NationStates Jolt Archive

Just a little enlightenment exercise, for those who tell people to argue their points without bringing up (a) divine being(s), a religious text, or morals in any sort of way.

Here’s the plan.

It is a commonly accepted idea that murder is wrong. I’m certainly not advocating murder in any way, but how can you justify the statement that murder is wrong without using morals (amorally)?

I think that, unless this very basic idea can be established amorally, all arguments, other that those based solely around fact, like 2+2=4 (yes, I know that this isn’t always the case) must be discussed from a moral standpoint.

In case you haven’t caught on, the point of this thread is to try to devise a logical, amoral approach, resulting in the conclusion that murder is wrong*.

*Some of you have pointed out that saying "wrong" implies morality. It does. If any of you have a suggestion as to how I can phrase the question in an amoral way, let me know.

If a man is murdered, then there is one less person contributing to society. If ten men were murdered, then there are ten less people contributing to society. If a hundred men were murdered, then there are one hundred less people contributing to society.

For example, the attacks on 9/11 killed an estimated 3,000 people. That is 3,000 less people contributing to society.

3,000 less consumers
3,000 less parents
3,000 less employees

I think I got that down correctly.

And the winner is...Colodia! :D

Use the Law and Economics approach.

Then you don't have to justify prohibiting murder on the grounds of morals, instead you can view its prohitbition as an economic proposition. (And there are several distinct arguments on this ground).

In short, allowing murder is not allocatively efficient.

Edit colodia beat me too it.

Just a little enlightenment exercise, for those who tell people to argue their points without bringing up (a) divine being(s), a religious text, or morals in any sort of way.

Here’s the plan.

It is a commonly accepted idea that murder is wrong. I’m certainly not advocating murder in any way, but how can you justify the statement that murder is wrong without using morals (amorally)?

I think that, unless this very basic idea can be established amorally, all arguments, other that those based solely around fact, like 2+2=4 (yes, I know that this isn’t always the case) must be discussed from a moral standpoint.

In case you haven’t caught on, the point of this thread is to try to devise a logical, amoral approach, resulting in the conclusion that murder is wrong.

Eh, I'll take a quick shot at this to start it off.

Murder rarely results in great benifit. If a person is killed for another's personal gain, the void that person leaves will often be greater than the short-term wealth/status/whatever that the murderer gains. So a strong society, as a whole, will avoid murder whenever it can, as murder only leads to loss.

And the winner is...Colodia! :D
http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/895000/images/_899916_nixon2300.jpg

How about this approach: The murdered person did not want to be murdered.

I don't think this is based on any morality.

You can also go with social contract.

Yes, but why should we be concerned at all with the welfare of society? Saying, "You shouldn't do this because it will be bad for other people" is basically using an argument based on morals, is it not? The moral that you shouldn't try to negatively effect peoples' lives?

Yes, but why should we be concerned at all with the welfare of society? Saying, "You shouldn't do this because it will be bad for other people" is basically using an argument based on morals, is it not? The moral that you shouldn't try to negatively effect peoples' lives?

The idea is that there is a unity of interest between the individual and the allocative efficiency of society. Not that there is any moral reason to worry about the welfare of society. It's all self interest.

How about this approach: The murdered person did not want to be murdered.

I don't think this is based on any morality.
I'd say that not doing something because it would go against the wants/needs of others is a morally based decision. But that's just me. One could say that you don't have to have a morally based reason to improve the lives of others, if you believe that by doing that you will improve your own life in some tangible way (more wealth or whatever). By that thinking, by killing someone, you would make people sad, and sad people aren't productive people, and the more productive people are, the better we will all have it (in general), so all the individuals out there who didn't kill someone will have a life that's ever-so-slightly better because they didn't kill anyone. I hope this makes sense, I realize I'm sort of babbling...

The idea is that there is a unity of interest between the individual and the allocative efficiency of society. Not that there is any moral reason to worry about the welfare of society. It's all self interest.
Ah, ok.

I think the original proposition is flawed. No one has ever proposed amorality, but simply the use of religiosity as a moral basis. You can still have morals based on, say, the Golden Rule, and conclude that murder is wrong. You simply won't be resorting to religious argument to support your conclusion.

Humans are moral beings, after all.

If a man is murdered, then there is one less person contributing to society. If ten men were murdered, then there are ten less people contributing to society. If a hundred men were murdered, then there are one hundred less people contributing to society.

For example, the attacks on 9/11 killed an estimated 3,000 people. That is 3,000 less people contributing to society.

3,000 less consumers
3,000 less parents
3,000 less employees

I think I got that down correctly.

What does society have to do with anything? (playing Devil's Advocate, here) Besides, if you want to think of "3,000 less", what about

3,000 less mouths to feed (world hunger)
3,000 less people adding to the confusion that is the world
3,000 less people that need employees to serve them

I really do feel sorry for the people who were effected by the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11th.

I'm just trying to prove a point

How about this approach: The murdered person did not want to be murdered.

I don't think this is based on any morality.

Yes, it is. It is based on the idea that all humans deserve equal respect (very much a moral idea, not a cold fact) (still DA)

I think the original proposition is flawed. No one has ever proposed amorality, but simply the use of religiosity as a moral basis. You can still have morals based on, say, the Golden Rule, and conclude that murder is wrong. You simply won't be resorting to religious argument to support your conclusion.

Humans are moral beings, after all.

Actually the Chigaco School of Law and Econmics proposed exactly that. They believe eliminating "morals" from the law and viewing it as an economic proposition will lead to more "crisp" legal decisions.

Unfortunately, because economics itself is so contentious and blurry (when used this way), people just end up advocating their chosen morality by other means.

Because I believe it's not natural for most mammals to kill others of its own species.

I think the original proposition is flawed. No one has ever proposed amorality, but simply the use of religiosity as a moral basis. You can still have morals based on, say, the Golden Rule, and conclude that murder is wrong. You simply won't be resorting to religious argument to support your conclusion.

Humans are moral beings, after all.

This is actually the point that I have been driving at.

Your second sentence is flawed, though. In the 10 days i've been active on this forum, I've seen two threads that have suggested that all arguments be presented amorally (I think one was about gay marriage and the other one was about abortion.

Because I believe it's not natural for most mammals to kill others of its own species.

That's untrue. It is rarer than them killing members of other species, but it certainly happens.

Besides, following observations based on nature could be considered using morals.

How's this for a completely rational approach:

The universe is a dangerous place for life. As the only conscious part of all that lives ( as far as we know at this point ), it is part of our responsibility to nurture and protect that which lives. If we murder another conscious being, we are thus at least partially twarting the purpose of our existence.

Enlightened self interest.

If I feel that it is okay to kill you, I may do that. However, there is nothing preventing other people from feeling that it is okay to kill me. Unless I want to spend all my life finding ways to defend myself against murderers, it behooves me to participate in the social contract that says "killing people is wrong". I may not actually feel that way (and it may not protect me from people who do not accept this contract) but if most people accept this contract, it will keep me safe.

How's this for a completely rational approach:

The universe is a dangerous place for life. As the only conscious part of all that lives ( as far as we know at this point ), it is part of our responsibility to nurture and protect that which lives. If we murder another conscious being, we are thus at least partially twarting the purpose of our existence.

With respect, that is a moral proposition. Why are we responsible?

It is a commonly accepted idea that murder is wrong. I’m certainly not advocating murder in any way, but how can you justify the statement that murder is wrong without using morals (amorally)?
Functionalism is capable of working independently of 'morals'. Indeed it seems more likely that morals arose from functionality than vice-versa, and arguably most if not all moral arguments are simply a form of functionalist argument, one in which particular assumed premises are paramount.

How's this for a completely rational approach:

The universe is a dangerous place for life. As the only conscious part of all that lives ( as far as we know at this point ), it is part of our responsibility to nurture and protect that which lives. If we murder another conscious being, we are thus at least partially twarting the purpose of our existence.

That's a moral argument, not a rational one. Where do you get this responsibility from? Why do you believe in it? How can you prove that you really have this responsibility, this purpose?

With respect, that is a moral proposition. Why are we responsible?
Because we are conscious beings and are part of all that lives. It is thus incumbent on us to accept responsibility for nurturing life as a means of protecting that of which we are a part.

Because we are conscious beings and are part of all that lives. It is thus incumbent on us to accept responsibility for nurturing life as a means of protecting that of which we are a part.

That's still a moral argument, why is it incumbent?

Because we are conscious beings and are part of all that lives. It is thus incumbent on us to accept responsibility for nurturing life as a means of protecting that of which we are a part.

Responsibility = morals.

Protecting that of which we are a part = morals

Just because you're a part of it doesn't mean you have to protect it (for example, if you're a US citizen, you don't have to fight for the US in war). Responsibilities, amorally speaking, are illusions.

Functionalism is capable of working independently of 'morals'. Indeed it seems more likely that morals arose from functionality than vice-versa, and arguably most if not all moral arguments are simply a form of functionalist argument, one in which particular assumed premises are paramount.

big words... little sleep... I'll handle this one tomorrow.

Actually the Chigaco School of Law and Econmics proposed exactly that. They believe eliminating "morals" from the law and viewing it as an economic proposition will lead to more "crisp" legal decisions.

Unfortunately, because economics itself is so contentious and blurry (when used this way), people just end up advocating their chosen morality by other means.
Right. So if you kill a bum, who was a complete asshole so nobody liked them, you're probably helping the economy overall. They're no longer consuming resources while giving nothing in return, and no one's gonna be so shaken up by their death that it affects their productivity. So should it count for less if you kill someone who was essentially worthless? And if you're speaking entirely amorally, you can't really say that all human life has value...
erm... Was this at all what you were getting at? I'm sort of rambling again...

I think the original proposition is flawed. No one has ever proposed amorality, but simply the use of religiosity as a moral basis. You can still have morals based on, say, the Golden Rule, and conclude that murder is wrong. You simply won't be resorting to religious argument to support your conclusion.

Humans are moral beings, after all.

It was a "what-if" question they were asking. I agree, humans need a happy medium. We're creatures of ethos, pathos, and logos. Still, we can speculate about a ethos-free situation.

If a man is murdered, then there is one less person contributing to society. If ten men were murdered, then there are ten less people contributing to society. If a hundred men were murdered, then there are one hundred less people contributing to society.

For example, the attacks on 9/11 killed an estimated 3,000 people. That is 3,000 less people contributing to society.

3,000 less consumers
3,000 less parents
3,000 less employees

I think I got that down correctly.
So a homeless person may be killed without any consequence?

Just a little enlightenment exercise, for those who tell people to argue their points without bringing up (a) divine being(s), a religious text, or morals in any sort of way.I think you misunderstand people who ask for non-religious explainations. My point, using the rules of formal logic, follows:

First of all, there is a difference between religion (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=religion) and morality (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=morality). To say that someone is religious usually implies that they are moral (morality is one of the main elements and benefits of religion), but to say that someone is moral doesn't always mean that they are religious. Morality CAN exist without religion, whereas religion generally cannot exist without morality (there may be exceptions, but most religions are morally 'good').

if 'religious' then 'moral'. (TRUE)
if 'moral', then 'relgious'. (FALSE: morals are not limited to those of faith)

Here's an example:
if 'it is a car', then 'it has wheels'. (TRUE)
if 'it has wheels', then 'it is a car'. (FALSE: other things have wheels that aren't cars)


Also, there is a difference between 'non-religious' and 'amoral'. To say that someone is amoral usually implies that they are non-religious (again, because most religions are 'good'), but non-religious does not mean amoral.


I for one am agnostic-ish (I don't really care for labels), but I have a strong sense of morality. I don't want to hear how something is right or wrong because some god, which I may or may not agree with or believe in, says it's wrong. It's like me saying that the Tooth Fairy backs my side (you probably don't believe in it, but you can't prove/disprove its existence any more than any god's).

So a homeless person may be killed without any consequence?
How many dead hobos are featured on the news?

Not all murder's are considered 'wrong'.

How does the Economic model account for justifiable and excusable murders such as through self-defence, provocation, insanity...
We do not find people guilty of murder where they have a defence. Yet, the mere fact that they the defence succeeds means that they did in fact commit murder.

How does one justify reducing murder to a mere killing that one is either less culpable for or not culpable for, without introducing morals?

We could bring in rights arguments here, but they skate close to morals arguments.

Not all murder's are considered 'wrong'.

How does the Economic model account for justifiable and excusable murders such as through self-defence, provocation, insanity...
We do not find people guilty of murder where they have a defence. Yet, the mere fact that they the defence succeeds means that they did in fact commit murder.

How does one justify reducing murder to a mere killing that one is either less culpable for or not culpable for, without introducing morals?

We could bring in rights arguments here, but they skate close to morals arguments.
Actually I would dispute your implied definition of murder. So far as I know murder is a particular kind of killing, the word to me describes the kind of killing that doesnt occur if people have a legal defence for their actions. When someone is found not-guilty murder due to self defence we are not saying that someone else murdered the person who is dead, nor are we claiming they are not dead after all. What we are stating is that the killing doesnt satisfy necessary elements that categorise an act as being murder.

Actually I would dispute your implied definition of murder. So far as I know murder is a particular kind of killing, the word to me describes the kind of killing that doesnt occur if people have a legal defence for their actions. When someone is found not-guilty murder due to self defence we are not saying that someone else murdered the person who is dead, nor are we claiming they are not dead after all. What we are stating is that the killing doesnt satisfy necessary elements that categorise an act as being murder.

Wrong.

The offence of murder consists of two elements - the act and the mental element.
To satisfy murder, you must prove
a) The defendant did the specified act; and
b) The defendant had the requisite intent

If the offence is proved, the defendant then has the option of trying to adduce a defence to either justify or excuse his otherwise murderous actions.

Thus when a person is not-guilty of murder due to self-defence. It is not that he did not commit murder. If he had not committed murder, there would be no need to look to self-defence. It is that we see him as justified in his actions and therefore not culpable.

The difference between not-guilty and innocent is particularly important in this case.

If a man is murdered, then there is one less person contributing to society. If ten men were murdered, then there are ten less people contributing to society. If a hundred men were murdered, then there are one hundred less people contributing to society.

and the amoralists say "so? what's so great about having people contribute to society? sounds like a moral judgement to me."

merely observing that murder has certain consequences cannot ever get you to an 'ought' statement.

In case you haven’t caught on, the point of this thread is to try to devise a logical, amoral approach, resulting in the conclusion that murder is wrong.You're going to need axioms, and you're going to need a system of logic (rules). (They may not be explicitly stated, but if you're going to be logical, they're going to be there). And one of those axioms or rules is going to have to use the term 'wrong'. Otherwise you could just substitute any other unbound term and prove that, say, murder is brillig. And that is not something that should pop out of a logical system.

In other words, what you're asking for can't be done. At most the moral rule can be hidden away behind a smokescreen, but it will always be there.

Logical, amoral way to prove that murder is wrong....
The question was: What doesn't end someone's life?

The word "Wrong" seems like a moral judgement, doesn't it?

Responsibility = morals.

Protecting that of which we are a part = morals

Just because you're a part of it doesn't mean you have to protect it (for example, if you're a US citizen, you don't have to fight for the US in war). Responsibilities, amorally speaking, are illusions.
Your reasoning is leading you in a circle. If you are a member of a family, you protect the family because they carry your genes and as a member of a mutally protective group. The same thing applies to being a member of the human race, and beyond that to being part of all that lives. What part of this do you not understand?

Games Theory:

We don't kill people because we don't want people to go around killing us. Those that go around killing people violate the interest of the aggregated comunity (which is to live) and are then eliminated (arrested).

So don't kill, or you suffer.

Actually the Chigaco School of Law and Econmics proposed exactly that. They believe eliminating "morals" from the law and viewing it as an economic proposition will lead to more "crisp" legal decisions.

Unfortunately, because economics itself is so contentious and blurry (when used this way), people just end up advocating their chosen morality by other means.

If they decide to base the law on economics, they should make the murder of what the nazis referred to as "useless eaters" legal. These are people who soak up resources without contributing.

This wouldn't eliminate morality, it would just instigate an economic morality. I prefer a morality based on respect.

Your reasoning is leading you in a circle. If you are a member of a family, you protect the family because they carry your genes and as a member of a mutally protective group. The same thing applies to being a member of the human race, and beyond that to being part of all that lives. What part of this do you not understand?

you are missing a word.

If you are a member of a family, you CAN protect the family...
If you are a member of the human race, you CAN protect the human race...

You don't have to.

Anyway, murder is ALWAYS wrong, because if it isn't wrong, it isn't murder.

If they decide to base the law on economics, they should make the murder of what the nazis referred to as "useless eaters" legal. These are people who soak up resources without contributing.

This wouldn't eliminate morality, it would just instigate an economic morality. I prefer a morality based on respect.

Ok, but the NAZI state wasn't allocatively efficient. It made - or could have made had it not got the crap smacked out of it - a lot of money for the oligarchy there, but it was not the richest society it could be.

The way the chicago school works is that it looks to maximize utility - which can be expressed in dollars (or unit of currency). The idea is to make allocative choices using the legal system in such a fashion that everyone is in the best possible position they can theoretically be. (A caveat, of course, is that chioces are made every day.)

This is the basis of the whole system. That every participant is placed in the best circumstance possible for any given distribution (I think it's called pareto efficient something like that). Failing that at least each allocative chioce will not increase the overall extent of disadvantage.

In other words it looks to make society the wealthiest it can be, as well as giving the maximum advantage to each of societies participants. That's where the unity of interest comes from.

It's fairly clear that under such a system, the Nazi government fails because the death camps prevented people fully realizing their economic potential. (likewise slavery is also bad.)

I personally don't subscribe to it myself. Although it makes a lot of sense for some aspects of civil and commercial law.

Yup, as Free Soviets and others point out, this question is doomed from the start. You can't have an amoral argument with the conclusion 'murder is wrong' because 'wrong' is a moral adjective. You can argue that murder is allocatively inefficient, or dangerous, or difficult, or vulgar, or whatever but you'll always still need to show that inefficiency, or danger, or difficulty, or vulgarity, or whatever is wrong. And you'll need a moral argument to do that.

What I think you really want is an argument to morality which isn't based on arbitrary (e.g. religious) grounds. Philosophers have been trying to do that for thousands of years, and rarely do any two of 'em agree. Good luck!

Yup, as Free Soviets and others point out, this question is doomed from the start. You can't have an amoral argument with the conclusion 'murder is wrong' because 'wrong' is a moral adjective. You can argue that murder is allocatively inefficient, or dangerous, or difficult, or vulgar, or whatever but you'll always still need to show that inefficiency, or danger, or difficulty, or vulgarity, or whatever is wrong. And you'll need a moral argument to do that.

What I think you really want is an argument to morality which isn't based on arbitrary (e.g. religious) grounds. Philosophers have been trying to do that for thousands of years, and rarely do any two of 'em agree. Good luck!

Well that is the point of the econimic school. Not that the allocative efficiency is chosen because it is "better", but because it is the situation where everyone is as happy as they can possibly be. Therefore it is inherently self interested. In otherwords, if we were all soveriegn maximizers that cared only for our own well being it is the system we would choose automatically, without regards to others. Hence amoral.

Not that I believe in it.

if 'religious' then 'moral'. (TRUE)
if 'moral', then 'relgious'. (FALSE: morals are not limited to those of faith)

your first proposition isn't true either. i've met some rather devious religious folk.

Well that is the point of the econimic school. Not that the allocative efficiency is chosen because it is "better", but because it is the situation where everyone is as happy as they can possibly be. Therefore it is inherently self interested. In otherwords, if we were all soveriegn maximizers that cared only for our own well being it is the system we would choose automatically, without regards to others. Hence amoral.

Not that I believe in it.

that still doesn't work. it still has to contain an ought statement. because the amoralist will just say "what's so great about rational self-interest or happiness? i might choose to not murder people, but then again maybe i will. i might choose to act in own self interest or i might choose to act against it. so what?"

Wrong.

The offence of murder consists of two elements - the act and the mental element.
To satisfy murder, you must prove
a) The defendant did the specified act; and
b) The defendant had the requisite intent

If the offence is proved, the defendant then has the option of trying to adduce a defence to either justify or excuse his otherwise murderous actions.

Thus when a person is not-guilty of murder due to self-defence. It is not that he did not commit murder. If he had not committed murder, there would be no need to look to self-defence. It is that we see him as justified in his actions and therefore not culpable.

The difference between not-guilty and innocent is particularly important in this case.
Phaikia.....I'm not convinced.
In the first place you dont get to defend yourself after the charges have been proved, you can appeal at that point if you have sufficient grounds, and enter evidence as to mitagating circumstances regarding sentencing.

I'm not entirely certain, but I'm under the impression that nations that leagally overtly allow for lethal force to be used in self defence, do not necessarily prosecute where there is no doubt that death occured as a result of self defence.

I would also suggest that the requisite intent is not found to have occured where a person is found not capable of forming the requisite intent, or simply found never to have formed criminal intent (for instance they were acting to defend themselves).

To suggest someone is not guilty, is to suggest that it has not been proven that they did commit the crime they are not guilty of, in some cases this is in spite of the fact that no one believes the accused didnt commit the acts that directly caused the death of another person. As you pointed out intent is a crucial component of commiting a crime. A person who's only intent was to defend themselves, or a person who was insane and incapable (legally) of forming criminal intent, isnt found 'not-guilty' because it was proved they commited a crime, then they offered some form of mitigation and we agreed that despite a crime being commited we would 'let them off'. Rather they have (so far as I can work out) been found to have not commited a crime, because a necessary component of the crime have been accused of (intent) has not been proven to be present......or at least that's how I have always reasoned it.... :p ;)

and the amoralists say "so? what's so great about having people contribute to society? sounds like a moral judgement to me."

merely observing that murder has certain consequences cannot ever get you to an 'ought' statement.
I think you'll find that no particular moral stance, is required in order to benefit from society's productivity, nor to recognise such benefit. I would hardly expect that looking out for yourself would be considered primarily a moral endeavour.

You're going to need axioms, and you're going to need a system of logic (rules). (They may not be explicitly stated, but if you're going to be logical, they're going to be there). And one of those axioms or rules is going to have to use the term 'wrong'. Otherwise you could just substitute any other unbound term and prove that, say, murder is brillig. And that is not something that should pop out of a logical system.

In other words, what you're asking for can't be done. At most the moral rule can be hidden away behind a smokescreen, but it will always be there.
You dont need the word 'wrong', undesirable, or harmful, or bad would do, none of which require any moral component in their definition.

Logical, amoral way to prove that murder is wrong....
The question was: What doesn't end someone's life?

The word "Wrong" seems like a moral judgement, doesn't it?
It doesnt matter what the word wrong seems like. Factually speaking I can easily come up with reasons that dont take morals into account, which can determine that certain acts should be discouraged. I need not use the word 'wrong' in order to do so. I need not do so however, as Portu Cale has kindly already done so....
We don't kill people because we don't want people to go around killing us. Those that go around killing people violate the interest of the aggregated comunity (which is to live) and are then eliminated (arrested).

If you are a member of a family, you CAN protect the family...
If you are a member of the human race, you CAN protect the human race...
Aha, people can choose to stick their hands in fire places as well, despite some moral reasons for why they shouldnt, it isnt in my opinion due to morality that most people do not. The fact that you can overlay moralistic notions over top of someone's behaviour doesnt make their behaviour based on morality. It could simply be the result of good health.

Yup, as Free Soviets and others point out, this question is doomed from the start. You can't have an amoral argument with the conclusion 'murder is wrong' because 'wrong' is a moral adjective. You can argue that murder is allocatively inefficient, or dangerous, or difficult, or vulgar, or whatever but you'll always still need to show that inefficiency, or danger, or difficulty, or vulgarity, or whatever is wrong. And you'll need a moral argument to do that.
I suggest that your argument requires a redefinition of the word wrong. If I genuinely believe and wrongly tell you that the Sydney Harbour Bridge is in Downtown LA, I suggest I am incorrect, as opposed to acting immorally.

Some of you have pointed out that saying "wrong" implies morality. It does. If any of you have a suggestion as to how I can phrase the question in an amoral way, let me know.

MORALITY doesn't require RELIGION in any way- It requires the expression of LOVE!

Is there ever LOVE being expressed in IMMORAL acts?

However the real question is: Is LOVE a THOUGHT? Can the MIND LOVE? Or is LOVE a feeling that the mind CANNOT KNOW?

Ken

Just a little enlightenment exercise, for those who tell people to argue their points without bringing up (a) divine being(s), a religious text, or morals in any sort of way.

In case you haven’t caught on, the point of this thread is to try to devise a logical, amoral approach, resulting in the conclusion that murder is wrong*.

*Some of you have pointed out that saying "wrong" implies morality. It does. If any of you have a suggestion as to how I can phrase the question in an amoral way, let me know.


Murder is wrong because it violates the social contract.

"Murder is wrong because it violates the social contract. "


Perhaps MURDER is wrong because it is NOT an ACT of LOVE/ACCEPTENCE?

Ken

Murder is undesirable. A society that allows it's members to kill one another with impunity, is in most cases 'poorly adapted' relative to one that prohibits and punishes citizens for killing each other in most or all circumstances.

This type of thread has beem going around lately so i'm going to one of my old posts.

The notion of entitlement to any abstract idea like justice is tricky as what exactly is true justice? For that matter does the notion of justice even hold any truth? One may say that human notions of morality such as justice are subjective and unstable and therefore impossible to hold any form of truth. For example is it just for Saudi Arabia to imprison people because they express ideas outside of the cultural bounders, and for the Royal family to publicly behead criminals? Was it a just act of the Russian communists to purge intellectuals in order to maintain order? Or for someone to get there hand cut of for stealing bread? Was is a just act for the Romans to enjoy watching the slaughter of Christians? Are the Iraqi insurgents just in there beheadings of Americans etc. To those it must have been viewed as a just or they would of not acted in such a way. The only thing it seems we humans need to perform acts of violence is justification in ones own mind.

I think you'll find that no particular moral stance, is required in order to benefit from society's productivity, nor to recognise such benefit. I would hardly expect that looking out for yourself would be considered primarily a moral endeavour.

looking out for yourself actually has several moral theories for itself. ethical egoism for one.

anyway, you can point out that something is beneficial in some way all day, but the amoralist can always say "so what?"

without a moral 'ought' statement, all you are doing is pointing out observations. the argument looks like this:
it is in your self-interest to ensure society's productivity.
murder hurts society's productivity.
therfore it would be in your own self-interest to prohibit murder.

to which the amoralist says "good to know," and then continues on, still not prohibiting murder. because to get to the next step you need to hold the moral value that one ought to act in one's own self-interest. to which the amoralist will say "i don't have to do anything, whether it benefits me or not."

in other words, your argument assumes that either people ought act in their own self-interest or always act in their own self-interest. the first is clearly a moral claim, the second is clearly false.

"Murder is wrong because it violates the social contract. "


Perhaps MURDER is wrong because it is NOT an ACT of LOVE/ACCEPTENCE?

Ken

That means that changing a flat tire is wrong, or that eating nachos is wrong, or that doing laundry is wrong, or that working is wrong....

looking out for yourself actually has several moral theories for itself. ethical egoism for one.

anyway, you can point out that something is beneficial in some way all day, but the amoralist can always say "so what?"

without a moral 'ought' statement, all you are doing is pointing out observations. the argument looks like this:
it is in your self-interest to ensure society's productivity.
murder hurts society's productivity.
therfore it would be in your own self-interest to prohibit murder.

to which the amoralist says "good to know," and then continues on, still not prohibiting murder. because to get to the next step you need to hold the moral value that one ought to act in one's own self-interest. to which the amoralist will say "i don't have to do anything, whether it benefits me or not."

in other words, your argument assumes that either people ought act in their own self-interest or always act in their own self-interest. the first is clearly a moral claim, the second is clearly false.
Just because you can superimpose a moral theory over a set of fact circumstance, that doesnt mean that the morals are the reasoning and explanation for the facts. I think that people have the cause effect relationship backwards. Morals dont cause biology, it's the other way around. It doesnt matter how many moral notions you can derive from those biological facts, ants live in cooperative ant colonies, because it is adaptive, not because they feel under some moral obligation to do so.

that still doesn't work. it still has to contain an ought statement. because the amoralist will just say "what's so great about rational self-interest or happiness? i might choose to not murder people, but then again maybe i will. i might choose to act in own self interest or i might choose to act against it. so what?"

Why would an amoralist choose to act against their own self/intersest happiness? Given complete freedom of choice without moralistics constraints why wouldn't you choose the course that always makes you the most happy?

I'm not saying self interest is how people "ought" to act, I'm saying that's how the "would" act. Hence no morality is needed.

Why would an amoralist choose to act against their own self/intersest happiness? Given complete freedom of choice without moralistics constraints why wouldn't you choose the course that always makes you the most happy?

I'm not saying self interest is how people "ought" to act, I'm saying that's how the "would" act. Hence no morality is needed.

because they feel like it? because they've taken to making decisions based on a coin flip? who knows - they're amoralists, the standard human decision-making processes don't so much apply to them.

people make choices other than that which is most pleasurable or in their own self-interest quite regularly. if it is possible to act against your self-interest now, then i see nothing to prevent it among a population of amoralists. and nobody could argue them out of it or tell them it was wrong without invoking an ought statement. which only would make the person presenting the argument into a moralist, because the amoralist would still say "so what?" or maybe flip their coin to see if they would take up deciding things on the basis of self-interest.

because they feel like it? because they've taken to making decisions based on a coin flip? who knows - they're amoralists, the standard human decision-making processes don't so much apply to them.

people make choices other than that which is most pleasurable or in their own self-interest quite regularly. if it is possible to act against your self-interest now, then i see nothing to prevent it among a population of amoralists. and nobody could argue them out of it or tell them it was wrong without invoking an ought statement. which only would make the person presenting the argument into a moralist, because the amoralist would still say "so what?" or maybe flip their coin to see if they would take up deciding things on the basis of self-interest.
Ants could all stop working as a colony, but for the most part, they dont. Unless you wish to argue that this is a moral decision on their part, you must accept that motivations/causes other than morality exist.
I think you still have the cause effect relationship backwards.

Just because you can superimpose a moral theory over a set of fact circumstance, that doesnt mean that the morals are the reasoning and explanation for the facts. I think that people have the cause effect relationship backwards. Morals dont cause biology, it's the other way around. It doesnt matter how many moral notions you can derive from those biological facts, ants live in cooperative ant colonies, because it is adaptive, not because they feel under some moral obligation to do so.

i don't know many people who would claim that ants are moral agents. and who said morals cause biology?

but biology doesn't cause morals. at best you can say it (partially) causes traits and tendencies that lead to certain outcomes. but placing moral worth onto these traits or even these outcomes is well beyond the scope of biology. if it were the case that a tendency towards rape was an evolutionarily benefitial trait, would that then be morally right? clearly evolution has not rid us of the tendencies to engage in actions that we call immoral - maybe they are benefitial, or at least nuetral.

you probably also could argue that biology is at least partly behind the feelings we have that we call moral intuitions. but as with anything in humans, it is really hard to untangle what is caused by biology and what is caused by culture and what is caused by our non-human external environments. plus, we can act in ways that are not in the interests of our "selfish genes". we can even act in ways that go against our moral intuitions. as the man says, biology is not destiny.

Ants could all stop working as a colony, but for the most part, they dont. Unless you wish to argue that this is a moral decision on their part, you must accept that motivations/causes other than morality exist.
I think you still have the cause effect relationship backwards.

ants don't have as many non-instinctual behaviors as we do. if we ran as they do, modern society would be impossible, as it is not what we evolved for. but we don't. we behave in ways we had to be taught. we behave in ways we teach ourselves.

of course motivations other than morality exist. our motivations are complex, and to some extent are up to us. we can choose to act in many different ways on criteria of our own choosing. and we do.

i don't know many people who would claim that ants are moral agents. and who said morals cause biology?

but biology doesn't cause morals. at best you can say it (partially) causes traits and tendencies that lead to certain outcomes. but placing moral worth onto these traits or even these outcomes is well beyond the scope of biology. if it were the case that a tendency towards rape was an evolutionarily benefitial trait, would that then be morally right? clearly evolution has not rid us of the tendencies to engage in actions that we call immoral - maybe they are benefitial, or at least nuetral.

you probably also could argue that biology is at least partly behind the feelings we have that we call moral intuitions. but as with anything in humans, it is really hard to untangle what is caused by biology and what is caused by culture and what is caused by our non-human external environments. plus, we can act in ways that are not in the interests of our "selfish genes". we can even act in ways that go against our moral intuitions. as the man says, biology is not destiny.
The question of the thread is can murder be shown to be 'wrong' (aka negative in this context) without resorting to morality in any way. The answer is yes.

Biology explains how murder can be defined as negative (aka 'wrong') indepently of morals, so unless you wish to argue that morality causes biology, we have an explanation for murder prohibitions independent of morality.

The question of the thread is can murder be shown to be 'wrong' (aka negative in this context) without resorting to morality in any way. The answer is yes.

Biology explains how murder can be defined as negative (aka 'wrong') indepently of morals, so unless you wish to argue that morality causes biology, we have an explanation for murder prohibitions independent of morality.

biology does no such thing. killing the competition is often a solid evolutionary strategy.

biology does no such thing. killing the competition is often a solid evolutionary strategy.
Yes and it is often not, it is often negative in fact. In this particular case we are not looking at whether or not it is more often positive or negative throughout all species, we are looking at whether or not prohibitions against indiscriminate killing of any human being you (as a human being) feels like killing, can be explained without reference or recourse to reasons that are 'morals'. The answer is yes.

because they feel like it? because they've taken to making decisions based on a coin flip? who knows - they're amoralists, the standard human decision-making processes don't so much apply to them.

people make choices other than that which is most pleasurable or in their own self-interest quite regularly. if it is possible to act against your self-interest now, then i see nothing to prevent it among a population of amoralists. and nobody could argue them out of it or tell them it was wrong without invoking an ought statement. which only would make the person presenting the argument into a moralist, because the amoralist would still say "so what?" or maybe flip their coin to see if they would take up deciding things on the basis of self-interest.

That only holds if you assume amoralists have absolutely no critical faculities whatsoever. I think your definition of moral is much broader than mind. By your standard amoral people may also just chop one of their own limbs off or something because they have no guiding code telling them not to. I don't think that would be the case. They would act in a self interested fashion because that it what a rational amoralist would do. (At least such an overwhelming percentage that it makes no difference.)

we are looking at whether or not prohibitions against indiscriminate killing of any human being you (as a human being) feels like killing, can be explained without reference or recourse to reasons that are 'morals'. The answer is yes.

the best that a cross-cultural look at human customs is likely to arrive at is that it is generally not tolerated for people to kill members of their own particular group without following certain rituals. assuming that this is largely due to evolution (which is fair enough; though almost certainly not biological evolution) that still doesn't get us to anything like the statement "murder is wrong". killing outside the group has been downright common. so even if we can claim that thing that are favored by evolution are culturally encouraged and things not so favored are prohibited (which seems like a rather dramatic claim to make), all we get is a statement like "prohibitions against killing within the group without following a set of culturally defined customs tend to be beneficial for that group". which doesn't seem to me to be where we intended to end up.

the best that a cross-cultural look at human customs is likely to arrive at is that it is generally not tolerated for people to kill members of their own particular group without following certain rituals. assuming that this is largely due to evolution (which is fair enough; though almost certainly not biological evolution) that still doesn't get us to anything like the statement "murder is wrong". killing outside the group has been downright common. so even if we can claim that thing that are favored by evolution are culturally encouraged and things not so favored are prohibited (which seems like a rather dramatic claim to make), all we get is a statement like "prohibitions against killing within the group without following a set of culturally defined customs tend to be beneficial for that group". which doesn't seem to me to be where we intended to end up.
The point is whether or not it is possible to formulate an argument that shows murder as being wrong without resorting to morals. Clearly if the question itself is not intended to be contradictory (and we have the original posters comments indicating that it was not), wrong is intended to mean 'negative' as opposed to correct (as in properly spelled, or not 'mythological) or 'immoral' (since you cant answer a question about morals without morals). So the poster is essentially asking can an argument be formulated that would show that human beings indiscriminately killing human beings (ie murdering them) is 'negative', and the answer is......yes.

We can give a value to 'wrong' that is consistent with the criteria (negative without relying on morals to differentiate between negative and positive) intended by the original poster, and we can argue that ramifications/consequences/effects of human beings indiscriminately killing one another (ie murdering each other with impunity) meets the value attached to the word wrong, a value consistent with the intended question of the original poster (ie negative independent of any moral discrimination).

Morals are a person own personal code. And so technically one could not have no morals. But the have a code saying they could do evrything and anything they want.

I think murder is wrong only becuase the person has a right to life as i do.

However, i don't mind killing the person if needs be.

I inculde animals and inscents and plants as "person" too. I'm an Equalist.

That only holds if you assume amoralists have absolutely no critical faculities whatsoever. I think your definition of moral is much broader than mind. By your standard amoral people may also just chop one of their own limbs off or something because they have no guiding code telling them not to. I don't think that would be the case. They would act in a self interested fashion because that it what a rational amoralist would do. (At least such an overwhelming percentage that it makes no difference.)

nah. humans currently do things that are against their own self-interest. therefore psychological egoism is false and in a society of amoralists, such acts would happen at least as often as they do now. amoralists would act in all the same ways that people act now, only without making moral arguments to themselves about what they ought to do. their actions may be based on self-interest, on altruism, on groupthink, on orders from authority figures, on random whims, and whatever else motivates us to make certain choices.

nah. humans currently do things that are against their own self-interest. therefore psychological egoism is false and in a society of amoralists, such acts would happen at least as often as they do now. amoralists would act in all the same ways that people act now, only without making moral arguments to themselves about what they ought to do. their actions may be based on self-interest, on altruism, on groupthink, on orders from authority figures, on random whims, and whatever else motivates us to make certain choices.
That humans currently do things that are against their own self interest is unsubstantiated in this discussion, but even in the likely event that it were established, it wouldnt prove anything by itself.
If the proposition that in a society of 'amoralists' people would without and independent of morals, "act in all the same ways that people act now", is true, this would prove that morals are not necessary in explaining our behaviour including the behaviour of designating certain behaviours as wrong.
Either way the point of the thread is to determine if negative/positive or in essence wrong/right can be argued without recourse to morals, and the answer so far as I can ascertain is yes.

Here's another one, hope it's not been done...


Murder is wrong amorally because murder involves piercing the morals of a human being. Thus, amorality and morality are intertwined.


Like it should be.

Some of you have pointed out that saying "wrong" implies morality. It does. If any of you have a suggestion as to how I can phrase the question in an amoral way, let me know.

well, that depends on where you want to get. it seems to me that what you'd want is some argument that ends with the conclusion "therefore murder should be prohibited". or else you would need two arguments; one showing that wrongness is a real property of things in the universe and another showing that murder contains this property.

That humans currently do things that are against their own self interest is unsubstantiated in this discussion, but even in the likely event that it were established, it wouldnt prove anything by itself.
If the proposition that in a society of 'amoralists' people would without and independent of morals, "act in all the same ways that people act now", is true, this would prove that morals are not necessary in explaining our behaviour including the behaviour of designating certain behaviours as wrong.
Either way the point of the thread is to determine if negative/positive or in essence wrong/right can be argued without recourse to morals, and the answer so far as I can ascertain is yes.

sorry if that was confusing, i meant that people would base their actions on all of the same motivations as now, with the exception of moral arguments. amoralists would be just as prone to the same irrational motivations as all of us. i think that the system of ethics that we were raised in or adhere to typically plays a rather large role in a lot of our decisions, unless outweighed by some other motivation.

also, just so it's clear, my favorite example of people acting against both rationality and self-interest is our rather disturbing tendency to let the group make our decisions for us - as epitomized in the psychology experiment where people are given every indication that there is a fire, but as long as nobody else seems to notice the subjects will just sit there coughing and rubbing their eyes from all the smoke, long past the point when they would have died in a real fire. while this is not necessarily a moral issue, it is a dramatic example of a well documented human behavior that often has moral implications

anyway, it still seems to me that labelling the consequences of certain actions as positive or negative is itself a normative moral valuation. leave out that bit of moral valuation and all you have is the statement that "murder causes x". and while the idea that "killing within the group is generally prohibited because groups without such a prohibition tend to die out" is close, it doesn't get you all the way to "murder is not good". so we may be able to explain why on average people don't murder while ignoring their personal ethical systems (but only in the aggregate, as any specific case will certainly deal largely with the subject's particular moral beliefs), that won't get us to why they shouldn't.

nah. humans currently do things that are against their own self-interest. therefore psychological egoism is false and in a society of amoralists, such acts would happen at least as often as they do now. amoralists would act in all the same ways that people act now, only without making moral arguments to themselves about what they ought to do. their actions may be based on self-interest, on altruism, on groupthink, on orders from authority figures, on random whims, and whatever else motivates us to make certain choices.

Well I have similar reservations about the theory myself. Remember I did say I don't hold with it. I was just tossing it out there as a possible explaination. I was sort of hoping we would get a follower of Judge Posner to chime in and defend it properly.

My biggest problem is that, psychological and outside influences aside, is that people just aren't "soveriegn maximizers" they lack both the knowledge and decision making capabilities to act as such. Even large capital markets that are supposed to reflect the actions of an ideal soveriegn maximizer are known to get it wrong. So what hope does the average guy have.

Also people - as you point out - are just not rational actors. They tend to be stupid in their decisions. (Gee honey, I secured our retirement, I mortgaged the house and sunk the money in myunderpants.com, it's easy street from now on!)

Finally, this whole edfice depends on moving society to the most allocatively efficient society. Since there is a wide divergence of opinions amongst economists what the society should be - public transport no public transport &ct. - how can we ever use that as a guide. After all it seems as if no-one knows where it is going.


But, from a law and economics perspective, your assertion that people act against there self interest is incorrect. You may not percieve their distributive decisions to move them to a better (therefore more self interested position), but this is rebuttable because you are not fully internalising all the aspects of their choice. It may seem dumb to you, but from their perspective it is a self-interested move because they are considering aspects of the decision that you are not.

For example in the case of the "bum" above, he may in fact considered not being a bum weighed the personal cost, and decided that this is the most efficient move for him. Thus he is as happy as he can be insofar as the allocative reasources at his disposal allow.

Some of you have pointed out that saying "wrong" implies morality. It does. If any of you have a suggestion as to how I can phrase the question in an amoral way, let me know.

Yes, saying "wrong" does imply morality. How about "bad"? Plenty of things are bad, but apparently violate no moral rule (even utilitarianism allows bad things, so long as the good outweighs the bad). And, of course, there are many things that a moral person considers "wrong," but which might arguably not be "bad."

I say all this to show that the two terms are not identical... and I think what you have in mind is something closer to, "Can one show, without recourse to moral principle, that murder is a bad thing?" Of course, this begs the question, "bad for whom?" .... But it is still closer to what you mean without causing an immediate contradiction.

Remember I did say I don't hold with it.

likewise, i've mostly just been having fun playing the hardcore amoralist, david hume, and (to a lesser extent) g.e. moore.

likewise, i've mostly just been having fun playing the hardcore amoralist, david hume, and (to a lesser extent) g.e. moore.

Yeah, actually this is the first time I wished I'd paid more attention in law and economics. Then I could really work up a good defense. Oh well.

sorry if that was confusing, i meant that people would base their actions on all of the same motivations as now, with the exception of moral arguments. amoralists would be just as prone to the same irrational motivations as all of us. i think that the system of ethics that we were raised in or adhere to typically plays a rather large role in a lot of our decisions, unless outweighed by some other motivation.

also, just so it's clear, my favorite example of people acting against both rationality and self-interest is our rather disturbing tendency to let the group make our decisions for us - as epitomized in the psychology experiment where people are given every indication that there is a fire, but as long as nobody else seems to notice the subjects will just sit there coughing and rubbing their eyes from all the smoke, long past the point when they would have died in a real fire. while this is not necessarily a moral issue, it is a dramatic example of a well documented human behavior that often has moral implications
Well actually acting as a group can be negative in some situations, but it can also be positive.

anyway, it still seems to me that labelling the consequences of certain actions as positive or negative is itself a normative moral valuation.
I see that, and that is where you are getting stuck. Morals are a type of value system, not the only value system. One can make a value system independent of morals in which some things are given the value good, and some things are given the value bad, all consistent with the first valuation which was arrived at independently of moral consideration.

leave out that bit of moral valuation and all you have is the statement that "murder causes x".
No this only occurs if you have no valuation system whatsoever, or according to the values adopted, all things are equal.

and while the idea that "killing within the group is generally prohibited because groups without such a prohibition tend to die out" is close, it doesn't get you all the way to "murder is not good".
Actually that depends on the definition of good. ;)

so we may be able to explain why on average people don't murder while ignoring their personal ethical systems (but only in the aggregate, as any specific case will certainly deal largely with the subject's particular moral beliefs), that won't get us to why they shouldn't.
Depends on what you mean by shouldnt, however either way that's not the point of the thread. The point of the thread is can the proposition 'murder is wrong' be made without reference to morals'?, and the answer is yes.

That means that changing a flat tire is wrong, or that eating nachos is wrong, or that doing laundry is wrong, or that working is wrong....
Exactly HOW do you come to say that these actions would be WRONG on the basis of LOVE and acceptence? Your logic is beyond me...

Please explain your assertion,

Ken

Phaikia.....I'm not convinced.
In the first place you dont get to defend yourself after the charges have been proved, you can appeal at that point if you have sufficient grounds, and enter evidence as to mitagating circumstances regarding sentencing.

If the murder charge is not proved, there is no need for a defence.
Lack of the requisite mental element or of certain components of the physical act such as voluntariness are often the first line of defense.
BUT if the actual definition of murder is proved, if a defendant cannot provide any reason for why we should not consider him legally culpable for murder then he is quilty of murder. Otherwise we find him not-guilty of murder, sometimes guilty of a lesser crime such as manslaughter.
The actual crime of murder was still established. We just attribute less or no culpability.


I'm not entirely certain, but I'm under the impression that nations that leagally overtly allow for lethal force to be used in self defence, do not necessarily prosecute where there is no doubt that death occured as a result of self defence.
Sure, it's at the discretion of the State who they decide to prosecute. Doesn't mean they couldn't establish murder.


I would also suggest that the requisite intent is not found to have occured where a person is found not capable of forming the requisite intent, or simply found never to have formed criminal intent (for instance they were acting to defend themselves).
As I have said, if they never formed the intent, then no there is no crime proved.
Capacity to form intent is slightly different and may come in at a fitness to plead stage, with regard to age of criminal responsiblity, or in arguing intent ie. This person does not have the capacity to form the intent, therefore they could never have had the intent.

Acting to defend still has criminal intent. You are using force with the intent to cause bodily injury, in some cases to kill. That is criminal intent. But it is understandable and we wouldn't want to strip people of the right to defend themselves and others with reasonable force. Murder isn't confined to intent to kill btw. It included intent to cause gbh or merely bodily injury and being reckless as to whether death ensues.


To suggest someone is not guilty, is to suggest that it has not been proven that they did commit the crime they are not guilty of, in some cases this is in spite of the fact that no one believes the accused didnt commit the acts that directly caused the death of another person. As you pointed out intent is a crucial component of commiting a crime. A person who's only intent was to defend themselves, or a person who was insane and incapable (legally) of forming criminal intent, isnt found 'not-guilty' because it was proved they commited a crime, then they offered some form of mitigation and we agreed that despite a crime being commited we would 'let them off'. Rather they have (so far as I can work out) been found to have not commited a crime, because a necessary component of the crime have been accused of (intent) has not been proven to be present......or at least that's how I have always reasoned it.... :p ;)

No, not-guilty can have several meanings.
- It has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Ie. there is still some doubt
- He committed the crime but we will not hold him culpable because he defended himself or he was insane.
I will acknowledge that legally speaking, though the act of murder has been done, the fact that it is not a culpable homicide means that we do not give the act the label of murder. Yet the act still satisfies all the necessary elements.
- He committed that crime but he is not entirely culpable so we will not find him guilty of that crime and instead find him guilty of some lesser crime.

I'm also glad you brought up insanity. Let me point you to the New Zealand definition of the legal defence of insanity, section 23 Crimes Act:
...(2)No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted by hime when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him incapable-
(a)Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or
(b)Of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong ...

This is a common definition and one we atleast got from the english. I'm fairly certain that most Western legal systems have the same definition with perhaps a difference in symantics.

Two more things about insanity. One, you do not 'get off', you are taken away to a mental health institution where you stay until it is decided that you are no longer a threat to society, which could be longer than your average sentence of imprisonment. Second, being found not-guilty by reason of insanity specifically does not affect the question of whether other persons can be found guilty as parties to the offence. Now to be a party to an offence, there has to have been an offence established in the first place. If I did not commit murder because I was insane, then how could my friend who helped me be found guilty as a party to murder. There was no murder. BUT my friend can be found guilty as a party to murder, a murder I committed, therefore though I am not-guilty, I still committed murder.


I'd like to think I know a little about what I'm talking about, otherwise I wasted 5 years and racked up a large debt and my law degree is not worth the paper it's printed on.

Anyways, my point was that, no matter what argument you use to try to amoralise murder, you simply can't. As others have said, by saying something is wrong is to imbue it with a moral character. The very fact that the law acknowledges varying degrees of culpability with respect to murder surely is proof of the moral character of murder.

Yes, saying "wrong" does imply morality. How about "bad"? Plenty of things are bad, but apparently violate no moral rule (even utilitarianism allows bad things, so long as the good outweighs the bad). And, of course, there are many things that a moral person considers "wrong," but which might arguably not be "bad."

I say all this to show that the two terms are not identical... and I think what you have in mind is something closer to, "Can one show, without recourse to moral principle, that murder is a bad thing?" Of course, this begs the question, "bad for whom?" .... But it is still closer to what you mean without causing an immediate contradiction.

To inquire into whether murder is bad, you should also inquire whether the criminal law penalises all things that are bad?
The answer is no, so there must be something more to murder than just simply being bad.

To inquire into whether murder is bad, you should also inquire whether the criminal law penalises all things that are bad?
The answer is no, so there must be something more to murder than just simply being bad.

Well, but then the question is simply, "Is it against the law?" And that is easily answered.

Surely, the criminal law does not penalize all things that are bad. As a matter of fact, it may punish some things that are good. But if you are going to start a discussion about why we "should" or "should not" do certain things, and you are determined not to use any moral principles, the next best place to start is with "good" and "bad." One could also try something like "healthy" and "unhealthy," although this implies a more organic notion of society than most people today would be likely to accept.

Well, but then the question is simply, "Is it against the law?" And that is easily answered.

Surely, the criminal law does not penalize all things that are bad. As a matter of fact, it may punish some things that are good. But if you are going to start a discussion about why we "should" or "should not" do certain things, and you are determined not to use any moral principles, the next best place to start is with "good" and "bad." One could also try something like "healthy" and "unhealthy," although this implies a more organic notion of society than most people today would be likely to accept.

Which gets you back to law and economics.

Unless you are legal positivist, in which case you can stop with your first sentence.

Which gets you back to law and economics.

Unless you are legal positivist, in which case you can stop with your first sentence.

I am neither, although I appreciate some of the incites coming out of law and economics.

In principle, however, you are quite right. If you determine not to use any moral language, then something like economics is about as close as you'll get to any sense of "justification" for anything.

I am neither, although I appreciate some of the incites coming out of law and economics.

In principle, however, you are quite right. If you determine not to use any moral language, then something like economics is about as close as you'll get to any sense of "justification" for anything.

My problem with law and economics is simple.

It is excellent for things like tort and commercial law. Where moral culpability does not attach. Then the whole idea really makes sense for analysing legal propositions. Indeed Learned hand recognized it insofar as negligence actions are concerned long before the term was coined.

Where it fails utterly is in areas like the criminal law. I don't believe that the "just" choice is necessarily the most allocatively efficient one. (Nor for that matter do I believe it could even be determined). But then I believe in law as integrity. (I'm a huge Dworkin fan).

My problem with law and economics is simple.

Where it fails utterly is in areas like the criminal law. I don't believe that the "just" choice is necessarily the most allocatively efficient one. (Nor for that matter do I believe it could even be determined). But then I believe in law as integrity. (I'm a huge Dworkin fan).

I certainly don't disagree with you. But justice is a moral term. Hence, I think that looking for an "amoral" condemnation of murder is more than a little foolish. But if you go down that road, it certainly leads to economics. And for the most part law and economics is internally coherent even when it comes to the criminal law.

I certainly don't disagree with you. But justice is a moral term. Hence, I think that looking for an "amoral" condemnation of murder is more than a little foolish. But if you go down that road, it certainly leads to economics. And for the most part law and economics is internally coherent even when it comes to the criminal law.

Well, I don't know if I would agree that it is completely internally coherent in respect of the criminal law. For example human sacrifice using volunteers is probably a pareto superior choice in some circumstances.

Also, just supposing we do in fact reach a pareto efficient society, i.e. where all members are in the best possible position they can be, that does not mean that we would necessarily agree with its structure because a less optimal society may be more social just. Arguably the US is pareto superior to Sweden, nevertheless many people believe that the scandanvian model is better.

In any event, there is huge dispute amongst economists themselves about which is the correct distributive choice in terms of social policy and criminal justice. (For example I believe some Yale economists studied the economic impact of gun ownership and concluded it was a net benefit. I can't remeber the cite unfortunatley. On the other hand many economists have concluded that gun ownership should be criminlized due to its negative economic impact.)

Thus being a bit of a moralist, as I stated earlier in this thread I reject this approach to "justice".

If the murder charge is not proved, there is no need for a defence.
Aha, and the point about a murder charge is that certain things about intent have to be proved, so if those things are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no provable defence left there, and if they are not proved, then neither yet is a murder charge. Until certain things about intent are proved neither is a murder charge, but those things being proved, leave no room for defence due to intent.

Lack of the requisite mental element or of certain components of the physical act such as voluntariness are often the first line of defense.
BUT if the actual definition of murder is proved, if a defendant cannot provide any reason for why we should not consider him legally culpable for murder then he is quilty of murder.
Then he is guilty, not he's guilty then he gets to prove his intent and then he is or isnt guilty.

Otherwise we find him not-guilty of murder,
Exactly, you dont find against him and then inquire into intent, because murder is not sufficiently proved without intent. What I am driving at is that the intent of the accused either does or does not satisfy the intent necessary to find a charge of murder. If the prosecution has proven beyond doubt that the person's intent satisfies the requirements of a murder conviction, then the defence cannot prove that the person's intent did not satisfy the requirements of a murder conviction. It doesnt make sense to say that murderous intent is proven then the defence can defend against that finding by disproving something already established beyond all reasonable doubt.

sometimes guilty of a lesser crime such as manslaughter. The actual crime of murder was still established. We just attribute less or no culpability.
Sure, it's at the discretion of the State who they decide to prosecute. Doesn't mean they couldn't establish murder.
I'm not really sure that establishes the facts one way or the other. Maybe some cases they (the State) could establish, but I believe that the kind of case I am referring to is the kind they dont proceed with because they couldnt establish it and to attempt to would be to invite at best ineffeciency and at worst legal sanctions.

As I have said, if they never formed the intent, then no there is no crime proved.
Which is actually what I mean. If they have not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt to have formed the intent required for a murder conviction, then they cant be convicted of murder, if such intent has been proven, then they cant prove their intent was less than that required for a murder conviction. It doesnt make sense to say intent has been proved but they might be found not guilty or guilty of a lesser charge if 'not intent' is proved. Not intent cannot be proved if intent is proved, and intent cannot be proved if not intent is still possible.

Capacity to form intent is slightly different and may come in at a fitness to plead stage, with regard to age of criminal responsiblity, or in arguing intent ie. This person does not have the capacity to form the intent, therefore they could never have had the intent.
Acting to defend still has criminal intent. You are using force with the intent to cause bodily injury, in some cases to kill. That is criminal intent. But it is understandable and we wouldn't want to strip people of the right to defend themselves and others with reasonable force. Murder isn't confined to intent to kill btw. It included intent to cause gbh or merely bodily injury and being reckless as to whether death ensues.
I'm aware that one does not need to specifically have intended the death of another to be found guilty of murder. I think you are missing the point that I take issue with. Logically you cannot have proven intent beyond all reasonable doubt if 'not intent' is still reasonably possible.

No, not-guilty can have several meanings.
- It has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Ie. there is still some doubt
- He committed the crime but we will not hold him culpable because he defended himself or he was insane.
I will acknowledge that legally speaking, though the act of murder has been done, the fact that it is not a culpable homicide means that we do not give the act the label of murder. Yet the act still satisfies all the necessary elements.
I think here you have missed my point entirely. Murder refers to that label that arises from a conviction. Either one is talking strictly legally in which case we know we cant call someone not convicted of murder a murderer, or we are talking daily usage, in which case it generally refers to acts whose facts a layperson reasons would be grounds for a murder conviction. You seem to be employing the term as something in between, in that it can informally be applied regardless of legal findings, but according to legal definitions. Legally only someone convicted of murder is a murderer, and in daily usage the technical principals that operate below the surface of legal proceedings are not relevent.

- He committed that crime but he is not entirely culpable so we will not find him guilty of that crime and instead find him guilty of some lesser crime.
Then legally you cant call him the title of the greater crime he was not convicted of. You cant lawfully print an artical calling someone a murderer by virtue of an assault convicition even if the assaulted person died as a result of the assault. Daily usage would ignore the legal findings and concentrate on the facts as the person utilising the word perceived them to be.

I'm also glad you brought up insanity.
As long as I'm only bringing it up and not driving you to it... ;)


Let me point you to the New Zealand definition of the legal defence of insanity, section 23 Crimes Act:
...(2)No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted by hime when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him incapable-
(a)Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or
(b)Of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong ...

This is a common definition and one we atleast got from the english. I'm fairly certain that most Western legal systems have the same definition with perhaps a difference in symantics.
This only strengthens my point. So far as I can ascertain, murder cannot be proven unless certain things are proven about intent, and those things preclude all the other things that you describe as a defence being possible.

Two more things about insanity. One, you do not 'get off', you are taken away to a mental health institution where you stay until it is decided that you are no longer a threat to society,which could be longer than your average sentence of imprisonment. Second, being found not-guilty by reason of insanity specifically does not affect the question of whether other persons can be found guilty as parties to the offence. Now to be a party to an offence, there has to have been an offence established in the first place. If I did not commit murder because I was insane, then how could my friend who helped me be found guilty as a party to murder. There was no murder. BUT my friend can be found guilty as a party to murder, a murder I committed, therefore though I am not-guilty, I still committed murder.
Because the acts and intent of your friend at the time remain unchanged regardless of your intent at the time. Your friends case would be decided on the physical facts and their intent, not the physical facts, and your intent.

I'd like to think I know a little about what I'm talking about, otherwise I wasted 5 years and racked up a large debt and my law degree is not worth the paper it's printed on.
I'm sure you do know what you are talking about with regards to the law, but when you employ a term that has a legal meaning as well as a common usage meaning, and those two meanings are different, merging the two doesnt add to clarity. Legally only someone convicted of murder is called a murderer, and in common usage legal technicalities are not relevent. As a matter of logic (all legal principals aside) I cant believe that intent can be found to be X and Y at the same time when X and Y are contradictory, and since the discussion wasnt a legalistic one, even if sound legal principals prove otherwise, that cant trump logic in a non legally premised discussion.

Anyways, my point was that, no matter what argument you use to try to amoralise murder, you simply can't. As others have said, by saying something is wrong is to imbue it with a moral character. The very fact that the law acknowledges varying degrees of culpability with respect to murder surely is proof of the moral character of murder.
Aha and I materially disagree. The person was not asking about the legal system or even legal aspects of murder. So the fact that the law may or may not have degrees of culpability is not relevent to whether or not murder (ie killing people indiscriminately) can be argued as wrong independent of morals. It may not be conventional or traditional to do so legally, but that tells us nothing about whether or not it is possible to do so generally.

I disagree that wrong refers to morals other than when it does so due to context. I'm not saying anything at all about morals when I say that 'you are wrong if you think the Sydney Harbour Bridge is in LA'. The poster even indicated they had not intended (when they used the word wrong) to include a word that people normatively chose to associate a moralistic element to. So the question the poster intends is can the indiscriminate killing of human beings by human beings be argued as negative independently of moralistic reasons, and the answer is yes. A value system independent of morals and internally consistent that shows human beings indiscriminately killing human beings to be negative as per the value assigned to negative consistent with the value system can be concieved and arguments formulated accordingly.

Well, I don't know if I would agree that it is completely internally coherent in respect of the criminal law.

Dave, you have a real problem with selective reading. I italicized "for the most part" in my post for a reason. I also seriously doubt that the law and economics approach is completely internally consistent with respect to criminal law. However, it is close enough that I do not believe a wholly fruitful attack can be made upon it from this perspective. Rather, I would confront its moral deficiency head-on. (But, based on the remainder of your post, I suspect we agree on this as well.)

For example human sacrifice using volunteers is probably a pareto superior choice in some circumstances.

Yes. And from the perspective of law and economics, this would explain why human sacrifice was "legal" at certain places and times. But remember that Pareto's optimum is always relative--i.e. the optimum allocation is always determined by the preceding distribution. Thus, there is no such thing as the "ideal" allocation; there is only "the ideal allocation given such-and-such."

Also, just supposing we do in fact reach a pareto efficient society, i.e. where all members are in the best possible position they can be, that does not mean that we would necessarily agree with its structure because a less optimal society may be more social just. Arguably the US is pareto superior to Sweden, nevertheless many people believe that the scandanvian model is better.

A meaningless comparison. The Pareto optimum does not occur "where all members are in the best possible position they can be," but rather where all members are in the best possible position they can be given where they started--and making only voluntary exchanges. Thus, Pareto tends to reproduce inequality. But this just goes to show that different legal systems are appropriate to different distributive models. It does nothing to disconfirm law and economics... What it does is suggest that what really determines the justice or virtue of a society is not the form or principle of its legal code, but the principle upon which it maintains a distribution of wealth. While the two are related, they remain separable questions.

In any event, there is huge dispute amongst economists themselves about which is the correct distributive choice in terms of social policy and criminal justice. (For example I believe some Yale economists studied the economic impact of gun ownership and concluded it was a net benefit. I can't remeber the cite unfortunatley. On the other hand many economists have concluded that gun ownership should be criminlized due to its negative economic impact.)

Quite true. But I suspect that many of these disputes will be resolved when scholars in law and economics realize what the anti-Federalists understood back in 1789, viz. that it is ridiculous to suppose a uniform law for a land as diverse as the United States will ever be universally fair. In the city, gun ownership almost certainly has a negative economic impact. In rural areas, almost certainly the reverse is true.

Thus being a bit of a moralist, as I stated earlier in this thread I reject this approach to "justice".

As do I, and for similar reasons. Although it surprises me that you should be such a moralist and yet be so convinced that human psychology can be reduced to a purely material explanation!!

Dave, you have a real problem with selective reading. I italicized "for the most part" in my post for a reason. I also seriously doubt that the law and economics approach is completely internally consistent with respect to criminal law. However, it is close enough that I do not believe a wholly fruitful attack can be made upon it from this perspective. Rather, I would confront its moral deficiency head-on. (But, based on the remainder of your post, I suspect we agree on this as well.)

I tend to stream of consciousness type, so sometimes I am imprecise with my choice of words. I know what you meant. I was just highlighting my concerns with the idea of the idea of internal consistency.



Yes. And from the perspective of law and economics, this would explain why human sacrifice was "legal" at certain places and times. But remember that Pareto's optimum is always relative--i.e. the optimum allocation is always determined by the preceding distribution. Thus, there is no such thing as the "ideal" allocation; there is only "the ideal allocation given such-and-such."

The ideal allocation is pareto efficient.



A meaningless comparison. The Pareto optimum does not occur "where all members are in the best possible position they can be," but rather where all members are in the best possible position they can be given where they started--and making only voluntary exchanges. Thus, Pareto tends to reproduce inequality. But this just goes to show that different legal systems are appropriate to different distributive models. It does nothing to disconfirm law and economics... What it does is suggest that what really determines the justice or virtue of a society is not the form or principle of its legal code, but the principle upon which it maintains a distribution of wealth. While the two are related, they remain separable questions.

We have a terminology problem here. Pareto optimum !=pareto efficient.

A pareto efficient distribution is exactly that, where are players are at the best position they can be for any given distribution of resources. Pareto optimum means that no subsequent voluntary transfers can produce a pareto superior position. However, it may well be that in both first and second best allocative efficiency analyses, the pareto effiecient distribution is unequal among the players. Also, it is entirely probable that for any given initial distribution, it is impossible to reach a pareto efficient solution, thorugh voulntary transfer.

The key here is volutary. Law is a monopoly of coercive force, pretty much, So it is within the aegis of the law to force non-voluntary transfers and thus reach a pareto efficient state. Unfortunately no-one knows what that is :mad:. (I am talking here now in terms of social policy not the criminal code).

A pedant may point out that this is not the case as a soveriegn maximizer is engaging in a voluntary transfer when the legal system is invoked. But given the governments wide re-distributive powers and the legal codes changing nature I do not find that wholly convincing.

Notwithstanding. My basic point was that the US, from the perspective of allocative efficiency is superior to sweden. In other words it is more allocatively efficient. However, that does not mean that many people do not find it better. Hence allocative efficiency should not be the sine qua non of the law.

Quite true. But I suspect that many of these disputes will be resolved when scholars in law and economics realize what the anti-Federalists understood back in 1789, viz. that it is ridiculous to suppose a uniform law for a land as diverse as the United States will ever be universally fair. In the city, gun ownership almost certainly has a negative economic impact. In rural areas, almost certainly the reverse is true.

States rights. Yea.

Conversely, the same argument could be made for civil rights and affirmative action. That is is necessary, and economically beneficial in some geographic areas, and detrimental in others. Yet that would probably be rejected by its proponents as unjust.

As a larger point, this type of "pick and mix" legistlation is fundamentally damaging to the body of law as a whole. The notion of a "slapdash" whatever works approach undermines the integrity of the legal system. I reject that sort of realism. The law should be coherent enough to encompass these different situations without recourse to geographical discontinuties.(Doubly so since the right to bear arms in the US is a dualist right - that is dual as in secondary not fighting.)


As do I, and for similar reasons. Although it surprises me that you should be such a moralist and yet be so convinced that human psychology can be reduced to a purely material explanation!!

Having both degrees in both engineering and law, I have no problem in compartmentalizing my view of the world. (Unlike my view of the law)

The ideal allocation is pareto efficient.

Then you do not understand Pareto. The specific changes that result in Pareto efficiency always depend on the initial allocation. Thus, there is no such thing as "the ideal allocation." It does not exist.

Also, it is entirely probable that for any given initial distribution, it is impossible to reach a pareto efficient solution, thorugh voulntary transfer.

Yes, this is what we call a market failure. But it is a practical, not a theoretical, impossibility. As a theoretical matter, the Pareto optimum is the point at which all voluntary exchanges that could be made (assuming perfect information and organization) have been made. According to many (but not all) economists, the only time authority should step in to influence the economy is when it does so to adjust the allocation toward what it "should" have been--i.e. its Pareto optimum condition.

Notwithstanding. My basic point was that the US, from the perspective of allocative efficiency is superior to sweden. In other words it is more allocatively efficient. However, that does not mean that many people do not find it better. Hence allocative efficiency should not be the sine qua non of the law.

Let me reiterate that I agree with you... It just bugs me that you get there from some pretty nonsensical positions. The question you might ask here is, "If we transplanted the American system of allocation into Sweden, but left the distributive rule alone, would it be an improvement upon Swedish allocation (law)?"

You seem to think that the only variable is the rule of allocation. Thus, you conclude that, since the United States has a more efficient rule of allocation (debatable, but I'll allow it), but Sweden is (to some at least), "better", that efficiency is not the best rule for designing allocation (law). But the fact of the matter is that people may consider Sweden "better" for other reasons entirely... among them, perhaps, its distributive rule.

Thus, your argument does nothing to contradict the claim that the most economically efficient law is the best law. Rather, what your argument should suggest to you is that distribution may be a more important factor than some might think. The "best" system might have a fair distribution (Sweden) and an efficient allocation.


Having both degrees in both engineering and law, I have no problem in compartmentalizing my view of the world. (Unlike my view of the law)

Clearly you have no problem with it. That was not my point. My point is that, however easy it may be for you, it is nevertheless inconsistent.

Then you do not understand Pareto. The specific changes that result in Pareto efficiency always depend on the initial allocation. Thus, there is no such thing as "the ideal allocation." It does not exist.

No pareto efficient is ideal. It's the best we can get from a given set of condtions. And don't go back in the thread and say I am contradicting myself now because as I said before, I am usually imprecise in my choice of words.

Yes, this is what we call a market failure. But it is a practical, not a theoretical, impossibility. As a theoretical matter, the Pareto optimum is the point at which all voluntary exchanges that could be made (assuming perfect information and organization) have been made. According to many (but not all) economists, the only time authority should step in to influence the economy is when it does so to adjust the allocation toward what it "should" have been--i.e. its Pareto optimum condition.

No, a market failure is when actors cease to act as sovereign maximizers - technicaly. Realistically every day the market fails. Efficient capital market hypothesis notwithstanding.

More fully, as is recognized, inherent distortions in the marketplace can lead to non-ideal outcomes. Thus it is impossible in many cases theoretically to reach the a pareto efficient outcome. Merely a pareto optimum one. It's called a direction field.

Thus the difference between the pareto efficient and the pareto optimal state is not only pratical but theoretical also. (The distortions are a product of theory).


Let me reiterate that I agree with you... It just bugs me that you get there from some pretty nonsensical positions. The question you might ask here is, "If we transplanted the American system of allocation into Sweden, but left the distributive rule alone, would it be an improvement upon Swedish allocation (law)?"

They are not nonsensical to me. I'm just not getting my point across because, like I said I tend to rattle this stuff off from the top of my head, so it doesn't always sound right.

As to the transplanting thing, I think you missed the point. The law is both distributive and allocative. You can't seperate the two. So I was referencing both.

You seem to think that the only variable is the rule of allocation. Thus, you conclude that, since the United States has a more efficient rule of allocation (debatable, but I'll allow it), but Sweden is (to some at least), "better", that efficiency is not the best rule for designing allocation (law). But the fact of the matter is that people may consider Sweden "better" for other reasons entirely... among them, perhaps, its distributive rule.

You really have to clarify why you feel the law is purely allocative and not distributive as well. I don't see where you are going here.

Thus, your argument does nothing to contradict the claim that the most economically efficient law is the best law. Rather, what your argument should suggest to you is that distribution may be a more important factor than some might think. The "best" system might have a fair distribution (Sweden) and an efficient allocation.




Clearly you have no problem with it. That was not my point. My point is that, however easy it may be for you, it is nevertheless inconsistent.

Eh? I go to church too, but I believe in the seperation of church and state notwithstanding the bible. As do most people at my church. Life is inconsistent. That's just how it is. I see no reason to worry about it intellectually.

No, a market failure is when actors cease to act as sovereign maximizers - technicaly.

No. Technically a market failure is when the market fails to produce--all by itself--Pareto optimal allocations. In the theoretical sense, this cannot happen when actors cease to act as sovereign maximizers, since theory assumes that they behave in this way. But there are plenty of examples of market failures that exist despite people's acting as sovereign maximizers--indeed, often because of this fact.

Classic examples include externalities and deficiencies in the production of public good. An example that more clearly illustrates how this occurs because people are sovereign maximizers is the used car market.

Suppose you purchase a brand-new car. One week later your employer suddenly transfers you overseas, and you want to get rid of the car. You decide to sell it, and since it is "brand new" you want something very close to what you paid for it--but the price is still a fantastic deal for whomever might buy it. Of course, you would find very quickly that you cannot sell the car at that price... people are suspicious, because they assume (rightly) that you know more about the car, and if you want to sell it, there must be a problem. So you lower the price... but now people are even more suspicious, because they want to know what could be so bad that you would sell a brand new car so cheaply!

It is entirely possible that, although you were willing to offer a price that would seem fair to you, and a price that should seem very fair to your buyer, no sale can be made. The Pareto sale should have occurred, but because of a lack of information on the buyer's side, it did not. (To correct for this failure, sellers may offer a guarantee... Services like CarFax also help.)

Thus it is impossible in many cases theoretically to reach the a pareto efficient outcome. Merely a pareto optimum one. It's called a direction field.

Could you point me to a source that states a difference between the Pareto optimum and Pareto efficiency? As far as I know, they are different terms for the same thing... but I would be happily corrected. It sounds like what you are saying is that "getting closer" to the Pareto optimum is often the best we can do. Which is true. But it is true in exactly the same way that it is true that often the best we can do is to get closer to Pareto efficiency.

They are not nonsensical to me. I'm just not getting my point across because, like I said I tend to rattle this stuff off from the top of my head, so it doesn't always sound right.

Clearly then, if you want to be understood, you need to change. "That's the way I am" is no excuse.

As to the transplanting thing, I think you missed the point. The law is both distributive and allocative. You can't seperate the two.

But theorists in law and economics do, don't they? Law as legislation is certainly both. But law as jurisprudence is entirely, or at least primarily, concerned with allocation. (It is precisely when judges concern themselves with distribution that critics accuse them of legislating rather than judging.)

EDIT: It looks like we may have been discussing law and economics from two very different perspectives. As you are no doubt aware, it has a way of dividing that way. As a student of the law as a matter of jurisprudence, in courts and among lawyers, I am primarily interested in the theories of law and economics that deal with the questions, "how do judges decide matters of law? How should they? Here it sounds like you are interested in the question, "What should the law be? How should legislatures control the resources of their country?" I consider these very different questions... and apparently we both agree that neither of them should be answered "economically.


Eh? I go to church too, but I believe in the seperation of church and state notwithstanding the bible. As do most people at my church. Life is inconsistent. That's just how it is. I see no reason to worry about it intellectually.

Ah, but your example here is not inconsistent. Going to church does not contradict the belief in the separation of church and state. Rather, you very consistently say that you believe in some parts of the Bible and not others, don't you? The problem is when you start to argue for one belief with arguments that contradict what you would use to convince someone of another belief. In this case you reveal the fact that you use your arguments as justifications, not real analysis. You decide what you believe first, why you believe it later. And there is great reason to worry about that as an intellectual.

You decide what you believe first, why you believe it later. And there is great reason to worry about that as an intellectual.

Since almost all initial belief is acquired from parents, isn't it true that virtually everyone begins with a set of inherited beliefs? If true, this would imply that people believe first, then ( if they're intellectually inclined to do so ) decide either to continue believing the system they inherited, or to cease believing what they inherited and begin believing something else. How, pray tell ( pun intended ), is this cause for intellectual worry?

Since almost all initial belief is acquired from parents, isn't it true that virtually everyone begins with a set of inherited beliefs? If true, this would imply that people believe first, then ( if they're intellectually inclined to do so ) decide either to continue believing the system they inherited, or to cease believing what they inherited and begin believing something else. How, pray tell ( pun intended ), is this cause for intellectual worry?

We're talking about two different things.

What you describe is normal: no cause for intellectual worry. We start with some assumed beliefs, and then later we decide if we want to continue believing them. Ideally, we evaluate our beliefs based on what reasonable evidence we can find.

What people like Dave do, however, is take their beliefs--whether they are their original assumed beliefs or some others--and without evaluating them internally or with respect to external evidence, merely look for evidence that supports their belief. Thus, it does not matter to them if their reasons for one belief contradicts their reasons for another belief--they are not in the business of evaluating beliefs. And that is a problem for anyone who wants to talk with a certain level of intellectual rigor.

No. Technically a market failure is when the market fails to produce--all by itself--Pareto optimal allocations. In the theoretical sense, this cannot happen when actors cease to act as sovereign maximizers, since theory assumes that they behave in this way. But there are plenty of examples of market failures that exist despite people's acting as sovereign maximizers--indeed, often because of this fact.

Classic examples include externalities and deficiencies in the production of public good. An example that more clearly illustrates how this occurs because people are sovereign maximizers is the used car market.

Suppose you purchase a brand-new car. One week later your employer suddenly transfers you overseas, and you want to get rid of the car. You decide to sell it, and since it is "brand new" you want something very close to what you paid for it--but the price is still a fantastic deal for whomever might buy it. Of course, you would find very quickly that you cannot sell the car at that price... people are suspicious, because they assume (rightly) that you know more about the car, and if you want to sell it, there must be a problem. So you lower the price... but now people are even more suspicious, because they want to know what could be so bad that you would sell a brand new car so cheaply!

It is entirely possible that, although you were willing to offer a price that would seem fair to you, and a price that should seem very fair to your buyer, no sale can be made. The Pareto sale should have occurred, but because of a lack of information on the buyer's side, it did not. (To correct for this failure, sellers may offer a guarantee... Services like CarFax also help.)[/B]

Eh? That's not acting like a soveriegn maximizer. Remember all soveriegn maximizers incorporate all information instantly with no knowledge cost. So your example is inapposite.

Could you point me to a source that states a difference between the Pareto optimum and Pareto efficiency? As far as I know, they are different terms for the same thing... but I would be happily corrected. It sounds like what you are saying is that "getting closer" to the Pareto optimum is often the best we can do. Which is true. But it is true in exactly the same way that it is true that often the best we can do is to get closer to Pareto efficiency.

It's inherent in the mathmatics. Nevertheless I think Posner makes the very same point. (Also markowitz (sp-?) of University of Texas)

Clearly then, if you want to be understood, you need to change. "That's the way I am" is no excuse.

I thought these boards were meant to be fun. Not appealate briefs.

But theorists in law and economics do, don't they? Law as legislation is certainly both. But law as jurisprudence is entirely, or at least primarily, concerned with allocation. (It is precisely when judges concern themselves with distribution that critics accuse them of legislating rather than judging.)

Clearly any theory of jurisprudence governs legislation too. Or do you reject the work of Rawls and Dworkin?

EDIT: It looks like we may have been discussing law and economics from two very different perspectives. As you are no doubt aware, it has a way of dividing that way. As a student of the law as a matter of jurisprudence, in courts and among lawyers, I am primarily interested in the theories of law and economics that deal with the questions, "how do judges decide matters of law? How should they? Here it sounds like you are interested in the question, "What should the law be? How should legislatures control the resources of their country?" I consider these very different questions... and apparently we both agree that neither of them should be answered "economically.

Well I don't think either can be seperated so easily. Short answer, having practised law in courtrooms, Judges decided points of law based upon what they have for breakfast or something. (It's a little more complex than that, but most decisions come down to issues outside of the the actual legal code and precedent.)

Long answer is: To make such an assertion you have to consider the source of las in the first place and, moreover, the source and scope of judicial authority. No scheme of jurisprudence can ignore the legislature. &ct.

Ah, but your example here is not inconsistent. Going to church does not contradict the belief in the separation of church and state. Rather, you very consistently say that you believe in some parts of the Bible and not others, don't you? The problem is when you start to argue for one belief with arguments that contradict what you would use to convince someone of another belief. In this case you reveal the fact that you use your arguments as justifications, not real analysis. You decide what you believe first, why you believe it later. And there is great reason to worry about that as an intellectual.

No there isn't. To quote Mario Puzo: "It is what it is, and you are what you are."

I really don't worry about these things.

Peopleandstuff, we are on two completely different wavelengths here.

For one, murder is a legal term. It's common meaning refers to the crime. You cannot have a discussion about murder without using legality. You could have a discussion about killing however. Killing is an ordinary word.
A person is a murderer, if and only if, they have been found guilty of murder. They are found guilty of murder only after a trial establishing whether the legal tests are met. The common definition refers back to the legal definition.

Secondly, lack of intent is not a defence per se. It is merely an element of the offence. Defences are not about negating intent. Intent has already been proved before you get to the presenting a defence stage, rather than negating the offence. What I'm trying to say here, to be completely clear, is that there are two steps in a defence. One, negate the offence. If you fail to negate, try to find some justification or excuse that you can present to relieve culpability.


What I was trying to point out is that the offence can be proved. And yet, depending on other facts, we can treat people differently. The offence of murder has still been committed. BUT we may not always hold every offender as MORALLY culpable as each other.

Therefore, if the law, which is what defines murder, can have varying degrees of moral culpability, then there must be some moral element to murder.

I emboldened that part of the insanity section on purpose. It notes that one of the ways of being held insane is not appreciating the MORAL quality of what you are doing. Thereby, while you may argue murder is separate of morals, the very system that defines what murder is, allows for lack of moral understanding to be a defence.

If you were to talk about killing, that would be a different thing.

I'd really rather be talking to you in person as I think we are both missing something in each other's point of view that cannot be clarified in such a stilted discourse. Nevertheless, a healthy countering of one's firmly held opinions is always good. :)

It's inherent in the mathmatics.

Great!! Then you can explain it to me. Because I have a degree in mathematics, and as I recall the two terms (Pareto optimum and Pareto efficiency) both describe the maximum of the same set of ordered allocation vectors. Please correct me.

Clearly any theory of jurisprudence governs legislation too. Or do you reject the work of Rawls and Dworkin?

I do happen to reject Rawls, but for reasons entirely foreign to the discussion at hand. I like Dworkin overall... but nothing in his key ideas requires that a theory of jurisprudence encompass legislation. He always allows that legislation can reconstruct the terms of jurisprudence, since essential elements of "the law" are determined by the kind of society instituted by people--an act of legislation. Since legislation defines the law, clearly no theory of jurisprudence will fully include legislation.



Well I don't think either can be seperated so easily. Short answer, having practised law in courtrooms, Judges decided points of law based upon what they have for breakfast or something. (It's a little more complex than that, but most decisions come down to issues outside of the the actual legal code and precedent.

Then how did you ever win a case? Send the judge breakfast in bed? Surely, as a lawyer, you must have known that something predictable went on?

No scheme of jurisprudence can ignore the legislature.

I agree with you there. But before you were saying something different, that the theory that explains jurisprudence must explain legislation as well.

Great!! Then you can explain it to me. Because I have a degree in mathematics, and as I recall the two terms (Pareto optimum and Pareto efficiency) both describe the maximum of the same set of ordered allocation vectors. Please correct me.

It's called a direction field. And how in the hell can you describe pareto efficiency as ordered allocation vectors, that's silly, unless you have some kind of tensor calculus which is hitherto unknown in application. And I note here how you have glossed over your incorrect definition of soveriegn maximizer.

You got some 'splaining to do.

Moreover, I can't explain it here due to the unavailability of the correct fonts.



I do happen to reject Rawls, but for reasons entirely foreign to the discussion at hand. I like Dworkin overall... but nothing in his key ideas requires that a theory of jurisprudence encompass legislation. He always allows that legislation can reconstruct the terms of jurisprudence, since essential elements of "the law" are determined by the kind of society instituted by people--an act of legislation. Since legislation defines the law, clearly no theory of jurisprudence will fully include legislation.

Well you have clearly never read Laws Empire by Dworkin, he in fact does adress the issue of legislation, it is one of the basis of his theory of jurisprudence. You must not know Dworkin very well to say that.


Then how did you ever win a case? Send the judge breakfast in bed? Surely, as a lawyer, you must have known that something predictable went on?

Well I've won two. (That is won not settled)

I agree with you there. But before you were saying something different, that the theory that explains jurisprudence must explain legislation as well.

Yes it must.

As Ap recalls:

A social state is said to be Pareto efficient when there is no feasible alternative to it in which at least one individual is better off and no individual is worse off.

When a competitive market reaches equilibrium, the outcome can be described as a Pareto optimum in that there are no Pareto efficient moves left: i.e., there are no remaining ways of redistributing holdings (or whatever else can be distributed) that would make someone better off without making someone else worse off.

So no, they are not the same. One term deals in feasibility, the other economic equilibria.

What about Self Preservation?

Say someone murders someone, then someone gets vengence twords that origional murderer and then that murderer is avenged as well. This could start a chain reaction that could envelop yourself, thus it is better to cut this off before it can happen rather than wait until someone else thinks that they can get vengence on someone you know by killing you.

It's called a direction field. And how in the hell can you describe pareto efficiency as ordered allocation vectors, that's silly, unless you have some kind of tensor calculus which is hitherto unknown in application.

Actually, it's very simple, and is the way it's been defined... well, since Pareto. To simplify it quite a bit, you start out with a vector that describes the existing allocation. (Surely you at least know how to do that.) Then ordering is defined such that vector A is greater than vector B |A|>|B| and there is no terms a' and b' (the ' is meant to denote that they are in like position) such that a'<b'. (You'll note that it is not a very well ordered set, since there may be distinct elements that "order" in exactly the same way. But that only means that there may not be a unique allocation that satisfies the optimization condition.)

And I note here how you have glossed over your incorrect definition of soveriegn maximizer.

We were misunderstanding one another. I thought you meant to imply that a market failure is a behavioral problem, that it occurs when people act non-rationally (as defined by an economist), when in fact it occurs as a natural result of the fact that real markets lack perfect information and organization. They occur, in other words, no matter what freely exchanging individuals do (unless they happen to have perfect information and organization).

Moreover, I can't explain it here due to the unavailability of the correct fonts.

Oh, please. I have seen (and have produced) some pretty advanced math explanations here. At least, if you can't do it, direct me to a website that makes the distinction!


Well you have clearly never read Laws Empire by Dworkin, he in fact does adress the issue of legislation, it is one of the basis of his theory of jurisprudence.

If you have read Laws Empire, then you have not read it very carefully. Dworking argues that law is best understood as an interpretation of the political practices of a society. Thus, in deciding a legal case, judges decide in accord with the interpretation of the society's institutions and legal texts that best fits and justifies the society's history and practices. However, he says nothing about what those institutions, history, practices and legal texts themselves should be, nor even an analytical theory that describes them! His theory is one of jurisprudence, not legislation!!

As Ap recalls:

A social state is said to be Pareto efficient when there is no feasible alternative to it in which at least one individual is better off and no individual is worse off.

When a competitive market reaches equilibrium, the outcome can be described as a Pareto optimum in that there are no Pareto efficient moves left: i.e., there are no remaining ways of redistributing holdings (or whatever else can be distributed) that would make someone better off without making someone else worse off.

So no, they are not the same. One term deals in feasibility, the other economic equilibria.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency

THE SAME DEFINITION. Show me another one.

"that the theory that explains jurisprudence must explain legislation as well."

Hmm...

Could you explain this one Dave? You lost me. If the legislature is a representative body that enacts the law, and juris prudence is the interpretation of the law so as to administer justice in civil matters, the same theory need not explain both as one is an attempt to explain and adjudicate the other.

"that the theory that explains jurisprudence must explain legislation as well."

Hmm...

Could you explain this one Dave? You lost me. If the legislature is a representative body that enacts the law, and juris prudence is the interpretation of the law so as to administer justice in civil matters, the same theory need not explain both as one is an attempt to explain and adjudicate the other.

Thank you AP, that is exactly what I have been trying to get out of him.

Take what AP stated, and apply it to your web source, particularly this paragraph:

Not every Pareto efficient outcome will be regarded as desirable. For example, consider a dictatorship run solely for the benefit of one person. This will, in general be Pareto optimal, because it will be impossible to raise the well-being of anyone except the dictator without reducing the well-being of the dictator, and vice versa. Nevertheless, most people (except perhaps the dictator) would not see this as a desirable economic system.

Take what AP stated, and apply it to your web source, particularly this paragraph:

Yes, the problem is that if you replace "Pareto efficient outcome" with "Pareto optimum," that paragraph is still perfectly true. They are the same thing.

Look here: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Pareto_optimum&redirect=no

The website appears to incorrectly use the two terms interchangeably.

In a dictatorship it would be pareto efficient, however, as it is not a true market equilibrium it would not be pareto optimum.

That help?

That help?

Again: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Pareto_optimum&redirect=no


YOU incorrectly distinguish the two. In all my education in political economy, no one has ever done so... and none of you can point me to a source that does! If you provide some evidence that some theorist makes the distinction, at least we can agree to disagree!

Pyndick, Robert S. and Rubinfield, Daniel L.,Microeconomics Fifth Edition, (2001)

Perloff, Jeffrey M, MicroEconomics Second Edition, (2001)

I recieved my second undergrad in economics. It is outlined in these texts.
My class was taught in part by Mr. Perloff, while he was working with Sumners on a Project at UCD.


Efficiency does not imply the optimum when the market Pareto efficiency exists in is not a free market.

That Better?

Dan Sumners, my teacher, world authority on agricultural and resource economics. Now education is moot. Go grab your econ texts and look it up.

pg 322 in perloff

pg 563-577 in Pyndick

Pyndick, Robert S. and Rubinfield, Daniel L.,Microeconomics Fifth Edition, (2001)

Perloff, Jeffrey M, MicroEconomics Second Edition, (2001)

I recieved my second undergrad in economics. It is outlined in these texts.
My class was taught in part by Mr. Perloff, while he was working with Sumners on a Project at UCD.


Efficiency does not imply the optimum when the market Pareto efficiency exists in is not a free market.

That Better?

I think you may have misunderstood your Professor. Either that, or he misundersood Pareto, because I've read his own definitions... and they are pure math that does not say anything about occurring in a free market. Now, it is true that most economists (including Pareto) would claim that a free market is especially well-equipped to actually produce a Pareto efficient condition, or Pareto optimality. But that is far from changing the mathematics. Rather, it is implied by the mathematics.

Nevertheless, I will be happy to check your sources. Since you know them better than I, and no doubt have copies handy, would you mind quoting the relevant passages here, with page number? If they satisfactorily explain themselves, I shall have no need to look them up. Otherwise, I will be much aided in the process, quickly and happily corrected, and prepared to return to the subject.

pg 322 in perloff

pg 563-577 in Pyndick

Great, would you mind providing a relevant quote or two? Surely if the distinction is as clear as you imply, it won't take much... and it will save me a trip to the library.

Actually, it's very simple, and is the way it's been defined... well, since Pareto. To simplify it quite a bit, you start out with a vector that describes the existing allocation. (Surely you at least know how to do that.) Then ordering is defined such that vector A is greater than vector B |A|>|B| and there is no terms a' and b' (the ' is meant to denote that they are in like position) such that a'<b'. (You'll note that it is not a very well ordered set, since there may be distinct elements that "order" in exactly the same way. But that only means that there may not be a unique allocation that satisfies the optimization condition.)

How in the hell do you describe a vector that does that?!

And you don't know either. And if you do the people who run the SI system will want to hear from you.

And it has not been well defined since pareto. because that is not what a vector is.

And no, I don't know I don't know how to describe a vector that does that. And what do you mean that the modulus of vector A is "greater" than the modulus of vector B. That is meaningless, it's not very simple at all.

Notwithstanding your explination states that there is only one optimal solution to any given distribution between A and B. Isn't that what I have always said.

Assuming your "vector" states have any meaning you just stated that there does in fact exist a pareto efficient condition. (Not a pareto opitmal one).

We were misunderstanding one another. I thought you meant to imply that a market failure is a behavioral problem, that it occurs when people act non-rationally (as defined by an economist), when in fact it occurs as a natural result of the fact that real markets lack perfect information and organization. They occur, in other words, no matter what freely exchanging individuals do (unless they happen to have perfect information and organization).



[QUOTE=AnarchyeL]Oh, please. I have seen (and have produced) some pretty advanced math explanations here. At least, if you can't do it, direct me to a website that makes the distinction!

i gave you cites before.




If you have read Laws Empire, then you have not read it very carefully. Dworking argues that law is best understood as an interpretation of the political practices of a society. Thus, in deciding a legal case, judges decide in accord with the interpretation of the society's institutions and legal texts that best fits and justifies the society's history and practices. However, he says nothing about what those institutions, history, practices and legal texts themselves should be, nor even an analytical theory that describes them! His theory is one of jurisprudence, not legislation!!

You've never read it have you? It doesn't say that at all. Try again. You sound like Scalia at this point, not dworkin.

It defines the rule of law.

You both seem to forget that it is Pareto's optimum on which post-Marxist arguments for the free market base themselves. Once Pareto came up with his definition of economic "efficiency," it was rather obvious to most economists that the free market should under ideal circumstances tend to produce Pareto efficient allocations. The only role for government, they argued, is to step in when the market fails to do so.

But the Pareto condition for efficiency holds in any system. It is a definition of efficiency in general. After Pareto, most of the socialist economists use it as a definition of efficiency as well, and either argue that market failures are too frequent and severe for the market to really produce Pareto efficient results, or socialists argue that the market is fine, so long as someone keeps track of distributive problems about which Pareto says nothing. (Market socialism.)

Are you familiar with contract curves and efficiency allocation?

In either event, here are two points as I am not about to type all that is written:

Pareto Efficiency occurs when one can not be made better off without making the other worse off.

It is pareto optimum when none can be made better off.

How can you purport to have an economics degree of any type and not have a microeconomics text, or notes from the class? Then base your argument on an internet encyclopedia?

Did you go to Whatsitmatter U or what?

Are you familiar with contract curves and efficiency allocation?

In either event, here are two points as I am not about to type all that is written:

Pareto Efficiency occurs when one can not be made better off without making the other worse off.

It is pareto optimum when none can be made better off.

Isn't that what I said ?

Marxist economics are based on Malthus, Not pareto!

That is why his system fails, it is based on false economic premises that fail to account for technology advancements in the face of limited resources, and biological assumptions of altruism, which also do not exist.
You surely would have been taught the implications of technology in economic analysis in any economics class, politcally based or not.

Was talking to Anarche Dave.

How in the hell do you describe a vector that does that?!

I just did. And it is the classic Pareto definition. Look, to give you an example:

A = [1, 2, 3]
|A| = sqrt(1 + 4 + 9) = sqrt(13)

B = [1, 4, 2]
|B| = sqrt(1 + 16 + 4) = sqrt(21)

|B| > |A|

However, according to Pareto's ordering, B is not greater than A, since 2 < 3 in the vector's third term. Obviously, this is not a very well-ordered set, but it has an ordering property (and one that maps the "real world" explanation of Pareto as not hurting anyone into mathematical terms). Moreover, there may be more than one Pareto optimum, as in the following. Start with A = [1, 1, 1]. Then for B = [1, 2, 1] and C = [1, 1, 2], B > A and C > A, but |B| = |C|. Thus, B and C are both Pareto efficient when A is the initial distribution.

And it has not been well defined since pareto. because that is not what a vector is.

And what, to you then, is a vector? (Note that an ordinary vector space is not especially well ordered either, since it's only ordering property is magnitude, and depending on the set of which the terms are elements, there could be an infinite number of distinct vectors that are the same length.

Notwithstanding your explination states that there is only one optimal solution to any given distribution between A and B.

Nope. Hope we have cleared that up now.


i gave you cites before.

Where?

You've never read it have you? It doesn't say that at all.

I am beginning to think you have not read it, since it says exactly that. Of course, you have not offered your own version, only a vague assertion that it supports your point. Tell me then, what is Dworkin's theory?

Personally I think one of the reasons murder is considered wrong is good ol self preservation. We all agree murder is 'wrong' so there will be less chance of it happening to ourselves.

It is pareto optimum when none can be made better off.

Yes. And it is also Pareto efficient when none can be made better off.

They mean the same thing.

How can you purport to have an economics degree of any type and not have a microeconomics text, or notes from the class? Then base your argument on an internet encyclopedia?

Did you go to Whatsitmatter U or what?

When did I say I have an economics degree?

My undergraduate education is in mathematics and philosophy. My Masters is in political theory, which included courses in political economy. I am currently working on a Ph.D. in political theory.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a person. Self defence is justified, legal, and not murder.

All murder is killing, not all killing is murder.

Marxist economics are based on Malthus, Not pareto!

Are people just not reading my posts anymore? POST-Marx, isn't that what I said? And wasn't I saying that post-Marxian capitalist economics has referred to Pareto... in part as a defense against Marxist criticisms?

So you are without concrete fundamental classes in economics, or are you? That you have knowledge of math is not helping in your identification and differentiation of the terms.

The two terms are different. Distribution can be pareto efficient, but not pareto optimum. Efficiency does not stipulate optimality.

Working towards Ph.D in Environmental Science and Policy, and JD. BS Env Science and Policy, BS Managerial Economics. Educational level still moot.

Explain your economic terms with something other than an internet encyclopedia.

So you are without concrete fundamental classes in economics, or are you? That you have knowledge of math is not helping in your identification and differentiation of the terms.

The two terms are different. Distribution can be pareto efficient, but not pareto optimum. Efficiency does not stipulate optimality.

Working towards Ph.D in Environmental Science and Policy, and JD. BS Env Science and Policy, BS Managerial Economics. Educational level still moot.

Explain your economic terms with something other than an internet encyclopedia.


didn't I say that, thank you. please stick your oar in here.

Refer to your political economics texts then.

Was between posts when marxism and pareto came up. Apologize for that.

I just did. And it is the classic Pareto definition. Look, to give you an example:

A = [1, 2, 3]
|A| = sqrt(1 + 4 + 9) = sqrt(13)

B = [1, 4, 2]
|B| = sqrt(1 + 16 + 4) = sqrt(21)

|B| > |A|

However, according to Pareto's ordering, B is not greater than A, since 2 < 3 in the vector's third term. Obviously, this is not a very well-ordered set, but it has an ordering property (and one that maps the "real world" explanation of Pareto as not hurting anyone into mathematical terms). Moreover, there may be more than one Pareto optimum, as in the following. Start with A = [1, 1, 1]. Then for B = [1, 2, 1] and C = [1, 1, 2], B > A and C > A, but |B| = |C|. Thus, B and C are both Pareto efficient when A is the initial distribution.



And what, to you then, is a vector? (Note that an ordinary vector space is not especially well ordered either, since it's only ordering property is magnitude, and depending on the set of which the terms are elements, there could be an infinite number of distinct vectors that are the same length.



Nope. Hope we have cleared that up now.




Where?



I am beginning to think you have not read it, since it says exactly that. Of course, you have not offered your own version, only a vague assertion that it supports your point. Tell me then, what is Dworkin's theory?

Your vector has no sense. You are simply re-iterating set theory. It has nothing to do with vectors.

Edit: And not for nothing I did my legal writing project on Dworkin’s theory of law. So I think I have a better idea what is in Law’s Empire than you do.

Dave,

I supplied definitons, citations with pages, and excerpts from the texts. Sorry if I am reinventing the wheel here, but Anarche appears to be in two seperate but interdependant arguments.

There may be more than one pareto efficiency anarche, there can be only one optimum.

See definitions.

Anarche,

There are points when a pareto efficiency can be a pareto opimality. But not all pareto efficiencies are pareto optimalities. You can not have more than one pareto optimality, but can have more than one pareto efficiency.

Logically, they can not mean entirely the same thing.

Your vector has no sense. You are simply re-iterating set theory. It has nothing to do with vectors.

You must have had all calculus, and no higher algebra, right? You think if you can't integrate or take a derivative, it "has no sense." Vector algebra, however, only requires a set and a binary operation. (There are some other technical details about how the operation has to be defined.) And these are certainly vectors capable of algebraic manipulation.

Edit: And not for nothing I did my legal writing project on Dworkin’s theory of law. So I think I have a better idea what is in Law’s Empire than you do.

Then why is it so hard for you to tell me what it is?

Anarche,

There are points when a pareto efficiency can be a pareto opimality. But not all pareto efficiencies are pareto optimalities. You can not have more than one pareto optimality, but can have more than one pareto efficiency.

Logically, they can not mean entirely the same thing.

No, I see where we differ here... and, surprisingly I think, it actually does turn on semantics. You are using Pareto efficiency essentially as an adjective, to describe the relationship of one distribution being "efficient" with respect to another. I was thinking of it as a noun, as in "the" Pareto efficiency. --Having checked my texts, I find that the two are used interchangeably to denote the Pareto optimum, but that given "efficiency" is used consistently to describe the relationship between any given vectors as well. It depends on the context.

Yes. And it is also Pareto efficient when none can be made better off.

They mean the same thing.


No, in pareto efficiency no one can be made better off without making another worse off. In pareto optimum, all parties are at their optimum, and none can be made better off.

"No, I see where we differ here... and, surprisingly I think, it actually does turn on semantics. You are using Pareto efficiency essentially as an adjective, to describe the relationship of one distribution being "efficient" with respect to another. I was thinking of it as a noun, as in "the" Pareto efficiency. --Having checked my texts, I find that the two are used interchangeably to denote the Pareto optimum, but that given "efficiency" is used consistently to describe the relationship between any given vectors as well. It depends on the context."

Well then, no point in discussing this further.

Take care, and if you can find the universal theory explaining both the legislature and jurisprudence.

You must have had all calculus, and no higher algebra, right? You think if you can't integrate or take a derivative, it "has no sense." Vector algebra, however, only requires a set and a binary operation. (There are some other technical details about how the operation has to be defined.) And these are certainly vectors capable of algebraic manipulation.

Every vector has a sense. It is axiomatic. And your description of vector alegebra is incorrect.



Then why is it so hard for you to tell me what it is?

I did describe it; in another thread

I'll give you a full answer tomrow,.

Every vector has a sense. It is axiomatic.

Okay, I misinterpreted what kind of sense you were talking about. You are correct, every vector has a sense... and therefore my use of the term was liberal, I admit. Call it a "set," then. The properties I describe are still exactly the ones for Pareto. I merely misused the term.


And your description of vector alegebra is incorrect.
How so?

I did describe it; in another thread
Where, please?

You know the funny thing is that this whole discussion started because Dave and I agreed on something.

Dave, I guess it just goes to show you that Freud is right when he says that the fiercest rivalries are the ones of subtle distinctions. ;)

Just a little enlightenment exercise, for those who tell people to argue their points without bringing up (a) divine being(s), a religious text, or morals in any sort of way.

Here’s the plan.

It is a commonly accepted idea that murder is wrong. I’m certainly not advocating murder in any way, but how can you justify the statement that murder is wrong without using morals (amorally)?


I am justified in stating that it is wrong because I believe it's wrong. Society is justified in acting on the basis that it is wrong because it is commonly accepted that it's wrong.

Logical, amoral way to prove that murder is wrong....
The question was: What doesn't end someone's life?

The word "Wrong" seems like a moral judgement, doesn't it?

Not neccessarily. There is, for example, a right way and a wrong way to put up a ladder, no moral judgement involved. All that "wrong" in this case means is that there is a correct way to accomplish a certain goal. Economic theories of morality/justice attempt to justify moral claims in terms of universally, or near-universally, accepted goals. IMHO they fail but it is a legitimate attempt to explain why moral claim x can be construed as wrong in non-moral terms.

Enlightened self interest.

If I feel that it is okay to kill you, I may do that. However, there is nothing preventing other people from feeling that it is okay to kill me. Unless I want to spend all my life finding ways to defend myself against murderers, it behooves me to participate in the social contract that says "killing people is wrong". I may not actually feel that way (and it may not protect me from people who do not accept this contract) but if most people accept this contract, it will keep me safe.

The problem with the enlightened self-interest approach is that it doesn't say that murder is wrong, rather it says that it is good to encourage others not to murder. Maybe the best way to do this is to not murder yourself, but it isn't necessarily so. Murdering in such a way as to ensure the murder is never discovered, while preaching the evil of murder, acheives the same goal. Indeed, from the view of enlightened self-interest the best scenario is one where all members of society except yourself abopt stringent moral practices, leaving you free to rape and pillage at will.

The economic theory similarly falls down. Even if we grant that the theory can claim that maximising benefit is a good thing without becoming just a form of utilitarianism then it manifestly fails to justify the statement "murder (or indeed anything) is wrong" because it clearly allows for benefit-maximising instances of the action, such as quietly killing those who are socially isolated and unproductive.

looking out for yourself actually has several moral theories for itself. ethical egoism for one.

anyway, you can point out that something is beneficial in some way all day, but the amoralist can always say "so what?"

without a moral 'ought' statement, all you are doing is pointing out observations. the argument looks like this:
it is in your self-interest to ensure society's productivity.
murder hurts society's productivity.
therfore it would be in your own self-interest to prohibit murder.

to which the amoralist says "good to know," and then continues on, still not prohibiting murder. because to get to the next step you need to hold the moral value that one ought to act in one's own self-interest. to which the amoralist will say "i don't have to do anything, whether it benefits me or not."

in other words, your argument assumes that either people ought act in their own self-interest or always act in their own self-interest. the first is clearly a moral claim, the second is clearly false.

It is true that saying domething is wrong implies an "ought" statement, and that without that statement you cannot say it is wrong. Where your argument falls down, however, is in saying that you need a "a moral 'ought' statement." There are other definitions of "ought" than the ethical definition.

For example, I can perfectly validly say to someone "you didn't support your ladder, that's wrong. You ought to support it". I'm hardly saying the person is immoral, however. We can say, then, that putting up a ladder without support is wrong and one ought not to do it without making any moral claims. The original post was asking whether the same can be done with murder, and that is what the economic/enlightened self-interest argument attempts to do. I don't feel it works, however...

Peopleandstuff, we are on two completely different wavelengths here.
Yeah, I kind of figured that as the exchange went on... ;)

For one, murder is a legal term. It's common meaning refers to the crime.
I'd dispute that the common meaning refers to the technical meaning of the crime within the law, which technical meaning, the one found in the US law, the English law, Maori Tikanga? Since recent legislation in New Zealand has mandated 'ordinary meaning' as being the default for the purposes of interpretation, is it not the convention in cases of dispute over ordinary meaning to resort to a dictionary as the relevent authority? The meanings listed in the Oxford Pocket (ie the abbreviated minimalist Oxford) includes 'kill wickedly or inhumanly' independent of any legal aspect.

You cannot have a discussion about murder without using legality.
You can if by murder you mean 'kill wickedly or inhumanly', as per the meaning listed in the Oxford Pocket. I think that objectively if one is looking for the truth it is clear that the poster was asking how someone can define what is ordinary considered a wicked and criminal act (- aka killing someone in a manner that in a moralistic value system would be described as wicked or inhumanly), without using morals (or any derivitive that is premised only by virture of moralistic rational) or the moralistic value system to justify the argument. When you read the kind of sentence it takes to express the concept, one can easily see why a short cut in communication was used. From the sum of the posters comments in the original post and their subsequent posts, it seems to me that the poster's intent was to ask a philosophical question, not a legal or a semantic question...

You could have a discussion about killing however. Killing is an ordinary word.
So is murder according to the dictionary, and the dictionary is surely the relevent authority when it comes to ordinary use?

A person is a murderer, if and only if, they have been found guilty of murder.
Not in ordinary usage. In ordinary usage a person is might be a murderer even if they have not been caught. If people are watching a tv show and they see someone murder someone else, they would not be considered wrong to describe the character as a murderer, even if in the show the murderer had not been arrested, much less charged, and certainly not convicted. That is ordinary usage.

They are found guilty of murder only after a trial establishing whether the legal tests are met. The common definition refers back to the legal definition.
Not necessarily, because commonly not everyone understands legal definitions and requirements, if everyone commonly knew these things, no one would spend 5 years and get themselves in a great deal of debt to find them out, or more essentially to know how to go about figuring these things out.
And lets be honest the law isnt that clear cut. It provides no universal standard (which is the kind of standard I believe the poster was aiming at) because laws are local, not universal. Secondly what the law says is a matter of interpretation, which brings us to the law being at least in part a matter of who is interpreting...if we extrapolate that analogy to ordinary usage, we will quickly see that what murder is, is at least in part a matter of who is using the word. Essentially, on the balance of evidence, would you as an objective judge rule that the poster intentionally used murder to restrict the dialogue to legalistic interpretations, or do you think it's probably more likely they didnt even consider that someone might interperet murder to mean, 'strictly in the sense that legally trained people understand and employ the word in legal proceedings'?

Secondly, lack of intent is not a defence per se. It is merely an element of the offence. Defences are not about negating intent. Intent has already been proved before you get to the presenting a defence stage, rather than negating the offence. What I'm trying to say here, to be completely clear, is that there are two steps in a defence. One, negate the offence. If you fail to negate, try to find some justification or excuse that you can present to relieve culpability.
Yes but you are looking at that as someone who is dealing with construction. It doesnt matter how many steps there are in building a door, to a lay-person, it's still just one door. A defence may consist of elements, but it is 'a' defence and not a series of defences. Whatever you may know about the construction and composite parts of a defence, to those who relate more to the effects than to the construction, these aspects are barely if at all visible. Which is what I mean about ordinary usage and getting below the semantics to what appears to be the thread starter's intended meaning.

What I was trying to point out is that the offence can be proved. And yet, depending on other facts, we can treat people differently.
Well of course we can, but that's neither here nor there for working out if we could formulate an internally consistent value system independent of moral rational that would show that what is currently deemed as murder is negative, which I am convinced is the point the original poster was driving at.

The offence of murder has still been committed. BUT we may not always hold every offender as MORALLY culpable as each other.
That might be worth raising if the issue was 'is our current legal system free of any and all moral based rational?', however that's not the issue. Obviously if we currently by convention base a lot of our reasoning on morality, it would be no surprise to find many of our conventional institutions (such as law) reasoned to an extent on morality. This wouldnt prove that we couldnt do otherwise.

Therefore, if the law, which is what defines murder, can have varying degrees of moral culpability, then there must be some moral element to murder.
The law doesnt define ordinary usage of the word murder (as can be ascertained by checking the relevent authority - a dictionary), so this argument cannot be sound (regardless of form, it is wrongly premised). Further (and more relevently) I think that that the interpretation you posit was not the interpretation intended by the original poster.

I emboldened that part of the insanity section on purpose. It notes that one of the ways of being held insane is not appreciating the MORAL quality of what you are doing.
As pointed out, just because we currently premise law on morals, doesnt mean we could not premise laws without morals, and I really am certain that the original poster did not intend for the words to be read in the legalistic manner you have chosen to interpret them in; I believe that ordinary usage (as supported by the relevent authority) pretty much backs me up on this one.

Thereby, while you may argue murder is separate of morals, the very system that defines what murder is, allows for lack of moral understanding to be a defence.
Which would make the original question a contradiction, and I dont believe that is what the poster intended. The poster did have a point and it wasnt 'is this question semantically possible or not', I dont think that what you are saying answers the question the poster intended. You might note that later in the thread the poster returned and even stated that they never intended to use a word that implied moral elements (ie the word 'wrong), so I would imagine this stated intent extends to other words employed in the question including murder, and so the poster would intend that if murder, by virtue of it's legalistic definition, has an inherent moral value attachment, for the sake of answering this question, we assume it does not, just as we have been requested to do so with the word 'wrong'.

The poster is in essence asking 'can we conceive of a value system that is internally consistent, not premised or reliant on moral rational, and which attributes a negative value (as consistent with it's own premises and independent of moral rational) to the act we currently refer to as murder?' The answer in my opinion is yes.

If you were to talk about killing, that would be a different thing.

I'd really rather be talking to you in person as I think we are both missing something in each other's point of view that cannot be clarified in such a stilted discourse. Nevertheless, a healthy countering of one's firmly held opinions is always good. :)
I agree that the internet isnt great for such discussions, the time lapse means you can not work out where the divergence in thinking/reasoning/knowledge/interpretation is occuring for posts and posts on end. However I suspect in this case the divergence arises from my belief that the poster was asking a philosophical question about the ability to argue that something is negative or positive independently of moralistic rational, and your literal interpretation of the original question, as it was phrased.

Now that we've had such an interesting talk without addressing what I believe was the intended question, I'd certainly like to know what you do think of the question as I have chosen to interperet it; 'Is it possible to formulate an internally coherent value system independent of moralistic rational, that shows that the act we normatively (as per a 'moralistic value system' would consider wicked or inhuman?' :D

Just a little enlightenment exercise, for those who tell people to argue their points without bringing up (a) divine being(s), a religious text, or morals in any sort of way.

Here’s the plan.

It is a commonly accepted idea that murder is wrong. I’m certainly not advocating murder in any way, but how can you justify the statement that murder is wrong without using morals (amorally)?

I think that, unless this very basic idea can be established amorally, all arguments, other that those based solely around fact, like 2+2=4 (yes, I know that this isn’t always the case) must be discussed from a moral standpoint.

In case you haven’t caught on, the point of this thread is to try to devise a logical, amoral approach, resulting in the conclusion that murder is wrong*.

*Some of you have pointed out that saying "wrong" implies morality. It does. If any of you have a suggestion as to how I can phrase the question in an amoral way, let me know.

Great thread. I personally think we should throw morality out of the window in favor of efficiency. At least in science.

mmmm, snippy goodness...

:D

To address the technicalities first.
Ordinary usage...oooh, this brings back memories from statutory interp. It's not just any dictionary that can be used, the Courts here tend to to use the latest edition of a more full Oxford dictionary than the pocket edition. For example, the Concise Oxford Dictionary tenth edition. This states the definition of murder as the unlawful premeditated killing of one person by another. :P In the real world, you cannot call a person a murderer until they have been proved guilty. You may opine that they are a murderer but they are in fact not a murderer till proved as such. Proof of this would be when Helen Clark was sued for defamation for calling a man a murderer when in fact he was a manslaughterer, she lost and had to pay compo.
Also, resort to ordinary usage is only had where meanings are ambiguous. Murder is always defined and defined strictly because of what is at stake. But that's not your point and is an annoying way to avoid trying to back up one's point, which is why I didn't rely on that :)

Ah yes, I did resort to a legal technical poo poo argument, I know. These things are hard to avoid when you've been immersed in that sort of approach for so long. But my argument was not so much to be a technical beatch, but to use the legal approach as a way of saying that the current interpretation of murder is one that involves moral judgements and therefore involves some sort of morally charged question concerning why we think murder is wrong. This would be so even without the law because the law merely adapted to fit the way jurors in ye olde glory days of English homicide law. Homicide used to be excessively harsh you see, what with all culpable homicides being capital. So when something came along, where the common man felt it unjust for the accused to be executed they would find him not-guilty by some fiddling of the facts.
The man who killed by stealth (ie. a murderer in our language) was viewed as deserving of execution whilst the man who had killed his adulterous wife, was viewed sympathetically. The jurors were exercising value judgements.


Okay, I do agree that the original poster likely did not intend a technical argument. I wasn't intending to embark on a technical argument, I was actually trying to get those law and economics people to address a problem with their theory. But they completely ignored it...which leads me to believe that the economic rationalisation is utter drivel.


Now for what I actually think :)

Is it possible to have an internal value system free of moral rationale in which the wicked killing of another human is in the not to be done basket?
Yes. The rationale being to preserve one's own conditions of life and one's own life itself. The consequences of such a killing of another, where there is no rule of law, lead to your life being at risk. It's the do unto others as you would have them do unto you way of life. Without the religious connotations, Jesus wasn't the first to come up with that, it is inherent in human and even, I believe, possibly all animal life. Survival instinct. The principle is ofcourse alot more sophisticated now and amongst humans, but that is because our environment has also changed.

To use my law point in another way, it is more probable that murder was never initially a moral thing. It just happened that back in less controlled days, those in power realised that blood feuds and vengeance were having a detrimental effect. So they created a law and a way of getting retribution without having it so that there was an endless cycle of murder and violence. Religions also adopted the idea, religions being a form of control and those men at the head of those religions would have wanted to establish principles and invoked punishment in afterlife for breaches of said principles. Again, noticing the danger of the cycle of vengeance. Eventually, this all fed into the modern conceptions of murder in the law, with Western systems pulling much of their criminal law from Chrisitianity. Over time, we have learnt that it is wrong to kill another human with wicked intentions, the laws have fed into creating this as a moral principle. When in the beginning, the original motivation was merely to preserve the community, the people in it, for their value as commodities and providers. Hmm, this sounds a little like an economic argument and it's not entirely well thought out at present, so feel free to rebut and we can develop this one :)

In the end, I don't really believe in morals per se. Individual internal value systems, I believe are based more on self-preservation. You do not want to do x to someone else, because it will come back to you. But when individuals come together into a community, the majority value system or the value system of the person/persons in power, come to be imposed on the community. They are sold as morals. You should do this, you should not do that... To not follow these rules makes you immoral and deserving of society's scorn etc... It's basically the powerful making the weak ensure their survival rather than doing it themselves.

I'd say a fundamental rights approach works well also. To murder someone is to deprive them of the fundamental right of life.

I'd say a fundamental rights approach works well also. To murder someone is to deprive them of the fundamental right of life.

But why is that wrong?

Right to life=Right not to die.

AP hereby declares its citizens to be Highlanders, with the right to life pertaining thereto bestowed upon them.

From a purely survivalist standpoint, murder eliminates one person's worth of potential to reproduce and/or help another person survive to reproductive age. I use survivalism because this is an instinct that permeates the entire natural world, and is therefore as far removed from human notions of morality as possible. However, it does still require explanation of why the species surviving is a goal to be attained.

From a purely survivalist standpoint, murder eliminates one person's worth of potential to reproduce and/or help another person survive to reproductive age. I use survivalism because this is an instinct that permeates the entire natural world, and is therefore as far removed from human notions of morality as possible. However, it does still require explanation of why the species surviving is a goal to be attained.

But, it never has to be explained in a moral way, indeed the way you pose it does not present a moral question. So morals, have nothing to do with survival. Survival instinct to me, is a primal urge, it's a biological thing, not an intellectual thing. All living things exist to propogate the species, plant life, animal life, even single celled organisms reproduce. Why is that? Because if they did not, all living things would quickly die out. Hmmm...this is going toward reasoning as to there being something greater than just the mundane world, because why should it matter if all life died out?

Hmmm....

(btw Zincite I agree with you, I'm just trying to find a way to answer your question, I'm unsure it can be done, because every answer can be countered with a why.)

:D
To use my law point in another way, it is more probable that murder was never initially a moral thing. It just happened that back in less controlled days, those in power realised that blood feuds and vengeance were having a detrimental effect. So they created a law and a way of getting retribution without having it so that there was an endless cycle of murder and violence. Religions also adopted the idea, religions being a form of control and those men at the head of those religions would have wanted to establish principles and invoked punishment in afterlife for breaches of said principles. Again, noticing the danger of the cycle of vengeance. Eventually, this all fed into the modern conceptions of murder in the law, with Western systems pulling much of their criminal law from Chrisitianity. Over time, we have learnt that it is wrong to kill another human with wicked intentions, the laws have fed into creating this as a moral principle. When in the beginning, the original motivation was merely to preserve the community, the people in it, for their value as commodities and providers. Hmm, this sounds a little like an economic argument and it's not entirely well thought out at present, so feel free to rebut and we can develop this one :)


Economic basically means to produce, and since it is essential to produce at least to the level of one's own subsistence needs, economics is never going to be far away...(this doesnt mean that we have to get carried away and assume that people are some kind of unit-of-consumption-bot, if that's what you are trying to avoid... ;) )

I think though that unless by 'law' you mean a very 'naturalist' view of the concept (ie 'non-positivist') you'll need to change the flow, I agree the law shapes morals, but so do other enviromental constituents, in societies where there is an absence of what a postivist would think of as law, what we refer to when we say morals, still exists. So while morals and law effect the formation of each other, I definately dont believe that when the first law was legislated and enacted, the humans that enacted them didnt already have morals, and that those morals didnt shape the legislation they enacted.

I either agree or am not sure one way or another about the rest of the comments regarding morals/moral free value systems. Formulating a moral free value system (as you demonstrated) is easily enough done, but working out the relationship between morals and laws, where they come from what they each shape and what shapes each of them....hehehe we could be here a while..... ;) :D

I think though that unless by 'law' you mean a very 'naturalist' view of the concept (ie 'non-positivist') you'll need to change the flow, I agree the law shapes morals, but so do other enviromental constituents, in societies where there is an absence of what a postivist would think of as law, what we refer to when we say morals, still exists. So while morals and law effect the formation of each other, I definately dont believe that when the first law was legislated and enacted, the humans that enacted them didnt already have morals, and that those morals didnt shape the legislation they enacted.



No no no, I do believe that criminal law sprang from morals and henceforward, the law and morals have been interacting to affect each other's developement.
Hmm, I didn't mean that originally the legislators were amoralistic, morals have existed for as long as humans have lived in community. I don't entirely mean to say that they rationalised the effect of losing life on their own personal interests, but that...hmmm...well, watching people endlessly kill each other has got to make you think that that's not right and want to control it.
It seems that the criminal law was originally used to force moral codes upon society...in fact, it still is really.

Morality is an end product of the emotions and desires of humans. To remove morality as a cause is to remove the human element from the discussion. If you remove the human element then there can and will be no murder.