NationStates Jolt Archive

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.

There's no destiny, only paths and whether you choose to follow one or the other. Some of this paths twists and turn, some cross each other multiple times. Some don't cross another one at all. Some go to the same place through a different route. Only one way to find out.

The only thing is you can't stop, just change paths when finding an intersection.

1) You have free will. Nothing is written in stone, your actions determine your future.

or

2) You have a destiny chosen for you by some supreme being(s) who want you to play a part in their play. You can choose not to play that part, the story still takes place, but things may end badly for you.

or

3) All is written in stone. You think you're acting according to your own will, but it was predestined.

Since we cannot know, the best course of action in my opinion is to assume you have free will. At least it takes away the fatalist excuses for not living your life the best way you can.

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.


There is nothing BUT free will, and I say that as a christian(we are sometimes seen as being caught up in the will of God, not our on accord). I am able to do whatever I want, to take any path i want. There is no force that can make me do other than what I want. This is MY story, i will write the ending the way i see fit. :)

I tend to view everything as a complex mathematical equation working itself to it's conclusion. Thus, everything involved, including our choices is predetermined by this predetermined mathematical formula.

However, we view the universe through our limited perceptions. Thus in the world of our perceptions, we have free will. We must presume we have free will, because we can't possibly glimpse the entirety of the workings of the universe with our limited perceptions, and should act as if we had free will.

Destiny, the idea that someone can somehow calculate the outcome of the 'mathematical formula', and predetermine what will happen to you, is absurd. Therefore, assume nothing, and act on you 'free will'.

There is no such thing as destiny or fate. You're future is decided by internal choices that you can control and external chaos that you cannot control.

1) You have free will. Nothing is written in stone, your actions determine your future.

or

2) You have a destiny chosen for you by some supreme being(s) who want you to play a part in their play. You can choose not to play that part, the story still takes place, but things may end badly for you.

or

3) All is written in stone. You think you're acting according to your own will, but it was predestined.

Since we cannot know, the best course of action in my opinion is to assume you have free will. At least it takes away the fatalist excuses for not living your life the best way you can.

Meh, I was going to say something along these lines. But you've said it much better than I would have, so this post is meaningless really... *quietly steps out of thread*

I think life is kinda like the Gwenyth Paltrow movie "Sliding Doors".

The way I live wth examples of psychics being freakishly right as they occasionally are (like the ones that work for police and some such) is that each of us has a number of different paths branching off from each decision and/or outcome (such as catching the train or not catching the train such as in "Sliding Doors") but unless we behave differently to a situation than we normally would than certain outcomes become much more probable so that a psychic might see the ultimate outcome if everyone behaves as they normally do, but then can also change the outcome by informing someone of what the ultimate result might be and thus for better or for worse change that person's behavior whether that person thinks the psychic is telling the truth or is just plain looney. Not that I think many psychics are right or anything, but I do think there is something to say for the ones who are time and again.

Besides that I think there are probably certain people that for whatever reason, be it reincarnation or predestination or 'soulmates' (*throws up a little in my throat*) or fate or whatever, we're meant to meet. Sometimes however, due to a combination of early deaths and actions of free will, these meetings never take place. Maybe that's why there can be freaky cases of children who dream of other people's lives...maybe they're still looking to meet the people that the person they dream of (and possibly are) never got a chance to meet.

1) You have free will. Nothing is written in stone, your actions determine your future.

or

2) You have a destiny chosen for you by some supreme being(s) who want you to play a part in their play. You can choose not to play that part, the story still takes place, but things may end badly for you.

or

3) All is written in stone. You think you're acting according to your own will, but it was predestined.

This is what I believe (Are you being serious?) except that I believe you cannot refuse the part given to you to play.

I don't suppose anyone else here is a compatibilist?

I am going to go with a predetermined path of all existence.

All the stimuli of a particular instance of existance can only add up to one possible occurrence. That would mean that all present existence is totally contingent on the past.

I don't suppose anyone else here is a compatibilist?

I would say that human imperfection can cause an apparent state of free will. I would also say that humans do have a will, so to speak, just at some point the will is the result of some other force.

We're governed by causality. However, thanks to the systemic nature of reality, there are so many levels on which this occurs that sufficiently developed systems have gained the ability to make personal choices (to an extent).

Essentially, we're the product of our past selves, and our past influences our current state which in turn drives our choices, but the choices are still ours to make.

I would say that human imperfection can cause an apparent state of free will. I would also say that humans do have a will, so to speak, just at some point the will is the result of some other force.

Hmmm. Human imperfection? Do you think human imperfection is the only reason for this apparent state of free will? :confused:

I would also say that humans do have a will, so to speak, just at some point the will is the result of some other force.

I agree with the basic point here.

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.
'Fate' is circumstances that act upon us. It includes things that move us or determine for us what must be, such as an earthquake forcing us to move to another location, as well as things we observe, such as a coincidence, that strike a chord of meaning for us, because meaningfulness inspires us to action (objectively), even if the action is as small as filing a thought away in memory.

'Destiny' is us acting, and through that action, creating new circumstances. 'Will' is a person determining action. Destiny requires will.

We cannot defy fate, as we have no control over it. Circumstance acts to move us in certain directions. We cannot defy destiny, because we create destiny with our actions today. Destiny is a path layed out before us, a path of circumstances that will come into play depending on what we choose to do right now.

Being 'destined' means that you have a choice to make: you can follow and fulfill an outlined destiny, or you can walk away.

These are the words as they are used in divination.

Essentially, we're the product of our past selves, and our past influences our current state which in turn drives our choices, but the choices are still ours to make.

We are making the choices, but if the choices are made through external causality, how are they truly our choices?

In a sense, the event of takes place within us, but it doesn't take place because of us.

The logical extension of determinism is complete worthlessness of existence. We are not individuals but simply a instant manifestation of an algorithm.

We all make our own choices and sometimes these choices come together to make some effect. Chaotic, really.

We all make our own choices and sometimes these choices come together to make some effect. Chaotic, really.

Do you believe that human interactions are chaotic?

I think life is kinda like the Gwenyth Paltrow movie "Sliding Doors".
I remember that I found that movie very disturbing and frustrating. I should rent it and watch it again, perhaps I can find out why.

Do you believe that human interactions are chaotic?

The way human relationships are I can hardly see things as anything but chaotic. People screwing each other over? What other conclusion can be drawn?

Hmmm. Human imperfection? Do you think human imperfection is the only reason for this apparent state of free will? :confused:

I would say yes, but the problem is this:

If a lack of understanding is what causes the apparent state of free will, then we would presumably understand the causality of our actions with complete understanding, correct?

However, when we have complete understanding, wouldn't our actions cease to be the result of causality, and then become the sole process of our conscious?

I kind of just derailed my own argument while thinking about how to explain it.

I would say yes, but the problem is this:

Interesting. I've actually heard much better explanations than human imperfection, but lets see where this goes...

If a lack of understanding is what causes the apparent state of free will, then we would presumably understand the causality of our actions with complete understanding, correct?

However, when we have complete understanding, wouldn't our actions cease to be the result of causality, and then become the sole process of our conscious?

I kind of just derailed my own argument while thinking about how to explain it.

This is an interesting argument. If you can work out a way to make it clearer I would love to discuss it.

If no motions are random (even on a subatomic scale), then inevitably everything that happens is the inevitable results of billions of years of matter interacting.

If no motions are random (even on a subatomic scale), then inevitably everything that happens is the inevitable results of billions of years of matter interacting.
That's exactly right.

That is why we philosophically distinguish between what happens to us, and what we do to make things happen. The latter has no inevitability attached to it.

The way human relationships are I can hardly see things as anything but chaotic. People screwing each other over? What other conclusion can be drawn?

There are several conclusions that can be drawn.

Some premise that humans are inherently evil/flawed/lacking self-control. Others might suggest that the system humans inhabit is chaotic/causally determined/indeterministic. A few others might use some combination of these approaches.

Interesting. I've actually heard much better explanations than human imperfection, but lets see where this goes...

This is an interesting argument. If you can work out a way to make it clearer I would love to discuss it.

There is not much of an argument.

I stated that there is no free will, we just think there is free will because we cannot follow the causal chain.

But when one takes that to its logical conclusion, one must assume that, when we can follow the causal chain we will know that there is no free will.

But then that doesn't work, as when we understand the causal chain, there is nothing forcing us to continue the chain. Thus when we can understand the chain, then we have free will.

So pretty much I am just thinking aloud.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn.

Some premise that humans are inherently evil/flawed/lacking self-control. Others might suggest that the system humans inhabit is chaotic/causally determined/indeterministic. A few others might use some combination of these approaches.

All of these possibilities will create the chaos. Humans in the end look out for themselves so if everyone is looking out for #1 then there could be no other end then for instability.

Getting right to it, having a fate or destiny would imply some higher power is going to determine your future. Even for those who believe in God recognize that God let's us choose our own paths, free will is essential for that. Of course you can circle back and say if you die in an automobile accident then it was fate from God for you to die then. Hard really to make an absolute statement on something you cannot prove absolutely. In the end though what you do is YOUR decision. The consequences thereof will be because of that.

There is not much of an argument.

I stated that there is no free will, we just think there is free will because we cannot follow the causal chain.

But when one takes that to its logical conclusion, one must assume that, when we can follow the causal chain we will know that there is no free will.

That depends on what sort of definition of free will you have. If your definition of free will is one of a contra-causal nature, then yes of course free will does not exist given universal causality. If your definition of free will is not contra-causal (and there's no reason it couldn't be), then free will is still very much a possibility.

But then that doesn't work, as when we understand the causal chain, there is nothing forcing us to continue the chain. Thus when we can understand the chain, then we have free will.

So pretty much I am just thinking aloud.

Interesting thoughts you have there.

That depends on what sort of definition of free will you have. If your definition of free will is one of a contra-causal nature, then yes of course free will does not exist given universal causality. If your definition of free will is not contra-causal (and there's no reason it couldn't be), then free will is still very much a possibility.

How could free will not be contra-causal?

How could free will not be contra-causal?

I'll try to give an example.

For my own amusement and the sake of argument, let's posit the existence of two entities who are exactly the same except in two respects, 1) their names and 2) one has the ability to act with contra-causal freedom and the other does not.

The first entity is Vittos Ordination, the second Vittos Ordination2. VO has contra-causal freedom, while VO2 does not.

Both VO and VO2 are deciding where to eat dinner, Taco Bell or McDonald's. They have the same biological need to eat, the same preferences, the same neurological state, and so on. Neither of them are being coerced by external forces or internal compulsions (eg. kleptomania). Given all the factors of the situation, both of them are causally determined to eat at Taco Bell.

VO, having contra-causal freedom, takes into account his need to eat, preferences, and so on to decide that it would be best to eat at Taco Bell, given his options. Of course since he has contra-causal freedom he can override his decision and choose McDonald's.

VO2, not having contra-causal freedom, takes into account that same information and decides that it would be best to eat at Taco Bell, and so he does.

The question is: Is what VO has actually free will? Or is it just a nonsensical and nonexistent form of freedom?

Is freedom having the power to override your own desires, even second-order desires, and choose options that make little sense? Or is freedom the lack of external coercion and internal compulsion?

Note: Dammit, ran out of time. Will edit in completed response later.

Edit: Edit completed.

Note: Dammit, ran out of time. Will edit in completed response later.
Teehee!

HodRodia,

This is a thread you might want to read. Much of it has to do with the very question of free will.

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=475032

How about constrained free will, i.e. you are free to make whatever choices you like, but in the end, the results are going to be pretty predictable. Four things happen to everybody: you're born, you get old, you get sick, and you die. You are free to do whatever you want in the meantime, but nothing you do is going to change those.

The logical extension of determinism is complete worthlessness of existence. We are not individuals but simply a instant manifestation of an algorithm.
There are algorithms that can handle their own writing. Rare, but they exist.

The problem comes from looking at a man as a variable. In fact, he is a system, and as a system, there is this self-manipulation aspect to him. That which we call "will" is, in fact, entirely local causality; it is contained within that which we call the "self" or "spirit". However, as long as the network of complex interactions that makes me up can modify itself, through chains of cause and effect or not, I as a whole can have causes with no effect and can experience effects without cause due to the emergent nature of my composition.

I as a whole can have causes with no effect and can experience effects without cause due to the emergent nature of my composition.

That is not determinism.

HodRodia,

This is a thread you might want to read. Much of it has to do with the very question of free will.

http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=475032

Thanks. I'll take a look at it later. I edited my earlier post.

I believe in fate and destiny, and i believe everything happens for a reason, but i also believe we make our own choices. I just happen to think those choices are dictated by fate. Since we don't know what fate has chosen for us though until we decide, we still do it blindly.

I'll try to give an example.

For my own amusement and the sake of argument, let's posit the existence of two entities who are exactly the same except in two respects, 1) their names and 2) one has the ability to act with contra-causal freedom and the other does not.

The first entity is Vittos Ordination, the second Vittos Ordination2. VO has contra-causal freedom, while VO2 does not.

Both VO and VO2 are deciding where to eat dinner, Taco Bell or McDonald's. They have the same biological need to eat, the same preferences, the same neurological state, and so on. Neither of them are being coerced by external forces or internal compulsions (eg. kleptomania). Given all the factors of the situation, both of them are causally determined to eat at Taco Bell.

VO, having contra-causal freedom, takes into account his need to eat, preferences, and so on to decide that it would be best to eat at Taco Bell, given his options. Of course since he has contra-causal freedom he can override his decision and choose McDonald's.

VO2, not having contra-causal freedom, takes into account that same information and decides that it would be best to eat at Taco Bell, and so he does.

The question is: Is what VO has actually free will? Or is it just a nonsensical and nonexistent form of freedom?

Is freedom having the power to override your own desires, even second-order desires, and choose options that make little sense? Or is freedom the lack of external coercion and internal compulsion?

Note: Dammit, ran out of time. Will edit in completed response later.

Edit: Edit completed.

I would say that free will is the ability to take any of a number of available options. My opinion of determinism states that, given a set of stimuli, a person will make a particular choice. Since the stimuli for a decision are existent prior to the decision, there is only one possible decision.

I would say that VO's choice to go against his usual desires is still a preexisting condition (existing prior to the choice) that is contingent on prior events and conditions.

In the end without desire there is no action. So in the instance of action we must assume desire. It is my opinion that all desire is predetermined.

That is not determinism.
It is. It's just that certain aspects of causality occur at a level below the abstraction level of my conscious self, which effectively means that I as an entity have a disjoint track between that which causes and that which is caused. Or, to put it bluntly, fate is trivial enough to be ignorable by the conscious self.

It is. It's just that certain aspects of causality occur at a level below the abstraction level of my conscious self, which effectively means that I as an entity have a disjoint track between that which causes and that which is caused. Or, to put it bluntly, fate is trivial enough to be ignorable by the conscious self.

Oh, so there is no true free will, we just assume that there is.

The question is: Is what VO has actually free will? Or is it just a nonsensical and nonexistent form of freedom?

Is freedom having the power to override your own desires, even second-order desires, and choose options that make little sense? Or is freedom the lack of external coercion and internal compulsion?
Um... I pick neither of those! Neither utilize a proper perspective for defining will, namely the subjective perspective.

I was destined to have free will.

We have free will at the moment, from the point of view of the present.
From the point of view of the future (where we're the past) we don't.

I'll try to give an example.

For my own amusement and the sake of argument, let's posit the existence of two entities who are exactly the same except in two respects, 1) their names and 2) one has the ability to act with contra-causal freedom and the other does not.

The first entity is Vittos Ordination, the second Vittos Ordination2. VO has contra-causal freedom, while VO2 does not.

Both VO and VO2 are deciding where to eat dinner, Taco Bell or McDonald's. They have the same biological need to eat, the same preferences, the same neurological state, and so on. Neither of them are being coerced by external forces or internal compulsions (eg. kleptomania). Given all the factors of the situation, both of them are causally determined to eat at Taco Bell.

VO, having contra-causal freedom, takes into account his need to eat, preferences, and so on to decide that it would be best to eat at Taco Bell, given his options. Of course since he has contra-causal freedom he can override his decision and choose McDonald's.

VO2, not having contra-causal freedom, takes into account that same information and decides that it would be best to eat at Taco Bell, and so he does.

The question is: Is what VO has actually free will? Or is it just a nonsensical and nonexistent form of freedom?

Is freedom having the power to override your own desires, even second-order desires, and choose options that make little sense? Or is freedom the lack of external coercion and internal compulsion?

Note: Dammit, ran out of time. Will edit in completed response later.

Edit: Edit completed.


You saved me a post.
Thanks.

In the end without desire there is no action. So in the instance of action we must assume desire. It is my opinion that all desire is predetermined.

Pretty much.
But that doesn't affect us having free will, since nobody's definition of Free Will includes "complete power over their own desires."

Free will just means that we can make choices, that we can choose to do what we desire.

We have free will at the moment, from the point of view of the present.
From the point of view of the future (where we're the past) we don't.
Just so. Will only exists from a subjective perspective.

Pretty much.
But that doesn't affect us having free will, since nobody's definition of Free Will includes "complete power over their own desires."

Free will just means that we can make choices, that we can choose to do what we desire.

Correct, as I said earlier free will is the ability to take any alternative choice. However, since we will always follow our desires, and our desires are a creation of natural forces, then we do not have the ability to take an alternative choice.

Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process take away our free will.

Ah yes, let's apply some wisdom upon these questions, philosophies and theories:

Nothing is certain.

Yes, this applies the 3 words themselves as well.

Ah yes, let's apply some wisdom upon these questions, philosophies and theories:

Nothing is certain.

Yes, this applies the 3 words themselves as well.

Then the fact that nothing is certain is not certain

Then the fact that nothing is certain is not certain
Indeed. That's what it says.

Ah yes, let's apply some wisdom upon these questions, philosophies and theories:

Nothing is certain.

Yes, this applies the 3 words themselves as well.

How long did it take you to come up with that one?

Correct, as I said earlier free will is the ability to take any alternative choice. However, since we will always follow our desires, and our desires are a creation of natural forces, then we do not have the ability to take an alternative choice.

Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process take away our free will.
The problem with this is that you keep changing context from subjective to objective. "Taking an alternative choice," is a subjective act. "Our desires are a creation of natural forces," is an objective observation.

The thing is, free will only exists from the subjective perspective. Your "however" takes that out of context, and therefore there you are no longer talking about free will at all anymore. So, of course, it's not there.

Nothing can ever take away our free will unless we are unconscious or dead, in which case we have no free will to lose.

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.

Your choice is an operation of your destiny... People "freely" choose the course of their predetermined path.

Indeed. That's what it says.

That's what the problem is, it's like; "This statement is a lie".

1) You have free will. Nothing is written in stone, your actions determine your future.

or

2) You have a destiny chosen for you by some supreme being(s) who want you to play a part in their play. You can choose not to play that part, the story still takes place, but things may end badly for you.

or

3) All is written in stone. You think you're acting according to your own will, but it was predestined.

Since we cannot know, the best course of action in my opinion is to assume you have free will. At least it takes away the fatalist excuses for not living your life the best way you can.

Your conclusion is very calvinistic... People are destined, none of us knows, in absolute our own destiny, and we cannot determine the destined path of others, so you operate in a fashion whereby you assume peoples choices are freely made.... This is known as "free agency" is calvinistic soterology... Everyone follows a predetermined path, but all choices which follow the course of this path are made freely by the agent (person) in accordance with their own nature with no forcefull interference.

The problem with this is that you keep changing context from subjective to objective. "Taking an alternative choice," is a subjective act. "Our desires are a creation of natural forces," is an objective observation.

The thing is, free will only exists from the subjective perspective. Your "however" takes that out of context, and therefore there you are no longer talking about free will at all anymore. So, of course, it's not there.

Nothing can ever take away our free will unless we are unconscious or dead, in which case we have no free will to lose.

What are you talking about here?

First off, the act of choosing from alternatives is an act that can be observed objectively. Sure desires are subjective, but that does nothing to deny their origination in natural forces.

Second, I gave an objective definition for the concept of free will, and through an objective observation of natural forces, tried to show that the objective definition of free will cannot exist.

Correct, as I said earlier free will is the ability to take any alternative choice. However, since we will always follow our desires, and our desires are a creation of natural forces, then we do not have the ability to take an alternative choice.

Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process take away our free will.

If there were true, given that all humans have basically the same desires, wouldn't we be all doing the same thing. Where is the variety coming from?

Does it follow that the rapist and the average good hearted mother are just following their desires?

All of our actions are predetermined. If we look back in the past, then we can see the reasons for doing a certain action. If, for example, I asked someone "If there are truly choices in the world, then how come when I woke up this morning I went to school and didn't sleep in." They would then say something along the lines of "Because you decided that sleeping isn't as important as going to school". Then I'd say that that piece of information eliminated the choice of sleeping in from ever having existed so in fact there are really no choices, because past influences exert an influence on us and determine our actions

If there were true, given that all humans have basically the same desires, wouldn't we be all doing the same thing. Where is the variety coming from?

That is far from a given. Those basic desires you are speaking of, I guess could come from evolutionary factors for prolong the survival of the species.

However, experience, reason, and situation all lead us to have a very, very wide spectrum of desires.

Does it follow that the rapist and the average good hearted mother are just following their desires?

Are you saying that a person rapes against his own will? That he doesn't want to rape, but that he compelled by some external force to rape?

All of our actions are predetermined. If we look back in the past, then we can see the reasons for doing a certain action. If, for example, I asked someone "If there are truly choices in the world, then how come when I woke up this morning I went to school and didn't sleep in." They would then say something along the lines of "Because you decided that sleeping isn't as important as going to school". Then I'd say that that piece of information eliminated the choice of sleeping in from ever having existed so in fact there are really no choices, because past influences exert an influence on us and determine our actions

Looking back at the past there seems to be no free will, but at the present there still remains a choice (assuming there is such a thing as randomness).

How long did it take you to come up with that one?

17 years, 5 months and 4 days.

That's what the problem is, it's like; "This statement is a lie".

Why is that a problem? It merely states that everything in uncertain. Even uncertainty is uncertain. And I can state that without reasonable doubt.

What are you talking about here?

First off, the act of choosing from alternatives is an act that can be observed objectively. Sure desires are subjective, but that does nothing to deny their origination in natural forces.

Second, I gave an objective definition for the concept of free will, and through an objective observation of natural forces, tried to show that the objective definition of free will cannot exist.
"Bill took his wife to the hospital," is an objective observation of Bill's subjective wilful act. To Bill, it was a conscious, determined act. Will is subjective to Bill.

"Bill's wife got taken to the hospital," is an objective observation of an objective action. No Bill, no will.

The "ability to take an alternative choice," is a subjective act. There is an agent, however implied, that makes the choice.

Natural forces dictating what our choices will be, determining what we desire, takes the subjective agent out of the picture. No subjective agent, no will.

You are no longer talking about will in your last sentence, because of the changed context.

Look at it this way: Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process take away our free will. <-Where is the conscious act by us in that sentence? There is none; Will is not taken away, it simply isn't there in this context.

If our actions are predetermined, then it becomes conceivable that we could discover what we are predetermined to do.
If you know what you are predetermined to do, do you fight it or do you ride it?
And if you fight it, is that a battle with possibility of victory?
I personally think that there is no such thing as Fate or Destiny. The universe is not deterministic except on the very largest of scales; and due to the fact that most systems are chaotic, even these can be affected by small scale events. So there is nothing in science to say we cannot make choices for ourselves; the 'mechanical' universe envisioned by Newton et al is no such thing.
So, unless you believe that there is a God, and that this God wishes to determine your every deed, there is no justification for predetermination. You can make highly accurate predictions, if you know someone well, but it is never possible to say exactly what they will do. That in itself, to my mind, is evidence that you can understand the factors pulling them this way and that, but not their 'self' that makes the choice.

Look at it this way: Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process take away our free will. <-Where is the conscious act by us in that sentence? There is none; there is no will to take away.

Would you prefer me to say "Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process preclude us from free will"?

There's no paths, there's no fate, and there's no destiny. There's free will.

As you may have noticed, I strongly believe in God - this is one of my reasons for not believing that fate/destiny etc exists (why would God deliberately make people do bad things as part of some thing called "fate"?)

Some people try to get round it by saying something like "there's free will, but there's different paths, and you can choose a good one (eg. the "Be nice path") or a bad one (eg. the "Murder babies path"). There is no way on this earth taht God would ever make a path like the latter. The reason babies get murder and other horrible things happen is because of Free Will - it's not because of paths, it's not because of destiny, and it's not because of "God's plan". God is a loving God, and there's no way on this earth (or outside of it) that God would kill a baby as part of some "plan".

The non-existance of afet etc. and the existance of Free Will also perfectly logically explains bad things. People have the will to do what they want, depending of course on whether they are prevented or stopped, (which I'm sure is because God didn't want to control us, plus God wanted to make sure that we're put in the right place when our bodies die, instead of murderers being put in Heaven), and sometimes God (or whoever's looking out for a particular person or set of people on God's behalf) doesn't get there in time. And people shouting "Oh my [you know the title - I don't want to be shouting that myself]" when they don't actually need God are NOT helping. It's like a hoax call to the Emergency Services - takes people away from where they are really needed.

Ok, if you don't mind answering me this question - why would God create people such that they freely choose evil?
Alternatively if God doesn't create people inclined to choose evil, why DO people choose evil?

Would you prefer me to say "Natural forces, through our desire, dictate what choices we make and in the process preclude us from free will"?
If it's the natural forces, rather than us, dictating then it is no different.

There can only be one agent of cause: us, or the natural forces. If natural forces do it, then we did not, and there is no will in that context.

Will only exists when a subject acts, when it exerts itself consciously. This is why will is likened to an expression of "self" or an expression of consciousness.

When an object acts, it may have acted wilfully subjective to itself if it acted consciously. An inanimate object or force, though, cannot act with will. "Natural forces" have no will, but their action on us says nothing about our will. "Circumstances" have no will, but their action on us says nothing about our will.

We cannot lose will by being subject to natural forces or circumstances. We can only surrender will by submitting ourselves to fate (and even that is a wilfull act).

"The only decision free will may not take; is to abdicate itself"
Paraphrasing somebody.
If you feel you have free will, what deterministic process would make you think so?

If it's the natural forces, rather than us, dictating then it is no different.

There can only be one agent of cause: us, or the natural forces. If natural forces do it, then we did not, and there is no will in that context.

Agreed, I am not a compatibilist.

Agreed, I am not a compatibilist.
I had to look that one up.

"According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. ... Hume also maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but rather caused by our choices as determined by our beliefs, desires, and by our characters. ...governed by a causal chain of events."

Agreed, then. The obvious counter to Hume's argument is that I am not my desires, I am not my beliefs, I am not my character. These things belong to me, they are are objective to me. If these things caused my choices, then I did not.

I had to look that one up.

"According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. ... Hume also maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but rather caused by our choices as determined by our beliefs, desires, and by our characters. ...governed by a causal chain of events."

Agreed, then. The obvious counter to Hume's argument is that I am not my desires, I am not my beliefs, I am not my character. These things belong to me, they are are objective to me. If these things caused my choices, then I did not.

In the other thread I linked HotRodia to, I argued Hume's point (without knowledge of Hume's opinion) with AnarchyeL and Alien Born. I stated pretty much that exact thing, that predetermination designates a particular choice, but does not eliminate hypothetical alternatives.

I came to the conclusion that, while it does remove the possibility of free will, it does not remove the possibility of moral judgement.

In the other thread I linked HotRodia to, I argued Hume's point (without knowledge of Hume's opinion) with AnarchyeL and Alien Born. I stated pretty much that exact thing, that predetermination designates a particular choice, but does not eliminate hypothetical alternatives.

I came to the conclusion that, while it does remove the possibility of free will, it does not remove the possibility of moral judgement.
I always have trouble with the hypotheticals posed for such, they seem nonsense to me. I mean, you make a choice for whatever reasons, and re-creating the exact same circumstance does not change the reasons. Nor does it change the fact that YOU were the one who made the choice, hence it was still a wilful act.

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.
I just live my life and try to enjoy my time here on Earth, because I believe that it's all I've got. I make my own destiny.

I always have trouble with the hypotheticals posed for such, they seem nonsense to me. I mean, you make a choice for whatever reasons, and re-creating the exact same circumstance does not change the reasons. Nor does it change the fact that YOU were the one who made the choice, hence it was still a wilful act.

But if your desires were the result of natural forces, then your choice follows the will of natural force, not your own.

But if your desires were the result of natural forces, then your choice follows the will of natural force, not your own.
Only conscious beings can exert a will.

Only conscious beings can exert a will.

Granted. I only used "will" for lack of a better term.

So regardless, it is not your conscious will that governs the decision.

Granted. I only used "will" for lack of a better term.

So regardless, it is not your conscious will that governs the decision.
Right. Then it was not *me* who made the decision. No will was involved.

Consciousness is our sense of awareness. We are consciously aware of things. Having consciousness sets up the dichotomy of "me" and "not-me". All things that are "not-me" are ...well, not "me". Things that are "out there" in the great big world are not-me. Things that belong to me (such as properties of me) are not-me. My body and my mind are not-me. At the centre of all this awareness, all this not-me, is me.

This creates an entirely subjective perspective, where the only thing that can exert my will is "me, myself and I": the self.

If natural forces made the choice, then I did not. The only way I can claim my will was executed in the action is if I made the choice. If *I* utilized my mind; if *I* utilized my brain; if *I* can claim this action to "me".

If our actions are predetermined, then it becomes conceivable that we could discover what we are predetermined to do.
If you know what you are predetermined to do, do you fight it or do you ride it?
And if you fight it, is that a battle with possibility of victory?

If you could fight it, then it wouldn't be predestined.

Ok, if you don't mind answering me this question - why would God create people such that they freely choose evil?
Alternatively if God doesn't create people inclined to choose evil, why DO people choose evil?

But God didn't create evil. The thing below the ground did. God needs to know who should be in Heaven, so God needs to know whether people would choose good or evil... in my opinion. People choose evil because they are influenced by the thing below the ground.

But God didn't create evil. The thing below the ground did. God needs to know who should be in Heaven, so God needs to know whether people would choose good or evil... in my opinion. People choose evil because they are influenced by the thing below the ground.

Oil?

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.

When I hear people talking about fate and destiny, I tend to start giggling madly. I say free will all the way. Because I do not think there is any kind of supreme being. Just seems kinda ridiculous to me. Oh well, to each their own I suppose...just don't expect me not to laugh at you. Just because I accept that you have faith doesn't mean it isn't funny.

When I hear people talking about fate and destiny, I tend to start giggling madly. I say free will all the way. Because I do not think there is any kind of supreme being. Just seems kinda ridiculous to me. Oh well, to each their own I suppose...just don't expect me not to laugh at you. Just because I accept that you have faith doesn't mean it isn't funny.

Fate/destiny does not require a conscious guidance.

Fate/destiny does not require a conscious guidance.

Very true. However, without a guiding hand, its even more amusing...to me, at least. Because then what the hell guides it? Chance?

Chance?

The exact opposite.

From the first moment of time one event necessitated another, the only event that was a chance occurence was the first.

The exact opposite.

From the first moment of time one event necessitated another, the only event that was a chance occurence was the first.

Ah, but of course, but of course. Thats still a fuckin' laugh. And hey, it gives me a great excuse for being a lazy bum...not that I need one...Anyway, I just find the thought that our every single action and decision is predetermined to be funny...because of the futility of attempting to change one's "fate" and the fact that so many still try to. Humanity is pretty damn pathetic, I must say.

Ah, but of course, but of course. Thats still a fuckin' laugh. And hey, it gives me a great excuse for being a lazy bum...not that I need one...Anyway, I just find the thought that our every single action and decision is predetermined to be funny...because of the futility of attempting to change one's "fate" and the fact that so many still try to. Humanity is pretty damn pathetic, I must say.

Humanity is a pretty amazing thing, but yes, we are pathetic compared to what we think of ourselves.

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.

i don't believe in fate or destiny in any mystical sense but i think our free will is limited by the fact that our lives are necesarrily structured by and around the expectations, norms and processes of society.

so i guess our fate is determined by the society that we live in.

having said that, there are many paths that we can choose to take in our lives which are made available to us by the society that we live in, so living in a particular society does not determine how our lives turn out it just determines what options we are presented with.

But God didn't create evil. The thing below the ground did. God needs to know who should be in Heaven, so God needs to know whether people would choose good or evil... in my opinion. People choose evil because they are influenced by the thing below the ground.
Aye; earth is evil, and God created us from the earth.

That is far from a given. Those basic desires you are speaking of, I guess could come from evolutionary factors for prolong the survival of the species.

However, experience, reason, and situation all lead us to have a very, very wide spectrum of desires.

I see, so really, we would have to look at children raised in the same family. Given the same set of parents, many similar experiences, etc., one would expect that all the children would end up doing pretty similar things with their lives. In some cases, we do see this, but in other cases, we don't. Thus we are not products of our evironments (or at least the environment is not the only factor). Studies on twins would tend to show that we are not products of our genes either, but that there seems to be an additional element called choice.



Are you saying that a person rapes against his own will? That he doesn't want to rape, but that he compelled by some external force to rape?

No, but a good mother will often ignore the lower desires (like losing her temper with a small child) and chose the greater good (like being patient and kind). Is that a product of her genes and environment, or is that called exercising your free will?

Ah, but of course, but of course. Thats still a fuckin' laugh. And hey, it gives me a great excuse for being a lazy bum...not that I need one...Anyway, I just find the thought that our every single action and decision is predetermined to be funny...because of the futility of attempting to change one's "fate" and the fact that so many still try to. Humanity is pretty damn pathetic, I must say.

And yet, if every single possible variable in the universe could be recorded and accounted, one could have 100% assurance as to the decisions you yourself would make.

And yet, if every single possible variable in the universe could be recorded and accounted, one could have 100% assurance as to the decisions you yourself would make.
And if wishes were ponies...

And if wishes were ponies...

Exactly... Which is why fatalism is absurd, since it's not possible to account for every variable.

I see, so really, we would have to look at children raised in the same family. Given the same set of parents, many similar experiences, etc., one would expect that all the children would end up doing pretty similar things with their lives. In some cases, we do see this, but in other cases, we don't. Thus we are not products of our evironments (or at least the environment is not the only factor). Studies on twins would tend to show that we are not products of our genes either, but that there seems to be an additional element called choice.

You do realize that one event, one experience, can send someone's life in a completely different direction?

My point being that if one tries to disprove or prove determinism based on empirical predictability, one is going to get nowhere.

No, but a good mother will often ignore the lower desires (like losing her temper with a small child) and chose the greater good (like being patient and kind). Is that a product of her genes and environment, or is that called exercising your free will?

It is acting reasonably based on experience and desires.

Reason, experience, and desires are all products of the natural forces.

Exactly... Which is why fatalism is absurd, since it's not possible to account for every variable.

Determinism is not fatalism, if that is what you are getting at.

Determinism is not fatalism, if that is what you are getting at.

Determinism is philosophic causality, ignoring causality in the system (ignoring ones own agency) to assume outcome becomes fatalism. Determinism rightly understands, in the framework, that all events, including the decisions of the agent, are an unbroken chain of events that are set in motion, and one adhering to the philosophy understands that their own operation is part of the event chain. But does not assume a result... merely understands that results are products of causality chains... Fatalism assumes results apart from causality chains, and assumes no agency in the system to the person (events unfold despite actions in the system by the agent [person]).

IOW, Determinism is result by agency in the system, fatalism is result without agency in the system.

The can be closely illustrated by concept of the will between calvinistic and hyper-calvinistic theology... The hyper- assumes results apart from actions (things unfold as they are meant to despite action taken by the agent/person), the normal understands that their actions themselves are a "part" of the result as agents in the system. The Fatalist assumes results occur despite actions by themselves, the determinist understands their actions are part of the inevitable result. Inaction itself, understood deterministically, is in fact an "action".

Determinism is philosophic causality, ignoring causality in the system (ignoring ones own agency) to assume outcome becomes fatalism. Determinism rightly understands, in the framework, that all events, including the decisions of the agent, are an unbroken chain of events that are set in motion, and one adhering to the philosophy understands that their own operation is part of the event chain. But does not assume a result... merely understands that results are products of causality chains... Fatalism assumes results apart from causality chains, and assumes no agency in the system to the person (events unfold despite actions in the system by the agent [person]).

IOW, Determinism is result by agency in the system, fatalism is result without agency in the system.

The can be closely illustrated by concept of the will between calvinistic and hyper-calvinistic theology... The hyper- assumes results apart from actions (things unfold as they are meant to despite action taken by the agent/person), the normal understands that their actions themselves are a "part" of the result as agents in the system. The Fatalist assumes results occur despite actions by themselves, the determinist understands their actions are part of the inevitable result. Inaction itself, understood deterministically, is in fact an "action".
Even to you they are different things.

Fatalism is simply the idea that nothing we do matters, a stance that most versions of determinism do not hold. Fatalism has to do with the futility of man's efforts, whereas the determinist considers man's efforts a part of the system of causality.

Exactly... Which is why fatalism is absurd, since it's not possible to account for every variable.
It is absurd, the hypothetical that supposes that we can ever possibly know all the variables.

Fatalism is not absurd so much as it is self-defeating. Determinism is not absurd either, though the most common and popular version of it tries to assume self-determination as a part of determinism when they are, in fact, antitheses. I have not yet heard a reasonable explanation of that.

I just live my life and try to enjoy my time here on Earth, because I believe that it's all I've got. I make my own destiny.
Bravo!

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.


Alrgiht then, Ive got you covered. There is a Fate as Destiny so to speak. It is God's will. Heres the kicker. Its optional. We have ultimate free will. Though we will be miserable, disconnected, run down, and possilbly burn in hell for not following it. You see God knows whats best and we must discover his will thogh prayer meditation and study of oneself. There are things we can never accomplish without Fate on our side and Vice Versa. You cannot change the world for the better without some intent for it by God. And your mother may die of Heart attack No matter what choice you make. So yes there is Fate, We can deny it, We have free will and the best heing to do is find it and follow it, love it, trust it...

I don't believe in the existance of the supernatural, so I don't believe in destiny.

I do believe in certain 'Tide of history' ideas, which you could call destiny.

Basically, I theorize that a culture will eventually shift their beliefs and cultural norms to the way of living that is most efficient and most condusive to long term survival and general happiness given the technology and the area.

Like...(I know most of you will probably think this theory is totally whacko and WAAAY out there)...I believe the adoption of monotheism and humanistic religion in general was inevitable. Because given the level of organization and technology of the Roman empire, monotheism makes more people happier than polytheism and makes for a more efficient society.

I guess you could call that 'destiny', but not in the sense that..you know, fantasy/scifi characters are 'destined'.


I feel the same way about democracy. Pre-Rennaisance, monarchy was the most efficient way to run a society. When trade cities became the norm and standard of living started going up, and fewer people became completely impoverished, democracy became more efficient.

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.

I think the answer to the original queston is one of additude, not of reality. Fate is an additude. So is free will. An additude of fate is one that can be either comforting (i.e. if you believe you are fated for happiness) or fatalistic. Free will can be either empowering (I am in control of my own destiny) or scary (I don't know what's going to happen). I'm not sure we can know the answer to the reality part of the question. Personally, I subscribe to the free will side of things.

It is acting reasonably based on experience and desires.

Reason, experience, and desires are all products of the natural forces.
But is "acting"?

But is "acting"?

Yes, as action is a result of the desire.

But that is the question of the hour.

Yes, as action is a result of the desire.

But that is the question of the hour.
Surely the desire inspired the action, but if all desires do not result in actions can we claim desires as the cause of acting (and if wishes were ponies...)?

More importantly, can we disclaim that we were the cause?

Surely the desire inspired the action, but if all desires do not result in actions can we claim desires as the cause of acting (and if wishes were ponies...)?

Not all desires result in action, but all actions stem from desires. While desire is the impetus for action, the desire is tempered by reason. Many desires a person has will be mutually exclusive to other desires. Sleeping and eating, sadly are two mutually exclusive desires (for the largest part).

More importantly, can we disclaim that we were the cause?

Not empirically, but rationally we can.

Not all desires result in action, but all actions stem from desires. While desire is the impetus for action, the desire is tempered by reason. Many desires a person has will be mutually exclusive to other desires. Sleeping and eating, sadly are two mutually exclusive desires (for the largest part).


Not empirically, but rationally we can.
Not even rationally. All those things you listed (tiredness, hunger, temperment, impetus) require an agent; they do not exist independently of a person *doing* them.

Not even rationally. All those things you listed (tiredness, hunger, temperment, impetus) require an agent; they do not exist independently of a person *doing* them.

It is perfectly reasonable to consider a fly to be hungry. Is this fly then an agent?

Yes all these actions require that that does them, but do they require a person. I think not. They certainly do not require self awareness. They exist independently of the person, but not of the being.

What this comes down to is that desires are original simple impressions. They are not things that we cause by considering our situation, or even by being aware of our situation. they are the result of the circumstances we are in. Now the million dollar question is whether we always act according to our desires. That one I am not sure of.

It is perfectly reasonable to consider a fly to be hungry. Is this fly then an agent?
Yes. If it is the fly doing it, as you say, being hungry, then the fly is the agent.

Yes all these actions require that that does them, but do they require a person. I think not. They certainly do not require self awareness. They exist independently of the person, but not of the being.

What this comes down to is that desires are original simple impressions. They are not things that we cause by considering our situation, or even by being aware of our situation. they are the result of the circumstances we are in. Now the million dollar question is whether we always act according to our desires. That one I am not sure of.
Flies are people too. Especially in India.

I won't dispute the definition of "person" with you. I used the word in keeping with the course of discussion, but the necessity of an agent applies to any self-controlled life-form. Even plant life. If a plant opens its leaves towards the light, it is the plant doing it.

These things listed earlier do not require self-awareness, but they do require awareness of other things in the world around us, i.e. consciousness. If we are not conscious, then we can't *be* hungry. We can't *be* anything.

"Impressions" implies something pressing them upon us, influencing us, creating a dent in us with them. What is doing the impressing, in your opinion?

In my opinion, desires are not things caused in us (objective), they are things we are (subjective). In being them, we are the source of them, because we are them. Causality falls away when you adopt the subjective perspective, because from there, everything that is you simply *is* you.

Yes. If it is the fly doing it, as you say, being hungry, then the fly is the agent.


Flies are people too. Especially in India.

I won't dispute the definition of "person" with you. I used the word in keeping with the course of discussion, but the necessity of an agent applies to any self-controlled life-form. Even plant life. If a plant opens its leaves towards the light, it is the plant doing it.
OK. I'll accept your position on the definition of person for this discussion. (I disagree, but arguing definitions is pointless).

These things listed earlier do not require self-awareness, but they do require awareness of other things in the world around us, i.e. consciousness. If we are not conscious, then we can't *be* hungry. We can't *be* anything.
They require response to the world around us. Unfortunately other persons are not accessable to us so we can not know if these responses are conscious or involuntary. We can clearly attribute hunger or tiredness to them, but maybe we are just anthropomorhizing. I disagree that consciousness is necessary for existence or even for response to stimuli. If hunger is just a chemical signal in the system, then the response can occur without any form of awareness being needed.

"Impressions" implies something pressing them upon us, influencing us, creating a dent in us with them. What is doing the impressing, in your opinion?
Sorry. I am working on Hume still, so his terminology tends to sneak into things I write. By impression I mean something that we are sensible of, that we can be aware of. It is impression in the sense of "I have the impression that she is not being honest with me" rather than in the sense of "the fabric left an impression on her skin". It is not something that is done, it is something that is present to our awareness.

In my opinion, desires are not things caused in us (objective), they are things we are (subjective). In being them, we are the source of them, because we are them. Causality falls away when you adopt the subjective perspective, because from there, everything that is you simply *is* you.

But the power of explanation goes with the causality. Because I want to, ends up being the full and indisputable explanation of any action I make, with the emphasis on the I, rather than on the want. It also implies that the full responsibility for each and every action one makes lies with ourselves. There can be no extenuating circumstances, we can not be coerced, drugged, threatened or otherwise forced into an action. After all we act on our desires and our desires depend only on ourselves, viewed subjectively

Not even rationally. All those things you listed (tiredness, hunger, temperment, impetus) require an agent; they do not exist independently of a person *doing* them.

They are qualities that, in a sense, are seperate from the person. They are not done by a person, they manifest themselves in the person. A person does not control hunger, he only perceives it.

They are qualities that, in a sense, are seperate from the person. They are not done by a person, they manifest themselves in the person. A person does not control hunger, he only perceives it.
And this is the crux of the subject-object divide that is so inherent in our language: from the objective perspective they are there before we can possibly become aware of them, and from our perspective we are not them until we become aware of them. Both perspectives exist, neither more important than the other.

OK. I'll accept your position on the definition of person for this discussion. (I disagree, but arguing definitions is pointless).


They require response to the world around us. Unfortunately other persons are not accessable to us so we can not know if these responses are conscious or involuntary. We can clearly attribute hunger or tiredness to them, but maybe we are just anthropomorhizing.
Actually, that's a very fortunate thing that other persons are not accessible to us (moreso than you probably know). Without it, we would have no concept of free will and hence responsibility, which is so important to our modern mind-set.

Anthropomorphizing applies strictly to things non-human.

I disagree that consciousness is necessary for existence or even for response to stimuli. If hunger is just a chemical signal in the system, then the response can occur without any form of awareness being needed.
Consciousness is not necessary for existence; rather, it is awareness of existence. In other words, things can exist without us being aware of them, but we cannot be aware of them if they do not exist. Hunger exists before we are aware of it, but we cannot "be hungry" until we are aware that we are hungry.

Sorry. I am working on Hume still, so his terminology tends to sneak into things I write. By impression I mean something that we are sensible of, that we can be aware of. It is impression in the sense of "I have the impression that she is not being honest with me" rather than in the sense of "the fabric left an impression on her skin". It is not something that is done, it is something that is present to our awareness.
I haven't "worked on" Hume at all, so you're one ahead of me. :)

Even as "something that we are sensible of, that we can be aware of" such an impression has made an impact on us: namely, that sensibility that pressed itself on our awareness. That can only be done of something objective to us (such as bodily functions are).

Yet, from our perspective, the subjective perspective, it becomes real at the moment we become aware of it. Before then there was nothing, and hence nothing we could possibly claim responsibility for. When we became aware of hunger (objective) is when we became hungry (subjective). There are two valid perspectives at work, always.

But the power of explanation goes with the causality. Because I want to, ends up being the full and indisputable explanation of any action I make, with the emphasis on the I, rather than on the want. It also implies that the full responsibility for each and every action one makes lies with ourselves. There can be no extenuating circumstances, we can not be coerced, drugged, threatened or otherwise forced into an action. After all we act on our desires and our desires depend only on ourselves, viewed subjectively
I agree that the power of explanation goes with causality --that is the essence of our science. And "because I want it" is the essence of "my actions", an expression of will.

When we say someone else was moved by a desire to perform a specific action, that action stemmed from them, and we can hold them responsible for it because in a moment they became their desire. If they did not, if the desire remained objective to them, then we cannot hold them responsible for the action that resulted from it.

You are partly right: there are no extenuating circumstances when we do things, only when things happen to us. However forces, coercion, drugs, etc. are things objective to us that happen to us. We cannot hold ourselves responsible for falling if gravity claims us and pulls us down towards the ground, although we "do" the falling. There are extenuating circumstances. Addiction, for instance, does not represent a desire so much as a chemical imbalance.

We act on our desires, but action is not the thing we hold ourselves responsible for, or are held responsible for: apart from situations of politeness and protocol, we hold ourselves responsible for the intent of our actions. When we take desire upon ourselves, become it and consciously will what happens next, then we are responsible.

And this is the crux of the subject-object divide that is so inherent in our language: from the objective perspective they are there before we can possibly become aware of them, and from our perspective we are not them until we become aware of them. Both perspectives exist, neither more important than the other.

All you have done here is shown the limits of human understanding.

Of course the objective perspective is more important, it is established by reason and consensus. The subjective is just the objective perspective when limited by one man's bias and perception.

All you have done here is shown the limits of human understanding.

Of course the objective perspective is more important, it is established by reason and consensus. The subjective is just the objective perspective when limited by one man's bias and perception.
lol

lol

:confused:

:confused:
...and yet we exist.

You are attempting to define reality and exclude our experience of it.

...and yet we exist.

You are attempting to define reality and exclude our experience of it.

That is ridiculous. Not only am I defining only how we know reality, but I am also implying that human perception is central to our understanding.

However, when determining and understanding truth (reality) the consensus perception if far more important than the individual perception.

There are biases and limits to every person's perception, and the only way to overcome these biases and limits are to gather outside confirmation through replication of the experience.


You have stated that a person can be hungry regardless of whether he perceives it or not, so obviously one man's perception does not provide an entirely accurate view of reality. So when you say that a person assumes he has free will, I say that is due to his limited perception.

That is ridiculous. Not only am I defining only how we know reality, but I am also implying that human perception is central to our understanding.

However, when determining and understanding truth (reality) the consensus perception if far more important than the individual perception.

There are biases and limits to every person's perception, and the only way to overcome these biases and limits are to gather outside confirmation through replication of the experience.
You are talking about metaphorical perspectives, i.e. the filter of opinion and bias through which we see reality; I was using a different context, talking about the actual perspective that experiences the world outwardly from the subject's perspective. Consensus is irrelevant to what I'm talking about.

As individuals, we experience the world from the subjective perspective. The objective perspective is something the subject can only abstract; both are valid perspectives for any one thing. For instance, you had said, "Not all desires result in action, but all actions stem from desires." In your sentence, the subject is 'desires', and from their subjective perspective they can stimulate actions. The subject view requires an agent; desires are the agent of the effects they cause.

You also said, "While desire is the impetus for action, the desire is tempered by reason. Many desires a person has will be mutually exclusive to other desires." Desire a person *has* makes that person the subject; the subject is the cause of the desire. The person is the one who is tempering them, who is recognizing impetus as a stimulant.

We have a subjective perspective (*the* ultimate subjective perspective, a conscious one) that we cannot avoid.

You had said, "The subjective is just the objective perspective when limited by one man's bias and perception." I laughed, because the objective is just one man's (or thing's) abstraction of his (its) own perspective as if from a point apart from himself (itself).

You are proposing an objective definition of reality, where desires are viewed objectively from us as causal of their own actions --and they are objective of us. They are their own subject. But then there is the subjective view, our subjective view, which is what I was presenting --we are a part of the reality we are trying to define, because we have this perspective that takes our desires unto ourselves as a part of us.

You have stated that a person can be hungry regardless of whether he perceives it or not, so obviously one man's perception does not provide an entirely accurate view of reality. So when you say that a person assumes he has free will, I say that is due to his limited perception.
One man's perception does not provide an accurate view of reality, right. However, we are discussing the nature of desires as causal agents --that is a view that is only valid because it is objectively stated. Subjectively stated, with us as the subject, we become the causal agent. Subjectivity determines the causal agent.

Alright, piece by piece and rearranged:

For instance, you had said, "Not all desires result in action, but all actions stem from desires." In your sentence, the subject is 'desires', and from their subjective perspective they can stimulate actions. The subject view requires an agent; desires are the agent of the effects they cause.

Yes, the desire is the agent bringing about the effect.

You also said, "While desire is the impetus for action, the desire is tempered by reason. Many desires a person has will be mutually exclusive to other desires." Desire a person *has* makes that person the subject; the subject is the cause of the desire. The person is the one who is tempering them, who is recognizing impetus as a stimulant.

Yes, a person has the subjective perspective of "possession" over the desires, that is compatible with the objective perception.

However, reason is the agent of temperence. Reason is the result of the same natural forces as desire, therefore the person is not an ultimate agent of reason either.

The subjective perception of a person is one of "possession" of the agents of desire and reason, not as originator.

As individuals, we experience the world from the subjective perspective. The objective perspective is something the subject can only abstract; both are valid perspectives for any one thing.

When two perspectives arive at opposing conclusions, how can they be considered to be equally valid? From the subjective perspective, a desire's existence is contingent upon our awareness of it. From the objective the desire is existent regardless of whether we become aware of it.

One perspective must be incorrect.

You had said, "The subjective is just the objective perspective when limited by one man's bias and perception." I laughed, because the objective is just one man's (or thing's) abstraction of his (its) own perspective as if from a point apart from himself (itself).

I truly believe that there is an objective reality that is not contingent upon our subjective perception. You are perfectly correct that the objective is an abstraction of the subjective.

However, our inspiration for considering an objective is in the search for truth. We know our perspective to be valuable, but we also know it to provide a rather limited view. Therefore we use our reason to abstract a greater view, and outside view.

Therefore, when we form an objective, we must consider it to be a more valid viewpoint than the subjective.

One man's perception does not provide an accurate view of reality, right. However, we are discussing the nature of desires as causal agents --that is a view that is only valid because it is objectively stated. Subjectively stated, with us as the subject, we become the causal agent. Subjectivity determines the causal agent.

This is a pretty strange statement.

Check me on this: You appear to be saying that, when we assume ourselves to be the causal agent, we must be the causal agent?

I believe in predestination as defined by Reformed/Calvinist theology. I don't mean to get in a fight with anyone. One can't really have an informed discussion on the topic unless all parties agree on infallibility of Scripture. Just letting you know what I believe.

Alright, piece by piece and rearranged:


Yes, the desire is the agent bringing about the effect.
Desire is the agent WHEN it brings about an effect. From the objectified desire's anthropomophized subjective view, it is the thing doing the deed.

That's a mouthful.

If, on the other hand, I do it, then I am the agent, and I can claim responsibility for the deed.

If I claim desire as the agent of an effect of hunger, and I certainly can, then I abdicate responsibility for the deed. All's well. But, from a man's subjective point of view, he cannot separate himself from his desires because they are a product of his 'self', his conscious mind. So what is ultimately the cause?

If I want to eat, if eating is *my* desire, then how am I to abdicate responsibility for that eating to something else, something apart from me, objective to me?

Yes, a person has the subjective perspective of "possession" over the desires, that is compatible with the objective perception.

However, reason is the agent of temperence. Reason is the result of the same natural forces as desire, therefore the person is not an ultimate agent of reason either.

The subjective perception of a person is one of "possession" of the agents of desire and reason, not as originator.
My body is me, my heart is me, my mind is me. My thoughts are me, my dreams are me, and my cunning schemes are me. Reason is me, and my so are my reasons. What I a) own that I identify with as "me" and b) *am* are inseparable; without these things, I have no identity at all. These things are the sum total and result of me, of my being.

As I said before, you are attempting to write the human out of the picture, to describe a reality that does not include our experience of it. I am the experience of my faculty of reason, and the things I reason exist because I reason them.

When two perspectives arive at opposing conclusions, how can they be considered to be equally valid? From the subjective perspective, a desire's existence is contingent upon our awareness of it. From the objective the desire is existent regardless of whether we become aware of it.

One perspective must be incorrect.
I was not comparing one person's subjective perspective with another's - I was contrasting one person's subjective perspective with the objective perspective, which is something abstract from them (any of them). Both the subjective view and the objective view are valid for the subject.

It is not a desire's existence (objective) that is contingent upon our awareness of it; the only thing that comes into being at that point is our awareness of it. At that moment, we become the thing, and the reason why we can become it is because we identify with it as a part of us. Essentially, when we become aware of hunger, we become hungry. It sounds obvious, I know, but look at it carefully. We identify with the hunger, and at the same time take on the responsibility of agency for it: "I am hungry". Hunger is me.

So objectively the body creates the hunger, but subjectively we are that hunger. Two valid views, both in operation at the same time. To a conscious mind, as the subject, this is a perspective that matters.

I truly believe that there is an objective reality that is not contingent upon our subjective perception. You are perfectly correct that the objective is an abstraction of the subjective.

However, our inspiration for considering an objective is in the search for truth. We know our perspective to be valuable, but we also know it to provide a rather limited view. Therefore we use our reason to abstract a greater view, and outside view.

Therefore, when we form an objective, we must consider it to be a more valid viewpoint than the subjective.
I also believe that objective reality is necessarily true. Without that concept, I couldn't blame anything that happens on anything but me. :) As much as I want to acknowlege my responsibility for some things, I sincerely don't want the weight of the entire world on my shoulders.

You are right; the objective perspective is the one that more closely describes objective reality. But then, the subjective view is also real...

We are real.

Which view should be more valid to us: the one we experience, with no effort, or the one we have to do extra work (abstract) to see?

This is a pretty strange statement.

Check me on this: You appear to be saying that, when we assume ourselves to be the causal agent, we must be the causal agent?
No, simply put it is: things I do are things I cause.

"I" is necessarily subjective.

If desire itself had a voice and spoke up, it would say, "Things I do are things I cause." And it would be correct.

Desire is the agent WHEN it brings about an effect. From the objectified desire's anthropomophized subjective view, it is the thing doing the deed.

That's a mouthful.

If, on the other hand, I do it, then I am the agent, and I can claim responsibility for the deed.

This is all accepted.

If I claim desire as the agent of an effect of hunger, and I certainly can, then I abdicate responsibility for the deed. All's well. But, from a man's subjective point of view, he cannot separate himself from his desires because they are a product of his 'self', his conscious mind. So what is ultimately the cause?

If I want to eat, if eating is *my* desire, then how am I to abdicate responsibility for that eating to something else, something apart from me, objective to me?

I just don't get where you are going with this. Regardless of whether a man perceives that his desires are the product of his self, they are not the product of his consciousness. Ultimate responsibility lies in the natural forces that brought about the desire. A person may suffer the pangs of guilt or the pride of achievement associated with an action, but that does not change his nature as a product of circumstance.

I guess you are trying to show that a person has responsibility for acting upon his desires, but you seem to assume your premise rather than proving it.

To show responsibility in this situation, you must show that a person is capable of originating the capability of acting counter to his desires, or show that the person is the originator of his desires.

My body is me, my heart is me, my mind is me. My thoughts are me, my dreams are me, and my cunning schemes are me. Reason is me, and my so are my reasons. What I a) own that I identify with as "me" and b) *am* are inseparable; without these things, I have no identity at all. These things are the sum total and result of me, of my being.

Your being is the product of circumstance. All of your identifying qualities are the result of factors that preceded their manifestation.

You certainly can say that you are inseperable from your qualities, but that does not mean that you created those qualities. If anything you can say that those qualities created you.

As I said before, you are attempting to write the human out of the picture, to describe a reality that does not include our experience of it. I am the experience of my faculty of reason, and the things I reason exist because I reason them.

I am trying to right the human as a supernatural force out of the picture.

All of reality is causal, yet we somehow come to the conclusion that we have something special that lifts us out of that reality.

Can a person experience, yes, of course. How could I say that I am not experiencing right now. Can they ultimately control their experience, no. How can I say that I am free of causality?

I was not comparing one person's subjective perspective with another's - I was contrasting one person's subjective perspective with the objective perspective, which is something abstract from them (any of them). Both the subjective view and the objective view are valid for the subject.

It is not a desire's existence (objective) that is contingent upon our awareness of it; the only thing that comes into being at that point is our awareness of it. At that moment, we become the thing, and the reason why we can become it is because we identify with it as a part of us. Essentially, when we become aware of hunger, we become hungry. It sounds obvious, I know, but look at it carefully. We identify with the hunger, and at the same time take on the responsibility of agency for it: "I am hungry". Hunger is me.

So objectively the body creates the hunger, but subjectively we are that hunger. Two valid views, both in operation at the same time. To a conscious mind, as the subject, this is a perspective that matters.

There is no need to repeat your argument I understand it.

However, you must explain to me how two perspectives that arrive at opposing conclusions can be equally valid. One must be correct and one must be incorrect. You cannot possibly hold that they are both correct.

Which view should be more valid to us: the one we experience, with no effort, or the one we have to do extra work (abstract) to see?


If we want truth, the objective. If we want expediency, the subjective.

I would shudder to think that I chose expediency over the truth.

No, simply put it is: things I do are things I cause.

"I" is necessarily subjective.

If desire itself had a voice and spoke up, it would say, "Things I do are things I cause." And it would be correct.

That's worthless.

Can I say "The things it does are the things it causes," and possibly be erroneous?

Actually, that's a very fortunate thing that other persons are not accessible to us (moreso than you probably know). Without it, we would have no concept of free will and hence responsibility, which is so important to our modern mind-set.
I am not sure of your line of thinking here. How would being able to know what someone else is feeling, wanting, thinking, etc. remove my concept of myself as an active agent?

Anthropomorphizing applies strictly to things non-human. I was referring to our describing the fly as hungry.


Consciousness is not necessary for existence; rather, it is awareness of existence. In other words, things can exist without us being aware of them, but we cannot be aware of them if they do not exist. Hunger exists before we are aware of it, but we cannot "be hungry" until we are aware that we are hungry.
That is begging the question that I was asking. It appears that you are defining hunger as the awareness of a state of hunger. What I am asking is if that state of hunger, in itself, without any awareness being involved should still be described as hunger; or does the term only become usable when awareness of the state occurs. For me, hunger is a term that describes a physical statre of an organism. It is not an emotional state. The hunger is their regardless of the awareness of this physical state. Have you never passed the situation of discovering that you are hungry when you start eating? What I am suggesting is that you were hungry prior to starting to eat (as I can not see how eating can cause hunger) but were unaware of it.


I haven't "worked on" Hume at all, so you're one ahead of me. :)

Even as "something that we are sensible of, that we can be aware of" such an impression has made an impact on us: namely, that sensibility that pressed itself on our awareness. That can only be done of something objective to us (such as bodily functions are).
I think you are using impact in two distinct and seperate meanings. One being physical, the other emotional or mental. I would not say that all impressions derive from an impact, in either sense. The impression that I may have that someone is watching me does not derive, necessarily, from anything outsside of my mental world. There is no bodily function involved here. The impression that I would be happier if ... is also completely internal. I am sorry, but I do not see all impresions as the result of physical (material) impacts of some kind.

Yet, from our perspective, the subjective perspective, it becomes real at the moment we become aware of it. Before then there was nothing, and hence nothing we could possibly claim responsibility for. When we became aware of hunger (objective) is when we became hungry (subjective). There are two valid perspectives at work, always.
No. There are many things in which there is only the subjective perspective. These are generally what we call our desires. The subjective feelings that we want this, or would like that. Emotions too do not have to have an objective partner. What is objective and external in being in love, or in being sad? Now here we hit a problem. We feel that we control our desires, but we know that we do not control our emotions. We can not shift the responsability for the emotion onto the external objective reality as emotions have no objective dimension. As such we have to either throw the concept that we are in control of our subjective world out alltogether or find an escape route. The latter is exactly what Freud did, with the ego, id and superego structure (copying Plato to a large degree it has to be said). I, however, disagree with Freud and take a different escape route. I hold that emotions are clearly causaly dependent states. There is always a reason for our emotional state, be it purely internal and subjective (our desires have been met or thwarted) or external and objective (the seratonin level in the brain is too low). This diferentiates emotions from desires in that desires are not, in the end, subject to causal explanation. They always come back to 'because I want to'.

When we say someone else was moved by a desire to perform a specific action, that action stemmed from them, and we can hold them responsible for it because in a moment they became their desire. If they did not, if the desire remained objective to them, then we cannot hold them responsible for the action that resulted from it.
I do not see how a desire is objective. I really do not. Are you suggesting here that people act without having the desire to so act?

You are partly right: there are no extenuating circumstances when we do things, only when things happen to us. However forces, coercion, drugs, etc. are things objective to us that happen to us. We cannot hold ourselves responsible for falling if gravity claims us and pulls us down towards the ground, although we "do" the falling. There are extenuating circumstances. Addiction, for instance, does not represent a desire so much as a chemical imbalance.
We fall, but not because we want to, normally (if we do want to we do not blame gravity for us falling, we blame the holder of the desire.) Addiction is questionable. You are eeing the addictas having a desire to continue in the addiction whilst normally having, at the same time, a contradictory desire to break the habit. If you attribute the desire to continue to a chemical state, then why do you not do the same with regard to the desire to stop? You are eliminating free will in this explanation. I prefer to describe addiction as an physically produced emotion (feeling) which is highly unpleasant. This combined with a rational awareness of how to alleviate this emotion (feeling) leads to a strong impulse toward continuing the addiction. This is not a desire though. If you ask an addict what they (subjective) want, they will nearly always say that they want to kick the habit. When asked why they don't they reply that they can't. They never reply because they don't want to. (Perhaps they will be in denial and say they don't have a habit,but that is another issue.)

We act on our desires, but action is not the thing we hold ourselves responsible for, or are held responsible for: apart from situations of politeness and protocol, we hold ourselves responsible for the intent of our actions. When we take desire upon ourselves, become it and consciously will what happens next, then we are responsible.

What I hold myself responsible for only I can know. What is significant though is what I hold others responsible for and what they hold me responsible for. This can not be based on intent as there is no access to the intent. It has to be based on the action or on the set of actions that the person is known to have made. Here there is a difficulty in attributing desire to an action accurately. So either only I can be the judge of my moral value, or this can not depend upon the actual intent and desire, but only upon the apparent intent and desire.

I think life is a combination of fate and free will... you have free will in your actions but other people's decisions create a sort of fate.... hmmm.... that rhymes...

I <3 philosophy :p

I believe that we are free to do as we desire, but that we are not free to choose which desires we have. In cases of conflict between desires, a person can choose which of her desires to follow.

If you want a solid philosophical explanation of this, look for The Importance of What We Care About by Harry Frankfurt.

I just don't get where you are going with this. Regardless of whether a man perceives that his desires are the product of his self, they are not the product of his consciousness. Ultimate responsibility lies in the natural forces that brought about the desire. A person may suffer the pangs of guilt or the pride of achievement associated with an action, but that does not change his nature as a product of circumstance.

I guess you are trying to show that a person has responsibility for acting upon his desires, but you seem to assume your premise rather than proving it.

To show responsibility in this situation, you must show that a person is capable of originating the capability of acting counter to his desires, or show that the person is the originator of his desires.


Your being is the product of circumstance. All of your identifying qualities are the result of factors that preceded their manifestation.

You certainly can say that you are inseperable from your qualities, but that does not mean that you created those qualities. If anything you can say that those qualities created you.
You talk about "ultimately", but that "ultimately" requires a stretch of the imagination. We are perfectly willing to make this stretch, but the very fact that we have to indicates that there is more going on here. Your "ultimate" ignores "me".

With your "ultimate", none of us are responsible for anything we do. This is not necessarily a bad thing, it's just not something I could ever believe in. My version of reality includes "me".

I am trying to right the human as a supernatural force out of the picture.
Exactly.

All of reality is causal, yet we somehow come to the conclusion that we have something special that lifts us out of that reality.

Can a person experience, yes, of course. How could I say that I am not experiencing right now. Can they ultimately control their experience, no. How can I say that I am free of causality?
I do believe that the supernatural "self" is a product of physical existence, as much as anything we conceive of is. That means it exists, conceptually. It is that centre point of consciousness around which everything we identify with as "me" exists --it is the owner of all that is "mine". That we have minds capable of producing such a concept does make this "self" special, lift it out of reality. It does make conscious life-forms special. Without it, we have no right to claim responsibility for anything. If I do not reason my reasons, then something else does: and vice versa. There is no middle ground with this philosophy.

And it does give us both something around which to build a philosophy --me including it in the picture, you deliberately writing it out.

My philosophy does not deny causality, but yours denies "me". You could say that the supernatural should be written out, but I say why? We do experience self-control phenomenally, it is a part of our reality --so why should our picture of reality be solely objective? Why should it exclude a part of our reality that is so vital to us? to who we are?

There is no need to repeat your argument I understand it.

However, you must explain to me how two perspectives that arrive at opposing conclusions can be equally valid. One must be correct and one must be incorrect. You cannot possibly hold that they are both correct.
Quite simply, your "perspective" (philosophy) and mine are reconciled when we take into account physical perspectives, the subject-object divide. This is what I have been trying to explain (so perhaps there is a need to repeat it ;)). One philosophy is objectively correct, the other subjectively correct. Or stated another way, one philosophy removes the subject from the picture, the other takes both subject and objects into account.

If we want truth, the objective. If we want expediency, the subjective.

I would shudder to think that I chose expediency over the truth.
Truth does belong to the objective; however, there is more to truth than the fact of a thing's physical existence.

My philosophy does not sacrifice truth.

That's worthless.

Can I say "The things it does are the things it causes," and possibly be erroneous?
Then a subjective viewpoint is assumed for it.

I am not sure of your line of thinking here. How would being able to know what someone else is feeling, wanting, thinking, etc. remove my concept of myself as an active agent?
How would you separate what is "me" from what is "not-me"? I mean, how would you know a feeling was yours or someone else's if you were the one experiencing it? Or a thought?

That is begging the question that I was asking. It appears that you are defining hunger as the awareness of a state of hunger. What I am asking is if that state of hunger, in itself, without any awareness being involved should still be described as hunger; or does the term only become usable when awareness of the state occurs. For me, hunger is a term that describes a physical statre of an organism. It is not an emotional state. The hunger is their regardless of the awareness of this physical state. Have you never passed the situation of discovering that you are hungry when you start eating? What I am suggesting is that you were hungry prior to starting to eat (as I can not see how eating can cause hunger) but were unaware of it.
No, I am defining "being hungry" in terms of awareness of hunger; "hunger" is the bodily function objectively described, but "being hungry" is what is more important to an individual; that is what will motivate him to feed himself. Yes, we can act without awareness of hunger being there, such as when we eat according to a daily ritual, but my point was that our awareness of hunger causes us to act to alieviate the hunger.

The objective term is 'usable' anytime we want to objectify an inner concept so that we can define it in terms of objective reality, like bodily systems (just as I objectified my "awareness" in my previous sentence). When we objectify things they become "not-me", they become "mine".

"That state of hunger" is hunger, even without our awareness of it (though we wouldn't be describing it at all unless we were aware of it, we'd have no reason to). It is necessarily there prior to our being aware of it: existence precedes consciousness.

I think you are using impact in two distinct and seperate meanings. One being physical, the other emotional or mental. I would not say that all impressions derive from an impact, in either sense. The impression that I may have that someone is watching me does not derive, necessarily, from anything outsside of my mental world. There is no bodily function involved here. The impression that I would be happier if ... is also completely internal. I am sorry, but I do not see all impresions as the result of physical (material) impacts of some kind.
You're right. I am using impact here as a metaphor. Metaphor is the language we use to describe inner concepts. The impression you have that someone is watching you is like a Star Wars 'disturbance in the force': it is a subconscious awareness that can be described by the metaphor of something pressing itself on your consciousness and leaving an impression.

No. There are many things in which there is only the subjective perspective. These are generally what we call our desires. The subjective feelings that we want this, or would like that. Emotions too do not have to have an objective partner. What is objective and external in being in love, or in being sad? Now here we hit a problem. We feel that we control our desires, but we know that we do not control our emotions. We can not shift the responsability for the emotion onto the external objective reality as emotions have no objective dimension. As such we have to either throw the concept that we are in control of our subjective world out alltogether or find an escape route. The latter is exactly what Freud did, with the ego, id and superego structure (copying Plato to a large degree it has to be said). I, however, disagree with Freud and take a different escape route. I hold that emotions are clearly causaly dependent states. There is always a reason for our emotional state, be it purely internal and subjective (our desires have been met or thwarted) or external and objective (the seratonin level in the brain is too low). This diferentiates emotions from desires in that desires are not, in the end, subject to causal explanation. They always come back to 'because I want to'.


I do not see how a desire is objective. I really do not. Are you suggesting here that people act without having the desire to so act?
For everything that exists, everything in the universe, there is an objective context and a subjective context of perspective. Desires are no exception, they are one of the things in the universe. You are right in that some things exist only subjectively, but I wasn't referring to existence.

The objective perspective abstracts a viewpoint apart from anything, apart from all things. The subjective perspective is the view from any one thing, with it as the subject. This viewpoint is always necessarily unique of an individual, and in the moment.

Things that are entirely "in our head" we examine objectively by conceptually holding them apart from us, referring to them as a thing on their own, as Vittos did when he referred to desire as being causal of action. We can examine ideas in this way, and we can discuss the concept of "self" in this way. When we adopt the subjective perspective, our conceptual view changes to be that of the subject's. "It is" becomes "I am." A subjective perspective for "desire" would be something seen from desire's point of view, and it can only have its own subjective perspective if we objectify it as something apart from us. So an objective desire would be desire conceptually held aloft as a thing on its own. That doesn't mean it's really on its own, it's just a way of looking at it (not to be confused with a perception, either).

I agree that emotions and desires are conditions present before we become aware of them. My point is that holding them aloft objectively is not a complete description of reality as it ignores the subjective perspective, with "me" as the subject and they as a part of all that I identify as me. I too, with my subjective perspective, am a part of the reality we are trying to define.

We fall, but not because we want to, normally (if we do want to we do not blame gravity for us falling, we blame the holder of the desire.) Addiction is questionable. You are seeing the addict as having a desire to continue in the addiction whilst normally having, at the same time, a contradictory desire to break the habit. If you attribute the desire to continue to a chemical state, then why do you not do the same with regard to the desire to stop? You are eliminating free will in this explanation.
The decision to take an addicting substance even though we could choose otherwise is an exercise of free will. That has nothing to do with the desire, though, which is either to take it or not to take it. One can desire to take it and choose not to, or desire not to take it and choose to take it. I associate both these decisions with addiction to the substance, but the desire to take it stems from the substance fulfilling a physical need, and that physical need is also the addiction. That is treatable.

Notice that I am talking objectively about our decisions and free will, here. I have objectified these subjective things in order to discuss them as a part of an objective causal chain of events. When I do that, we end up with a chain that goes Physical Need -> Desire -> Decision -> Action. This apparently objective chain includes an assumed subjective "I" who made the decision and executed the action. That is where we find free will, in the individual able to later conscientiously assert, "I did it. I chose to take this substance."

I prefer to describe addiction as an physically produced emotion (feeling) which is highly unpleasant. This combined with a rational awareness of how to alleviate this emotion (feeling) leads to a strong impulse toward continuing the addiction. This is not a desire though. If you ask an addict what they subjective) want, they will nearly always say that they want to kick the habit. When asked why they don't they reply that they can't. They never reply because they don't want to. (Perhaps they will be in denial and say they don't have a habit,but that is another issue.)
The person who says they cannot has freely surrendered their will to fate or circumstance. People do that all the time. It is not really true --they can, and that is evident in that some of them do eventually change their attitude and realize they can do it.

What I hold myself responsible for only I can know. What is Significant though is what I hold others responsible for and what they hold me responsible for. This can not be based on intent as there is no access to the intent. It has to be based on the action or on the set of actions that the person is known to have made. Here there is a difficulty in attributing desire to an action accurately. So either only I can be the judge of my moral value, or this can not depend upon the actual intent and desire, but only upon the apparent intent and desire.
What we hold others responsible for is another issue, but we do hold them responsible for their intent, where it is known, as well as their actions, where intent is not known.

I guess you are trying to show that a person has responsibility for acting upon his desires, but you seem to assume your premise rather than proving it.

To show responsibility in this situation, you must show that a person is capable of originating the capability of acting counter to his desires, or show that the person is the originator of his desires.
To prove my case, all I need show is that there is a person with a subjective perspective. We can use ourselves as an example. If "I" exist, and if "I" do things, then the case that the subjective can be safely ignored is upset.

Of course, you seem to be campaigning for people with no responsibility for their actions, anyway, so your solely objective view of the world is all right and well.

How would you separate what is "me" from what is "not-me"? I mean, how would you know a feeling was yours or someone else's if you were the one experiencing it? Or a thought?
The same way I know that this post is mine and not yours. Access to your mental world does not have to make it phenomenologically indistinguishable from my mental world.


No, I am defining "being hungry" in terms of awareness of hunger; "hunger" is the bodily function objectively described, but "being hungry" is what is more important to an individual; that is what will motivate him to feed himself. Yes, we can act without awareness of hunger being there, such as when we eat according to a daily ritual, but my point was that our awareness of hunger causes us to act to alieviate the hunger. So when we rescribe a fly as being hungry we are just anthropomorphizing then.

The objective term is 'usable' anytime we want to objectify an inner concept so that we can define it in terms of objective reality, like bodily systems (just as I objectified my "awareness" in my previous sentence). When we objectify things they become "not-me", they become "mine".
That is not how I understand objective. I understand objective as meaning infependent of the particular and personal influences that I bring with me. An objective evaluation of a persons work is one that disregards the relationship that the evaluator has with the author of the work, etc. There are things that we can not objectify, and these things are those that can not exist independently of the individual preferences and prejudices of the person. Thus I can nort objectify my desires, beliefs or emotions. These are inherently and irrevocably tied to my subjective experience.

(More later - I have to go and collect my son from Judo.)

The same way I know that this post is mine and not yours. Access to your mental world does not have to make it phenomenologically indistinguishable from my mental world.
True, but what would distinguish them? I cannot imagine.

You know this post is mine and not yours because you didn't go through the actions of posting it. That doesn't really compare to the experience of a fleeting thought, though.

So when we rescribe a fly as being hungry we are just anthropomorphizing then.
I do believe a fly is aware, so there is no anthropomorphizing necessary in order for it to be aware that it is hungry. Now if it identified hunger with self and assumed responsibility for its actions, I'd start to get worried. ;)

That is not how I understand objective. I understand objective as meaning infependent of the particular and personal influences that I bring with me. An objective evaluation of a persons work is one that disregards the relationship that the evaluator has with the author of the work, etc. There are things that we can not objectify, and these things are those that can not exist independently of the individual preferences and prejudices of the person. Thus I can nort objectify my desires, beliefs or emotions. These are inherently and irrevocably tied to my subjective experience.

(More later - I have to go and collect my son from Judo.)
The objective evaluation is one that ignores the examiner's subjective feelings about the author. That's a different context of subjective, but not unrelated. For human beings, thoughts and feelings that are preceptible only from the subject's perspective are identified as 'subjective things'.

All things can be objectified; we do so in order that we might talk about them. When you talk about "desires" and "beliefs" in the sentence above, you do so with them in as objects in your sentence. "I" is the subject in your sentence. "Objectify" is the verb, the action. The subject acts upon the objects; the subject is the one with causality and, in this case, will. This sentence structure, in our English language, reflects precisely the perspectives that I am talking about.

True, but what would distinguish them? I cannot imagine.
What distinguishes my speech as being mine when I hear it? The fact that I am aware that it originates with me. The same can easily applyt to mental events. [/quote]

You know this post is mine and not yours because you didn't go through the actions of posting it. That doesn't really compare to the experience of a fleeting thought, though.
Why not? I did not go through the action of thinking it, is equivalent is it not?


I do believe a fly is aware, so there is no anthropomorphizing necessary in order for it to be aware that it is hungry. Now if it identified hunger with self and assumed responsibility for its actions, I'd start to get worried. ;)
Fair enough. I do not consider a fly to be aware in any sense at all. I see it as a set of programmed responses to stimuli. However that is a matter of opinion and your's is as valid as mine.


The objective evaluation is one that ignores the examiner's subjective feelings about the author. That's a different context of subjective, but not unrelated. For human beings, thoughts and feelings that are preceptible only from the subject's perspective are identified as 'subjective things'.
Which is, as you say, only one aspect of the term subjective. Subjective can, and often does, mean unverifiable. What I am concerned with here are those things that can only be subjective with the way we exist. (The necessity here is contingent on our senses and perceptions, it is not a logical necessity.) These are, as you recognize, our thoughts and feelings. Now I know you follow this with an objection, I will present a rebuttle after that.

All things can be objectified; we do so in order that we might talk about them. When you talk about "desires" and "beliefs" in the sentence above, you do so with them in as objects in your sentence. "I" is the subject in your sentence. "Objectify" is the verb, the action. The subject acts upon the objects; the subject is the one with causality and, in this case, will. This sentence structure, in our English language, reflects precisely the perspectives that I am talking about.
I would like to draw a difference between the thought and the feeling and the description of such a though or feeling. We can indeed discuss our feelings, as we can create objective descriptions. What we cannot do, ever, is objectify the feeling itself. I can describe my emotional state, but there is no way that I can present the state itself to you. All I can do is present a description. The sentence structure in almost all languages, not just English, reflects this ability to create objective descriptions of subjective states, but that does not imply that the state itself has an objective component.
What I feel, think, believe and desire are necessarily (contingently) subjective. They have no objective component for us. Our language allows us to report, to describe, to communicate our awareness of these states. it does not allow us to make these states in any way objective.

To prove my case, all I need show is that there is a person with a subjective perspective. We can use ourselves as an example. If "I" exist, and if "I" do things, then the case that the subjective can be safely ignored is upset.

I don't understand this argument. How does the assumption of self prove the responsibility of self?

When I say that the "self" is the result of natural circumstance, the assumption of self proves absolutely nothing.

So, like I said before, you must show that the "self" or at least some part of it is not result of natural circumstance before the "self" provides proof of free will.

Alrgiht then, Ive got you covered. There is a Fate as Destiny so to speak. It is God's will. Heres the kicker. Its optional. We have ultimate free will. Though we will be miserable, disconnected, run down, and possilbly burn in hell for not following it. You see God knows whats best and we must discover his will thogh prayer meditation and study of oneself. There are things we can never accomplish without Fate on our side and Vice Versa. You cannot change the world for the better without some intent for it by God. And your mother may die of Heart attack No matter what choice you make. So yes there is Fate, We can deny it, We have free will and the best heing to do is find it and follow it, love it, trust it...

Amazing, this is my definition of Fate and Destiny (at least very close to it), Not that any of you will believe me when i cite my ideals, but this is the best definition in my opinion. So I like the responses I got from everyone and keep an eye out for my future threads concernig the high ideals of society.

How can fate be optional? Aren't those fundamentally opposed concepts?

What distinguishes my speech as being mine when I hear it? The fact that I am aware that it originates with me. The same can easily applyt to mental events.


Why not? I did not go through the action of thinking it, is equivalent is it not?
I think you have a different concept of experiencing things than I do. (And we were talking about thoughts and feelings, not speech.)

Fair enough. I do not consider a fly to be aware in any sense at all. I see it as a set of programmed responses to stimuli. However that is a matter of opinion and your's is as valid as mine.


Which is, as you say, only one aspect of the term subjective. Subjective can, and often does, mean unverifiable. What I am concerned with here are those things that can only be subjective with the way we exist. (The necessity here is contingent on our senses and perceptions, it is not a logical necessity.) These are, as you recognize, our thoughts and feelings. Now I know you follow this with an objection, I will present a rebuttle after that.
I have never encountered 'subjective' as meaning unverifiable, though I have encountered it as meaning verifiable to the subject alone; obviously not the same thing. The subjective view is necessarily unique to an individual. Yes, it's not objectively verifiable, but then ...it is subjective, not objective.

I would like to draw a difference between the thought and the feeling and the description of such a though or feeling. We can indeed discuss our feelings, as we can create objective descriptions. What we cannot do, ever, is objectify the feeling itself. I can describe my emotional state, but there is no way that I can present the state itself to you. All I can do is present a description.
Sure there is. Poets have been doing it for eons, with the use of metaphor.

"Shivering I brush off my nervousness
and smile coolly.
You smile back with the kindness
and innocence of a budding flower.
No one casts a feeling like you do."

The sentence structure in almost all languages, not just English, reflects this ability to create objective descriptions of subjective states, but that does not imply that the state itself has an objective component.
I can only imagine that you are mistaking objectifying a subjective object for creating an objective object. Otherwise, I don't know what you are talking about.

What I feel, think, believe and desire are necessarily (contingently) subjective. They have no objective component for us. Our language allows us to report, to describe, to communicate our awareness of these states. it does not allow us to make these states in any way objective.
They are subjective *things*; however, I was talking about perspectives.

'Objectivity' is not a "component" or property of a thing unless it is something that physically exists apart from us. You are taking this subject off-topic.

Originally Posted by Willamena
To prove my case, all I need show is that there is a person with a subjective perspective. We can use ourselves as an example. If "I" exist, and if "I" do things, then the case that the subjective can be safely ignored is upset.

I don't understand this argument. How does the assumption of self prove the responsibility of self?
How do you account for responsibility, then, in your philosophy? If "I" do not do something, how can I possibly be held responsible for the action?

The assumption of "self" does not *prove* either the existence of self nor the responsibilty of self; it assumes it. It does, however, prove my case. Without an assumption of responsibility on the part of the individual, there can be no responsibility assigned to "me" at all. You have admitted as much.

When I say that the "self" is the result of natural circumstance, the assumption of self proves absolutely nothing.
I couldn't agree more. I would add, in fact, that the assumption of self is not present there, in that philosophy.

(and I have, I have added it... but I guess you weren't listening)

So, like I said before, you must show that the "self" or at least some part of it is not result of natural circumstance before the "self" provides proof of free will.
I have, in fact, stated that the self is a result of our physical nature. I have provided no "proof" of anything, only a philosophy that assumes that we have free will. Perhaps you are mistaking our respective philosophies for truth. The difference between what you put forth and what I do, which you still fail to grasp, is that your presentation is entirely objective, and hence excludes the human from any responsibility for anything that occurs.

You have not "proven" anything, either. Neither would I want you to: it is philosophies we are discussing, not truths.

How do you account for responsibility, then, in your philosophy? If "I" do not do something, how can I possibly be held responsible for the action?

Responsibility always lies with the causal chain, however, we can identify the manifestation of the immorality as being the person.

I have, in fact, stated that the self is a result of our physical nature. I have provided no "proof" of anything, only a philosophy that assumes that we have free will. Perhaps you are mistaking our respective philosophies for truth. The difference between what you put forth and what I do, which you still fail to grasp, is that your presentation is entirely objective, and hence excludes the human from any responsibility for anything that occurs.

I have never claimed that determinism makes an individual responsible.

I have also read your comment that my statements are purely objective to understand that too.

I do feel that my philosophy is the truth, I believe that existence occurs in pretty much the manner I have described.

I also have trouble discussing the existence of free will when you simply assume it exists.

You have not "proven" anything, either. Neither would I want you to: it is philosophies we are discussing, not truths.

Causality does have the backing of nearly all recorded evidence, though I will agree that I cannot offer proof.

But I would like to also state that all philosophies are not equal.

Responsibility always lies with the causal chain, however, we can identify the manifestation of the immorality as being the person.
Hmm. I have no idea what "manifestation of the immorality" could mean, but I'll try to do some searching on the Internet so I can address this.

I have never claimed that determinism makes an individual responsible.
I know; but I feel the lack of responsibility for actions on the part of a conscious individual is one of the major flaws in determinism, and undermines our entire civilization. :) That is why I keep going back to it.

I have also read your comment that my statements are purely objective to understand that too.

I do feel that my philosophy is the truth, I believe that existence occurs in pretty much the manner I have described.

I also have trouble discussing the existence of free will when you simply assume it exists.
...just as I have trouble discussing my self-control in terms that ignore "me". :)

No philosophy is the truth, and they don't try to be all-encompassing of reality --philosophy is simply a way of looking things.

Causality does have the backing of nearly all recorded evidence, though I will agree that I cannot offer proof.
Causality exists; there we agree. My philosophy includes it from the objective perspective which is its context, and includes the subjective perspective, at the same time, with a nod to the divide between them. That "gap" (not a real gap, just a metaphor) means that we can look at things objectively or switch views to look at things subjectively, but the advantage of the subjective view is that we can keep the objective view overlayed and still acknowledge it while looking at things through our own eyes. Multi-tasking.

Can't do that with the solely objective view. That view necessarily ignores the subject.

But I would like to also state that all philosophies are not equal.
No argument there.

Hmm. I have no idea what "manifestation of the immorality" could mean, but I'll try to do some searching on the Internet so I can address this.

I didn't get it from the internet or any other source, at least not directly, so I will explain it.

We can still determine morality through comparison to alternatives. So while we cannot say that a person can generate morality, we can still judge the morality of his actions. So morality or immorality manifests itself in the person, just as reason, eye color, personality, or hunger manifests itself.

I know; but I feel the lack of responsibility for actions on the part of a conscious individual is one of the major flaws in determinism, and undermines our entire civilization. :) That is why I keep going back to it.

You are not the only one.

...just as I have trouble discussing my self-control in terms that ignore "me". :)

I am not ignoring the person. The person exists.

I am simply stating that the qualities are what makes the person, not the other way around.

Causality exists; there we agree. My philosophy includes it from the objective perspective which is its context, and includes the subjective perspective, at the same time, with a nod to the divide between them. That "gap" (not a real gap, just a metaphor) means that we can look at things objectively or switch views to look at things subjectively, but the advantage of the subjective view is that we can keep the objective view overlayed and still acknowledge it while looking at things through our own eyes. Multi-tasking.

Can't do that with the solely objective view. That view necessarily ignores the subject.

How can you acknowledge the objective view from the subjective view, when the objective view precludes the subjective view.

I must be dense, because your argument (at least to me) states that one must know that he has free will and simultaneously know that there is no free will. How can that be?

I didn't get it from the internet or any other source, at least not directly, so I will explain it.

We can still determine morality through comparison to alternatives. So while we cannot say that a person can generate morality, we can still judge the morality of his actions. So morality or immorality manifests itself in the person, just as reason, eye color, personality, or hunger manifests itself.
What is the mechanism of the manifestation of a concept?

You are not the only one.


I am not ignoring the person. The person exists.
...as a lump of flesh, a marionette at the mercy of natural forces. Okay, I'll stop now. ;)

I am simply stating that the qualities are what makes the person, not the other way around.
"Qualities" are all the characteristics and properties that define a person?

How can you acknowledge the objective view from the subjective view, when the objective view precludes the subjective view.
Because acknowledgement is not the same as adopting the solely objective view. The "gap" is what keeps us sane, a metaphorical buffer that protects us from that abstracted, imaginary world of objectivity that excludes our very sensible personal perspective on things.

:D

I must be dense, because your argument (at least to me) states that one must know that he has free will and simultaneously know that there is no free will. How can that be?
I'm not sure how to explain it any better than I already have. My argument is that one must know they have free will, and simultaneously know that that free will cannot be acknowledged from an objective perspective. The objective perspective requires that free will be ignored in favour of the interplay of cause and effect. Effectively, there is no free will from an objective perspective (in the same way that science excludes the supernatural, per other debates --that does not mean that the supernatural does not exist, only that science cannot take into account its existence).

I'll try and explain it again. From the subjective perspective, I know free will exists because I determine things. From the objective perspective, the subject view is ignored, so that makes it possible for us to envision causation as a result of an interplay of 'natural forces' or whatever, cause and effect. There is no free will in this picture, not because it doesn't exist but because there is no subject in this picture. So the objective view alone does not give us the whole of the picture. In terms of free will, it can give us no picture. We can objectify the concept of free will so that we can discuss it as thing, here, now, but always when we do this there is necessarily an unspoken assumption of a subjective perspective (consiousness) for that concept.

The objective perspective describes truth, but the truth is we cannot define free will in terms of utilization objectively.

What is the mechanism of the manifestation of a concept?

I'm not sure I quite get what you are asking.

"Qualities" are all the characteristics and properties that define a person?

Qualities are the characteristics that make up all things, not just people. The word define does not go far enough, but yes, things are defined by their qualities.

Because acknowledgement is not the same as adopting the solely objective view. The "gap" is what keeps us sane, a metaphorical buffer that protects us from that abstracted, imaginary world of objectivity that excludes our very sensible personal perspective on things.

I'm not sure how to explain it any better than I already have. My argument is that one must know they have free will, and simultaneously know that that free will cannot be acknowledged from an objective perspective. The objective perspective requires that free will be ignored in favour of the interplay of cause and effect. Effectively, there is no free will from an objective perspective (in the same way that science excludes the supernatural, per other debates --that does not mean that the supernatural does not exist, only that science cannot take into account its existence).

I'll try and explain it again. From the subjective perspective, I know free will exists because I determine things. From the objective perspective, the subject view is ignored, so that makes it possible for us to envision causation as a result of an interplay of 'natural forces' or whatever, cause and effect. There is no free will in this picture, not because it doesn't exist but because there is no subject in this picture. So the objective view alone does not give us the whole of the picture. In terms of free will, it can give us no picture. We can objectify the concept of free will so that we can discuss it as thing, here, now, but always when we do this there is necessarily an unspoken assumption of a subjective perspective (consiousness) for that concept.

The objective perspective describes truth, but the truth is we cannot define free will in terms of utilization objectively.

I give up. I don't know, this just isn't registering with me.

To me, free will is established with causation, and causation can be viewed objectively. I can look objectively at someone (or myself) and say that he/she were not the originating cause, and therefore they have no free will.

To me the objective view is the whole picture, and it is abstracted from the subjective, so I don't understand how the subjective is excluded from the objective.

So your argument is that we

I'm not sure I quite get what you are asking.
You had said that "morality or immorality manifests itself in the person," and that characteristics manifest themselves. Manifest is a verb, a word of action. Things manifest when they come into being. Things come into being in our contingent universe through some mechanism of cause and effect. I was asking what is the mechanism by which concepts like free will or morality can manifest themselves. The statement that they have no agency (a person to manifest them) is akin to saying that our thoughts create themselves and that we are nothing more than our thoughts. But I'm sure you meant something else, because that is a position contrary to determinism, as it allows things to come into being with no cause. Of course, you might not really be a determinist, for all I know. So I was asking.

Qualities are the characteristics that make up all things, not just people. The word define does not go far enough, but yes, things are defined by their qualities.
Generally it is accepted that properties are things that another thing owns. Characteristics that define us, people, for instance, are called properties because they are things that belong to us, that we own, that are evident of us *after* we present ourselves to someone else's perception; and therefore we must exist before they can.

What you seem to be presenting as your philosophy is a whole new way of looking at it, one I haven't encountered before.

I give up. I don't know, this just isn't registering with me.

To me, free will is established with causation, and causation can be viewed objectively. I can look objectively at someone (or myself) and say that he/she were not the originating cause, and therefore they have no free will.

To me the objective view is the whole picture, and it is abstracted from the subjective, so I don't understand how the subjective is excluded from the objective.
So... what causes free will?

Let's say there is no free will (though really it's just that you cannot see it objectively). You see someone acting and *must* attribute their actions to some cause, so you look for the obvious causes in all things that exist ...desire, influence, stimuation, etc... and attribute their actions to that. Free will *effectively* does not exist, because you have found other causes. You can and do dismiss the idea of free will.

This isn't logical, though, that free will does not exist because of this. It may very well not exist, but not because of this. It's the same rationality that some use to dismiss god: if we can find a cause in nature we need look no further to explain it. And we will always find a cause in nature. God is unnecessary only from an objective viewpoint.

Free will does not exist. Every action is a reaction, and every reaction is an action that causes a reaction. Everything that exists succumbs to this chain of events. You don't choose to do things freely, but rather it is a reaction to some previous action you had no control over.

Free will does not exist. Every action is a reaction, and every reaction is an action that causes a reaction. Everything that exists succumbs to this chain of events. You don't choose to do things freely, but rather it is a reaction to some previous action you had no control over.
Right. Now... take those same actions, but this time look at them from the perspective of the person who is doing the acting.

"His arm moves," becomes, "I move my arm."

"He does things with no free will involved in the description," becomes, "I do things of my own free will."

You had said that "morality or immorality manifests itself in the person," and that characteristics manifest themselves. Manifest is a verb, a word of action. Things manifest when they come into being. Things come into being in our contingent universe through some mechanism of cause and effect. I was asking what is the mechanism by which concepts like free will or morality can manifest themselves. The statement that they have no agency (a person to manifest them) is akin to saying that our thoughts create themselves and that we are nothing more than our thoughts. But I'm sure you meant something else, because that is a position contrary to determinism, as it allows things to come into being with no cause. Of course, you might not really be a determinist, for all I know. So I was asking.

A person at any moment in time is the sum of his qualities. Those qualities are based in the causal chain. Can I describe the process that brings about concepts, no. If I had that sort of deductive ability, I would spend my time at the horsetracks.

Now, I could say that the quality of whiteness manifests itself in my truck, and that would be a valid statement. But it would be ludicrous to assume that the truck originated the quality of whiteness, or that whiteness just happened to the truck.

Now, concepts within people would be no different. The manifestation occurs in the person, he can observe it, he can conclude that it exists. However, the person is not the true originator of the concept, rather all of the stimuli and natural forces that govern the person are the originator.

Generally it is accepted that properties are things that another thing owns. Characteristics that define us, people, for instance, are called properties because they are things that belong to us, that we own, that are evident of us *after* we present ourselves to someone else's perception; and therefore we must exist before they can.

What you seem to be presenting as your philosophy is a whole new way of looking at it, one I haven't encountered before.

It is my attempt to reconcile determinism with what we perceive to be our individualism.

Within hardline determinism, one must not be an individual, but a marianette, as you aptly put it. Yet all perception leads us to the conclusion that we are an individual.

So... what causes free will?

Let's say there is no free will (though really it's just that you cannot see it objectively). You see someone acting and *must* attribute their actions to some cause, so you look for the obvious causes in all things that exist ...desire, influence, stimuation, etc... and attribute their actions to that. Free will *effectively* does not exist, because you have found other causes. You can and do dismiss the idea of free will.

This isn't logical, though, that free will does not exist because of this. It may very well not exist, but not because of this. It's the same rationality that some use to dismiss god: if we can find a cause in nature we need look no further to explain it. And we will always find a cause in nature. God is unnecessary only from an objective viewpoint.

The objective view necessarily has a subjective tint to it. I cannot possibly form my objective views of reality without considering my subjective view.

People, when caught in a mistake, have shown themselves to be very adept at deducing outside causes for their actions from a subjective viewpoint.

A person at any moment in time is the sum of his qualities. Those qualities are based in the causal chain. Can I describe the process that brings about concepts, no. If I had that sort of deductive ability, I would spend my time at the horsetracks.

Now, I could say that the quality of whiteness manifests itself in my truck, and that would be a valid statement. But it would be ludicrous to assume that the truck originated the quality of whiteness, or that whiteness just happened to the truck.

Now, concepts within people would be no different. The manifestation occurs in the person, he can observe it, he can conclude that it exists. However, the person is not the true originator of the concept, rather all of the stimuli and natural forces that govern the person are the originator.



It is my attempt to reconcile determinism with what we perceive to be our individualism.

Within hardline determinism, one must not be an individual, but a marianette, as you aptly put it. Yet all perception leads us to the conclusion that we are an individual.
Well, it is fascinatingly different, though still recognizably deterministic. I can't say I understand it, though.

My personal philosophy takes some unusual bends, too, but I've much to learn.

The objective view necessarily has a subjective tint to it. I cannot possibly form my objective views of reality without considering my subjective view.

People, when caught in a mistake, have shown themselves to be very adept at deducing outside causes for their actions from a subjective viewpoint.
Tint. :) Yes, since the objective view is abstracted, there is necessarily a subjective view in the background when we do the objectivity thing, but that doesn't mean that the subjective view has any part in the objective view; on the contrary, ingoring the subjective perspective is the whole point of doing objectivity.

It takes, "He moved his arm," and turns it into, "Oh look! His arm moved." In the latter case, he may have been conscious or unconscious, it's all the same; the objective statement deals with the arm as the subject, not the person --and only if it's a conscious person who is the subject can free will even be considered.

And, yes! People are very skilled at finding reasons not to blame themselves by looking to outside forces.

Well, it is fascinatingly different, though still recognizably deterministic. I can't say I understand it, though.

My personal philosophy takes some unusual bends, too, but I've much to learn.

Well, yours doesn't make sense to me either, so we could probably butt heads on this for hundreds of posts. At least we're civil.

Tint. :) Yes, since the objective view is abstracted, there is necessarily a subjective view in the background when we do the objectivity thing, but that doesn't mean that the subjective view has any part in the objective view; on the contrary, ingoring the subjective perspective is the whole point of doing objectivity.

Correct, but my point is that no one can actually ignore their subjective view in forming an objective. Try as they might, their objective is still based in the subjective, it must be.

It takes, "He moved his arm," and turns it into, "Oh look! His arm moved."

See that is a false dichotomy to me.

Correct, but my point is that no one can actually ignore their subjective view in forming an objective. Try as they might, their objective is still based in the subjective, it must be.
It is true that the subjective perspective is still there, but it is ignored in the objective in that the subject is not used. "Ignore" is perhaps not the best word, but until now I considered it adequate.

Depends on what you mean by "based in," too, I suppose.

See that is a false dichotomy to me.
How is it false? It exists.

Right. Now... take those same actions, but this time look at them from the perspective of the person who is doing the acting.

"His arm moves," becomes, "I move my arm."

"He does things with no free will involved in the description," becomes, "I do things of my own free will."

The question is why? Why are you moving your arm? Because you want to. Why do you "want" to? To achieve something. What is this that you need to achieve and why? Lets say I am moving my arm to grab a jar off a shelf. Why a jar? The jar is filled with cookies and I am hungry for a snack. Why am I hungry, and why cookies? I am hungry because of the lack of food in my stomach, and cookies just seemed to appeal to me. Why do cookies appeal to you? And so on...

You think you do things on your own free will, but there are reasons you do such things, and reasons can be broken down to chemical and even subatomic levels, which you cannot control.

You think you do things on your own free will, but there are reasons you do such things, and reasons can be broken down to chemical and even subatomic levels, which you cannot control.

Ah. Now you get to quantum probability. On a certain level, nothing is certain. Which means you cannot predict exactly what action someone is going to do.

Depends on what you mean by "based in," too, I suppose.

If one subjectively feels something to be true, they will generally translate that into objective truth. For example, for someone to find determinism objectively true, then they must subjectively find other causes for their actions.

How is it false? It exists.

Because I see "He moves his arm" and "His arm moves" as one and the same. He is nothing more than a point in the process that made his arm move.

From that person's subjective perspective, yes the process of moving the arm does come through him, whereas he move his arm. However, from the subjective perspective, he can also realize that those forces that cause a squirrel to store nuts before the winter are causing him to move his arm.

That is the way it works from my subjective perspective. I know that the words I am typing into this forum are predetermined by things that I don't control. However, those desires that cause me do what I do give me fulfillment as if I had complete control, so there is no loss. It is helpless perspective, but it is not a hopeless perspective.

Ah. Now you get to quantum probability. On a certain level, nothing is certain. Which means you cannot predict exactly what action someone is going to do.

But, in a sense, you dont need to predict because they do everything.
Schroedinger's (sp?) cat for the win.

Ah. Now you get to quantum probability. On a certain level, nothing is certain. Which means you cannot predict exactly what action someone is going to do.

That doesn't argue for free will, only against determinism. Randomness does not necessitate free will.

If one subjectively feels something to be true, they will generally translate that into objective truth. For example, for someone to find determinism objectively true, then they must subjectively find other causes for their actions.
But, from the subjective perspective, there IS no other cause possible for their actions, not and still have the actions be theirs.

Because I see "He moves his arm" and "His arm moves" as one and the same. He is nothing more than a point in the process that made his arm move.
In the first phrase, "he" is identified as the source of the action by the sentence structure. In the second phrase, there is no identified source of the action in the sentence structure. That is a significant difference in what the two phrases mean: one includes a subject and his perspective, the other does not. One implies that he has control and responsibility for his action, the other eliminates that.

You eliminate the subjectivity, too, when you state that he is "nothing more" than a part of a larger process. That "nothing more" ignores the human who is in control of himself, and looks at him strictly objectively.

From that person's subjective perspective, yes the process of moving the arm does come through him, whereas he move his arm. However, from the subjective perspective, he can also realize that those forces that cause a squirrel to store nuts before the winter are causing him to move his arm.
There you go! Now we're on the same page, or getting there. Only objectively are these 'forces at work' the cause of our actions; and from his subjective window on the world he can look out at things objective to him and see that, and abstract a point of view that recognizes that in himself.

That is the dichotomy, in a nutshell.

That is the way it works from my subjective perspective. I know that the words I am typing into this forum are predetermined by things that I don't control. However, those desires that cause me do what I do give me fulfillment as if I had complete control, so there is no loss. It is helpless perspective, but it is not a hopeless perspective.
You wilfully surrender your self-control to these 'forces', I get that; and I suppose that's an alright philosophy if it gets you from point A (birth) to point B (death).

What I am suggesting is that both are true, because both perspectives are true: objectively the world is in control of us, and subjectively we are in control. They can both be true, because of the subject/object split that consciousness gives us.

The question is why? Why are you moving your arm? Because you want to. Why do you "want" to? To achieve something. What is this that you need to achieve and why? Lets say I am moving my arm to grab a jar off a shelf. Why a jar? The jar is filled with cookies and I am hungry for a snack. Why am I hungry, and why cookies? I am hungry because of the lack of food in my stomach, and cookies just seemed to appeal to me. Why do cookies appeal to you? And so on...

You think you do things on your own free will, but there are reasons you do such things, and reasons can be broken down to chemical and even subatomic levels, which you cannot control.
I have reasons for doing the things I do, and the reasons exist and propel me; however, influences do not negate the fact that if I want a cookie and reach for it, it is me who is doing it. I, not my reasons, am reaching for the cookie. I am the cause of my action.

My reasons are "why I do it", my free will is "me doing it".

You wilfully surrender your self-control to these 'forces', I get that; and I suppose that's an alright philosophy if it gets you from point A (birth) to point B (death).

What I am suggesting is that both are true, because both perspectives are true: objectively the world is in control of us, and subjectively we are in control. They can both be true, because of the subject/object split that consciousness gives us.

It isn't so much a willful surrender of my self-control, it is an acknowledgement that it has never existed regardless of any belief or perception to the counter.

I suspect we are not to far off. I will not deny that we do perceive ourselves to be the originator of actions, it is the necessary result of our desire to delineate boundaries as to what constitutes ourselves.

I am just saying that those boundaries that we create for ourselves are ficticious; that, while we perceive ourselves to be the actors, we are more or less just actions.

So both perspectives exist, the subjective is simply erroneous. And like I said, there is nothing barring us from enjoying the benefits of the subjective.

It isn't so much a willful surrender of my self-control, it is an acknowledgement that it has never existed regardless of any belief or perception to the counter.

I suspect we are not to far off. I will not deny that we do perceive ourselves to be the originator of actions, it is the necessary result of our desire to delineate boundaries as to what constitutes ourselves.

I am just saying that those boundaries that we create for ourselves are ficticious; that, while we perceive ourselves to be the actors, we are more or less just actions.

So both perspectives exist, the subjective is simply erroneous. And like I said, there is nothing barring us from enjoying the benefits of the subjective.
But the acknowlegement needn't be at the expense of the subjective reality, where it does exist. You're half right: when you disregard the perspective of perception, free will/self-control doesn't exist.

It's not erroneous: it is just an attitude that assigns a truer truly true truth to what is objective at the expense of what we are.

I have reasons for doing the things I do, and the reasons exist and propel me; however, influences do not negate the fact that if I want a cookie and reach for it, it is me who is doing it. I, not my reasons, am reaching for the cookie. I am the cause of my action.

My reasons are "why I do it", my free will is "me doing it".

No, YOU are not the cause of the action. WHO you are is the cause of your action, and you dont have control over that. Your reasons for doing things exist, and there are reasons why those reasons exist. It all breaks down until what you have left is something you have no control over.

No, YOU are not the cause of the action. WHO you are is the cause of your action, and you dont have control over that. Your reasons for doing things exist, and there are reasons why those reasons exist. It all breaks down until what you have left is something you have no control over.
Who am I?

Am I my body? Am I my mind? Am I my actions, or some combination of those? Or am I something that owns those ("my" being a personal possessive adjective)? If I own them, then they are objects to me, they are objective to that which is "me". So I am something more.

Our consciousness can only make us aware of objects, we cannot be aware of the subject that is conscious. Objects are not the cause of my actions; either I am, or the actions are not mine.

But the acknowlegement needn't be at the expense of the subjective reality, where it does exist. You're half right: when you disregard the perspective of perception, free will/self-control doesn't exist.

From the subjective it appears to exist. Were I to say, "I typed this reply", I would be truthful, and that gives the appearance of free will. But were I to say, "I am the cause of this reply," I would still be in the subjective, but it would be untrue, and would therefore eliminate the possibility of free will.

That is the inadequacy of the subjective perspective, at least in my opinion.

It's not erroneous: it is just an attitude that assigns a truer truly true truth to what is objective at the expense of what we are.

We have already discussed that the nature of the objective perspective is one of truly truer truthiness.

From the subjective it appears to exist. Were I to say, "I typed this reply", I would be truthful, and that gives the appearance of free will. But were I to say, "I am the cause of this reply," I would still be in the subjective, but it would be untrue, and would therefore eliminate the possibility of free will.

That is the inadequacy of the subjective perspective, at least in my opinion.
From a perspective of perception, there can be no difference between what appears to be and what is, because everything is perception. So you fault perception for being what it is by attempting to trivialize it as 'appearances'.

If it is, as you say, truthful form the subjective perspective, then it cannot be untrue from that same perspective; only from the objective. You are therefore defaulting to the objective as the only truth, at the expense of truth.

We have already discussed that the nature of the objective perspective is one of truly truer truthiness.
Objectively, it is, yes. The 'truer' truth lies with the objective, because that is the favoured reality our civilization of science actively seeks. We live in a world dominated by and driven by science, and the scientific explanation is necessarily the objective one. Science looks at things from the perspective that excludes the subject in order to tell us how things work in a way that can be replicatable by others. Explanations that are subjective are useless to science because they are necessarily unique case (to an individual and to a moment in time) and so not replicatable at all.

All this says nothing about truth, in general, but if we are looking for the truth of mechanism or the truth about explanation of cause-and-effect, we would look to the objective view, and if we are looking for the truthful experience, we would ask the subject, as he's the only one who can know.

So can science tell us how free will works, what its mechanism is? It can try, but science is necessarily objective. In seeking an explanation of free will, we must talk about subjective things objectively ('objectifying' them), i.e. it turns "he moves his arm" into "these reasons of his for moving his arm impel him to this action". But then, look what happened... suddenly with the objective explanation we are no longer taking about 'him' doing things. The subject is gone, replaced by both the reasons and the man as objects interacting with each other. The free will that is demonstrated in 'me doing things' has vanished into the mist, and all because our perspective on it changed.

From a perspective of perception, there can be no difference between what appears to be and what is, because everything is perception. So you fault perception for being what it is by attempting to trivialize it as 'appearances'.

If it is, as you say, truthful form the subjective perspective, then it cannot be untrue from that same perspective; only from the objective. You are therefore defaulting to the objective as the only truth, at the expense of truth.

Going by what you say, that "there is no difference between what appears to be and what is," it can't help but be trivialized in the matters of truth. Perception makes no attempt at showing proof, it only shows appearances. That is the entire point of the objective perspective, to cope for the ineptitude of human perception. To use reason to apply truth to our perception.

Objectively, it is, yes. The 'truer' truth lies with the objective, because that is the favoured reality our civilization of science actively seeks. We live in a world dominated by and driven by science, and the scientific explanation is necessarily the objective one. Science looks at things from the perspective that excludes the subject in order to tell us how things work in a way that can be replicatable by others. Explanations that are subjective are useless to science because they are necessarily unique case (to an individual and to a moment in time) and so not replicatable at all.

All this says nothing about truth, in general, but if we are looking for the truth of mechanism or the truth about explanation of cause-and-effect, we would look to the objective view, and if we are looking for the truthful experience, we would ask the subject, as he's the only one who can know.

So can science tell us how free will works, what its mechanism is? It can try, but science is necessarily objective. In seeking an explanation of free will, we must talk about subjective things objectively ('objectifying' them), i.e. it turns "he moves his arm" into "these reasons of his for moving his arm impel him to this action". But then, look what happened... suddenly with the objective explanation we are no longer taking about 'him' doing things. The subject is gone, replaced by both the reasons and the man as objects interacting with each other. The free will that is demonstrated in 'me doing things' has vanished into the mist, and all because our perspective on it changed.

It has not vanished because of a change in perspective, it has vanished because we are now holding it to a higher standard of truth. There is nothing about the objective view that denies someone could indeed be responsible for his own movement. In fact, the only way that can be shown is through objective analysis of alternative possibilities.

There is nothing but pure rambunctious free will!

For those who don't know(pretty much everyone), I like to pose philisophical questions. Here is my newest question. What do you think of when you hear about fate or destiny. What does it do to our free will. Is it real and how does it work. If it does exist, can we defy or overcome it. And does being Destined mena you have no choice? You tell me what you think. I have my answer, but I want to see yours first.
"Fate, destiny, and free will" are all illusions. :p

Going by what you say, that "there is no difference between what appears to be and what is," it can't help but be trivialized in the matters of truth. Perception makes no attempt at showing proof, it only shows appearances. That is the entire point of the objective perspective, to cope for the ineptitude of human perception. To use reason to apply truth to our perception.
But the 'appearances' are no less true for what they are. If someone reports a perception, it is truthfully his perception that he reports. It is only when we try to take them for something they are not --take them out of a subjective context and into objective reality --that they fall apart. Their usefulness vanishes into the mist.

There is nothing inept or inadquate about perception when it is taken for what it is.

It has not vanished because of a change in perspective, it has vanished because we are now holding it to a higher standard of truth. There is nothing about the objective view that denies someone could indeed be responsible for his own movement. In fact, the only way that can be shown is through objective analysis of alternative possibilities.
Really, we are simply butting heads, now, and perhaps we should stop.

It was fun.