NationStates Jolt Archive

OK, another problem that's been stuck in my head lately. It seems to me that advocates of liberalism (and I'd love to count myself as one if I could get past the problem I'm about to describe) often take their position as one that is morally neutral, ie does not take any one moral position above any other. Rather, it leaves people free to decide on their own morality. This is a very useful standpoint to make since it avoids the problem of justification that other moral theories need.

My problem comes with how a liberal (classic, ie not the US definition) or libertarian responds to those who have a moral belief that allows, or even requires, the imposition of a code of morality on others (through indoctrination, force or other illiberal means). How, then, is someone with a liberal outlook supposed to respond in a non-circular manner?

I've looked at a number of classic justifications of liberalism and they seem to fall down in one of three main ways:

1) Take some ideal as above liberty, which then justifies it. I'd take Mill (general well-being) and Rawls (maximising the state of the worst off) as falling in this camp. The problem here is that liberty then becomes contingent, only to be maintained as long as it isn't violating the higher principle. This makes it far too weak, in my opinion, especially since the higher principles offered are usually so vague as to allow extreme limitations on liberty (the current Chinese regime often excuses human rights violations as being justified in the name of the greater good and/or benefitting the poorest in society).

2) Inherant human nature. Kant, Locke and Nozick argued this line. The problem here is that once one invokes human nature you need to make a host of assumptions, both about human nature and its supremacy. This line of reasoning clearly falls down in the face of religious arguments, which would put human nature as subordinate to a god. It also is often contradictory, since humans are often contradictory: what is stopping somebody from violating the rights of another person on the basis of deeply held moral convictions if not violating their nature?

3) Pragmatism. Rousseau is the only philosopher I know who argued this line. This line is obviously very shaky since first it depends on some good that one can used to make a pragmatic statement about (well-being, safety, comfort etc.) Secondly, the pragmatic liberal cannot justify their arguments completely since it's easy to have completely opposing views about what is best. Hobbes argued his system was the most pragmatic and many would agree with him. Given the short history of liberal political systems there's simply no good evidence to decide either way, and there probably won't be any.

Given this, then, how do those of you who consider the preservation of liberty to be vital justify this line? How do you argue that others should not violate the liberty of others, even if everything they believe tells them they should?

Sorry I missed the point of this thread. What are you trying to say?

hes argueing that libertariniam is logically unworkable because it is based on respecting others beliefs,and others beliefs may involve forceing those beliefs on others.

such is easily solved,everyone has a right to there own beliefs.and thus attempting to force beliefs on another(includeing your children).inherently goes against.you can believe that others should follow your beliefs,but the moment you try to use force those beliefs you have directly attacked the other invidual.

my problems with anarcho capitilism,is its inherently unsustainable.

So, people should be free to do whatever they like as long as they don't interfere with other's liberties. The perfect world, surely. Where's the contradiction?

My problem comes with how a liberal (classic, ie not the US definition) or libertarian responds to those who have a moral belief that allows, or even requires, the imposition of a code of morality on others (through indoctrination, force or other illiberal means). How, then, is someone with a liberal outlook supposed to respond in a non-circular manner?

Is it not the case that the other has to justify the imposition, rather than the libertarian justify the non action?

I've looked at a number of classic justifications of liberalism and they seem to fall down in one of three main ways:

1) Take some ideal as above liberty, which then justifies it. I'd take Mill (general well-being) and Rawls (maximising the state of the worst off) as falling in this camp. The problem here is that liberty then becomes contingent, only to be maintained as long as it isn't violating the higher principle. This makes it far too weak, in my opinion, especially since the higher principles offered are usually so vague as to allow extreme limitations on liberty (the current Chinese regime often excuses human rights violations as being justified in the name of the greater good and/or benefitting the poorest in society).

Rawls, in particular, makes some very powerful presumptions about what is good and what is not. He is viewed as a Libertarian, but really should not be. The assumptions are in what is a good state, and who is the worst off. These are purely economically driven, which is not necessarily the criteria that should be used. John Stuart Mill, and Bentham, do not have any argument for liberty whatsoever. It is not a concern of theirs. What they are concerned with is utility (pure in Bentham's case, modified by the imposition of some external value judgements in Mills case.)

2) Inherant human nature. Kant, Locke and Nozick argued this line. The problem here is that once one invokes human nature you need to make a host of assumptions, both about human nature and its supremacy. This line of reasoning clearly falls down in the face of religious arguments, which would put human nature as subordinate to a god. It also is often contradictory, since humans are often contradictory: what is stopping somebody from violating the rights of another person on the basis of deeply held moral convictions if not violating their nature?

Can I start by excluding Kant, and introducing Hume? Kant's moral theory does not depend upon human nature, but upon the nature of reasoning or rational thought itself. This does not leave space for the supremacy argument, as rationality is seen as independent of any particular entity, This also removes the inconsistency argument. The problem is that Kant's theory gives no practical guidance, it describes what the process of deciding should be, but does not condone, nor condem any behaviour.
Hume, a naturalist philosopher, and not a sceptic as many believe, argues that morality derives from what we are as humans. He was, at least agnostic in his philosophy, so his arguments have to face the religous challenge. One way of doing this is to argue:
Either God exists and He created us or God does not exist, or God has no interest in us if He exists.
If He created us then He would not have created our nature contrary to his will and desire, so following our nature is to follow his will and desire.
If He does not exist then all we have is our nature and the religious argument is empty.
If He exists and is not interested in us, then being subordinate to Him is irrelevant, we have to do waht we can to make our own lives good, and this depends upon our nature.

The religious argument fails against the human nature argument, mostly due to the first part of the disjunction.
OK, human nature is contradictory. No, it is not. Specific individual desires are often contradictory, even within the one person (I want to lose weight, but that cake is so tempting), but our nature is not. This requires an understanding of what is meant by nature. Hume addresses this question and comes to the conclusion that what is good, for our nature, is anything that gives pleasure, to us or others, or has utility, for us or others. Now these have been and are constant over historical and geographical distances. This is, I believe the line of argument that a Libertarian can successfully use.

3) Pragmatism. Rousseau is the only philosopher I know who argued this line. This line is obviously very shaky since first it depends on some good that one can used to make a pragmatic statement about (well-being, safety, comfort etc.) Secondly, the pragmatic liberal cannot justify their arguments completely since it's easy to have completely opposing views about what is best. Hobbes argued his system was the most pragmatic and many would agree with him. Given the short history of liberal political systems there's simply no good evidence to decide either way, and there probably won't be any.

C.S. Peirce also used pragmatism, until William James hijacked the name, when Peirce changed the name to the "unappealing" pragmaticism. Your point that this is completely relativistic, is where these arguments generally fail.

Given this, then, how do those of you who consider the preservation of liberty to be vital justify this line? How do you argue that others should not violate the liberty of others, even if everything they believe tells them they should?

Belief is powerful, and there is no line of argument that will persuade a convinced religious individual that he should allow others to act as they see best. This is the reason why there have been so many religious wars throughout history. The Libertarian does have a philosophical justification in the human nature argument, but the religious individual is not looking for you to have a philosophical justification, he is looking for you to repent your sins and see the light. As such, the challenge he presents is a challenge for anyone who does not follow his belief, be they Socialist, Libertarian, or Conservative. :cool:

OK, another problem that's been stuck in my head lately. It seems to me that advocates of liberalism (and I'd love to count myself as one if I could get past the problem I'm about to describe) often take their position as one that is morally neutral, ie does not take any one moral position above any other. Rather, it leaves people free to decide on their own morality. This is a very useful standpoint to make since it avoids the problem of justification that other moral theories need.

My problem comes with how a liberal (classic, ie not the US definition) or libertarian responds to those who have a moral belief that allows, or even requires, the imposition of a code of morality on others (through indoctrination, force or other illiberal means). How, then, is someone with a liberal outlook supposed to respond in a non-circular manner?

I've looked at a number of classic justifications of liberalism and they seem to fall down in one of three main ways:

1) Take some ideal as above liberty, which then justifies it. I'd take Mill (general well-being) and Rawls (maximising the state of the worst off) as falling in this camp. The problem here is that liberty then becomes contingent, only to be maintained as long as it isn't violating the higher principle. This makes it far too weak, in my opinion, especially since the higher principles offered are usually so vague as to allow extreme limitations on liberty (the current Chinese regime often excuses human rights violations as being justified in the name of the greater good and/or benefitting the poorest in society).

2) Inherant human nature. Kant, Locke and Nozick argued this line. The problem here is that once one invokes human nature you need to make a host of assumptions, both about human nature and its supremacy. This line of reasoning clearly falls down in the face of religious arguments, which would put human nature as subordinate to a god. It also is often contradictory, since humans are often contradictory: what is stopping somebody from violating the rights of another person on the basis of deeply held moral convictions if not violating their nature?

3) Pragmatism. Rousseau is the only philosopher I know who argued this line. This line is obviously very shaky since first it depends on some good that one can used to make a pragmatic statement about (well-being, safety, comfort etc.) Secondly, the pragmatic liberal cannot justify their arguments completely since it's easy to have completely opposing views about what is best. Hobbes argued his system was the most pragmatic and many would agree with him. Given the short history of liberal political systems there's simply no good evidence to decide either way, and there probably won't be any.

Given this, then, how do those of you who consider the preservation of liberty to be vital justify this line? How do you argue that others should not violate the liberty of others, even if everything they believe tells them they should?

I think i'm getting your line of reasoning..

Well, one thing i observe in society, is that morals are relative, in the sense that though people have moral values, those are relative of individual to individual. Some sets of moral values, being absolute (such as religions, and some forms of ideals, such as communism, that wants to be scientific) do not admit that they can be wrong. Those that sponsor such morals, thinking they have the truth, have the moral obligation of pushing such truths to those that dont want them, or dont even understand them.

Its like a doctor that wants to give a vaccine to a person that needs it to survive, but doesnt want it.

Since some people don't want to have moral values pushed to them (even if those pushing think they are doing what is right), there will be conflict.

This conflict can only be solved by force (in proportion to the threat): If you believe that you are right, then you must resist in proportion. If a religious zealot wants to peacefully convert you, peacefully defend your ideals, in an open discussion. If a dictator wants to tell you how to live, fight.

There isnt much reasoning that one can follow, actually. In the end, it all goes down to what one believes. It would be good if everyone in the world could respect other people's views without pushing them too far, but this isnt a perfect world. In my opinion, we should always be ready to defend what we believe, without ever pushing too far our beliefs, without "converting" by force others to what we believe in.

I think i'm getting your line of reasoning..

Well, one thing i observe in society, is that morals are relative, in the sense that though people have moral values, those are relative of individual to individual. Some sets of moral values, being absolute (such as religions, and some forms of ideals, such as communism, that wants to be scientific) do not admit that they can be wrong. Those that sponsor such morals, thinking they have the truth, have the moral obligation of pushing such truths to those that dont want them, or dont even understand them.

Its like a doctor that wants to give a vaccine to a person that needs it to survive, but doesnt want it.

Since some people don't want to have moral values pushed to them (even if those pushing think they are doing what is right), there will be conflict.

This conflict can only be solved by force (in proportion to the threat): If you believe that you are right, then you must resist in proportion. If a religious zealot wants to peacefully convert you, peacefully defend your ideals, in an open discussion. If a dictator wants to tell you how to live, fight.

There isnt much reasoning that one can follow, actually. In the end, it all goes down to what one believes. It would be good if everyone in the world could respect other people's views without pushing them too far, but this isnt a perfect world. In my opinion, we should always be ready to defend what we believe, without ever pushing too far our beliefs, without "converting" by force others to what we believe in.


This is such a pessimistic view of us humans. As I posted above, at the end of my post if you do not want to wade through it all, the religious fanatic is a problem, however, is there any religion which does not have peace as one of its basic tenets. If the religious leaders were serious about their beliefs, then religious fanaticism would not be a problem.

There is, therefore, a little hope that force could become unnecessary. It does require a better education, and a deeper understanding that the other is to be respected, than currently exists, but this is not unobtainable.

Given this, then, how do those of you who consider the preservation of liberty to be vital justify this line? How do you argue that others should not violate the liberty of others, even if everything they believe tells them they should?
The same way I'd argue it if everything they believe didnt tell them they should...

John Stuart Mill, and Bentham, do not have any argument for liberty whatsoever.
Hang on "On Liberty" is actually not about liberty....wow I must really have been having a bad day comprehension-wise when I read that one...I could have sworn it was about nothing else....

hes argueing that libertariniam is logically unworkable because it is based on respecting others beliefs,and others beliefs may involve forceing those beliefs on others.
doesnt take sherlock holmes to figure out that libertarianism is unworkable.

hes argueing that libertariniam is logically unworkable because it is based on respecting others beliefs,and others beliefs may involve forceing those beliefs on others.

He's arguing about Liberalism, not Libertarianism. Libertarianism, my philosophy, is rooted in free capitalism rather than state control and forced equality of wellbeing.

The problem is easy, take religion and all of those things that cause someone to attempt to infringe on someone's rights out of your definition of liberty. I do not believe that religion is a basic right. Your ability to practice it will be preserved by free speech and right to assembly, but your beliefs should not be respected by the government at all. The government should have absolutely no responsibility or respect for religion.

As for any other morals you might be considering, I would imagine the same would apply.

Hang on "On Liberty" is actually not about liberty....wow I must really have been having a bad day comprehension-wise when I read that one...I could have sworn it was about nothing else....

Yeah - you're right, Mill does have an argument for liberty, it's just a strange one. In the introductory chapter to ‘On liberty’, Mill expressly rejects the notion that liberty is important because it is of any intrinsic value, as a natural right to which we can all claim:

‘I forego any advantage which could be derived from my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility’
On Liberty, Ch. I

As such, if Mill is to convince us of the vital importance of liberty and its inviolability, it is by recourse to the principle of utility. That is to say, Mill believes that liberty is significant because a society in which general happiness is maximised is one in which people are given significant freedom over how they conduct their private lives. We will be happier as individuals, but also as a society, if we are free. This is because individuals are more likely than anyone else to have put a lot of thought into, and be intimately aware of what is in their best interests. As such, it seems sensible to say that happiness will be maximised if we allow people a large private sphere of interest.

There are other arguments too - I'd go into them but I can't be bothered. He does definitely have an argument for liberty though. Definitely.

Yeah - you're right, Mill does have an argument for liberty, it's just a strange one.
I dont find it to be strange.

In the introductory chapter to ‘On liberty’, Mill expressly rejects the notion that liberty is important because it is of any intrinsic value, as a natural right to which we can all claim:
I dont interpret the comments as rejecting the notion, but rather foregoing it, and sensibly so.

‘I forego any advantage which could be derived from my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility’
On Liberty, Ch. I
To me this says that Mill's is prepared to only argue from the justifiable position of utillitarism, rather than expecting everyone to assume that liberty is it's own justification.

As such, if Mill is to convince us of the vital importance of liberty and its inviolability, it is by recourse to the principle of utility.
Aha, which is like me saying that to prove something I contend is objectively true, I will forego arguments based on subjective notions that cannot in themselves be objectively proven.

That is to say, Mill believes that liberty is significant because a society in which general happiness is maximised is one in which people are given significant freedom over how they conduct their private lives.
Aha, and at the end of the day, is there an arguement in favour of liberty that doesnt rely on subjective belief systems (such as religion, tradition etc), that isnt utillitarian?

We will be happier as individuals, but also as a society, if we are free. This is because individuals are more likely than anyone else to have put a lot of thought into, and be intimately aware of what is in their best interests. As such, it seems sensible to say that happiness will be maximised if we allow people a large private sphere of interest.

There are other arguments too - I'd go into them but I can't be bothered. He does definitely have an argument for liberty though. Definitely.
I'm not sure why you think Mill's argument is strange, the fact that rather than relying on everyone to agree that liberty is inherently valuable 'just because', Mill's states the justifying values that lead him to assert the value of liberty, is a matter of logic and good argumentation, rather than strange...