NationStates Jolt Archive

I do not agree with many people that this war was an inherent failure. I believe it could have worked and, with the right strategy, it can still work successfully. But the current course of inconsistency, appeasement, and schizophrenia by the US is unacceptable, and at the very best, Iraq will be a semi stable oligarchy that will become an oilholic state. These mistakes are not ranked in order, for I beliieve each is significant.
1. Perhaps it is most important, as it is the root of many problems. The Pentagon is divided between old Cold Warriors and new age military strategists (which the neocons are part of). This split began after the fall of the USSR and the peace dividend, when the military was threatened with extinction. So in the resulting ideaological wars, they reached a compromise. They'd buy hardware as if the Cold War were still being fought, but fight wars as if it were over. Isn't that inconsistent?
Such petty squabbles erupted fully after 9/11, when America was faced with real war. President Bush, being the catalyst leader that he is, tries to compromise. That doesn't work, however, and it costs American lives.
2. Whether you are a Cold Warrior or a new military strategist, you gotta admit that the military in Iraq now is not the right one for the job. I think that there are enough troops, but they are heavily equipped for tank battles, not for street skirmishes. Humvees, for example, are largely unarmed. Which leads me to...
3. No post war planning at any level of the government, not even Congress. The Bush Admin. and Gen. Franks both swept it under the rug, assuming that the State Dept. would settle all things afterwards. Very big mistake.
4. The tenuous nature of the occupation. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) answered to State, the military to CENTCOM. The early two figures, Amb. Paul Bremer and Gen. Ricardo Sanchez had a bad relationship. They were gone in a year, replaced by a new team. They have also been replaced. There really isn't anyone on the ground with a good idea of what the hell is going on.
5. Disbanding the Iraqi Army in June of 2003. Colossal mistake. In addition to little security infrastructure, 300,000+ angry, unemployed men with military training not only allowed the insurgency to waltz right through, but joined it as well.
6. The occupation needed to be longer in order to establish liberal freedoms in Iraq, and not see them carried away by militia parties. They should've written a constitution with a democratically elected government, and make ratification easy, so as not to make it contrived. It'd be better than the crap we see today.
7. Engage the militias. They could've been valuable assets in the counterinsurgency efforts, and could've been folded into the regular army later. Give them promises that are still guranteed to militias even in the US, like a right to bear arms.
8. Rebuild Iraq's economy, or at least its infrastructure, very quickly to avoid catastrophe, which wasn't done. Foreign contracts alone couldn't help. The US should ran the central bank, and grant a contract to another bank to run it and help administer funds in Iraq. Out of $18 bn. in US aid that has been sent to Iraq, just $2 bn. has been spent.
9. Poor intelligence hampered the early counterinsurgency effort. We could've snuffed it out before it started. Also, a poor job was done early on in capturing or killing Hussein's paramilitary forces (though, in the US's defense, most of the old Iraqi regime has been caught).
10. Stop the niceties. The US delibrately tries not to endanger mosques and other buildings of "cultural significance", all at the expense of American and Iraqi lives. The police are also given diversity training and courses in courtesy towards abused women, something that is irrelevant to shooting down insurgents.

This does not mean that the effort in Iraq is dead. We may see a change of strategy if the Bush Admin. realizes that we can't keep being beaten by a shadow army and have public opinion turn against the war at the same time. However, if we stay on the current course, we need to lower our standards of success.

11. Claiming there are weapons of mass destruction.

Weapons Suspected: 20 (at least)

Weapons Found: 0

12. Having Bush in charge... the entire world is laughing at us

Both your ideas are just based on simple hatred. What's more of an issue in the Bush Admin. is the long running war between Cold Warriors and post Cold Warriors and their neocon allies. I forgot to mention that the current rivalry between the Pentagon and the CIA may also be an issue. The CIA is too pragmatic for both camps in the Pentagon and Congress, and is certainly less idealistic than State or the White House. Anyone who tells you that fmr. CIA director George Tenet had a hand in this is a liar. The director was merely a pawn in a grand chess game, and did what he could to stay alive.

13. The constant back-biting, useless division, and self-destruction . . . the terrorists are laughing at us - along with the rest of the world.

10. Stop the niceties. The US delibrately tries not to endanger mosques and other buildings of "cultural significance", all at the expense of American and Iraqi lives. The police are also given diversity training and courses in courtesy towards abused women, something that is irrelevant to shooting down insurgents.

I'd disagree with this. There is far more to the task of pacifying Iraq than "shooting down insurgents". It is also necessary, to use the hackneyed phrase, "to win the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people, especially if you hope to hand over control of security in the immediate future. You'll hardly be able to persuade the Iraqi people not to listen to the Islamic rhetoric of the bombers if you blow up mosques, and their continued support will put more Iraqi and American and British and everyone else in Iraq's lives at risk.

14. The utter and complete failure, of Americans (in charge and not in charge) to try to put themselves into the Iraqi's shoes.

I'd disagree with this. There is far more to the task of pacifying Iraq than "shooting down insurgents". It is also necessary, to use the hackneyed phrase, "to win the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people, especially if you hope to hand over control of security in the immediate future. You'll hardly be able to persuade the Iraqi people not to listen to the Islamic rhetoric of the bombers if you blow up mosques, and their continued support will put more Iraqi and American and British and everyone else in Iraq's lives at risk.
The battle for hearts and minds is lost because the Iraqis do not have the same values as Americans. They value force. Yes, the counterinsurgency is more than a military strategy, but the military should have a natural right to defend itself. Considering that the Americans could trust themselves to do it, America needs to be a stern master that whips Iraq into shape after centuries of misrule and apathy. Maybe I'm describing more of cultural engineering, but it did work in Japan. And far more than just places of worship were destroyed.

The battle for hearts and minds is lost because the Iraqis do not have the same values as Americans. They value force. Yes, the counterinsurgency is more than a military strategy, but the military should have a natural right to defend itself. Considering that the Americans could trust themselves to do it, America needs to be a stern master that whips Iraq into shape after centuries of misrule and apathy. Maybe I'm describing more of cultural engineering, but it did work in Japan. And far more than just places of worship were destroyed.
I feel that if you consider the battle for hearts and minds lost then you must consider the war lost. The war for Iraq can no longer be won militarily. The only way for a peaceful Iraq is for the Iraqis to consider the US et al. as a better/ safer/ more secure etc. option to the way of the insurgents and withdraw support, deny them shelter and succour etc. and refuse to engage with their politics. The only way that can be achieved is by fostering a cordial relationship.

Maybe I'm describing more of cultural engineering, but it did work in Japan. And far more than just places of worship were destroyed.
Japan is a compleatly different setting, culturally and religiously, than Iraq is, and the idea that Japan compleatly did a 180 thanks to America is ignoring a great deal of what goes on in the Japanese politcal world.

It should also be noted that many of the main shrines in Japan were not damanged by allied attacks during WWII specifically. We avoided them for the same reason the US forces are avoiding the mosques and other places of cultural significance.

I feel that if you consider the battle for hearts and minds lost then you must consider the war lost. The war for Iraq can no longer be won militarily. The only way for a peaceful Iraq is for the Iraqis to consider the US et al. as a better/ safer/ more secure etc. option to the way of the insurgents and withdraw support, deny them shelter and succour etc. and refuse to engage with their politics. The only way that can be achieved is by fostering a cordial relationship.
The battle for hearts and minds can still be won. But it must be done in a way that addresses Arab values, being that of strength. I'm not making an arguement to delibratly target mosques or randomly kill civilians, but I do feel that Arabs will respect the US more if the US shows more strenght. Of course, I advocate this for the reason that I trust the US with strenght overseas. The entire neoconservative philosophy, in fact, is to use strenght to promote liberal democracy. And of course, the survival of the fittest no longer has a place in liberal democracy.

It should also be noted that many of the main shrines in Japan were not damanged by allied attacks during WWII specifically. We avoided them for the same reason the US forces are avoiding the mosques and other places of cultural significance.
Like during the bombing or Hiroshima, or the firebombing of Tokyo? In many aspects, the Japanese were a worse culture, and when a traditionally militaristic culture teams up with an ideaology that causes extreme hatred and rots brains, that culture certainly needed to be shifted. Everything done in Japan was justified because it beat the culture out of the Japanese. So too, must it be in Iraq.

Biggest mistake---not understanding how a weak nation fights a superpower, and not understanding the culture of the area. The only one with experience and understanding was Powell and they totally ignored him. The answer to the problem was obvious to anyone with an understanding of history of war. Even little old me said in front of many witnesses before the war started, that Saddam had tried to fight toe to toe in the gulf war. He wasn't stupid enough to try again. His soldiers would fall back and fight a guerilla war. The other big thing the administration didn't understand about the history of war is the winner doesn't say when a war is over, the loser says when a war is over. This relates to the culture of the area. For 2000 years the Jews said "next year in Jerusalem". For over 45 years the Palistinians have continued war. Until one side admits a loss the war goes on. In this culture, no one admits a loss.

So the solution now, 4 options:
1. Pull out, most likely a strongman will take over and rule with an iron fist.
2. Bleed a little longer and hope your man becomes the strong man.
3. Stay until someone else admits they lost.
4. Play for a win.
A. Put in enough troops to take one city or village at a time, and HOLD it. Never retreat. Of course this won't end the war. We will just be the strongman.
B. Cut the support for the guerillas. That means killing the women, old and children that support them. This is how Saddam solved the guerilla war problem.

12. Having Bush in charge... the entire world is laughing at us

Wake up, the world was laughing at us for years before Bush was elected. It's not like we deserved it or anything, but it's true.

Wake up, the world was laughing at us for years before Bush was elected. It's not like we deserved it or anything, but it's true.

True, they were laughing at us.

But now they have a reason.

You speak as though they needed one.

The US needs to show more strength, as does the Iraqi Army and Police. But, that strength needs to come with strict boundaries. The US should not target mosques, unless they are taking fire from them, in which case it is the terrorists who have defiled the mosque.

The US also needs to communicate better with all concerned.

But now they have a reason.
Oh, come on. You were (collectively) laughing yourselves silly over Nixon, not to mention Ford, and a fair chunk of you thought Reagan was hysterical, too. Well, so did we.

See? We might've laughed at you in the past, but for different reasons. And anyway, you were laughing too. Somewhere along the line, though, you seem to have forgotten how to do that.

0a. Thinking about it

0b. talking about it

0c. considering it a possibility

Like during the bombing or Hiroshima, or the firebombing of Tokyo?
Or like the fact that the ancient capitols of Kyoto and Nara were left compleatly untouched, even though many of the most important shrines in Japanese history are there. The Grand Shine of Ise which enshrines Amateratsu Omikamai and the Imperial Regelia, the loss of THAT would have been a major blow to the Japanese... yet we didn't bomb them. Nor did we bomb the tombs of Emperor Jimmu, the first emperor of Japan, or the Meiji Emperor, again, it would have been a major, major blow but we left them untouched.

You also forget that SCAP decided to blaime the war on the military and dismantled THAT, but left the poltical stucture, and most of the politicans, intact in order to help them. We also left the Showa Emperor in power, a symbol, but still regining, insetad of either removing the emperor system, or demanding his abdication and inditing him as a war crminial.

In many aspects, the Japanese were a worse culture, and when a traditionally militaristic culture teams up with an ideaology that causes extreme hatred and rots brains, that culture certainly needed to be shifted. Everything done in Japan was justified because it beat the culture out of the Japanese. So too, must it be in Iraq.
Right... one, that statement shows compleate lack of understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture at the time, and it also shows compleate lack of understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture now. Two, looking at the occupation of Japan as a way to project how Iraq should have gone, or will go, is a very, very false comparision.

Right... one, that statement shows compleate lack of understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture at the time, and it also shows compleate lack of understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture now. Two, looking at the occupation of Japan as a way to project how Iraq should have gone, or will go, is a very, very false comparision.

He probably thinks there's an Islamic equivalent of an Emperor out there who commands enough respect and authority to make a sweeping statement/order and have the Islamic Terror groups follow it. :p

I do not agree with many people that this war was an inherent failure. I believe it could have worked and, with the right strategy, it can still work successfully. But the current course of inconsistency, appeasement, and schizophrenia by the US is unacceptable, and at the very best, Iraq will be a semi stable oligarchy that will become an oilholic state. These mistakes are not ranked in order, for I beliieve each is significant.

1. Perhaps it is most important, as it is the root of many problems. The Pentagon is divided between old Cold Warriors and new age military strategists (which the neocons are part of). This split began after the fall of the USSR and the peace dividend, when the military was threatened with extinction. So in the resulting ideaological wars, they reached a compromise. They'd buy hardware as if the Cold War were still being fought, but fight wars as if it were over. Isn't that inconsistent?
Such petty squabbles erupted fully after 9/11, when America was faced with real war. President Bush, being the catalyst leader that he is, tries to compromise. That doesn't work, however, and it costs American lives.

2. Whether you are a Cold Warrior or a new military strategist, you gotta admit that the military in Iraq now is not the right one for the job. I think that there are enough troops, but they are heavily equipped for tank battles, not for street skirmishes. Humvees, for example, are largely unarmed. Which leads me to...

3. No post war planning at any level of the government, not even Congress. The Bush Admin. and Gen. Franks both swept it under the rug, assuming that the State Dept. would settle all things afterwards. Very big mistake.

4. The tenuous nature of the occupation. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) answered to State, the military to CENTCOM. The early two figures, Amb. Paul Bremer and Gen. Ricardo Sanchez had a bad relationship. They were gone in a year, replaced by a new team. They have also been replaced. There really isn't anyone on the ground with a good idea of what the hell is going on.

5. Disbanding the Iraqi Army in June of 2003. Colossal mistake. In addition to little security infrastructure, 300,000+ angry, unemployed men with military training not only allowed the insurgency to waltz right through, but joined it as well.

6. The occupation needed to be longer in order to establish liberal freedoms in Iraq, and not see them carried away by militia parties. They should've written a constitution with a democratically elected government, and make ratification easy, so as not to make it contrived. It'd be better than the crap we see today.

7. Engage the militias. They could've been valuable assets in the counterinsurgency efforts, and could've been folded into the regular army later. Give them promises that are still guranteed to militias even in the US, like a right to bear arms.

8. Rebuild Iraq's economy, or at least its infrastructure, very quickly to avoid catastrophe, which wasn't done. Foreign contracts alone couldn't help. The US should ran the central bank, and grant a contract to another bank to run it and help administer funds in Iraq. Out of $18 bn. in US aid that has been sent to Iraq, just $2 bn. has been spent.

9. Poor intelligence hampered the early counterinsurgency effort. We could've snuffed it out before it started. Also, a poor job was done early on in capturing or killing Hussein's paramilitary forces (though, in the US's defense, most of the old Iraqi regime has been caught).

10. Stop the niceties. The US delibrately tries not to endanger mosques and other buildings of "cultural significance", all at the expense of American and Iraqi lives. The police are also given diversity training and courses in courtesy towards abused women, something that is irrelevant to shooting down insurgents.

This does not mean that the effort in Iraq is dead. We may see a change of strategy if the Bush Admin. realizes that we can't keep being beaten by a shadow army and have public opinion turn against the war at the same time. However, if we stay on the current course, we need to lower our standards of success.
I mostly agree. However I think that there should be more soldiers there, and I disagree with #10 because I think it is important to get the majority of Iraqis on our side.

Or like the fact that the ancient capitols of Kyoto and Nara were left compleatly untouched, even though many of the most important shrines in Japanese history are there. The Grand Shine of Ise which enshrines Amateratsu Omikamai and the Imperial Regelia, the loss of THAT would have been a major blow to the Japanese... yet we didn't bomb them. Nor did we bomb the tombs of Emperor Jimmu, the first emperor of Japan, or the Meiji Emperor, again, it would have been a major, major blow but we left them untouched.[quote]
The military situation then was different. In Iraq, it was a looney leader the US was against. In thiss case, it was the entire society.
As for your shrine point, when the atomic bomb was finally developed, the War Dept. had a list of targets, with Kyoto at its top. It was dismissed only by orders of the War secretary, as he liked Japanese architecture. But that's a theme of war: generals too scared to do the job because they don't want to destroy their favorite buildings. Well, let me tell you, if someone held Manhattan, I don't care if the Empire State Building needed to come down for them to be gone.

[quote]Right... one, that statement shows compleate lack of understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture at the time, and it also shows compleate lack of understanding and knowledge of Japanese culture now. Two, looking at the occupation of Japan as a way to project how Iraq should have gone, or will go, is a very, very false comparision.
It doesn't matter what Japanese culture was like. Fascism is the same anywhere it went. Germany, Italy, and Japan needed total destruction to save them from a dreadful disease.

I mostly agree. However I think that there should be more soldiers there, and I disagree with #10 because I think it is important to get the majority of Iraqis on our side.
I think that they would be on the US's side because they are shown force, and can respect that.

You speak as though they needed one.

The US needs to show more strength, as does the Iraqi Army and Police. But, that strength needs to come with strict boundaries. The US should not target mosques, unless they are taking fire from them, in which case it is the terrorists who have defiled the mosque.

I'm not advocating that they wontonly do it. But they shouldn't put as much onus on the troops to preserve them if their lives are endangered. The buildings can be rebuilt, anyhow.