NationStates Jolt Archive

I know people here have been discussing about the existence of free will from the "deterministic" angle ad nauseum.

What about discussing free will and individual responsibility from a complex systems approach? Let me explain.

A person's behavior is tugged in two directions, internal and external.

Internally, a person is a complex system of many component interactions that influence behavior. If you inject an "aggression" chemical into a person, to what extent is the person responsible for his or her violent actions?

Externally, a person is a component of society that also has a potent influence on behavior. If the organization, or the state, decrees a person to kill, to what extent is the person responsible for the action?

What are the boundaries of "free will" in individual behavior?

"Free will" is a subconstruct of that emergent aspect of a person we call Self. The ability to choose is related to the scope of the individual's consciousness; which, in truth, is not very great. Anything that alters your self, be it society or chemical, changes your ability to choose. However, in doing so, it also changes you.

Regardless of influence, it is always you that makes the choices you do. It just so happens that what you are is in part defined by the societal and physical environment you are in.

What are the boundaries of "free will" in individual behavior?

I don't think there is free will as such. I think humans are decision making creatures. We we take in infomation, we make decisions. But when you ask, could I have decided something else, the question doesn't really make sense, because you are the decision making program. There is no "I" that exists seperate from the ability to make decisions. There is no little man inside you who can decide to change things. You are your decision making capability.

I think a lot of confusion has come about do to the idea that people have a soul. Perhaps if he had never had the concept of a soul we would never have developed the concept of free will.

Yes, free will does exist. I don't know if you have it, but I do know that I make decisions now and then, and the ability to make your own decisions implies free will. So regardless of what you say and regardless of the poll *I* have free will.

EDIT: Boundaries... I guess the boundaries of your thoughts. Society, hormones and whatever else you may list that changes one's actions does that by changing who you are, and thus are not limits on your free will. But if you don't have the ability to see some possibilities, or if you don't understand how you work, then I guess that limits your ability to choose.

I don't know if I care for the idea that someone is making me behave the way that I do. On the other hand, that person obviously has a twisted sense of humor, and we would probably get along very well. ;)

I don't know if I care for the idea that someone is making me behave the way that I do. On the other hand, that person obviously has a twisted sense of humor, and we would probably get along very well. ;)Would you have any choice otherwise?

Yes, free will does exist. I don't know if you have it, but I do know that I make decisions now and then, and the ability to make your own decisions implies free will. So regardless of what you say and regardless of the poll *I* have free will.

EDIT: Boundaries... I guess the boundaries of your thoughts. Society, hormones and whatever else you may list that changes one's actions does that by changing who you are, and thus are not limits on your free will. But if you don't have the ability to see some possibilities, or if you don't understand how you work, then I guess that limits your ability to choose.

I guess what I'm getting at is the responsibility bit of the choices that you are aware of. If I give you ultraviolence juice and you "choose" to kill someone I planted conveniently nearby, should you do the time? Or me?

Whoa, back up. What's this about bunnies attacking Australia?

I don't think there is free will as such. I think humans are decision making creatures. We we take in infomation, we make decisions. But when you ask, could I have decided something else, the question doesn't really make sense, because you are the decision making program. There is no "I" that exists seperate from the ability to make decisions. There is no little man inside you who can decide to change things. You are your decision making capability.

I think a lot of confusion has come about do to the idea that people have a soul. Perhaps if he had never had the concept of a soul we would never have developed the concept of free will.
Sometimes...:p and:(

Yes, free will does exist. I don't know if you have it, but I do know that I make decisions now and then, and the ability to make your own decisions implies free will. So regardless of what you say and regardless of the poll *I* have free will.

1. A marble rolls down a groove until it comes to a fork. There is a fifty percent chance it will take the left fork and a fifty percent chance it will take the right fork. The marble goes to the left. Can we day the marble have free will?

2. A rat goes down a tunnel until it comes to a fork. Previous trails with rats show there is a fifty percent chance the rat will go left and a fifty percent chance the rat will go right. The rat goes to the right. Can we say the rat has free will?

3. Same as above but a human.

Whoa, back up. What's this about bunnies attacking Australia?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabbits_in_Australia

There is no escape.

1. A marble rolls down a groove until it comes to a fork. There is a fifty percent chance it will take the left fork and a fifty percent chance it will take the right fork. The marble goes to the left. Can we day the marble have free will?

2. A rat goes down a tunnel until it comes to a fork. Previous trails with rats show there is a fifty percent chance the rat will go left and a fifty percent chance the rat will go right. The rat goes to the right. Can we say the rat has free will?

3. Same as above but a human.

Interesting, I had this idea before. If everyone has a choice between two options (without threats or tricks) and everyone chooses the same option freely, did they have free will?

A postdoc in my previous lab insisted that as long as the choice was made freely, they had free will. I am suspicious of "free will" compelling everyone to make exactly the same choice.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabbits_in_Australia

There is no escape.

:eek: . OMG they are "an invasive species"! Better lock the doors and stock up on 1080. If I dont make it through the night, give my kangaroo to my girlfriend. :p

I am suspicious of "free will" compelling everyone to make exactly the same choice.

Why? If the option was, for example, death or cake; it's pretty obvious which option most (if not all) people are going to chose. The free will part is that they had the option to chose cake. Now if the person offering was out of death, thats when the trouble starts.

I don't see how we can call free will the ability to make decisions. A cockroach can make decisions but we generally don't regard them as having free will. The question is, although we feel that we have the ability to make free choices is this feeling an illusion?

1. A marble rolls down a groove until it comes to a fork. There is a fifty percent chance it will take the left fork and a fifty percent chance it will take the right fork. The marble goes to the left. Can we day the marble have free will?

2. A rat goes down a tunnel until it comes to a fork. Previous trails with rats show there is a fifty percent chance the rat will go left and a fifty percent chance the rat will go right. The rat goes to the right. Can we say the rat has free will?

3. Same as above but a human.
There is no external proof of free will. That's why I said "I don't know if you have it". Free will is when your preferences about the future make a difference to your behaviour now. I have it. Marbles don't have it (they have no brain and thus no mind). Rats might have it, but I can't know and don't believe it.

Interesting, I had this idea before. If everyone has a choice between two options (without threats or tricks) and everyone chooses the same option freely, did they have free will?

A postdoc in my previous lab insisted that as long as the choice was made freely, they had free will. I am suspicious of "free will" compelling everyone to make exactly the same choice.
If you could show that everyone would act the same way in a certain situation that would mean that this course of action is better for everyone, which might mean that it is objectively better. It doesn't say anything about free will.

I don't see how we can call free will the ability to make decisions. A cockroach can make decisions but we generally don't regard them as having free will. The question is, although we feel that we have the ability to make free choices is this feeling an illusion?

Hmm, that's strange I would consider cockroachs to have free will. But I do agree with you about what the question actually is. The problem is there's no way of answering it.

There is no external proof of free will. That's why I said "I don't know if you have it". Free will is when your preferences about the future make a difference to your behaviour now. I have it. Marbles don't have it (they have no brain and thus no mind). Rats might have it, but I can't know and don't believe it.
I had a rat who made a pretty convincing argument in favour of him possessing (and sporadically employing) free will.
He played tricks on other, dumber rats. And you could watch him thinking it out first.
He tried to climb up peoples' nostrils.

I had a rat who made a pretty convincing argument in favour of him possessing (and sporadically employing) free will.
He played tricks on other, dumber rats. And you could watch him thinking it out first.
He tried to climb up peoples' nostrils.

He tried to climb up peoples' nostrils of his own volition? I think you just contradicted yourself.

He tried to climb up peoples' nostrils of his own volition? I think you just contradicted yourself.
How? I didn't say he was intelligent, i implied he had sporadic instances of what appeared to be free will. I did also say he could be seen thinking out his pranks on the other rats.
Yes, and he tried to pry my lips open and climb in. So i let him. *shrug*
He'd actually sit in your mouth while you talked. He loved it. So did the cats.

I guess what I'm getting at is the responsibility bit of the choices that you are aware of. If I give you ultraviolence juice and you "choose" to kill someone I planted conveniently nearby, should you do the time? Or me?
What is "ultraviolence juice"? What does "give" mean in the context?

As to who is responsible, you don't give enough information to know that. To take the easy case first, if I knowingly and without being forced did something that caused his death, then that is my responsibility and you are innocent. If the "juice" directly caused me to kill him, then the relevant action would be drinking it, but I would still be responsible.

If you did force or fool me to drink a mindaltering substance, then that is assault, for which you should be punished. I see it as analogous to you pushing me against the other man so that he falls off a rock and dies. In that case I should be punished for manslaughter if and only if I could still make the choice not to kill him, while you should be punished for the murder as well as the assault if and only if there was no way I could do differently.

"I don't see how we can call free will the ability to make decisions. A cockroach can make decisions but we generally don't regard them as having free will. The question is, although we feel that we have the ability to make free choices is this feeling an illusion?"

Althusser would say it is an illusion which reproduces the system...
and i think i agree with him.

The question is, although we feel that we have the ability to make free choices is this feeling an illusion?
Yeah, sure. On the other hand, who says society isn't an illusion? Who says this message isn't an illusion? Who says everything isn't just a great big illusion? Somewhere asking if things are illusions goes from filosophy to inanity, and I would like to hear an argument why questioning free will hasn't crossed that line.

Or we could do a sensible version of Pasqual's wager and say that either we have free will or we haven't. If we don't, then we can't change anything, and then it doesn't matter what we think. On the other hand if we do have it we can make a difference, and then it is a good thing to understand that. So assuming both are possible it is better or at least equally good to think that we have free will compared to thinking that we don't.

Yeah, sure. On the other hand, who says society isn't an illusion? Who says this message isn't an illusion? Who says everything isn't just a great big illusion? Somewhere asking if things are illusions goes from filosophy to inanity, and I would like to hear an argument why questioning free will hasn't crossed that line.

Or we could do a sensible version of Pasqual's wager and say that either we have free will or we haven't. If we don't, then we can't change anything, and then it doesn't matter what we think. On the other hand if we do have it we can make a difference, and then it is a good thing to understand that. So assuming both are possible it is better or at least equally good to think that we have free will compared to thinking that we don't.

well, it is an illusion unlike your other examples, since that illusion creates a pseudo-concept of 'individual', over which the capitalistic system reproduces itself. the conceptioning of the society might be called an 'illusion' but society as a 'social formation' is not an illusion, it is a form of survival for the humans.

I think the concept of free will is a bit of a dead end. All we can say is that we appear to make decisions and the results of decision can bring us pleasure or pain. So I recommend makeing decisions that maximize long term pleasure (so lay off the smack) and minimize pain. There is no evidence I can think of for a mind/body duality that some assume is the basis of free will. I could easily lampoon a person who believes in free will as someone who says after making a decision, "Yeah, but I could have made a different choice if I wanted to because I have free will."

well, it is an illusion unlike your other examples, since that illusion creates a pseudo-concept of 'individual', over which the capitalistic system reproduces itself. the conceptioning of the society might be called an 'illusion' but society as a 'social formation' is not an illusion, it is a form of survival for the humans.
:eek: We are different species.

I think the concept of free will is a bit of a dead end. All we can say is that we appear to make decisions and the results of decision can bring us pleasure or pain. So I recommend makeing decisions that maximize long term pleasure (so lay off the smack) and minimize pain. There is no evidence I can think of for a mind/body duality that some assume is the basis of free will. I could easily lampoon a person who believes in free will as someone who says after making a decision, "Yeah, but I could have made a different choice if I wanted to because I have free will."
Yeah, I think that I aknowledged that one before. But is that how you see yourself?

I think the concept of free will is a bit of a dead end. All we can say is that we appear to make decisions and the results of decision can bring us pleasure or pain. So I recommend makeing decisions that maximize long term pleasure (so lay off the smack) and minimize pain. There is no evidence I can think of for a mind/body duality that some assume is the basis of free will. I could easily lampoon a person who believes in free will as someone who says after making a decision, "Yeah, but I could have made a different choice if I wanted to because I have free will."
But they could have done so and would have done so if they wanted. They didn't, and thus any post-event speculation as to what may have otherwise happened is somewhat meaningless, but had their thought processes indicated a preference to follow a different course of action, a different course of action could be taken.

The issue here is one of want itself. Our desires and impulses are not random things, nor are they generated from nothing. They are the result of internal biological interactions and chemical processes. What it is we want is decided by our physical composition, which can itself, in acting on these wants, cause yet more instances of want or need.

This thing we call I is an abstraction that includes these pseudo-deterministic feedback systems. (I say pseudo-deterministic since although it's theoretically possible to predict general behaviour for the system as a whole, the behaviour of individual member finite particles is unpredictable) It has to be; how else can we define I other than as such an emergent systemic entity?

If what I is includes this roughly determined system of want and need then it stands to reason that I can and do therefore act however I want. It is not unrestricted free will, by any means, but it is freedom of choice.

Bee-Beep. As-a-Ko-re-an-sex-bot-I-have-no-free-will-I-ex-ist-to-plea-sure-you. Beeeeeeep.

Bee-Beep. As-a-Ko-re-an-sex-bot-I-have-no-free-will-I-ex-ist-to-plea-sure-you. Beeeeeeep.

Hey you're the sort of guy who would have fond memories of Synclavier keyboards and think modern digital instruments sound too "natural" to be good.

Rock!:fluffle:

Internally, a person is a complex system of many component interactions that influence behavior. If you inject an "aggression" chemical into a person, to what extent is the person responsible for his or her violent actions?
This person is responsible for his or her violent actions to the extent that they have conscious contol over themselves and act deliberately while under the influence.

Externally, a person is a component of society that also has a potent influence on behavior. If the organization, or the state, decrees a person to kill, to what extent is the person responsible for the action?
Fully, unless of course they obey unwittingly.

What are the boundaries of "free will" in individual behavior?
Conscious, deliberate and controlled behavior is wilful behavior.

Yeah, I think that I aknowledged that one before. But is that how you see yourself?

Hmmm. Well, I seem to exist and I seem capable of taking actions and making decisions. Some actions seems to make my life better, some make it worse. Drinking chocolate milk brings pleasure but drinking it all the time reduces pleasure and ability to squeeze through doorways. Walking into tables brings pain so I try to avoid doing this. I find I am spread out over time, recieving input from the past called memories, input from the present via my senes and also input from my own speculations about the future. My memories suggest that I am likely to continue to exist for quite some time. So yes, that is how I see myself.

I don't think there is free will as such. I think humans are decision making creatures. We we take in infomation, we make decisions. But when you ask, could I have decided something else, the question doesn't really make sense, because you are the decision making program. There is no "I" that exists seperate from the ability to make decisions. There is no little man inside you who can decide to change things. You are your decision making capability.
Just so! Except, that *is* free will. "Could you have made a different decision?" is not free will. "This is the decision I made," is free will. Free will isn't about having choices, it's about making a decision (self-determination).

There i no such thing as free will.

We are all just following a series of 'IF/THEN' statements.

There i no such thing as free will.

We are all just following a series of 'IF/THEN' statements.
IF/THEN requires a decision.

I know people here have been discussing about the existence of free will from the "deterministic" angle ad nauseum.

What about discussing free will and individual responsibility from a complex systems approach? Let me explain.

A person's behavior is tugged in two directions, internal and external.

Internally, a person is a complex system of many component interactions that influence behavior. If you inject an "aggression" chemical into a person, to what extent is the person responsible for his or her violent actions?

It has been said before, and indeed it is quite a logical supposition, that a person injected with some mind altering drug is only responsible for their actions bearing in mind the strength of the drug. If it's something quite strong, then the chances are they will have no conscious control over their actions. However, it could be a case of simply a lack of mental willpower.

Externally, a person is a component of society that also has a potent influence on behavior. If the organization, or the state, decrees a person to kill, to what extent is the person responsible for the action?

What are the boundaries of "free will" in individual behavior?

A person is always free to choose. Though the consequences of your choice be undesirable, the choice is still there to be made. Short of actually taking physical and/or mental control of a person a state or organisation can not actually make anyone do anything. Consequently if said person does kill, they are wholly responsible. Pleading innocence based on the statement that they would be killed themselves is not excuse.

If what I is includes this roughly determined system of want and need then it stands to reason that I can and do therefore act however I want. It is not unrestricted free will, by any means, but it is freedom of choice.

So then, free will does not exist? All choices are limited, as they are dictated by external circumstances both in and out of our control. Based on this principle a person may make a choice, but it is always a limited set of choices. Of course we are innately bound by the most basic laws of physics and such. I may want to simply float off the planet, but because of gravity I cannot. The means to pursue this desire are wholly beyond my control. Now that said, one may use external means to achieve this end, but the fact is I still cannot, by my own compulsion, leave the earths gravitational pull.

But I suppose I have missed the point somewhat with that. That it may be impossible to do something does not preclude the fact that one may choose to do it. One may choose, but only insofar as one may make a decision. As I said, external circumstances often dictate the viability of fulfilling this want or need.

So, free will? No. We are free to make our own decisions and perform our own actions, but there are boundries. And no matter how basic they be, they are still boundries, and this then cannot be free will.

What are the boundaries of "free will" in individual behavior? Well, we will be held responsible for decisions whether or not we have the free will to make them, so at the very least the concept of free will exists in post-action analysis. Most determinists would consider this to be part of the deterministic chain.

IF/THEN requires a decision.Not necessarily. If it starts to rain, then I will stay indoors. If it does not rain, I will go outside. There may or may not be a decision there, but simply a response to an 'if'.

A person is always free to choose. Though the consequences of your choice be undesirable, the choice is still there to be made. Short of actually taking physical and/or mental control of a person a state or organisation can not actually make anyone do anything. Consequently if said person does kill, they are wholly responsible. Pleading innocence based on the statement that they would be killed themselves is not excuse.

I have an issue with this view. What does it matter if the gun to the decider's head is point blank or a kilometre away on a sniper rifle? Whether the decider dies immediately or will be killed next week.

When one is cornered in a do or die situation the "free-will" aspect is truely suspect.

Hmmm. Well, I seem to exist and I seem capable of taking actions and making decisions. Some actions seems to make my life better, some make it worse. Drinking chocolate milk brings pleasure but drinking it all the time reduces pleasure and ability to squeeze through doorways. Walking into tables brings pain so I try to avoid doing this. I find I am spread out over time, recieving input from the past called memories, input from the present via my senes and also input from my own speculations about the future. My memories suggest that I am likely to continue to exist for quite some time. So yes, that is how I see myself.
But that sounds to me precisely like a description of a person with free will. So why do you think that free will is a dead end, and why would you be lampooning a person for thinking that they made a choice? (referring to the post that I replied to)

I have an issue with this view. What does it matter if the gun to the decider's head is point blank or a kilometre away on a sniper rifle? Whether the decider dies immediately or will be killed next week.

When one is cornered in a do or die situation the "free-will" aspect is truely suspect.

I don't agree. You're freedom to make a decision has not been taken away, I see it as being influenced in a given direction. It's easy to say that with a gun to your head you don't really have a choice but you do.

You are still in complete control of both your mind and body. It is true, however, that the consequences of a given choice may move someone to a decision, but that is just it: a decision.

Not necessarily. If it starts to rain, then I will stay indoors. If it does not rain, I will go outside. There may or may not be a decision there, but simply a response to an 'if'.
How does 'the response to an if' differ from a decision?

How does 'the response to an if' differ from a decision?In the same type of way that if I fall out of the window, then I will plummet to the ground. The plummeting to the ground is a response to the if.

Why? If the option was, for example, death or cake; it's pretty obvious which option most (if not all) people are going to chose. The free will part is that they had the option to chose cake. Now if the person offering was out of death, thats when the trouble starts.

What if I don't like cake?

The argument is not that the person did not make a decision, only that his decision is predetermined. For example we choose cake because of natural and socially conditioned preferences.

What if I don't like cake?

The argument is not that the person did not make a decision, only that his decision is predetermined. For example we choose cake because of natural and socially conditioned preferences.
That's called free will.

EDIT: Assuming of course that it is the preferences of the chooser, not somebody else, that determines the choice.

That's called free will.

EDIT: Assuming of course that it is the preferences of the chooser, not somebody else, that determines the choice.

No, its a causal link.

Only if it is shown that the preference originated within the individual does it become free will.

No, its a causal link.

Only if it is shown that the preference originated within the individual does it become free will.
Why? And where else could it possibly come from? "Natural and social conditions" determine who you are, but that does not change the fact that at each instant you have free will, ie your decisions are determined by your personal preferences, as well as by the circumstances.

Besides, "only if it's shown" what goes on inside your head means you already made up your mind. And if you don't believe that you control your actions, then that's your prerogative. However, I do, so free will exists even if it is only in me.

Why? And where else could it possibly come from? "Natural and social conditions" determine who you are, but that does not change the fact that at each instant you have free will, ie your decisions are determined by your personal preferences, as well as by the circumstances.

Besides, "only if it's shown" what goes on inside your head means you already made up your mind. And if you don't believe that you control your actions, then that's your prerogative. However, I do, so free will exists even if it is only in me.

I am saying that, at any instance, a causal chain will lead to a finite number of factors that will result in your decision. All of your preferences are a result of conditioning and biological factors that are out of your control. Like timber floating in a river, the person is totally subject to natural forces, a natural algorithm, outside of his or her control. It is the subjective nature of the decision making process that gives us the illusion of free will.

In the same type of way that if I fall out of the window, then I will plummet to the ground. The plummeting to the ground is a response to the if.
But then falling to the ground isn't an action you take, but something that happens *to* you. You are correct, then, in that there is no decision and no free will involved in things that happen to us.

Free will only applies to actions initiated by us.

But then falling to the ground isn't an action you take, but something that happens *to* you. You are correct, then, in that there is no decision and no free will involved in things that happen to us.

Free will only applies to actions initiated by us.Right, so what I'm saying is that what appears to be free will could simply be things that happen to us affecting us. VO2 explained this well in the post above yours.

I am saying that, at any instance, a causal chain will lead to a finite number of factors that will result in your decision. All of your preferences are a result of conditioning and biological factors that are out of your control. Like timber floating in a river, the person is totally subject to natural forces, a natural algorithm, outside of his or her control. It is the subjective nature of the decision making process that gives us the illusion of free will.
But it's still your decision. No matter what criteria you may use to make your decision, the decision cannot be made by those criteria, only by the conscious mind placed between them and the result.

But then falling to the ground isn't an action you take, but something that happens *to* you. You are correct, then, in that there is no decision and no free will involved in things that happen to us.

Free will only applies to actions initiated by us.

A good point that takes us back to where we started. Who actually initiated the action. Component interactions below the system level of self? Social effects above the system level of self?

Human beings are complex open systems, impossible to isolate from either organizational levels. Where did the "initial" action come from?

Right, so what I'm saying is that what appears to be free will could simply be things that happen to us affecting us. VO2 explained this well in the post above yours.
But falling out of a window has no appearance of an act of free will. Jumping off the building might, but that's a different act than the if/then one you exampled.

But falling out of a window has no appearance of an act of free will. Jumping off the building might, but that's a different act than the if/then one you exampled.I'm saying that a determinist would say that if somebody jumps off of a building, then that's the only action that they could have taken in that instance, in the same way that falling to the ground is the only thing that could have happened in that instance.

A good point that takes us back to where we started. Who actually initiated the action. Component interactions below the system level of self? Social effects above the system level of self?

Human beings are complex open systems, impossible to isolate from either organizational levels. Where did the "initial" action come from?
The initial action comes from us. If there is any doubt, then you doubt your own ability to do anything.

You are trying to examine objectively something that is a subjectively experienced phenomenon.

But it's still your decision. No matter what criteria you may use to make your decision, the decision cannot be made by those criteria, only by the conscious mind placed between them and the result.

'Your' designates possession, possession does not necessitate origination.

Certainly a thinking mind is necessary for a decision, however, we can't argue that the thinking mind is its own creator.

'Your' designates possession, possession does not necessitate origination.

Certainly a thinking mind is necessary for a decision, however, we can't argue that the thinking mind is its own creator.
Posession requires a possessee, and that possessee is the originator of things that possessee does. Otherwise, the possessee is not "doing" the things.

If the thinking mind is its own creator then it is the initiator of all it is and does.
EDIT: Ah, I read that wrong. No argument with your last statement.

But falling out of a window has no appearance of an act of free will. Jumping off the building might, but that's a different act than the if/then one you exampled.

I would say that the act of jumping off and being pushed off a building are largely the same.

Ok, so now Vittos and Jello have redefined free will so that you must be entirely independent of the world to have it. And obviously we ain't. Whereas I define free will as the ability to make decisions and act, which we just as obviously have. This teaches one thing only: Filosophy debates on the 'net is like the Special Olympics. Even if you win you are retarded, otherwise you wouldn't have been there.

I would say that the act of jumping off and being pushed off a building are largely the same.
How so? One is initiated by the jumpee, the other by someone external to him. How are those the same?

The illusion of free will is simply because we don't know all the factors going in to making the decision.

We decide what we do because our environment interacts with our biology in such a way that, given our history, causes certain synapses in our brain to fire and certain other ones to not.

Now, since we can never know all of these factors, we may as well operate under the assumption of free will, since we will be held accountable for our actions by other people who are under that assumption as well anyway.

Posession requires a possessee, and that possessee is the originator of things that possessee does. Otherwise, the possessee is not "doing" the things.


Your first statement is a non-sequitor, to appropriately follow you must replace the word "does" with "has," and that makes the statement demonstrably false.

Our subjective drives us to accept possession of decisions because they are observed as happening within us. But that does not go far enough in determining cause, origination.

The illusion of free will is simply because we don't know all the factors going in to making the decision.

We decide what we do because our environment interacts with our biology in such a way that, given our history, causes certain synapses in our brain to fire and certain other ones to not.

Now, since we can never know all of these factors, we may as well operate under the assumption of free will, since we will be held accountable for our actions by other people who are under that assumption as well anyway.

Agreed. Do you think our behavior can be completely deterministic without being completely predictable?

The illusion of free will is simply because we don't know all the factors going in to making the decision.
No; it's because we can't know all the factors involved in making the decision, and that's because we view the decision from a subjective perspective. A subjective perspective is a vital component of a wilful act (well, consciousness, which is what creates the subjective perspective).

We decide what we do because our environment interacts with our biology in such a way that, given our history, causes certain synapses in our brain to fire and certain other ones to not.
But, still, we are the ones doing the deciding, not the external factors.

Ok, so now Vittos and Jello have redefined free will so that you must be entirely independent of the world to have it. And obviously we ain't. Whereas I define free will as the ability to make decisions and act, which we just as obviously have. This teaches one thing only: Filosophy debates on the 'net is like the Special Olympics. Even if you win you are retarded, otherwise you wouldn't have been there.

No, there are two tests that allow us to say we have free will:

a) We are an original cause. There is some impetus for a decision that originates in the person and cannot be traced to a prior cause.

b) There are multiple possibilities for action, and the original cause in the person lead to the singling out of one preferred action.


EDIT I just realized that my post was completely uninfluenced by Krakatao0's insult, I am a zen master.

How so? One is initiated by the jumpee, the other by someone external to him. How are those the same?

I disagree that the action is ultimately initiated by the jumpee. It is only a domino.

Your first statement is a non-sequitor, to appropriately follow you must replace the word "does" with "has," and that makes the statement demonstrably false.
And what does a conscious mind possess, what does it "have" from its perspective? I'll tell you: states of being.

Our subjective drives us to accept possession of decisions because they are observed as happening within us. But that does not go far enough in determining cause, origination.
"Our subjective drives us..."? "Our subjective" is us. In your insistence on placing responsibility for our actions on something external to us, you say things that make no sense. Okay, I'll assume you mean the subjective perspective results in possession of things external to consciousness that are identified as "us", e.g. our body, our mind, our heart, our decisions. No argument there.

You are the subjective perspective that you have.

That's the "self." It doesn't determine cause objectively, only subjectively. It cannot present an objective cause, only be one to someone else. States of being.

No, there are two tests that allow us to say we have free will:

a) We are an original cause. There is some impetus for a decision that originates in the person and cannot be traced to a prior cause.

b) There are multiple possibilities for action, and the original cause in the person lead to the singling out of one preferred action.


EDIT I just realized that my post was completely uninfluenced by Krakatao0's insult, I am a zen master.
Free will has only one real test: it requires that our actions be voluntary.

Agreed. Do you think our behavior can be completely deterministic without being completely predictable?Absolutely. Like PI, each number is completely deterministic, but without pattern there is no prediction.

I disagree that the action is ultimately initiated by the jumpee. It is only a domino.
Then he is not responsible for jumping, and by extension none of us are responsible for anything we supposedly "do". What a useless philosophy.

And what does a conscious mind possess, what does it "have" from its perspective? I'll tell you: states of being.

What is your point?

"Our subjective drives us..."? "Our subjective" is us. In your insistence on placing responsibility for our actions on something external to us, you say things that make no sense. Okay, I'll assume you mean the subjective perspective results in possession of things external to consciousness that are identified as "us", e.g. our body, our mind, our heart, our decisions. No argument there.

You are the subjective perspective that you have.

That's the "self." It doesn't determine cause objectively, only subjectively. It cannot present an objective cause, only be one. States of being.

What is your point?

Free will has only one real test: it requires that our actions be voluntary.

How do we test whether they are voluntary?

Then he is not responsible for jumping, and by extension none of us are responsible for anything we supposedly "do". What a useless philosophy.

It isn't useless at all, it is our dependance on the perception of ourselves as a thinking thing that makes it useless.

When we we use determinism to break our existence down to merely an experiencing thing, we can start a new framework of morality and philosophy in general.

What is your point?

What is your point?
When we are talking about consciousness, "has" is "does".

How do we test whether they are voluntary?
We ask him.

But, still, we are the ones doing the deciding, not the external factors.I'd argue we're not, because "we" don't actually exist. We're merely products of an electro-chemical engine, something demonstrated when we create anomolies in that engine, such as by ingesting Prozac, which occasionally causes people to decide to commit suicide -- more often when they're adolescent and their electro-chemical engine is undergoing its own changes.

If who you are can change so radically based on the ingestion of a chemical, it seems foolhardy to suppose that you have any existance beyond the electrical, chemical, and biolgical processes that make up your body. Given such, any decisions made are really environmental processes.

I'd argue we're not, because "we" don't actually exist. We're merely products of an electro-chemical engine, something demonstrated when we create anomolies in that engine, such as by ingesting Prozac, which occasionally causes people to decide to commit suicide -- more often when they're adolescent and their electro-chemical engine is undergoing its own changes.

If who you are can change so radically based on the ingestion of a chemical, it seems foolhardy to suppose that you have any existance beyond the electrical, chemical, and biolgical processes that make up your body. Given such, any decisions made are really environmental processes.
Products exist.

Whoever you are, you are. As long as it's you doing the things, it doesn't matter (for the purposes of this discussion) if your entire personality has changed.

Objectively, yes, actions are determined by electro-chemical biological processes. But free will is experienced by the subject, not objectively --it has no objective context. Free will is... the subjective translation of that objective event. It is "I decide," as opposed to "it was decided by these forces." In the former, I am the subject; in the latter, the forces are the subject deciding things for me. In the former, free will is expressed; in the latter, free will is not addressed.

I put down, "I don't know and don't give a rat's ass." It is somewhat fascinating, I guess. The question I would ask myself is, "If I knew, would I act any differently?" I don't think I would, and hence, I don't think it's important. It's just semantics.

Products exist.

Whoever you are, you are. As long as it's you doing the things, it doesn't matter (for the purposes of this discussion) if your entire personality has changed.

Objectively, yes, actions are determined by electro-chemical biological processes. But free will is experienced by the subject, not objectively --it has no objective context. Free will is... the subjective translation of that objective event. It is "I decide," as opposed to "it was decided by these forces." In the former, I am the subject; in the latter, the forces are the subject deciding things for me. In the former, free will is expressed; in the latter, free will is not addressed.
So essentially you're saying that the subjective perception of free will exists, even though objectively it does not.

This makes about as much sense as claiming that since you subjectively experience the existance of pink unicorns, they exist.

So essentially you're saying that the subjective perception of free will exists, even though objectively it does not.

This makes about as much sense as claiming that since you subjectively experience the existance of pink unicorns, they exist.
Especially the invisible ones.

When we are talking about consciousness, "has" is "does".

I still don't understand.

I think you are just rewording your initial statement, that because we possess the decision we are the cause of the decision, but I don't know why I should just accept that.

There is nothing about possession that implies cause, it only implies existence. If we observe our making a decision, all we can know from that observation is that the decision took place, we cannot make determine the cause by simply observing the decision.

We ask him.

We might as well ask a preist if there is a God. He can explain how he feels God's presence until he is blue in the face, but it goes nowhere to proving God's existence to me.

But that sounds to me precisely like a description of a person with free will. So why do you think that free will is a dead end, and why would you be lampooning a person for thinking that they made a choice? (referring to the post that I replied to)

I think discussions about free aren't very fruitful because there is no way I can know that I am not a robot following some preprogrammed course and there is no way that I can know that my decisions aren't the result of a trillion dice being rolled in my head. I see myself as a program generated by chemical reactions inside my skull to coordinate my actions. Since to survive well I have to predict my own effects upon the environment I am self aware. My self aware processing of infomation is what we refer to as free will, but as I believe that I cannot have a thought independant of the chemical reactions in my brain I don't see how my thoughts are free. I see myself as having a head full of dice. Sure my actions aren't random, as I learn the dice get loaded in various ways, but it's still a head full of dice.

So essentially you're saying that the subjective perception of free will exists, even though objectively it does not.

This makes about as much sense as claiming that since you subjectively experience the existance of pink unicorns, they exist.

I have discussed this with him before and that is exactly how I felt.

He believes that the subjective view that we possess free will and the objective view that we don't are equally valid, and maybe I just don't think 'outside-of-the-box', but it doesn't register for me.

So essentially you're saying that the subjective perception of free will exists, even though objectively it does not.

This makes about as much sense as claiming that since you subjectively experience the existance of pink unicorns, they exist.
Sort of; I am saying that free will is perceived by the subject, because it, like the subjective perspective itself, is a phenomenon of consciousness. It is consciousness asserting itself with deliberation and control. The determination for action that precedes manifestation of that action.

Imaginary pink unicorns exist. It is not an actual existence, but it is existence.

I still don't understand.

I think you are just rewording your initial statement, that because we possess the decision we are the cause of the decision, but I don't know why I should just accept that.

There is nothing about possession that implies cause, it only implies existence. If we observe our making a decision, all we can know from that observation is that the decision took place, we cannot make determine the cause by simply observing the decision.
And I'll keep rewording it until I find something that makes sense to you. Let's give it another go.

Free will is not about cause but determination. "Cause" is what happens to us to make us do things: it is the objective view. "Determination" is what we do to cause things, such as decisions and solutions, to occur. That is the subjective view. Both are present to help define our existence. We act, and in turn we are acted upon by the universe. All's well.

Free will is the us-active bit.

We might as well ask a preist if there is a God. He can explain how he feels God's presence until he is blue in the face, but it goes nowhere to proving God's existence to me.
Asking the preist if there is an actual God (external to him) is not the same as asking a person if he deliberately did something. While the former may or may not be real, we can usually take the word of the person for the latter. We generally trust that people know themselves; no one else can.

He believes that the subjective view that we possess free will and the objective view that we don't are equally valid, and maybe I just don't think 'outside-of-the-box', but it doesn't register for me.
Both subjective and objective views exist and are part of our experience of existence. Why are they not equally valid?

Sort of; I am saying that free will is perceived by the subject, because it, like the subjective perspective itself, is a phenomenon of consciousness. It is consciousness asserting itself with deliberation and control. The determination for action that precedes manifestation of that action.

Yes. Free will is necessarily subjective; it is only from the subjective perspective that it is meaningful at all. The objective fact that our decisions and consciousness are determined, or coexistent with, various material processes not under our control is irrelevant.

Free will is the consciousness's translation of the processes of decision-making, in accordance with its creation of an identity from similar brain processes; it exists as long as the processes determine our actions.

And I'll keep rewording it until I find something that makes sense to you. Let's give it another go.

Free will is not about cause but determination. "Cause" is what happens to us to make us do things: it is the objective view. "Determination" is what we do to cause things, such as decisions and solutions, to occur. That is the subjective view. Both are present to help define our existence. We act, and in turn we are acted upon by the universe. All's well.

Free will is the us-active bit.

Determination and causation are the same when discussing free will. If we find that actions are ultimately caused or determined by the person, then we have free will, if the actions are ultimately caused or determined outside of the person then there is no free will.

Asking the preist if there is an actual God (external to him) is not the same as asking a person if he deliberately did something. While the former may or may not be real, we can usually take the word of the person for the latter. We generally trust that people know themselves; no one else can.

I have already said that the sense of self creates an illusion of cause from within the person. As this is purely a subjective view (like God), as you will agree, it cannot be viewed as truth.

Both subjective and objective views exist and are part of our experience of existence. Why are they not equally valid?

Two views that offer opposing realities cannot both be correct. There is only one reality. The position of the objective is one of established truth, and in times of conflict between the views, the objective is taken.

Determination and causation are the same when discussing free will. If we find that actions are ultimately caused or determined by the person, then we have free will, if the actions are ultimately caused or determined outside of the person then there is no free will.
That is an objective view of things --it places the cause of things apart from the human even while proposing to take his free will into account. If we find that actions are ultimate at all, then we have an objective thing, because I know you are speaking of objective reality, not reality subjectively viewed.

I have already said that the sense of self creates an illusion of cause from within the person. As this is purely a subjective view (like God), as you will agree, it cannot be viewed as truth.
Well, I don't agree. Truth can be viewed subjectively.

Two views that offer opposing realities cannot both be correct. There is only one reality. The position of the objective is one of established truth, and in times of conflict between the views, the objective is taken.
They can only not both be correct if "correctness" is laid solely on one at the expense of the other; in this case, you have laid it on the objective view.

There is only one reality; there are two perspectives of it.

From the subjective view, it is correct that free will exists. When you change to an objective view, free will is no longer in the picture.

Determination and causation are the same when discussing free will. If we find that actions are ultimately caused or determined by the person, then we have free will, if the actions are ultimately caused or determined outside of the person then there is no free will.

What is "the person"?

That is an objective view of things --it places the cause of things apart from the human even while proposing to take his free will into account. If we find that actions are ultimate at all, then we have an objective thing, because I know you are speaking of objective reality, not reality subjectively viewed.

Determination and causation are the same from each perspective, the ultimate is required from each perspective. If subjective perspective implies free will it must imply that the individual is the ultimate determinant/cause of the action.

Well, I don't agree. Truth can be viewed subjectively.

Certainly it can, it must.

However, the subjective view can be shown to be false through the formation of the objective.

They can only not both be correct if "correctness" is laid solely on one at the expense of the other; in this case, you have laid it on the objective view.

Correctness is not 'laid' on one view over another, it is inherently possessed by one or the other. I cannot simply give truth to a concept, I can only discover it in a concept.

And the reason they cannot both be correct is because they imply completely opposing results. Free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, one says we are the deciding factor of our actions, one says we aren't. It is logically impossible for both to be accurate discriptions of reality.

There is only one reality; there are two perspectives of it.

From the subjective view, it is correct that free will exists. When you change to an objective view, free will is no longer in the picture.[/QUOTE]

What is "the person"?

That is a very open-ended question.

In the sense that I used it, it would be the entity that experiences the decision itself. I guess it could be considered the conscious thinker.

In the end, it depends on what one means by person. A 'person' could constitute all physical qualities of the human, it could constitute only those metaphysical qualities of thought.

Determination and causation are the same from each perspective, the ultimate is required from each perspective. If subjective perspective implies free will it must imply that the individual is the ultimate determinant/cause of the action.
They are not the same. If I determine that a thing is to be, then I can claim that I acted wilfully. If circumstances determine that a thing is to be, then I cannot claim to have acted wilfully. I have no right to such a claim on behalf of the universe, which is the subject in that case (one with an anthropomorphized consciousness). These are subjective views, with either me or the universe as the subject of our determined actions.

If, on the other hand, I want to examine what happens objectively I would look to causation, to cause-and-effect. That is the objective view regardless of which participants, objects or subjects are being discussed. Events follow each other in sequence from a perspective somewhere apart from the events, that looks at everything equally and can talk about them equally. That is the ultimate you refer to, that truth must abide. (That is the whole purpose and advantage of having the objective perspective: that we can describe objective reality.)

The ultimate you talk about --the one single sole explanation of causation --is only required from the objective perspective. The subjective perspective on the universe is unique to each individual or group observing it. From the subjective perspective, regarding free will, each individual thing (or group) is an explanation of causation. Multiple ultimate causes, one for each subject in the universe (and even one for the universe itself).

Free will claims responsibility and intent for actions. This is the voluntary act, the one that is determined by the conscious subject.

Certainly it can, it must.

However, the subjective view can be shown to be false through the formation of the objective.
In other words, it can be shown to be "false" in comparison to something it is not, namely the objective view. But then that's true of anything: it is "false" when it is expected to be something it is not.

Correctness is not 'laid' on one view over another, it is inherently possessed by one or the other. I cannot simply give truth to a concept, I can only discover it in a concept.

And the reason they cannot both be correct is because they imply completely opposing results. Free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, one says we are the deciding factor of our actions, one says we aren't. It is logically impossible for both to be accurate discriptions of reality.
The thing is, the two views do not offer opposing realities, they offer two views of reality. It is you who says that the objective view is the correct one, and the subjective view "false" because its view does not abide by the objective view. Therefore you have laid correctness on the objective view.

We cannot "give truth to a concept," but we can view both reality and truth either objectively or subjectively. The reality and the truth so viewed do not change, only the perspective changes. There is only one reality, and truth is absolute.

I used to think, too, that free will and determinism were incompatible, until I realised that because both are true, there must be a piece missing to my puzzle. That piece is the perspectives. It is the subject/object divide that allows them both to be true ...and I covered that ad nauseum in the other thread we did, so I won't repeat it.

The result that suggests that the individual is the cause of actions is only incompatible with determinism when both results are viewed objectively. It is only logically impossible for both to be an objective description of reality (Do you see now how the subjective is ignored by the objective?).

We ask him.

I used to think, too, that free will and determinism were incompatible, until I realised that because both are true, there must be a piece missing to my puzzle. That piece is the perspectives. It is the subject/object divide that allows them both to be true ...and I covered that ad nauseum in the other thread we did, so I won't repeat it.

The result that suggests that the individual is the cause of actions is only incompatible with determinism when both results are viewed objectively. It is only logically impossible for both to be an objective description of reality (Do you see now how the subjective is ignored by the objective?).So then does this mean that a person who believes ze has free will has free will, and a person who believes zir actions are determined does not have free will?

(*Ze and zir being gender-neutral pronouns.)

So then does this mean that a person who believes ze has free will has free will, and a person who believes zir actions are determined does not have free will?
Uh... no. The person who believes in Determinism has wilfully surrendered the free will that he has to a higher authority. He still has it, he just uses it to claim he doesn't.

Uh... no. The person who believes in Determinism has wilfully surrendered the free will that he has to a higher authority. He still has it, he just uses it to claim he doesn't.Then how can free will and determinism both be correct?

They are not the same. If I determine that a thing is to be, then I can claim that I acted wilfully. If circumstances determine that a thing is to be, then I cannot claim to have acted wilfully. I have no right to such a claim on behalf of the universe, which is the subject in that case (one with an anthropomorphized consciousness). These are subjective views, with either me or the universe as the subject of our determined actions.

And as you have shown, determination is equivalent to causation. If the person is the determinant of action, he is the cause of action and there is free will.

If, on the other hand, I want to examine what happens objectively I would look to causation, to cause-and-effect. That is the objective view regardless of which participants, objects or subjects are being discussed. Events follow each other in sequence from a perspective somewhere apart from the events, that looks at everything equally and can talk about them equally. That is the ultimate you refer to, that truth must abide. (That is the whole purpose and advantage of having the objective perspective: that we can describe objective reality.)

It seems your subjective view must ignore very many concepts and observations that are plainly knowable to the subjective perception.

The ultimate you talk about --the one single sole explanation of causation --is only required from the objective perspective. The subjective perspective on the universe is unique to each individual or group observing it. From the subjective perspective, regarding free will, each individual thing (or group) is an explanation of causation. Multiple ultimate causes, one for each subject in the universe (and even one for the universe itself).

No, it is required by both perspectives to establish free will, unless you are saying that subjective requires a whole different set of definitions.

In other words, it can be shown to be "false" in comparison to something it is not, namely the objective view. But then that's true of anything: it is "false" when it is expected to be something it is not.

What are you talking about? No one has tried to make the subjective something that it is not, it has only been compared to an alternative perspective that, by its very nature, is a more true representation of reality.

Your argument would apply if I tried to say that the mobile in my neice's crib is an accurate representation of the universe. It is only shown to be false in comparison to something that it is not, namely the true model of the universe.

The thing is, the two views do not offer opposing realities, they offer two views of reality. It is you who says that the objective view is the correct one, and the subjective view "false" because its view does not abide by the objective view. Therefore you have laid correctness on the objective view.

Imagine we are in a square room, there is a gauge in the center of the north wall. It goes from 0 to 100, with the center highest point being 50. I am standing against the east wall of the room, you are standing against the west wall. I look at the gauge and see that it is reading 47, you look at the gauge and see that it is reading 53. How can this be, the gauge cannot be showing two different readings. When we combine our perspectives and objectively view the gauge we see that it reads 50 and decide that that is the true value.

That is the nature of the objective, it is not an abandonment of the subjective, as it still requires subjective for perception. However, it does acknowledge the inadequacies of the subjective and thereby attempts to eliminate them through reason and external confirmation.

The formation of the objective has only one purpose, to form a more true representation of reality. So it is the relationship between the subjective and objective to say that, when they disagree, the subjective is incorrect. Otherwise we would translate the subjective view into the objective.

I used to think, too, that free will and determinism were incompatible, until I realised that because both are true, there must be a piece missing to my puzzle. That piece is the perspectives. It is the subject/object divide that allows them both to be true ...and I covered that ad nauseum in the other thread we did, so I won't repeat it.

The result that suggests that the individual is the cause of actions is only incompatible with determinism when both results are viewed objectively. It is only logically impossible for both to be an objective description of reality (Do you see now how the subjective is ignored by the objective?).

The trouble is that you are reworking the nature of the subject/object divide to allow you to deny the contradiction. Both the subject and object are subject to the same reality. I understand that when we look objectively, our view of the subjective is blocked by the objective exterior of the entity, however, our knowledge of our subjective selves, allows us to fit that into our objective view.

Then how can free will and determinism both be correct?
How can they not? One is a real phenomenon, experienced from the subjective perspective, and the other is a description of objective reality, which excludes the subjective. Both subjective and objective views exist.

How can they not? I don't see how a person who believes in free will can ultimately be a determinist, and likely I don't see how a determinist can believe in free will, except as accepting it as a common illusion that people have.

One is a real phenomenon, experienced from the subjective perspective, and the other is a description of objective reality, which excludes the subjective. Both subjective and objective views exist.Schizophrenics experience lots of things, but this doesn't mean that the CIA is really after them. (Or that they aren't.) Likewise, simply because someone experiences the feeling of free will and making a decision, this doesn't mean they are. (Or that they aren't.)

That is a very open-ended question.

In the sense that I used it, it would be the entity that experiences the decision itself. I guess it could be considered the conscious thinker.

In the end, it depends on what one means by person. A 'person' could constitute all physical qualities of the human, it could constitute only those metaphysical qualities of thought.

I asked because like most Incompatibilists, to me you seem to have an ultimately incoherent conception of free will.

You wrote:

If we find that actions are ultimately caused or determined by the person, then we have free will, if the actions are ultimately caused or determined outside of the person then there is no free will.

For a given action to be "ultimately caused or determined by the person," the set of preferences that led to that action must have been "ultimately caused or determined by the person," too. But that doesn't make any sense. It means that at the start a person's preference set was blank, and then preferences began to suddenly appear. Because there were no preferences beforehand, there is no way the person could have freely chosen those preferences. How would he have done so? The preferences were chosen without any consultation of his (non-existent) preferences; he is no freer than the actor subject to determinism.

A person without preferences has no will at all, free or not. Freedom only becomes meaningful once a person already has preferences, however they came to be, at which point either his consciousness with its preferences is in control, in which case he is free, or it is not, in which case he is not.

And as you have shown, determination is equivalent to causation. If the person is the determinant of action, he is the cause of action and there is free will.
Well, I re-read what I wrote, and I did maintain the context that I was demonstrating. It was never my intention to demonstrate that they are equivalent; they are not. Even the dictionary clearly distinguishes between them. I was demonstrating the difference in context.

The person can be the determiner and the cause of things, and all things so determined cause things, you're right about that. But free will is about the determination, not the cause. It's about what we do, not what happens as a result, or what happened before. A cause is tied to its results, and is in turn a result of other things; it is about what happens. Determination is the act.

It seems your subjective view must ignore very many concepts and observations that are plainly knowable to the subjective perception.
Um... what? Like what?

The subjective view is the subjective perspective. Perception is a different thing.

No, it is required by both perspectives to establish free will, unless you are saying that subjective requires a whole different set of definitions.
The subjective already *has* a whole different set of explanations, though they are mostly the same just with "to me" tacked on the end. :D

Free will is something that I have/do, not something that happens to me. I establish it by virtue of being.

What are you talking about? No one has tried to make the subjective something that it is not, it has only been compared to an alternative perspective that, by its very nature, is a more true representation of reality.

Your argument would apply if I tried to say that the mobile in my neice's crib is an accurate representation of the universe. It is only shown to be false in comparison to something that it is not, namely the true model of the universe.
The alternative perspective is something that this perspective is not. To hold the alternative perspective up and say that 'this one is correct' and 'that one is false' is to compare them. To indicate one correct over the other is to say that the other should be like the one in order to be correct also. That's what I meant by trying to make the subjective something it is not.

The subjective view is not an incorrect objective view, it is a correct subjective view.

Imagine we are in a square room, there is a gauge in the center of the north wall. It goes from 0 to 100, with the center highest point being 50. I am standing against the east wall of the room, you are standing against the west wall. I look at the gauge and see that it is reading 47, you look at the gauge and see that it is reading 53. How can this be, the gauge cannot be showing two different readings. When we combine our perspectives and objectively view the gauge we see that it reads 50 and decide that that is the true value.

That is the nature of the objective, it is not an abandonment of the subjective, as it still requires subjective for perception. However, it does acknowledge the inadequacies of the subjective and thereby attempts to eliminate them through reason and external confirmation.

The formation of the objective has only one purpose, to form a more true representation of reality. So it is the relationship between the subjective and objective to say that, when they disagree, the subjective is incorrect. Otherwise we would translate the subjective view into the objective.
Now are playing "What is wrong with this picture?" I like this game.

The objective perspective is the reality. It is not the sum of our estimates, and it is not the best guess accepted as the true number --it *is* the true number on the gauge, whatever that may be, regardless of where anyone is standing observing it. Imagine that the objective view is the number seen through reality's eyes. The objective view ignores the input of any subjective view, not because they are incorrect, but because the perspective has changed from us to it. We are no longer in the picture except as "just another object".

The number we see from our distorted angles only gives a wrong or "false" value when it is expected that we should be able to see the true number on the gauge from that angle, but if we're viewing it from such a steep angle that's not a realistic expectation. It is never realistic to expect that the subjective perspective be anything other than what it is.

The trouble is that you are reworking the nature of the subject/object divide to allow you to deny the contradiction. Both the subject and object are subject to the same reality.
The contradiction only exists by denying the subject/object divide. The subject and the object are subject to the same reality, no argument there. They just look at it a bit differently.

I understand that when we look objectively, our view of the subjective is blocked by the objective exterior of the entity, however, our knowledge of our subjective selves, allows us to fit that into our objective view.
We do not look objectively with eyes --I hope you know that. We look objectively with the eyes of our imagination. The objective view is a concept that abstracts a perspective away from everyone and everything. It has no subject, and we are all objects to it.

I'm just replying to the original post and ignoring all other arguments in this thread to just toss in my two cents.

I personally like the idea of free will. We make choices every day, and we seem to have controll over it. Even not making a choice is a choice in itself, and no matter the environment you're in, there is always choice.

Of course, while I enjoy the idea of free will, it is also possible that it is only a figment of human imagination. I acknowledge this and move on with my life, and that too is a choice.

Considering, though, that our universe is based on chaos and random changes creating new and more complex designs, I think Free Will is really just Chaos in action.

I asked because like most Incompatibilists, to me you seem to have an ultimately incoherent conception of free will.

For a given action to be "ultimately caused or determined by the person," the set of preferences that led to that action must have been "ultimately caused or determined by the person," too. But that doesn't make any sense. It means that at the start a person's preference set was blank, and then preferences began to suddenly appear. Because there were no preferences beforehand, there is no way the person could have freely chosen those preferences. How would he have done so? The preferences were chosen without any consultation of his (non-existent) preferences; he is no freer than the actor subject to determinism.

A person without preferences has no will at all, free or not. Freedom only becomes meaningful once a person already has preferences, however they came to be, at which point either his consciousness with its preferences is in control, in which case he is free, or it is not, in which case he is not.

I am a hard-line determinist. I go so far as to say that there is no independent thinking or acting person, that there is only a limited subjective viewpoint of the causal chain, an experience.

Now, free will is established by saying that a person has the ability to choose, and therefore the person is the ultimate factor of the resulting choice. Now this could mean, as you point out, that the person is the cause of his preferences. It could also mean that person can act counter to his preferences.

I reject both. I say that, at the moment of 'choice', there is a finite set of values that will decide the decision, and if a person is given that exact set of values repeated he would be powerless to choose a different option. Therefore choice is solely dependent on the circumstances and not the 'person'.

The subjective already *has* a whole different set of explanations, though they are mostly the same just with "to me" tacked on the end. :D

Free will is something that I have/do, not something that happens to me. I establish it by virtue of being.

So because I exist, I do?

I still don't agree with combination of 'have' and 'do', you cannot do free will, you can only have it, and as a result do things.

You are also assuming that doing equates to causing. The are not equal terms, and this is where we got to the has/do thing. When we say that a person does something, we say that he has taken on an action as a quality. The action only relates to him, as qualities do not exist unless combined with a entity. However, the possession of this quality of action does not imply that the person caused it.

That is your assumption, that since the action is only applicable to the subjective, then the subjective can assume cause for it. That is untrue.

The alternative perspective is something that this perspective is not. To hold the alternative perspective up and say that 'this one is correct' and 'that one is false' is to compare them. To indicate one correct over the other is to say that the other should be like the one in order to be correct also. That's what I meant by trying to make the subjective something it is not.

The subjective view is not an incorrect objective view, it is a correct subjective view.

They are both views of reality, and as such can be compared as views of reality.

Now are playing "What is wrong with this picture?" I like this game.

The objective perspective is the reality. It is not the sum of our estimates, and it is not the best guess accepted as the true number --it *is* the true number on the gauge, whatever that may be, regardless of where anyone is standing observing it. Imagine that the objective view is the number seen through reality's eyes. The objective view ignores the input of any subjective view, not because they are incorrect, but because the perspective has changed from us to it. We are no longer in the picture except as "just another object".

This is beside the point, but for our purposes, the objective can only be our best estimate as to what the true value is, but yes, the objective we arrive at is not the exact objective.

Now, to the point, how can you say that the objective represents the true reality, say that from the objective everything is predetermined, and then say we have no free will. No matter whether or not the subject is performing the act, your assumptions contradict any claims to free will.

The number we see from our distorted angles only gives a wrong or "false" value when it is expected that we should be able to see the true number on the gauge from that angle, but if we're viewing it from such a steep angle that's not a realistic expectation. It is never realistic to expect that the subjective perspective be anything other than what it is.

Yes, the subjective is only false when we can compare it to an objective measurement. I have never said that the subjective is anything other than the subjective, I have only said that it is flawed and is less truthful than the objective.

Now, free will is established by saying that a person has the ability to choose, and therefore the person is the ultimate factor of the resulting choice. Now this could mean, as you point out, that the person is the cause of his preferences. It could also mean that person can act counter to his preferences.

How can one act against his preferences without another preference behind that decision? If I choose one alternative over another, clearly I prefer that alternative. It isn't a random process, but even if it were, it would be even less free than being "controlled" by one's preferences.

How can one act against his preferences without another preference behind that decision? If I choose one alternative over another, clearly I prefer that alternative. It isn't a random process, but even if it were, it would be even less free than being "controlled" by one's preferences.

I agree with you, but I don't know any non-deterministic arguments.

To me people are bound to the way their preferences react to external forces, and those preferences are in no way created by the person.

Free will is something that I have/do, not something that happens to me. I establish it by virtue of being.
So because I exist, I do?
[...have free will?][...things?]

Everything does something, even if it's only 'being'. Objectively, we 'have' it, but subjectively we 'do' it.

When you are referring to consciousness subjectively, there is no difference between, for example, "having" a thought and the experience of the thought.

I still don't agree with combination of 'have' and 'do', you cannot do free will, you can only have it, and as a result do things.

You are also assuming that doing equates to causing. The are not equal terms, and this is where we got to the has/do thing. When we say that a person does something, we say that he has taken on an action as a quality. The action only relates to him, as qualities do not exist unless combined with a entity. However, the possession of this quality of action does not imply that the person caused it.

That is your assumption, that since the action is only applicable to the subjective, then the subjective can assume cause for it. That is untrue.
That is looking at it objectively. Objectively, the action has a cause in physical forces, in circumstantial influences, in reasons. Objectively, there can be no 'cause of free will' because there is no free will in the picture ...it's the wrong picture to see it.

Subjectively, it cannot be anything but true that we are the cause of deliberate actions. Subjectivity is the only approriate angle that will allow free will into the picture. Subjectively, free will doesn't have a "because" (a cause that comes be-fore it), rather it is us in control.

Will is consciousness exerting itself. Free will is the idea that we are in control of the exerting, we do it deliberately. When you are talking about consciousness, subjectively there is no difference between "having" free will and the experience of free will. Free will is me deliberately exerting myself upon the world around me in thought, word and action. Every thought, word and action that happens by my choice is wilful. It is something I make happen, not something that happens to me. ("By my choice" is a euphamism for that control.)

By exerting myself wilfully, I cause things. This means that to me I am the cause of them. If free will was something I had and not something I was, then I could literally give it away, get rid of it, discard it. I cannot. Surrendering free will to a higher authority, that I mentioned earlier, is just a metaphor.

When we say a person does something, we put them in the driver's seat, in control of the action. As such, they are the subject of whatever verb they are participating in. The result, the action executed, is not a property of them. (I'm still uncertain about your use of the word 'quality'. We only possess properties.) It is an entirely separate thing from them that has its own characteristics and identity.

Free will is not in the executed action, it is the driver's seat. It's not in the choice, it's in "me, choosing."

They are both views of reality, and as such can be compared as views of reality.
Views, yes, but not reality itself. Compared, yes, but not equated. There is no obligation for the one view to be like the other view. If they were, we wouldn't have two views, would we?

The objective view is a view of actual reality. Saying the subjective view presents a "false" reality is saying that it is not presenting a view of actual reality, but we already knew that. It's the subjective view. It's not an inferior view, unless you are trying to use it to view reality objectively, in which case it cannot do that. It cannot be the objective view. It's not supposed to be the objective view, it's the subjective view. That doesn't make it any less valid of a view --it has its uses.

This is beside the point, but for our purposes, the objective can only be our best estimate as to what the true value is, but yes, the objective we arrive at is not the exact objective.
Ah, that's why you fail to understand what I'm saying. You dismiss it as being beside the point when it is precisely the point.

Our best estimate as to what the true value is is subjective. (It's even there in your grammar: your statement contains "our", and therefore introduces a subject.) Only the actual true value is objective.

Now, to the point, how can you say that the objective represents the true reality, say that from the objective everything is predetermined, and then say we have no free will. No matter whether or not the subject is performing the act, your assumptions contradict any claims to free will.
Objectively, everything is determined by what causes it. From the subjective view, and that view alone, we are in control.

How can both views be correct? Because the two views are not one, and one is only incorrect if you try to make it "as if" the other. The subjective view is an incorrect objective view, sure... but it is a correct subjective view.

It's not uncommon to hold up the objective view of actual reality as the only truely true view --everyone does it at some time or another. But if it doesn't provide the whole picture, then it is less useful as a philosophy than taking both views into account. The other view exists. We exist.

I didn't say we have no free will, I said it is not present in the *view* that is objective, the view of reality that excludes what we see looking out from our minds. We provide things with meaning, something the objects cannot.

"Predetermined" is another idea, one that suggests that the entirety of time, including the future, is laid out in advance. I don't believe in that. The future doesn't exist ...yet.

Yes, the subjective is only false when we can compare it to an objective measurement. I have never said that the subjective is anything other than the subjective, I have only said that it is flawed and is less truthful than the objective.
Well, you did imply it shouldn't be what it is. It's implicit in the conclusion of your comparison. The subjective view is not flawed or less truthful unless you are expecting it to *be* objective reality. As I said, that is an unreasonable expectation.

I don't see how a person who believes in free will can ultimately be a determinist, and likely I don't see how a determinist can believe in free will, except as accepting it as a common illusion that people have.
I am not a Determinist. Does that help explain it? :)

Schizophrenics experience lots of things, but this doesn't mean that the CIA is really after them. (Or that they aren't.) Likewise, simply because someone experiences the feeling of free will and making a decision, this doesn't mean they are. (Or that they aren't.)
Actually, that's all it means. Experiencing something means participating in it. Reality isn't the only thing we participate in.

But from reality's eyes the other things we participate in are invisible. Objectively, there is a whole world of things that are not part of the picture.

That doesn't make it any less valid of a view --it has its uses.

Here's the sticking point.

Define these uses if you would please.

Where is the subjective view more useful than the objective view? Other than perhaps in an argument where you simply don't like what the truth is?

I am not a Determinist. Does that help explain it? :)Lol. No, it reaffirms what I've said - that people who believe in free will cannot be determinists, and determinists cannot believe in free will.

Actually, that's all it means. Experiencing something means participating in it. Reality isn't the only thing we participate in.
But from reality's eyes the other things we participate in are invisible. Objectively, there is a whole world of things that are not part of the picture.True, we have imaginations, but what's imaginary is usually viewed as being inferior to reality.

I agree with you, but I don't know any non-deterministic arguments.

To me people are bound to the way their preferences react to external forces, and those preferences are in no way created by the person.

Right. But we disagree as to whether or not that constitutes free will.

I say it does, because our preferences lead to our actions. The fact that we did not create them is irrelevant, because before we had preferences we had no preferences, and without preferences freedom is meaningless.

[...have free will?][...things?]

Everything does something, even if it's only 'being'. Objectively, we 'have' it, but subjectively we 'do' it.

When you are referring to consciousness subjectively, there is no difference between, for example, "having" a thought and the experience of the thought.


That is looking at it objectively. Objectively, the action has a cause in physical forces, in circumstantial influences, in reasons. Objectively, there can be no 'cause of free will' because there is no free will in the picture ...it's the wrong picture to see it.

Subjectively, it cannot be anything but true that we are the cause of deliberate actions. Subjectivity is the only approriate angle that will allow free will into the picture. Subjectively, free will doesn't have a "because" (a cause that comes be-fore it), rather it is us in control.

Will is consciousness exerting itself. Free will is the idea that we are in control of the exerting, we do it deliberately. When you are talking about consciousness, subjectively there is no difference between "having" free will and the experience of free will. Free will is me deliberately exerting myself upon the world around me in thought, word and action. Every thought, word and action that happens by my choice is wilful. It is something I make happen, not something that happens to me. ("By my choice" is a euphamism for that control.)

By exerting myself wilfully, I cause things. This means that to me I am the cause of them. If free will was something I had and not something I was, then I could literally give it away, get rid of it, discard it. I cannot. Surrendering free will to a higher authority, that I mentioned earlier, is just a metaphor.

When we say a person does something, we put them in the driver's seat, in control of the action. As such, they are the subject of whatever verb they are participating in. The result, the action executed, is not a property of them. (I'm still uncertain about your use of the word 'quality'. We only possess properties.) It is an entirely separate thing from them that has its own characteristics and identity.

Free will is not in the executed action, it is the driver's seat. It's not in the choice, it's in "me, choosing."


Views, yes, but not reality itself. Compared, yes, but not equated. There is no obligation for the one view to be like the other view. If they were, we wouldn't have two views, would we?

The objective view is a view of actual reality. Saying the subjective view presents a "false" reality is saying that it is not presenting a view of actual reality, but we already knew that. It's the subjective view. It's not an inferior view, unless you are trying to use it to view reality objectively, in which case it cannot do that. It cannot be the objective view. It's not supposed to be the objective view, it's the subjective view. That doesn't make it any less valid of a view --it has its uses.


Ah, that's why you fail to understand what I'm saying. You dismiss it as being beside the point when it is precisely the point.

Our best estimate as to what the true value is is subjective. (It's even there in your grammar: your statement contains "our", and therefore introduces a subject.) Only the actual true value is objective.


Objectively, everything is determined by what causes it. From the subjective view, and that view alone, we are in control.

How can both views be correct? Because the two views are not one, and one is only incorrect if you try to make it "as if" the other. The subjective view is an incorrect objective view, sure... but it is a correct subjective view.

It's not uncommon to hold up the objective view of actual reality as the only truely true view --everyone does it at some time or another. But if it doesn't provide the whole picture, then it is less useful as a philosophy than taking both views into account. The other view exists. We exist.

I didn't say we have no free will, I said it is not present in the *view* that is objective, the view of reality that excludes what we see looking out from our minds. We provide things with meaning, something the objects cannot.

"Predetermined" is another idea, one that suggests that the entirety of time, including the future, is laid out in advance. I don't believe in that. The future doesn't exist ...yet.


Well, you did imply it shouldn't be what it is. It's implicit in the conclusion of your comparison. The subjective view is not flawed or less truthful unless you are expecting it to *be* objective reality. As I said, that is an unreasonable expectation.

I have read your argument many times and it doesn't make sense to me. I don't know how you validate separating the subject from the objective, and I don't know how you assume that, since we are the subject, we also must be in control.

Right. But we disagree as to whether or not that constitutes free will.

I say it does, because our preferences lead to our actions. The fact that we did not create them is irrelevant, because before we had preferences we had no preferences, and without preferences freedom is meaningless.

So you are saying that someone who has no control over his/her actions can still have free will?

If decisions are bound to preferences, and preferences are bound to natural forces, then there is no personal responsibility, no free will.

So you are saying that someone who has no control over his/her actions can still have free will?

If decisions are bound to preferences, and preferences are bound to natural forces, then there is no personal responsibility, no free will.

A person most definitely has control over his actions. His preferences, and the thought processes he uses to fulfill them, are part of him. It is there that personal responsibility and free will come in.

A person most definitely has control over his actions. His preferences, and the thought processes he uses to fulfill them, are part of him. It is there that personal responsibility and free will come in.

The person is in control of his actions, but is the person in control of himself?

The person is in control of his actions, but is the person in control of himself?
You already said he is, in the first part of your question.

Here's the sticking point.

Define these uses if you would please.

Where is the subjective view more useful than the objective view? Other than perhaps in an argument where you simply don't like what the truth is?
First and most obviously, human interaction would not be possible without our conscious subjective perspective. From our subjective perspective we perceive the world around us, build relationships to the things in it, and other people. We also define relationships between other things in the world. This allows us to assign meaning to things. Meaning is especially useful, as it leads to order and organization, societal and physical structures. Stuff like that.

The objective perspective has a view on chaos.

True, we have imaginations, but what's imaginary is usually viewed as being inferior to reality.
Only recently, and it's a trend that is passing with the elevation of studies like psychology that promote better understanding of ourselves.

First and most obviously, human interaction would not be possible without our conscious subjective perspective. From our subjective perspective we perceive the world around us, build relationships to the things in it, and other people. We also define relationships between other things in the world. This allows us to assign meaning to things. Meaning is especially useful, as it leads to order and organization, societal and physical structures. Stuff like that.

The objective perspective has a view on chaos.

You've answered when the objective point of view can't be used.

You haven't shown that the subjective point of view is more useful or even as useful as an objective point of view where it exists. And in fact, I'd suggest that human interaction based on subjective points of view where an objective point exists (unless they coincide) is not as fruitful as interaction based on objective points of view.

Assigning meaning to things is only useful where the meaning is a reflection of the objective reality.

Where an objective point of view exists, is there a purpose to maintaining the subjective one?

You already said he is, in the first part of your question.

If we consider the person to be made up of all of his desires and reason, we conclude that the person has control over his actions, as desires and reason control actions.

But if we consider the person to be made up of all his desires and reason, does the person have any control over himself? Is the person responsible for the reason and desire that makes himself up? I say no.

As I have said before, the person is a causal link, it perpetuates determinism through its actions. It acts, but it acts only in ways that were predetermined by a previous causal link. It is our perception of ourselves as actor, as controller and instigator of action, that gives us the illusion of free will. That perception is a necessary function of our self-concept. However, the self-concept makes no attempt to derive whether the instigation of action is a result of oneself, or a result of natural forces, by its nature it must assume that it is a result of oneself.

You've answered when the objective point of view can't be used.

You haven't shown that the subjective point of view is more useful or even as useful as an objective point of view where it exists. And in fact, I'd suggest that human interaction based on subjective points of view where an objective point exists (unless they coincide) is not as fruitful as interaction based on objective points of view.

Assigning meaning to things is only useful where the meaning is a reflection of the objective reality.

Where an objective point of view exists, is there a purpose to maintaining the subjective one?
Are you talking about points of view, as in opinions, standpoints, philosophies? I was talking about perspectives: actual geographic perspectives.

The subjective perspective cannot but be maintained. It's not like we could ever abandon it, even if we wanted to.

I never suggested that the subjective perspective is more useful than the objective perspective. I only stated that it has a use.

If we consider the person to be made up of all of his desires and reason, we conclude that the person has control over his actions, as desires and reason control actions.

But if we consider the person to be made up of all his desires and reason, does the person have any control over himself? Is the person responsible for the reason and desire that makes himself up? I say no.
Well, if your premise is that desire and reason control actions, then it's not him controlling actions, it's them... unless you're stating that he *is* his desires and his reasons.

If you're stating that he *is* his desires and reasons, and that they/him control his actions, then you're saying also that he controls his actions.

As I have said before, the person is a causal link, it perpetuates determinism through its actions. It acts, but it acts only in ways that were predetermined by a previous causal link. It is our perception of ourselves as actor, as controller and instigator of action, that gives us the illusion of free will. That perception is a necessary function of our self-concept. However, the self-concept makes no attempt to derive whether the instigation of action is a result of oneself, or a result of natural forces, by its nature it must assume that it is a result of oneself.
What you call the illusion of free will, I call the phenomenon of free will. You address it as an object, and I address it with the subject as a participant in it.

If you find an answer to your own questions, perhaps you'll find an answer to the question you asked me.

Well, if your premise is that desire and reason control actions, then it's not him controlling actions, it's them... unless you're stating that he *is* his desires and his reasons.

If you're stating that he *is* his desires and reasons, and that they/him control his actions, then you're saying also that he controls his actions.

What you call the illusion of free will, I call the phenomenon of free will. You address it as an object, and I address it with the subject as a participant in it.

If you find an answer to your own questions, perhaps you'll find an answer to the question you asked me.

You missed the fundamental explanation of my opinion.

"the person is a causal link"

Yes, the person participates, yes the person instigates actions. We observe that as the subject and we believe we have free will.

But we act as a domino.

Picture 50 dominos stacked in a row. A finger tips the first domino, that domino tips the next, which in turn tips another. From the subjective position the domino does participate in the falling, and certainly does exert the action of knocking over the next domino. However, the subjective position of action is entirely based on the actions of other dominos, and natural forces. No where is the domino free in its action.

You missed the fundamental explanation of my opinion.

"the person is a causal link"

Yes, the person participates, yes the person instigates actions. We observe that as the subject and we believe we have free will.

But we act as a domino.

Picture 50 dominos stacked in a row. A finger tips the first domino, that domino tips the next, which in turn tips another. From the subjective position the domino does participate in the falling, and certainly does exert the action of knocking over the next domino. However, the subjective position of action is entirely based on the actions of other dominos, and natural forces. No where is the domino free in its action.
Dominoes don't instigate action; if they did, they would make themselves fall down unaided. They fall as a result of action, not by an act they themselves instigate. The only action instigated in your story is by the finger.

Dominoes don't instigate action; if they did, they would make themselves fall down unaided. They fall as a result of action, not by an act they themselves instigate. The only action instigated in your story is by the finger.

Now, insert "people" for "dominoes" and "live" for "fall down" and you will describe my opinion perfectly.

They see themselves as the cause for other actions (the subsequent domino's fall), but that is only because they have subjective view of their own actions (falling).

I don't have an explanation for the finger, though.

I have read your argument many times and it doesn't make sense to me. I don't know how you validate separating the subject from the objective, and I don't know how you assume that, since we are the subject, we also must be in control.
Would it help if I said that you are looking for free will in the wrong place? (Oops, already said that in my first post... nevermind.)

Explanations and justification belong to the objective perspective. The objective perspective is where we talk *about* things, rather than being them or experiencing them. Science, for example, provides explanations and is strictly objective. When we ask ourselves, 'What causes us to move?' we are necessarily asking for an objective answer, and we will ONLY find the explanation from the objective perspective --by talking *about* the experience, rather than putting ourselves in other's shoes and seeing things subjectively.

In that context, free will can never be an explanation of why we do what we do. Free will is "being in the driver's seat", and we are asking for an explanation of the movement of the car. Different contexts. No comparison.

Regarding free will, there is no "since..when", which is essentially the same as your "if..then". I am not trying to justify free will as the cause of our actions; rather, I am saying that free will is being in control... it is being the conscious subject acting deliberately. Being in the driver's seat requires no explanation when you are already there. It is an axiom.

The subject and object are separated by definition, so the subjective and objective also. One cannot be the other --mutually exclusive.

Would it help if I said that you are looking for free will in the wrong place? (Oops, already said that in my first post... nevermind.)

Explanations and justification belong to the objective perspective. The objective perspective is where we talk *about* things, rather than being them or experiencing them. Science, for example, provides explanations and is strictly objective. When we ask ourselves, 'What causes us to move?' we are necessarily asking for an objective answer, and we will ONLY find the explanation from the objective perspective --by talking *about* the experience, rather than putting ourselves in other's shoes and seeing things subjectively.

In that context, free will can never be an explanation of why we do what we do. Free will is "being in the driver's seat", and we are asking for an explanation of the movement of the car. Different contexts. No comparison.

Regarding free will, there is no "since..when", which is essentially the same as your "if..then". I am not trying to justify free will as the cause of our actions; rather, I am saying that free will is being in control... it is being the conscious subject acting deliberately. Being in the driver's seat requires no explanation when you are already there. It is an axiom.

The subject and object are separated by definition, so the subjective and objective also. One cannot be the other --mutually exclusive.

I understand.

But I disagree with you in two fundamental places.

1. The subjective is accounted for in the objective.

2. Free will is established by cause not by action.

1. The subjective is accounted for in the objective.
How so?

2. Free will is established by cause not by action.
Not by action, by being.

How so?

Because the objective is necessarily abstracted from the subjective. To form the objective, we project our subjective position in to other things.

Not by action, by being.

It seemed to me that the doing was contingent for free will.

Because the objective is necessarily abstracted from the subjective. To form the objective, we project our subjective position in to other things.
No, that's not objective. If you are creating an abstract subjective, then that's not objective. The objective has no subject. It's a point looking upon another thing from nowhere in particular.

I used the analogy "reality's eyes" earlier: reality is everywhere at once, not any particular place.

It seemed to me that the doing was contingent for free will.
'Being' is what consciousness does. The mind and body do actions; that's why they are possessions of the self, and not the self itself.

The person is in control of his actions, but is the person in control of himself?

He does not choose his base preferences, no. The idea of choosing your base preferences in a manner that involves real choice, not merely random selection, doesn't make any sense. Freedom is only relevant when you already have preferences.

He does not choose his base preferences, no. The idea of choosing your base preferences in a manner that involves real choice, not merely random selection, doesn't make any sense. Freedom is only relevant when you already have preferences.

Maybe, but free will is all about being free of those natural preferences.

Maybe, but free will is all about being free of those natural preferences.

Only an incoherent and blatantly illogical conception of free will could involve freedom from preferences, and I don't see how their naturality is relevant.

Only an incoherent and blatantly illogical conception of free will could involve freedom from preferences, and I don't see how their naturality is relevant.

Your definition of free will is utterly useless, as far as I can discern what your definition is.

If someone's actions are bound by their preferences, and their preferences are bound by natural forces, they are not ultimately responsible for their actions.

The entire purpose of free will is to assign responsibility for actions, and your definition does not do that.

Your definition of free will is utterly useless, as far as I can discern what your definition is.

If someone's actions are bound by their preferences, and their preferences are bound by natural forces, they are not ultimately responsible for their actions.

The entire purpose of free will is to assign responsibility for actions, and your definition does not do that.

Their preferences. Their preferences are a part of their mind, of themselves; thus they are responsible for their actions. Since they, too, are part of the determinist chain, they are not compelled by it but rather participate in it, and achieve responsibility through it.

Their preferences. Their preferences are a part of their mind, of themselves; thus they are responsible for their actions. Since they, too, are part of the determinist chain, they are not compelled by it but rather participate in it, and achieve responsibility through it.

I agree with the last part, but as they are not responsible for their preferences, they are not ultimately responsible for their actions.

If someone is molded into a sociopathic killing machine completely by natural forces, his killing spree is entirely unavoidable on his part.

I agree with the last part, but as they are not responsible for their preferences, they are not ultimately responsible for their actions.

But ultimate responsibility, that is, the choice of one's preferences, isn't necessary for free will, because without preferences choice is meaningless.

But ultimate responsibility, that is, the choice of one's preferences, isn't necessary for free will, because without preferences choice is meaningless.

I would say that, without preference there is no choice.

Maybe I should have said 'any' responsibility rather than 'ultimate' to better phrase my point. Determinism precludes any personal responsibility, and personal responsibility is the entire point of free will. Without personal responsibility there is no point for considering free will.

I would say that, without preference there is no choice.

Precisely. There is just randomness.

Maybe I should have said 'any' responsibility rather than 'ultimate' to better phrase my point. Determinism precludes any personal responsibility, and personal responsibility is the entire point of free will. Without personal responsibility there is no point for considering free will.

But there is responsibility. I choose to commit an action; I, which includes my preferences, am responsible for it.

I am not an entity constrained by external deterministic forces; I am part of the deterministic chain, and thus have responsibility.

I personally believe 'free will' is the result of chemical systems in the body.

But..so? Those processes represent *who I am*. They're essentially my soul. Excusing your actions because you have 'aggressive genes' is pretty much exaclty the same as excusing your actions on the basis that you have a 'tainted soul'.

If you don't hold people responsible for the actions they choose to undertake, knowing the consequences, you completely undermine the very concept of 'humanity' and it's impossible to enforce a civil society.

Failure to excersize impulse control is not a sickness. Excersizing impulse control is the bare minimum we can possibly expect from people living in a civil society.

I'm free already.

willd.

But there is responsibility. I choose to commit an action; I, which includes my preferences, am responsible for it.

I am not an entity constrained by external deterministic forces; I am part of the deterministic chain, and thus have responsibility.


But if your choice is predetermined by your preferences, which in turn are predetermined by prior events, where does your free will come in.

I will not deny that a person, as a causal link, is the object which passes along the forces that instigate action. But I cannot see that one is a "voluntary" actor in a deterministic chain.

But if your choice is predetermined by your preferences, which in turn are predetermined by prior events, where does your free will come in.

With the preferences. They are a part of you. Thus actions determined by preferences are actions determined by you.

I agree with the last part, but as they are not responsible for their preferences, they are not ultimately responsible for their actions.

If someone is molded into a sociopathic killing machine completely by natural forces, his killing spree is entirely unavoidable on his part.

I think this brings up a good point in the direction of my original intention for this thread. I am not as well read as you in this regard so please bear with me.

There is a more "social" aspect of free will, preferred by religion and law, which assumes all actions emanating from the person, must originate in the person and thus is the full responsibility of the person. Since isolated bags of chemical or cells don't have the decision-making capability of a complete person, or since social forces cannot always compel a person to act mechanically in a certain way (people have maintained their silence till death for example) they tend to relegate full responsibility to the individual. Thus you can be blamed for being lazy, fat, angry, regardless your genetic/environmental makeup. This works well in a social context and has been the norm for thousands of years.

Then there is the more "mathematical" aspect of free will ascribed by yourself and others, which observes that it is absurd to view a person's action in a vacuum. Every one of a person's decision is tampered by both internal and external considerations, and in the strictest sense we are all just part of a long causal chain of deterministic events. You can make the sanest person do bizarre and illegal acts by forcibly injecting the person with drugs. You can make the sanest person do bizarre and illegal acts by threatening to kill him or his family. Evidence in support of this view include more aggressive behavior of XYY males, belligerent behavior of young males, and increased incident of violent behavior in a social environment of unrest. In this view of free will, it is incomplete and unfair to take the moral high ground and indict a person for her actions simply because she did it.

From the systems point of view, it is not a simple matter of where the causal chain initiated or who conveniently takes the blame. It is always a question of degrees. How much influence does the biology or environment play a role on the person's decision/action? And to what extent will that action be taken in spite of the biology or environment? This sort of discussion is becoming influential in legal proceedings and will continue to do so in future.

With the preferences. They are a part of you. Thus actions determined by preferences are actions determined by you.

Let us see if an example will make this any clearer.

A pedophile is made a pedophile by natural forces out of his control. He also has a preference that is out of his control to abide by social norms that are out of his control.

Now if he molests a child, we can assume it is because his preferences for pedophilia outweighed his preference for abiding by social norms. Yet, he is powerless to mitigate his preference for pedophilia or strengthen his preference for social norms.

How then can we hold him responsible for his actions?

Reading your last post compelled me to respond to the original post.

I know people here have been discussing about the existence of free will from the "deterministic" angle ad nauseum.

What about discussing free will and individual responsibility from a complex systems approach? Let me explain.

A person's behavior is tugged in two directions, internal and external.

Internally, a person is a complex system of many component interactions that influence behavior. If you inject an "aggression" chemical into a person, to what extent is the person responsible for his or her violent actions?

Externally, a person is a component of society that also has a potent influence on behavior. If the organization, or the state, decrees a person to kill, to what extent is the person responsible for the action?

What are the boundaries of "free will" in individual behavior?

You are on to something here, possibly empirical evidence of free will.

If we can produce artificial desires within people, we can measure just how well a person can resist desires, and develop some way to test free will.

In other words, if we can know how a deterministic path would result for the person, some contrary results would destroy determinism.

I think this brings up a good point in the direction of my original intention for this thread. I am not as well read as you in this regard so please bear with me.

There is a more "social" aspect of free will, preferred by religion and law, which assumes all actions emanating from the person, must originate in the person and thus is the full responsibility of the person. Since isolated bags of chemical or cells don't have the decision-making capability of a complete person, or since social forces cannot always compel a person to act mechanically in a certain way (people have maintained their silence till death for example) they tend to relegate full responsibility to the individual. Thus you can be blamed for being lazy, fat, angry, regardless your genetic/environmental makeup. This works well in a social context and has been the norm for thousands of years.

Then there is the more "mathematical" aspect of free will ascribed by yourself and others, which observes that it is absurd to view a person's action in a vacuum. Every one of a person's decision is tampered by both internal and external considerations, and in the strictest sense we are all just part of a long causal chain of deterministic events. You can make the sanest person do bizarre and illegal acts by forcibly injecting the person with drugs. You can make the sanest person do bizarre and illegal acts by threatening to kill him or his family. Evidence in support of this view include more aggressive behavior of XYY males, belligerent behavior of young males, and increased incident of violent behavior in a social environment of unrest. In this view of free will, it is incomplete and unfair to take the moral high ground and indict a person for her actions simply because she did it.

I think you have very accurately described where the imcompatibility of free will comes into play.

You are correct that people who support free will are doing so out of an attempt to show moral or social responsibility. And to my reasoning the idea that a person can be anything more than the the natural forces that dictate his wants and circumstances seems ludicrous. It doesn't add up, to relate to your mathematical categorizing.

From what I understand (I am not well read on the subject), the trouble of figuring out how someone can rise above their circumstances and assume moral responsibility is a big problem for philosophy.

There are compatibilists that say that there is no contradiction here, but I find their arguments hard to believe.

From the systems point of view, it is not a simple matter of where the causal chain initiated or who conveniently takes the blame. It is always a question of degrees. How much influence does the biology or environment play a role on the person's decision/action? And to what extent will that action be taken in spite of the biology or environment? This sort of discussion is becoming influential in legal proceedings and will continue to do so in future.

If a systems approach adequately shows determinism, most of our moral philosophy is up shit creek.

How then can we hold him responsible for his actions?

Why do we hold anyone responsible for their actions? Because he committed them. Those preferences are part of him; they are not external constraints on his behavior.

Why do we hold anyone responsible for their actions? Because he committed them. Those preferences are part of him; they are not external constraints on his behavior.

Refer to my analogy of the dominoes.

Sure one domino knocks over another, but we cannot hold them responsible for the chain of events, we must blame it on the natural forces at work.

I voted that bunnies will rule the world, but in truth, IF we could determine the speed, direction, and composition of every particle in the universe at a single point of time we would know how they would interact until the end of time, hence predict to future. So in a sense we don't have free will sense we are nothing but complex chemical/necular/quantum reactions. But, we are not born with predertimed views and a destiny, it is out interaction with the world around us that will determine how we live and die.

I voted that bunnies will rule the world, but in truth, IF we could determine the speed, direction, and composition of every particle in the universe at a single point of time we would know how they would interact until the end of time, hence predict to future. So in a sense we don't have free will sense we are nothing but complex chemical/necular/quantum reactions. But, we are not born with predertimed views and a destiny, it is out interaction with the world around us that will determine how we live and die.

And I thank you. You shall be spared when Xislakilinia bunnies copulate their way into World Dominance. :D

Refer to my analogy of the dominoes.

Sure one domino knocks over another, but we cannot hold them responsible for the chain of events, we must blame it on the natural forces at work.
The dominoes are being acted upon by external natural forces, so yes, we must blame the natural forces.

Preferences are not external natural forces. This is what he's saying.

The dominoes are being acted upon by external natural forces, so yes, we must blame the natural forces.

Preferences are not external natural forces. This is what he's saying.

Preferences are internal, I will agree there, but so is our heart beat, and I would not say that our heart beats out of free will.

He is saying that, as preferences are internal to us, and as preferences are responsible for our actions, then we are responsible for our actions.

He also agrees that we are not the creator of our preferences.

The part that he doesn't address is whether we are responsible for our preferences. For us to be responsible for the actions our preferences cause, we must be responsible for our preferences.

So he is saying that free will is possible even if we are bound by our preferences, and preferences are determined by natural forces. I say that free will is only possible if we can act against our naturally determined preferences (or at least choose one that is weaker than another).

Well, this is how I would word the response, but I don't speak for Soheran.

Preferences are internal, I will agree there, but so is our heart beat, and I would not say that our heart beats out of free will.
Heartbeat is internal to the body, not to the 'self'. Everything consciousness recognizes is external to itself, external to the conscious sense-of-self --we do not consciously recognize preferences when we make a decision based on them; we just do ahead and do it (be it). If we do think about what our preference is, in order to be considerate of an outcome, then that is a thought, so again it is something external to the 'self', i.e. not-me.

He is saying that, as preferences are internal to us, and as preferences are responsible for our actions, then we are responsible for our actions.

He also agrees that we are not the creator of our preferences.

The part that he doesn't address is whether we are responsible for our preferences. For us to be responsible for the actions our preferences cause, we must be responsible for our preferences.

So he is saying that free will is possible even if we are bound by our preferences, and preferences are determined by natural forces. I say that free will is only possible if we can act against our naturally determined preferences (or at least choose one that is weaker than another).
Again, this is my response, not speaking for Soheran. I would word it: as preferences are internal to the self, and so as we are the sum of our preferences, then we are responsible for actions that result from them.

We are not the creator of our preferences: that would place us external to them, as God is external to his creation. Rather, we are our preferences.

We are not responsible for our preferences, any more than we are responsible for existing. That is not by choice. The difference between being responsible for the actions and being responsible for the preferences is that the actions we are responsible for are directed external to us, and that is where the outcomes reside. The preferences are internal, they are us.

Again, it's a matter of perspective.

If you don't hold people responsible for the actions they choose to undertake, knowing the consequences, you completely undermine the very concept of 'humanity' and it's impossible to enforce a civil society.

This is not true. It is quite possible, but it becomes a case of hating the sin, not the sinner.

"You did act X, which we find reprehensible. We understand that you did it through motives outside of yourself. We are going to apply punishment and/or rehabilitation to ensure that in future, your motives include the realization of this consequence. If you then go on to do act X again, the failure is not in you, it is in that the corrective measures applied were not strong enough to overcome the other motives that are driving you to do these actions."

Free-will looks at problems as originating from the individual. But we can't change individuals if they really have free-will. They'll decide on their own whether we like it or not.
Determinism looks at problems as originating from the environment(s).
In many ways, determinism is much more empowering -- we can change environments.

This is not true. It is quite possible, but it becomes a case of hating the sin, not the sinner.

"You did act X, which we find reprehensible. We understand that you did it through motives outside of yourself. We are going to apply punishment and/or rehabilitation to ensure that in future, your motives include the realization of this consequence. If you then go on to do act X again, the failure is not in you, it is in that the corrective measures applied were not strong enough to overcome the other motives that are driving you to do these actions."

Free-will looks at problems as originating from the individual. But we can't change individuals if they really have free-will. They'll decide on their own whether we like it or not.
Determinism looks at problems as originating from the environment(s).
In many ways, determinism is much more empowering -- we can change environments.
But saying, "You did act X," holds them responsible for the act.

If you're not holding them responsible for the act, you would say, "Act X happened..."

Heartbeat is internal to the body, not to the 'self'. Everything consciousness recognizes is external to itself, external to the conscious sense-of-self --we do not consciously recognize preferences when we make a decision based on them; we just do ahead and do it (be it). If we do think about what our preference is, in order to be considerate of an outcome, then that is a thought, so again it is something external to the 'self', i.e. not-me.

I am not entirely sure there is a self. I cannot figure out what would constitute a "self." There seems to be nothing independent about the person.

No action of our brain cannot be accounted for by those chemical reactions within it. No action of our body cannot be accounted for by those chemical reactions within it.

But saying, "You did act X," holds them responsible for the act.

If you're not holding them responsible for the act, you would say, "Act X happened..."
No, it doesn't, any more than saying "The vase fell" holds the vase responsible for the act. The person did the act. Simple fact.

Holding them responsible is ascribing fault for it.

No, it doesn't, any more than saying "The vase fell" holds the vase responsible for the act. The person did the act. Simple fact.

Holding them responsible is ascribing fault for it.
Obviously then we disagree on what responsibility is.

The vase that falls is not responsible for its actions.

Responsibility and fault are not the same thing.

Obviously then we disagree on what responsibility is.

The vase that falls is not responsible for its actions.

Responsibility and fault are not the same thing.

Very true. Many people try to equate the two, which in theory might work, but in practice doesn't. If one is hit by a drunk driver, it may be the driver's fault that causes injury, but it is the responsiblity of the individual to undergo physical therapy to recover.

I think what would make the above statement more accurate is to say "The vase that falls is unable to accept responsibility for its actions." One could even go so far to say that it's the vase's fault for being made out of porcelain (or clay, doesn't matter), but that does not make the vase any less shattered.

Ultimately, responsibility can only be gained by acceptance of responsibility.

I'm still not sure why the concept of responsibility is something that determinism has to consider.

Very true. Many people try to equate the two, which in theory might work, but in practice doesn't. If one is hit by a drunk driver, it may be the driver's fault that causes injury, but it is the responsiblity of the individual to undergo physical therapy to recover.

I think what would make the above statement more accurate is to say "The vase that falls is unable to accept responsibility for its actions." One could even go so far to say that it's the vase's fault for being made out of porcelain (or clay, doesn't matter), but that does not make the vase any less shattered.

Ultimately, responsibility can only be gained by acceptance of responsibility.
Actually, more accurately, what I should have said was that "the vase is not responsible for the act of falling", as falling is not "its act" but an act that happens to it.

The vase is not at fault for being.

Responsibility accompanies ability; fault is accepted when a value (bad) is applied to an act.

I'm still not sure why the concept of responsibility is something that determinism has to consider.
That's just it. It doesn't have to consider it; and yet, responsibility exists.

That means that determinism is not looking at the whole picture.

If we are not free, why do we feel as if we are? Read existentialists on angst...

Also heres something I came across a little while ago - Cause and effect is the basis of determinism. But for humans and many animals its not cause and effect, its stimulis and response.

That's just it. It doesn't have to consider it; and yet, responsibility exists.

That means that determinism is not looking at the whole picture.

No, it doesn't. That's the whole thing. Responsibility doesn't exist. You're the one who claimed it did, but have given no proof of that. What exists is cause and effect. Action and reaction. Consequences.

If we are not free, why do we feel as if we are? Read existentialists on angst...
Because we're not that bright, either.

Also heres something I came across a little while ago - Cause and effect is the basis of determinism. But for humans and many animals its not cause and effect, its stimulis and response.
The terms are basically synonomous, so I'm not sure what you're getting at here.

I am not entirely sure there is a self. I cannot figure out what would constitute a "self." There seems to be nothing independent about the person.

No action of our brain cannot be accounted for by those chemical reactions within it. No action of our body cannot be accounted for by those chemical reactions within it.
The way I talk about self, it is the result of the conscious (or assumed conscious) subjective perspective, that is the one looking outward from a thing. Consciousness is the faculty of awareness, therefore there must be a centre "point" from which awareness of things around the subject (outwardness) can be judged. That conceptual point is the self. (Conscious beings cannot be aware of that point, as it is consciousness itself; we can only be conscious of things external to it.)

Consciousness is necessary for a subjective perspective, but obviously not all subjects are conscious or have eyes to look out of. When we talk about objects as the subject of things they do or are, we infer consciousness as if it's a life-form, or imply a pseudo-consciousness. We address them as "itself" though it doesn't really have a consciousness; it does something "(by) itself". It looks out at the world from its perspective.

When it is said that we are the sum of our preferences, then they are internal to that "point" that is the self, which places them below the level of consciousness. Many things reside there that are inaccessible to us unless and until we can become aware of them; then they become thoughts that we can examine and play with.

Notice, too, that self is a conceptual point, not a physical point --it has no fixed place or size. When we ask "what constitutes a self?" the thing that is the subject is what we point at, as that is all we can point at.

No, it doesn't. That's the whole thing. Responsibility doesn't exist. You're the one who claimed it did, but have given no proof of that. What exists is cause and effect. Action and reaction. Consequences.
The proof that it exists is that we make use of it everyday in our social interactions. To deny that it exists denies our entire legal system, for one.

I think I'd probably qualify as a determinist, but I believe in free will (or at least free will as I understand the concept).

My understanding is free will is a capacity that facilitates/makes possible 'intentional intervention and/or participation in the construction of 'oneself'.

I see free will as a contiguous trait not a discrete trait, people vary in the degree and quality of 'free will' they have, both relative to other people, and relative to themselves at different times in their existence.

I dont see any conflict between my understanding of and belief in free will and my understanding of the relationship between 'cause and effect' being characterised by 'determinism'.

The way I talk about self, it is the result of the conscious (or assumed conscious) subjective perspective, that is the one looking outward from a thing. Consciousness is the faculty of awareness, therefore there must be a centre "point" from which awareness of things around the subject (outwardness) can be judged. That conceptual point is the self. (Conscious beings cannot be aware of that point, as it is consciousness itself; we can only be conscious of things external to it.)

Consciousness is necessary for a subjective perspective, but obviously not all subjects are conscious or have eyes to look out of. When we talk about objects as the subject of things they do or are, we infer consciousness as if it's a life-form, or imply a pseudo-consciousness. We address them as "itself" though it doesn't really have a consciousness; it does something "(by) itself". It looks out at the world from its perspective.

When it is said that we are the sum of our preferences, then they are internal to that "point" that is the self, which places them below the level of consciousness. Many things reside there that are inaccessible to us unless and until we can become aware of them; then they become thoughts that we can examine and play with.

Notice, too, that self is a conceptual point, not a physical point --it has no fixed place or size. When we ask "what constitutes a self?" the thing that is the subject is what we point at, as that is all we can point at.

I would like to believe that perception or experience constitutes the "self", maybe even thought. That would at least give us a base for moral and ethical values. But I cannot see that the person has any more control over or interest in his perception and experience than he does with his arms and legs.

The proof that it exists is that we make use of it everyday in our social interactions. To deny that it exists denies our entire legal system, for one.

Please. You're answering with a tautology. The entire point under debate is whether free-will exists. If free-will does not exist, then what we're making use of every day in our social interactions is simply cause and effect relationships, which, in our limited understanding, we assume to indicate free will and responsibility.

You might as well argue that the bible is true because it's the word of god, and it's the word of god because it's true.

To be honest, I'm simply getting frustrated with this partially because my own stance is a tautology as well. After all, you can say someone made a choice, and I can say that at that particular moment there was no other choice that that person could make based on their environment and history, and neither one of us will ever be proved correct.

Personally, however, I think that viewing things as deterministic is much more empowering than free-will, and likely to be more fruitful in advancing humanity.

Personally, however, I think that viewing things as deterministic is much more empowering than free-will, and likely to be more fruitful in advancing humanity.This is a unique point of view, and the way you explained it makes sense, but personally I am sympathetic to determinism for the opposite reason.

It is not tautology. If I had said it exists because it exists, that would be tautology ...but that's not what I said. What I said (implied) was that our acknowledgement of it is what creates it, and our use of it is what maintains its existence. Its existence requires us --and you are right, if you remove us from the picture by looking at it objectively then it effectively doesn't exist. That's my point.

It is not possible to "prove" objectively the existence of something that only exists subjectively.Does this mean that we can say God exists, too, even if it's only subjectively?

I would like to believe that perception or experience constitutes the "self", maybe even thought. That would at least give us a base for moral and ethical values.
:eek: It does?

I'll try to think that one through, but brain not working now. If you can post an explanation of what you're thinking there, that would help.

But I cannot see that the person has any more control over or interest in his perception and experience than he does with his arms and legs.
The person has no control over perceptions. He has all the world of interest in them --vested interest, because they determine the boundaries of his world.

Look... you are familiar with how people can be calmed by talking to them, right? They hear the words directed at them, and the words go through processes in the mind/brain to be understood, and that understanding allows them to calm their body, to consciously slow their breathing and relax.

Free will isn't us affecting things, creating effects in the world --it is us in the driver's seat. Whatever the processes are that can be followed through from spoken word in one mouth to calmed effect in the other person, whatever those processes are *objectively*, free will is the second person doing this thing, calming himself. Objectively, as you said, it is an illusion of self-control. Subjectively, though, a whole 'nother story is taking place, and if you default always to looking at the processes objectively, you are ignoring what's going on there. If you dismiss it as illusion, then that's all it is --and you have effectively held the objective view as more valuable to you then any subjective view. That's okay, but it's not the whole picture.

Does this mean that we can say God exists, too, even if it's only subjectively?
Depends on what you mean by God. And exist.

I worded that poorly, fell back on words that don't attempt to convey understanding to others, but represent the ideas to myself. Phrases, not meaningful to others.

I'm not intending to say that "some things exist only subjectively". Existence is a tricky topic, as different people take it in different contexts. I am trying to say that "some things that exist can only be meaningful when viewed subjectively," which is not quite the same thing. Free will and responsibility are things that are meaningful from a subjective perspective --from an objective perspective, they are just things to talk *about*. They might as well not exist if their proper context will not also be considered.

Depends on what you mean by God. And exist.

I worded that poorly, fell back on words that don't attempt to convey understanding to others, but represent the ideas to myself. Phrases, not meaningful to others.

I'm not intending to say that "some things exist only subjectively". Existence is a tricky topic, as different people take it in different contexts. I am trying to say that "some things that exist can only be meaningful when viewed subjectively," which is not quite the same thing. Free will and responsibility are things that are meaningful from a subjective perspective --from an objective perspective, they are just things to talk *about*. They might as well not exist if their proper context will not also be considered.Ah, I see. Well, would the concept of free will be meaningful if the majority of people were determinists and free will wasn't codified into law?

Ah, I see. Well, would the concept of free will be meaningful if the majority of people were determinists and free will wasn't codified into law?
But the majority of people are not solely Determinists, and I dare say that situation can never be. There are too many people who do not fail to recognize, and base their personal philosophies around, their individual subjective perspectives. Those are what is significantly meaningful to us, above objective reality.

:eek: It does?

I'll try to think that one through, but brain not working now. If you can post an explanation of what you're thinking there, that would help.

Yes, if there is no self, just a deterministic, how can we say that anything is right or wrong? There must be value or responsibility to human life before there can be a true system of ethics.

The person has no control over perceptions. He has all the world of interest in them --vested interest, because they determine the boundaries of his world.

Yes, I consider the self to be an experiencing thing, the sum of their perceptions, and as such a value could be assigned to human life. But even a person's perceptions can be just another natural force, another causal link, and that makes them no more important than the objects that made the impression.

Look... you are familiar with how people can be calmed by talking to them, right? They hear the words directed at them, and the words go through processes in the mind/brain to be understood, and that understanding allows them to calm their body, to consciously slow their breathing and relax.

Free will isn't us affecting things, creating effects in the world --it is us in the driver's seat. Whatever the processes are that can be followed through from spoken word in one mouth to calmed effect in the other person, whatever those processes are *objectively*, free will is the second person doing this thing, calming himself. Objectively, as you said, it is an illusion of self-control. Subjectively, though, a whole 'nother story is taking place, and if you default always to looking at the processes objectively, you are ignoring what's going on there. If you dismiss it as illusion, then that's all it is --and you have effectively held the objective view as more valuable to you then any subjective view. That's okay, but it's not the whole picture.

It is the objective/subjective divide that you rely on that I fundamentally agree with. I do think that any conflict between the two are just illusory perceptions.

I say that the objective view is the whole picture.

Yes, if there is no self, just a deterministic, how can we say that anything is right or wrong? There must be value or responsibility to human life before there can be a true system of ethics.
Okay.

But there is self.... We are conscious. We have individual perspectives. Unless you are going to consciously deny that you exist, there is self. Any speculation about the whole picture of reality that excludes this fact would be incomplete.

Yes, I consider the self to be an experiencing thing, the sum of their perceptions, and as such a value could be assigned to human life. But even a person's perceptions can be just another natural force, another causal link, and that makes them no more important than the objects that made the impression.
Again, you are holding the objective view as more important than the subjective view. To say that that makes them 'no more important' is to say that we do not assign values to things. But we do.

But you're right that the objective does not make one thing any more important than anything else; it cannot, because it has no subject.

It is the objective/subjective divide that you rely on that I fundamentally [dis]agree with. I do think that any conflict between the two are just illusory perceptions.

I say that the objective view is the whole picture.
I think that you are looking at both the subjective and objective views objectively, and not putting yourself in the subject's shoes, so to speak, which is necessary for the divide to occur. In other words, you won't change perspectives to see it, and so it is effectively not there.

This assessment fits with your last statement.

Okay.

But there is self.... We are conscious. We have individual perspectives. Unless you are going to consciously deny that you exist, there is self. Any speculation about the whole picture of reality that excludes this fact would be incomplete.

I have grounds to deny that I exist as a self, in the sense that it implies boundaries and individuality. I have grounds to deny that there is any boundary between you and I.

Again, you are holding the objective view as more important than the subjective view. To say that that makes them 'no more important' is to say that we do not assign values to things. But we do.

But you're right that the objective does not make one thing any more important than anything else; it cannot, because it has no subject.

But how does the subjective view permit us to form a morality? It can only be solipsistic, and I do not wish to know what morality we would form from that position.


I think that you are looking at both the subjective and objective views objectively, and not putting yourself in the subject's shoes, so to speak, which is necessary for the divide to occur. In other words, you won't change perspectives to see it, and so it is effectively not there.

This assessment fits with your last statement.

I think my opinion on the objective is taken from my subjective viewpoint. Only from the subjective can one experience and measure the outside forces acting upon oneself and causing our actions.

The subjective doesn't just allow us to say that we did something, it also allows us to say that forces are acting upon us.

Whoa, back up. What's this about bunnies attacking Australia?

I hate it when they do that

But the majority of people are not solely Determinists, and I dare say that situation can never be. There are too many people who do not fail to recognize, and base their personal philosophies around, their individual subjective perspectives. Those are what is significantly meaningful to us, above objective reality.Ah, I see. I have to say that I personally have to agree with William James - that even if free will is just an illusion, we should behave as though it isn't an illusion and that we act to make our choices a reality.

I have grounds to deny that I exist as a self, in the sense that it implies boundaries and individuality. I have grounds to deny that there is any boundary between you and I.
What are these "grounds"? From what I've seen so far, re determinism, they consist of ignoring the subjective perspective that consciousness gives and looking at the world entirely objectively.

But how does the subjective view permit us to form a morality? It can only be solipsistic, and I do not wish to know what morality we would form from that position.
I'm not sure what you're asking. I'm not well versed in solipsism except for the dictionary definition which states that it is a philosophy that holds that the individual is the only thing that they can be sure truly exists. I don't see how that necessarily fits in, or even why you are bringing it up --can you explain?

Morality is behaviour that conforms to a recognition of "what is right" and "what is wrong". "What is right" is in order, it "works", it makes sense from either a subjective view or an objective one. Not necessarily both.

I think my opinion on the objective is taken from my subjective viewpoint. Only from the subjective can one experience and measure the outside forces acting upon oneself and causing our actions.

The subjective doesn't just allow us to say that we did something, it also allows us to say that forces are acting upon us.
The forces, as we experience them act upon us, are from a subjective view. If we were to look at that objectively, we would abstract a position away from us, and look back at ourselves to see the interplay of 'forces and us' as one picture. The objective view is the entirely conceptual one, a stepping out of everyone's shoes. It is what you do (must do) to see the deterministic view, at all.

How can it be claimed that the view of the experiencer and the view apart from all experiencers is the same? If you can recognize that they are different, then there is the divide.

Please bear with me, here.

"I did it." There, a subjective view. What makes it subjective? --quite simply, it is the view from a person, a subject with a unique perspective on things, in this case the one claiming responsibility for an act.

"He did it." Another subjective view --mine again, since "I" am the one making the claim that he did it. The subjective view is the one of the person from whose shoes the story happens. This story happens from my shoes. It is only objective in the sense that I am looking at "him" and "it" and describing interplay between them; but any objectivity here is coloured by it being from a subjective view. It is an opinion, my opinion. Because there is a subject in the picture, me, a subject with a unique and limited perspective, it is not an objective view. If what I say about him is correct, it also indirectly implies a subjective view for him, but only he can make the claim that holds his subjective view. It is unique to him.

"This happened to me/him." An objective view. "Me" is the objective case of "I", it denotes an imagined perspective apart from the person that includes the person as an object interacting with other things. Here we have a person telling their story, but not from [i]their shoes; they are telling the story from anyone's shoes. No one in particular's shoes. Anyone can take this claim and run with it. The objective view is not unique, it is universal. This is the perspective that gives us the philosophy of determinism, that eliminates the subject and just looks at objects.

Ah, I see. I have to say that I personally have to agree with William James - that even if free will is just an illusion, we should behave as though it isn't an illusion and that we act to make our choices a reality.
I'll have to read up on that.

Everything from the subjective perspective is "illusion" when viewed objectively. :)

What are these "grounds"? From what I've seen so far, re determinism, they consist of ignoring the subjective perspective that consciousness gives and looking at the world entirely objectively.

How could I possibly ignore the subjective, considering that all of my thoughts are the product of the subjective?

And if we assume that there is a causal chain, then we are all extensions of the chain, without individual thoughts, desires, motivations. We are all one big algorithm.

I'm not sure what you're asking. I'm not well versed in solipsism except for the dictionary definition which states that it is a philosophy that holds that the individual is the only thing that they can be sure truly exists. I don't see how that necessarily fits in, or even why you are bringing it up --can you explain?

Because the subjective can only view can only consider itself. The subjective can only experience actions and impressions on itself, and as such it has no consideration of others. From the subjective, only the subjective exists and all else are simply impressions.

Morality is behaviour that conforms to a recognition of "what is right" and "what is wrong". "What is right" is in order, it "works", it makes sense from either a subjective view or an objective one. Not necessarily both.

How can you view what is right, what is wrong, or what works from a subjective viewpoint?


The forces, as we experience them act upon us, are from a subjective view. If we were to look at that objectively, we would abstract a position away from us, and look back at ourselves to see the interplay of 'forces and us' as one picture. The objective view is the entirely conceptual one, a stepping out of everyone's shoes. It is what you do (must do) to see the deterministic view, at all.

How can it be claimed that the view of the experiencer and the view apart from all experiencers is the same? If you can recognize that they are different, then there is the divide.

Please bear with me, here.

"I did it." There, a subjective view. What makes it subjective? --quite simply, it is the view from a person, a subject with a unique perspective on things, in this case the one claiming responsibility for an act.

"He did it." Another subjective view --mine again, since "I" am the one making the claim that he did it. The subjective view is the one of the person from whose shoes the story happens. This story happens from my shoes. It is only objective in the sense that I am looking at "him" and "it" and describing interplay between them; but any objectivity here is coloured by it being from a subjective view. It is an opinion, my opinion. Because there is a subject in the picture, me, a subject with a unique and limited perspective, it is not an objective view. If what I say about him is correct, it also indirectly implies a subjective view for him, but only he can make the claim that holds his subjective view. It is unique to him.

"This happened to me/him." An objective view. "Me" is the objective case of "I", it denotes an imagined perspective apart from the person that includes the person as an object interacting with other things. Here we have a person telling their story, but not from [i]their shoes; they are telling the story from anyone's shoes. No one in particular's shoes. Anyone can take this claim and run with it. The objective view is not unique, it is universal. This is the perspective that gives us the philosophy of determinism, that eliminates the subject and just looks at objects.

From the subjective there are only impressions, not external forces, and I was referring to impressions.

External forces, once acting upon the individual, register to the subjective as impressions.

In other words, I am not concerned with "This happened to me," I am concerned with "I felt this," which is entirely subjective and can show a causal link.

How could I possibly ignore the subjective, considering that all of my thoughts are the product of the subjective?

And if we assume that there is a causal chain, then we are all extensions of the chain, without individual thoughts, desires, motivations. We are all one big algorithm.
You ignore the subjective view by continually defaulting to the objective view. The subjective is the unique perspective --not the one that looks at itself as a link in the chain, but the one that is an individual link in the chain looking out at a world around it with its own thoughts, desires, motivations...

There is literally a world of difference between the two.

Because the subjective can only view can only consider itself. The subjective can only experience actions and impressions on itself, and as such it has no consideration of others. From the subjective, only the subjective exists and all else are simply impressions.
Consciousness (the faculty of awareness) can only be aware of things external to it. Consciousness, and hence the subjective view, requires that those things external to it exist before it does, and it does not exist without them. That would seem to be the opposite of the solipsism stance.

The subjective view can only consider things external to it, out there all around it. It can only look at them. We are unconscious of things internal to the subjective perspective; internally, we can only apply a label of "self" and be happy with that. Here be dragons.

Perception is impressions. The subjective view for conscious beings requires perception, but perception is not the subjective perspective. They are two related but different things: one is input for consciousness from external stimuli; the other is simply the view looking out at those things.

How can you view what is right, what is wrong, or what works from a subjective viewpoint?
Let's take a traffic intersection as a good example. Four cars approach an unmarked intersection from different directions. From the subjective perspective of any one of the cars, there is a way to proceed that "feels right", that makes sense to him. It might depend on (for instance) his observation of the intersection, the relative speed of the other vehicles, his memory of intersection rules, and the feel of the road under his wheels. And his compassion. Note that this is not "right" itself, it is the driver comparing what he perceives to "right" to judge its validity. Judgement occurs from the subjective viewpoint.

Morality is the driver's behaviour that takes into consideration the comparison to "right" or "wrong". If he acts, for instance, with a conscious understanding that the right thing to do is to be considerate of the other cars, pedestrians and local laws, then he has behaved morally. "He acts..." from a subjective view.

If, on the other hand, we speak about moral acts taking place, we have switched to an objective view. "Acts [happen to] take place..." from an objective view.

Will finish this post later.

You ignore the subjective view by continually defaulting to the objective view. The subjective is the unique perspective --not the one that looks at itself as a link in the chain, but the one that is an individual link in the chain looking out at a world around it with its own thoughts, desires, motivations...

There is literally a world of difference between the two.

I understand, but I am trying to ask why I can't find determinism from my subjective. I have already said that my subjective can feel impressions, can understand the process that turns those impressions into actions, and understand myself as actor, and those are all that are necessary to find determinism.

Consciousness (the faculty of awareness) can only be aware of things external to it. Consciousness, and hence the subjective view, requires that those things external to it exist before it does, and it does not exist without them. That would seem to be the opposite of the solipsism stance.

The subjective view can only consider things external to it, out there all around it. It can only look at them. We are unconscious of things internal to the subjective perspective; internally, we can only apply a label of "self" and be happy with that. Here be dragons.

Perception is impressions. The subjective view for conscious beings requires perception, but perception is not the subjective perspective. They are two related but different things: one is input for consciousness from external stimuli; the other is simply the view looking out at those things.

Consciousness cannot be aware of something external to itself. Consciousness is only aware of itself, and becomes aware of external forces through changes in itself.

Regardless of all of this, a subjective based morality is based on how actions effect the actor, it requires an objective position to judge morality based on anything else.

Let's take a traffic intersection as a good example. Four cars approach an unmarked intersection from different directions. From the subjective perspective of any one of the cars, there is a way to proceed that "feels right", that makes sense to him. It might depend on (for instance) his observation of the intersection, the relative speed of the other vehicles, his memory of intersection rules, and the feel of the road under his wheels. And his compassion. Note that this is not "right" itself, it is the driver comparing what he perceives to "right" to judge its validity. Judgement occurs from the subjective viewpoint.

You must have noted that your individual based his judgement on observations taken from the objective position. We make moral judgements subjectively in that they occur within us, but we make moral judgements from the objective position.

Morality is the driver's behaviour that takes into consideration the comparison to "right" or "wrong". If he acts, for instance, with a conscious understanding that the right thing to do is to be considerate of the other cars, pedestrians and local laws, then he has behaved morally. "He acts..." from a subjective view.

If, on the other hand, we speak about moral acts taking place, we have switched to an objective view. "Acts [happen to] take place..." from an objective view.

This doesn't address my point. We have already addressed that the person acts subjectively.

I agree with you that the process of comparison is subjective, like the consideration for action. However, the moral judgement must come from an objective position. A person who does not abstract himself to the objective to determine his morality takes a solipsistic view, one with no consideration for others, as he cannot measure the effect on others from his subjective.

I understand, but I am trying to ask why I can't find determinism from my subjective. I have already said that my subjective can feel impressions, can understand the process that turns those impressions into actions, and understand myself as actor, and those are all that are necessary to find determinism.
All that understood stuff is good, and it is objective --it is looking at yourself as a part of the chain, or a part of events or circumstances. Any perspective that looks *at* you is the objective perspective. The subjective perspective is you, looking.

Consciousness cannot be aware of something external to itself. Consciousness is only aware of itself, and becomes aware of external forces through changes in itself.
How did you come by these conclusions? Are they are a published philosophy (that I can read more about)?

Are you perhaps equating consciousness with the mind? Consciousness is our ability to be aware. Things that go on in the mind are one of the things we can be aware of. Contained in this idea is a "we" who is the one being made aware of these things. Self, consciousness and mind are not the same thing.

Regardless of all of this, a subjective based morality is based on how actions effect the actor, it requires an objective position to judge morality based on anything else.


You must have noted that your individual based his judgement on observations taken from the objective position. We make moral judgements subjectively in that they occur within us, but we make moral judgements from the objective position.
If we're talking about the judgements themselves that a person makes then the objective judgement would be one that looks upon events with an eye towards equality and fairness. That is another context of "objective" than the perspectives we were talking about earlier. They are related, but not the same thing.

His observations were ones that he made, hence they were made from a subjective perspective --his.

This doesn't address my point. We have already addressed that the person acts subjectively.

I agree with you that the process of comparison is subjective, like the consideration for action. However, the moral judgement must come from an objective position. A person who does not abstract himself to the objective to determine his morality takes a solipsistic view, one with no consideration for others, as he cannot measure the effect on others from his subjective.
You are talking about subjective things, and I am talking about the subjective perspective. This is only confusing things.

All judgements are rendered from an individual subjective perspective. All judgements are not necessarily subjective ones.

All that understood stuff is good, and it is objective --it is looking at yourself as a part of the chain, or a part of events or circumstances. Any perspective that looks *at* you is the objective perspective. The subjective perspective is you, looking.

No, it is entirely subjective. I feel, I think, I do.

How did you come by these conclusions? Are they are a published philosophy (that I can read more about)?

They are not entirely my own thoughts, but I don't know where you can read directly about that line of thinking.

Are you perhaps equating consciousness with the mind? Consciousness is our ability to be aware. Things that go on in the mind are one of the things we can be aware of. Contained in this idea is a "we" who is the one being made aware of these things. Self, consciousness and mind are not the same thing.

Consciousness is not a static entity, it is a string of perceptions. As such I cannot see the consciousness as an active perceiving interpreter, but more of a basket in which ideas gather.


If we're talking about the judgements themselves that a person makes then the objective judgement would be one that looks upon events with an eye towards equality and fairness. That is another context of "objective" than the perspectives we were talking about earlier. They are related, but not the same thing.

I am referring to the observations. Regardless of a persons understanding of objective reality, their decisions will be subjective. However, morality must be based on objective perception and reality.

His observations were ones that he made, hence they were made from a subjective perspective --his.

Because I read ahead I feel compelled to say this:

Now you are the one who is confusing the terms of this discussion. We are talking about what is true from objective and subjective realities, which I admit are different.

The observations were made subjectively, but they were perceptions that described an objective reality.

You are talking about subjective things, and I am talking about the subjective perspective. This is only confusing things.

All judgements are rendered from an individual subjective perspective. All judgements are not necessarily subjective ones.

I am referring to objective and subjective realities.

No, it is entirely subjective. I feel, I think, I do.


They are not entirely my own thoughts, but I don't know where you can read directly about that line of thinking.


Consciousness is not a static entity, it is a string of perceptions. As such I cannot see the consciousness as an active perceiving interpreter, but more of a basket in which ideas gather.
Consciousness is not an active perceiving interpreter, nor a recepticle for ideas --the brain is that. Consciousness is the body's faculty of awareness.

The misunderstanding is my fault. I'm making a botch of this. To be precise, when I said "consciousness can only be aware of things external to it," I should have said, "the conscious body can only be..." Consciousness makes us aware of things external to us.

I am referring to the observations. Regardless of a persons understanding of objective reality, their decisions will be subjective. However, morality must be based on objective perception and reality.


Because I read ahead I feel compelled to say this:

Now you are the one who is confusing the terms of this discussion. We are talking about what is true from objective and subjective realities, which I admit are different.

The observations were made subjectively, but they were perceptions that described an objective reality.


I am referring to objective and subjective realities.
I know; you've changed topics. I've been trying to steer it back, in vain.

Morality isn't really a topic that interests me.