NationStates Jolt Archive

Stalingrad - the Misconception About the Turning Point]
I have a few problems with people always referring to Stalingrad as the turning point of the Second World War. Although sure, it hosted several slight 'turning points', as in it stopped a German offensive for the second time, and it was the first time the Soviets stopped a German offensive inside a city proper, I disagree with historians that claim that after Stalingrad the fall of the Third Reich was inevitable. Every piece of evidence that I have studied seems to point towards the opposite direction.

For example, after the astonishing success of Operation Uranus, which had forced the Italian and Romanian flanks to collapse and caught the 6th Army and parts of the 4th Panzer Army totally by suprise which ultimately caused the encirclement of said units (German 6th Army (Paulus), parts of the German 4th Panzer Army (Hoth), and the Italian 8th Army, as well as some Romanian divisions), the Red Army still proved to be an extremely inneffective fighting force in the sense that it had still not grasped strategical superiority over the Germans. This is proven by the shattering Winter Tempest offensive which saw Field Marshall von Manstein reach within thirty kilometers of Stalingrad tearing through the slightly overstretched Soviet soldiers who had completed Operation Uranus. Had Paulus been open to using his remaining strength to pushing towards von Manstein's men he would have most likely been able to open a corridor which would have saved the main part of his army, at least those who were still combat effective.

However, it seems as if the fall of Stalingrad was actually a better event than Paulus making his escape. The arguments for this are quite persuasive and thus I lay my trust on the notion that this correct. It is, in fact, true that having Paulus' troops at Manstein's disposal would have rendered the German Field Marshall no advantage, as the 6th Army was in no shape to fight another defensive. On the contraire, Paulus utter determination to defend his Stalingrad enclave gave Manstein the time he needed to stabalize the Don River front.

Now, the evidence that Stalingrad was not the end all turning point of the war was Manstein's March 1943 ability to recapture the city of Kharkov from the victorious Soviets using the II SS Panzerkorp. This stunning success put an immediate halt to the German offensive. Moreover, early 1943 events concerning Leningrad were not going nearly as bad as some authors put it, the stranglehold on Leningrad was still very much alive regardless of Soviet operations in the area.

It comes to my attention that the true turning point in the [i]Ostfront was the Battle of Kursk. It was Kursk which ate up the carefully built armored reserves committed to by Heinz Guderian and it was Kursk which weakened the German Orel Salient which later came to bite the Germans in the rear (the Soviet July 1943 operation to re-take the Orel Salient). So, in my own personal view, should Hitler have never ordered Operation Citadel the Germans could have to the very least bled their enemies white, or at least, postpone their death until around 1948, unless the United States was completely bent on dropping atom bombs on Europe.

For sure, bled the Russians white. On 2 May, 1944, Koniev launched his first attempt to make some sort of breakthrough into Romania. Two armies were stopped gold by the GrossDeutschland Division at Targul Frumos within six days. Imagine the defensive power the Germans could have taken advantage of had they not wasted the lives of three dozen men at Kursk and double that at Orel in July and Kharkov in August of 1943.

What do you guys think?

*Nods Head*
Kharkov Kharkov Kharkov!

Kursk was Hitler's little game to show off his new toys namely Tiger and Panther(even though they wernt fully operational)

It served no purpose.
The Germans knew of the Tank traps the deep Russian lines,reserve troops etc yet Hitler wanted it done.Guderian Hated it.

The Rumanian Capitulation was also filthy!
But they got there just desserts!

Three dozen men?

*Nods Head*
Kursk was Hitler's little game to show off his new toys namely Tiger and Panther(even though they wernt fully operational)


And it's funny since the mechanical failures of the Tiger were made obvious during Winter Storm and in North Africa before the capitulation of von Arnim. Hitler's inability to foreshadow obvious events, concerning military consequences, is in my own opinion what caused his downfall.

Three dozen men?

Sorry, my mistake, three dozen thousand.

I buy ziss threadd! FIFTY RUBLES! NO MORE! WHAT LITTLE GIRL? IS MY PUPPY NOW! HAHAHA......................HARRY POTTER MUST NOT GO BACK TO HOGWARTS!

And it's funny since the mechanical failures of the Tiger were made obvious during Winter Storm and in North Africa before the capitulation of von Arnim. Hitler's inability to foreshadow obvious events, concerning military consequences, is in my own opinion what caused his downfall.
Correct.
Whether it was the MEPTH'S he was on or Borman's (and the other guy) who "protected" Hitler from the Fury of his Generals.

Its intersting to note the African campaign was intended to be a Defensive campaign and yet they picked Rommel to command it when he was an offensive general while the man to assist and later take over was Von Arhim who was a more defensive General.
Kasserine proved this(well that and he didnt like Rommel because he was the golden boy).

NORTH AFRICA
I don’t see how the African campaign could ever of been considered a defensive campaign at any stage, it’s motives were to officially aid the Italians of course in reality it was to takeover from their ineptitude. Now considering that by taking North Africa would of meant that resources from the rest of the British Empire would have to travel around the Cape instead of going through the Suez Canal and would also of stripped Britain of it’s oil assets.

So, that doesn’t seem like a defensive campaign. The Italians were busy empire building, the British took offence to the idea and the Germans had to go and do the job the Italians couldn’t. It was all offensive, course if you’ve got some other sources perhaps you can point me in that direction.

Really to make such generalisations as 'turning points' to something as large and as chaotic as World War Two really is quite foolish. There are a number of turning points, each equally importantly:

Churchill appointed Prime Minister of Britain - had it not been him, it would have been Lord Halifax who would have signed a peace treaty with Hitler.

The British victory in the Battle of Britain - If it had been a defeat it would have meant 1 million less troops for D-Day, no place to launch air support from.

Stalingrad - forced Hitler to send all of his best troops there. Lost most of his armour there too.

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour - brought America and its vast resources into the war.

D-Day itself - Had it failed, Germany could have easily maintained its control over Western Europe.

There are many others too.

North Africa
Well I think Hitler's main idea for sending Rommel and German troops to North Africa originally was to protect the section of Italy and France that had not been conquered by the British in their fascinating sweep against an overwhelmingly large enemy.

The British victory in the Battle of Britain - If it had been a defeat it would have meant 1 million less troops for D-Day, no place to launch air support from.

I assume you mean Britain would of been taken out of the war, if that were the case I really hope you're not suggesting that America would of attempted to ship hundreds of thousands of troops, thousands of tanks and millions of tons of equipment across the Atlantic. If you are, that is a really daft notion for the obvious reason that crossing the atlantic in a ship takes a long time which entails massive security problems, one message and everybody knows that a fleet of more ships in one big or several large convoys is heading for Europe than at any time in history.

No Britain = No Invasion of Europe

I actually heard in a Military History group I host on Yahoo that the United States had plans for an invasion of the Canary Islands should have Great Britain fallen. Whatever the case the invasion of North Africa would have still been the case, as half the troops came from the United States and not from Britain in any case (not refering to nationality, referring to deployment bases for Operation Torch).

Also, the Battle of Britain couldn't have been won by air by the Germans no matter what the policy Hitler took on the issue, whether bombing London or bombing military bases. The British were already in the process of moving their air bases north of the Thames where the Me-109s didn't have the range, so bomber groups would have been intercepted at will by British aircraft.

I don't really find the Battle of Britain as a turning point in any case. The turning point I believe was the entire aerial bombardment of Malta and Hitler's fateful decision not to launch Operation Hercules (I think this was the code name), the invasion of Malta.

I don't really find the Battle of Britain as a turning point in any case. The turning point I believe was the entire aerial bombardment of Malta and Hitler's fateful decision not to launch Operation Hercules (I think this was the code name), the invasion of Malta.
I believe that is the name.
But when the 3 divs you use on Crete all lose 40% casulties with one losing above 50% you know youve got a problem 1st major(not including Belgian Fortress ops+ they wernt sole para although sea invasion was part of crete invasion plan.) Para op and it takes those casulties makes you think ive got a rather large white elephant.

NORTH AFRICA
I don’t see how the African campaign could ever of been considered a defensive campaign at any stage, it’s motives were to officially aid the Italians of course in reality it was to takeover from their ineptitude. Now considering that by taking North Africa would of meant that resources from the rest of the British Empire would have to travel around the Cape instead of going through the Suez Canal and would also of stripped Britain of it’s oil assets.

So, that doesn’t seem like a defensive campaign. The Italians were busy empire building, the British took offence to the idea and the Germans had to go and do the job the Italians couldn’t. It was all offensive, course if you’ve got some other sources perhaps you can point me in that direction
Rommel wasnt given authority to launch his attacks he was there to hold the British.
When at Tobruk? he had a parade(at this parade he sent his tanks thru the streets to enhance their numbers making any inteligence reports the British got overestimated.-it worked.) and declared his intention to take Alexandria and Cairo but he didnt have the backing of the Fuhrer.

But when the 3 divs you use on Crete all lose 40% casulties with one losing above 50% you know youve got a problem 1st major(not including Belgian Fortress ops+ they wernt sole para although sea invasion was part of crete invasion plan.) Para op and it takes those casulties makes you think ive got a rather large white elephant.

However, Malta, both in size, geography and the deployment on the island, is not a Crete. Meaning, a German offensive the size of the German offensive agaisnt Eben Emael in May 1940 would have reaped the results necessary to occupy the island within the day, especially with the utter air support the drops would have stop, giving them the aerial fire power to push any resistance back under the ground.

On Crete German paratroopers were facing horrible logistical requirements and an experienced British opponent which was more or less the same size. Indeed, the Germans would have been defeated had the British been a bit less cautious.

talking about turning points on the Eastern Front is tricky....

important things to consider.

German losses in 1941 (June through December) were so severe that the Wehrmacht lacked the strength in the Spring of 1942 to return to the general offensive all along the front. The Stalingrad and Caucasus operations consisted of most of the available armored vehicle strength on the Eastern Front as the 2 Panzer Armies involved, plus the 6th and 17th Armies (plus the various Romanian, Hungarian, Italian units) were brought up to strength at the expense of the remainder of the front, where Panzer divisions had only about 60 tanks instead of the 200 they had the previous year.

So the destruction of the 6th Army, severe losses inflicted on the 4th Panzer Army (2 corps of which were trapped with the 6th Army), and race to escape encirclement by the 3rd Panzer Army, and the similarly heavy attrition inflicted on the Luftwaffe during the airlift (nearly 600 transports were lost), tied in with heavy Luftwaffe losses in North Africa (another 600 transports lost, and these pilots were obtained by raiding the training schools) resulted in a permanent inability of the Germans to inflict a decisive blow on the Russian Army.

That the Germans tried at Kursk is very important, but there would have been no Kursk if 1942 had worked out and in 1943 the Germans were still facing the situation were they couldn't launch a general offensive, and now they couldn't launch a strategic offensive. Kursk was an operational blow by 2 armies (instead of 4 German armies like in 1942, and the whole front as in 1941) and those 2 armies could attack only because once again the remaining German forces had to make do with fewer replacements so sufficient forces could be assembled in to attack.

My suspecions are that even if the Germans had won at Kursk, they still wouldn't have had the forces necessary to do anything decisive with that victory.

So Stalingrad and 1942 in my view was the last oppurtunity the Germans had for outright victory in the East. Kursk was their last opportunity to force a draw or maybe acceptable (from German viewpoint) armistice.

From then on, the Russians had the strategic and operational initiative for the remainder of the war.

Therefore, Stalingrad was the more decisive victory.

However, Malta, both in size, geography and the deployment on the island, is not a Crete. Meaning, a German offensive the size of the German offensive agaisnt Eben Emael in May 1940 would have reaped the results necessary to occupy the island within the day, especially with the utter air support the drops would have stop, giving them the aerial fire power to push any resistance back under the ground.

On Crete German paratroopers were facing horrible logistical requirements and an experienced British opponent which was more or less the same size. Indeed, the Germans would have been defeated had the British been a bit less cautious.
Yes but in Hitlers eyes he could never again launch such a massive attack it wasnt until Maleme was taken and glider troops could be rushed in that things began to turn and inside the first 2 hours a strong counter attack would have sealed the fate of the germans.

The German Para commander was so close to commiting Suicide for the failure until a brave young officer was given the task of landing on the island inspecting the results then returning to deliver them.

Of course by British you mean New Zealand as well as 30,000 others(namely Brits Aussies and what greeks we(the brits) could scrape away from Greece)

After Crete I think Hittler said that the para trouper was useless

there is a good book on logistics that talks about the Mediterranean theater and why the Germans lost. The simple fact is that geography and port capicity overwhelmingly favored the British. The Germans had use of Tripoli for the entire period which is roughly 1200 miles from the vital areas of Egypt. When they controlled Benghazi and Tobruk, both very small ports unable to unload more than a couple of ships at a time, they were still over 600 miles from Alexandria. The Germans and Italians simply didn't have the trucks necessary to move the amount of supplies that would have been required if the Afrika Korps had been expanded much of its maximum size of 2 panzer and 2 motorized infantry divisions plus attachments. The German Army had nearly half of its trucks in the East (and needed more desperately), and half the remainder in Africa. They still needed trucks in the West and in the Balkans (remember fighting there continued past 1941). No more could be spared.

Malta in British hands was important, as it was a useful submarine and airbase, and that resulted in the sinking of hundreds of thousands of tons of Axis shipping, but even if Malta hadn't been in Allied hands, and the shipping losses had been minimal, there was still the bottleneck of not enough trucks, huge distances, and rugged conditions.

Best chance the Germans had to take the Middle East would have been a two pronged invasion from the Balkans through Turkey into the Levant and Iraq, plus the move from Libya.

Thankfully a road not taken.

I have to disagree. Had Hitler postponed the Citadel offensive indefinately and instead had given his commanders an open field of choices the German army would have been much more successful in 1943.

Namely, had Manstein been able to capitalize on his success at Kharkov in March 1943 and had been able to continue with the operations he had already laid out in his mind the Germans would have most likely been able to gain some of the lost territory which the Soviets had taken back during their dual winter offensives of 1942.

And the fact that the Germans has scrapped most of their armor for Operation Blau doesn't seem very decisive since Army Group Center was able to decimate two hundred thousand infantry of the Red Army during Zhukov's ill fated Operation Mars, October 1942, a full month after the success of Operation Uranus.

In my own humble opinion I believe that the armored reserves Guderian was able to gather after Stalingrad would have been more than enough to pursue a policy of limited and thought out offensives in strategical areas, such as the military idea that Manstein was pursuing in the beginning of 1943. And although they wouldn't have had a stunning victory like what Operation Typhoon and Operation Blau were designed to be the Germans could have regained the strategical iniative in the East.

Most of the authors I've read (Colonel Albert Seaton, Trevor N. Dupuy, David M. Glantz, Salisbury, Antony Beevor, etc) seem to all agree that Stalin too had reached the bottom of his recruiting barrel, especially since he had murdered a full forty million of one hundred and fifty million people of his own Soviet Union (although this number is widely discussed...but I don't want to get into an argument about Stalin since it would be impossible to prove, regardless of opinion).

So, with Soviet production superiority or not, both of the mammoths of the Second World War were on an equal playing field and in 1943, taking in mind the defeat of Stalingrad, and assuming that Kursk was never launched, I really think that the Germans, who still commanded a tactical superiority, could have regained the iniative in the East....the West is a completely different matter.

An awsome book that I've read on Malta is Jame Holland's Fortress Malta : An Island Under Siege 1940-43 ...a very good read!

in the west they could have won

in the west they could have won

Hard to say. Although the Soviet Union is normally considered the strongest of all the allied nations I consider the United States much stronger since the United States hadn't gone through twenty years of purges and executions and hadn't gone through two years of invasion and murder... so I don't believe that a Germany, bled white through two years of war, could have defended themselves successfully against the United States, who although rather green in 1942, hadn't been touched by the war (save the Pacific).

Snip

Thats true about the trucks and Port capacity ive got a book its too far away but the supply lines were horrendous along the roads.
50% of landed fuel was used to get to and from the front lines.
Only 18?% of neccasry German supplies reached german hands 30 percent for the Italians.
Italy had 1 or 2 divs in reserve with more tanks than the forward units???

An awsome book that I've read on Malta is Jame Holland's Fortress Malta : An Island Under Siege 1940-43 ...a very good read!

that is a good one... read it a few years ago myself

An awsome book that I've read on Malta is Jame Holland's Fortress Malta : An Island Under Siege 1940-43 ...a very good read! Alamein by John Latimer
Keith Park owns you!

Hard to say. Although the Soviet Union is normally considered the strongest of all the allied nations I consider the United States much stronger since the United States hadn't gone through twenty years of purges and executions and hadn't gone through two years of invasion and murder... so I don't believe that a Germany, bled white through two years of war, could have defended themselves successfully against the United States, who although rather green in 1942, hadn't been touched by the war (save the Pacific).
Americas military had had a purge though just not a shoot them into a ditch purge.

Thats true about the trucks and Port capacity ive got a book its too far away but the supply lines were horrendous along the roads.
50% of landed fuel was used to get to and from the front lines.
Only 18?% of neccasry German supplies reached german hands 30 percent for the Italians.
Italy had 1 or 2 divs in reserve with more tanks than the forward units???

the one I am referring to is called "Supplying War" (I don't have it handy for additional information like author or publisher).

and those were the essential points it made.

Alamein by John Latimer
Keith Park owns you!

I own that one as well. Also a very good book. Another Alamein book which is a really good read was one by Jon Bierman.


Americas military had had a purge though just not a shoot them into a ditch purge.

Well the United States could call on its demobilized forces to mobilize again. What I was trying to get to was the fact that the United States hadn't lost over one third of its population over twenty years of corruption, dictatorship and war.

I have to disagree. Had Hitler postponed the Citadel offensive indefinately and instead had given his commanders an open field of choices the German army would have been much more successful in 1943.

Namely, had Manstein been able to capitalize on his success at Kharkov in March 1943 and had been able to continue with the operations he had already laid out in his mind the Germans would have most likely been able to gain some of the lost territory which the Soviets had taken back during their dual winter offensives of 1942.

And the fact that the Germans has scrapped most of their armor for Operation Blau doesn't seem very decisive since Army Group Center was able to decimate two hundred thousand infantry of the Red Army during Zhukov's ill fated Operation Mars, October 1942, a full month after the success of Operation Uranus.

In my own humble opinion I believe that the armored reserves Guderian was able to gather after Stalingrad would have been more than enough to pursue a policy of limited and thought out offensives in strategical areas, such as the military idea that Manstein was pursuing in the beginning of 1943. And although they wouldn't have had a stunning victory like what Operation Typhoon and Operation Blau were designed to be the Germans could have regained the strategical iniative in the East.

Most of the authors I've read (Colonel Albert Seaton, Trevor N. Dupuy, David M. Glantz, Salisbury, Antony Beevor, etc) seem to all agree that Stalin too had reached the bottom of his recruiting barrel, especially since he had murdered a full forty million of one hundred and fifty million people of his own Soviet Union (although this number is widely discussed...but I don't want to get into an argument about Stalin since it would be impossible to prove, regardless of opinion).

So, with Soviet production superiority or not, both of the mammoths of the Second World War were on an equal playing field and in 1943, taking in mind the defeat of Stalingrad, and assuming that Kursk was never launched, I really think that the Germans, who still commanded a tactical superiority, could have regained the iniative in the East....the West is a completely different matter.

I agree with part of what your saying. Once the initial opportunity had passed, Guderian wanted the offensive cancelled, and Manstein had misgivings. But Hitler needed a victory so Citadel was tried. If the Germans had continued Mansteins strategy of allowing the Soviets to attack, and then smashing them back as in the Kharkov campaign, the Germans might have managed to force the Soviets to accept a seperate peace as even Stalin was running out of men of military age by 1944, and the old men and kids were in Russian divisions as well as German divisions by 1945. But the Soviet weak divisions could be kept in quiet areas while the Germans didn't have the luxury.

But as the battles were actually fought, I still believe that Stalingrad, along with the North Africa campaign, permanently reduced the Luftwaffes ability to conduct offensive operations, and the moral prestige of the victory on Allied morale (especially Soviet morale) was ultimately decisive as it allowed the Russians to continue the war, prevented German outright victory (is it likely the Soviets would have been able to continue fighting without the oil in the Caucasus region?) and severely reduced the German ability to conduct anything but local operations.

if it werent for Montgomery the allies would probaly won in the desert
Now lets look at the tanks
Allies:
Crusader 2 and 3 had bad armorment and thin armor
Grant a bit better but had a bad gun mount
Sherman burned real quick
Axis:
Panzer 3 good all round tank that could take on any thing in the dessert
Panzer 4 the same as above
M 40/13 (I think) was the worst Axis tank

The allies did win in the desert..and it was Montgomery who did it..he might have not been a very effective commander regarding pure genius like his German counterparts..but he had the iniative and the charisma to get the job done, and that's what the British needed.

The allies did win in the desert..and it was Montgomery who did it..he might have not been a very effective commander regarding pure genius like his German counterparts..but he had the iniative and the charisma to get the job done, and that's what the British needed.

its too bad that he was wrong in Sicily, and in Holland. He was competent, charismatic, and did fairly well, but I think Alexander and Slim were better British generals.

Montgomery did it
his policy was no more retreats

its too bad that he was wrong in Sicily, and in Holland. He was competent, charismatic, and did fairly well, but I think Alexander and Slim were better British generals.

Hehe, but then again, Patton was wrong as well, well in my own opinion. I don't think Patton could have pulled off an 'infallable' offensive from Central France to the Rhine without having his flanks hacked to pieces and his 3rd Army suffering horrendous casualties. In that case I would have expected Operation Autumn Mist in September of 1944.

America sucked in every stage of the war

its too bad that he was wrong in Sicily, and in Holland. He was competent, charismatic, and did fairly well, but I think Alexander and Slim were better British generals.
He wasnt to far awy from being right with MArket garden.
Plus he saved the Day(Fortnight)at The Bulge.

Hehe, but then again, Patton was wrong as well, well in my own opinion. I don't think Patton could have pulled off an 'infallable' offensive from Central France to the Rhine without having his flanks hacked to pieces and his 3rd Army suffering horrendous casualties. In that case I would have expected Operation Autumn Mist in September of 1944.

your right about that... the better strategy would have been to do what had to be done in November... clear the approaches to Antwerp and THEN continue the general offensive. Market Garden prevented that for an entire month, bringing about general supply shortages and a forced slow down everywhere which gave the Germans breathing space in November to attack in December (which worked out better in the long run anyway, but thats another story).

Monty persuaded Alexander and Ike to go with a massive landing on the south coast of Sicily, while the original plan that Patton argued for was an American landing near Messina, and a British landing at Syracuse. As most of the German reinforcements arrived after the initial Allied landing, this would have prevented the long campaign that resulted, and bagged all of the Germans already there, who were in central Sicily at the start of the Sicily battle. Oh well, hindsight is 20/20,,, it would have been better to invade Sardinia instead of Sicily anyway, and landed closer to Rome later on in any case, and Sicily forced the Allies to crawl up the entire Italian boot instead of landing close to Rome at the beginning. But that wasn't Montys fault. Blame General Brooke and Churchill for that one, and Ike and Roosevelt for agreeing with it.

America sucked in every stage of the war
Goering-America can only make Razor blades!
Guderian-We could use some of them!
Not exact but eh!

Its true America couldnt fight there way out of a paper bag!
The Bulge was an American defeat!
But not a German Victory.

Dietrich forces should have been sent into the center where massive gains had been made from the outset.

But that wasn't Montys fault. Blame General Brooke and Churchill for that one, and Ike and Roosevelt for agreeing with it.
Nope Blame Mark Clarke the pantless wonder.
if in doubt blame Mark Clarke!

the one good thing with America was they distracted the germans for the comenwelth forces

He wasnt to far awy from being right with MArket garden.
Plus he saved the Day(Fortnight)at The Bulge.

even Churchill said Monty wasn't the victor at the Bulge, but the American soldier. A lot of historians criticize Montys handling of American forces in the Bulge, and for failing to attack south to link up with Pattons drive north closer to the base of the salient until way too late. Only a couple of British brigades saw action in the Bulge at all, and in a supporting role in the 2nd US Armored Division attack at Celles which crushed the German 2nd Panzer Division. Although Monty had command over the 1st Army and 9th Army during the battle (and the 9th Army wasn't involved, although some of its units were), the four best books on the battle (the official US Army history written by the same author who wrote Company Commander, Tollands book, John Eisenhowers book, and Dupuys book) all give credit to Monty for pulling the US 7th Armored division out of the fortified goose egg at St. Vith, but are very critical of his actions afterward, and for his glory hounding that damned near got him fired when Ike was in the process of writing a letter to Roosevelt and Churchill saying either Eisenhower resigns or Monty is fired.

Monty was a damned fool at times, and this was his worst moment.

Meh, I think that the United States did rather well during the Second World War and produced generals only second to Germany's. The Falaise Pocket, although it proved to be at best flawed, was proof of the American's grasp of tactical victory and strategical concepts, and it didn't take them three years of defeat like the British and the Soviets, although the Americans did have three years to learn by taking a look at the British and Soviet defeats.

Moreover, American action during the Bulge only proved the G.I. Joe's ability at war. Three German armies attacked three overstretched American divisions, with neither the Germans or the Americans able to place aircraft in the skies in decisive numbers, and failed to break through to the Meuse in the day they had envisioned to do so. Autumn Mist was a German failure and proof that the American Army had more guts than people attribute to it.

The British XXX Corp, although a part of the success at the Bulge, was not as vital as you would like it to think. Moreover, the British XXX was reinforced by the American 30th Division, which was who my grandfather with, and the purpose of these units was to place a huge wall on the side of the head of the German offensive through the Ardennes.

Nope Blame Mark Clarke the pantless wonder.
if in doubt blame Mark Clarke!

Mark Clark had no command role in the Sicily invasion... the US 7th Army commanded by Patton and the British 8th Army commanded by Monty were at Sicily. Clark didn't get a command until the US 5th Army invaded at Salerno... and he didn't pick the invasion site, Alexander did.

[QUOTE]Meh, I think that the United States did rather well during the Second World War and produced generals only second to Germany's.[QUOTE]
American propaganda
In Afraca they were massercared
In the Pacific they were being beaten by the jappanese
In Euroup they met the people who were tired of war or new to it

[QUOTE]Meh, I think that the United States did rather well during the Second World War and produced generals only second to Germany's.[QUOTE]
American propaganda
In Afraca they were massercared
In the Pacific they were being beaten by the jappanese
In Euroup they met the people who were tired of war or new to it

have you actually read anything about World War 2?

American propaganda
In Afraca they were massercared
In the Pacific they were being beaten by the jappanese
In Euroup they met the people who were tired of war or new to it

In Africa they were not massacred. The Americans proved their capabilities at Oran and Longstop Hill. Kasserine was just evidence that the American soldiers were still green - it was indeed their first combat theater.

In the Pacific the only battles the United States lost against the Japanese were those fought directly after the beginning of the war between the Japanese and the United States. In every single major battle from the Coral Sea to the dropping of the Atomic Bombs the United States emerged victorious. The casualty count was somewhere near 20:1 in the favor of the Americans.

In Europe the people who were encountered by the Americans were all battle tried soldiers and even some were the crack elite of what Hitler had. Evidence of this exist with the Battle of Mortain in which the 30th Division stopped Hitler's 2nd SS Division cold. Not only that, but while the British failed to grasp their primary objectives until two weeks after the Overlord landings the Americans were able to occupy their own primary objectives within three to four days.

even Churchill said Monty wasn't the victor at the Bulge, but the American soldier

all give credit to Monty for pulling the US 7th Armored division out of the fortified goose egg at St. Vith, but are very critical of his actions afterward, and for his glory hounding that damned near got him fired when Ike was in the process of writing a letter to Roosevelt and Churchill saying either Eisenhower resigns or Monty is fired.

Monty was a damned fool at times, and this was his worst moment.
Churchill was the genius in favour of helping Greece!
He also got rid of Auchinleck? because his plan of attack was for september
Monty comes in and says his plan is for October(another month)and all he did was use weight of numbers.WTF???

Montys handling was brilliant why use them to attack, hold the line they had been pasted as it was.
Monty was a showman but Ike was nothing flash(not that im saying he had to be daring but he wasnt great).

Mark Clark had no command role in the Sicily invasion... the US 7th Army commanded by Patton and the British 8th Army commanded by Monty were at Sicily. Clark didn't get a command until the US 5th Army invaded at Salerno... and he didn't pick the invasion site, Alexander did.
I never implied the Sicilian invasions sorry for you if you felt i did!

Not only that, but while the British failed to grasp their primary objectives until two weeks after the Overlord landings the Americans were able to occupy their own primary objectives within three to four days.
Wasnt that because the British and Canadians drew the Germans away at Caen???

Operation Torch
For those not in the know Op Torch was the invasion of North Africa, as was rightly pointed out this involved a deployment base from the USA however the results were pretty damn close in terms of shipping. Large numbers of escort ships were stripped from the convoys and so they suffered but this massive convoy still suffered heavy losses simply because it was so damn easy to find.

Alternate History
The numbers involved for Torch would of been no use in a European invasion, IF,and that's a big IF, American forces and whatever else could of been scrapped together had managed to land in Western Europe the ability to actually break out would of been near zero. Remember how many days it took to unload just the American beaches or for them to actually begin a proper offensive? And that was with a supply base only across the channel.

Macabees mentioned the Canary Islands but purely on the size of those islands they would of been ineffective for a launching point, assuming for some reason you did you're still facing a near total lack of air cover. You've got the U-Boat bases able to operate at close ranges, aircraft from the mainland and a supply base on the other side of the Atlantic.

Operation Torch worked because the Vichy French were as unprepared as the American forces invading them and the Americans had that force multiplier of shore bombardment and air cover. True, those two factors aren't decisive but against the French they were.

North Africa
I've never heard of Rommel being simply ordered to hold the line and not drive towards Alexandria, sounds plausible but I've just never heard of it before.
Not the best site or source but Desert Conflict (http://www.ez-zone.co.uk/ww2desert/overview.htm)

Now as far as my history has been taught and learnt, Rommel arrived in North Africa to support the Italians and the Italians were there because they wanted a Mediteranean Empire, again. As the link shows no sooner had Rommel arrived and he was on the offensive, albeit unsuccesfull but still an offensive.
It was all short lived really, the campaign that is, logistics were terrible with Axis forces in North Africa being forced to fight on less water than Allied forces and they had to share this water with their vehicles. They certainly bred them tough in that day and age.

War Bringers
You grasp of history is obviously limited, you're the type of person who siezes upon single moments and attempts to draw ultimate conclusions, surprisingly they're grossly flawed. The industrial capacity of America was a huge influence, at Germany's height its production capacity didn't come close to America's. This industrial capacity is part of their success, sure they were green but so was the BEF and all the Commonwealth forces, American forces demonstrated a capability which they've never had since and that's mainly due to politics.
Those who actually fought and learned a thing or two during the war ended up being demobilised and never heard from again, that's not true in all cases but was for so many. Those who hadn't learned things the hard way often moved up the ladder and presented an appealing image for a new armed forces in a new world. It would of been possible to salvage them all, especially the army, after the Korean War but that chance was missed and hard won lessons were lost because the people who knew them were gone.

by the way, the US Army won every campaign it fought in World War 2 except for the opening campaign in the Philippines.... a record none of the other nations involved can claim. The US Navy managed to win every single one of its campaigns except for the opening campaign in the Dutch East Indies and Philippines as well....the US Army lost some battles (Huertgon Forest, a couple of failed attempts at Monte Cassino, Kassarine Pass) but still won in the end. The British Army lost in France 1940, Greece and Crete 1941, Malaya 1942, Burma 1942, and had its share of defeats after that as well (Market Garden, three of the four tries at Caen, Monte Cassino once) and was a much slower and less flexible army than its ancestor in World War 1 or the Germans or Americans or Canadians. Even British historians have been rough of the British Army in World War 2.

The Germans of course lost every campaign from the Spring of 1943 on, the Russians lost terribly in several campaigns from 1941 - 1943 (not counting the Winter War which was a very costly victory), and I don't know of a successful Italian campaign (in either World War 1 or 2). The Japanese of course lost every campaign outside of China after May 1942 as well.

So for a mediocre army (as criticized earlier in the thread) the US Army did pretty well I think.

even the Royal Navy can't claim a record as successful as the US Navy in World War 2. The RN lost in the Dutch East Indies too, plus Norway sn't exactly a victory as the Germans slipped by them in spite of taking a lot of lumps after they managed to get ashore. I consider Malaya part of the general defeat in the East Indies, and for a while in 1941 the RN lost control of the Med (after Crete).

Not counting the years before December 1941, the Royal Navy suffered a higher loss rate as well. Blame the RAF and British Government in the prewar year for neglecting criminally the naval aviation branch of the RN (really inadequate carrier aircraft until lend lease provided good aircraft from 1943 on)

American propaganda
In Afraca they were massercared
In the Pacific they were being beaten by the jappanese
In Euroup they met the people who were tired of war or new to it

Hmmm.... That must be why I'm sitting here in Japan, teaching English, instead of sitting at home in the US studing Japanese.

Japan was stopped 6 months after Pearl Harbor (Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942). The Battle of Midway was a month later, and the Japanese were on the defensive for the rest of the war in the Pacific. Japan did manage to continue offensive operations against the British Fourteenth Army in Malay, Burma, and India until 1944*, so if anyone was being beaten in the Pacific theater, it was France and the UK.

The Battles of Imphal and Kohima were the last major Japanese offensive. One might want to note the British might well have loat were it not for US (and Canadian!) logistical support (the Northeast Indian Railways were able to keep up with the needed supplies by using US and Canadian locomotives) and USAAF air support, as well as 5307th Composite Unit (provisional). (The first person who can tell me the common name of that unit without looking it up, wins a cookie! Double cookies if you can tell me what unit they were eventually redesignated as.)

Stalingrad - the Misconception About the Turning Point]
I have a few problems with people always referring to Stalingrad as the turning point of the Second World War.
(snip)
What do you guys think?

The Battle of Moscow. If the German's '41 offensive had been planned better (ie avoided the numerous delays and contengencies for winter), they might haven been able to take Moscow. The ETO war might have been over in '42/3.
Even so, if the Germans had consolidated their positions instead of trying to push on to Moscow in the dead of winter, they would have been better positioned to resume the offensive in the spring.

As it was, they did neither. The result was Zhukov's counter-offesnsive that push the exhausted and freezing Germans out of reach of Moscow for the rest of the war.

(An argument could also be made for the Battle of Smolensk as a delaying action that lead to the results of the Battle of Moscow. That was the first time the Blitkrieg was blunted.)

The British Army lost in France 1940, Greece and Crete 1941,(Market Garden, three of the four tries at Caen, Monte Cassino once)

Just so you know The British might have had a crack at Cassino after 2NZD but 2NZD failure to take Cassino was no smear on its honour nor the 4th?Indians or 78th? but it is all Mark Clarkes fault of all battles fought by New Zealand forces at divisional level(Somme, Paschedalle,Greece,Crete)they all had one thing in common, they failed because of a lack of preparation!

This wasnt New Zealand's fault on any occasion but of those higher up!

Hmmm.... That must be why I'm sitting here in Japan, teaching English, instead of sitting at home in the US studing Japanese.

The Battles of Imphal and Kohima were the last major Japanese offensive. One might want to note the British might well have loat were it not for US (and Canadian!) logistical support (the Northeast Indian Railways were able to keep up with the needed supplies by using US and Canadian locomotives) and USAAF air support, as well as 5307th Composite Unit (provisional). (The first person who can tell me the common name of that unit without looking it up, wins a cookie! Double cookies if you can tell me what unit they were eventually redesignated as.)
Hmm English aye not with those spelling mistakes!LOL- your alright ill forgive you. ;)

Id read NZ had the largest amount of AF personnel serving in India for those campaigns. ;)

I know this but its not appaent to me.- Hells Angels.(Such a bad option) :confused:
But i wouldnt say Tokyo express because i think that ferried JAp troops to Solomons.

Hmm English aye not with those spelling mistakes!LOL- your alright ill forgive you. ;)

Id read NZ had the largest amount of AF personnel serving in India for those campaigns. ;)

I know this but its not appaent to me.- Hells Angels.(Such a bad option) :confused:
But i wouldnt say Tokyo express because i think that ferried JAp troops to Solomons.

Me teach Engrish good. ;) (What do you expect on my day off, after 5 hours sleep and a couple of beers. :))

Not the Hells Angels (3rd Persuit Squadron -> 76th Pursuit Squadron -> 76th Fighter Squadron).
(Hints: It's an ground combat unit. Very famous - at least on our side of the pond, and the current unit from that lineage is still very much active.)

Oh, and man for man, the Kiwis, Aussies, and Canadians were some of the hardest fighting men on the Allied side.

I just wrote a very elaborate reply to this thread yet when I tried to post it, it was gone in some virtual void :headbang: .

This is in very short what I said:

-Stalingrad not the turning point: battle of Moscow is. Without Leningrad and Moscow Russia surrendered, then probably GB and US alone. Read this thread for more elaborate version by me (Gottsmik): http://www.blackclawgames.com/bcforum/viewtopic.php?t=272

-North Africa: defensive to help Italian allies who were on the verge of being pushed out N-Africa. Rommel got two smaller Panzer Divisions, turned them into the feared Afrika Korps, and started to push the Britains back AGAINST Hitlers commands. They let him after they saw his results yet Rommel received few reinforcements and supplies up to after El Alamein (if he had gotten those before he would have kicked the Britains out of NA).

Torch: (mostly) americans landed in Vichy France Algiers and Maroc, hoping to persuade the Kolonial forces to join allies, which they did, Tunis however occupied by Axis. If VF would've fought: another long and draining war theatre ahead for the Allies. Vichy France annexed by Hitler as a response.

Japan never would've won the war: Pearl and Philipined just bought time, even Midway would've never gained any good => America build more ships and Aircraft carriers then they ever would.

-Stalingrad not the turning point: battle of Moscow is. Without Leningrad and Moscow Russia surrendered, then probably GB and US alone. Read this thread for more elaborate version by me (Gottsmik): http://www.blackclawgames.com/bcforum/viewtopic.php?t=272

-North Africa: defensive to help Italian allies who were on the verge of being pushed out N-Africa. Rommel got two smaller Panzer Divisions, turned them into the feared Afrika Korps, and started to push the Britains back AGAINST Hitlers commands. They let him after they saw his results yet Rommel received few reinforcements and supplies up to after El Alamein (if he had gotten those before he would have kicked the Britains out of NA).

Torch: (mostly) americans landed in Vichy France Algiers and Maroc, hoping to persuade the Kolonial forces to join allies, which they did, Tunis however occupied by Axis. If VF would've fought: another long and draining war theatre ahead for the Allies. Vichy France annexed by Hitler as a response.

Japan never would've won the war: Pearl and Philipined just bought time, even Midway would've never gained any good => America build more ships and Aircraft carriers then they ever would.

All good. :D

Just so you know The British might have had a crack at Cassino after 2NZD but 2NZD failure to take Cassino was no smear on its honour nor the 4th?Indians or 78th? but it is all Mark Clarkes fault of all battles fought by New Zealand forces at divisional level(Somme, Paschedalle,Greece,Crete)they all had one thing in common, they failed because of a lack of preparation!

This wasnt New Zealand's fault on any occasion but of those higher up!

the New Zealanders have no reason to be ashamed, it was the Poles who finally took Monte Cassino after all, and a lot of American, Canadian, Polish, Free French, British and New Zealand blood was spilled along the way.

the British record in World War 2 using New Zealand troops is a bit shaky, the 1st New Zealand division was nearly lost in Greece, pulled back to Crete, badly chewed up there (and a lot of it was lost), had to be rebuilt, took heavy lumps in the Western Desert on a number of occasions, and then got the unenviable duty of crawling up the Italian boot the remainder of the war.

The Australians saw an entire division of theirs lost at Malaya under British command, so its no wonder they demanded that the other three divisions be sent home when the war with Japan began. They also nearly lost an entire division in Greece, and then again at Tobruk.

If I was an ANZAC soldier in World War 2, I am not to sure I would have trusted the British much. The Americans under MacArthur treated the ANZACs with contempt during the war (at the upper command level) but US commanders never threw away ANZAC lives. MacArthur did stick them with the thankless task of mopping up in the South Pacific after the war moved to the Philippines and Central Pacific, but there is justification for that decision (debatable, but a justification nevertheless)

I think you’ve got your terminology and references confused. Caen, Monte Cassino and the Huertgon Forest were not campaigns they were just battles which you said but then you compare portions of British campaigns against entire US campaigns.

Campaign - A series of military operations undertaken to achieve a large-scale objective during a war.

Market Garden nearly worked, don’t forget that all but Arnhem was secured and that British paratroopers held out longer than had been planned for against forces more heavily armed than planned for, had Market Garden of come off to plan it would have been a major blow and would have been a striking blow.

It’s no surprise losses were high at Monte Cassino, the entire purpose of the heightened fighting in Italy was to draw Axis forces off the Normandy coast. The Italian summers were hot and dry whilst the winters were wet and cold both are very sapping conditions to live, let alone fight in. The US Army put it’s foot right in it during the landings on the Italian mainland, the beachhead commander, who’s name eludes me at the moment, spent so much time building up his forces needlessly and against proper advice that he missed a great opportunity to cut Axis forces off, then when he did start moving he let Rangers get slaughtered because they were sent ahead against Axis armour without support, if that isn’t worse he choose doing the political thing of striking for Rome instead of actually cutting Axis forces off, said Axis forces then withdrew to the Gustav Line.

I have to contest your idea that the Royal Navy lost control of the Mediterranean after Crete, which wasn’t a significant location in terms of naval control. During the war it was Royal Navy ships which conducted the bulk of operations in the med, the US Navy made an appearance for Operation Torch but was soon recalled for convoy duty. The reason Malta remained in Allied control, interdicting vast amounts of Axis shipping to forces in North Africa, is an obvious testament that the Royal Navy was still capable of more than just contesting control. The Fleet Air Arm, of the Royal Navy, severely humiliated the Italian Navy and considering they did it with World War One era biplanes makes the mission all the more impressive and after that date the Italian Navy restricted it’s larger ships to areas of strong air cover. The aircraft you mention were only so good because the US Navy had to go and produce a whole new range because their own were insufficient, part of the general culture which did not rate carrier based aircraft highly. Remember it was only a few decades after it was proved that aircraft could actually perform offensive combat operations in World War One.

Royal Navy loss rates were not significantly higher, they continued at a high level until the course of the Atlantic War was finally altered in Allied favour. It took some months for the US Navy to actually make a useful contribution in the Atlantic, efforts obviously being concentrated in the Pacific after the Pearl harbour debacle.

Oh, and man for man, the Kiwis, Aussies, and Canadians were some of the hardest fighting men on the Allied side.

Don't forget the Ghurkhas or those bloodly marvelous Chindits.

Huertgon Forest and Market Garden actually were subcampaigns of the general campaign in Northwest Europe, as they consisted of a number of battles. Monte Cassino was similar as well (4 different operations were conducted before success occured, each with multi division sized attacks).

Caen is a lot like Monte Cassion and part of the overall Normandy Campaign which was part of the overall Northwest Europe campaign. Campaign and battle is a little tricky in World War 2, as Okinawa for example was a single battle involving nearly 1,000 ships, 300,000 troops (on all sides) and nearly 8,000 aircraft (on both sides) and it lasted nearly 3 months while DDay involved even more ships, men and aircraft and lasted a couple of days (including travel time) and BOTH are considered battles. Both of these battles involved more men, ships and planes than the entire Guadalcanal campaign of 6 months.

Major theaters had campaigns and these campaigns frequently involved so many different actions as to warrant the description of campaigns themselves.

But initially the reference was that Caen, Huertgon and the others were battles lost, over the course of a general campaign.

I will defend the statement that the British lost control of the Med for the period June 1941 until early 1942..... losses in operations like Pedestal and the seige of Malta basically show that when the Axis wanted to use the aircraft, they could close the Central Med at will and threaten the Eastern Med as well.


A couple of good websites on World War 2 naval operations
http://www.world-war.co.uk/
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-ships.html
http://www.warships1.com/index_links/links_navy.htm

The 5307th Composite Unit (provisional). (The first person who can tell me the common name of that unit without looking it up, wins a cookie! Double cookies if you can tell me what unit they were eventually redesignated as.)

Hmmm... only one guess...

(I may be wrong, but, I think there was a poster who claimed to have served or to be serving in the unit they eventually became.)


Don't forget the Ghurkhas or those bloodly marvelous Chindits.

Not forgotten. :)

5307th Composite Unit (provisional). (The first person who can tell me the common name of that unit without looking it up, wins a cookie! Double cookies if you can tell me what unit they were eventually redesignated as.)

the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) was commonly known as Merrills Marauders, and the recon platoon was known as the "Dead End Kids"

The US Army 1st Special Forces Regiment and 75th Ranger Regiment trace their lineage not only to Merrills Maruaders, but also the Ranger battalions (all 6 of them, including the three battalions known as Darbys rangers, the 2 battalions at Omaha Beach and Point de Huc, and the 6th battalion that rescued US civilian and military internees at Manila. Both regiments also trace their lineage to the 1st Special Services Brigade, known as the Devils Brigade, a unique American/Canadian combined brigade that did really incredible things from 1943 - 44 when it was finally disbanded after the Invasion of Southern France.

The Devils Brigade was probably one of the best units of its size fielded by anybody during the entire war.

the New Zealanders have no reason to be ashamed, it was the Poles who finally took Monte Cassino after all, and a lot of American, Canadian, Polish, Free French, British and New Zealand blood was spilled along the way.

the British record in World War 2 using New Zealand troops is a bit shaky, the 1st New Zealand division was nearly lost in Greece, pulled back to Crete, badly chewed up there (and a lot of it was lost), had to be rebuilt, took heavy lumps in the Western Desert on a number of occasions, and then got the unenviable duty of crawling up the Italian boot the remainder of the war.

The Australians saw an entire division of theirs lost at Malaya under British command, so its no wonder they demanded that the other three divisions be sent home when the war with Japan began. They also nearly lost an entire division in Greece, and then again at Tobruk.

If I was an ANZAC soldier in World War 2, I am not to sure I would have trusted the British much. The Americans under MacArthur treated the ANZACs with contempt during the war (at the upper command level) but US commanders never threw away ANZAC lives. MacArthur did stick them with the thankless task of mopping up in the South Pacific after the war moved to the Philippines and Central Pacific, but there is justification for that decision (debatable, but a justification nevertheless)

Yeah its actually quite funny about the New Zealand Division it got renamed the 2nd sometime after the evacuation quite possibly when all the brigades were united(5th? was in Britain at the time.)

Miqar Quaim(SP) is a really cool story 8th army was holding the line and after 2ndNZ had had its refit it was sent in to bolster the defences only problem was someone forgot to tell them that there was a withdraw to happen that night so as the BRits withdrew the NZ'ers came forward.

When Morning came the 2ndNZ Div looks to the right(to where the 10th Armoured should be)and cant find them Freyberg sets up a defensive line and sends out scouts to locate the 10th(the 10ths tank liason officers were with the 2ndNZ)and after sometime tank support is promised(without actually saying they are comming).

Unfortunatly noone tells the A-T gunners (as the Div has just been attacked by Skirmishers trying to find out who this lone Divsion is)and so they subsequently shot up the advanced British tanks after that no more tank support will arrive.

After the repulse of the Skirmish forces Rommel decides to send 4 Divs(2 Panzer) to combat this Unknown force, the frontal assualts are repulsed but one rear attack succeeds capturing 600(or so)men after this Freyberg decides to withdraw but instead of avoiding the encircling forces he goes straight for 1 of the forces(21st (Panzer)?)and during this night assualt smashes them.Evacuating the whole div in a succeesful fighting withdrawl. ;)

Don't forget the Ghurkhas or those bloodly marvelous Chindits.
Just so you know Aussies and Kiwi's were in the chindits! ;)

the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) was commonly known as Merrills Marauders, and the recon platoon was known as the "Dead End Kids"

The US Army 1st Special Forces Regiment and 75th Ranger Regiment trace their lineage not only to Merrills Maruaders, but also the Ranger battalions (all 6 of them, including the three battalions known as Darbys rangers, the 2 battalions at Omaha Beach and Point de Huc, and the 6th battalion that rescued US civilian and military internees at Manila. Both regiments also trace their lineage to the 1st Special Services Brigade, known as the Devils Brigade, a unique American/Canadian combined brigade that did really incredible things from 1943 - 44 when it was finally disbanded after the Invasion of Southern France.

The Devils Brigade was probably one of the best units of its size fielded by anybody during the entire war.

:D Double cookies for you.

And while the other units mentioned (and other's including, of course, Roger's Rangers and Mosby's Rangers) most certainly contributed to the 75th Ranger Regiment's heritage, it's direct parentage was the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional). AFAIK, the others ended up as Special Forces units or were disbanded. (The Canadian element ended up as the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which was disbanded after the unfortunate scandal in Somalia (http://www.netnomad.com/canada.html). :()

The unit was consolidated with the 475th Infantry on August 10, 1944. On June 21, 1954, the 475th was redesignated the 75th Infantry. It is from the redesignation of Merrill's Marauders into the 75th Infantry Regiment that the modern-day 75th Ranger Regiment traces its current unit designation.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/75rr-hist.htm

Rather than create an entirely new unit designation for such an elite force, the Department of the Army looked to its rich and varied heritage and on 1 February 1969 designated the 75th Infantry Regiment, the present successor to the famous 5307th Composite Unit (Merrill's Marauders) as the parent organization for all Department of the Army designated Long Range Patrol (LRP) units. The parenthetical designation (Ranger) in lieu of (LRP) was given and the units were identified by letters. As a result, Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (Abn), assigned to First Field Force Vietnam became Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The 5307th was organized on 3 October 1943, and trained for deep penetration missions behind enemy lines in Japanese-held Burma. On 10 August 1944, the 5307th was consolidated with the 475th and the combined unit was designated the 475th Infantry Regiment and was designated as a long range penetrating force. The 475th was inactivated on 1 July 1945 in China. On 21 June 1954, the 475th was redesignated the 75th Infantry Regiment and activated in Okinawa on 20 November 1954 and remained active until 21 March 1956.
http://e20-lrp-c75-rgr.org/history/history.html

In order to provide a parent regiment for the redesigned Ranger Companies of the Active Army the 75th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders) was activated on 1 January 1969. The 75th Infantry which traces its origin to the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was considered the most appropriate regiment with which to identify the Ranger Companies.

In World War II and Korea the following organizations were considered to be "special mission" units: The Ranger Battalions (lst*6th Battalions); and 1st Special Service Force; the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) and the Ranger Companies (lst_5th, 8th and the 8th Army Ranger Company). The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly referred to as "Merrill's Marauders", was selected as the parent unit for the LRP/Ranger units since the heraldry of the Ranger Battalions, the 1st Special Service Force and the Korean War Ranger Companies has been absorbed by the 1st Special Forces.

The 5307th Composite Regiment (Provisional) was organized on 3 October 1943 in the China-Burma-India Theater. On 10 August 1944 the 5307th Composite Unit was consolidated with the 475th Infantry and designated the 475th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders). On 21 June 1954 the 475th Infantry Regiment was redesigned the 75th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders).[quote]
www.benning.army.mil/rtb/HISTORY/lrrpmerr.htm
(Google it and look at the cache if you can't see it.)

[quote]The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) derives its lineage from the unit of World War II fame -- The First Special Service Forces. "The Devils Brigade" -- a combined Canadian-American Force, constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment,1st Battalion, Third Regiment,1st Special Service Force.
www.campbell.army.mil/5thsfg.htm

the Canadian Airborne Regiment
http://www.airborneassociation.com/cgi/articles.php?lng=en&pg=86

And wasn't someone claiming to be serving in the 75th? Or am I just mis-remembering.

I worry about Canada sometimes... at what point do they cut their defense force to the point where it becomes useless? Although the days of massive parachute drops are long over, airborne training is a pretty useful way to find out who the warriors are in your army BEFORE you send them to combat or peacekeeping missions to find out the hard way.

To eliminate an entire unit because of one incident? and a few minor infractions on top of it? Talk about throwing the baby out with the bath water!

I just wrote a very elaborate reply to this thread yet when I tried to post it, it was gone in some virtual void :headbang: .

This is in very short what I said:

-North Africa: defensive to help Italian allies who were on the verge of being pushed out N-Africa. Rommel got two smaller Panzer Divisions, turned them into the feared Afrika Korps, and started to push the Britains back AGAINST Hitlers commands. They let him after they saw his results yet Rommel received few reinforcements and supplies up to after El Alamein (if he had gotten those before he would have kicked the Britains out of NA).

Japan never would've won the war: Pearl and Philipined just bought time, even Midway would've never gained any good => America build more ships and Aircraft carriers then they ever would.
*Takes his hat off*(Africa post)

TIs true about JApan they never could reequip units they never had the resources!
Although to take MIdway and Pearl HArbo(u)r would have taken away American forward bases they still wouldnt have been useful to the Japs as forward bases for ops against America!