NationStates Jolt Archive


On the Military Failures in Iraq

Gravlen
23-07-2006, 17:21
Thomas E. Ricks has written a book called "FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq" that will soon be published. However, the Washington Post presents an article he wrote based on the book that I found very interesting. You can find the link to the four-page article here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/22/AR2006072201004.html

The following are some excerpts and highlights from the article, pointing out some of the same weaknesses that have been pointed out by others before: The problems with the lack of leadership, training and adaptability in Iraq.
On May 16, 2003, L. Paul Bremer III, the chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S.-run occupation agency, had issued his first order, "De-Baathification of Iraq Society." The CIA station chief in Baghdad had argued vehemently against the radical move, contending: "By nightfall, you'll have driven 30,000 to 50,000 Baathists underground. And in six months, you'll really regret this."

He was proved correct, as Bremer's order, along with a second that dissolved the Iraqi military and national police, created a new class of disenfranchised, threatened leaders.
Complicating the U.S. effort was the difficulty top officials had in recognizing what was going on in Iraq. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld at first was dismissive of the looting that followed the U.S. arrival and then for months refused to recognize that an insurgency was breaking out there. A reporter pressed him one day that summer: Aren't you facing a guerrilla war?

"I guess the reason I don't use the phrase 'guerrilla war' is because there isn't one," Rumsfeld responded.
That fall, U.S. tactics became more aggressive. This was natural, even reasonable, coming in response to the increased attacks on U.S. forces and a series of suicide bombings. But it also appears to have undercut the U.S. government's long-term strategy.
Feeding the interrogation system was a major push by U.S. commanders to round up Iraqis. The key to actionable intelligence was seen by many as conducting huge sweeps to detain and question Iraqis. Sometimes units acted on tips, but sometimes they just detained all able-bodied males of combat age in areas known to be anti-American.

These steps were seen inside the Army as a major success story, and they were portrayed as such to journalists. The problem was that the U.S. military, having assumed it would be operating in a relatively benign environment, wasn't set up for a massive effort that called on it to apprehend, detain and interrogate Iraqis, to analyze the information gleaned, and then to act on it.

"As commanders at all levels sought operational intelligence, it became apparent that the intelligence structure was undermanned, under-equipped and inappropriately organized for counter-insurgency operations," Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones wrote in an official Army report a year later.

Senior U.S. intelligence officers in Iraq later estimated that about 85 percent of the tens of thousands rounded up were of no intelligence value. But as they were delivered to the Abu Ghraib prison, they overwhelmed the system and often waited for weeks to be interrogated, during which time they could be recruited by hard-core insurgents, who weren't isolated from the general prison population.
That summer, retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson, an expert in small wars, was sent to Baghdad by the Pentagon to advise on how to better put down the emerging insurgency. He met with Bremer in early July. "Mr. Ambassador, here are some programs that worked in Vietnam," Anderson said.

It was the wrong word to put in front of Bremer. "Vietnam?" Bremer exploded, according to Anderson. "Vietnam! I don't want to talk about Vietnam. This is not Vietnam. This is Iraq!"
One of the essential texts on counterinsurgency was written in 1964 by David Galula, a lieutenant colonel in the French army who was born in Tunisia, witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents and died in 1967.

...

Galula warned specifically against the kind of large-scale conventional operations the United States repeatedly launched with brigades and battalions, even if they held out the allure of short-term gains in intelligence. He insisted that firepower must be viewed very differently than in regular war.

"A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with every available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty," he wrote, adding that "the reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to apply the minimum of fire."

The U.S. military took a different approach in Iraq. It wasn't indiscriminate in its use of firepower, but it tended to look upon it as good, especially during the big counteroffensive in the fall of 2003, and in the two battles in Fallujah the following year.
"Scholars are virtually unanimous in their judgment that conventional forces often lose unconventional wars because they lack a conceptual understanding of the war they are fighting," Lt. Col. Matthew Moten, chief of military history at West Point, would comment in 2004.
I'll end on a hopeful note:
"We are finally getting around to doing the right things," Army Reserve Lt. Col. Joe Rice observed one day in Iraq early in 2006. "But is it too little, too late?"
But there is a lot more, and I recommend looking through it. Read critically and be enlightened - comments are welcome
BogMarsh
23-07-2006, 17:24
Failure? What failure?

The US forces are currently outkilling the insurgents 40:1.
No failure there.
It seldom gets better 'n that.

The only failure I perceive is the political failure what Dumouriez already noted during the French Revolution:
Nobody likes Armed Missionaries.

Politicians must understand that Armed Force cannot and should not be ordered to win Hearts and Minds.
Gravlen
23-07-2006, 18:00
Failure? What failure?

The US forces are currently outkilling the insurgents 40:1.
No failure there.
It seldom gets better 'n that.
Yet the violence continues. According to the BBC, the US reports that attacks had risen from an average of 24 a day between 14 June and 13 July to about 34 a day "over the past five days." (Jul. 20th)

The failure consists in letting the insurgency take place at all. The US should have been ready and changed tactics right after Baghdad fell. They shouldn't be fighting the insurgency three years later.

The only failure I perceive is the political failure what Dumouriez already noted during the French Revolution:

Politicians must understand that Armed Force cannot and should not be ordered to win Hearts and Minds.
They can - if only the politicians had planned for it properly in advance.
Tactical Grace
23-07-2006, 18:03
Failure? What failure?

The US forces are currently outkilling the insurgents 40:1.
No failure there.
It seldom gets better 'n that.
Russia vs. Afghanistan, 1979-1989.

Kills: ~1,000,000
Losses: ~25,000

Do the math, LOL.

It's always the same. The counter-insurgency always inflicts far higher losses on the insurgents. And the insurgents usually win. Because it is not the killing the matters.
BogMarsh
23-07-2006, 18:05
Yet the violence continues. According to the BBC, the US reports that attacks had risen from an average of 24 a day between 14 June and 13 July to about 34 a day "over the past five days." (Jul. 20th)

The failure consists in letting the insurgency take place at all. The US should have been ready and changed tactics right after Baghdad fell. They shouldn't be fighting the insurgency three years later.

They can - if only the politicians had planned for it properly in advance.

Hunh? What are you on about?
Armies are made for killing - not for brainwashing enemy civilians.
Oh - Weltanschauungssoldaten might - but military history pretty much tells us that the side that comprises of Weltanschauungs-soldaten gets the drubbing in the end.
BogMarsh
23-07-2006, 18:07
Russia vs. Afghanistan, 1979-1989.

Kills: ~1,000,000
Losses: ~25,000

Do the math, LOL.

It's always the same. The counter-insurgency always inflicts far higher losses on the insurgents. And the insurgents usually win. Because it is not the killing the matters.


See? The failure to understand that is always, and by nature, a political failure.

I'm reminded of our discussion regarding the post-Occupation future of Iraq.
Same story, innit?
Tactical Grace
23-07-2006, 18:09
See? The failure to understand that is always, and by nature, a political failure.
Only an ignorant military fails to notice political failure.
Gravlen
23-07-2006, 18:29
Hunh? What are you on about?
Armies are made for killing - not for brainwashing enemy civilians.
Oh - Weltanschauungssoldaten might - but military history pretty much tells us that the side that comprises of Weltanschauungs-soldaten gets the drubbing in the end.
I'm saying that a country of such immense military might as the US has in it's possession, a country that is ready to perform offensive action like invation and occupation to protect its interest, should have a prepared peacekeeping/anti-insurgency force.

At the very least the politicians should be able and willing to train the forces when war looms. And they should be aware of the basics concerning counterinsurgency doctrine, and be willing to learn from the past (even the mistakes). If they had, there could be a force that would be prepared for the post-Saddam situation. Perhaps the soldiers wouldn't have won the hearts and minds but they would at least have avoided the worst fuck-ups.

Armies might be made for killing. I would say they should be made for winning wars, and the secret to how they win is all in the training they recieve and their ability to adapt.
Gravlen
23-07-2006, 23:57
You know what? I'm going to give this a *bump* just this once...
Inconvenient Truths
24-07-2006, 01:18
Failure? What failure?

The US forces are currently outkilling the insurgents 40:1.
No failure there.


As the US army's primary purpose (allegedly) is also to protect the civilians of the country, how are they doing when figures for civilian death by violence are added in?

Oh...

That's not quite so promising is it?
In fact, they (like most of the forces out there) are getting their asses whopped.
Seriously, if it was the US, not Iraq, and 60/100 Civillians will killed/wounded each day would you say that the US army was not failing in its role as protector?