NationStates Jolt Archive

One part of the investigation into the Haditha-incident is concluded, and the conclusion is that Marine leadership has failed multiple times.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/08/AR2006070800904.html
Reading the article I noticed some of the thoughts Chiarelli had expressed in the report:
Chiarelli has long been concerned that the U.S. military was inadequately prepared to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. He also included thoughts about how better to prepare troops and commanders, the official added.

"You've got to prepare for the fight you're in today," said a second defense official, summarizing Chiarelli's findings on the military's inadequate training for counterinsurgency operations. "It's totally different" from fighting in Iraq two or three years ago, he said.

The Army, for example, tends in its training to emphasize using heavy firepower against the enemy, although classic counterinsurgency doctrine teaches that soldiers should use the minimal amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission.

Also, the Army early in Iraq tended to focus on killing or capturing insurgents, although counterinsurgency doctrine teaches that the best way to deal with an insurgent is to persuade him to change sides or to desert. Also, in contrast to a spate of cases of abuse of detainees, counterinsurgency theorists recommend treating captured fighters well, to encourage them to desert and to persuade others to give themselves up. Above all, people are seen as the prize in the war, not as its playing field.
I think he's right on the money and that this is one of the major internal problems the army is facing in this conflict; a problem that has worsened the general situation in Iraq - the military was not prepared for the role of occupant or the role of peace keeper, something I believe they should have thought of as they were planning the invasion.
This lack of preparation may to some degree explain how the Haditha-incident could come about, and also say something about why the US military is doing a relatively poor job of stopping the insurgency.

Any comments or thoughts?

Counter-insurgency operations are never easy, but there is a solid body of work out there on what works most of the time, and what fails most of the time. Unfortunately for the Americans, the most effective approaches remain outside of their cultural frame of reference. It is not merely a lack of training, it is an absence of a capacity to think in certain terms. There is nothing in the upbringing and formal education of most American kids that would introduce things such as political awareness, empathy, moral and cultural relativism, etc. Indeed, relativism and equivocation of any form is usually attacked as a character deficiency.

This is an area where Europe excels, but it lacks the military strength and inclination to apply its experience. Frankly, this is no bad thing. After a thousand years of occasional war, culminating in two centuries of frequent slaughter, it is perfectly entitled to cease to care about violence, at least for a few generations.

If they are serious about the imperial / peacekeeping enterprise, the Americans will have to build up that counter-insurgency and colonial administration capacity on their own. It is not something that will be achieved by the failures of just one or two generations. And ultimate success cannot be taken for granted - it may never come to pass.

This is very much like what I've been saying for some time now. Americans in general just don't deal well with other cultures. As a friend of mine who was in Bosnia told me, US troops would ride around in HMMWV's bristling with rifle barrels while the Europeans would be in the local cafés.

In an ideal world (or at least less crappy world, an ideal world wouldn't have things like war) the US would be sent in to conduct the high intensity conflict portion of the war, and then they would hand it over to the Europeans.

I'm a bit puzzled as to why the US military were so unprepared for post-invasion Iraq. I mean one thing is that they expected to be greeted with flowers and hailed as liberators - but did they really not expect any resistance?

And why have they been so slow to adapt to the present situation? They've had plenty of time since the "end of major combat operations" as Bush declared it in may 2003, yet the impression I get is that they're still in 'invation-mode' and only recently (after Haditha) have begun to seriously rethink their strategy. (Rethink, but not implement any major changes so far...)

I'm a bit puzzled as to why the US military were so unprepared for post-invasion Iraq. I mean one thing is that they expected to be greeted with flowers and hailed as liberators - but did they really not expect any resistance?


'Once they have freedom, everything will fall into place' etc etc. Even their allies noticed -

"SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY"


"The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html

A combination of arrogance, ignorace, idealism and not wishing to draw attention to the fact that a smaller military (Rumsfdelds baby, I believe) was not suited to the job of occcupation, which requires asses in large numbers, at least in the initial phases.

[QUOTE=Gravlen]
And why have they been so slow to adapt to the present situation? They've had plenty of time since the "end of major combat operations" as Bush declared it in may 2003, yet the impression I get is that they're still in 'invation-mode' and only recently (after Haditha) have begun to seriously rethink their strategy. (Rethink, but not implement any major changes so far...)

See above. They've always had a problem seeing beyond the "blast them" mentality.

I know I shouldn't be, but I am surprised at the apparent lack of leadership, adaptability and accountability in what some have claimed to be the "Greatest and most effective military the world has ever seen". :rolleyes:

I'm a bit puzzled as to why the US military were so unprepared for post-invasion Iraq. I mean one thing is that they expected to be greeted with flowers and hailed as liberators - but did they really not expect any resistance?
They thought the resistance would be conventional, ie open and consequently ineffective.

Their attitude is exemplified thus... a British journalist recalled one US soldier in Afghanistan complaining with genuine disbelief and frustration that the enemy never comes out and fights in the open. The journalist recalled observing at the time, that the man had clearly never given any thought to how he would fight an enemy possessing superiority in the air, in mobility, in firepower, in marksmanship, all while lacking body armour, support, supplies and communications.

Question.

Why is such thinking in the field being performed by a British journalist, rather than an American soldier? What does that say about the education and worldview that the two cultures impart? What does that say about which class of individual is naturally better suited to that form of warfare?

In another time, that journalist's type would probably have been working for The Honourable East India Company or some such. Because somehow, in Europe we have prepared such men.

The fact is, the American colonies never won independence by lining up in rows and marching towards British artillery at the appointed hour. The British found their colonists' improvisation so frustrating. Yet time and time again, the US has expressed disbelief that its enemies do not follow that script. Lessons lost in time.

One would have thought that the experience in Vietnam would have taught America something. Yet the episode seems to have been so embarrassing, nothing was learnt from it. And the interesting (and often forgotten!) thing is, America's ten year failure to adapt in Vietnam came soon after France failed after a decade of applying its own, superior experience. It is not simply a case of learning from one's own failure. When a master of the art has failed before you, and you repeat their errors, you are stuffed.

The real trick to waging counter-insurgency operations is to continually arrange matters to ensure that no insurgency begins. In other words, pre-empting the actual insurgency with successful colonial administration. Once an insurgency begins, it is rather like a death by torture - you have permanently lost the initiative, you no longer have control of the situation, and the timing of the end is merely a question of stamina.

This is why France got beaten in Vietnam, because events came to an insurgency. This is why the US failed in the same length of time with vastly greater resources, because its starting point was the moment of a more competent entity's failure. It is why the Battle of Algiers is required study for anyone still expecting a victory in Iraq. France got kicked out of Algeria not because it lost the war against an insurgency - once it began, victory was never possible. France got kicked out because its administration of the colony weakened, eroded under pressure and failed. The outcome of the conflict, once the insurgency gained sufficient momentum, was a foregone conclusion.

I think it is because the US was naively not expecting resistance, because of its confidence in the package it was offering, because of its complacent belief in the supposedly self-evident wisdom of accepting it, that it failed to plan for serious resistance. And because it did not expect an insurgency, it failed. And the key was never in expecting resistance and planning to counter it! The key was in expecting resistance and planning to arrange matters so the insurgency never reached a critical momentum. Had the US assumed a war of attrition would begin, and planned to fight it, the situation would be no different today, and the likely outcome no different. Europe won and lost its colonies and protectorates on the strength of the administrations it planned and ran, not purely on the strength of its militaries.

I never planned to write such a long post, but now I reach a natural conclusion - what this clearly identified gap in American military capability means for the war in Iraq. Put simply, it means the war was lost in the spring of 2004. Since then, what has been on display is American stamina. We will probably see it fight on for another decade before the logical conclusion is reached, and it will not be a victory, or even a compromise.

I'm a bit puzzled as to why the US military were so unprepared for post-invasion Iraq. I mean one thing is that they expected to be greeted with flowers and hailed as liberators - but did they really not expect any resistance?

And why have they been so slow to adapt to the present situation? They've had plenty of time since the "end of major combat operations" as Bush declared it in may 2003, yet the impression I get is that they're still in 'invation-mode' and only recently (after Haditha) have begun to seriously rethink their strategy. (Rethink, but not implement any major changes so far...)
You have to realize that the country is run by career politicians and headed by a guy from Texas who surrounded himself with family friends and yes-men and has never been without a silver spoon in his mouth. The current government wants to hear good, happy shit and discourages negativity and facts counter to their little rabbit-hole view of the world to the extreme of public slander and job reassignment.

*snip*
I never planned to write such a long post
But I'm glad you did, because you present many valid points and you presente them in a clear and eloquent manner.

My only comment is that I'm not sure I agree with the implication I understand that you make that once an insurgency starts you cannot win, but it's true that it will be very difficult for the occupier to achieve victory - at least if they're trying to do so in a somewhat humane fashion.

You have to realize that the country is run by career politicians and headed by a guy from Texas who surrounded himself with family friends and yes-men and has never been without a silver spoon in his mouth. The current government wants to hear good, happy shit and discourages negativity and facts counter to their little rabbit-hole view of the world to the extreme of public slander and job reassignment.
I know, but I had more faith in the common sense and experience of the military men, not to mention guts and the ability to stand up against what they think is wrong. But you are right, dissent seems to be frowned upon (in a big way) under the current administration.