Eutrusca
24-03-2005, 22:40
Army Takes Lessons From A U.S. Battle (http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_lesson_032405,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl)
The Boston Globe
March 24, 2005
WASHINGTON - As it struggles to control the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. Army is looking for lessons from an unusual source: urban gangs.
After two years of steady violence, a new Army War College analysis concludes that, instead of fighting a ragtag army, American troops in Iraq are dealing with an enemy that more closely resembles sophisticated, violent street gangs, similar to powerful Central American groups spawned more than a decade ago in Los Angeles.
Challenging the conventional approach of the U.S. military and its allies of relying on firepower to defeat guerrillas, the study argues that the current anti-insurgent strategy can't succeed without tough police work and social programs addressing the root causes of street conflict -- poverty, injustice, repression, lack of opportunity.
"We traditionally think of insurgency as primarily a military activity, and we think of gangs as a simple law enforcement problem," according to the study by Max Manwaring, a professor of military strategy. "Yet insurgents and gangs are engaged in a highly complex political act: political war."
The Iraq insurgency shows signs of spiraling into a broader criminal network. Some senior officers have recently reported that criminals for hire are playing larger roles in the violence. But Manwaring's paper, which is getting attention on military websites and in internal Pentagon discussions, warns that the U.S. military still treats insurgents as largely a security problem, not a societal one -- a major reason why violence remains high in Iraq. Some specialists worry that without a more holistic approach, the instability will remain long after the troops come home.
The Boston Globe
March 24, 2005
WASHINGTON - As it struggles to control the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. Army is looking for lessons from an unusual source: urban gangs.
After two years of steady violence, a new Army War College analysis concludes that, instead of fighting a ragtag army, American troops in Iraq are dealing with an enemy that more closely resembles sophisticated, violent street gangs, similar to powerful Central American groups spawned more than a decade ago in Los Angeles.
Challenging the conventional approach of the U.S. military and its allies of relying on firepower to defeat guerrillas, the study argues that the current anti-insurgent strategy can't succeed without tough police work and social programs addressing the root causes of street conflict -- poverty, injustice, repression, lack of opportunity.
"We traditionally think of insurgency as primarily a military activity, and we think of gangs as a simple law enforcement problem," according to the study by Max Manwaring, a professor of military strategy. "Yet insurgents and gangs are engaged in a highly complex political act: political war."
The Iraq insurgency shows signs of spiraling into a broader criminal network. Some senior officers have recently reported that criminals for hire are playing larger roles in the violence. But Manwaring's paper, which is getting attention on military websites and in internal Pentagon discussions, warns that the U.S. military still treats insurgents as largely a security problem, not a societal one -- a major reason why violence remains high in Iraq. Some specialists worry that without a more holistic approach, the instability will remain long after the troops come home.