Warning - this may include spoilers! (heh) No - actually this may require the use of neurons in a efficient process beyond the capabilities of many of the people who post on NS. (you know who you are) If you are susceptible to brain hemorrhage or seizures from mental exertion you may wish to stop here and just go to here or here...
http://www.stratfor.com/
There are plenty of so called 'political analysis' websites out there discussing various world situation. Most seem to fall somewhere between 'thinly veiled political agenda' and 'tin hats for sale here'. This website is the first I've found which really seems to be able to put forward a solid, informed unbiased analysis and speculation. Amazing! It certainly is not easy nor light reading - but then - considering the subject what would one expect? Sadly it is pay only. I can post some bits and pieces on occasion.
Here is a brief excerpt from one of their research pieces. I'll post the rest in a second.
Just as the delivering up of al-Zarqawi represented a critical step in showing the Shia that there did not have to be permanent civil war with the Sunnis, getting control of the militias would be the Shiite way of demonstrating that the Sunnis don't have to fear the Shia permanently. This is, if you will, the next break point.
In studying the Shiite calculus, it seems to be in their interest both to
avoid a grab for absolute power and to avoid allowing a civil war to
collapse the central government. This is not about loving democracy or their
fellow man. The Shia have gotten the best politico-military situation they
are going to get, and there is a lot of oil money sitting on the table that
could actually slip away from them if they aren't careful.
the full report:
Iraq: Next Moves for the Shia
By George Friedman
In "Break
<http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=266594>
Point," a piece we published about three weeks ago, we made the argument
that the war in Iraq had reached the critical point. A basic political deal
had been made between the three major groups in Iraq -- the Sunnis, Shia and
Kurds -- and that the Sunnis at that point either would begin to contain the
insurgency, or the situation could not be contained. As we put it then,
"First, in response to the deal that has been made, can the Sunni political
leadership move decisively to end the insurgency, or at least reduce its
tempo? And second, is it willing to do so?"
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of the Sunni jihadist organization
operating in Iraq, is dead -- killed by Americans. On his de ath turns the
answer to the question posed above: whether the Sunnis are prepared to rein
in the insurgency. Two very different explanations for al-Zarqawi's death
are possible. To be more precise, the manner in which al-Zarqawi died --
whether by a bomb or a bullet -- is much less important than how the
Americans got the intelligence about his location. If it was the result of a
free-standing American intelligence operation that managed to subvert
someone close to al-Zarqawi, then his death, while important, has no lasting
political significance. On the other hand, if the intelligence was provided
to the Americans by senior Sunni officials, then al-Zarqawi's death is an
indication that the political deal that created the Iraqi government is
being translated into concrete actions to bring the violence under control.
Answering this question is the key to understanding what is happening in
Iraq, and it is a very difficult question to answer . Even on the ground,
U.S. intelligence officials might not be able to distinguish their own
efforts and luck from a cold-blooded political decision by the Sunnis to
terminate al-Zarqawi. The Sunni leaders would want to keep their distance
from the betrayal, at least on the ground, and therefore would provide any
intelligence through a conduit designed to look like a stand-alone agent. He
would not be carrying a sign saying "Working for Senior Leaders." Indeed, he
might not even know he was working for them. A Sunni leader might have
fingered someone known to be close to al-Zarqawi, allowing nature to take
its course from there. Between all of the potential permutations and the
deliberate and reasonable desire of U.S. intelligence to confuse the issue
of exactly what happened, no judgment can be drawn.
Judging simply by events in Iraq following al-Zarqawi's death, it is
difficult to see any political hand in any of this. The level of viole n ce
after his death was not reduced to an obvious degree. If the Sunni
leadership had made a decision to curb the insurgency, the only part of it
that clearly was curbed was al-Zarqawi himself. Other Sunni groups do not
appear to have backed off at all. From this, we would have to conclude that
his death came about as the result of a successful American intelligence
operation and not from any political deal.
And yet, there is an oddity: The air strike that killed al-Zarqawi took
place at 6:15 p.m. Baghdad time on Wednesday, June 7. His death was
announced publicly at 11:37 p.m. At 12:17 a.m. Thursday, 40 minutes later,
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that the last three positions
in the Cabinet had been filled, and that a Sunni had been appointed defense
minister. There had been no indication prior to the appointment that the
last remaining deadlock over the Cabinet had been settled, and no reason why
such an important a nn ouncement should be made after midnight rather than at
a full-blown press conference in the morning. Yet there it was. Al-Zarqawi's
death was announced, followed minutes later by a compromise on the Cabinet.
There is another point. During the night in question, U.S. forces said they
conducted raids on 17 other locations in and around Baghdad. They said the
raids were based on intelligence gathered at the home where al-Zarqawi was
killed, which had been blown up by two 500-pound bombs. That's possible. But
it is hard to imagine finding the material, analyzing it and tasking 17
separate raiding parties in the timeframe involved. It could be the case,
but a more easily believable scenario is that the same source that provided
the intelligence on the location of al-Zarqawi's safe-house also provided
intelligence about 17 other locations.
That gets interesting. Al-Zarqawi didn't survive as long as he did by being
sloppy. In any insurgen cy, information must be compartmentalized carefully.
Having and divulging details about al-Zarqawi's location, plus 17 other
operational sites, could take down most of al Qaeda's network in the Baghdad
area. It is hard to imagine a single source, no matter how senior, having
that much information. But it is not hard to imagine several senior Sunni
officials, fully aware of al-Zarqawi's operations in their villages and
neighborhoods, being able to paint a picture for the Americans.
Again, this analysis assumes that there was not enough time to mount all the
attacks from intelligence gleaned from al-Zarqawi's safe-house, that no
single person knew the full structure of al-Zarqawi's organization in
Baghdad and, therefore, that the intelligence came from senior Sunnis whose
own networks of sources would know where al-Zarqawi's people were. But even
if we don't buy this argument, how do we explain the timing of the Cabinet
announcements? The be st counterargument would be that al-Maliki, having
announced the death of al-Zarqawi, decided to routinely announce the Cabinet
decisions in the wake of that death. That just doesn't work. The two were
linked.
There are peripheral factors that play into this as well. At about this same
time, Iran softened its rhetoric concerning its nuclear program and said it
was ready for negotiations with permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council. It has long been our view that Iran's blessing would be needed for
any political deals forged in Baghdad and that Tehran has used the nuclear
<http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=260950> issue
as a means of securing its interests there. Thus, the sudden shift, which
also coincided with al-Zarqawi's death, seems noteworthy.
To our minds, the intelligence on al-Zarqawi's loc ati on was the down payment
for the political settlement that the Sunnis said they wanted. The Sunni
payment must now be reciprocated by a Shiite payment: a resolution on the
status of the Shiite militias, which have been killing Sunnis in reprisal
for jihadist attacks and torture suffered under Baathist rule, among other
reasons. The plan that al-Maliki previously had laid out was that the
militias would be integrated into the Iraqi army. The response from the
Sunni head of Iraqi intelligence, which came shortly after al-Zarqawi's
death, was that this was not an acceptable solution. If the militias were
simply integrated into the Iraqi army as whole units, they would be able to
continue carrying out their political function in uniform. The solution, he
said, was to disarm them and turn them into unarmed civil servants.
The notion of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army being turned into clerks at the
Iraqi Department of Motor Vehicles is surely w orth thinking about, but after
we get serious again, it's clear that that isn't going to happen. The Shia
now have a problem. Al-Zarqawi is dead and al Qaeda is badly disrupted, but
it can recover if the Sunnis want it to. The Shia -- for the moment -- can
decide to move the political process forward or, by inaction, allow it to
collapse and return to the status quo. Bringing the militias under control
is a difficult process that will cause wrenching shifts in the Shiite
community. But that is the price for a unitary Iraq in which Shiite power
dominates but is limited by Sunni and Kurdish interests.
Shiite Options
The question now is whether the Shia want this deal. Obviously, they want to
dominate Iraq without limitations. That isn't going to happen. Both the
Sunnis and the Kurds are in a position to resist this. The Americans are
still there, and they can block the Shia. Should the Americans leave, the
Shia could wage a more effec tive war -- but only if they had the direct and
open intervention of Iran. So, the path to domination depends on many
variables and could fail under any circumstances. But under any
circumstances, that path leads to an Iranian presence -- and likely
domination -- in Iraq.
The other alternative is to let the process collapse, not respond to
al-Zarqawi's killing and allow the civil war to intensify. The Shia would do
relatively well in fighting the civil war, but again, there would be
complexity. The Saudis in particular do not want to see Iraq divided into
three independent entities. The southern entity would be Shiite -- and the
Shia, the Saudis have to calculate, would be dominated by the Iranians. That
would leave Saudi Arabia vulnerable to Iranian attack, with the only
counterweight being the U.S. Army. The last thing Saudi Arabia wants is U.S.
forces deployed on its soil. It is also the last thing the United States
wants. The result wou ld be Saudi and U.S. support being poured into the
Sunnis. That, in turn, would increase Shiite dependency on Iran or else
force the Shia to turn to the Americans. Civil war would be untidy, to say
the least, for the Shia.
Note that in these two scenarios, there is a substantial probability of
massively increased dependence on Iran. With that dependence comes the
likelihood of Iraqi Shia being turned into puppets of the Iranians.
Obviously, the Shia of Iraq and Iran have some common interests and common
perspectives. During the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iran played an important
role in preserving some of the interests and power of the Iraqi Shia. But
the relationship between the two communities isn't as simple as one might
think. There are theological differences between An Najaf and Qom, the two
religious centers of the Iraqi and Iranian Shia. There is the difference
between Arabs and Persians. And then, not to be crude, there is oil.< BR>The Shia dominate the southern oil fields of Iraq and would dominate the
central government in Baghdad. With oil prices at $70 a barrel -- or even
$40 a barrel -- those southern fields represent an enormous amount of money.
After investment, production levels could rise substantially. Whatever the
communal relations between the two Shiite communities, control of the oil
fields around Basra has tremendous financial significance. Thus, the more
dependent the Iraqi Shia became on Iran, the more Iran would try to shape --
or usurp -- control over the oil fields. This is not a certain outcome, but
it is certainly possible. And it is an enormous and unacceptable risk for
the Iraqi Shia. It is essential that they control the business processes
around that oil. With that amount of money involved, the Iranians would be
tempted to assert control, and that is not something the Iraqi Shia want to
see. With fighting flaring among Shia in Basra
< http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=267640>
(where, incidentally, protesters stormed the Iranian consulate on
Wednesday), the question is already very much on the table. The Shia do not
want to be caught fighting on two fronts.
They also don't want to be caught fighting among themselves. It is never
clear to us the extent to which there are splits among the Shia and the
extent to which various Shiite
<http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=265011>
factions are used by the Shiite leadership to create "good cop, bad cop"
situations. In other words, in watching their actions, it frequently seems
to us that the Shia are more unified than it might appear. In any case, this
is showdown time amon g the S hia. Just as the delivering up of al-Zarqawi
represented a critical step in showing the Shia that there did not have to
be permanent civil war with the Sunnis, getting control of the militias
would be the Shiite way of demonstrating that the Sunnis don't have to fear
the Shia permanently. This is, if you will, the next break point.
In studying the Shiite calculus, it seems to be in their interest both to
avoid a grab for absolute power and to avoid allowing a civil war to
collapse the central government. This is not about loving democracy or their
fellow man. The Shia have gotten the best politico-military situation they
are going to get, and there is a lot of oil money sitting on the table that
could actually slip away from them if they aren't careful. Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani is not a careless man, and he is likely to be seeing what we
are seeing. A space exists in which most of the aspirations of the Iraqi
Shia can be real ized; mo ve much further, though, and they could be reduced
to puppets of the Iranians.
Iranian Goals
It is interesting to note that over the weekend, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim -- who
leads the United Iraqi Alliance coalition in parliament, went to Tehran for
consultations with Iranian leaders. Clearly, al-Hakim, a major Shiite
political figure, needed to sound out the Iranians on their view of Iraq
after al-Zarqawi's death. The Iranians liked what al-Zarqawi was doing --
not only because he was tying up the Americans, but also because his attacks
against Iraqi Shia rendered them more dependent on Iran -- and it was
rumored that they were helping him. Al-Hakim went to Tehran to find out the
Iranian leadership's views, but also, we suspect, to tell the Iranians that
the Iraqi Shia were looking for a formula to make their next move. The
message was delivered delicately, but it was delivered.
We thought for a moment that there would be d irect and open talks between
Iran and the Americans. It didn't happen. Nevertheless, talks of some sort
are critical -- not because of the nuclear issue, but rather because the
Iranians have the ability to disrupt the process in Iraq. The question is
what the Iranians really want. The answer is that they want to be the
dominant power in the region. Neither the Americans, the Saudis or, for that
matter, the Iraqi Shia are really interested in seeing this happen. On the
other hand, the Americans want to see a settlement that gets them out of a
mess. They may agree to something, with the private reservation that they
will work to contain the Iranians later. The Iranians may know that is the
American thinking but will figure that they will deal with the Americans
later.
It gets murky at this point. How the Iranians will react to the situation is
a great uncertainty. However, what appears clear to us is that at the break
point, the Sunnis ti lted towa rd a resolution of the conflict by delivering
up, by whatever devious means, al-Zarqawi. That solves part of the problem.
The next step is for the Shia to show how they will bring their militias
under control. The fighting obviously continues: The non-jihadist Sunni
forces continue to fight, as do the Shiite militias. Al Qaeda is badly hurt
but could regenerate. But given the logic of the Shiite position -- caught
between the death of al-Zarqawi and the Iranian problem -- solving the
question of the militias seems to be in their interests.
Therefore, we would expect to see increasing tension within the Shiite
community and between Iraqi and Iranian Shia in the near future. U.S.
President George W. Bush's visit to Baghdad this week celebrated one moment
in the process, and it was an important one. The next step in the drama will
be difficult and painful, but the logic now is on the side of a long-term
settlement and a long-term d ecline in the war.
That is the logic -- but then, this is the Middle East.
Sadly it is pay only.
Pay for things of teh intarwebs? Pfft!
And I do believe you're not allowed to repost things you had to pay for.
Paying for stuff - how novel. Yes, it is OK to share. Here is their policy;
Distribution and Reprints
This report may be distributed or republished with attribution to Strategic
Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com. For media requests, partnership
opportunities, or commercial distribution or republication, please contact
pr@stratfor.com.
This was embedded in a larger disclosure which I deleted from the original text since it was not relevant to the subject and mostly about subscription incentives.
So many problems, I don't know where to begin.
Well, to start, it is not productive to talk about the decisions of "the Shi'ites." If we want to talk about the decisions that are altering the fate of the country we have to talk about the current Shi'ite leadership, who, especially if something even vaguely approximating a liberal democracy is created, will not necessarily remain in that position of power. They almost certainly know this, and will take steps to prevent it. That is one reason why their interests are very much contrary to democracy, like the interests of every other major player.
The Shi'ite leadership aligned with the US occupation early on, affirming its loyalties by pulling out the rug beneath Moqtada al-Sadr in Spring '04 and again in August '04. They did so in the expectation, turning out to be correct, that elections would put them in power. This alliance was complicated, from what I can tell, by two factors:
1. Moqtada al-Sadr and similar militantly anti-occupation forces, and the popular support behind them. Al-Sadr was seemingly neutralized by a government post, but he seems to be still a factor.
2. Iran. The overtures between the Iraqi government and the Iranian one very much worried the US, and prompted a response.
The response was to remove the Shi'ite domination of power and attempt to form a national unity coalition including the Kurds and the Sunnis, a move which seems to have been mostly successful. Whether the US can maintain control over it is an open question. The Sunni "insurgents" are certainly not going to give up just because a few cabinet seats have been shuffled around.
Another problem with the opinion advanced by the article is the idea that Iran wants to turn the Shi'ites into puppets, but the US doesn't. This is vacuous nonsense, nothing more than the typical exceptionalist swill we are expected to swallow without question. If anything, the Shi'ite leadership has more reason to align with Iran than with the US; it will provide them with more popular support, the political models may end up similar, and Iran is less likely to double-cross them, because it has parallel incentives to align with them. They are willing to sacrifice some independence in order to secure their control; this has been the main thrust of their actions for the past few years.
To all of this, al-Zarqawi is monumentally irrelevant. The Sunnis never supported al-Zarqawi, the nationalist-oriented resistance opposed him from the start - as they would anyone who willfully and regularly slaughtered their fellow citizens.
So many problems, I don't know where to begin.
Well, to start, it is not productive to talk about the decisions of "the Shi'ites." If we want to talk about the decisions that are altering the fate of the country we have to talk about the current Shi'ite leadership, who, especially if something even vaguely approximating a liberal democracy is created, will not necessarily remain in that position of power. They almost certainly know this, and will take steps to prevent it. That is one reason why their interests are very much contrary to democracy, like the interests of every other major player.
The Shi'ite leadership aligned with the US occupation early on, affirming its loyalties by pulling out the rug beneath Moqtada al-Sadr in Spring '04 and again in August '04. They did so in the expectation, turning out to be correct, that elections would put them in power. This alliance was complicated, from what I can tell, by two factors:
1. Moqtada al-Sadr and similar militantly anti-occupation forces, and the popular support behind them. Al-Sadr was seemingly neutralized by a government post, but he seems to be still a factor.
2. Iran. The overtures between the Iraqi government and the Iranian one very much worried the US, and prompted a response.
The response was to remove the Shi'ite domination of power and attempt to form a national unity coalition including the Kurds and the Sunnis, a move which seems to have been mostly successful. Whether the US can maintain control over it is an open question. The Sunni "insurgents" are certainly not going to give up just because a few cabinet seats have been shuffled around.
Another problem with the opinion advanced by the article is the idea that Iran wants to turn the Shi'ites into puppets, but the US doesn't. This is vacuous nonsense, nothing more than the typical exceptionalist swill we are expected to swallow without question. If anything, the Shi'ite leadership has more reason to align with Iran than with the US; it will provide them with more popular support, the political models may end up similar, and Iran is less likely to double-cross them, because it has parallel incentives to align with them. They are willing to sacrifice some independence in order to secure their control; this has been the main thrust of their actions for the past few years.
To all of this, al-Zarqawi is monumentally irrelevant. The Sunnis never supported al-Zarqawi, the nationalist-oriented resistance opposed him from the start - as they would anyone who willfully and regularly slaughtered their fellow citizens.
You contradict yourself quite often in in an irational manner - as follows;
"it is not productive to talk about the decisions of "the Shi'ites."...
we have to talk about the current Shi'ite leadership," huh?
if something even vaguely approximating a liberal democracy is created, (Shiites) will not necessarily remain in that position of power... The Shi'ite leadership aligned with the US occupation early on..in the expectation, turning out to be correct, that elections would put them in power.
Well, which is it?? You can't have both..
"The overtures between the Iraqi government and the Iranian one very much worried the US, and prompted a response. The response was to remove the Shi'ite domination of power" - did you make that up or do you have an example? Sounds pretty made up to me considering the Iraqis drafted their own government and held their own elections - during which - I am certain- nobody fro the US administrtion cast a vote.
Another problem with the opinion advanced by the article is the idea that Iran wants to turn the Shi'ites into puppets, but the US doesn't. This is vacuous nonsense Really? Again - you have examples of US puppet nations? Would that be England? Japan? Germany? South Korea? All of these nations have much in common with Iraq in that they lost a war (or in the event of Korea - tied) and still have US troops stationed there (Except England AFIK). All of these are US puppet nations too? What example or precedent is there or evidence do you have that the US is attempting this with Iraq and that Iran is not interested in extending influence in Iraq?
You say they are different - then say they are the same.
I am making a distinction between the Shi'ites and the Shi'ite leadership.
Well, which is it?? You can't have both..
"Elections" imply "elections," not "liberal democracy." Furthermore, I was referring to what would happen in the long term, not immediately.
did you make that up or do you have an example? Sounds pretty made up to me considering the Iraqis drafted their own government and held their own elections - during which - I am certain- nobody fro the US administrtion cast a vote.
Shiites Say U.S. Is Pressuring Iraqi Leader to Step Aside (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/international/middleeast/28cnd-iraq.html?ex=1301202000&en=15493a3118442a2c&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss[/quote)
Paying attention to the news can help sometimes.
Really? Again - you have examples of US puppet nations?
Most of Latin America? Not so much anymore, but constant intervention of a superpower against Third World countries tends to get that result.
What example or precedent is there or evidence do you have that the US is attempting this with Iraq
The US has shown its disrespect for Iraqi democracy by refusing to respect the wish of the Iraqi people for a withdrawal timetable, for one example.
and that Iran is not interested in extending influence in Iraq?
It's obvious that Iran is. The question is whether the US is.
What's interesting is that you demand evidence that the US is interested in controlling Iraq and also that Iran is not interested in controlling Iraq. That is precisely the exceptionalist standard I referred to in my last post.
Greyenivol Colony
18-06-2006, 01:03
Another problem with the opinion advanced by the article is the idea that Iran wants to turn the Shi'ites into puppets, but the US doesn't. This is vacuous nonsense Really? Again - you have examples of US puppet nations? Would that be England? Japan? Germany? South Korea? All of these nations have much in common with Iraq in that they lost a war (or in the event of Korea - tied) and still have US troops stationed there (Except England AFIK). All of these are US puppet nations too? What example or precedent is there or evidence do you have that the US is attempting this with Iraq and that Iran is not interested in extending influence in Iraq?
Any potentially good point you may have had has been negated in my mind by your inability to refer to the British state by its correct name.
And yeah, there are US troops stationed here.
Any potentially good point you may have had has been negated in my mind by your inability to refer to the British state by its correct name.
And yeah, there are US troops stationed here.
Didn't know that - are they in Ireland? Wales? Scotland?
I am making a distinction between the Shi'ites and the Shi'ite leadership.
"Elections" imply "elections," not "liberal democracy." Furthermore, I was referring to what would happen in the long term, not immediately.
whatever...
Shiites Say U.S. Is Pressuring Iraqi Leader to Step Aside (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/international/middleeast/28cnd-iraq.html?ex=1301202000&en=15493a3118442a2c&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss[/quote)
Paying attention to the news can help sometimes.
This is hardly news. Must have been a slow news day at the times...
Senior Shiite politicians said today that the American ambassador has told Shiite officials to inform the Iraqi prime minister that President Bush does not want him to remain the country's leader in the next government. Sounds more like an event from Middle School than Iraq. "The assistant head cheerleader says that a receiver from the football team told another cheerleader to tell the head cheerleader that the quarterback does not want her to be head cheerleader next year. Like, OH MY GOD!!!"
Regardless, the story then goes on to report; "The decisions about the choice of the prime minister are entirely up to the Iraqis," Ms. Colton said. "This will be an Iraqi decision."
And, even if that is not adequate - it continues with "It is the first time the Americans have directly intervened " according to their source. (the cheerleader) if it is even true.
Hardly an indictment - obvious to anyone who is paying attention.
Most of Latin America? Not so much anymore, but constant intervention of a superpower against Third World countries tends to get that result.
Specifically what South American (or even Central American) nations are puppets? Mexico? Brazil? Ecuador? Belize? Venezuela? You have no leg to stand on there. I will not dispute they are influenced by the US (what nation isn't) but they are certainly not puppets...
The US has shown its disrespect for Iraqi democracy by refusing to respect the wish of the Iraqi people for a withdrawal timetable, for one example.
What evidence do you have that the Iraqi people want a timetable specific to withdrawal?
It's obvious that Iran is. The question is whether the US is.
What's interesting is that you demand evidence that the US is interested in controlling Iraq and also that Iran is not interested in controlling Iraq. That is precisely the exceptionalist standard I referred to in my last post.
The US has specifically said that they are not interested in controlling Iraq and has done nothing to indicate that they want any more than a stable Iraq government. That is fair evidence. Iran has not made such statements but has been found to be funneling money to militias and political parties...
http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=4599
http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=5194
There is plenty of evidence that the US does not want to influence the political process and plenty of evidence that Iran does. It is common sense - not hypocrisy - in requesting evidence supporting any claim to the opposite of what the preponderance of evidence currently indicates.