NationStates Jolt Archive

What we often regard as facts in history may not often be so, because these facts are subject to our own interpretations. Upon the past, we impose our own value systems, our own ethics and our own ideas and this often shows in our histories of the past. Facts become altered, thoughts that never existed in those periods are subtly inserted. It is perhaps the first and foremost duty of the professional historian to attempt to sort through the interpretations of past chroniclers in order to try and find an objective truth (or as close to an objective truth as it is possible to come).

In the case of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the distortions of facts have created a gross injustice. Haig is remembered as the Butcher of the Somme, at best a man placed in a job far beyond his capabilites, at worst an incompetent and callous murderer. Too often when his name is mentioned does the public see the BlackAdder interpretation of Geoffrey Palmer sweeping toy soldiers from a map with disdain. So loathed is Haig that there are popular campaigns to have his statutes removed.

It may come as a surprise to some of you to learn that the opposite is true of Haig. As a soldier and a general, he is only beaten by Wellington and Marlborough in terms of talent and ability. His military career both during World One and prior to it are filled with achievement. As a man, he was compassionate, shy (but steely), intelligent and modest.

What will surprise you even more is how widespread that opinion of Haig is in the academic world. Ever since John Terrain's landmark work Haig: the Educated Soldier was released in the 1980s, the revisionist argument (i.e. Haig was a good soldier and man) has managed to claim the allegiance of most First World War historians. The debate between academics has concluded and it found firmly in favour of the revisionists

So why, indeed, does the negative public image of Haig still exist? What caused this image in the first place? Before these questions can be answered we must observe some of the predominant myths as to Haig and the First World War. It must also be noted, even at this early stage, that the way in which the First World War has been viewed since its end has participated to the injustice inflicted on Haig's reputation.

1) Haig was nothing more than a calvary man: The reputation of the pre-1918 British calvary is not one of the brightest. The stereotype of blundering, brainless, brash charges such as that made by the Light Brigade in the Crimea has remained fixed in the public attention. Haig was orginally a calvary officer and so the stereotype has become attached to him: he knew nothing of fighting other than how to charge and this resulted in the bloodbath of the Somme. This view, however, is incorrect. Haig did very little calvary fighting - for the vast amount of his early career (pre-1900) he was a staff officer who worked on training methods and organisational techniques, skills which were to be of great use in the First World War.

2) Haigh was an incompetent soldier On the contary, on graduating from the Sandhurst military academy, he came top and was awarded a sword in recognition of this. The work he did as a staff officer proved invaluable both in Boer War and in the preparation to the First World War. He realised during the Boer War that troops would have to be spread out rather than clustered when fighting a machine gun bearing enemy and often advocated this method of fighting. Haig was an advisor to John Haldane, who, in 1910, began to bring about the much needed reforms of the army. Alas Haldane and Haig began their work too late for many of their reforms to be implemented. During this time Haig realised two things that were to take the British establishment 3 years of bloody fighting to recognise: firstly, a continental war would mean total war, involving conscription and all the resources of the nation and secondly, that a continental war would require the utter defeat and destruction of the enemy army. Had these ideas (especially universal conscription) been implemented in 1914 (or even 1915) then there is ever possibility that the blood shed on the allied side would have been nowhere near as severe.

3) Haig (and other generals) were cowards who hid miles behind the line: During the first year of the war, losses in the higher ranks (i.e. major general and above) were astonishingly high for both the French, Germans and British. This is how Haig (and many others) were able to rise through the ranks so quickly - in 1914, Haig was not even a full general but by December 1915, he was Commander in Chief of the British army. Niveulle, the French Commander in Chief who replaced Joffre in 1917, had only been a Colonel of an artillery regiment in 1914. Generals were frequent casualities of the war. Haig himself had several close escapes: on one occasion he had to escape in a staff car with the lights turned off, so close were the Germans. On another, his headquarters was hit by a shell and one of the chandliers feel down, narrowly missing Haig's head. It is also unfair to blame Haig for being away from the front line once he was CinC: on his soldiers lay the organisation of the biggest military force Britain had ever deployed. If he had been killed by German machine gunners, the effects on the British army would have been disasterous. Equally, so busy was Haig, he was lucky if he was ever even able to get away from headquarters.

3) Haig commanded the British army from 1914 to 1918: Haig was only given command in December 1915 from Sir John French and thus inherited the situation that French had created. French was certainly unsuited for the position of C in C: he had in fact been driven to mental break down by the responsibilty.

4) The Battle of the Somme:
Firstly, it is necessary to point out that the legendary reputation of the Somme is a modern reputation: in the 1920s and 1930s, the Somme was viewed in a very much different light. It was viewed as a necessary victory. This view of the Somme is much more accurate than our modern day one of futile slaughter.

Secondly, the Battle of the Somme was not to Haig's liking. He complained to London and to the French about it, as he knew from its geography that it was not a good place to attack. Why then did he attack there? Quite simply, ever since the British army had arrived in France, it had been told to comply with the French army's wishes when-ever possible. Sir John French enforced this idea as did London and Paris. This is unsurprising considering that Britain was very much a junior partner to France in 1914. The situation remained throughout the war, even when the war became primarily a British run affair. This was due to London politics, not Haig. But back to the Somme: at the time, the French were being attacked in Verdun and it was believed by all that if the French army were defeated there, the Germans would break through and win the war. Thus, the French 'asked' the British army to draw attention away from Verdun by launching a counter-attack and they wanted that counter-attack on the Somme. As mentioned. Haig complained but alas to no avail.

Thirdly, the Battle of the Somme was not a defeat for the British army - in fact, it was a victory. This is unquestionable. The British army managed to take the German line and draw pressure off the French at Verdun. The Germans were forced to retreat along that front after bitter, bitter fighting. The huge losses of the first day of the Somme (60,000 British casualities) were never repeated: the British average losses after this was 2,000 casualities a day. The loss of life was huge but in military terms, the victory was worth it. This victory was ultimately to allow the allied armies to win the war and it saved the French in Verdun. The German losses were huge: 560,000 is the (accurate but rarely stated)estimate. The combined British and French losses were 530,000. Britain and France lost heavily, true, but they could depend on Russia and Italy at this stage. Germany, however, was the major partner in its alliance and those huge losses hurt them massively.

Fourthly, the conduct of the first day of the battle was perfectly sound in terms of military planning and Haig's experience of the western front. During his time in France, Haig had organised the only two British offensives of the war and on both occasions the same thing occured: the German frontlines were taken by charging troops but then the British failed on both occasions to back up their troops in time for the German counter-attack. Thus, the advances were lost. Haig applied the lessons from this to the Somme which is why he sent wave after wave after wave of British soldiers into the machine guns. But why did commanders not stop the waves once they realised that the first waves were failing? Simple: the commanders did not realise the first waves were failing. Communication technology was not what it was in World War Two: there were no hand held radios for the charging troops to carry forward. Smoke quickly obscured the battle field from vision for miles around and shelling prevented runners from reporting the situation. Thus, the commanders did not know what was happening and thus could not be reasonably expected to have known when things went wrong. Also the often close formation of the British troops: this was not Haig's order but a result of the training that the volunteer armies received. They were not the experienced BEF men of 1914, who knew how to independently act under fire. These volunteer armies, though brave, were trained to respond to complex and detailed orders: these sort of orders were impossible to use on a battlefield like the Somme. Thus, they crowded together and so were slaughtered en-mass. Haig cannot be blamed for the quality of the armies he was sent.

5) Haig hated new ideas like the tank: This is the most absurd myth of the lot. Haig actively embraced the tank: indeed a more sensible criticism of him would be that he was too eager to use new technology. Haig heard of the tank shortly after coming into the command of the army (December 1915) and already by March, he began to factor it into his battle plans. He spoke with its designers and manufacturers and expressed his desire to use tanks in the July offensive on the Somme: however, he was told he would only have 50 operation tanks (and trained crews) by August, instead of the 100 he wanted for the 1st July. After the Somme (and the debue of the tank in September 1916 on that battlefield) he asked for 1000 more tanks: however he did not receive anywhere near that number until the close of the year 1918. In 1917, Haig suggested an amphibous assault on the Belgian coast using tanks in a plan very similar to those made for D-Day, 1944 but the technology of the tank was not yet ready for such an achievement. Too often when the public think of tanks, they think of the Shermans of 1944 or the Blitzkrieg Panzers of 1940. These were not the 1916 tanks, which travelled at about 3mph and could only be used for a limited amount of time before the fumes from their exhaust suffocated the crew. Haig also made intensive use of the Royal Flying Core in survelliance matters, something Sir John French actively discouraged.

6) Haig did not care about his troops and their suffering: Haig's diaries show a constant care for the sufferings of his men and the hardships they had to endure. It was in fact one of his primary objectives to take care of them and to avoid losses. What more could Haig have done, considering the way in which World War One panned out? The line of trenches streched from the Belgian coast to Switzerland. There was no way of outflanking the German lines, they could not be bombed out of their lines. There had been no success in opening up alternative theatres of war: Gallipoli had ended horribly. In short, the British, French and German commanders had no choice other than to throw men at the defended lines. Losses were always going to be huge: it was simply unavoidable.

7) The allies won World War One: Yes, this actually has to be repeated. The British and the French (with their less significant allies, the Americans and the Italians) defeated the Germans. The war was a victory, no matter how costly. The British public of today still seems to believe that World War One was a victory only in name: to the contary, it was a total victory that accomplished all that the war had been declared for. German imperialism was dead and buried: its threat to Britain and France's home security was gone. The British and French empires remained.

8) The soldiers did not know what they were fighting for: From day one to the end, almost all of the British and French soldiers knew what they had been fighting for: they believed they had fought to save their homes from German militarism (keep in mind that during the war, Germany was under military dictatorship) and domination. This was believed by the ranks, the offices, the high command and the home front. Sources prove this. There was no concept of futility in their minds - to them, it was worth it. They did not believe they were simply fighting for the advancement of empire: they believed they were fighting for their homes and families. This is why soldiers on all sides fought with such ferorcity and unreserved bravery.

I am going to finish now and go onto the histography of Haig at a later point, in order to illustrate how the negative myths of Haig and WW1 became so socially accepted. The above myths are by no means a conclusive summary of the last 20 years of revisionist research but they do dispel the most prevalent myths regarding Haig. Also some of the above points do not address Haig's leadership directly: this is because much of Haig's reputation does not stem from his actions but from public perception of the war.

Bump

He was a nub. I'd refute the points one by one, but it's close to midnight.

The most glaring ones are 3 and 4.

Firstly, casualties among the British senior officer corps were indeed high in the first year of the war - because they believed in leading from the front, and it was still a war of movement. They (the promoted survivors) did indeed quickly take to hiding miles behind enemy lines, once the war became static, and the lessons learnt.

Secondly, the Somme was not a one-day battle, it was an offensive that lasted for several months. The British lost 20,000 on the first day, along with the French the casulaties approached a quarter million by the time they gave up. The "necessary victory" talk was propaganda. Most news at the time was produced by the military, and was fabricated. The Somme offensive was however too crushing a loss to disguise in the usual manner, so it was made into a tragic victory, accompanied for example by the first newsreel footage of bodies in the war. The subsequent reassessment of the offensive is a failure is a more accurate conclusion.

A number of things I would contend here:

Haig did very little calvary fighting - for the vast amount of his early career (pre-1900) he was a staff officer who worked on training methods and organisational techniques, skills which were to be of great use in the First World War.
He was a desk soldier. Just say it.


This is unsurprising considering that Britain was very much a junior partner to France in 1914. The situation remained throughout the war, even when the war became primarily a British run affair.
That was only by the mutinies of 1917 though. Before that, the BEF was getting stronger, but the French were still doing most the fighting.

Thirdly, the Battle of the Somme was not a defeat for the British army - in fact, it was a victory. This is unquestionable. The British army managed to take the German line and draw pressure off the French at Verdun. The Germans were forced to retreat along that front after bitter, bitter fighting.
Retreat? The purpose of an attack would have been to actually break through the lines. That was never achieved, if anything, it was pushed back by a tiny amount of ground (8 km at the furthest point).
And as far as I know, all the Somme changed in Verdun is that the Germans transferred some of their artillery. At that time, the German army was quite able to keep up both theatres, while at the same time slug it out in the East. But Verdun was already a disaster before the British attacked at the Somme.

560,000 is the (accurate but rarely stated)estimate. The combined British and French losses were 530,000. Britain and France lost heavily, true, but they could depend on Russia and Italy at this stage. Germany, however, was the major partner in its alliance and those huge losses hurt them massively.
Accurate is not quite true. No one really knows, and wiki says best guess is in between 465,000 and 600,000. At any rate, it was one against two, and thus it's not quite fair to stress "combined". It was the Allies against the Germans, and ultimately, both lost a pretty similar number of men.

7) The allies won World War One: Yes, this actually has to be repeated. The British and the French (with their less significant allies, the Americans and the Italians) defeated the Germans. The war was a victory, no matter how costly. The British public of today still seems to believe that World War One was a victory only in name: to the contary, it was a total victory that accomplished all that the war had been declared for. German imperialism was dead and buried: its threat to Britain and France's home security was gone. The British and French empires remained.
Well, apart from the fact that it is a joke to think Britain was at any time going to be threatened by Germany, I'll give you that. Although I wouldn't look for the reasons with the British and French troops so much as with the blockade and mistakes the Germans made early on. They could've won the Marne and taken Paris (thus ending the war) if they had just stuck to the damn plan.

...they believed they had fought to save their homes from German militarism (keep in mind that during the war, Germany was under military dictatorship) and domination...
Not to forget things like this (http://www-db.stanford.edu/~mmorten/propaganda/wwi/us--45/destroy-brute.jpg).

By the way, if you want to see a real commander of WWI, check out Oskar von Hutier.

Haig's failure to take the lessons of the boer war and put them into practice was simtomatic of a general French and British officer Corps failing. A lot of what you said is partially or wholly true, however, he insisted on completing a task with the tools he inherited rather than remodeling the whole process. Realistcally, the German's liked the trenches as a way of absorbing the threat of superiour forces and both britain and France fell into the trap of letting the enemy get theirt own terms. As for competancy, one needs only look at the Boer war as proof of general incopetance on the British side, of which Haig was part and the failure of superior numbers over smaller enemy forces choosing the methods and locations of actions.

He was a nub. I'd refute the points one by one, but it's close to midnight.

The most glaring ones are 3 and 4.

Firstly, casualties among the British senior officer corps were indeed high in the first year of the war - because they believed in leading from the front, and it was still a war of movement. They (the promoted survivors) did indeed quickly take to hiding miles behind enemy lines, once the war became static, and the lessons learnt.

And what should they have done? Gone into the front lines to be shelled, thus depriving the British army of its entire command system? That is pure idiocy and not sound military thinking at all.

Secondly, the Somme was not a one-day battle, it was an offensive that lasted for several months. The British lost 20,000 on the first day, along with the French the casulaties approached a quarter million by the time they gave up. The "necessary victory" talk was propaganda. Most news at the time was produced by the military, and was fabricated. The Somme offensive was however too crushing a loss to disguise in the usual manner, so it was made into a tragic victory, accompanied for example by the first newsreel footage of bodies in the war. The subsequent reassessment of the offensive is a failure is a more accurate conclusion.

Nowhere did I state it was a one day battle. I mentioned above - casualities on the first day were 60,000 but they were significantly reduced afterwards as the average casualities per day after that were 2000. This demonstrates how quickly the British command, officers and soldiers adapted to the admittedly disasterous blunders of the first day. And it was a victory - of this there can be little reasonable question. Certainly you can argue that the loss of men did not justify the goals but those goals were accomplished - the Germans had to retreat to the Hidenburg line, the Germans lost a huge quantity of men and pressure was removed from the Verdun district. It was a victory (in military terms) and a necessary one. I am afraid the propaganda argument has been well and truly crushed in the academic circle - it was proported by a man called John Winters in his book Haig's Command: A Re-Assessment, who claimed that the British establishment (led by Haig) created a huge conspiracy to diguise the true disaster of the war. This has been proved to be poppy-cock: firstly John Winters is not even an academic (he was a school teacher) and secondly, when real historians investigated his references, they discovered that Winters had meddled with them. The opinion of him in academic circles is that he is an "insane bastard" (to quote my lecturer).

He was a desk soldier. Just say it.

Quite true, he was. Which is exactly the sort of general that the British required in World War One. The army that the British had by 1916 was the largest one that had ever been fielded by that nation. It was operating in a foreign country. In order to keep it going, it needed huge amounts of food and equipment. To get that food and equipment to the line, there needed to be transport links - railways, convoys, roads. The British army/government had never conducted this sort of war before and this is why Haig was needed - as a 'desk' soldier, he was able to understand and perform the vast, vast task of making the British army ready to fight. For this alone, he deserves far more credit than he has ever received from the public.
Just because he was a desk soldier first and foremost, do not presume he did not know anything of the war. He had seen the front throughout 1914 and 1915 and knew precisely the sort of situation his army was facing. Haig's 'desk' soldier qualities also made him a good commander - he knew that intense, detailed planning was needed for the execution of a proper military campaign. Thus, in 1914, while still a corps commander, Haig's corps managed to perform one of the most sound withdrawal actions of the war. Equally, the two offensives that Haig participated in during 1915 would have been victories for Haig had his forces been backed by Sir John French. Haig knew of trench warfare and he knew about tactics.

That was only by the mutinies of 1917 though. Before that, the BEF was getting stronger, but the French were still doing most the fighting.

Which is my point. Had the British armies taken over individual command in 1917 (which they really should have done, considering the amount of men they had in the field by this time in comparison to the French) then it is likely that the disaster that was Passendale would have been avoided. Passendale was yet another support action, this time done in order to be a distraction as French forces attacked further down the line.

Retreat? The purpose of an attack would have been to actually break through the lines. That was never achieved, if anything, it was pushed back by a tiny amount of ground (8 km at the furthest point).
And as far as I know, all the Somme changed in Verdun is that the Germans transferred some of their artillery. At that time, the German army was quite able to keep up both theatres, while at the same time slug it out in the East. But Verdun was already a disaster before the British attacked at the Somme

The losses were so severe to the German line at the Somme that, in December 1916, they retreated to the Hidenburg line, which had been the objective of the battle. The Germans did so because another Somme would have been disasterous to their efforts. The Somme was a military victory and it gave the allies some advantages (slight though they were) in 1917, although the events of that year were rapidly wasted.
Yes, Verdun was a disaster by the time the British attacked the Somme, which is really the entire point. The French informed the British that they were near breaking point and that they needed relief. Thus, the British were 'asked' to attack along the Somme in order to draw German troops off. I think you are perhaps slightly deluded if you believe that the loss of 500,000 German troops at the Somme did nothing to impact their efforts at Verdun. It did a great deal.

Accurate is not quite true. No one really knows, and wiki says best guess is in between 465,000 and 600,000. At any rate, it was one against two, and thus it's not quite fair to stress "combined". It was the Allies against the Germans, and ultimately, both lost a pretty similar number of men.

The British Official History (a multi volume work, with somewhere around 15 volumes on the Western front which took about 20 yars to write) places the figure at roughly 560,000. This figure was derived from German estimates in their Official History and their statistics have been proved, via later analysis by historians, to be fairly accurate.
Secondly, you cannot compare France and Britain's positions to that of Germany's. Britain and France not only had each to rely on but they also had the Russians and the Italians. This somewhat lessens the impact of their losses on the overall war effort. The Germans however had only the Austrians, who were quite incapable of independent action. The Germans were the main driving force of the Central Powers alliance and thus the loss of 500,000 men impacted upon their war effort far more harshly thatn equivalent losses on the French and British.

Haig's failure to take the lessons of the boer war and put them into practice was simtomatic of a general French and British officer Corps failing. A lot of what you said is partially or wholly true, however, he insisted on completing a task with the tools he inherited rather than remodeling the whole process. Realistcally, the German's liked the trenches as a way of absorbing the threat of superiour forces and both britain and France fell into the trap of letting the enemy get theirt own terms. As for competancy, one needs only look at the Boer war as proof of general incopetance on the British side, of which Haig was part and the failure of superior numbers over smaller enemy forces choosing the methods and locations of actions.

Are you aware that the part of the army in which Haig served were the only force to make any substantial headway in the Boer War conflict? His part in the Boer War was quite a sucess story, which is why the methods he put in place were eventually spread across the entire British army.
Your comment on 'remodelling' shows ignorance of the situtation the British army found itself in in 1914. Britain (unlike France, German, Austria and Russia) had never fought large scale continental wars - even the Pennisular campaign under Wellington used relatively small numbers of troops when compared to their French adversaries. The British entered 1914 with a force of about 6 divisions while the Germans had about 130 and the French about 100: that is how unprepared they were. This is not Haig's fault: from 1900 onwards, he had been advocating universal conscription in the event of continental war. Unfortunately, the Liberal (pacifist) government ignored his suggestions and continued to do so until 1917. When Haig was given command in France, his job was one that has never been experienced before or since by a British commander: he had to find a way to supply a force of half a million men and then how to fight with them. This was an entirely new field to British military thinking: is it any wonder that he made mistakes? What is remarkable about the British part in the First World War is how they learnt so quickly and adapted to the changing role of their army.

Are you aware that the part of the army in which Haig served were the only force to make any substantial headway in the Boer War conflict? His part in the Boer War was quite a sucess story, which is why the methods he put in place were eventually spread across the entire British army.

Since when did Haig command the Natal Volunteer Corps?

Your comment on 'remodelling' shows ignorance of the situtation the British army found itself in in 1914. Britain (unlike France, German, Austria and Russia) had never fought large scale continental wars - even the Pennisular campaign under Wellington used relatively small numbers of troops when compared to their French adversaries. The British entered 1914 with a force of about 6 divisions while the Germans had about 130 and the French about 100: that is how unprepared they were.. Between them, France and Britain had more than twice the number of men under arms in all services than Germany, a more accurate assement is that the Germans had greater forces in Europe. France had, aside from the 100 divisons in Metropolitan France, three African and one Asian Army and Britain had the Indian Army to call on as well as vast untapped African, Australian and Canadian populations. True no "metropolitan" British Army had existed of this size, and true the Empire was largely managed at an opperational level, but the logistics were so taxing because of the lack of preparedness on the staff level.

from 1900 onwards, he had been advocating universal conscription in the event of continental war. More men to throw pointlessly over the trenches?

Unfortunately, the Liberal (pacifist) government ignored his suggestions and continued to do so until 1917. When Haig was given command in France, his job was one that has never been experienced before or since by a British commander: he had to find a way to supply a force of half a million men and then how to fight with them.. What about the Indian army?

What is remarkable about the British part in the First World War is how they learnt so quickly and adapted to the changing role of their army.
No, what is remarkable is that both the British and French (more importantly and the uniforms demonstrate this well) the Army failed to learn from their colonial experiences that they should have fought more mobile and smaller scale engagements rather than fall into the German trap of the trench.

Since when did Haig command the Natal Volunteer Corps?

Haig did not - he was however an advisor to Sir John French in the war and Sir John French's part of the army were one of the first to begin using the tactics of spread out, independent troops who could move flexibly in the face of guerilla attack. Haig was one of the primary advocates of this strategic method, which reduced casualities and increased effectiveness.

Between them, France and Britain had more than twice the number of men under arms in all services than Germany, a more accurate assement is that the Germans had greater forces in Europe. France had, aside from the 100 divisons in Metropolitan France, three African and one Asian Army and Britain had the Indian Army to call on as well as vast untapped African, Australian and Canadian populations. True no "metropolitan" British Army had existed of this size, and true the Empire was largely managed at an opperational level, but the logistics were so taxing because of the lack of preparedness on the staff level.

No, the lack of preparedness was nationwide and extended both into the core of the government and the military. No-one in Britain (apart from Haig and a few others) had any idea of what World War One was going to be like and so employed the tactic Britain usually employed - they deployed a small expeditonary force to their allies, while using superior naval power and financial acumen to grind down the enemy home front. That is why the army deployed to Europe in 1914 was so small compared to the Germans and the French and because of that smallness it was almost entirely destroyed by 1914. The British government failed to understand that a large and well trained conscript army was necessary for fighting the continental war - that was not Haig's fault, as he had been demanding for such a conscript army for a long time.

More men to throw pointlessly over the trenches?

1. Conscription, had it been effected in 1900, would have meant a large British force numbering in the millions being deployed in 1914. When combined with the French, it is more than likely that the Germans would have been forced back much more quickly and the war might have been concluded as early as 1916.

2. Frontal assault was the only tactic available to generals. The trench line streched from the Belgian coast to Switzerland. Tanks were, for the vast part of the war, unavailable and unreliable. Bombers were also at a very rudimentary stage of development. The blockade of Germany's trade was having only a gradual effect. Attempts to open up alternative theatres had failed disasterously. There could be no other tactic available to the generals.

3. Frontal assault was often successful, more successful than is generally believed. In the two British offensives of 1914 and 1915, the British managed to capture the German lines but were driven back by ferocious counter attacks. At the Somme, German lines were captured by frontal assault. The Germans themselves captured French lines at Verdun and in 1918 completely broke through the allied lines by the method of frontal assault. Frontal assaults were costly but they actually achieved their aims more often than not. That is why they were repeatedly used.

No, what is remarkable is that both the British and French (more importantly and the uniforms demonstrate this well) the Army failed to learn from their colonial experiences that they should have fought more mobile and smaller scale engagements rather than fall into the German trap of the trench.

The policy of entrenchment happened naturally - it was not some great German plot that the incompetent allies fell into. The race to the sea, for example, was not (as it usually held) a series of mobile encounters but a series of reactionary encounters that forced the building of trenches. The Germans would defend one position and the allies would attempt to flank. The Germans would then move and defend that position (via trenches) and the allies would attempt to flank that position. Thus the process went one until the two sides had created two lines of trenches from the sea to the mountains.
Also, it should be noted, that Haig can only bear partial responsibilty for the emergence of trenchwarfare, as it came about during 1914/1915, when Sir John Frenc (not Haig) was in command.

When you talk about conscription, do you mean that Britian should have kept a large 1,000,000 standing army, or that there should have been a two-year national service programme, creating a large trained reserve?

In any case, Britian should have stayed out of the continent - except for a token stiffening force - and concentrated on snapping up other people's colonies, and making money from the war. Clearly a political failure.

Well, apart from the fact that it is a joke to think Britain was at any time going to be threatened by Germany


Actually, the Kaiser expected, and wanted a war with Britain at some point. That was why they built the large German Navy (second or third in the world. Cant remember which). He just didnt want it then, there or the type of war it was.

Of course the whole "If we had lost WW1 we would all be speaking German now" stuff is a load of rubbish. Germany never intended to invade Britain, and wasnt going to incorporate France into Germany. Instead they would have extracted harsh repreations and terms from Britain and France, taken colonies etc, much like the allies did to Germany after the war when they won.

1) Haig was nothing more than a calvary man:
"Calvary" was a hill in what is now Israel, near the city of Jerusalem.

"C_a_v_a_l_r_y" is a type of mounted military unit.