Silliopolous
22-02-2006, 20:19
In the issue of the ports sale to a UAE GOVERNMENT OWNED company, there is one bit of testimony that some people might find interesting.
It was given by George Tenent to the 9-11 Commission (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.htm) when discussing how it was that prior attempts to get Bin Laden had failed.
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98 and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated that decision, and who made that decision?
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it, Mr. Fielding.
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled days and days had passed.
So I would appreciate --
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin was inside or outside the camp --
MR. FIELDING: Of course.
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor here.
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into everybody's calculation in all this.
You see, the CIA elected NOT to bomb the camps one time when they knew Osama was going to be there because the UAE Royal family was at the camp visiting Osama that day.
You know - this is the sort of "Tie To Terrorism" that was stated as equating to "complicity with terrorism" when it came to Saddam. And Saddam was never, I don't believe, ever accused of meeting Osama personally.
So...... you want your ports run by people that hang out with Osama on weekends?
It was given by George Tenent to the 9-11 Commission (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.htm) when discussing how it was that prior attempts to get Bin Laden had failed.
MR. FIELDING: Well, yesterday we talked about the three events in '98 and '99 where there were occasions that it looked like there might be an opportunity, which then in each instance was deemed not to be operational. And the one that I find the most intriguing and the one that's been labeled as perhaps the lost opportunity more than any was the February '99 hunting camp, I guess it's been described, and the desert camp. And yesterday in the staff statement that was read, we were told about that and we were told that the intelligence seemed pretty strong, and that the preparations were made and then the strike was called off, and -- although the lead CIA agent in the field felt that it was very reliable intelligence. I guess, was there anything unique about the intelligence or the circumstances that necessitated that decision, and who made that decision?
MR. TENET: I don't have a recollection of the uniqueness of the intelligence in question at the time. I'm going to go back and provide that for you. In fact, I'd like to go back and try and package up all the data at my disposal when we were thinking about these issues.
I believe this was a collective decision. I also believe this target went away because the camp was ultimately dismantled. So in reading through your staff inquiry, your staff notes on this, I can't recall who made the call, but I know we were all in the same place about it, Mr. Fielding.
MR. FIELDING: Yeah. Well, I would appreciate that on behalf of the Commission if you could do that because it seemed that this -- when the intelligence was so good, and that by the time the camp was dismantled days and days had passed.
So I would appreciate --
MR. TENET: There's also a question, I believe, as to whether bin Ladin was inside or outside the camp --
MR. FIELDING: Of course.
MR. TENET: -- it was a complicating issue in this whole thing -- and whether he was there or not. So there's a second complicating factor here.
The third complicating factor here is, you might have wiped out half the royal family in the UAE in the process, which I'm sure entered into everybody's calculation in all this.
You see, the CIA elected NOT to bomb the camps one time when they knew Osama was going to be there because the UAE Royal family was at the camp visiting Osama that day.
You know - this is the sort of "Tie To Terrorism" that was stated as equating to "complicity with terrorism" when it came to Saddam. And Saddam was never, I don't believe, ever accused of meeting Osama personally.
So...... you want your ports run by people that hang out with Osama on weekends?