Deep Kimchi
08-12-2005, 18:50
Recently, we heard what a bad job the US is doing about preventing another terrorist attack, but that's not what I'm concerned about. There's a bit of information referred to as "Able Danger" where the Pentagon came up with three of the hijackers, including Atta by name, and they were forbidden at the time from passing that information on to the FBI.
Currently, the 9-11 Commission says that since they can't get the Pentagon to produce "that chart", then it doesn't matter what Able Danger came up with - because the specified chart is missing. Never mind that people who belonged to the Able Danger group say that they identified Atta and others before 9-11 - we'll focus on the chart.
And I wonder why they would cover that up.
We have Louis Freeh's statements, from a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed
[T]his is also a good time for the country to make some assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named "Able Danger" have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently, military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even though appointments had been made to do so. Why?
There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?
The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it "was not historically significant." This astounding conclusion — in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings — raises serious challenges to the commission's credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself.
Currently, the 9-11 Commission says that since they can't get the Pentagon to produce "that chart", then it doesn't matter what Able Danger came up with - because the specified chart is missing. Never mind that people who belonged to the Able Danger group say that they identified Atta and others before 9-11 - we'll focus on the chart.
And I wonder why they would cover that up.
We have Louis Freeh's statements, from a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed
[T]his is also a good time for the country to make some assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named "Able Danger" have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently, military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even though appointments had been made to do so. Why?
There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?
The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it "was not historically significant." This astounding conclusion — in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings — raises serious challenges to the commission's credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself.