NationStates Jolt Archive

This is my attempt at starting a little intellectual debate about one of the great questions regarding the theory of determinism, are humans morally responsible?
I dotn really want to debate the validity of Determinism itself, so any angry libertarians can just bugger off.
If, as determinism suggests, our actions are controlled by pre-existant factors (social, emotional, cultural, physical, psychological etc) then can we blame someone for their actions?
If someone breaks into our house and steals from us, then should we punish them? They could not, according to determinism, have 'not' done it, so they essentially had no choice but to do it. Can we then hold them morally responsible? And should they be punished?
To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.



-Mishka, the Empress of Incomprehensibility.

It depends on the case. Punishment is not always a factor that determines their future behaviour in the desired way. Sometimes it makes things worse. The threat of punishment is sometimes more influencing than the punishment itself. But I don't think we can generalize to say that punishment is always the best way to determine a behaviour.

Determinism = no moral responsability = no punishment
However as we do punish criminals:
Determinism = No choice in our actions = what we do we have to do = we have to punish criminals.

All that determinism does is to remove the concept of moral responsability.

[QUOTE=Incoprehensibility]If, as determinism suggests, our actions are controlled by pre-existant factors (social, emotional, cultural, physical, psychological etc) then can we blame someone for their actions?
- Not blaming others for their actions denies their will. Whether or not determinism is the truth of reality, as long as there is will, there is no way to withhold blame from them for things they have done.

[QUOTE=Incoprehensibility]If someone breaks into our house and steals from us, then should we punish them? They could not, according to determinism, have 'not' done it, so they essentially had no choice but to do it. Can we then hold them morally responsible? And should they be punished?
- Again, if will (self-determinism) is recognized, it supercedes determinism. If we were somehow able to rob everyone of their will by denying will and exterminating the concept, then we are free to rest blame on circumstances. As long as will exists, there is no way to avoid blame.

- Determinism does not determine morality, willful action does.

Are there perfect behaviourists, who believe that the entirety of every action is determined by external influences, with no element of free choice at all?

- Not blaming others for their actions denies their will. Whether or not determinism is the truth of reality, as long as there is will, there is no way to withhold blame from them for things they have done.
Determinism negates any real will. The will may be an epiphenomenon that we think we are aware of, but it actually is purely illusiory under determinism.


- Again, if will (self-determinism) is recognized, it supercedes determinism. If we were somehow able to rob everyone of their will by denying will and exterminating the concept, then we are free to rest blame on circumstances. As long as will exists, there is no way to avoid blame.

- Determinism does not determine morality, willful action does.
This is discussing what the OP asked not to be discussed, determinism itself. Admittedly, a thread about morality unde determinism does not have much to discuss, as there is no real morality if we are not responsable for our actions, but that was the proposal. (Aside, I agree with you anyway)

Determinism negates any real will. The will may be an epiphenomenon that we think we are aware of, but it actually is purely illusiory under determinism.

If the will is an epiphenomenon, then there is no need for it to be illusory, just for the implied causal relation between it and our actions (where the will is primary) to be so.

Are there perfect behaviourists, who believe that the entirety of every action is determined by external influences, with no element of free choice at all?

Yes. There are those who hold that our actions are the result of physical processes, and as these are deterministic, so our actions have to be deterministic.
There is also a tradition of determinism that goes back to at least Aristotle with regard to the possibility of predicting the future, and the omniscience of God.

Determinism negates any real will. The will may be an epiphenomenon that we think we are aware of, but it actually is purely illusiory under determinism.
Alright, if will is eliminated, then so is morality; then it makes perfect sense to withhold responsibility and blame for actions.

If the will is an epiphenomenon, then there is no need for it to be illusory, just for the implied causal relation between it and our actions (where the will is primary) to be so.

True. However most think of the will as being necessarily causally effective. A will that does not cause action, is not what most would describe as a wil. In this sense I think it would be fair to call an epiphenomenal will illusiory. Yes it is a real experience, but it does not do what it appears to do.

Are there perfect behaviourists, who believe that the entirety of every action is determined by external influences, with no element of free choice at all?

There are two main camps of determinists, soft determinists and hard determinists. Soft determinists meld free will with saying somethings are determined by environment or heredity. Hard determinists believe all things draw back either to heredity or environment. Most people tend to fall towards soft determinism.

An example of determinism present in our thinking would be the upbringing of a child. If you ask a parent, do you want to bring your child up in a slum or in a nice rural area, what would their answer most likely be? Here, many people recognize environment plays a large role. There's a better chance of gang activity in the depressed areas of New York city than in a moderately wealthy area in Fairfield, Connecticut.

As for punishment in terms of determinism-

A person may be placed in prison without worrying about moral responsibility if you give your thinking over to determinism. If a person murders another human being, he may be seen as a threat (dependent upon the situation of course, which is what courts must decide). He could be dangerous to other people in society, and hence should be locked away. Also, if prisons operated as rehabilitation centers instead of as merely punishment, determinism would sit nicely besides prison. A person committed an unlawful act->society changes this persons environment in order to change his future actions.

As for punishment in terms of determinism-

A person may be placed in prison without worrying about moral responsibility if you give your thinking over to determinism. If a person murders another human being, he may be seen as a threat (dependent upon the situation of course, which is what courts must decide). He could be dangerous to other people in society, and hence should be locked away. Also, if prisons operated as rehabilitation centers instead of as merely punishment, determinism would sit nicely besides prison. A person committed an unlawful act->society changes this persons environment in order to change his future actions.

The last sentence implies some kind of decision being made by society. The justification of punishment in terms of determinism, tends to fall into this error. If determinism holds, in a hard sense, then society does not decide anything. There is nothing to be decided, it simply is determined with the concept of there even being an alternative not applying. Any statement that goes if we did this, then that would hapen is irrelevent as there can be no if we did. We did or we did not do. That is fixed. We put a person in prision. It simply is the case. There is no justification, as there was no decision. We did not do it "in order to" anything, it was simply done, inexorably without alternative.

To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.


Well, that's always been exactly my way of seeing it.

I'm a "hard" determinist; I believe that free will is a necessary illusion, but an illusion nonetheless, and that everything we do is dictated by the biological machinery of our brain, which has accumulated all we have ever seen/felt/been taught, etc, and uses it as the basis upon which to formulate our actions. Thus for one individual faced with a given situation, there is only one possible course of action.

But "punishment" remains a necessity, since it is another influencing factor that the brain will receive, store and compute into its future assessments of situations. In other words, if you've done something and been punished, chances are you won't do it again, not because of free will, but because your brain will remember the punishment and won't let you do it.

If, as determinism suggests, our actions are controlled by pre-existant factors (social, emotional, cultural, physical, psychological etc) then can we blame someone for their actions?

No serial killer in history ever felt compelled to commit their murders in front of the police station.

Even though they may have been diagnosed with a mental illness, or felt a compulsion to kill to satisfy some deeply held psychological urge, and even though they may have had a horrific childhood that led them to kill...

they still knew it was wrong - and we know that because they ALL concealed the efforts of their crimes.

If you know it's wrong, and you hide it, you're making a choice. Plenty of people grow up in bad neighborhoods, suffer abuse as a child, drink, take drugs --- and they don't do bad things to other people. Some of them even become wildly successful. So I don't believe that people have "no choice".

The last sentence implies some kind of decision being made by society.

Ah but that's where things get more specific. I grouped a bunch of individuals into "society". Society itself does not make the decision but rather a group of people (e.g. jurors). These jurors determine whether a person is placed in jail depending on what type of people they are and what type of person the juror is. I firmly believe a person makes "choices" based on all past experiences and their heredity. A person can only "choose" that which they would choose based on who they are. I know that's a clumsy sentence, sorry.

For example, suppose you and I are sitting in a room and you're holding a pencil. I say, "You are going to drop the pencil." You don't. Why? Perhaps based on your past experiences with me, you want to prove me wrong. And if you are the type of person to fulfill such wants, you will. If you have been taught submission your whole life and will follow any word I say, you will drop the pencil. It comes down to who you are.

I probably did a crappy job of explaining...sorry. heh heh.

If you know it's wrong, and you hide it, you're making a choice. Plenty of people grow up in bad neighborhoods, suffer abuse as a child, drink, take drugs --- and they don't do bad things to other people. Some of them even become wildly successful. So I don't believe that people have "no choice".

Those people firstly would have a higher than usual drive to rise out of the area around them. And something would have to give them that drive. It may be seeing all that is around them and desiring to be more than it. It may be a particularly influencial person. Something caused that drive. For one to seek out wealth, their environment must first introduce wealth to them (for example in movies or television).

Also, to say anyone "knows" anything is sketchy...we could all be brains in vats somewhere, part of the Matrix, or part of DesCartes' Demon's illusion. It's all belief...knowledge is just extremely strong belief.

Ah but that's where things get more specific. I grouped a bunch of individuals into "society". Society itself does not make the decision but rather a group of people (e.g. jurors). These jurors determine whether a person is placed in jail depending on what type of people they are and what type of person the juror is. I firmly believe a person makes "choices" based on all past experiences and their heredity. A person can only "choose" that which they would choose based on who they are. I know that's a clumsy sentence, sorry.

For example, suppose you and I are sitting in a room and you're holding a pencil. I say, "You are going to drop the pencil." You don't. Why? Perhaps based on your past experiences with me, you want to prove me wrong. And if you are the type of person to fulfill such wants, you will. If you have been taught submission your whole life and will follow any word I say, you will drop the pencil. It comes down to who you are.

I probably did a crappy job of explaining...sorry. heh heh.

You are still missing my point. I was not complaining about you placing society as an agent, that is a common shorthand that is easily understood. What I was concerned about was the action of deciding, itself.
I was specific about my objection referring to the rarer hard determinism case.
Under this no-one ever makes a decision. Everything is preprogrammed, what will happen will happen regardless of the desires or intentions of any individual or collective. If our choices are determined, not based, on our genetics and experience, which is what hard determinism actually proposes, then if you tell me to drop a pencil, whether I do or not is not in any way causaly determined by my epiphenomenal will. My will is in fact, under this system, determined by you telling me to drop the pencil along with the rest of my programing.
So, we put someone in prison. This is not done "in order to", it is done because we could not do otherwise. It may be justified, post hoc, in our minds as being "in order to" but this is not a cause of the action. Punishment, under hard determinism is as fixed and determined as everything else.

The last sentence implies some kind of decision being made by society. The justification of punishment in terms of determinism, tends to fall into this error. If determinism holds, in a hard sense, then society does not decide anything. There is nothing to be decided, it simply is determined with the concept of there even being an alternative not applying. Any statement that goes if we did this, then that would hapen is irrelevent as there can be no if we did. We did or we did not do. That is fixed. We put a person in prision. It simply is the case. There is no justification, as there was no decision. We did not do it "in order to" anything, it was simply done, inexorably without alternative.

Making a decision is an action. Regardless of whether the results of the decision is a given, the action of making a decision still occurs and can be referenced.

This is my attempt at starting a little intellectual debate about one of the great questions regarding the theory of determinism, are humans morally responsible?
I dotn really want to debate the validity of Determinism itself, so any angry libertarians can just bugger off.
If, as determinism suggests, our actions are controlled by pre-existant factors (social, emotional, cultural, physical, psychological etc) then can we blame someone for their actions?
If someone breaks into our house and steals from us, then should we punish them? They could not, according to determinism, have 'not' done it, so they essentially had no choice but to do it. Can we then hold them morally responsible? And should they be punished?
To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.



-Mishka, the Empress of Incomprehensibility.

I would just like to say this is a pointless discussion. If determinism is true then you have no choice as to whether you should punish them or not. Then I suppose, you have no choice in whether or not you continue this discussion. This may be classed as 'debating the validity of determinism', but again, if it is true I could not 'not' have posted this.

Making a decision is an action. Regardless of whether the results of the decision is a given, the action of making a decision still occurs and can be referenced.

Given freedom of the will a decision is an action. If there was no alternative possible, then there is no decision made, there may have been the illusion of deciding, but no real decision. That is the price of hard determinism.

Given freedom of the will a decision is an action. If there was no alternative possible, then there is no decision made, there may have been the illusion of deciding, but no real decision. That is the price of hard determinism.

Again the act of deciding occurred whether or not the result was predetermined. Just like you suggested the justification was added post-hoc but the justification existed since you first began to exist, you just became aware of it at some given time. Whether I had a choice to decide not to post this, matters not. I did decide to post this even if it was just the illusion of will.

Think of deciding as a program on a computer. The results of the program are determined at the time the program is written but the program still has to run.

Given freedom of the will a decision is an action. If there was no alternative possible, then there is no decision made, there may have been the illusion of deciding, but no real decision. That is the price of hard determinism.

On the other hand, there's religious determinism, which means God decided. And frankly, that really means God should pay for it. Arrest the bastard! Let's get him before a court and find out once and for all if he's controling all crime from behind the scenes, in some evil cat-and-mouse game to destroy us all.

Again the act of deciding occurred whether or not the result was predetermined. Just like you suggested the justification was added post-hoc but the justification existed since you first began to exist, you just became aware of it at some given time. Whether I had a choice to decide not to post this, matters not. I did decide to post this even if it was just the illusion of will.

Think of deciding as a program on a computer. The results of the program are determined at the time the program is written but the program still has to run.

Ah, but if determinism holds true then there never was a choice, and so you actually bear no responsibility. Given your own example, is it your PC's fault that Windows doesn't work properly, or is it Microsoft for shit programming?

What matters here is actually how we define 'decide'. The word itself automatically implies choice, rather than the illusion of it, and so leaves it invalid under determinist theory.

Ah, but if determinism holds true then there never was a choice, and so you actually bear no responsibility. Given your own example, is it your PC's fault that Windows doesn't work properly, or is it Microsoft for shit programming?

What matters here is actually how we define 'decide'. The word itself automatically implies choice, rather than the illusion of it, and so leaves it invalid under determinist theory.

Thank you my good man, someone else seems to understand the paradox of claiming that decisions exist even in hard determinism

Ah, but if determinism holds true then there never was a choice, and so you actually bear no responsibility. Given your own example, is it your PC's fault that Windows doesn't work properly, or is it Microsoft for shit programming?

What matters here is actually how we define 'decide'. The word itself automatically implies choice, rather than the illusion of it, and so leaves it invalid under determinist theory.

I'm not suggesting it's the PC's fault. I'm not suggesting that the PC can change the program. The fact is that the PC has the job of running the program, however.

Look up decide in the dictionary. Depending on which definition you use, it either means to make up your mind, an action that occurred whether you have the ability to prevent it or not, or it means, to reach a decision, which also occurred whether you could prevent it or not. Choice or the illusion of it does nothing to change the fact that the "decision" program ran.

Look up decide in the dictionary. Depending on which definition you use, it either means to make up your mind, an action that occurred whether you have the ability to prevent it or not, or it means, to reach a decision, which also occurred whether you could prevent it or not. Choice or the illusion of it does nothing to change the fact that the "decision" program ran.

One entry found for decide.
Main Entry: de·cide
Pronunciation: di-'sId, dE-
Function: verb
Inflected Form(s): de·cid·ed; de·cid·ing
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French decider, from Latin decidere, literally, to cut off, from de- + caedere to cut
transitive senses
1 a : to arrive at a solution that ends uncertainty or dispute about <decide what to do> b : to select as a course of action -- used with an infinitive <decided to go>
2 : to bring to a definitive end <one blow decided the fight>
3 : to induce to come to a choice <her pleas decided him to help>
source (http://www.webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?sourceid=Mozilla-search&va=decide)


1. refers to ending uncertainty. In determinism there is no uncertainty to end, so it is not this.

2. to bring to a definitive end. A completely different meaning. Nothing whatsoever to do with morals or suchlike

3. involves choice, again determinism does not allow choice. It is this that it explicitly excludes.

No. deciding is not something that can happen under determinism. Try the dictionary yourself. This time an English one please that does not define decide in terms of decision. The second meaning you give, is nothing to do with decision or deciding it is the definition for the terms in English: happen or occur.

I'm not suggesting it's the PC's fault. I'm not suggesting that the PC can change the program. The fact is that the PC has the job of running the program, however.

And in running the program, the computer can make no alterations based on 'morals'. It runs the program, but it has no moral input into it and cannot be blamed for the failings inherent in the program it has to run. Also, it is not making any decisions in the course of running the program, it is simply running the next line of code. There is no decision made, no decision to be made, and no decision at all.

Look up decide in the dictionary. Depending on which definition you use, it either means to make up your mind, an action that occurred whether you have the ability to prevent it or not, or it means, to reach a decision, which also occurred whether you could prevent it or not. Choice or the illusion of it does nothing to change the fact that the "decision" program ran.

But since there is NO decision in the first place, you have NOT decided anything at all. You have done exactly as you would have done in any case, and it doesn't matter if you try and claim it is a decision. The decision relies on the act of deciding in itself, which is impossible in the case of a pre-determined action. Don't try and use linguistic quibbling in a philosophical debate, as it is the word as opposed to how you choose to define it that matters here. Decision and pre-determination are completely incompatible, by their very nature.

1. refers to ending uncertainty. In determinism there is no uncertainty to end, so it is not this.

2. to bring to a definitive end. A completely different meaning. Nothing whatsoever to do with morals or suchlike

3. involves choice, again determinism does not allow choice. It is this that it explicitly excludes.

No. deciding is not something that can happen under determinism. Try the dictionary yourself. This time an English one please that does not define decide in terms of decision. The second meaning you give, is nothing to do with decision or deciding it is the definition for the terms in English: happen or occur.

Actually, I used a Princeton Dictionary. I prefer to use an American dictionary v English. And even in your definition they mention choice, but they are certainly not addressing whether choice is an illusion or not.

Again, use the program reference because it's most apt. Let's say you have a program that can be represented by a simple flowchart. It takes certain input x and either performs A or performs B. The inputs are set so the program always performs A. Still in my diagram of the program I have to show that it can perform B with different inputs. You don't deny that with different inputs a different result can occur with a human being, do you? The inputs are just set so that a particular result occurs. The simple fact that a different result could occur with different inputs means that the process should be documented. The process is act of making a decision. I don't care how many times you suggest the outcome is fixed, the decision program analyzed the inputs and gave an output. If the inputs are fixed, Determinism, then so are the outputs, but they were still filtered through the program.

Depending on which definition you use, it either means to make up your mind, an action that occurred whether you have the ability to prevent it or not, or it means, to reach a decision, which also occurred whether you could prevent it or not. Choice or the illusion of it does nothing to change the fact that the "decision" program ran.
With determinism the action of "making up your mind" does not happen, because it isn't you making up your mind, it is causes apart from your "self". In fact, the premise, as I see it, takes an entirely objective, materialistic view of the universe. Since it denies self-determination, and hence any purpose or need for self, any action on the part of individuals is meaningless --it wasn't "you" who made up "your mind", it is simply a part of the whole that together is made up for you.

And in running the program, the computer can make no alterations based on 'morals'. It runs the program, but it has no moral input into it and cannot be blamed for the failings inherent in the program it has to run. Also, it is not making any decisions in the course of running the program, it is simply running the next line of code. There is no decision made, no decision to be made, and no decision at all.



But since there is NO decision in the first place, you have NOT decided anything at all. You have done exactly as you would have done in any case, and it doesn't matter if you try and claim it is a decision. The decision relies on the act of deciding in itself, which is impossible in the case of a pre-determined action. Don't try and use linguistic quibbling in a philosophical debate, as it is the word as opposed to how you choose to define it that matters here. Decision and pre-determination are completely incompatible, by their very nature.

But see, that's the point. We philosophically don't agree. You suggest that because the inputs are set, thus the output is set that the decision never occurred. I suggest that the decision occurred but could never have been a different output because the input is set. Change the inputs and the output changes, a different decision is reached. Just because the inputs will never change does not mean that the act that brought about the output didn't occur. What was the path between input and output? Magic?

Again, use the program reference because it's most apt. Let's say you have a program that can be represented by a simple flowchart. It takes certain input x and either performs A or performs B. The inputs are set so the program always performs A. Still in my diagram of the program I have to show that it can perform B with different inputs. You don't deny that with different inputs a different result can occur with a human being, do you? The inputs are just set so that a particular result occurs. The simple fact that a different result could occur with different inputs means that the process should be documented. The process is act of making a decision. I don't care how many times you suggest the outcome is fixed, the decision program analyzed the inputs and gave an output. If the inputs are fixed, Determinism, then so are the outputs, but they were still filtered through the program.
The possibility of B is an illusion if the inputs are set to do A.

With determinism the action of "making up your mind" does not happen, because it isn't you making up your mind, it is causes apart from your "self". In fact, the premise, as I see it, takes an entirely objective, materialistic view of the universe. Since it denies self-determination, and hence any purpose or need for self, any action on the part of individuals is meaningless --it wasn't "you" who made up "your mind", it is simply a part of the whole that together is made up for you.

Your mind is a program written by the universe. Just because you didn't create your mind, doesn't mean your mind doesn't exist. Just because the lines of that program are fixed and can not be editted by you does not mean the program isn't running and analyzing the inputs and creating outputs. You guys seem to suggest that fixed inputs changes the function of the program. It doesn't.

Actually, I used a Princeton Dictionary. I prefer to use an American dictionary v English. And even in your definition they mention choice, but they are certainly not addressing whether choice is an illusion or not.
exactly. Determinism means there is no choice, the action is determined. What here do you not understand? If it is illusiory, it does not really exist, there is no choice.

Again, use the program reference because it's most apt. Let's say you have a program that can be represented by a simple flowchart. It takes certain input x and either performs A or performs B. The inputs are set so the program always performs A. Still in my diagram of the program I have to show that it can perform B with different inputs. You don't deny that with different inputs a different result can occur with a human being, do you? The inputs are just set so that a particular result occurs. The simple fact that a different result could occur with different inputs means that the process should be documented. The process is act of making a decision. I don't care how many times you suggest the outcome is fixed, the decision program analyzed the inputs and gave an output. If the inputs are fixed, Determinism, then so are the outputs, but they were still filtered through the program.

You are describing a deterministic procedure. There is no decision made anywhere after the initial input is selected. There is no consideration of, maybe this, maybe that. The confusion is that you are thinking as a programer, not as a person. (I too am a programmer, so no insult intended). When you flow chart a program you place things called decision boxes. These are where the output depends upon the input. If it depends on the input, then there was no choice involved inside the box, the outcome can be known before the signal enters the routine. In programing terms this is a decision, but only in programing. Program validation depends upon this. Computer programs are the epitomy of hard determinism.
When you decide something, as a person, is it totally dependent upon your genetics and experience, upon the input? If it is, then no decision is being made, only a routing is being made. This routing is predetermined by the programming.
Now apply this to punishing criminals. There is no judgement, or choice, involved in punishing a criminal if hard determinism applies. There is an input: the crime commited by the individual, then there is the result of the code block: punishment. One is inevitable, given the other. Where is the decision in human terms? Where is the consideration of alternatives. If given that input, no other result is possible, there is no choice involved.

The possibility of B is an illusion if the inputs are set to do A.

Even if the probability of B is 0 that part of the program still exists. You can not say the function of a program is different by fixing the inputs. The program still works the way it would if the inputs were not fixed, you are only changing the probability of some outputs to 0.

Your mind is a program written by the universe. Just because you didn't create your mind, doesn't mean your mind doesn't exist. Just because the lines of that program are fixed and can not be editted by you does not mean the program isn't running and analyzing the inputs and creating outputs. You guys seem to suggest that fixed inputs changes the function of the program. It doesn't.
Mind may very well exist as you describe it, but that's beside the point. With determinism, there is no "self". Self requires self-determination.

Even if the probability of B is 0 that part of the program still exists. You can not say the function of a program is different by fixing the inputs. The program still works the way it would if the inputs were not fixed, you are only changing the probability of some outputs to 0.
Even if B is a part of the program, if the possibility of the program doing B is zero then there is effectively no B option.

Your mind is a program written by the universe. Just because you didn't create your mind, doesn't mean your mind doesn't exist. Just because the lines of that program are fixed and can not be editted by you does not mean the program isn't running and analyzing the inputs and creating outputs. You guys seem to suggest that fixed inputs changes the function of the program. It doesn't.

You then are advocating hard determinism. Fine, but accept that it means that there is no choice for you or anyone else in what they do. Any feeling that you could have done other than what you did is illusiory, as the inputs are just a determined as the outputs of the decision box.

The human mind, to me, is not a program. That is the difference. I believe, and it can not be proved either way, that under identical inputs, I could react differently. A program can not. (Or if it does, we would reject it as invalid!). This is what I understand as free will, and it is this that makes me resposable for my actions. If I commit a crime, I am guilty. It is not the inevitable outcome of my not being given a teddy bear.

exactly. Determinism means there is no choice, the action is determined. What here do you not understand? If it is illusiory, it does not really exist, there is no choice.

The definition you used - to select as a course of action - applies here and just means I selected, whether or not I could have selected differently is not a factor here. Just because most people believe in will and there assume if I say, "I decided to go", that I could have decided not to go, does not mean that a decision never happened if deciding not to go wasn't really a probability.

You are describing a deterministic procedure. There is no decision made anywhere after the initial input is selected. There is no consideration of, maybe this, maybe that. The confusion is that you are thinking as a programer, not as a person. (I too am a programmer, so no insult intended). When you flow chart a program you place things called decision boxes. These are where the output depends upon the input. If it depends on the input, then there was no choice involved inside the box, the outcome can be known before the signal enters the routine. In programing terms this is a decision, but only in programing. Program validation depends upon this. Computer programs are the epitomy of hard determinism.
When you decide something, as a person, is it totally dependent upon your genetics and experience, upon the input? If it is, then no decision is being made, only a routing is being made. This routing is predetermined by the programming.
Now apply this to punishing criminals. There is no judgement, or choice, involved in punishing a criminal if hard determinism applies. There is an input: the crime commited by the individual, then there is the result of the code block: punishment. One is inevitable, given the other. Where is the decision in human terms? Where is the consideration of alternatives. If given that input, no other result is possible, there is no choice involved.

Oh, I'm not arguing punishment, because that is just part of defining the inputs to determine the desired outputs (and obviously whether or not we punish them can't be changed ;-))

Now, you just defined where we differ philosophically. I actually do believe that our minds are just flesh computers run programs written by our circumstances and DNA. The decision-making process is a program. In the idea of Determinism we are simply fixing the inputs, we are not changing the purpose or function of the decision-making program. That is my philosophical belief in simple terms.

Yes, they should still be punished. Even considering determinism, it is still the person at fault, they are still responsible. Even if everyone is destined to behave in a certain fashion the social contract must be enforced.

Alien Born, are you a religious individual?

The definition you used - to select as a course of action - applies here and just means I selected whether or not I could have selected differently is not a factor here. Just because most people believe in will and there assume if I say, "I decided to go", that I could have decided not to go, does not mean that a decision never happened.
Belief in will is all it takes to undermine determinism. If I say "I made this choice between A and B" then I will accept responsibility for the outcome of that choice I made whether or not the action was predetermined by the hand of fate.

Yes, they should still be punished. Even considering determinism, it is still the person at fault, they are still responsible. Even if everyone is destined to behave in a certain fashion the social contract must be enforced.
How does society determine "fault"? If the program ran as it was supposed to, then the outcome is perfect.

How does society determine "fault"? If the program ran as it was supposed to, then the outcome is perfect.

The person is a part of the system. If a crime is committed that means that the outcome is not perfect and the system is not perfect. The fault must be found within the system and removed in order to make it run more efficiently and produce less poor results. Therefore, the person responsible for the crime must be removed from society.

This is not something I have really considered closely, and this explanation requires way to much metaphor, but it is the best answer I can come up with.

You do realize that this question is not entirely valid. Determinism does not concern itself with the running of society, determinism has nothing to do with morality. At least my idea of it.

Alien Born, are you a religious individual?

No. I am an agnostic with tendencies toward athiesm. I also do not believe that the physical universe is deterministic in the sense that hard determinism requires.

You do realize that this question is not entirely valid. Determinism does not concern itself with the running of society, determinism has nothing to do with morality. At least my idea of it.
I agree.

No. I am an agnostic with tendencies toward athiesm. I also do not believe that the physical universe is deterministic in the sense that hard determinism requires.

The reason I asked is that disbelief in determinism requires a person to believe in an inherent superiority of humanity. Humans must be a special kind that has risen above the fray of what is otherwise a deterministic universe. It's a view that is very near spirituality, and closely resembles the "humans are the likeness of God" idea that is thrown into many religions.

Even if B is a part of the program, if the possibility of the program doing B is zero then there is effectively no B option.

The probability of B moves to zero only if we fix the inputs which we did in this case. The program does have a B option and you would document it as it's a part of the programming.

The reason I asked is that disbelief in determinism requires a person to believe in an inherent superiority of humanity. Humans must be a special kind that has risen above the fray of what is otherwise a deterministic universe. It's a view that is very near spirituality, and closely resembles the "humans are the likeness of God" idea that is thrown into many religions.

That's an interesting way to put it. So what if God is subject to determinism?

Mind may very well exist as you describe it, but that's beside the point. With determinism, there is no "self". Self requires self-determination.

Why does the idea of self require self-determination?

That's an interesting way to put it. So what if God is subject to determinism?

In monotheistic religion, God is determinism. He is omnipotent and omniscient. He is eternal. There is no way to get around the fact that free will is impossible with such a being in existence.

The reason I asked is that disbelief in determinism requires a person to believe in an inherent superiority of humanity. Humans must be a special kind that has risen above the fray of what is otherwise a deterministic universe. It's a view that is very near spirituality, and closely resembles the "humans are the likeness of God" idea that is thrown into many religions.
I would say rather that humans are a unique life-form, being not only sentient but conscious in a way that allows them to abstract such things as self into existence. This is the likeness of god, alike with the way he abstracted his idea of world into existence. It's not about superiority over ones surroundings or other life-forms, it's about self-awareness. With determinism, the whole concept of self is dissolved.

I would say rather that humans are a unique life-form, being not only sentient but conscious in a way that allows them to abstract such things as self into existence. This is the likeness of god, alike with the way he abstracted his idea of world into existence. It's not about superiority over ones surroundings or other life-forms, it's about self-awareness. With determinism, the whole concept of self is dissolved.

Again, I don't agree. Most I think would argue that awareness is what determines self. Unlike PC's, in our flesh computers the programming is aware of the computer that houses it. Sentience and consciousness determine self, not free will.

I would say rather that humans are a unique life-form, being not only sentient but conscious in a way that allows them to abstract such things as self into existence. This is the likeness of god, alike with the way he abstracted his idea of world into existence. It's not about superiority over ones surroundings or other life-forms, it's about self-awareness. With determinism, the whole concept of self is dissolved.

Nothing is changed about the self or self-awareness in determinism, see Jocabia's post.

Do you believe that self-awareness has some sort of spiritual source, or do you believe that it is merely a biological aspect of the human brain?

Why does the idea of self require self-determination?
We identify consciousness with self-awareness. In order for a consciousness to be aware of itself, it must be aware of things not-self (it sets up a condition where there is self, and there is the world apart from self; without this condition, there is no self). The world apart from self includes things like the brain and other parts of the body, and everything in the physical world stretching outward from that perspective. Self is the centre of awareness, neither a physical part of the body nor separate from it.

Self-determination has the self as a cause of some events. The self is in control of itself and determines its participation in these events. Determinism, as I understand it, has the cause of all events being not-self things, the result of genetic coding, circumstances, interations, memories, etc. Anything but self. Without self as the cause of at least some events, there is no difference between self and not-self. We are just "along for the ride".

If events in the world spur me to an anger reaction that is all a part of the 'program' that has been set up by all the inputs fed into me up to that moment, then I have no control over the events that subsequently happen; they happen without my active participation.

We identify consciousness with self-awareness. In order for a consciousness to be aware of itself, it must be aware of things not-self (it sets up a condition where there is self, and there is the world apart from self; without this condition, there is no self). The world apart from self includes things like the brain and other parts of the body, and everything in the physical world stretching outward from that perspective. Self is the centre of awareness, neither a physical part of the body nor separate from it.

Self-determination has the self as a cause of some events. The self is in control of itself and determines its participation in these events. Determinism, as I understand it, has the cause of all events being not-self things, the result of genetic coding, circumstances, interations, memories, etc. Anything but self. Without self as the cause of at least some events, there is no difference between self and not-self. We are just "along for the ride".

If events in the world spur me to an anger reaction that is all a part of the 'program' that has been set up by all the inputs fed into me up to that moment, then I have no control over the events that subsequently happen; they happen without my active participation.

They happen with your (the self's) active participation. Just because you can't behave differently doesn't make your participation not an act you are committing. Also, I don't remember self as a cause being anywhere in the idea of the existence of self. Also, even if the actions of the self is a part of determinism does not negate the fact that those actions occur and are caused by the self (the program represented by the idea of self). The body is the flesh computer, the brain is the processor and the self is the programs in the computer. The self is shaped by experience and DNA that it can't control, but this does not cause it not to exist.

Determinism and self are NOT mutually exclusive and the idea of self or lack thereof is not a main tenet of Determinism.

The reason I asked is that disbelief in determinism requires a person to believe in an inherent superiority of humanity. Humans must be a special kind that has risen above the fray of what is otherwise a deterministic universe. It's a view that is very near spirituality, and closely resembles the "humans are the likeness of God" idea that is thrown into many religions.

Only if you believe that the rest of the universe is deterministic, which is why I added my disagreement with that position to my reply to your question.

Only if you believe that the rest of the universe is deterministic, which is why I added my disagreement with that position to my reply to your question.

What in the universe do you believe to not be deterministic?

EDIT: Personally, I can't understand how anything could not have a deterministic nature.

They happen with your (the self's) active participation. Just because you can't behave differently doesn't make your participation not an act you are committing.
It is an act being committed dispite myself. At least, that's how I understand the deterministic view. If it's an act I am consciously in control of, then it is self-determined.

Also, I don't remember self as a cause being anywhere in the idea of the existence of self. Also, even if the actions of the self is a part of determinism does not negate the fact that those actions occur and are caused by the self (the program represented by the idea of self). The body is the flesh computer, the brain is the processor and the self is the programs in the computer. The self is shaped by experience and DNA that it can't control, but this does not cause it not to exist.

Determinism and self are NOT mutually exclusive and the idea of self or lack thereof is not a main tenet of Determinism.
The actions of a self is not a part of determinism; this is my belief. If a self is doing the actions, they are self-determined, not deterministic. But then, perhaps I know nothing about Determinism, as you suggest.

Fuck determinism. In your example about the robber, if everything is determined then technically we have no choice whether to punish him or not. If we punish him, that's what we were SUPPOSED to do. If not, that's what we were supposed to do. You can't say one person's actions are determined then ask if we can punish them for them, because ours would be as well.

"Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does." - Sartre

It is an act being committed dispite myself. At least, that's how I understand the deterministic view. If it's an act I am consciously in control of, then it is self-determined.


The actions of a self is not a part of determinism; this is what I'm saying. If a self is doing the actions, they are self-determined, not deterministic. But then, perhaps I know nothing about Determinism, as you suggest.

It seems we're going in circles, but I'll try one more time. Your consciousness is not question, your free will is. You are still reacting to the inputs, but as your programming is subject to previous inputs and DNA, your response is predetermined. This does not negate the idea that you are still reacting (read: acting). The self is doing the actions but they are predetermined. Whether you are or are not, in fact, acting has nothing to do with self-determination. Determination only applies to whether or not you could act differently.

EDIT: You are not acting despite yourself, but more because of yourself. Without the program, there is no output.

Fuck determinism. In your example about the robber, if everything is determined then technically we have no choice whether to punish him or not. If we punish him, that's what we were SUPPOSED to do. If not, that's what we were supposed to do. You can't say one person's actions are determined then ask if we can punish them for them, because ours would be as well.

"Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does." - Sartre

Although your opinions on determinism were not fleshed out too well, you are dead on with why the original question was not valid.

In monotheistic religion, God is determinism. He is omnipotent and omniscient. He is eternal. There is no way to get around the fact that free will is impossible with such a being in existence.

There is absolutely no reason to equate an omnipotent omniscient god with determinism.

To know for absolutely sure that something will happen is not the same as forcing it to happen.

There is absolutely no reason to equate an omnipotent omniscient god with determinism.

To know for absolutely sure that something will happen is not the same as forcing it to happen.

To know absolutely what will happen means that the future is already set. Even if it does not mean that God forces it to happen, it means that nature of the universe is deterministic.

There is absolutely no reason to equate an omnipotent omniscient god with determinism.

To know for absolutely sure that something will happen is not the same as forcing it to happen.

Copying and pasting something I posted on another forum in a discussion on paradox:

Free will literally means that your future is undefined. If it were defined, be this by God, by a seer, a time traveler, whatever, this would logically prove that you will not be able to have done anything other than that that you will do. (Ugh, the tenses were nasty in that sentence.) The problem goes back to at least the days of Aristotle and has not yet been solved.
Rephrased, if God knows now, what I will do in the future, then I am not free to not do that in the future. It does not matter what you actually choose to do, for your will to be free. What matters is that whatever you do, it was possible for you to have done something other than that. God's omniscience eliminates that possibility. Hence the paradox.

Turning this a little on its head, an omniscient God does demand determinism at some level.

It seems we're going in circles, but I'll try one more time. Your consciousness is not question, your free will is. You are still reacting to the inputs, but as your programming is subject to previous inputs and DNA, your response is predetermined. This does not negate the idea that you are still reacting (read: acting). The self is doing the actions but they are predetermined. Whether you are or are not, in fact, acting has nothing to do with self-determination. Determination only applies to whether or not you could act differently.
Will (self-determination) is the activity of a consciousness. We will our thoughts, we will an outcome (choice) from available options, we will our bodies to act and interact with other people. If will is "in question" or, more specifically, out of the picture entirely because everything is predetermined (it cannot be predetermined and self-determined at the same time), then consciousness has nothing to do. It participates in nothing. Reaction is not action, and not the active participation of a self. We might as well be zombies.

The self is conscious. A consciousness wills.

Cause-and-effect is insufficient to describe all of existence.

You are not acting despite yourself, but more because of yourself. Without the program, there is no output.
There is no real "self" representation in this statement, only the outcome of a program.

Will (self-determination) is the activity of a consciousness. We will our thoughts, we will an outcome (choice) from available options, we will our bodies to act and interact with other people. If will is "in question" or, more specifically, out of the picture entirely because everything is predetermined (it cannot be predetermined and self-determined at the same time), then consciousness has nothing to do. It participates in nothing. Reaction is not action, and not the active participation of a self. We might as well be zombies.

The self is conscious. A consciousness wills.

Cause-and-effect is insufficient to describe all of existence.


There is no real "self" representation in this statement, only the outcome of a program.

The reason there is a self is because we're having this discussion. You couldn't make an argument for or against the idea of self without your own self-awareness. Will does not play into that concept. You are tying two ideas together and using the fact you tied them together to argue they should be tied together.

Before today I have never heard anyone argue that self-determination is required for the existence of self. All arguments for the self I have heard before rely on awareness and the ability to think. Again, the "thinking" that is programmed into your flesh computer still occurs even if the outcome is already known. You can't change function by freezing the inputs. "I think therefore I am" still holds.

EDIT: Hopefully, you're thinking about the above statements right now, but that doesn't prove that your reply isn't predetermined.

To know absolutely what will happen means that the future is already set. Even if it does not mean that God forces it to happen, it means that nature of the universe is deterministic.

Uncontrolled flatulence. Tell me anyone knew I was gonna say that.

...you are dead on with why the original question was not valid.

My creation of this post means only that I was intended to create it, that a multitude of pre-existant factors caused me create it.
Whether we punish the criminal or not may be out of our control, but it does no harm to think about why we punish/dont punish him/her.
That given, this discussion itself is now a factor that could be causally sufficiant in your own future actions. You all seem to have thought rather hard about this, and I appreciate your opinions and especially some of the wonderful articulation in some of these arguments. I enjoyed reading the responses.
If this argument is invalid, then all thought is invalid. God forbid.

-Mishka, Empress of Incomprehensibility.

This is my attempt at starting a little intellectual debate about one of the great questions regarding the theory of determinism, are humans morally responsible?
I dotn really want to debate the validity of Determinism itself, so any angry libertarians can just bugger off.
If, as determinism suggests, our actions are controlled by pre-existant factors (social, emotional, cultural, physical, psychological etc) then can we blame someone for their actions?
If someone breaks into our house and steals from us, then should we punish them? They could not, according to determinism, have 'not' done it, so they essentially had no choice but to do it. Can we then hold them morally responsible? And should they be punished?
To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.



-Mishka, the Empress of Incomprehensibility.
Determinism is stupid because it implies irresponsibility. In other words, "whatever happens, would've happened, no matter what", so I'm just going to sit here, and do nothing.

Determinism may be true. There's no doubt about that. But believing in it is idiotic. Some of the most famous people have done great things that they would not have accomplished, if they accepted their fate. No.

To give you a play-on-words, determinism makes you less determined. Even if he lived in a pre-destined universe, the little train that could was a believer in free will.

But to answer your question, yes. If you believe in determinism, no one is ethically responsible, although punishments still need to be enacted, in order to maintain law and order.

And Mishka, there's one possibility you fail to recognize: You assume that free will or events caused by it have to directly cause the other. They could be what's called a "parallel process." You move your hand, but your free will is not causing your hand to move. It moves through processes beyond that. But your free will always goes hand-in-hand with destiny. So, the world is neither pre-determined or free, but both. Thus, we have a fate, but we're still responsible for the decisions we make.

To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.

If we are assuming determinism to be true, then is not the question of what we should do in response to our determined actions entirely moot?

Copying and pasting something I posted on another forum in a discussion on paradox:



Turning this a little on its head, an omniscient God does demand determinism at some level.

Hmmm. If said God were also omnipotent, could it not be that said God can know our future actions despite the universe being non-deterministic? After all, He's omnipotent. :)

What in the universe do you believe to not be deterministic?

EDIT: Personally, I can't understand how anything could not have a deterministic nature.


Um, everything. There are only probabilities of events happening the way they happened, and these are not probabilities of 1. With the revolution in thinking about the physical world, that occurred at the end of the 19th century and culminated 100 years ago with the description of quantum physics, determinism went out the window for good.
We still think in deterministic ways as, on the macro scale, the world still apears to be deterministic. When I hit a pool ball with another I can predict, with a high degree of confidence where the ball will go. This prediction though is not 100% certain, by the current understanding of the laws of physics. There is a very small chance (0.1 x 10^-30 sort of value) that the ball will do something other than what Newtonian mechanics predicted. On the atomic and sub atomic scale these probabailities of behaving non deterministicly are much higher, approaching 0.5. Now if something behaves in a non deterministic way half the time the whole concept of determinism has to be thrown away as you can not predict the behaviour.

I've had to sleep, so sorry if I repeated someone elses reply.

Hmmm. If said God were also omnipotent, could it not be that said God can know our future actions despite the universe being non-deterministic? After all, He's omnipotent. :)

Omnipotence has nothing to do with knowing anything. The knowldge side of the God business is handled by the department of omniscience.
Omnipotence is paradoxical in itself anyway, so even if the responsability was moved to this department, it still falls down the hole in the outside.

Um, everything. There are only probabilities of events happening the way they happened, and these are not probabilities of 1. With the revolution in thinking about the physical world, that occurred at the end of the 19th century and culminated 100 years ago with the description of quantum physics, determinism went out the window for good.
We still think in deterministic ways as, on the macro scale, the world still apears to be deterministic. When I hit a pool ball with another I can predict, with a high degree of confidence where the ball will go. This prediction though is not 100% certain, by the current understanding of the laws of physics. There is a very small chance (0.1 x 10^-30 sort of value) that the ball will do something other than what Newtonian mechanics predicted. On the atomic and sub atomic scale these probabailities of behaving non deterministicly are much higher, approaching 0.5. Now if something behaves in a non deterministic way half the time the whole concept of determinism has to be thrown away as you can not predict the behaviour.

I've had to sleep, so sorry if I repeated someone elses reply.

Blast you, quantum physics. I have a very sketchy knowledge of it at best so I can't come close to discussing it. However, it is only logical for me to think that nothing can happen at random, and that anything that does act at random only appears to because we do not have ample information to predict its action.

Blast you, quantum physics. I have a very sketchy knowledge of it at best so I can't come close to discussing it. However, it is only logical for me to think that nothing can happen at random, and that anything that does act at random only appears to because we do not have ample information to predict its action.
Surely random means the outcome is unpredictable? If we cannot predict the outcome, then it is randomly determined. Any speculation on information we do not have is just that --speculation.

Surely a random thing is something for which the outcome is unpredictable? If we cannot predict the outcome, then it is randomly determined. Any speculation on information we do not have is just that --speculation.

There is no chance that we can predict anything perfectly, for once we observe an action we change it in at least miniscule ways, and it would be impossible for the action and resulting actions to occur.

However, a lack of predictability does not mean randomness, it just means we don't understand.

One of the key aspects in my view of determinism is unpredictability. Were people able to break down the algorithm of determinism so perfectly that they could predict the outcomes accurately and precisely, determinism would fly out the window.

Blast you, quantum physics. I have a very sketchy knowledge of it at best so I can't come close to discussing it. However, it is only logical for me to think that nothing can happen at random, and that anything that does act at random only appears to because we do not have ample information to predict its action.

OK. Let us try another line, if quantum physics is to esoteric.
Examine any two events that you understand to be causally linked. In this examination try to identify what it is about the first event that makes you think that it is the cause for the second event. What can you find? Nothing more than the event that you are describing as the cause happened immediately before the event that you are describing as the effect. What quality or property of the first event makes it a cause of the second event? What quality or property of the second even makes it an effect of the first?

Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects which we shall call cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in order to find that impression, which produces an idea of such prodigous consequence. . . . And indeed there is nothing existent, either externally or internally, which is not to be consider'd either as cause or effect; tho' 'tis plain there is no one quality, which universaly belongs to all things, and gives then title to that denomination.


All that is there is succession (one before the other), and a belief that the second would not have occurred if it were not for the first. This is a belief in there being a necessary connection between the two. For the second to hapen it was necessary that the first happened. However this necessary connection can not be found in the world, but only in our ideas. Causality is the way we interpret the world. It is not logical at all. Determinism depends upon causality, causality depends upon our way of thinking. There is nothing, beyond our thinking habits, that makes the world deterministic. (And this is what makes quantum physics so difficult to think about, we simply don't think the right way.)

To know absolutely what will happen means that the future is already set. Even if it does not mean that God forces it to happen, it means that nature of the universe is deterministic.

Um... Due to his omnipotent nature, nothing that CAN happen is against the will of God. So therefore He MUST be forcing it to happen, merely by willing it to be so. Which really makes God a bit of a dick in many many ways.

Um... Due to his omnipotent nature, nothing that CAN happen is against the will of God. So therefore He MUST be forcing it to happen, merely by willing it to be so. Which really makes God a bit of a dick in many many ways.
God does not have free will, god has God's Will. He does not 'make things happen', he is the thing happening.

EDIT: I state that as fact but it is, of course, simply my belief (conversely, my simple belief).

OK. Let us try another line, if quantum physics is to esoteric.
Examine any two events that you understand to be causally linked. In this examination try to identify what it is about the first event that makes you think that it is the cause for the second event. What can you find? Nothing more than the event that you are describing as the cause happened immediately before the event that you are describing as the effect. What quality or property of the first event makes it a cause of the second event? What quality or property of the second even makes it an effect of the first?



All that is there is succession (one before the other), and a belief that the second would not have occurred if it were not for the first. This is a belief in there being a necessary connection between the two. For the second to hapen it was necessary that the first happened. However this necessary connection can not be found in the world, but only in our ideas. Causality is the way we interpret the world. It is not logical at all. Determinism depends upon causality, causality depends upon our way of thinking. There is nothing, beyond our thinking habits, that makes the world deterministic. (And this is what makes quantum physics so difficult to think about, we simply don't think the right way.)


The problem with this point is that you are estimating that determinism has anything to do with our ability to predict the outcome, it doesn't. Anything we study or look at in our world and can't predict has nothing to do with determinism. We are not omniscient. That we don't know how to do something doesn't make it impossible and that we don't know something doesn't make it not exist. Our lack of proof for a God is not proof there is no God. The fact that none of us will ever prove determinism is not evidence that determinism is impossible.

OK. Let us try another line, if quantum physics is to esoteric.
Examine any two events that you understand to be causally linked. In this examination try to identify what it is about the first event that makes you think that it is the cause for the second event. What can you find? Nothing more than the event that you are describing as the cause happened immediately before the event that you are describing as the effect. What quality or property of the first event makes it a cause of the second event? What quality or property of the second even makes it an effect of the first?

All that is there is succession (one before the other), and a belief that the second would not have occurred if it were not for the first. This is a belief in there being a necessary connection between the two. For the second to hapen it was necessary that the first happened. However this necessary connection can not be found in the world, but only in our ideas. Causality is the way we interpret the world. It is not logical at all. Determinism depends upon causality, causality depends upon our way of thinking. There is nothing, beyond our thinking habits, that makes the world deterministic. (And this is what makes quantum physics so difficult to think about, we simply don't think the right way.)

It seems to me that causality is the exact same premise as logic.

If A and B, then C. If you use statements for A and B, then C becomes a conclusion. If you use events for A and B, then C becomes the result.

This is my attempt at starting a little intellectual debate about one of the great questions regarding the theory of determinism, are humans morally responsible?
I dotn really want to debate the validity of Determinism itself, so any angry libertarians can just bugger off.
If, as determinism suggests, our actions are controlled by pre-existant factors (social, emotional, cultural, physical, psychological etc) then can we blame someone for their actions?
If someone breaks into our house and steals from us, then should we punish them? They could not, according to determinism, have 'not' done it, so they essentially had no choice but to do it. Can we then hold them morally responsible? And should they be punished?
To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.

If determism is indeed true, then what is the point of free will? Can an individual be striped of their own will entirely, and subject only to the will of others? Then why have individual rights, or even be considered an individual?

There is no chance that we can predict anything perfectly, for once we observe an action we change it in at least miniscule ways, and it would be impossible for the action and resulting actions to occur.

However, a lack of predictability does not mean randomness, it just means we don't understand.

One of the key aspects in my view of determinism is unpredictability. Were people able to break down the algorithm of determinism so perfectly that they could predict the outcomes accurately and precisely, determinism would fly out the window.
But we can and do make predictions that are demonstrably correct. 'Tomorrow the sun will rise.' And there are things we cannot predict, like what card I am going to pull next from a face-down deck of cards. A lack of predictability means that the method used to get an outcome is a random means. And 'Randomness' provides us with a means of explaining the world that fits the observations.

The problem with this point is that you are estimating that determinism has anything to do with our ability to predict the outcome, it doesn't. Anything we study or look at in our world and can't predict has nothing to do with determinism. We are not omniscient. That we don't know how to do something doesn't make it impossible and that we don't know something doesn't make it not exist. Our lack of proof for a God is not proof there is no God. The fact that none of us will ever prove determinism is not evidence that determinism is impossible.

The argument was meant to show that causality is a way of thinking that is built in to us. It was in response to Vittos Ordination stating that it was only logical for him to think that nothing happened at random. The arguments for determinism is not part of the world, anywhere, are based on quantum indeterminacy, and VO had made it clear that this was not a direction he wished to go. I was simply showing a cause as to why we interpret the world in a causal deterministic manner when it, as far as we know, is not.

Determinism as a world view, implies that the current state of the world defines completely all future states of the world. That is its definition, and anything else is not determinism. A world in which each event has a 100% predictable outcome is deterministic. If, however there is one event in theat world, the outcome of which is only 99.99999999% predictable, the world is no longer deterministic, it has become probablistic.

There are two arguments here. One is a argument against determinism (Quantum indetermism), and the other is an argument as to why we are predisposed toward accepting determinism ewven when there is no evidence for it.

But we can and do make predictions that are demonstrably correct. 'Tomorrow the sun will rise.' And there are things we cannot predict, like what card I am going to pull next from a face-down deck of cards. A lack of predictability means that the method used to get an outcome is a random means. And 'Randomness' provides us with a means of explaining the world that fits the observations.

No, a lack of predictability means a lack of full information. If the prediction was faulty that means that there must have been some factor unaccounted for.

*snip*

Are you saying that all of causality is faulty, that all things happen at random?

It seems to me that causality is the exact same premise as logic.

If A and B, then C. If you use statements for A and B, then C becomes a conclusion. If you use events for A and B, then C becomes the result.

Fine, now connect the logic to the world. That is what can not be done. The logic of material implication A -> B, A : B is totaly abstract. Where, does the sentence If A and B then C come from. It is a theoretical construct. You can not find it in the world.

1. You can find A and B then C, with the "then" simply being temporal, not causal. It rains (A) and I am exposed to the weather (B) then I eat dinner (C). Nothing about A or B or any combination of the two causes C. More than this you can not observe in the world.

2. You can find It rains (A) and I am exposed to the weather (B) then I get wet (C), which we understand as causal, but you can not find properties in the events or states that show that it is causal.

There is no logical difference between 1 and 2. but in 2 we would say that my geting wet was caused (determined) by A and B wheras in 1 we would not say my eating dinner was. Logic does not require the world to be deterministic. Causal reasoning, which is not the same thing, does.

Are you saying that all of causality is faulty, that all things happen at random?

Edit:
Yes and no. Within the probabilities, not totally at random.

Too short a reply before.

If someone breaks into our house and steals from us, then should we punish them? They could not, according to determinism, have 'not' done it, so they essentially had no choice but to do it. Can we then hold them morally responsible? And should they be punished?
To start the argument off, I do not believe that people are morally responsible, but do believe that they should be punished because the punishment we give them could be a factor that determines their future behaviour and so may deter them from doing it again.
-Mishka, the Empress of Incomprehensibility.

If really everything was determined, a punishment etc. would be it as well. So it would not really be necessessary to discuss wether to punish s.o. or not.
(At least if you follow the "hard" definition of determinism.

No, a lack of predictability means a lack of full information. If the prediction was faulty that means that there must have been some factor unaccounted for.

This is a very long subject. I am going to post a link to a public lecture.
Do not be frightened off by the name of the speaker, this lecture is very accessible to non specialists.

Does god play dice? (http://www.hawking.org.uk/lectures/dice.html)

This is well worth reading if you are interested in the idea that events are or are not predictable.

2. You can find It rains (A) and I am exposed to the weather (B) then I get wet (C), which we understand as causal, but you can not find properties in the events or states that show that it is causal.


In the first example there are far too many factors left out to make the logical conclusion. Where you to include all factors of the decision, which would be impossible, I believe you could come to a logical chain of events that would cause the person to eat dinner.

As for the second one, are you saying that there is a chance that if rain did fall on your skin, your skin would not become wet? That the raindrop and the wetness on your arm are unrelated?

In the first example there are far too many factors left out to make the logical conclusion. Where you to include all factors of the decision, which would be impossible, I believe you could come to a logical chain of events that would cause the person to eat dinner.

As for the second one, are you saying that there is a chance that if rain did fall on your skin, your skin would not become wet? That the raindrop and the wetness on your arm are unrelated?

You are following your perfectly natural and normal pre-disposition to see things as causally determined. There is no difference between the first case and the second. I include A, I included B (in fact the As were the same and the Bs were the same.) I stated a logical formula (statement) A & B -> C, A, B. I included C, in both cases.
Now you say one is logical, but the other is missing data. Why, what data? What is the difference? (It seems a stupid question, I know, but it is not, it is a very serious question indeed.)

The argument was meant to show that causality is a way of thinking that is built in to us. It was in response to Vittos Ordination stating that it was only logical for him to think that nothing happened at random. The arguments for determinism is not part of the world, anywhere, are based on quantum indeterminacy, and VO had made it clear that this was not a direction he wished to go. I was simply showing a cause as to why we interpret the world in a causal deterministic manner when it, as far as we know, is not.

Determinism as a world view, implies that the current state of the world defines completely all future states of the world. That is its definition, and anything else is not determinism. A world in which each event has a 100% predictable outcome is deterministic. If, however there is one event in theat world, the outcome of which is only 99.99999999% predictable, the world is no longer deterministic, it has become probablistic.

There are two arguments here. One is a argument against determinism (Quantum indetermism), and the other is an argument as to why we are predisposed toward accepting determinism ewven when there is no evidence for it.

And again, the THEORY of Quantum indetermism is faulty in that it was built by a human or humans. No proof we give that the world is anything less than 100% predictable actually proves that is, it only proves that with our current knowledge and equipment we can only prove to x% predictability. The argument for determinism will always be philosophical, because there is no chance we will ever be omniscient and anything less is flawed. We are only talking about how we believe the world to work. There is no evidence for or against determinism and I sincerely doubt there ever will be.

Having read the Hawking article I see very plainly why our ability to predict is limited, but I still don't understand how causality is undermined. Just because we can't observe and don't understand the rules that a black hole behaves according to doesn't mean they don't exist. Just because we can no longer predict the behavior of particles around a black hole does not mean that they do not behave by some causal chain of events.

I freely admit that you know much more about this than I do, so if I am wrong it will be no skin off of my back to admit it, so explain away.

But we can and do make predictions that are demonstrably correct. 'Tomorrow the sun will rise.' And there are things we cannot predict, like what card I am going to pull next from a face-down deck of cards. A lack of predictability means that the method used to get an outcome is a random means. And 'Randomness' provides us with a means of explaining the world that fits the observations.

The problem with your example, or actually what makes it poignant, is that whether we can predict the next card in a face-down deck there is an order held by the deck of cards whether we have knowledge of that order or not. If that deck has a full house on top no amount of thinking and deciding will ever make you draw a straight in your first five cards. The outcome is not random only because our knowledge is limited it appears random. Are you proposing that your lack of knowledge of the first card means that it has not yet been determined and are we falling into one of these "if a tree falls in the forest and no hears it does it make a sound" kind of arguments?

The problem with your example, or actually what makes it poignant, is that whether we can predict the next card in a face-down deck there is an order held by the deck of cards whether we have knowledge of that order or not. If that deck has a full house on top no amount of thinking and deciding will ever make you draw a straight in your first five cards. The outcome is not random only because our knowledge is limited it appears random. Are you proposing that your lack of knowledge of the first card means that it has not yet been determined and are we falling into one of these "if a tree falls in the forest and no hears it does it make a sound" kind of arguments?
That's not a problem at all. There is an objective order to the deck, yes, and we can hold that abstract thought in our minds as we view the world around us through our subjective eyes. The position of the card in the deck, whatever it may be, is determined. It is the uncertainty of outcome that exists for the individual drawing a card that makes his selection a random one. This is what randomness is about: an inability to discern the pattern.

That's not a problem at all. There is an objective order to the deck, yes, and we can hold that abstract thought in our minds as we view the world around us through our subjective eyes. The position of the card in the deck, whatever it may be, is determined. It is the uncertainty of outcome that exists for the individual drawing a card that makes his selection a random one. This is what randomness is about: an inability to discern the pattern.
That implies randomness is an inverse function of intelligence. So wouldn't that make the degree to which your life is pre-determined a function of your intelligence? Seems a little paradoxical.
[/not entirely serious point]

No one responded my statements.

Determinism cannot be declared as true or false, for reasons already stated. The same can be said of free will.

So, the basis on whether or not we believe one or the other should be not be based on truthfulness (as determinism and indeterminism are equally valid), but rather, the basis for believing in one or the other should be it's consequences.

Determinism implies moral irresponsibility. Indeterminism implies freedom and responsibility-things that are not only the foundation for happiness, but what society require in order to exist.

Therefore, it's unknown whether determinism is true, but we should not accept it as true, because of the moral and emotional consequences.

And again, the THEORY of Quantum indetermism is faulty in that it was built by a human or humans. No proof we give that the world is anything less than 100% predictable actually proves that is, it only proves that with our current knowledge and equipment we can only prove to x% predictability. The argument for determinism will always be philosophical, because there is no chance we will ever be omniscient and anything less is flawed. We are only talking about how we believe the world to work. There is no evidence for or against determinism and I sincerely doubt there ever will be.

Go study the mathematics of the Bell inequalities. They are hard proof of the indeterminism of quantum mechanics and they are empiricaly verified. Now yes, one can question whether quantum mechanics is a valid description of the world, but one can always question any ontology. We are limited there. Does that mean, however that we should throw our hands in the air and say "We can't know the ultimate truth, so I will just believe anything I feel like believing". You can take it to mean that if you want, I prefer to adopt a policy of believing whatever self consistent theory best predicts and describes the empirical evidence we have. At the moment, quantum mecahanics is by far the best theory we have ever had in these terms. I choose to accept it as being valid. Therefore I have to deny determinism.

That's not a problem at all. There is an objective order to the deck, yes, and we can hold that abstract thought in our minds as we view the world around us through our subjective eyes. The position of the card in the deck, whatever it may be, is determined. It is the uncertainty of outcome that exists for the individual drawing a card that makes his selection a random one. This is what randomness is about: an inability to discern the pattern.

We are not talking about your ability to discern the outcome. The deck is determined and we are talking about determinism. Determinism has nothing to do with human knowledge or human ability to predict outcome. It only says that the outcome is fixed and that if we knew enough about the universe and the variables it could be predicted. We don't know enough and probably never will. You agree that we don't know enough so where's the problem.

No one responded my statements.

Determinism cannot be declared as true or false, for reasons already stated. The same can be said of free will.

So, the basis on whether or not we believe one or the other should be not be based on truthfulness (as determinism and indeterminism are equally valid), but rather, the basis for believing in one or the other should be it's consequences.

Determinism implies moral irresponsibility. Indeterminism implies freedom and responsibility-things that are not only the foundation for happiness, but what society require in order to exist.

Therefore, it's unknown whether determinism is true, but we should not accept it as true, because of the moral and emotional consequences.

I agree that we have sort of a social contract to behave as if free will exists whether it does or not.

Having read the Hawking article I see very plainly why our ability to predict is limited, but I still don't understand how causality is undermined. Just because we can't observe and don't understand the rules that a black hole behaves according to doesn't mean they don't exist. Just because we can no longer predict the behavior of particles around a black hole does not mean that they do not behave by some causal chain of events.

I freely admit that you know much more about this than I do, so if I am wrong it will be no skin off of my back to admit it, so explain away.

I wish I could explain this without having to go into fairly complex mathematics. I will try without the math first, if that does not work, and you want to see the math, I will dig it out (It is nasty though).
You read the Hawkings article (not to long or technical I hope). Do you remember in about the third or fourth paragraph on the first page he talks about hidden variable theories being eliminated due to the experimental confirmation of the work of Bell. What Bell had done was to show that if there were local hidden real variables then when certain measurements were made on what are called entangled particles, then there were certain relationships that had to hold, regardless of what these hidden variables were. These relationships were of the form P1 < P2, hence the name Bell inequalities. For the adventurous and brave reader (with good eyesight unless you use CTRL + + on firefox) it is all explained here (http://www.objectivescience.com/articles/tn_bell_1.htm) (five pages, but has maths in it.) Now the measurements specified by Bell can and have been made. Famously by Aspect, but also by others. One problem here is that these are mathematical physicists, and they do not like to write papers that us non mathematical physicists can understand. (I am a philosopher, with a particular interest in the philosophy of science, hence the background here, but I am no great shakes as a mathematician). What I can give is a link to an abstract that says in plain English the the Bell inequalities have been shown to be violated. This is here (http://uk.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0007044)

So now we have the situation of a mathematical proof that if something is determined by the previous state of the universe certain inequalities will hold, and the empirical evidence that these inequalities do not hold. To me this is prof that causal determinism does not apply to the world. It basicaly says that given an event, what follows from it is probable, not certain. Now causality has always been framed in terms of certainty. If I do this thing, then that thing will happen. If I let go of my pencil in mid air, it will fall to the ground (in a gravitational field of course). What we now have evidence of is that if I let go of my pencil in mid air, it is only very very likely indeed that it will fall to the ground. There is a chance, ridiculously smal, but still a chance that it could do one of an almost infinite number of other things. (These chances are not equal.) The world is now only probabilistic.

As I have said in my post prior to this one, this is all only theory at a philosophical level. We can not even prove that anything exists, let alone how things that may not exist interact with other things that may not exist. I still, however, prefer to make the reasonable assumption that there is an external world and our science is making a good fist of describing it.

Go study the mathematics of the Bell inequalities. They are hard proof of the indeterminism of quantum mechanics and they are empiricaly verified. Now yes, one can question whether quantum mechanics is a valid description of the world, but one can always question any ontology. We are limited there. Does that mean, however that we should throw our hands in the air and say "We can't know the ultimate truth, so I will just believe anything I feel like believing". You can take it to mean that if you want, I prefer to adopt a policy of believing whatever self consistent theory best predicts and describes the empirical evidence we have. At the moment, quantum mecahanics is by far the best theory we have ever had in these terms. I choose to accept it as being valid. Therefore I have to deny determinism.

Ok, I'm not going to laugh at your bolding of proof. You can't prove indeterminism no matter how hard you try. It's not possible. You're not the first one to claim you had hard proof for something that was later disproven. You make assumptions about my familiarity with physics and mathematics and you can all you wish (I'm a computer engineer with a minor in mathematics), but this is strictly a philosophical argument.

I forgot where I saw this, but I saw this on television yesterday and it applies here and it's only a philosophical argument. "Just because every time in the past I dropped a quarter it fell to the ground, doesn't mean if I drop one now it won't fly up into the sky."(paraphrased). Obviously, it would be irresponsible to act is if, when I drop a quarter it might not fall towards the ground, but if it did fly up in the sky it would force us to reevaluate our theories on gravity. This isn't likely, but philosophically the point is that we base our theories on knowledge that is fallible.

Don't tell me you think there is no amount of growth and reevaluation that goes on in mathematics, because there was a time when it could be said beyond a shadow of a doubt that two plus two is always four, but if you're familiar with advanced mathematics, you know this only applies to general mathematics and that it's not always a fair assumption in some particular forms of advanced mathematics.

EDIT: I wrote this without reading your previous post. That's pretty funny that we used the same example to suggest exactly opposite things. My point is that if our theories (such as gravity) suddenly turn out to be untrue then this only questions are knowledge of causality and not the existence of causality.

Ok, I'm not going to laugh at your bolding of proof. You can't prove indeterminism no matter how hard you try. It's not possible. You're not the first one to claim you had hard proof for something that was later disproven. You make assumptions about my familiarity with physics and mathematics and you can all you wish (I'm a computer engineer with a minor in mathematics), but this is strictly a philosophical argument.

I forgot where I saw this, but I saw this on television yesterday and it applies here and it's only a philosophical argument. "Just because every time in the past I dropped a quarter it fell to the ground, doesn't mean if I drop one now it won't fly up into the sky."(paraphrased). Obviously, it would be irresponsible to act is if, when I drop a quarter it might not fall towards the ground, but if it did fly up in the sky it would force us to reevaluate our theories on gravity. This isn't likely, but philosophically the point is that we base our theories on knowledge that is fallible.

Don't tell me you think there is no amount of growth and reevaluation that goes on in mathematics, because there was a time when it could be said beyond a shadow of a doubt that two plus two is always four, but if you're familiar with advanced mathematics, you know this only applies to general mathematics and that it's not always a fair assumption in some particular forms of advanced mathematics.

EDIT: I wrote this without reading your previous post. That's pretty funny that we used the same example to suggest exactly opposite things. My point is that if our theories (such as gravity) suddenly turn out to be untrue then this only questions are knowledge of causality and not the existence of causality.


You did not read my post you replied to in much detail either. I accept that it is a philosophical discussion at the bottom, as is every single thing that anyone ever discussed at any time. You are a computer engineer with a minor in mathematics, I am a joint honours graduate in computer science and philosophy and holsd a Mastrs degree in the philosophy of science. We are both qualified to hold opinions, but whoopee, so is everyone else. The qualifications do not mean that you understand it any better than I or I any better than you or either of us any better than my 8 year old son.

What is happening here is that you are starting from one unprovable basic assumption and using this to question my equally unprovable basic assumption. I am doing the reverse. Do you agree on that? If not please justify your assumptions. I recognise that my position is based on at least the assumptions:
1. There is some kind of objective reality, unknowable, but real (in my meaning of the term Willamena, not yours OK);
2. That science is asymptotically approaching some kind of truth about this reality. It will never reach it, but it is a lot closer than it was;
3. The organisation that the human mind imposes upon our perceptions is necessary and inescapable in visualisation;
4. Mathematics does not change with time, it grows as it expands into new areas;
5. The only solid proofs that can exist are tautological ones in mathematics and logic. (Type checking proofs in computing terms);
6. We are justified in accepting empirical data as we have no alternative to this, and it has been functionally useful.

We base our theories on two things. Empirical evidence and mathematical modelling. The empirical evidence side of scientific theories really no longer plays a major role in the development of the theory. (See SST or M-brane theory for evidence of the complete seperation of theory from empirical evidence at times. I have philosophical problems with these being described as theories, rather than beliefs.) Quantum mechanics is only a theory. But it is the most thoroughly verified theory we have ever had, far more so than gravity, or the laws of thermodynamics or anything else you care to name. Now quantum mechanics is a mathematical description of the relationships between matter and energy and the interations thereof. This description generates, by mathematics the Bell inequalities. This is solid for me on the basis of assumptins 4 and 5 above. Now you add in the Aspect experimental results (assumption 6) and on my admitted assumptions you have a proof of non determinism. To deny this proof you would have to:
a: show the error in the derivation of the Bell equalities, which is the line that the EPR followers try to take most often. (challenging the non locality conditions primarily)
b: deny one or more of assumptions 4, 5, or 6 given above. This you are welcome to do, but please do it explicitly. Say which assumption you disagree with and what assumption you make in its place. My guess is that you wil challenge 6, but it is up to you.

You did not read my post you replied to in much detail either. I accept that it is a philosophical discussion at the bottom, as is every single thing that anyone ever discussed at any time. You are a computer engineer with a minor in mathematics, I am a joint honours graduate in computer science and philosophy and holsd a Mastrs degree in the philosophy of science. We are both qualified to hold opinions, but whoopee, so is everyone else. The qualifications do not mean that you understand it any better than I or I any better than you or either of us any better than my 8 year old son.

What is happening here is that you are starting from one unprovable basic assumption and using this to question my equally unprovable basic assumption. I am doing the reverse. Do you agree on that? If not please justify your assumptions. I recognise that my position is based on at least the assumptions:
1. There is some kind of objective reality, unknowable, but real (in my meaning of the term Willamena, not yours OK);
2. That science is asymptotically approaching some kind of truth about this reality. It will never reach it, but it is a lot closer than it was;
3. The organisation that the human mind imposes upon our perceptions is necessary and inescapable in visualisation;
4. Mathematics does not change with time, it grows as it expands into new areas;
5. The only solid proofs that can exist are tautological ones in mathematics and logic. (Type checking proofs in computing terms);
6. We are justified in accepting empirical data as we have no alternative to this, and it has been functionally useful.

We base our theories on two things. Empirical evidence and mathematical modelling. The empirical evidence side of scientific theories really no longer plays a major role in the development of the theory. (See SST or M-brane theory for evidence of the complete seperation of theory from empirical evidence at times. I have philosophical problems with these being described as theories, rather than beliefs.) Quantum mechanics is only a theory. But it is the most thoroughly verified theory we have ever had, far more so than gravity, or the laws of thermodynamics or anything else you care to name. Now quantum mechanics is a mathematical description of the relationships between matter and energy and the interations thereof. This description generates, by mathematics the Bell inequalities. This is solid for me on the basis of assumptins 4 and 5 above. Now you add in the Aspect experimental results (assumption 6) and on my admitted assumptions you have a proof of non determinism. To deny this proof you would have to:
a: show the error in the derivation of the Bell equalities, which is the line that the EPR followers try to take most often. (challenging the non locality conditions primarily)
b: deny one or more of assumptions 4, 5, or 6 given above. This you are welcome to do, but please do it explicitly. Say which assumption you disagree with and what assumption you make in its place. My guess is that you wil challenge 6, but it is up to you.

Last I checked I didn't accuse you of not being able to understand, you did accuse me, so I gave you my credentials. I absolutely agree that neither of us can prove it and have said so. You suggested that there was proof against determinism and I only disputed that assumption. I have never disputed your belief that determinism does not actually happen. If you read my previous posts I have only disputed the nature of determisim and what it means to other theories and have asserted my beliefs. I have never discounted your beliefs, only your arguments to assert your beliefs.

I agree with 1, 2, 3, 4 (but assertions based on mathematics do change), I believe that in a philosophical discussion no solid proofs exist, only logical supporting arguments do, 6 (and have said as much).

You make an error here. Given the nature of determinism I don't base my opinions on emperical evidence as it is a flawed way of looking at something of this nature as you yourself have as much as said. I do base my theories on mathematical evidence or emperical data as it has no place in determinism as it only can add to or detract from the idea if we are omniscient, since we aren't it's not really valid.

I would argue that quantum mechanics qualifies as a thoery moreso than almost any theory ever held. It incorporates more philosophy than any theory I've ever heard of. I believe it was Einstein said that the correct answer is the most elegant one. Quantum theory is not elegant and requires itself as proof. I believe one day we will come up with a theory that actually can show the location of a particle and as I feel this is more elegant I also feel it is more accurate, We simply haven't uncovered it yet. I feel quantum mechanics is as flawed as our initial views of that atom and much like the physics surrounding it, you can't show your view is any more vailid than mine nor is it more accepted. I actually disagree with the way it is taught currently as it is being treated as more than a theory in most colleges.

As far as gravity, I think most people would challenge the theory of gravity if it said that I could only guess at what direction the penny would go when I let go of it. Calling quantum mechanics more proven than gravity is like saying Nikes are more comfortable than a Sleep comfort mattress. Not really comparable. At all.

Omnipotence has nothing to do with knowing anything.

By definition, no it does not. Omnipotence is about "power" or "capacity" or however you wish to express it. Of course, I don't see how that's relevant to my post so you may have to explain why that fact matters at all.

The knowledge side of the God business is handled by the department of omniscience.

Why do you say that? Does your God-concept have a "separation of powers" existence in which each of God's abilities stem from a particular organ (ie the "omniscience organ" and the "omnipotence organ") that exist independently of each other within one entity?

Omnipotence is paradoxical in itself anyway

Why do you say that? I've always found that omnipotence (by definition) could overcome any problem that we perceive it as creating, including a violation of the Law of Non-contradiction.

By definition, no it does not. Omnipotence is about "power" or "capacity" or however you wish to express it. Of course, I don't see how that's relevant to my post so you may have to explain why that fact matters at all.
You limked omnipotence to knowledge. I simply denied this linkage. You may not find it relevant but then why did you say "If said God were also omnipotent, could it not be that said God can know our future actions despite the universe being non-deterministic?" where I have hioghlighted the linkage.



Why do you say that? Does your God-concept have a "separation of powers" existence in which each of God's abilities stem from a particular organ (ie the "omniscience organ" and the "omnipotence organ") that exist independently of each other within one entity?
I don't actually have a God concept, so no. A little light humour on my part is all, sorry if it offended you, it was not intended to be offensive. It was I suppose a subconscious dig at the standard concept of God as being omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, which I have difficulty comprehending how anyone can believe. That is, however because I do not believe it.

Why do you say that? I've always found that omnipotence (by definition) could overcome any problem that we perceive it as creating, including a violation of the Law of Non-contradiction.

Have God create a wall he can not demolish then. One or the other He can not do. He can either create it, in which case he can not demolish it, or he can not create it.

Last I checked I didn't accuse you of not being able to understand, you did accuse me, so I gave you my credentials. I absolutely agree that neither of us can prove it and have said so. You suggested that there was proof against determinism and I only disputed that assumption. I have never disputed your belief that determinism does not actually happen. If you read my previous posts I have only disputed the nature of determisim and what it means to other theories and have asserted my beliefs. I have never discounted your beliefs, only your arguments to assert your beliefs.
You agree and have said so? What is this then, from your previous post?
Ok, I'm not going to laugh at your bolding of proof. You can't prove indeterminism no matter how hard you try. It's not possible.

There is a self contradiction in stating categorically that proof is not possible. Can you see that? I assume you can, but you keep overlooking it. To give the benefit of the doubt, I will assume that it is a habitual expression rather than a considerd opinion.

I agree with 1, 2, 3, 4 (but assertions based on mathematics do change), I believe that in a philosophical discussion no solid proofs exist, only logical supporting arguments do, 6 (and have said as much).

You make an error here. Given the nature of determinism I don't base my opinions on emperical evidence as it is a flawed way of looking at something of this nature as you yourself have as much as said. I do base my theories on mathematical evidence or emperical data as it has no place in determinism as it only can add to or detract from the idea if we are omniscient, since we aren't it's not really valid.
I am assuming that this second paragraph is a refutal of my assumption 6. (Something went wrong either in your post, or in my understanding of it that has left it a little muddled)
So theory is not the same as opinion for you as one, opinion, you do not base on empirical evidence, whilst the other, theory, you base on mathematical evidence and empirical data. The alternative is that you mean empirical data is not empirical evidence, which makes even less sense.
I take it that you are arguing that we can not know if the world is deterministic or not. I have never denied this. My argument was clear, or at least I thought so, in stating that the best scientific theory we have at the moment denies that the world is deterministic. Accepting this theory is a matter of belief. There is no pretension to omniscience, nor any requirement for this here.

I would argue that quantum mechanics qualifies as a thoery moreso than almost any theory ever held. It incorporates more philosophy than any theory I've ever heard of. I believe it was Einstein said that the correct answer is the most elegant one. Quantum theory is not elegant and requires itself as proof. I believe one day we will come up with a theory that actually can show the location of a particle and as I feel this is more elegant I also feel it is more accurate, We simply haven't uncovered it yet. I feel quantum mechanics is as flawed as our initial views of that atom and much like the physics surrounding it, you can't show your view is any more vailid than mine nor is it more accepted. I actually disagree with the way it is taught currently as it is being treated as more than a theory in most colleges.
You are accepting that QM is a theory. So am I. You are denying that you accept the theory as being a good description of the world. Fine. You do not understand the implications of the Bell inequalities and the empirical violation of them if you state "I believe one day we will come up with a theory that actually can show the location of a particle". This is rather like stating that you do not believe that the force of gravitational attraction between two masses is proportional to the square root of the distance between the centre of mass of the two masses. Until there is empirical evidence that the bell inequalities are confirmed, the theory holds. Until there is empirical evidence of gravitational attraction obeying some other relationship the square root of distance law holds. To argue that science should not be taught, is to argue for a return to the middle ages where all knowledge was restricted to religious edict and the works of Aristotle and Augustine. If you prefer this, then go ahead, close your mind to theory, depend only upon revelation, but do not think that you have any right impose it on others. If this is not your opinion, why are you treating QM in the same way that creationists treat evolution?

As far as gravity, I think most people would challenge the theory of gravity if it said that I could only guess at what direction the penny would go when I let go of it. Calling quantum mechanics more proven than gravity is like saying Nikes are more comfortable than a Sleep comfort mattress. Not really comparable. At all.

That is all that the theory of gravity does say in the end. There is actually no explanatory value to Newton's theory of gravity. It is just a mathematical description of observed events to date. Now, just because something has always happened in the past does not mean that it will always happen in the future. (All swans are white, after all, aren't they.) The comparison of two empiricaly confirmable theories depends upon their status as such. The teory of gravity predicts future empirically measurable events. The measurement of these and comparison to the prediction is a measure of the theories success. QM does exactly the same, and it too can be assessed in this way. Now the quantity, accuracy and frequency of these empirical checks can be compared. This is what I was comparing. QM is the most thoroughly verified theory we have ever had. You could compare the comfort of a nike to a sleep comfort mattress if ecah of them provided means by which their claims could be verified. As they don't (not being theories), then this comparison can not be made. A very bad analogy.

You have not responded to the request to clearly state your assumptions. Please do so.

I'll break up my quote of you this time, like you did for me, and I think my replies will make more sense.

You agree and have said so? What is this then, from your previous post?

There is a self contradiction in stating categorically that proof is not possible. Can you see that? I assume you can, but you keep overlooking it. To give the benefit of the doubt, I will assume that it is a habitual expression rather than a considerd opinion.

First, where is the contradiction? You showed twice where I said proof of determinism does not exist.

I am assuming that this second paragraph is a refutal of my assumption 6. (Something went wrong either in your post, or in my understanding of it that has left it a little muddled)
So theory is not the same as opinion for you as one, opinion, you do not base on empirical evidence, whilst the other, theory, you base on mathematical evidence and empirical data. The alternative is that you mean empirical data is not empirical evidence, which makes even less sense.

The second paragraph was to refute the paragraph after your list of six items where you said we base our theories on two things. We base our scientific theories on those things, but not our philosophical theories. Many philosophical theories are based on strings of logic. They may or may not be supported by emperical evidence, but depending on the theories this really doesn't play into the validity of the theory. We are using two different definitions of theory.

1 : the analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another
2 : abstract thought : SPECULATION


I take it that you are arguing that we can not know if the world is deterministic or not. I have never denied this. My argument was clear, or at least I thought so, in stating that the best scientific theory we have at the moment denies that the world is deterministic. Accepting this theory is a matter of belief. There is no pretension to omniscience, nor any requirement for this here.

I think I was clear, but I'll try again. I am not arguing the existence of emperical evidence or it's appropriateness in other discussions. My point is that emperical evidence has no bearing on my belief in determinism and really doesn't fit into any theory of determinism. You might as well suggest to me that you have emperical evidence that proves God doesn't exist. You don't and you can't. That's the point. In fact, I agree with what someone said earlier about the existence of an omniscient God would mean determinism is valid because omniscience implies that God knows the result of every action before it happens. So you are in effect claiming that you emperical evidence that disputes the existence of an omniscient God. Do you see why I might dispute the appropriateness of claiming you have emperical evidence that has anything to do with this discussion.

You do not understand the implications of the Bell inequalities and the empirical violation of them if you state "I believe one day we will come up with a theory that actually can show the location of a particle".

No, actually I do. I also believe that a renowned scientist once said that everything that could be known was known (best memory of the quote). I believe that at one point we claimed that atoms were the smallest particle. I make the claim that quantum theory holds because of limitations in our knowledge and technology and that when we improve both we will eventually come up with new theories about subatomic particles. Are you claiming that new technology and new information hasn't disproved theories in the past? Do you think we've reached a stage where this won't occur any longer?



That is all that the theory of gravity does say in the end. There is actually no explanatory value to Newton's theory of gravity. It is just a mathematical description of observed events to date. Now, just because something has always happened in the past does not mean that it will always happen in the future. (All swans are white, after all, aren't they.) The comparison of two empiricaly confirmable theories depends upon their status as such. The teory of gravity predicts future empirically measurable events. The measurement of these and comparison to the prediction is a measure of the theories success. QM does exactly the same, and it too can be assessed in this way. Now the quantity, accuracy and frequency of these empirical checks can be compared. This is what I was comparing. QM is the most thoroughly verified theory we have ever had. You could compare the comfort of a nike to a sleep comfort mattress if ecah of them provided means by which their claims could be verified. As they don't (not being theories), then this comparison can not be made. A very bad analogy.

You have not responded to the request to clearly state your assumptions. Please do so.

If you want to discuss quantum mechanics start a new thread and it has no bearing on determinism. Let's say I created a theory that said that I could predict the outcome of rolling a dice and I said that I could predict the outcome of rolling a dice, but I only predict that the outcome will be 1 seventeen percent of the time and that the rest of the time it will be something other than one. Would you say that theory appears to be incomplete? Admittedly, it's a horrible exaggeration, but which of the two theories you're comparing would be closer to the dice theory, gravity or qm? I believe qm should be taught as it is a useful theory and does have applications. I also believe that QM injects philosophy into science and the fact this occurring should be admitted. My physics teacher implied as you do that this is the most proven theory ever created. QM is a lot more disputed theory than, say, gravity. I just want teachers to admit to students that this is just the best we can do right now, because we need to mathematically address quantum mechanics so we just put up with the best we have.

This is what randomness is about: an inability to discern the pattern.
That implies randomness is an inverse function of intelligence. So wouldn't that make the degree to which your life is pre-determined a function of your intelligence? Seems a little paradoxical.
[/not entirely serious point]
Well, in the case stated it has nothing to do with intelligence, since the randomness is introduced deliberately.

We are not talking about your ability to discern the outcome. The deck is determined and we are talking about determinism. Determinism has nothing to do with human knowledge or human ability to predict outcome. It only says that the outcome is fixed and that if we knew enough about the universe and the variables it could be predicted. We don't know enough and probably never will. You agree that we don't know enough so where's the problem.
Determinism says that what happens next is entirely determined by what came before. I am saying that this is an entirely different matter to the individual, from his subjective view, than it is objectively, as a mental exercise. Both the subjective and objective views are necessary to fully describe the world, and from the subjective view, randomness exists. If you want to limit discussion to the objective view, I have nothing more to say, as that doesn't interest me as much (it's not practical).

Determinism says that what happens next is entirely determined by what came before. I am saying that this is an entirely different matter to the individual, from his subjective view, than it is objectively, as a mental exercise. Both the subjective and objective views are necessary to fully describe the world, and from the subjective view, randomness exists. If you want to limit discussion to the objective view, I have nothing more to say, as that doesn't interest me as much (it's not as practical).

Ok, that's fair. I agree that we have to treat the world in a way that is based on what we experience and not based on some objective philosophical theory that has no bearing on what we experience. It would be irresponsible to do otherwise. I said earlier that we should behave as if free will exists whether it does or not. I think it's part of the social contract.

You're right in that the original discussion was about the application of determinism in the real world. I guess I got away from that. That's probably the point that Alien Born is trying to make as well. I thought we were discussing the ideas behind determinism and not it's application.

You're right in that the original discussion was about the application of determinism in the real world. I guess I got away from that. That's probably the point that Alien Born is trying to make as well. I thought we were discussing the ideas behind determinism and not it's application.

You got it. That is the point I was trying to make. (I only enterd into the discussion of QM due to VO saying that he could not see how anything could not be causal.)

You got it. That is the point I was trying to make. (I only enterd into the discussion of QM due to VO saying that he could not see how anything could not be causal.)

Well, determinism has no bearing on moral responsibility. The belief in moral responsibility is part of the social contract. The current flaws in our society I think stem from a violation of that contract and holding people to personal moral responsibility. If a man raped my sister and I saw him on the street I'd tear his heart out, but I would also expect to be punished by the government for my actions.

Edit: Was my last reply with the broken out quoting clearer?

Well, determinism has no bearing on moral responsibility. The belief in moral responsibility is part of the social contract. The current flaws in our society I think stem from a violation of that contract and holding people to personal moral responsibility. If a man raped my sister and I saw him on the street I'd tear his heart out, but I would also expect to be punished by the government for my actions.

Edit: Was my last reply with the broken out quoting clearer?
Just out of curiosity, you use the phrase "the social contract" with an obviously implicit meaning. What does it mean (to you)?

Just out of curiosity, you use the phrase "the social contract" with an obviously implicit meaning. What does it mean (to you)?

Well, briefly, the social contract we must hold to can be disputed but it refers to behaviors that are necessary to avoid chaos, to maintain a society.

EDIT: http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/soc-cont.htm

Well, determinism has no bearing on moral responsibility. The belief in moral responsibility is part of the social contract. The current flaws in our society I think stem from a violation of that contract and holding people to personal moral responsibility. If a man raped my sister and I saw him on the street I'd tear his heart out, but I would also expect to be punished by the government for my actions.

Edit: Was my last reply with the broken out quoting clearer?

To answer the last question first. Yes. I have, however decided to let it be, as it is, as you rightly indicated a complete sidetrack.

The belief in moral responsability as part of the social contract is fine if you believe in such a mythology. I (obviously) do not. Messrs. Locke and Rousseau have a lot to answer for here. That too, however, is another debate. ;)

Now if you do not believe in a social contract view and you are constrained to determinism by the terms of the debate. It is difficult to see morality as being anything more than a post hoc justification. Personal responsability, which is to me the foundation of moral judgement, has been removed by the premiss of determinism. This determinism has to apply to both the external physical world and the internal subjective world. If it does not apply to our thinking then we could genuinely desire to do one thing and still do another if the physical world is determined

That being said, punishment and moral evaluation and evertything else that we describe as moral behaviour could still occur. Just that this would be determined behaviour, and thereby illusiory in moral terms.

To answer the last question first. Yes. I have, however decided to let it be, as it is, as you rightly indicated a complete sidetrack.

The belief in moral responsability as part of the social contract is fine if you believe in such a mythology. I (obviously) do not. Messrs. Locke and Rousseau have a lot to answer for here. That too, however, is another debate. ;)

Now if you do not believe in a social contract view and you are constrained to determinism by the terms of the debate. It is difficult to see morality as being anything more than a post hoc justification. Personal responsability, which is to me the foundation of moral judgement, has been removed by the premiss of determinism. This determinism has to apply to both the external physical world and the internal subjective world. If it does not apply to our thinking then we could genuinely desire to do one thing and still do another if the physical world is determined

That being said, punishment and moral evaluation and evertything else that we describe as moral behaviour could still occur. Just that this would be determined behaviour, and thereby illusiory in moral terms.

Well, I still would make the argument that whether or not determinism is in fact the reality of the universe we hold an obligation to act as if free will exists. It really doesn't matter if free will is a valid premise, it only matters that without a belief in personal responsibility actions slowly degrade into chaos. If you believe that we have no personal responsibility and should behave as such then if a guy cuts you off in traffic, shoot him and the government shouldn't punish you as you can't help it. This in turn changes the environment for other people who "wish" to shoot someone in traffic and then their decision-making program doesn't discourage them from shooting people in traffic and so on and so forth.

The fact that you are having this discussion with me suggests that you feel that your and my understanding of a subject has a bearing on actions, otherwise it's all just so much breath.

Well, I still would make the argument that whether or not determinism is in fact the reality of the universe we hold an obligation to act as if free will exists.
In "holding that obligation" you make a choice. So the question of whether determinism applies would seem to be already decided, in your mind at least.

Well, in the case stated it has nothing to do with intelligence, since the randomness is introduced deliberately.
Yes, I was taking your line shamelessly out of context. I apologise; I have a fondness for weak jokes.

Well, I still would make the argument that whether or not determinism is in fact the reality of the universe we hold an obligation to act as if free will exists. It really doesn't matter if free will is a valid premise, it only matters that without a belief in personal responsibility actions slowly degrade into chaos. If you believe that we have no personal responsibility and should behave as such then if a guy cuts you off in traffic, shoot him and the government shouldn't punish you as you can't help it. This in turn changes the environment for other people who "wish" to shoot someone in traffic and then their decision-making program doesn't discourage them from shooting people in traffic and so on and so forth.

The fact that you are having this discussion with me suggests that you feel that your and my understanding of a subject has a bearing on actions, otherwise it's all just so much breath.

I do believe in free will, which is why I am participating in the discussion. However the terms of the discussion are those of presuming determinism.

Under that presumption, our beliefs make no difference. What will happen will happen. Under determinism we do not have personal responsability because we do not choose to do anything, we are constrained by the deterministic nature of the universe and if we shoot the road hog, and the police arrest us for that, that is what was always going to happen. (Belief in free will or not.)
Our actions, under determinism, do affect the environment, but we can not make actions to intentionally cause some future effect, we only act due to circumstances in the past.

In "holding that obligation" you make a choice. So the question of whether determinism applies would seem to be already decided, in your mind at least.

No I perform an act called holding that obligation. Choice does is not proven or implied. If determinism holds I can't help but hold that obligation, but I still do it. My "programming" forces me to believe that I am performing under my own free will even if I am not. Notice FORCES.

I do believe in free will, which is why I am participating in the discussion. However the terms of the discussion are those of presuming determinism.

Under that presumption, our beliefs make no difference. What will happen will happen. Under determinism we do not have personal responsability because we do not choose to do anything, we are constrained by the deterministic nature of the universe and if we shoot the road hog, and the police arrest us for that, that is what was always going to happen. (Belief in free will or not.)
Our actions, under determinism, do affect the environment, but we can not make actions to intentionally cause some future effect, we only act due to circumstances in the past.

Going back to the programming argument, our programming requires us to perform under the social contract to prevent the breakdown of society.

I believge in punishment not for retribution but for pragmatic reasons. Severely punish criminals and watch the crime rates fall.

Going back to the programming argument, our programming requires us to perform under the social contract to prevent the breakdown of society.

Yes that is one possible an interpretation. There are others that do not need to introduce any hypothetical contract. For example, Leibniz's Monadology:

In the writings of the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, monads are atomistic mental objects which experience the world from a particular point of view. Leibniz's theory does not posit physical space; rather, physical objects are constructs of the collective experiences of monads. This way of putting it is misleading, however; monads do not interact with each other (are "windowless"), but rather are imbued at creation with all their future experiences in a system of pre-established harmony. The arrangements of the monads make up the faith and structure of this world, which to Leibniz was "the best of all possible worlds".
Link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monad)


If each and every awareness in the world is pre progarmmed to act in specific ways then we can arrive at our phenomenal experience without having any world or causality whatsoever. But all totally determined by the "clock maker" as Leibniz thought of God. This would include all our apparent moral actions and all apparent moral decisions.

Just an alternative.

With the revolution in thinking about the physical world, that occurred at the end of the 19th century and culminated 100 years ago with the description of quantum physics, determinism went out the window for good.

Just because quantum physics doesnt seem to be caused, it doesnt mean its not caused. In the past we thought the world was flat, and we didnt understand gravity. Over the centuries people have figured out scientifical explainiations for all those "we dont know why..." statements. This is no different. Phsyicists today know more than physicists a hundred years ago, and a hundred, even a thousand years from now they will have found so many more explainations for the things that happen. Quantum Physycists may be smart comapred to the average person, but they arent perfect, they dont know everything, and they still have much to learn.

I believe that quantum physics is not random at all. I believe it couldnt possibly be random. Things dont just move for no reason.

Just because quantum physics doesnt seem to be caused, it doesnt mean its not caused. In the past we thought the world was flat, and we didnt understand gravity. Over the centuries people have figured out scientifical explainiations for all those "we dont know why..." statements. This is no different. Phsyicists today know more than physicists a hundred years ago, and a hundred, even a thousand years from now they will have found so many more explainations for the things that happen. Quantum Physycists may be smart comapred to the average person, but they arent perfect, they dont know everything, and they still have much to learn.

I believe that quantum physics is not random at all. I believe it couldnt possibly be random. Things dont just move for no reason.

I am not going to repost it all.
First read this lecture
Does god play dice? (http://www.hawking.org.uk/lectures/dice.html)


Then read this (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=8512716&postcount=102)

Then ask any questions that remain.

I am not going to repost it all.
First read this lecture
Does god play dice? (http://www.hawking.org.uk/lectures/dice.html)


Then read this (http://forums.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=8512716&postcount=102)

Then ask any questions that remain.

I agree with Einstein. Scientists have a habit of coming up with pompous theories that they claim can never be disproven and the more sure they are the more often they are proven hideously wrong. QM is a pompous theory that uses itself as a proof that it can't be disproven. Yes, all tests we have conducted so far have upheld QM, but please admit that our knowledge is limited as is our technology. QM works with current knowledge and technology much as many other theories were always upheld when technology and knowledge was more limited and then were disproven as we advanced. And I'll define pompous as I mean it here - "The wave function contains all that one can know of the particle..."

Yes that is one possible an interpretation. There are others that do not need to introduce any hypothetical contract. For example, Leibniz's Monadology:



If each and every awareness in the world is pre progarmmed to act in specific ways then we can arrive at our phenomenal experience without having any world or causality whatsoever. But all totally determined by the "clock maker" as Leibniz thought of God. This would include all our apparent moral actions and all apparent moral decisions.

Just an alternative.

That reason for describing things in the way you showed just now is to give the existence and behavior of things a causality. Whether you believe rain is caused by droplets forming in a cloud or little gnomes crying, there is still a causality. Causality does not cease to exist because we can't define it.

That reason for describing things in the way you showed just now is to give the existence and behavior of things a causality. Whether you believe rain is caused by droplets forming in a cloud or little gnomes crying, there is still a causality. Causality does not cease to exist because we can't define it.

Stop.

I am now discussing how the world could work, and how morality is part of that, if meaninglessly so, under determinism. Detrminism does require causality.

I, do not, in my own beliefs, hold that either determinism or pure causality are good descriptions of the world. However we are discussing this under the premise that the universe is purely deterministic. Remember?

I agree with Einstein. Scientists have a habit of coming up with pompous theories that they claim can never be disproven and the more sure they are the more often they are proven hideously wrong. QM is a pompous theory that uses itself as a proof that it can't be disproven. Yes, all tests we have conducted so far have upheld QM, but please admit that our knowledge is limited as is our technology. QM works with current knowledge and technology much as many other theories were always upheld when technology and knowledge was more limited and then were disproven as we advanced. And I'll define pompous as I mean it here - "The wave function contains all that one can know of the particle..."

You agree with Einstein, but then deny QM, which derives directly from his work. An interestingly inconsistent position. You have not understood the nature of the denial of the hidden variable theories by the Bell inequalities being violated. This is not QM proving itself, it is simply a scientific proof (mathematical derivation and empirical verification) that either all of QM is wrong or there are no hidden variables.
You can deny QM if you wish, but then you will be under an obligation to present a better theory, one which is at least as reliable in prediction and description of known phenomena, that does not have indeterminacy as a part of it, and is empiracally verifiable.
Or you could simply say "it ain't so cos I know it ain't so". It says so right here in this book. i.e. a religious style closed belief argument.

I, not being able to do better than QM for a theory of matter, prefer to accept the consequences that it brings, until such time that it is superceded as the best theory we have. I have not said that the world is not deterministic, I said that determinism went out the window with QM. Build a better theory and pul it back in again.

You agree with Einstein, but then deny QM, which derives directly from his work. An interestingly inconsistent position. You have not understood the nature of the denial of the hidden variable theories by the Bell inequalities being violated. This is not QM proving itself, it is simply a scientific proof (mathematical derivation and empirical verification) that either all of QM is wrong or there are no hidden variables.
You can deny QM if you wish, but then you will be under an obligation to present a better theory, one which is at least as reliable in prediction and description of known phenomena, that does not have indeterminacy as a part of it, and is empiracally verifiable.
Or you could simply say "it ain't so cos I know it ain't so". It says so right here in this book. i.e. a religious style closed belief argument.

I, not being able to do better than QM for a theory of matter, prefer to accept the consequences that it brings, until such time that it is superceded as the best theory we have. I have not said that the world is not deterministic, I said that determinism went out the window with QM. Build a better theory and pul it back in again.

No, I don't deny QM. I told you I think it should be used as it is the best theory that we have. However, I don't accept the philosophical proofs derived from it, just as Einstein wouldn't have. You fail to mention that I agree with Einstein who didn't support QM which was derived from his work. Was he inconsistent?

You keep suggesting that my disagreement with the results of Bell's theory implies that I don't understand it. When someone's argument is weak they tend to suggest that people don't understand their arguments. Notice I've never suggested that you don't understand my arguments. I accept that you simply don't agree with me, which is your right. Maybe you should go back to questioning my credentials. That will certainly help your arguments.

I believge in punishment not for retribution but for pragmatic reasons. Severely punish criminals and watch the crime rates fall.
Never happen. All this scenario will lead to is more violence on both sides of the equation. Violence breeds violence.

No I perform an act called holding that obligation. Choice does is not proven or implied. If determinism holds I can't help but hold that obligation, but I still do it. My "programming" forces me to believe that I am performing under my own free will even if I am not. Notice FORCES.
Alright, so under determinism we are all zombies with no will, slaves to circumstances, operating under a delusion that we are in control of ourselves. Fine. :rolleyes:

Alright, so under determinism we are all zombies with no will, slaves to circumstances, operating under a delusion that we are in control of ourselves. Fine. :rolleyes:

Actually, no one is disputing will, only free will. I suggest that whether it is predetermined objectively holds no bearing as it is not predetermined subjectively. As I pointed out earlier, I believe that the social contract requires us to act is if free will exists whether it does or not. And for all practical purposes, we can't predict outcomes so those outcomes may as well not be determined even if they are.

What is your point here? Are you mad that determinism holds the premise it does? It holds almost exactly what you said even if you were attempting to be facetious. I didn't make up determinism, I'm just explaining it and it's consequences as best I can.

Stop.

I am now discussing how the world could work, and how morality is part of that, if meaninglessly so, under determinism. Detrminism does require causality.

I, do not, in my own beliefs, hold that either determinism or pure causality are good descriptions of the world. However we are discussing this under the premise that the universe is purely deterministic. Remember?

Reread your post. You said that the theory you quoted shows that causality doesn't exist. That statement was incorrect. You just said so, AGAIN. Accept it.

Actually, no one is disputing will, only free will. I suggest that whether it is predetermined objectively holds no bearing as it is not predetermined subjectively. As I pointed out earlier, I believe that the social contract requires us to act is if free will exists whether it does or not. And for all practical purposes, we can't predict outcomes so those outcomes may as well not be determined even if they are.

What is your point here? Are you mad that determinism holds the premise it does? It holds almost exactly what you said even if you were attempting to be facetious. I didn't make up determinism, I'm just explaining it and it's consequences as best I can.
I'm not angry, and I understand your motives although I don't understand your position. I just find it all so absurd. Will (self-determination) is disputed, by the very fact of accepting determinism as a premise (things cannot be determined and self-determined at the same time), and yet the existence of will is indisputable for actively conscious individuals. Will is a conscious action.

I read the social contract link, but I don't understand: are you suggesting that it forces us into actions, rather than sets up conditions through which we act?

"Free will" is a philosophical term invented to differentiate will that is directed by god from will that is self-determined. So far this discussion, from your quarter at least, has been secular. If you are not bringing predestination into the discussion and limiting yourself to predeterminism, then will is free will, with no difference between the two terms. (Unless you're inventing a new idea of "will".)

I'm not angry, and I understand your motives although I don't understand your position. I just find it all so absurd. Will (self-determination) is disputed, by the very fact of accepting determinism as a premise (things cannot be determined and self-determined at the same time), and yet the existence of will is indisputable for actively conscious individuals. Will is a conscious action.

I read the social contract link, but I don't understand: are you suggesting that it forces us into actions, rather than sets up conditions through which we act?

No, as you pointed out earlier, there is a difference between the objective reality of the universe and our subjective reality. Not all definitions of will requires that it be free. We have a will which motivates us to perform acts. It may or may not be free will, which is what we're disputing. I maintain that desire exists whether that desire is determined or not.

I am not suggesting that the social contract FORCES us to do anything. We behave under the social contract because the results of adhering to a social contract are desirable. We follow the law not only because we fear the punishment but because lawlessness is undesirable. The whole point of all of this is that in determinism everything sets up the conditions through which we act, but we are programmed I will as act in a specific way to a given set of conditions and you will act in a different but just as specific of a way to the same given set of conditions.

Reread your post. You said that the theory you quoted shows that causality doesn't exist. That statement was incorrect. You just said so, AGAIN. Accept it.

Reread it acurately. I said that if QM is correct causality does not exist. Nothing more, nothing less.

Originally Posted by Wiki
In the writings of the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, monads are atomistic mental objects which experience the world from a particular point of view. Leibniz's theory does not posit physical space; rather, physical objects are constructs of the collective experiences of monads. This way of putting it is misleading, however; monads do not interact with each other (are "windowless"), but rather are imbued at creation with all their future experiences in a system of pre-established harmony. The arrangements of the monads make up the faith and structure of this world, which to Leibniz was "the best of all possible worlds".

If each and every awareness in the world is pre progarmmed to act in specific ways then we can arrive at our phenomenal experience without having any world or causality whatsoever. But all totally determined by the "clock maker" as Leibniz thought of God. This would include all our apparent moral actions and all apparent moral decisions.

Just an alternative.

I'm pretty sure that's not what you're saying here, but maybe I misread it. Would you care to show me how this says if QM exists then causality doesn't?

I'll outlay my point simply since we seem to be going in circles.

As AB so aptly pointed out, our subjective reality is based on emperical evidence and mathematical proofs or, at least, the three of us base it on that. In my subjective reality, free will exists, personal responsibility exists and QM is the best game in town. Bell and Hawkings are still pompous, but we'll just agree to disagree on that one.

My objective reality is based on logic as I view human knowledge to flawed in an objective reality. Human logic is flawed as well which is why I accept the fallibility of my theories and why there can be two seperate and competing theories that are both fully supported by logic. However, like QM, human logic is the best game in town, so I'm gonna run with it for a time. I can actually show you how it's logically possible for creationism to be correct in the bible (but is misinterpreted frequently) and evolution is also correct. That's the beauty of logic.

My objection to some of the current physics and mathematical theory is when the proofs are offered to make a statement about the objective universe. Are those statements logical? Absolutely, unless they state that they cannot be disproven. Given our experience with such statements, I think we should accept by now that anything can be disproven. ANYTHING.

The only place I have to analyze my subjective reality and how it relates to the objective universe is where emperical data appears to conflict with my beliefs on the objective universe. This leaves me two outs. Change my beliefs about the objective universe or logically explain away the conflict. For example, let's say I believe that *POOF* the universe was here and there were men standing on a planet called Earth, made whole by God (I don't believe this, so please don't choose to begin a debate about my example). Then I learn about evolution. "Oh, dear, what do I do now?" I can choose to accept that evolution must play into the fact that humans walk the Earth or I can come up with a explanation based on logic and my other beliefs that the Devil placed the evidence there to trick me. Being that I'm a scientist, I choose to accept evolution and simply modify my belief structure to include it. You may think QM is similar to that example, but I don't. I don't think our theories on how evolution occurs is nearly as limited by our technology. It's a basic difference between the macro and micro worlds.

Not all definitions of will requires that it be free. We have a will which motivates us to perform acts.
Sort of. You mean like "He will do something" meaning that the will motivates him to do it? That's incorrect. Will in this context isn't a motivation so much as an expression of the intention to act. Motivation is provided by causes (by self things, by non-self things, by conditions and circumstances, etc); we are motivated to perform actions. Some are willful, caused by the "self", a use of the conscious mind. In addtion to willful, we can also act habitually or subconsciously (such as a reaction or mind-less response).

All instances of I "will act" expressed with the idea of deliberation imply self-determination; it's implicit there.
EDIT: Note, the instance of "if I do this, he will do this" doesn't have the same implication for "him"; "will" expressed on behalf of someone else isn't as meaningful. If the action he performs turns out to be subconscious (for example) then we would hardly accuse him of acting willfully.

I maintain that desire exists whether that desire is determined or not.
It's existence isn't in dispute, but what causes it.

Will is not synonymous with desire, but with the desire to act. If we follow through on that desire consciously, we have acted willfully.

I am not suggesting that the social contract FORCES us to do anything. We behave under the social contract because the results of adhering to a social contract are desirable. We follow the law not only because we fear the punishment but because lawlessness is undesirable. The whole point of all of this is that in determinism everything sets up the conditions through which we act, but we are programmed I will as act in a specific way to a given set of conditions and you will act in a different but just as specific of a way to the same given set of conditions.
Okay. But the only action possible in the theory of determinism is that of automatons (to use your programming analogy). It is not willful, but more a response or reaction. The whole idea of will (self-determination) goes out the window.

I'm pretty sure that's not what you're saying here, but maybe I misread it. Would you care to show me how this says if QM exists then causality doesn't?

EDIT:As you just referred to my previous post, and the last one I had dealt with was again about the Bell inequalities and determinism, I assumed it was QM you were referring to again. Sorry, but the confusion there was due to you not being clear on the input. (GIGO) /EDIT

Why do conditional clauses give you such a problem. The sentence you highlighted starts with the word If. This means that there will be two distinct statements that follow. One, the second is conditional on the other, the first.

If each and every awareness in the world is pre progarmmed to act in specific ways then we can arrive at our phenomenal experience without having any world or causality whatsoever.

Here is the sentence that you are claiming that means I am saying that causality does not exist. Let us analyse it.
If <condition> then <consequence>
In the sentence as I have quoted above <condition> is highlighted in bold and <consequence> is underlined.
Pre programmed to act in specific ways, in this sentence is referring to Leibniz's pre established harmony theory. (Nothing to do with computers this time.) This is a theory that isolates each and every "monad" form all the others. There is no input to a monad, it is a sealed system without, what Leibniz called "windows".
Then given this theory, one possible interpretation is "we can arrive at our phenomenal experience without having any world or causality whatsoever"
In fact this is a weaker statement than would normally be made given that all I have acknowledged as being a consequence of monadology, is the possibility of a non causal world, hence the "can". Normaly, the monadology is interpreted as necessarily excluding causality.
This is all theory, no facts involved. No assertions about how the world is, just about the consequences of ceetain positions.

I do not believe in determinism but we are discussing the possibility of moral action under the presumption of determinism. This makes the whole discussion hypothetical for me to start with.

Willamena/Jocabia. Be careful about the use of the word will here. It is normal to discuss this in terms of free will, but then people tend to slide between the various meanings of will. (Intention/desire, future tense). This confusion only hapens in English, I f you know another language well enough, translate it out of English and the error becomes obvious.

I would recomend that you use intention/intend rather than will when you are referring to a voluntary action, and leave going to for the future tense (leave the word will out of the discussion altogether), but it is your debate so do as you will. (now which sense was that one ;) )

I would recomend that you use intention/intend rather than will when you are referring to a voluntary action, and leave going to for the future tense (leave the word will out of the discussion altogether), but it is your debate so do as you will. (now which sense was that one ;) )
It is actually both senses, as in English when we say we "will" do something (intent) it means we do follow through with deliberate action (exercise will power). Otherwise, we are lying.

You limked omnipotence to knowledge. I simply denied this linkage. You may not find it relevant but then why did you say "If said God were also omnipotent, could it not be that said God can know our future actions despite the universe being non-deterministic?" where I have hioghlighted the linkage.

I never linked omnipotence to knowledge (though I certainly could define "the ability to know" as being a form of "power" or "capacity" which would certainly provide a valid link). What I did imply was that the use of one could affect the use of the other (or at least that's what I intended to express), not that the two characteristics themselves were intrinsically linked. Perhaps I did not succeed in expressing it clearly.

I don't actually have a God concept, so no. A little light humour on my part is all, sorry if it offended you, it was not intended to be offensive. It was I suppose a subconscious dig at the standard concept of God as being omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, which I have difficulty comprehending how anyone can believe. That is, however because I do not believe it.

I was in no way offended, only curious. :) I'm even more curious now because it seems that you were making an implicit assumption about the nature of God while not having a God-concept. Usually it's the theists who make such implicit assumptions about the nature of God. :)

Have God create a wall he can not demolish then. One or the other He can not do. He can either create it, in which case he can not demolish it, or he can not create it.

Hmmmm...it again comes down to the factor of omnipotence. If God is omnipotent, He would by definition be able to resolve any violation of the Law of Non-contradiction or the Law of the Excluded Middle or any number of other restrictions we could introduce. All of which would make your point in this case of the "can God make a rock he cannot lift" dilemma rather null.

(All of this is quite aside from the fact that there is another way I could respond to the "omnipotence is contradictory" statement and accompanying argument, if my atheist acquiantance Clonetopia is reading this. ;) )

I'm an angry Libertarian, but my belief is that the existence of determinism means nobody can be blamed for their actions. *Edit: Would mean.

It should be noted that determinism is not the same thing as knowing the future (although failing to change an atrocity might be as bad as causing it.). If I ask my girlfriend to choose between watching Night Of The Living Dead, and 13 Going On 30, I know she'll say 13 Going On 30. But I didn't make that choice for her, I simply knew the outcome. Y'dig? =P

I never linked omnipotence to knowledge (though I certainly could define "the ability to know" as being a form of "power" or "capacity" which would certainly provide a valid link). What I did imply was that the use of one could affect the use of the other (or at least that's what I intended to express), not that the two characteristics themselves were intrinsically linked. Perhaps I did not succeed in expressing it clearly.
If knowledge is involved in any way, then it involves in the general christian idea of God, the attribute of omniscience. It can be that one could consider omniscience as subservient and derivative of omnipotence, in the sense of the "power to know", but, the reverse could equally be true in the sense of "knowing how to". I quoted the passage where you explicitly linked the two. The denial of any intention to do so, I accept, but then you have to show how omnipotence has an effect on determinism, which you have not done yet.
I was in no way offended, only curious. :) I'm even more curious now because it seems that you were making an implicit assumption about the nature of God while not having a God-concept. Usually it's the theists who make such implicit assumptions about the nature of God. :)
Not having a personal concept of God, what is available to me in any discussion is the standard description of the theists. Does that explain the similarity?

Hmmmm...it again comes down to the factor of omnipotence. If God is omnipotent, He would by definition be able to resolve any violation of the Law of Non-contradiction or the Law of the Excluded Middle or any number of other restrictions we could introduce. All of which would make your point in this case of the "can God make a rock he cannot lift" dilemma rather null.
Defining omnipotence as being the ability to do anything, even to the extent of breaking the rules of logic, makes it a null concept. To use a null concept to argue that a valid concept is null, seems a little strange, to say the least.


(All of this is quite aside from the fact that there is another way I could respond to the "omnipotence is contradictory" statement and accompanying argument, if my atheist acquiantance Clonetopia is reading this. ;) )

OK. I'll bite TH. Give me the argument or post a link.

Sort of. You mean like "He will do something" meaning that the will motivates him to do it? That's incorrect. Will in this context isn't a motivation so much as an expression of the intention to act. Motivation is provided by causes (by self things, by non-self things, by conditions and circumstances, etc); we are motivated to perform actions. Some are willful, caused by the "self", a use of the conscious mind. In addtion to willful, we can also act habitually or subconsciously (such as a reaction or mind-less response).

All instances of I "will act" expressed with the idea of deliberation imply self-determination; it's implicit there.
EDIT: Note, the instance of "if I do this, he will do this" doesn't have the same implication for "him"; "will" expressed on behalf of someone else isn't as meaningful. If the action he performs turns out to be subconscious (for example) then we would hardly accuse him of acting willfully.


It's existence isn't in dispute, but what causes it.

Will is not synonymous with desire, but with the desire to act. If we follow through on that desire consciously, we have acted willfully.


Okay. But the only action possible in the theory of determinism is that of automatons (to use your programming analogy). It is not willful, but more a response or reaction. The whole idea of will (self-determination) goes out the window.

You are defining will in a way that makes it impossible to not be self-determination and then saying it doesn't exist in determinism. Sure, it doesn't, if you wrote the dictionary. You didn't. The desire to act still exists in determinism, you simply cannot act differently.

Why do conditional clauses give you such a problem. The sentence you highlighted starts with the word If. This means that there will be two distinct statements that follow. One, the second is conditional on the other, the first.

I'm going to use the assumption that you actually understand your own post so I assume you're just trying not to admit you contradicted yourself. You gave an alternate way of describing determinism and you said if that description holds, causality does not. You used that description to show that causality does not exist in determinism. No problem with the conditional there. Causality does exist, even in that description, but that's a seperate point. Later you said if determinism holds then causality also holds. That is a plain and straight contradiction. Why is it so hard to admit you contradicted yourself? Now grab some quotes and try to twist it so you meant it differently. I'll keep answering as long as I find it amusing.

You are defining will in a way that makes it impossible to not be self-determination and then saying it doesn't exist in determinism. Sure, it doesn't, if you wrote the dictionary. You didn't. The desire to act still exists in determinism, you simply cannot act differently.
No, I didn't write the dictionary. I just use it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_%28verb%29).

I'm going to use the assumption that you actually understand your own post so I assume you're just trying not to admit you contradicted yourself. You gave an alternate way of describing determinism and you said if that description holds, causality does not. You used that description to show that causality does not exist in determinism. No problem with the conditional there. Causality does exist, even in that description, but that's a seperate point. Later you said if determinism holds then causality also holds. That is a plain and straight contradiction. Why is it so hard to admit you contradicted yourself? Now grab some quotes and try to twist it so you meant it differently. I'll keep answering as long as I find it amusing.

If you can not understand plain English, then there is no point to this conversation. Show me where I said that if determinism holds causality holds.

If knowledge is involved in any way, then it involves in the general christian idea of God, the attribute of omniscience. It can be that one could consider omniscience as subservient and derivative of omnipotence, in the sense of the "power to know", but, the reverse could equally be true in the sense of "knowing how to". I quoted the passage where you explicitly linked the two. The denial of any intention to do so, I accept, but then you have to show how omnipotence has an effect on determinism, which you have not done yet.

It was not my intention to show that omnipotence has an effect on determinism, rather it was my intention to show that it is possible to have an omniscient God in a non-deterministic universe. I'll try to lay it out more clearly.

Assumptions:

A. God exists.
B. God is omniscient (is all-knowing).
C. God is omnipotent (is all-powerful).
D. The universe exists.
Blah. Blah. Blah.

Possible Scenario: God is omniscient and the universe is non-deterministic (only in the sense that humans have free will).

Here's (hypothetically) how it could possibly occur:

Event #1 God (because of omniscience) knows everything that will happen.
Event #2 God (using OMFGZ! omnipotence) gives humans free will.
Therefore
Event #3 God is omniscient and the universe is non-deterministic (only in the sense that humans have free will).

If (and I realize that you may consider the assumptions to be false, but please play along) we are operating under assumptions A, B, C, and D then this follows, does it not?

Not having a personal concept of God, what is available to me in any discussion is the standard description of the theists. Does that explain the similarity?

Ah. You've spent too much time around theists. Understood. :)

Defining omnipotence as being the ability to do anything, even to the extent of breaking the rules of logic, makes it a null concept. To use a null concept to argue that a valid concept is null, seems a little strange, to say the least.

The concept is only null to the extent that you are constrained by logical forms. If you are in fact so constrained, then there's really not much we can discuss further on this subject, given that our respective understandings of reality are so different on such a basic level. :)

OK. I'll bite TH. Give me the argument or post a link.

You'll have to wait a bit. It was a long time ago and I'll have to spend a lot of time to find it, since you're actually interested.

[Edit: Bah. I'll just restate it.]

Ahem. My intention here is to demonstrate that it is possible for God to be omnipotent and make a rock He cannot lift without generating an inherent contradiction.

Assumption: God is omnipotent.
Definition: Omnipotence is defined as “having the potential power to do all things.”
Definition: (X) is defined as the current amount of lifting power that the entity in the scenario has.

Hypothetical Scenario: God makes a rock he cannot lift.

Here’s how this plays out…I’ll use an analogy to help you understand.

I currently have (X) amount of power. I can lift a 100 pound rock.
I spend time exercising and now have (X+1) amount of power. I can now lift a 101 pound rock.

Now let’s see what God can do.

Event #1 God currently has (X) amount of power. He can lift a 1,000 pound rock.
Event #2 God creates a 1,001 pound rock. He can’t lift it.
Event #3 God spends time (this would be even easier if we assumed that God is not limited by space and time and/or consider that “exercise” would be considerably easier for God, but I say KISS :) ) exercising and now has (X+1) amount of power. He can now lift the 1,001 pound rock he created.

This particular argument stems from various discussions about God and the quality of omnipotence being inherently contradictory which led specifically to the topic of the nature of omnipotence. Eventually, I figured out that if I defined omnipotence in terms of “potential” power rather than “realized” or “actual” power the contradiction seemed to be gone. Basically, what I am showing is a process that looks something like this:

Process - God makes rock he cannot lift. God strengthens self. God lifts rock. Ad infinitum.

In this scenario, God has all “potential” power, and so is (by definition) omnipotent, even though he cannot lift the rock at all points in time because he does not have all “actual” or “realized” power.

A few months later I heard a Catholic nun making the same basic argument and was a bit disappointed to find that my argument wasn’t original. C’est la vie. :)

No, I didn't write the dictionary. I just use it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_%28verb%29).

Forgive me if I choose (yes, I said choose) to use Mirriam-Webster.

If you can not understand plain English, then there is no point to this conversation. Show me where I said that if determinism holds causality holds.

So, the monodality description that you offered up does not describe determinism? If it were valid, would or would not the universe be deterministic? If not, perhaps you can explain why not since it appears to me that you said it means all actions are preprogrammed into these "particles". It sounds deterministic but show me where I'm wrong.

No, I didn't write the dictionary. I just use it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_%28verb%29).

Also, I believe we were talking about will as a noun. Using a dictionary isn't enough, now you have to use it properly.

Also, I believe we were talking about will as a noun. Using a dictionary isn't enough, now you have to use it properly.
"To will" (verb) is the use of "will" (noun).

EDIT: I have little objection with using your dictionary. M-W lists the following for will (noun):
1. a. Disposition, inclination (where there's a will there's a way)
1. b. Appetite, passion
1. c. Choice, determination
2. a. Something desired; especially : a choice or determination of one having authority or power
2. b.(1) Archaic : request, command
2. b.(2) the part of a summons expressing a royal command
3. the act, process, or experience of willing
4. a. Mental powers manifested as wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending
4. b. A disposition to act according to principles or ends
4. c. The collective desire of a group
5. The power of control over one's own actions or emotions (a man of iron will)
6. A legal will...

Leaving off a legal "will" (the document) and #2, which imposes "will" on others, and #4 which is the "intention" context discussed earlier, we are left with will as "choice/determination", "the act of willing", and "the power of control over one's own actions or emotions". I find generally that dictionary definitions are self-refrencing and brief to the point of inadequacy, which is why I prefer an encyclopedic dictionary or an encyclopedia to find more all-embracing definitions for words and concepts.

Choice is eliminated or made illusory under determinism. The idea of the individual having a power to be the cause of his own actions or emotions is also eliminated, and therefore also the act of willing.

"To will" (verb) is the use of "will" (noun).

EDIT: I have little objection with using your dictionary. M-W lists the following for will (noun):
1. a. Disposition, inclination (where there's a will there's a way)
1. b. Appetite, passion
1. c. Choice, determination
2. a. Something desired; especially : a choice or determination of one having authority or power
2. b.(1) Archaic : request, command
2. b.(2) the part of a summons expressing a royal command
3. the act, process, or experience of willing
4. a. Mental powers manifested as wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending
4. b. A disposition to act according to principles or ends
4. c. The collective desire of a group
5. The power of control over one's own actions or emotions (a man of iron will)
6. A legal will...

Leaving off a legal "will" (the document) and #2, which imposes "will" on others, and #4 which is the "intention" context discussed earlier, we are left with will as "choice/determination", "the act of willing", and "the power of control over one's own actions or emotions". I find generally that dictionary definitions are self-refrencing and brief to the point of inadequacy, which is why I prefer an encyclopedic dictionary or an encyclopedia to find more all-embracing definitions for words and concepts.

Choice is eliminated or made illusory under determinism. The idea of the individual having a power to be the cause of his own actions or emotions is also eliminated, and therefore also the act of willing.

I was going with 1a as I listed. Free is not requirement for will. Choice exists whether or not other choices can actually be selected due to the nature of our "programming". This is simply where we disagree and have been disagreeing. This is the point I made. You can't define or prove this any more than I can as this is just a belief structure. Desire, choice, will, the act of deciding all exist under determinism in my opinion. As I said before, even if I fix the inputs, the desire, choice, will and act of deciding programs still run, the outputs are just fixed by our limitation of the inputs. You're not wrong to not agree with me, but you can't PROVE that I'm wrong for believe what I do as it's completely logical. I can say that you are wrong if you say will cannot exist under determism. I can say you are completely justified if you say you don't beleive will exists under determinism.

I was going with 1a as I listed. Free is not requirement for will. Choice exists whether or not other choices can actually be selected due to the nature of our "programming". This is simply where we disagree and have been disagreeing. This is the point I made. You can't define or prove this any more than I can as this is just a belief structure. Desire, choice, will, the act of deciding all exist under determinism in my opinion. As I said before, even if I fix the inputs, the desire, choice, will and act of deciding programs still run, the outputs are just fixed by our limitation of the inputs. You're not wrong to not agree with me, but you can't PROVE that I'm wrong for believe what I do as it's completely logical. I can say that you are wrong if you say will cannot exist under determism. I can say you are completely justified if you say you don't beleive will exists under determinism.
Alright, for discussion's sake let's go with #1a, the "where there's a will there's a way" one. With this definition, a conscious decision (will) has already been reached and all that remains is to follow-through with action (way) to fulfill the desired outcome. Let’s use the previous example: "If determinism holds I can't help but hold that obligation, but I still do it. My 'programming' forces me to believe that I am performing under my own free will even if I am not." Your action of holding of the obligation fulfills a decision made to do so.

For an individual consciousness operating within the program of a deterministic world, this means one of two things: either the individual chose betwen available options, or the "program" chose for him. Only one or the other agent can make the choice. Let's say options (choices) exist but only one will be selected due to "the nature of our programming". You clearly say that the program chooses. Then the self does not. This is the only point I really wanted to make. Regardless of other options being available, there is no choice made by the individual if it is all pre-programmed. The existence of the decision being a part of the program eliminates the possibility that it was the individual who introduced the decision into the program, all delusion aside.

If things are pre-programmed, the program is the cause of our actions, including the decision action.

Alright, for discussion's sake let's go with #1a, the "where there's a will there's a way" one. With this definition, a conscious decision (will) has already been reached and all that remains is to follow-through with action (way) to fulfill the desired outcome. Let’s use the previous example: "If determinism holds I can't help but hold that obligation, but I still do it. My 'programming' forces me to believe that I am performing under my own free will even if I am not." Your action of holding of the obligation fulfills a decision made to do so.

For an individual consciousness operating within the program of a deterministic world, this means one of two things: either the individual chose betwen available options, or the "program" chose for him. Only one or the other agent can make the choice. Let's say options (choices) exist but only one will be selected due to "the nature of our programming". You clearly say that the program chooses. Then the self does not. This is the only point I really wanted to make. Regardless of other options being available, there is no choice made by the individual if it is all pre-programmed. The existence of the decision being a part of the program eliminates the possibility that it was the individual who introduced the decision into the program, all delusion aside.

If things are pre-programmed, the program is the cause of our actions, including the decision action.

Actually, I said the program is the self, several times. Our conversation began with you saying the self and the program are seperate and me disagreeing with that. You quoted me and used your beliefs to suggest I'm contradicting myself. The individual, the self, the program, all the same. Only under determinism, that individual, self, program does not have FREE will. I understand your point and you've been consistent in that point. I just disagree with it.

Actually, I said the program is the self, several times. Our conversation began with you saying the self and the program are seperate and me disagreeing with that. You quoted me and used your beliefs to suggest I'm contradicting myself. The individual, the self, the program, all the same. Only under determinism, that individual, self, program does not have FREE will. I understand your point and you've been consistent in that point. I just disagree with it.
Well, then there is no self. Okay, we're in agreeance.

Well, then there is no self. Okay, we're in agreeance.

Ha, right back to the beginning, huh? I think we've pretty much killed this subject, but I really did enjoy talking to you and AB. Because I don't agree with you guys, doesn't mean your ideas aren't intelligent or well-founded. Hopefully, we'll clash swords in the future.

Ha, right back to the beginning, huh? I think we've pretty much killed this subject, but I really did enjoy talking to you and AB. Because I don't agree with you guys, doesn't mean your ideas aren't intelligent or well-founded. Hopefully, we'll clash swords in the future.
Ta. I learn from everyone I discuss with, especially those who disagree with me. :)

So, the monodality description that you offered up does not describe determinism? If it were valid, would or would not the universe be deterministic? If not, perhaps you can explain why not since it appears to me that you said it means all actions are preprogrammed into these "particles". It sounds deterministic but show me where I'm wrong.

It is one possible interpretation of determinism. If it were valid, the universe would be irrelevant, each monad would act deterministicaly. What does this have to do with my supposedly saying that determinism eliminates causality. One theory, the monadology, does the two things. This does not mean that all deterministic theories eliminate causality. Most of them are strictly causal.

Detrminism does require causality.

Do you need a date and time? You can find the entire statement on page nine the same page where you showed monodality.

If each and every awareness in the world is pre progarmmed to act in specific ways then we can arrive at our phenomenal experience without having any world or causality whatsoever.

Here is the other quote.

I'm going to use the assumption that you actually understand your own post so I assume you're just trying not to admit you contradicted yourself. You gave an alternate way of describing determinism and you said if that description holds, causality does not. You used that description to show that causality does not exist in determinism. No problem with the conditional there. Causality does exist, even in that description, but that's a seperate point. Later you said if determinism holds then causality also holds. That is a plain and straight contradiction. Why is it so hard to admit you contradicted yourself? Now grab some quotes and try to twist it so you meant it differently. I'll keep answering as long as I find it amusing.

Then I said this.

If you can not understand plain English, then there is no point to this conversation. Show me where I said that if determinism holds causality holds.

Then you replied with this. Are you ready to admit you contradicted yourself yet or must I go farther? In the future, try remembering what you yourself wrote before you try to insult someone. It just makes you look silly.