn't read the whole thing.


Nope, but the living person that they once were used them as far as the disposal of their property goes.
OK.


I didn't say that I agreed with the premise, however I was aware that you did.
Then you're trolling.

I don't see how.

You stated that the change of a person's desires over time meant that the dichotomy between acting according to one's desires or acting randomly was false.

Now you say that change in desires over time neither grants the power of choice nor denies it, meaning that change over time is not relevant to a single decision.

My original dichotomy is not proven false by changes in desires over time, as duration of time does not apply to decisions, which are made in a singular infinitesimal point in time.

Of course I made that point before, when explaining why duration of time is not relevant 186, but you separated my post into two parts and attacked them as if they were unrelated. When I stated that a decision could not be made using two different value sets, you separated it and attacked a strawman.

And?

This is another situation where two statements make one point. Since change of desires cannot happen within the instant of decision, they are irrelevant to whether someone acts according to his desires or acts randomly.

Relevance? None.

You are the one who originally said that desires change. Are you saying that posts 182 and 188 were worthless, irrelevant blathering, perhaps with the intent of stalling meaningful discussion? I figured that from the start, but I wouldn't expect you to admit it.

Yes. That's fleshing out your premise, not providing evidence.Here, let's try this mathematically. In the middle, we'll have an equal sign. On the left, a number representing a person's ability to do something. On the right, a number representing a person's freedom to do something. If a person has zero ability to do something, then they also have zero freedom to do something. 0=0 You appeared to agree to this. Ability = freedom. If this is the case, then someone will have more freedom to do something as they have more ability to do it. Unless two people have the same ability to do something, then they won't have the same freedom to do it, either.

The real one.No, I'm using the real one. Find me a socialist philosopher who believes that government should own the means of production, and explain why that person's definition should trump all of the philosophers who believe that the workers should own the means of production.

It means that you didn't read the whole thing.I read the snippet that you provided in the post. If there's more to it that's relevant, kindly provide another snippet.

Then you're trolling.No, I'm using current definitions of property rights and your beliefs in them to make an argument.

Incidentally, I looked up "state of nature" on Wikipedia. It's essentially what I would have said that it was, though I would have explained it differently. Anyway, in what way are the Kibbutzim in the state of nature?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Nature

Here, let's try this mathematically.
Won't do you any good anyway. Ability does not equal freedom.


No, I'm using the real one.
No, you're using the fantasy one. It doesn't matter if some socialists don't think that the government should own the means of producion, since socialism means that the government will own the means of production. It is, as Marx said, an historical inevitability.


I read the snippet that you provided in the post. If there's more to it that's relevant, kindly provide another snippet.
Why don't you read the whole chapter? I provided a link to it.


No, I'm using current definitions of property rights and your beliefs in them to make an argument.
You most certainly are not.


Incidentally, I looked up "state of nature" on Wikipedia. It's essentially what I would have said that it was, though I would have explained it differently.
Essentially, you explained it incorrectly.


Anyway, in what way are the Kibbutzim in the state of nature?
They are without property rights.

Won't do you any good anyway. Ability does not equal freedom.So then not having the ability to move means having freedom of movement?

No, you're using the fantasy one. It doesn't matter if some socialists don't think that the government should own the means of producion, since socialism means that the government will own the means of production. It is, as Marx said, an historical inevitability.No, socialism is the end state of the process. Government owning the means of production is not the end state, it is simply part of the process, according to many theories of socialism. This, of course, doesn't include the socialist theorists who disagreed with Marx.

Why don't you read the whole chapter? I provided a link to it.We'll see.

You most certainly are not.Yes, I was, though that tangent of the debate is over now.

Essentially, you explained it incorrectly.I didn't explain it at all, you said the Kibbutzim were in the state of nature, and I asked which definition of state of nature you meant and you said Hobbes's.

They are without property rights.The Wikipedia article doesn't refer to property rights. It does, however, refer to a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, which would, for the Kibbutzim, be when they kick someone out (assuming that they do).